Arguments advance

1.Whether the case is valid or the FIR should be quashed u/s 482 of
criminal procedure 1973?
The landmark case of State of Haryana and Ors. Vs Bhajan Lal and Ors.,[9] the Hon’ble
Supreme Court laid down the categories of cases where the inherent powers under Section
482 could be exercised for quashing of an FIR-

When the allegations in the FIR or complaint, even if accepted at face value, do not
constitute any offense, or make a case against the accused.

When the allegations in the FIR and accompanying materials do not disclose a cognizable
offense that justifies investigation by the police under Section 156(1) of the Criminal
Procedure Code (CrPC) without an order from a Magistrate under Section 155(2) of the
CrPC.

When the allegations in the FIR and supporting evidence do not reveal the commission of
any offense or make a case against the accused.

When the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offense but only a non-
cognizable offense, in which case no investigation by a police officer is permitted without a
Magistrate’s order under Section 155(2) of the CrPC.

When the allegations in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable that
no reasonable person could conclude that there are sufficient grounds to proceed against
the accused.

When there is a specific legal provision in the CrPC or the relevant Act that bars the
institution or continuation of criminal proceedings, or when there is an alternative legal
remedy available to address the aggrieved party’s grievance.

When a criminal proceeding is clearly motivated by malice or ulterior motives, such as

personal grudges, rather than a genuine pursuit of justice.

In a more recent case in the year of 2017, the Hon’ble Supreme Court referring to the
Bhajan Lal Judgement laid down the guidelines to be followed by the High Courts under
Section 482 which are summarised as follows[10]–

Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not grant new powers to the High
Court but rather preserves its inherent powers to prevent abuse of court processes and
ensure justice.

Section 482 can be used to quash even non-compoundable offences.

It is the duty of the High Court evaluate whether quashing a criminal proceeding serves the
interests of justice.

The inherent power of the High Court must be exercised:

To secure the ends of justice.

To prevent abuse of the process of any court.

No principles can be formulated on whether a complaint or FIR should be quashed based

on settlement of the dispute as it depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.

Serious offences like murder, rape, and dacoity cannot be quashed, even if the victim and
offender have settled, due to their impact on society.

Misuse of Section 482

Misuse to Scuttle Investigation or Prosecution: Some accused individuals file petitions

under Section 482 with the primary intention of delaying or obstructing the ongoing
investigation or prosecution against them. They may seek to use this provision to halt the
legal process, even if there are valid reasons for the investigation or prosecution.[11]

Misuse to Bypass Statutory Remedies: Another misuse of Section 482 occurs when
accused persons approach the High Court seeking the quashing of an FIR or charge sheet
without first availing themselves of the statutory remedies available under the Criminal
Procedure Code (CrPC), such as applying for anticipatory bail[12] or regular bail.[13]

Misuse to Seek Interim Stay on Proceedings: In some cases, individuals misuse Section
482 by requesting an interim stay on legal proceedings, particularly when they are unable
to obtain such a stay from lower courts.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that the inherent powers under Section 482
should be exercised sparingly and with great caution, and that the power should not be
used as an alternative to the statutory remedies available to the parties. The court has also
held that the inherent powers should not be used to interfere with the jurisdiction of the
lower courts or to scuttle a fair investigation or prosecution. In conclusion, while the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the CrPC are wide and discretionary, they must be
exercised judiciously and with great caution.

2. Whether the accused is liable u/s 376 ipc or not?

Determine whether the accused is liable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC)
or not, the prosecution may present the following arguments:
Sexual Intercourse: The prosecution may argue that the accused engaged in sexual
intercourse with the victim without her consent, which is a key element of the offense
under Section 376 IPC.

Lack of Consent: The prosecution may present evidence to show that the victim did not
consent to the sexual act or was incapable of giving consent due to reasons such as
intoxication, fear, or coercion.

Age of the Victim: If the victim is a minor, the prosecution may argue that the accused
committed the offense of rape under Section 376 IPC as sexual intercourse with a minor is
considered rape even if the minor appears to have consented.

Injury or Force: The prosecution may highlight any injuries on the victim’s body or use of
force by the accused to establish lack of consent and prove the offense under Section 376
IPC.

Circumstantial Evidence: The prosecution may rely on circumstantial evidence such as

witness testimonies, medical reports, and any other relevant evidence to prove the guilt of
the accused under Section 376 IPC.

These are some of the arguments that the prosecution may present to establish the
accused’s liability under Section 376 IPC.

Patan Jamal Vali Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh

[Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 2021 arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 1795 of 2021]

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J

This judgment has been divided into the following sections to facilitate analysis:

A Factual Background

1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises from a judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh dated 3 August 2019. The High Court has affirmed the conviction of the
appellant for offences punishable under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 19891 and Section 376(1) of
the Indian Penal Code.
3. The appellant has been sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life for each of the
above offences, the substantive sentences being directed to run concurrently. In
addition, the appellant has been sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 for each of the
offences and in default to suffer imprisonment of six months.
 4. The appellant was residing in Gajulapalli village and was engaged in carrying out
manual work for two years prior to the incident. PW2 who is blind since birth used to
live with her mother (PW1) and brother (PW3). PW3 and LW5 are the sons of PW1.
They were also engaged in manual work together with the appellant, at the same
place. The appellant, according to the prosecution, lived in the same village and
regularly visited the house of PW1 due to his acquaintance with her sons.
5. At about 9 am on 31 March 2011, PW1 was attending to her household chores at a
public tap which was within a distance of fifty feet and her sons were cutting fire
wood in the vicinity. The appellant is alleged to have enquired about her sons when
PW1 replied that her spouse and sons were chopping fire wood and asked him to
wait for a while. After half an hour, on hearing the voice of her daughter (PW2) in
distress, she rushed to the house and found that the door was locked from inside.
Upon raising an alarm her husband and sons rushed to the house.

Conclusion and Summary of Findings

73 For the above reasons we have come to the conclusion that the conviction under
Section 376(1) and the sentence imposed by the Sessions Judge must be affirmed. In the
circumstances we order as follows:

(i) The conviction of the appellant for an offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC and
ST Act and the sentence imposed in respect of the offence is set aside and the
appeal allowed to that extent; and
(ii) The conviction of the appellant for an offence punishable under Section 376(1)
of the Penal Code and the sentence of imprisonment for life is upheld. The fine
of Rs 1,000/- and default imprisonment of six months imposed by the Sessions
Judge and affirmed by the High Court shall also stand confirmed.

3. Whether the accused is liable u/s 354A,C,D IPC or not,

To determine whether the accused is liable under sections 354A, 354C, or 354D of the
Indian Penal Code (IPC), we would need specific details about the incident and the
elements of each section. Here’s a brief overview of these sections:

Section 354A IPC: Deals with sexual harassment and punishment for sexual harassment.

Section 354C IPC: Pertains to voyeurism and punishment for voyeurism.

Section 354D IPC: Addresses stalking and punishment for stalking.

Each of these sections has specific elements that need to be proven to establish liability.
Factors such as the nature of the act, the intention of the accused, and the circumstances
surrounding the incident play crucial roles in determining guilt or innocence.

If you provide more details about the case or the specific circumstances under which these
sections are being considered, I can offer more tailored information or guidance.

Cases: In the case of State of Punjab v. Major Singh (1967), the offender interfered with
the epithelial duct of a seven-and-a-half-month-old female child, which led to an injury in
the vagina of the infant. The accused was held guilty under Section 354 of the Indian Penal
Code. It was observed that there is no age limit, no measure of understanding of the
abusive act and that the consciousness of a female is not essential to constitute the
offence. The criminal intention and knowledge of the offender are at the crux of the matter.
The provision of Section 354 would be applicable when a reasonable man believes that the
act he is committing is sufficient to tarnish the modesty of the victim. The court further
stated that the act of removing a woman’s saree coupled with a request for sexual
intercourse would be an outrage to the modesty of a woman.

In the case of Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill (1995), the accused hit the back of
a lady at a public gathering. The petitioner was an I.A.S. officer who lodged an F.I.R. against
the accused. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate of Chandigarh held the accused guilty
under Section 354 and Section 509 of the IPC. The Supreme Court referred to the Oxford
Dictionary to find the meaning of the word ‘modesty’. It was observed that the behaviour of
the offender outraged the decency of the woman. This case is also known as the “butt-
slapping case” in the media.

In the case of Ram Pratap v. State of Rajasthan (2001), the offender entered the victim’s
house when she was alone at home. The accused made her lie on a cot and misbehaved
along with her. It was observed that no preparation for committing rape was done. So
instead of convicting him under Section 376 or Section 511 and Section 452 of the IPC, he
was held guilty under Section 354 and Section 451 of the IPC. He was sentenced to simple
imprisonment for a period of six months, along with a fine.

In the recent case of the State of Maharashtra v. Rovena Aadnya Amit Bhosle (2020), it was
held that women could also be held guilty of outraging the modesty of women. The
accused was a woman who assaulted her neighbour by tearing her nightdress in the
passage of the building in front of several people. The victim was left completely naked and
was beaten with a shoe. The metropolitan magistrate of the Mumbai Court held the
accused guilty under Section 354 of the IPC as being gender neutral. She was convicted
and sentenced to one year of rigorous imprisonment for outraging another woman’s
modesty. As she was the mother of three, the youngest being only one and a half years old,
she was awarded the minimum punishment stated under Section 354 of the Indian Penal
Code.

4. Whether the accused is liable u/s 66A r/w, 66C, 66E IT act?
Section 66A of the Act criminalizes the sending of offensive messages through a computer
or other communication devices. Under this provision, any person who by means of a
computer or communication device sends any information that is:

Grossly offensive;

False and meant for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger,
obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will;

Meant to deceive or mislead the recipient about the origin of such messages, etc, shall be
punishable with imprisonment up to three years and with fine.

Over the past few years, incidents related to comments, sharing of information, or
thoughts expressed by an individual to a wider audience on the internet have attracted
criminal penalties under Section 66(A). This has led to discussion and debate on the ambit
of the Section and its applicability to such actions.

March 2015, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India,
declaring that s 66A was ‘unconstitutionally vague’, for it failed to provide limits on the
government’s power. The Court held that the provision did not fall within the reasonable
exceptions of the freedom of speech and expression. It declared the provision to be ‘void
ab initio’- meaning it should be treated as though it never existed.

The Shreya Singhal judgment stated that all pending cases under the provision would be
dismissed, and no new provisions would be implemented. In 2018, it was observed that s
66A continued to exist as a ‘legal zombie’– new FIRs were still being filed under the
provision.

In 2019, the NGO People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) approached the Supreme Court,
seeking directions for compliance with the Court’s judgment in Shreya Singhal v. UOI. The
Court directed that copies of the judgment should be made available to the Chief
Secretaries of all states, who in turn would educate the police about the development.

Despite the 2019 order from the Court, s 66A continues to be used to file FIRs and make
arrests across the country. No amendment has been enacted to remove it from the IT Act.
PUCL has filed the present petition as a Miscellaneous Application in the Shreya Singhal
case. It seeks further directions from the Court to ensure that s 66A is not used to make
unconstitutional arrests.

On 14 July, the Ministry of Home Affairs issued an advisory to States and Union Territories
to direct all police stations not to register cases under the ‘repealed’ s 66A.