COMMENTARY Directions for Research on Climate and Conflict

10.1029/2020EF001532
Katharine J. Mach1,2 , W. Neil Adger3 , Halvard Buhaug4,5 , Marshall Burke6,7 ,
Key Points: James D. Fearon8, Christopher B. Field9 , Cullen S. Hendrix10,11, Caroline M. Kraan12 ,
• Disagreement about the relationship Jean‐Francois Maystadt13,14 , John O'Loughlin15 , Philip Roessler16 , Jürgen Scheffran17 ,
between climate and the risk of
violent conflict persists, limiting
Kenneth A. Schultz8 , and Nina von Uexkull18,4
societal management of the risks 1
• Future directions for
Rosenstiel School of Marine and Atmospheric Science, University of Miami, Miami, FL, USA, 2Leonard and Jayne Abess
climate‐conflict research include Center for Ecosystem Science and Policy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, USA, 3Geography, College of Life and
deepening insight on what the links Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK, 4Peace Research Institute Oslo, Oslo, Norway, 5Department of
are, when they matter, and how they Sociology and Political Science, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway, 6Department of
manifest
Earth System Science, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA, 7National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA,
• Compelling opportunities
necessitate integrating research USA, 8Department of Political Science, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA, 9Stanford Woods Institute for the
designs, responsive to ongoing Environment, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA, 10Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver,
decision‐making and potential Denver, CO, USA, 11Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, USA, 12Environmental Science and
responses Policy Graduate Program, Leonard and Jayne Abess Center for Ecosystem Science and Policy, University of Miami, Coral
Gables, FL, USA, 13Institute of Development Policy (IOB), University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium, 14Department of
Economics, Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK, 15Institute of Behavioral Science and Department of Geography,
University of Colorado Boulder, Boulder, CO, USA, 16Department of Government, College of William & Mary,
Correspondence to:
Williamsburg, VA, USA, 17Research Group Climate Change and Security (CLISEC), Institute of Geography, University of
K. J. Mach,
[email protected] Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany, 18Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden

Citation: Abstract The potential links between climate and conflict are well studied, yet disagreement about the
Mach, K. J., Adger, W. N., Buhaug, H., specific mechanisms and their significance for societies persists. Here, we build on assessment of the
Burke, M., Fearon, J. D., Field, C. B.,
et al. (2020). Directions for research on relationship between climate and organized armed conflict to define crosscutting priorities for future
climate and conflict. Earth's Future, 8, directions of research. They include (1) deepening insight into climate‐conflict linkages and conditions
e2020EF001532. https://doi.org/ under which they manifest, (2) ambitiously integrating research designs, (3) systematically exploring future
10.1029/2020EF001532
risks and response options, responsive to ongoing decision‐making, and (4) evaluating the effectiveness of
Received 25 FEB 2020 interventions to manage climate‐conflict links. The implications of this expanding scientific domain
Accepted 15 MAY 2020 unfold in real time.
Accepted article online 25 MAY 2020

Author Contributions:
Conceptualization: Katharine J. 1. Introduction
Mach, Caroline M. Kraan
Formal analysis: Katharine J. Mach, The potential links between climate and the risk of violent conflict are well studied, with agreement that the
W. Neil Adger, Halvard Buhaug, issue raises concerns about the scope and severity of possible climate change impacts (Adger et al., 2014;
Marshall Burke, James D. Fearon,
Burke et al., 2015). Yet the scholarship has yielded divergent findings and controversy about the direct
Cullen S. Hendrix, Caroline M. Kraan,
Jean‐Francois Maystadt, John and identifiable causal mechanisms and their significance relative to other sources of conflict.
O'Loughlin, Philip Roessler, Jürgen
Scheffran, Kenneth A. Schultz, Nina
We are a group of scholars from different disciplines, including environmental science, political science, geo-
von Uexkull graphy, and economics, who have reached varying conclusions in our previous work on climate and conflict.
Methodology: Katharine J. Mach, Together, we assessed the current state of knowledge on the relationship between climate and organized
Caroline M. Kraan
Project administration: Katharine J.
armed conflict within countries (Mach et al., 2019a). Our expert assessment combined full‐day individual
Mach, Caroline M. Kraan elicitation interviews and a subsequent 2‐day group deliberation and yielded 950 transcript pages reflecting
Supervision: Katharine J. Mach on areas of agreement and the reasons for disagreement. Here, we build on that assessment to define cross-
Visualization: Caroline M. Kraan
Writing ‐ original draft: Katharine J.
cutting priorities for future directions of research within a broad and expanding scholarly domain.
Mach
Across the expert group, best estimates were that 3–20% of organized armed conflict risk has been influenced
(continued)
by climate over the last century (Mach et al., 2019a). Other drivers, however, were judged much more influ-
ential for conflict overall, and the specific mechanisms underpinning climate‐conflict linkages were identi-
©2020. The Authors. fied as a key uncertainty. We agreed that additional climatic changes, including changes in climate extremes
This is an open access article under the
and resulting impacts for societies and economies, will further increase the risks of civil conflict although
terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License, which permits use, uncertainties grow larger.
distribution and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is
Determining the relative importance of climate versus other drivers of conflict remains a key starting
properly cited. point for future research (Mach et al., 2019a). This need includes the extent to which climate‐conflict

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 Earth's Future 10.1029/2020EF001532

Writing – review & editing: linkages are moderated by political and socioeconomic conditions that could lead these impacts to
Katharine J. Mach, W. Neil Adger,
Halvard Buhaug, Marshall Burke, change over time (Gleditsch, 2012; Koubi, 2019). The links will play out differently across scales, from
James D. Fearon, Cullen S. Hendrix, individual‐level violence, to civil war, to interstate conflict. Here we recognize that much research initi-
Caroline M. Kraan, Jean‐Francois ally explored climate‐conflict links for organized armed conflict within countries (e.g., Adger et al., 2014),
Maystadt, John O'Loughlin, Philip
Roessler, Jürgen Scheffran, Kenneth A. as reflected in our treatment, at the same time that the path forward requires attention to the diverse
Schultz, Nina von Uexkull forms of social contestation and violence. New and better models and decision‐support methods are also
necessary to enrich knowledge of the uncertainties that will persist and must be managed as such.
Climate change impacts continue to intensify, reductions of heat‐trapping emissions remain ineffective
at global scale, and choices to act on potential climate‐conflict linkages or not—whichever may be more
prudent—carry implications that unfold in real time. In the sections that follow, we define crosscutting
priorities for future directions of integrative, decision‐relevant research toward these themes (Figure 1).

2. Deeper Insight Into Climate‐Conflict Linkages

Research to date has identified some statistical signals of climatic effects on conflict. The challenge is to go
beyond black‐box approaches and address the mechanisms linking climate and armed conflict, the condi-
tions under which they materialize, and the relative contribution of climate among conflict determinants.
This challenge (Buhaug, 2015; Gemenne et al., 2014; Gleditsch, 2012; Selby, 2014) is especially important
for informing interventions and management of the risks from the onset and escalation of violence through
to its termination. The links are also integral to human security impacts well short of violence, which will
disproportionately affect vulnerable communities. Hurdles include the diversity of possibly relevant
mechanisms across different settings and the difficulty of collecting data in conflict‐prone regions
(Hendrix, 2017; Salehyan, 2014).
Most plausible explanations work through economic shocks related to climate (Mach et al., 2019a). Such
shocks, in turn, are thought to decrease the opportunity costs of participating in rebellion, exacerbate
inequality and disrupt cooperative bargains among groups, and hamper long‐term socioeconomic develop-
ment. To the extent that these mechanisms lead to conflict through observable intermediate steps, one
option is to trace the relevant processes, starting with conflicts influential in statistical results and evaluating
whether they arose through hypothesized mechanisms (Lyall, 2015). Mixed methods can then iterate
between in‐depth qualitative study of specific cases and crosscutting quantitative analysis.
For example, process tracing methods could focus on the opportunity‐cost mechanism in which
climate‐related hazards adversely impact livelihoods, such as through reducing agricultural income, and
thereby make participation in violence relatively more attractive (Koubi, 2019; Maystadt & Ecker, 2014).
Market reactions, such as commodity price shocks, may simultaneously play a role (Dube & Vargas, 2013;
McGuirk & Burke, 2017). There are also likely to be complex interactions between resource scarcity and
abundance (Koren, 2019). Process tracing could additionally assess whether and how uneven economic
impacts disrupt cooperative interactions among groups. Consideration of differential effects across societal
groups and locations is important. Studying cases experiencing shocks, such as widespread failure of export
crops, but not violence is crucial for understanding the moderators of outcomes for societies (Gemenne
et al., 2014).
Monitoring contexts with climatic shocks, including through multicountry, multisite panel surveys in
drought‐prone regions, can shed light on operational mechanisms, for instance, the ways livelihood choices
or adaptive adjustments shape attitudes toward violence and participation in conflict (Koren, 2019; Linke
et al., 2017; Vestby, 2019). Evaluation can encompass microlevel effects, such as through indicators of will-
ingness to cooperate with people from other societal groups or through household‐level capital accumula-
tion and well‐being (Pande & Savenije, 2016).
There are also opportunities to incorporate the burgeoning field of single‐event attribution, in which the role
of human‐induced climate change can be probabilistically assessed in individual heat, rainfall, or drought
events (Knutson et al., 2017; Otto, 2017). These climate‐science advances could be used to bridge the
long‐standing disconnect between weather and climate in the analysis and interpretation of consequences
for conflict (Buhaug, 2015).

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Figure 1. Directions for research on climate and conflict. Future research has compelling opportunities to deepen insight
on potential climate‐conflict links. This work can be responsive to the needs for ongoing decision‐making and responses.

Randomized controlled trials or quasi‐experimental evaluation of existing programs could both help adjudi-
cate among alternative mechanisms and inform understanding of the effectiveness of particular policy inter-
ventions (Fetzer, 2020). For example, such studies could evaluate whether recipients of cash transfers or crop
insurance are less likely to engage in violence compared to control groups not receiving such support (e.g.,
Buller et al., 2018; Crost et al., 2016). They could also assess the implications of larger‐scale interventions,
such as infrastructural interventions to support water security or mitigate flood risk, which may displace
marginalized populations and lead to resistance and unrest (e.g., Mills‐Novoa & Taboada Hermoza, 2017).
Governance challenges related to equity, power, and justice are central in associated policies (Srinivasan
et al., 2012; Zwarteveen & Boelens, 2014).

3. Integration Across Research Designs

Divergent research methods have resulted in different findings about the relationship between climate varia-
bility and conflict across both quantitative and qualitative studies (Buhaug et al., 2014; Hsiang et al., 2013;
Selby, 2014). There have been different conclusions about the same episodes of conflict arising from differing
applications of similar research methods (e.g., Burke et al., 2015), as well as from fundamental differences
across modes of inquiry and epistemologies (e.g., crosscutting statistical analyses testing hypotheses versus
in‐depth studies generating theories; Selby, 2014).
While such differences contribute to a lack of consensus, they also create an opportunity. Systematic evalua-
tion of the sensitivity of results to different research designs and data choices would explain the implications
of the conclusions that arise under some data, modeling, and analysis choices but not others. When do they
suggest artifacts versus relationships that depend on the social context? What is being missed when key
potential drivers of engagement in violence cannot be quantified or are unknown?
Increasingly, scholarship has recognized the need to move beyond large‐scale, continent wide analyses to
within‐country multidisciplinary evaluations in order to understand climate‐conflict mechanisms. The
range of research designs to integrate includes, importantly, qualitative inquiry such as through ethno-
graphic participant observations and semistructured interviews (Ide, 2017; LeBillon & Duffy, 2018). A
trade‐off to contend with, however, is the potential nonrepresentativeness of the places that can be readily
studied. For example, scholarship on climate and conflict has focused on particular regions or high‐profile
contexts, such as Kenya or Syria, because of the accessibility of data, feasibility of research, or scope and pro-
minence of the example (Hendrix, 2017; Selby, 2014; Selby et al., 2017).
Future research can exploit growing access to microlevel data from diverse sources, such as satellite and
drone imagery, social media, and population surveys. These data sources shed light on diverse factors from
fine‐scale differences in agricultural productivity, to the movement and interactions of people, to levels of
trust in government (e.g., Ash & Obradovich, 2019). Different methods can be applied to such data sets.
Machine learning and other data‐science methods that flexibly accommodate complex and conditional

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relationships can be used to anticipate dynamics of conflict where data on violence are sufficient (e.g., Hegre
et al., 2019; Mueller & Rauh, 2018). Microlevel data can also advance the measurement of potential
climate‐conflict pathways previously only qualitatively or coarsely understood. For example, data sets on
economic well‐being or asset wealth at the household or village scale could enable subsequent analysis of
their role for climate and conflict (Jean et al., 2016). Tracking the mobility of people through cellphone or
social media data or repeated panel surveys can shed light on migratory mechanisms and implications for
the stability of societies (Lu et al., 2016).

4. Decision‐Relevant Exploration of Future Risks and Options

Analyzing future conflict risk is inherently difficult whether in the context of early warning or long‐term
scenario‐based projections (Hegre et al., 2016; Witmer et al., 2017). Existing models are better at predicting
which states or regions are more vulnerable to conflict over the long term than they are at predicting
whether violence will break out in a given place at a given time or if and when it will escalate. This, in turn,
is a challenge for proactive intervention, peacekeeping missions, development aid, or food assistance.
Forecasting has to grapple with intrinsically unpredictable strategic adjustments by government and mem-
bers of society as information emerges. At larger scales, anticipation of conflict risk faces other issues of out‐
of‐sample prediction (Bowlsby et al., 2019; Buhaug & Vestby, 2019; Van Weezel, 2019; Walter, 2017).
Identified relationships between climatic variability and increased instability may well hold over a given
window of time or set of contexts, yet fail beyond that (Abel et al., 2019). It is important to understand such
dynamics to shed light on the generalizability versus context specificity of different theories and results.
Evaluating possible futures to inform decision‐making requires exploring local‐to‐global interactions rele-
vant to both climate change and conflict risk. If climate‐related shocks affect flows of displaced people or
the functioning of agricultural markets, conflict could arise in times and places that are distant from the
actual trigger. For example, a combination of weather shocks and export bans in major grain‐producing
countries led global food prices to spike in 2010, with destabilizing effects for importers in the Middle
East and North Africa (Costello et al., 2015). Further, cultural values underpin what is at stake, such as
for natural resources that have place‐specific meanings or histories distinct from their economic value.
Iterative interactions between analysts and practitioners are therefore central in advancing modeling capa-
city and iteratively informing decision‐maker goals and priorities.
There are also uncertainties unlikely to be eliminated or even reduced. Some system interactions are
unknowably complex and the drivers, such as geopolitical factors shaping external power interventions, dif-
ficult to anticipate (Mach et al., 2019a). Such deep uncertainties include the extent and effectiveness of adap-
tation, lack of historical precedents, and the tail risks of low‐probability outcomes. A range of analytical tools
are relevant including scenario simulations, preferences elicitation, agent‐based modeling, dynamic adap-
tive pathways, or theories of tipping points, risk cascades, and stability (Hegre et al., 2019; Kwakkel
et al., 2016; Witmer et al., 2017). Nuanced risk communication and policy analyses robust to the uncertain-
ties are essential.

5. Interventions That Work

Ultimately, the most consequential open questions relate to the effectiveness of interventions that might
break the links between climate change, armed conflict, and instability, as emphasized by practitioners
managing these risks in intergovernmental, national, and local contexts (Busby, 2018; Mach et al., 2019b).
An important question is whether standard techniques of conflict management (e.g., mediation, peacekeep-
ing, and aid) are sufficient or if new interventions at interacting scales are needed to manage human security
and conflict risks arising from climate change. The associated interconnections stretch from global‐scale
cooperation on greenhouse gas emissions reductions, through to village‐scale interventions to manage the
impacts. Some toolkits, such as transboundary institutions for water management, are better understood
than others (e.g., within‐country institutions for managing conflict risks in resource‐scarce regions)
(Busby, 2018).
Policy‐focused analyses could evaluate specific interventions related to adaptation, insurance and risk shar-
ing, humanitarian assistance, or development policy, considering implications for conflict risk (Di Falco
et al., 2014; Fetzer, 2020). Which policies and measures addressing climate‐related economic shocks,

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reduced agricultural production, or displacement reduce engagement in violence? Experimental field meth-
ods are unlikely to examine the full link between climate and conflict, yet can instead explore intermediary
outcomes predicted by different mechanisms, such as increased mistrust of government following inade-
quate and unequal distribution of disaster relief (e.g., Humphreys & Weinstein, 2009). Conducting such
experiments, and translating their findings into improved policies, necessitates sophisticated attention to
the ethics of research potentially posing risks for people studied (Israel & Hay, 2011). It also demands ded-
ication from researchers and practitioners alike.
Fundamental to interventions that work is understanding what enables cooperation and peace in conflict
and postconflict situations and in circumstances of climate‐related shocks, as well as the ways in which con-
flict and cooperation coexist (Gemenne et al., 2014; Ide & Scheffran, 2014; Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008).
Relevant interventions pertain to the integration of displaced populations and social‐safety‐net support to
most marginalized groups as well as natural resource management and environmental cooperation as a
facilitator for environmental peacebuilding (Ide, 2018). There is also an associated shift in framing, toward
the capabilities of people and government institutions and their security more holistically (Linke
et al., 2017).
As climate change impacts and responses extend beyond historical experiences, new questions will arise. For
migration, for example, if governments increasingly relocate populations or face issues with refugee resettle-
ment, testing implementation processes to minimize conflict will have immediate relevance. Or if involun-
tary displacement intensifies, there will be increased urgency in evaluating approaches and conditions under
which displaced persons are effectively absorbed into communities in ways that minimize frictions, within
countries and in countries both bordering and far removed (Linke et al., 2018; Maystadt et al., 2019).
Coproduction of research among researchers, stakeholders, practitioners, or boundary organizations is
potentially fruitful (Busby, 2018; Lemos et al., 2018). Such collaborations encourage real‐world orientations
on how best to proactively address potential linkages between climate and conflict across contexts or on how
to implement adaptation in fragile states or conflict situations (Abrahams, 2020). International peacekeep-
ing groups, development banks, and disaster relief organizations are all working in contexts where
climate‐conflict links are potentially relevant, and they could be informed by evidence on interactions
between their investments and such links. As climate change adaptation increasingly occurs, evaluation
of interventions implemented by different organizations and agencies could additionally yield insights
toward improving their conflict sensitivity (e.g., Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012). The considerations impor-
tantly include the risks of downplaying versus overemphasizing conflict risks from climate change given cur-
rent knowledge, persistent uncertainties, and a climate that will continue to change.

6. Conclusions
The effects of armed conflict and war are severe and long lasting for societies and, importantly, greatly
increase their climate‐related vulnerability. Comprehensive and transdisciplinary efforts are needed to fully
understand the multifaceted links between climate and conflict and appropriate responses. Associated ques-
tions at the frontier of current knowledge come into focus as societies increasingly respond to the changing
climate, advance inclusive sustainable development, and support stable, peaceful states. Against a backdrop
Acknowledgments
of finite resources and ongoing choices, it is important to understand the interactions between climate
Funding was provided by the Alexander
von Humboldt Foundation, the change and the risk of violent conflict, along with the synergies and trade‐offs among all the options for
Stanford Woods Institute for the response.
Environment, the Belmont Forum and
U.K. Economic and Social Research
Council program on Migration and Conflict of Interest
Transformations to Sustainability
(Grant ES/S007687/1), European The authors declare no financial or other conflicts of interests.
Research Council Grant 648291, the
German Science Foundation Clusters of
Excellence CliSAP and CliCCS, the
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