(Javier) ILOILO GRAIN COMPLEX CORPORATION VS. HON. MA. THERESA N. ENRIQUEZ-GASPAR, IN HER CAPACITY (Digested)

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ILOILO GRAIN COMPLEX CORPORATION, PETITIONER VS. HON. MA. injunctions.

The said statutes however do not explicitly


THERESA N. ENRIQUEZ-GASPAR, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING
JUDGE OF RTC-ILOILO CITY, BRANCH 33, AND NATIONAL GRID
proscribe the issuance of a permanent injunction granted by a
CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS court of law arising from an adjudication of a case on the
April 2023 merits.
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
Issues In fine, the prohibition circumscribed under Section 3 of RA
1)Did the filing of the Petition 8975 applies to the issuance by lower courts of temporary or
for Certiorari and Prohibition directly preliminary injunctive writs alone, but does not preclude them
with the Court violate the doctrine of from issuing permanent injunction arising from an adjudication
hierarchy of courts? of the case on the merits.
2)Did the trial court commit grave abuse
of discretion when it issued the The subject of the present Petition and Application for TRO or
assailed writ of possession?
Writ of Preliminary Injunction does not pertain to the merits of
The case involves a pure legal
the main case for expropriation, which is yet to be heard on the
question excepted from the
merits by the trial court. What IGCC seeks to enjoin is only the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts
implementation of the writ of possession and related
issuances in order to protect itself from
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts dictates that litigants must,
being peremptorily ousted from its own property without due
as a rule, file their petitions before the lower-ranked court since
process of law. Verily, IGCC correctly invoked the application
a direct recourse to the Court is generally improper. It guides
of Section 3 of RA 8975 to justify its direct recourse to the
the litigants as to the proper venue of appeals or the
Court.
appropriate forum for issuance of the extraordinary writs
of CPM-QW-HC over which the Court, the CA, and the RTC
In Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, the Court acknowledged
have concurrent original jurisdiction.
that it has full discretionary power to take cognizance of and
assume jurisdiction over SCA filed directly with it for
It is founded principally on two reasons: first, the SC is a court
exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature
of last resort and must remain to be so in order for it to
of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition.
satisfactorily perform its constitutional functions, allowing it to
devote its time and attention to matters within its exclusive We further analyzed the commonality of the exceptions to the doctrine
jurisdiction and to prevent the overcrowding of its docket; in Gios-Samar v. Department of Transportation and
[54]
and second, the SC is not a trier of facts. It is not equipped Communication, where we finally clarified that the determinative factor
– either by structure or rule – to receive and evaluate evidence to be considered whether to allow direct recourse to this Court is
in the first instance as these are the primary functions of lower the nature of the question at hand, and not the mere invocation of
courts or regulatory agencies. Disregard of the hierarchy of compelling reasons, thus:
courts merits the immediate dismissal of the action.
A careful examination of the jurisprudential bases of the
foregoing exceptions would reveal a common denominator – the
Iloilo Grain Complex Corporation (IGCC), however, justifies issues for resolution of the Court are purely legal.
direct resort to the Court since its prayer for TRO or writ of
preliminary injunction against the implementation of the writ of We take this opportunity to clarify that the presence of one or
possession allegedly falls within the exclusive authority of the more of the so-called "special and important reasons" is not
Court by virtue of Section 3 of RA 8975, viz.: the decisive factor considered by the Court in deciding whether
to permit the invocation, at the first instance, of its original J.
Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining
over the issuance of extraordinary writs.
Orders, Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. – No court, except the SC,
shall issue any TRO, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory
injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or Here, IGCC raises a pure
any person or entity, whether public or private acting under the legal question: Did the trial court
government direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts: commit GAD amounting to LEJ when
(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way it issued a writ of possession, albeit
and/or site or location of any national government project; the very authority of NGCP to
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government expropriate the subject property has
as defined under Section 2 hereof; been incipiently assailed at the
(c) Commencement prosecution, execution, implementation, operation earliest opportunity? In other words,
of any such contract or project; is the issuance of a writ of
(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and possession in expropriation cases
ministerial upon the trial court where
(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity
necessary for such contract/project. . .
the authority of petitioner to
expropriate is in question?
It posits that since the act sought to be enjoined is the taking of
its property for the acquisition, clearance, and development of The trial court committed GAD
a right-of-way for the Ingore Cable Terminal Station and the when it issued the writ of
possession, albeit NGCP's
Panay-Guimaras 138kV Transmission Line Project, a national
authority to expropriate the
government infrastructure, both its principal action subject property is in question
for Certiorari and Prohibition along with its prayer for the
issuance of a TRO or Preliminary Injunction may be filed only The right of persons to life, liberty, or property is
with the Court. constitutionally protected. No one can be deprived of the same
without due process of law. For this reason, Section 9, Article
On this score, We reiterate our pronouncement in Spouses III of the Constitution limits the inherent power of the State
Soller v. Singson, viz.: itself in the taking of private property, viz.:
In the case of Philco Aero, Inc. v. Secretary Tugade, this Court Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use
recognized the remedy of resorting directly before this Court in without just compensation.
cases covered under R.A No. 8975. Section 3 of R.A No. 8975
was explicit in excluding other courts in the issuance of This is the power of eminent domain. It is defined as the right
injunctive writs. However, in the case of Bases Conversion and of the government to take and appropriate private property for
Development Authority v. Uy, this Court clarified that the public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can
prohibition applies only to TRO and preliminary injunction, viz.: be done only on condition of providing reasonable
compensation therefor. It is inseparable from sovereignty and
A perusal of these aforequoted provisions readily reveals that all inherent in the State. It is, however, primarily lodged with
courts, except this Court, are proscribed from issuing TROs and writs Congress as the legislative branch of the government.
of preliminary injunction against the implementation or execution of
Congress, however, may delegate the exercise of the power of
specified government projects. Thus, the ambit of the prohibition
eminent domain to local government units, other public entities,
covers only temporary or preliminary restraining orders or writs and public utility corporations, subject only to Constitutional
but NOT decisions on the merits granting permanent
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limitations. issuance of a writ of possession, which demands only two
requirements: (a) the sufficiency in form and substance of
In the hands of government agencies, local governments, the complaint, and (b) the required provisional deposit.
public utilities, and other persons and entities, the right to The sufficiency in form and substance of the complaint for
expropriate is not inherent and is only a delegated power. On expropriation can be determined by the mere examination
this score, it is undisputed that the legislature via RA 9511 of the allegations in the complaint.
granted NGCP not only the franchise to operate, manage, We focus on the first requisite, that is, the complaint must be
maintain, and develop the country's state-owned power grid sufficient both in form and substance.
and to engage in electricity transmission service but also the
right to eminent domain, viz.: XXX To be deemed sufficient in substance, a complaint for
expropriation must clearly set forth the ff requisites for the valid
As clearly indicated, NGCP's right to ED, being a mere exercise of eminent domain: (1) the property taken must be
delegated power, is subject to several restrictions: first, it must private property; (2) there must be genuine necessity to take
conform to limitations prescribed by law; and second, it must the private property; (3) the taking must be for public use; (4)
be exercised in accordance with the proper procedure for there must be payment of just compensation; and (5) the
expropriation.The scope of its delegated power is thus taking must comply with due process. Indubitably, for entities
necessarily narrower than that of the delegating authority. exercising a mere delegated power of expropriation, they must
The trial court committed GAD amounting to LEJ when it likewise demonstrate that they do have the authority to
issued the writ of possession without first determining whether exercise such power of expropriation.
NGCP has in fact complied with the requirements of the law for
a valid exercise of its delegated power to expropriate, among On this score, we turn to Section 9(d) of the EPIRA which
them, the existence of a genuine necessity for the taking of the requires ERC's prior approval of any plan to expand or improve
subject property, compliance with the required ERC approval TransCo's facilities now being operated and maintained by
for the project, and compliance with the requirement that the NGCP, thus:
expropriation and the manner by which it is sought to be
implemented is least burdensome to the landowner. SECTION 9. Functions and Responsibilities. – Upon the effectivity of
this Act, the TRANSCO shall have the ff functions and responsibilities:
Under Rule 67 of the RC, the exercise of the power of ED has two xxx
stages: first, the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise (d) Improve and expand its transmission facilities, consistent with the
in the context of the surrounding facts; and second, the taking of the Grid Code and the Transmission Development Plan (TOP) to be
land by the State or its agency subject to payment of just promulgated pursuant to this Act, to adequately serve generation
compensation. The first stage ends, if not in a dismissal of the action, companies, distribution utilities and suppliers requiring transmission
with an order of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful service and/or ancillary services through the transmission
right to take the property sought to be condemned, for public use . system: Provided, That TRANSCO shall submit any plan for
expansion or improvement of its facilities for approval by
The State or its agents may not proceed to the second part the ERC. . .
without complying with the first. As stated, genuine necessity is
a condition sine qua non to the taking of one's private property. In fine, before NGCP may take any concrete action for
expansion, e.g., expropriating private land for such project, it
The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal must first secure prior approval from the ERC. Lacking this pre-
corporation to exercise the right of ED is admittedly within the requisite, it cannot be said that a genuine necessity exists for
power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal the taking of petitioner's land simply because there is yet no
corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case approved project for the use of such land.
under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a
question which the courts have the right to inquire into. In any case, NGCP's failure to allege in its complaint that it had
secured the requisite ERC approval and that the expropriation
Here, the trial court never heard the issue of necessity sought, as well as its choice of the portion to be expropriated is
incipiently raised by IGCC in relation to the alleged absence of the least burdensome to the landowner renders the complaint
the required ERC clearance, lack of a genuine negotiation in insufficient in substance. To reiterate, for a complaint for
good faith on the part of NGCP, and lack of any showing that expropriation to be sufficient in substance, there is a need to,
the choice of the subject property is the least burdensome to at the minimum, allege that the expropriating agency
the landowner. possesses the authority to exercise the power of eminent
domain,[92] which includes allegations that all restrictions
We now reckon with Section 2, Rule 67 of the RC, viz.: provided by the delegating law have been complied with. In
Section 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized this case, Section 4 of RA 9511 expressly required NGCP to
government depositary. – Upon the filing of the complaint or at any exercise its right of eminent domain "insofar as it may be
time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall reasonably necessary" and to acquire private property as is
have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property
"actually necessary for the realization of the purposes for which
involved if he [or she] deposits with the authorized government
depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property the franchise is granted." This, NGCP failed to allege, as well.
for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders
of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the Notably, these matters essentially hinge on the issue of
court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government necessity vis-à-vis the expropriator's compliance with the
bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the statutory requirements for a valid exercise of the power of ED.
authorized government depositary. Consequently, the insufficiency of the complaint as to
substance precludes the trial court from proceeding to the
If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally
second stage, that is, the taking of the property which
ascertained and the amount to be deposited shall be promptly fixed by
the court. commences with the issuance of the writ of possession. In light
of these attendant circumstances, therefore, the trial court
After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or cannot rightly claim to have been vested with the ministerial
other proper court officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in duty to order its issuance.
possession of the property involved and promptly submit a
report thereof to the court with service of copies to the parties. It is dutybound, however, to revert to the first stage of the
OCA Circular No. 113-2019, as reiterated by OCA Circular No. expropriation proceedings and hear the parties on the authority
68-2022 cites the case of Cordova as basis for directing lower of NGCP to expropriate the subject property. Specifically, it
courts to immediately issue a writ of possession in must determine at first instance whether NGCP is armed with
expropriation cases once the ff requisites are satisfied: (1) the required ERC approval, whether it initiated and pursued an
sufficiency of the complaint in form and substance; and (2) the honest to goodness negotiation with IGCC before filing the
required provisional deposit, viz.: case for expropriation. and whether its chosen line path is
reasonably necessary for the public purpose intended to be
Pathfinder and Topanga contend that the trial court issued an served and proved to be the least burdensome to the
Order of Condemnation of the properties without previously landowner. It is only after the trial court shall have determined
conducting a proper hearing for the reception of evidence of all these questions in the affirmative may it advance to the
the parties. However, no hearing is actually required for the second stage of taking, starting off with the issuance of the writ
2
of possession so long as the twin requisites therefor are
present; otherwise, the complaint should be dismissed.

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Very Urgent
Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction is GRANTED. The Orders dated December 12, 2022 and January 20,
2023 of the RTC are NULLIFIED.
Respondent Hon. Enriquez-Gaspar, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
RTC, Branch 33, Iloilo City, and respondent National Grid Corporation of the
Philippines, and all other persons acting on their behalf, are PERMANENTLY
PROHIBITED from executing and/or implementing the writ of possession dated
December 12, 2022 and other orders related thereto.
Further, respondent Presiding Judge is ORDERED to determine, upon due
notice and hearing, the authority of the National Grid Corporation of the
Philippines to expropriate the subject property vis-à-vis the specific matters
heretofore stated.

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