Lawsuit Challenges Ohio Ban On Foreign Donations in Ballot Issues

Case: 2:24-cv-03495-MHW-KAJ Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/27/24 Page: 1 of 47 PAGEID #: 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
OPAWL – BUILDING AAPI FEMINIST

LEADERSHIP, NORTHEAST OHIO
COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS,
ELISA BREDENDIEK, PETER
QUILLIGAN, and JOHN GERRATH, Case No.
Plaintiffs, Judge
v. Magistrate Judge
DAVE YOST, in his official capacity as

Ohio Attorney General, and FRANK
LAROSE, in his official capacity as Ohio
Secretary of State,
Defendants.
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Plaintiffs OPAWL – Building AAPI Feminist Leadership, Northeast Ohio Coalition for the
Homeless, Elisa Bredendiek, Peter Quilligan, and John Gerrath file this complaint against
Defendants Dave Yost, in his official capacity as Ohio Attorney General, and Frank LaRose, in his
official capacity as Ohio Secretary of State, and allege as follows:
NATURE OF THE CASE
1. The First Amendment protects against laws that abridge the freedoms of speech or
association. Central to the First Amendment’s protections is the foundational principle that
allowing for free and robust debate about salient issues of the day is among our most cherished
constitutional values. With House Bill 1 (“HB 1”), which was signed by the Governor on June 2,
2024, and will take effect on September 1, Defendants stand poised to unconstitutionally impede
public debate through the enforcement of new broad and sweeping prohibitions on spending
related to advocacy for or against ballot issues—and even spending in support of nonprofit
organizations that do not have a primary purpose of supporting or opposing candidates, political
parties, or ballot issues.
2. HB 1’s proponents claimed that it would make Ohio’s campaign finance law
consistent with federal law and prevent foreign billionaires from interfering in Ohio’s elections. In
reality, no new legislation was needed to bring Ohio in line with federal law. And by extending
candidate-related election spending regulations to the ballot issue context, HB 1 ignores decades
of binding U.S. Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent establishing that the state cannot
regulate the latter consistent with the First Amendment. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978); Citizens Against Rent Control/Coal. For Fair Hous. v. City of
Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 296 (1981); Michigan State Chamber of Com. v. Austin, 823 F.2d 947,
949 (6th Cir. 1987). HB 1’s proponents similarly ignored that federal prohibitions on contributions
and spending by “foreign nationals” in relation to candidate-related elections are only permitted
because of compelling interests that are unique to the candidate context.
3. Specifically, the Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit have found that the
government may impose certain limited restrictions on candidate-related contributions and
spending specifically to guard against potential quid pro quo corruption, where a candidate feels
beholden to a donor once in office and may make policy decisions accordingly. See, e.g., Fed.
Election Comm’n v. Cruz, 596 U.S. 289, 305 (2022) (“This Court has recognized only one
permissible ground for restricting political speech: the prevention of ‘quid pro quo’ corruption or
its appearance.”); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976); Austin, 823 F.2d at 949.
4. As the Supreme Court recognized in Bellotti nearly fifty years ago, “[t]he risk of
corruption perceived in cases involving candidate elections simply is not present in a popular vote
on a public issue.” 435 U.S. at 791 (internal citations omitted); see also Austin, 823 F.2d at 949
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(quoting the same). This should be self-evident: if the majority of voters endorse a ballot issue at
the ballot box, the policy approved by the voters becomes law; no amount of spending—regardless
of its source—can change that policy, which is set forth in the text that the voters themselves
approved. And there is no legitimate basis for dampening the discussion surrounding the issue as
the people consider it. To the contrary, as the Supreme Court has recognized, “the direct
participation of the people in a referendum, if anything, increases the need for the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.” Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 791 n.29
(cleaned up) (emphasis added). Yet HB 1’s broad and sweeping prohibitions take direct aim at this
full and free discussion. The Supreme Court has been clear that “the First Amendment rejects the
‘highly paternalistic’ approach of statutes like [HB 1] which restrict what the people may hear.”
Id. at 791 n.31.
5. HB 1 is also directly at odds with Supreme Court precedent (and federal campaign
finance law) in its sweeping inclusion of anyone who is not a U.S. citizen in its broad prohibitions
on issue-related speech by “foreign nationals.” The definition of this key term in HB 1 is so broad
that it includes lawful permanent residents, threatening them with criminal prosecution and
substantial fines for any amount of election-related spending—no matter how de minimus or
indirect. In contrast, federal campaign finance law permits lawful permanent residents to
contribute even to candidates. See 52 U.S.C. § 30121(b).
6. As then-Judge Kavanaugh recognized in a decision that was summarily affirmed
by the Supreme Court, a state’s interest in “preventing foreign influence over the U.S. political
process” raises different questions when applied to lawful permanent residents. Bluman v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288, 292 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012). This
is because the Supreme Court has long held that the First Amendment’s protections apply to
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noncitizen residents, see Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945), with “substantial connections
with this country,” United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990).
7. HB 1 targets anyone who is not a U.S. citizen—including lawful permanent
residents who have made their homes in Ohio, are raising their families here, are deeply committed
to their communities and a future here, and are excepted from federal campaign finance
restrictions. Because of HB 1, all noncitizens are now threatened with investigation, criminal
prosecution, and mandatory fines if they even indicate they intend to engage in any election-related
spending or contributions—including to support or oppose ballot questions in virtually any
capacity.
8. Plaintiff John Gerrath, a Canadian citizen and lawful permanent resident who
intends to apply for U.S. citizenship when he is eligible, could be criminally prosecuted if the
Attorney General concludes that he “implicitly promised” to make a contribution, expenditure, or
even independent expenditure in any amount to support a ballot issue, or that he made a
contribution to a nonprofit organization that was then used to influence an election. These are all
activities that directly further the societal interest in the free flow of information about matters of
public concern, an interest that is at the heart of the First Amendment and entitled to its fullest and
most robust protection. See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783. Yet, once HB 1 takes effect, Mr.
Gerrath—and all noncitizens—will be prohibited from engaging in this core protected activity.
9. HB 1 will also have devastating effects on a broad array of citizens’, companies’,
and organizations’ ability to exercise their fundamental speech and associational rights because the
law’s broad, sweeping prohibitions threaten them, too, with criminal investigation, prosecution,
and large mandatory fines if they aid in or facilitate any prohibited spending; “directly or
indirectly” accept funds for ballot issue advocacy that were “directly or indirectly” contributed by
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noncitizens; or if they contribute or expend any such funds on ballot issue advocacy. Plaintiff and
nonprofit organization OPAWL – Building Asian American Feminist Leadership, for instance,
could face crippling financial and criminal penalties for receiving contributions from its members,
which include noncitizens, and spending even modest amounts of money to support ballot issues
that affect its constituent community—simply because, as is fundamental to its organizational
purpose, it has long been inclusive of all Asian American and Pacific Islander (“AAPI”) and Asian
women and nonbinary people residing in Ohio, regardless of their citizenship status.
10. Because HB 1 imposes unjustified burdens on individuals’ and entities’ speech and
associational rights, contains overbroad and vague provisions, and impermissibly classifies
noncitizens based on citizenship status, it violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution. Unless enjoined, HB 1 will have devastating effects for free debate and
association in Ohio.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
11. Plaintiffs bring this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 to redress the
deprivation, under color of state law, of rights secured by the U.S. Constitution.
12. This Court has original jurisdiction over this action because the matters in
controversy arise under the U.S. Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court also has original
jurisdiction because this action seeks redress from the deprivation, under color of state law, of a
right secured by a provision of the U.S. Constitution providing for equal rights of U.S. citizens. Id.
§ 1343.
13. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants, who are sued in their official
capacities.
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14. Venue is proper in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio because
(1) Defendants reside in this judicial district, and (2) a substantial part of the events that give rise
to Plaintiffs’ claim occurred, and will occur, in this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
15. This Court has the authority to enter a declaratory judgment and provide
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief pursuant to Rules 57 and 65 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202.
PARTIES
16. Plaintiff OPAWL – Building AAPI Feminist Leadership (“OPAWL”) is a nonprofit
grassroots member-led community organization whose mission is to build collective power to
advance social justice and elevate the voices, visibility, and progressive leadership of Asian and
AAPI women and nonbinary people across Ohio. OPAWL was originally founded in 2016 and has
grown to include more than 350 members statewide, all of whom identify as Asian or AAPI women
and nonbinary people. Although OPAWL does not require its members to disclose their citizenship
status or the status of others in their households, OPAWL knows that many of its members are
noncitizen immigrants or have noncitizen family members.
17. As a fiscally sponsored project of a 501(c)(3) organization, OPAWL operates as a
continuing association under Ohio law and is subject to any applicable 501(c)(3) regulations. See
Ohio Rev. Code § 3517.01(C)(4). OPAWL receives its funding from—and funds and supports its
engagement and advocacy with the use of money from—foundation grants and donations from
individual donors, including its individual members. Neither external donors nor members who
donate are required to disclose their citizenship status or affiliation with foreign nationals when
donating to OPAWL.
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18. OPAWL’s civic engagement work is core to its mission and includes nonpartisan
organizing in support of or opposition to ballot issues, including by hosting voter outreach events,
translating voter education materials into Asian languages, and collecting signatures for ballot
issues. OPAWL’s members, too, are active in their communities and dedicated to using the power
of their voices to make collective change by donating to causes they care about, hosting voter
outreach and education events, and volunteering for and attending issue-related demonstrations.
As noted above, many of OPAWL’s members make regular donations to OPAWL specifically, and
even those who do not make direct financial contributions often expend some of their own funds
to support OPAWL’s ballot issue advocacy—whether by purchasing snacks for an event or
providing materials for a phone bank.
19. HB 1 will completely silence some of OPAWL’s members—noncitizens, those
whose finances are closely associated with noncitizen family members, and those who would
otherwise work in coordination with or with support from noncitizens—from speaking and
associating on issues they care about through ballot issue advocacy and nonprofit contributions,
putting them at risk of investigation, criminal prosecution, and significant fines, including
returning the total amount accepted in violation of the law, if they violate any of its broad
provisions.
20. HB 1 will likewise put OPAWL itself, its leadership, and its members at risk of
prosecution if it “aids or facilitates” any such activity, accepts contributions in violation of, or
engages in any of its own spending in violation of the law’s broad and vague provisions. In order
to try to avoid violating HB 1, OPAWL will need to start collecting citizenship information from
its members and donors, which is contrary to the organization’s inclusive mission—indeed, is
antithetical to the values that brought most of OPAWL’s members to the organization in the first
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place—and would place a significant and costly administrative burden on the organization, which
has limited resources and staff capacity. This diversion of resources would make it harder for
OPAWL to conduct other mission-critical programs like community building and storytelling. In
the meantime, HB 1 will force OPAWL to cease its ballot issue advocacy altogether, for fear of
being caught in the crosshairs of an investigation by the Attorney General. In this and in so many
other ways, HB 1 will severely chill OPAWL’s protected speech and associational rights.
21. Plaintiff Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless (“NEOCH”) is a 501(c)(3)
nonprofit charitable organization operating in the City of Cleveland. As a result, NEOCH qualifies
as a continuing association under Ohio law and is subject to any applicable 501(c)(3) regulations.
See Ohio Rev. Code § 3517.01(C)(4). NEOCH’s mission is to eliminate the root causes of
homelessness while supporting its diverse community through organizing, advocacy, education,
and street outreach. It is a coalition of service providers, housing activists, and homeless people,
all working together to advance this shared mission.
22. In support of this mission, for many years, NEOCH has worked to help and
advocate on behalf of homeless people, including by providing direct services and contributing
and expending resources to advocate for or against nonpartisan policies that impact the homeless
community in Ohio. For example, in 2023, NEOCH contributed to support local ballot issues in
Cleveland about participatory budgeting and lead safety initiatives. And, as part of its voter
education and outreach, NEOCH educates the communities it serves about how statewide ballot
issues will affect their daily lives. This includes education and communications that could be
viewed as advocating for or against any number of statewide ballot issues.
23. NEOCH funds and supports its work—including its issue advocacy work—through
grants and individual donations. NEOCH does not inquire about the citizenship status of donors,
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nor does it require foundations to monitor the citizenship status of their own contributors before
issuing grants to NEOCH. NEOCH is aware that noncitizen individuals have made contributions
in the past, and NEOCH does not currently segregate or track funding from noncitizens.
24. HB 1 threatens NEOCH in multiple ways. It puts the organization at risk of
investigation, criminal prosecution, and significant fines, including returning the total amount
accepted in violation of the law, if NEOCH violates any of its broad and often vague provisions,
including those that prohibit NEOCH from accepting any funds that came “directly or indirectly”
from a noncitizen, H.B. 1, 135th Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. § 3517.121(C)(1) (Ohio 2024), from
contributing or expending funds on the essential issue advocacy that is a core part of NEOCH’s
work, id. § 3517.121(C)(2), and from “aid[ing] or facilitat[ing]” any of HB 1’s restrictions, id.
§ 3517.121(D).
25. To attempt to avoid violations, NEOCH will have to, for the first time, request
citizenship information from its donors and, to minimize the risks of violating HB 1, the same
information about its donors’ donors, ad infinitum. Doing so will create new costly administrative
burdens for NEOCH, which will divert resources from its direct community services and other
projects and likely deter certain individuals from contributing or associating with the organization
at all. Even with efforts to minimize the risk of violating HB 1, the speech and association rights
of NEOCH will be substantially chilled by HB 1.
26. Plaintiffs Elisa Bredendiek—a German citizen—and Peter Quilligan—a U.S.
citizen and native of Northeast Ohio—are a married couple who reside together with their two
U.S. citizen children in Cleveland, Ohio. Ms. Bredendiek has deep ties to Ohio, having lived here
for nearly two decades. She is authorized to work and live in the United States under federal law,
as a lawful permanent resident. Like many married couples, Ms. Bredendiek and Mr. Quilligan
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share finances and pay taxes together. Both Ms. Bredendiek and Mr. Quilligan care deeply about
what happens in Ohio and in their local community, and about laws and public policies that impact
them as Ohio residents. In order to support, advance, and hopefully influence others to also support
and advance their policy preferences, they regularly contribute to NEOCH and other organizations
that sometimes engage in ballot issue-related advocacy. They have also periodically attended
rallies and demonstrations for issues that affect them and communities they care about, and they
have paid small amounts of money for gas, parking, and supplies in the process of doing so.
27. Absent relief, HB 1 will chill Ms. Bredendiek’s and Mr. Quilligan’s First
Amendment freedoms of speech and association because they will cease their contributions and
advocacy rather than risk prosecution and steep civil penalties, not to mention the threat of
mandatory investigation if any Ohio elector decides to allege that they are in violation of HB 1.
28. John Gerrath is a Canadian citizen who resides in Silver Lake, Ohio with his family.
Mr. Gerrath has deep ties to his community, where he has lived and worked for seven years; he
became a lawful permanent resident in 2019. In addition to working as a botanist and conservation
biologist, he is active in his local community. In fact, he currently serves on his village’s Park
Board as Tree Commissioner. Mr. Gerrath sees his future—and the future of his family—here in
the United States and intends to apply for U.S. citizenship when he becomes eligible. Mr. Gerrath
cares deeply about what happens in Ohio and in his local community and about laws and public
policies that impact him as an Ohio resident. As a result, he has supported ballot issues in the state.
This support included paying for yard signs advocating the passage of both of last year’s citizen-
initiated ballot issues—for reproductive freedom and legalizing adult cannabis use.
29. Absent relief, HB 1 will chill Mr. Gerrath’s First Amendment freedoms of speech
and association because he will cease his contributions and advocacy rather than risk prosecution
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and steep civil penalties, not to mention the threat of mandatory investigation if any Ohio elector
decides to allege that he is in violation of HB 1.
30. Defendant Dave Yost is the Attorney General of the State of Ohio. Attorney General
Yost is charged under Ohio Revised Code Section 3517.121 with investigating and prosecuting
violations of HB 1. H.B. 1, 135th Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. § 3517.121(G) (Ohio 2024).
31. Defendant Frank LaRose is the Secretary of State of Ohio and the State’s chief
election officer. Ohio Rev. Code § 3501.04. Secretary LaRose is responsible for overseeing the
State’s entire elections process. Specifically, he is responsible for issuing rules and instructions
regarding the proper methods of conducting elections and investigating and reporting violations of
the election laws. See id. § 3501.05. Secretary LaRose is tasked with consulting with Attorney
General Yost on investigations of violations of HB 1. H.B. 1, 135th Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess.
§ 3517.121(G)(2) (Ohio 2024).
LEGAL BACKGROUND
32. The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I. The Amendment “is designed and intended to remove
governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views
shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the belief that no other approach would
comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.”
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 203 (2014) (cleaned up). As a result, central
to the First Amendment’s core protections are the “right to participate in the public debate through
political expression and political association.” Id.
33. Restrictions that threaten core First Amendment interests, including in the election-
related spending context, are generally reviewed using strict scrutiny.
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34. To survive strict scrutiny, the government must show that the restriction (1) furthers
a compelling state interest and (2) is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340, 343 (2010); see also Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Me.
Comm’n on Governmental Ethics & Election Pracs., No. 1:23-CV-00450-NT, 2024 WL 866367,
at *7, *11 (D. Me. Feb. 29, 2024) (applying strict scrutiny to state statute prohibiting political
campaign spending by a “foreign government-influenced entity”).1
35. Nearly fifty years ago, the Supreme Court recognized in Bellotti that spending to
promote or oppose ballot measures was expression that was at the very heart of the First
Amendment’s protections. 435 U.S. at 775. “It is the type of speech indispensable to
decisionmaking in a democracy.” Id. at 777 (emphasis added).
36. The Supreme Court has been especially protective of spending in the ballot issue
context, because “[c]ontributions by individuals to support concerted action by a committee
advocating a position on a ballot measure is beyond question a very significant form of political
expression.” Citizens Against Rent Control/Coal. for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290,
298 (1981). “Whatever may be the state interest or degree of that interest in regulating and limiting
contributions to or expenditures of a candidate or a candidate’s committees there is no significant
state or public interest in curtailing debate and discussion of a ballot measure.” Id. at 299
(emphasis added).
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When evaluating contributions limits (as opposed to expenditure limits), courts have
applied a slightly lower but still rigorous standard of review, under the theory that contributions
“permit the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but do not in any way
infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues.” McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 197
(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21) (cleaned up). Even under that less-than-strict review, the State
must show that the challenged contribution limit (1) furthers a “sufficiently important interest” and
(2) “employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.”
Id. at 197 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25).
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37. While the Supreme Court has found that the government may impose certain
specific limited restrictions on contributions and spending in the candidate-election context, it has
done so based on its conclusion that such restrictions are carefully tailored to advance the state’s
compelling interest in preventing real or apparent “quid pro quo” corruption—that is, the
possibility that officeholders would carry political debts to their donors, who would thus exercise
outsized influence over public policy. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26–27.
38. But both the Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit have explained that the same
interest does not exist in the ballot issue context, where the people themselves vote on the policy
at issue, and where that policy will remain whatever the voters approve, irrespective of donor
influence. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790 (“The risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate
elections simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue.”); Austin, 832 F.2d at 949 (same);
see also Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 787 n.26 (explaining that “speak[ing] on issues of general public
interest” is a “quite different context” from “participation in a political campaign for election to
public office”); Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 288, 291 (Kavanaugh, J.) (recognizing that the state’s
interest in “preventing foreign influence over the U.S. political process” raises different questions
when applied to ballot issue advocacy), aff’d, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012).
39. Indeed, “the direct participation of the people in a referendum, if anything,
increases the need for the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources.” Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790 n.29 (cleaned up). And “[t]he inherent worth of the
speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend on the identity of its source
. . . .” Id. at 777 (emphasis added).
40. The Supreme Court has also made clear that First Amendment protections extend
not just to individual U.S. citizens, but also to corporations and to noncitizens residing in the
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United States. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)
(quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783) (“Corporations and other associations, like individuals,
contribute to the ‘discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas’ that the First
Amendment seeks to foster.”); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (“Freedom of speech
and of press is accorded aliens residing in this country.”).
41. Federal campaign finance law’s candidate-related regulations reflect this
difference: while federal law prohibits foreign nationals from directly or indirectly making a
“contribution or donation of money or other thing of value . . . in connection with a Federal, State,
or local election,” 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1)(A); 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(b), it does not include lawful
permanent residents in its definition of “foreign national.” 52 U.S.C. § 30121(b).
42. Similarly, the Federal Election Commission has generally interpreted “federal, state
or local election” to require some nexus to a candidate. See Statement of Reasons, MUR 7523
(Stop I-186) (Nov. 2, 2021).2
43. Because ballot issues ask the voters to decide whether to approve or reject a policy
and not to elect or defeat a candidate, federal campaign finance law as interpreted by the Federal
Election Commission—which has exclusive jurisdiction over its enforcement, see Fed. Election
Comm’n v. NRA Pol. Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 91 (1994)—does not limit foreign national
spending on ballot issues.
2
Available at https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/7523/7523_28.pdf.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. Ohio voters have long had the power to approve or reject policy using direct
democracy, but their elected officials have increasingly moved to impede that right.
44. The Ohio Constitution reserves to the people the power “to propose to the general
assembly laws and amendments to the constitution, and to adopt or reject the same at the polls.”
Ohio Const. art. II, § 1.
45. For more than a century, Ohioans have exercised their reserved power to direct
democracy by joining together to speak on issues they care about, enshrining constitutional
amendments ranging from establishing term limits to protecting reproductive freedom.
46. Recently, there has been a growing divergence between the policy preferences of
the majority party and the majority of the Ohio electorate, particularly on some highly contentious
issues, and the people have responded by securing for themselves rights and policies that they
overwhelmingly support through the use of direct democracy. In response, some of Ohio’s elected
officials have become fixated on curbing the power of Ohioans to successfully approve policy
provisions and enshrine new rights.
47. For example, just last year, the General Assembly approved Senate Joint Resolution
Number 2 (“S.J.R. 2”), which submitted to the people a proposed constitutional amendment that
would have made it far more difficult for the people to successfully use their constitutionally-
guaranteed rights of direct democracy—most notably by increasing the threshold for ratification
of future amendments by the voters from a simple majority to sixty percent.
48. In the normal course, amendments proposed by the General Assembly are
submitted to the people for a vote at the next regularly scheduled general or primary election,
which occurs in November, May, or (in presidential election years) March. Ohio Rev. Code
§ 3501.02.
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49. Indeed, the General Assembly had eliminated statewide August special elections
by statute earlier in the very same session, see id. §§ 3501.01(D), 3501.022 (amended by Substitute
House Bill 458 in December 2022), citing concerns that such elections are expensive to run and
typically have very low voter turnout.
50. Nevertheless, the General Assembly was committed to increasing the threshold for
ratification of future amendments before any citizen-initiated amendments were due to appear on
the ballot in November 2023.
51. S.J.R. 2 therefore provided that the increased threshold amendment would be
submitted to the voters at a single-issue statewide August special election and that it would take
effect immediately if ratified.
52. Despite bipartisan opposition from former statewide officeholders and local
election officials, Ohio’s statewide executive branch officials supported the General Assembly’s
actions.
53. Secretary LaRose was one of S.J.R. 2’s primary proponents, Governor DeWine
signed legislation setting the special election, and Attorney General Yost defended the special
election and the amendment’s misleading ballot language in court.
54. Ultimately, more than three million Ohio voters cast ballots in the August special
election, defying turnout expectations. And they overwhelmingly rejected the General Assembly’s
increased threshold amendment—by a decisive 14-point margin.
55. In doing so, Ohioans preserved the longstanding democratic order and made clear
that they would not easily cede or acquiesce to efforts to undermine their constitutionally-reserved
power to engage in direct democracy.
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II. HB 1 broadly threatens the free and unfettered exchange of ideas related to issues of
public concern and the right to association.
56. With HB 1, the General Assembly makes another attempt to undercut Ohioans’
ability to engage in direct democracy, this time not by targeting the mechanism for approving
ballot issues, but instead by enacting broad, strict, and vague restrictions that threaten to
significantly chill public discussion on issues of importance affecting Ohioans.
A. The General Assembly considered several bills this year to impede spending
by noncitizens related to ballot issues.
57. From the beginning of the year, it was clear that certain members of the General
Assembly were again set on targeting ballot issue advocacy, indirectly this time, under the guise
of curbing “foreign influence” in Ohio’s elections.
58. Consistent with the restrictions set forth in federal campaign finance law, Ohio had
long prohibited certain noncitizens—but not lawful permanent residents—from contributing or
making expenditures in support of or opposition to candidates for elective office in Ohio, and it
prohibited candidates, campaign committees, and political parties from accepting the same
noncitizen contributions or expenditures.
59. Although noncitizens like Plaintiffs Elisa Bredendiek and John Gerrath cannot vote
in the state’s elections, until now they have been free to advocate for issues they care about and
that may impact them or others in their lives through financial contributions, expenditures, and
independent expenditures in support of or against ballot issues and questions.
60. Ohio has also not historically forbidden noncitizens from contributing to nonprofits
organized under 501(c)(3), (c)(4), and (c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code.
61. Both of these facts changed with HB 1, which represented the culmination of a
legislative session—and then special session—in which the General Assembly considered no less
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than five different pieces of proposed legislation that targeted issue advocacy spending by
noncitizens.
62. The first of these related bills was Senate Bill 215 (“SB 215”), which the Ohio
Senate considered and passed on February 28, 2024.
63. SB 215 as passed by the Senate would have, among other things, prohibited direct
or indirect spending by any noncitizen in the ballot issue space and imposed new registration,
disclosure, and reporting requirements on ballot issue committees.
64. SB 215’s co-sponsors, Senators Theresa Gavarone and Robert McColley, testified
that the purpose of the bill’s restrictions was: (a) to ensure that foreign billionaires could not
influence Ohio’s elections; (b) to make regulation of ballot issue campaigns consistent with that
of candidate campaigns under federal and state law; and (c) to impose large penalties on violators
to provide effective deterrence.
65. When the House failed to take up SB 215, the Senate proceeded to include versions
of its restrictions as amendments to other bills that the House had already passed. These bills
included House Bill 114, House Bill 305, and House Bill 271. Senator McColley testified in favor
of each iteration of the provisions.
66. Over the course of his testimony, Senator McColley repeatedly failed to
substantiate the justifications that he and the bills’ other sponsors and supporters offered as
explanations for why their new restrictions were necessary.
67. For example, despite repeatedly referring to foreign money writ large as a “clear
and present threat to the upcoming election,” neither Senator McColley nor any of the bills’
supporters could explain what was so threatening about spending and contributions that simply
facilitates more speech on issues that Ohio voters care about.
18
68. Senator McColley further admitted that the contributions by noncitizens probably
did not ultimately affect ballot issue election results in 2023.
69. And although most of the bills included lawful permanent residents among their
definition of the “foreign nationals” whose spending and contributions they would prohibit, neither
Senator McColley nor any of the bills’ supporters ever explained what would be improper about
these Ohioans contributing to or spending to support or oppose policies that they care about and
that stand to impact them directly.
70. The bills’ supporters also failed to explain why it was necessary or even advisable
to attempt to make regulation of ballot issue campaigns consistent with that of candidate
campaigns under federal and state law.
71. Senator McColley’s assertion that the new bills would make regulation of ballot
issue campaigns consistent with that of candidate campaigns under federal and state law is flatly
incorrect. Lawful permanent residents can contribute to candidate campaigns under federal law—
and before HB 1, could do the same under Ohio law. See Ohio Rev. Code § 3517.13(W)(3).
72. And, despite the repeated focus on the influence of “foreign billionaires,” and
Senator McColley’s related claim that the bills were meant to target “those who [] actively conspire
and set up a method by which to accomplish” foreign election interference—not those involved in
small-dollar transactions—none of the bills limited their restrictions based on any order of
magnitude: each prohibited any and all contributions and spending by noncitizens. See S.B. 215,
135th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2024); H.B. 114, 135th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio
2024); H.B. 305, 135th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2024); H.B. 271, 135th Gen. Assemb.,
Spec. Sess. (Ohio 2024); H.B. 1, 135th Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. (Ohio 2024).
19
73. The Senate ultimately passed four versions of SB 215 between February and May
of this year—all over the objections of Senators from the minority party, who argued that the bills
would make it harder for Ohioans to organize and were redundant of existing provisions that
addressed foreign election interference. These bills were SB 215, House Bill 114, House Bill 305,
and House Bill 271.
74. The House did not consider any version of SB 215’s provisions during its regular
session.
B. The General Assembly ultimately enacted HB 1 in a special session.
75. On May 24, 2024, Governor Mike DeWine called a special session of the General
Assembly, in part to ensure that it passed legislation that would prohibit campaign spending by
foreign nationals. In response to the Governor’s request, both legislative chambers quickly
considered and passed HB 1. It was signed into law by the Governor on June 2, 2024.
1. HB 1 broadly defines “foreign national” to include any noncitizen.
76. HB 1 imposes broad and sweeping restrictions on spending related to issue
advocacy by anyone who is not a U.S. citizen, regardless of their immigration status.
77. The bill’s definition of “foreign national” is expressly defined to include, “[i]n the
case of an individual, an individual who is not a United States citizen or national.” H.B. 1, 135th
Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. § 3517.121(A)(2)(a) (Ohio 2024).
78. There is no carveout or exception in HB 1 for lawful permanent residents, or any
other noncitizens who may have substantial connections to the United States.
79. HB 1’s broad definition of “foreign national” is different from the definition of
“foreign national” under federal campaign finance law, which, as to an individual, is defined as
someone “who is not a citizen of the United States or a national of the United States (as defined in
20
section 1101(a)(22) of title 8) and who is not lawfully admitted for permanent residence, as defined
by section 1101(a)(20) of title 8.” 52 U.S.C. § 30121(b)(2).
80. Prior to the enactment of HB 1, Ohio defined the term “foreign national” the same
way that it is defined in federal campaign finance law, explicitly stating that “‘foreign national’
has the same meaning as in section 441e(b) of the Federal Election Campaign Act.” Ohio Rev.
Code. § 3517.13(W)(3).
2. HB 1 imposes broad restrictions on issue advocacy by noncitizens.
81. Division (B) of HB 1 sets forth the bill’s broad prohibitions on contributions,
expenditures, and independent expenditures by any and all noncitizens. The portions of this
division that expressly relate to advocacy regarding ballot issues and questions, as well as
contributions to continuing associations, are discussed below.
82. First, subdivision (B)(2) of HB 1 broadly prohibits any noncitizen from “directly
or indirectly through any person or entity” making a “contribution, expenditure, or independent
expenditure in support of or opposition to a statewide ballot issue or question.” H.B. 1, 135th Gen.
Assemb., Spec. Sess. § 3517.121(B)(2) (Ohio 2024). This restriction applies “regardless of
whether the ballot issue or question has yet been certified to appear on the ballot.” Id. There is no
limiting language that makes clear at what point in time this restriction becomes triggered, making
it potentially temporally limitless.
83. Ohio law defines “contribution” as “a loan, gift, deposit, forgiveness of
indebtedness, donation, advance, payment, or transfer of funds or anything of value, including a
transfer of funds from an inter vivos or testamentary trust or decedent’s estate, and the payment by
any person other than the person to whom the services are rendered for the personal services of
21
another person, which contribution is made, received, or used for the purpose of influencing the
results of an election.” Ohio Rev. Code § 3517.01(C)(5).3
84. Ohio law defines “expenditure” as “the disbursement or use of a contribution for
the purpose of influencing the results of an election or of making a charitable donation.” Id.
§ 3517.01(C)(6).
85. Ohio law defines “independent expenditure” as an “expenditure by a person
advocating the election or defeat of an identified candidate or candidates, that is not made with the
consent of, in coordination, cooperation, or consultation with, or at the request or suggestion of
any candidate or candidates or of the campaign committee or agent of the candidate or candidates.”
Id. § 3517.01(C)(17).
86. There is no exception for de minimus spending in HB 1. As a result, HB 1 could
prohibit a noncitizen from contributing five dollars to a campaign to raise the minimum wage or
buying gas to travel to a rally in support of reproductive rights, or bar a coalition of religious
organizations from passing out flyers in support of a religious freedom amendment with money
originating from the offering plate at a congregation that includes noncitizens.
87. Subdivision (B)(4) of HB 1 contains further restrictions. First, it expressly prohibits
any noncitizen from “directly or indirectly through any person or entity” “mak[ing] a contribution
to . . . any committee created to support or oppose a ballot issue or question.” H.B. 1, 135th Gen.
Assemb., Spec. Sess. § 3517.121(B)(4) (Ohio 2024).
3
In Buckley, the Supreme Court found that similar language—“for the purpose of . . .
influencing” an election—would be unconstitutionally overbroad unless narrowly interpreted as
electioneering communications, or expressly advocating for or against a specific federal candidate.
424 U.S. at 80.
22
88. This language only further underscores that the broader spending restriction in
(B)(2) is meant to be read as broadly as it is written: if the law only intended to limit direct
contributions to ballot issue committees, the contributions prohibitions in (B)(2) and (B)(4) would
not both be necessary.
89. Subdivision (B)(4) moves even further from election-related spending in its last
clause, which prohibits any noncitizen from, “directly or indirectly through any person or entity”
“to the maximum extent permitted by law and by the constitutions of the United States and of this
state,” making a contribution “to a continuing association.” Id. § 3517.121(B)(4).
90. A “continuing association” is defined in Ohio code as “an association, other than a
campaign committee, political party, legislative campaign fund, political contributing entity, or
labor organization, that is intended to be a permanent organization that has a primary purpose
other than supporting or opposing specific candidates, political parties, or ballot issues, and that
functions on a regular basis throughout the year.” Ohio Rev. Code § 3517.01(C)(4) (emphasis
added).
91. The Ohio definition for continuing association also expressly “includes
organizations that are determined to be not organized for profit under subsection 501 and that are
described in subsection 501(c)(3), 501(c)(4), or 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code.” Id. These
types of organizations include a broad array of organizations, including charities, religious
organizations, scientific organizations, educational organizations, social welfare organizations,
business leagues, chambers of commerce, and boards of trade.
92. Subdivision (B)(5) of HB 1 prohibits any noncitizen, “directly or indirectly through
any person or entity,” from “promis[ing], either expressly or implicitly” to do any of the things
described above. H.B. 1, 135th Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. § 3517.121(B)(5) (Ohio 2024).
23
93. Persons who “knowingly violate” any of these prohibitions set forth in division (B)
of HB 1, are “guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree on a first offense and . . . of a felony of
the fifth degree on a second or subsequent offense.” Id. § 3517.121(F)(1).4 Additionally, any
violator “shall be fined an amount equal to three times the amount involved in the violation or ten
thousand dollars, whichever amount is greater.” Id.
94. Finally, HB 1 also expressly prohibits anyone from “knowingly aid[ing] or
facilita[ting] a violation of” the restrictions set forth in division (B). Id. § 3517.121(D). Violation
of the “aiding or facilitating” prohibition is punishable as a misdemeanor in the first degree and a
mandatory fine of one thousand dollars. Id. § 3517.121(F)(3).
3. HB 1 also expressly broadly prohibits any individual and a broad array

of entities from seeking or receiving support—directly or indirectly—
from any noncitizen.
95. HB 1 not only restricts the rights of noncitizens; in division (C), it imposes
correspondingly broad restrictions on other individuals and entities who might associate with
noncitizens, particularly in relation to issue advocacy. The portions of this division that expressly
relate to advocacy regarding ballot issues and questions, and contributions to continuing
associations, are discussed below.
96. First, subdivision (C)(1), prohibits any “individual,” as well as any “committee
created to support or oppose a ballot issue or question and, to the maximum extent permitted by
law and by the constitutions of the United States and of this state, . . . [or any] continuing
association,” from “directly or indirectly through any other person or entity, knowingly”
4
Under Ohio law, incarceration is possible even for the misdemeanor offense, Ohio Rev.
Code § 2929.24(A)(1), and prison sentences for the felony offense range from six to twelve
months. Id. § 2929.14(A)(5).
24
“[s]olicit[ing], accept[ing], or receiv[ing] any funds from” any noncitizen “for any purpose
described in” division (B) of HB 1. Id. § 3517.121(C)(1).
97. Subdivision (C)(2) prohibits the same actors from “directly or indirectly through
any other person or entity, knowingly” “mak[ing] a contribution, expenditure, or independent
expenditure using any [of the] funds” from any noncitizen “for any purpose described in” division
(B) of HB 1. Id. § 3517.121(C)(2).
98. There are no exceptions set forth in (C)(2), including for de minimus spending. As
a result, under the provision’s plain text, an individual U.S. citizen in Ohio could not use a $20 bill
they received from their noncitizen family member to purchase posterboard and markers to make
a sign opposing a ballot issue.
99. Persons who “knowingly violate” the prohibitions set forth in division (C) are
“guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree on a first offense and . . . of a felony of the fifth degree
on a second or subsequent offense.” Id. § 3517.121(F)(2). Additionally, any violator “shall be fined
an amount equal to three times the amount involved in the violation or ten thousand dollars,
whichever amount is greater, and shall be required to return the total amount accepted in violation
. . . to the foreign national from whom it was accepted.” Id.
100. HB 1 also expressly prohibits anyone from “knowingly aid[ing] or facilita[ting] a
violation of” the restrictions set forth in division (C). Id. § 3517.121(D). Violation of the “aiding
or facilitating” prohibition is punishable as a misdemeanor in the first degree and a mandatory fine
of one thousand dollars. Id. § 3517.121(F)(3).
4. HB 1 confers on the Attorney General broad and mandatory

enforcement powers.
101. HB 1 grants the Ohio Attorney General “exclusive authority to prosecute a violation
of this section” and “exclusive supervision and control of all investigations, prosecutions, and
25
enforcement proceedings under this section,” unless he is involved as a victim or witness and then
should refer the matter to another prosecutor. Id. § 3517.121(G)(1).
102. HB 1’s plain text goes so far as to require that the Attorney General “shall
investigate an alleged violation of this section in consultation with the secretary of state” whenever
the office receives a complaint from the governor, the secretary of state, the general assembly, the
Ohio elections commission, or any elector. Id. § 3517.121(G)(2).
103. Notably, division (B)—unlike division (C)—does not include a mens rea
requirement for the prohibition on noncitizen spending. Compare id. § 3517.121(B) with id.
§ 3517.121(C). It therefore follows that any Ohio elector could complain that a noncitizen violated
the spending prohibitions in division (B) without even alleging that the noncitizen did so
“knowingly”; and the Attorney General would be required to investigate the alleged violation. Id.
§ 3517.121(G)(2).
104. Under HB 1, any complaints of violations of the pre-existing law which previously
banned foreign nationals (but not lawful permanent residents) from candidate-related election
spending are now treated as allegations of violations of the new code section created by HB 1. Id.
§ 3517.121(E).
C. HB 1 was enacted over objections that it would chill free speech and run
afoul of the First Amendment.
105. Despite HB 1’s sweeping changes to Ohio campaign finance law, its consideration,
amendment, and passage through the General Assembly was fast and furious.
106. On Friday, May 24, 2024, Governor DeWine called a special session of the General
Assembly. HB 1 was introduced on Tuesday, May 28; passed by the House on Thursday, May 30;
passed by the Senate on Friday, May 31; and signed by the Governor on Sunday, June 2.
26
107. When HB 1 was first introduced in House Government Oversight Committee on
May 28, it excluded lawful permanent residents from the bill’s restrictions on foreign nationals.
H.B. 1, 135th Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. (Ohio 2024) (as introduced).
108. The bill’s sponsor Representative Bill Seitz testified that HB 1 was intended to
make Ohio law consistent with federal law banning foreign spending in campaigns and a 2021
Ohio Elections Commission opinion setting forth that such spending was already illegal in Ohio.
109. However, when an opponent of the bill, Representative Dani Isaacsohn, asked
whether its restrictions would apply to a foreign student who spent ten dollars on a poster to
demonstrate in favor of a ballot issue, Representative Seitz could point to no language in the bill
that would protect the student from facing the bill’s steep penalties. Instead, Representative Seitz
avoided the question, responding, “please read the whole bill and we can talk offline about your
going down a rat hole that is not there.”
110. Despite the break-neck pace by which the bill was considered, HB 1 drew
considerable opposition in the short, special session. Many citizens and representatives of
nonprofit and other community-focused organizations testified before the House Government
Oversight Committee that the bill would chill their organizing activities.
111. A representative of Doctors Organized for Health Care Solutions explained to the
House Government Oversight Committee that, while the stated purpose of the legislation was to
limit the influence of foreign nationals in elections, the bill’s plain text was so sweeping and broad
that it would limit even the speech of individuals married to lawful permanent residents with
comingled finances.
27
112. Multiple other witnesses, including one from the Ohio Environmental Council
Action Fund, testified that HB 1 would chill ballot issue activity going forward and limit who
would be able to participate in that process.
113. Other witnesses testified about the threat posed by the Attorney General’s exclusive
authority to investigate and prosecute violations of the bill, warning that it would discourage
Ohioans from participating in ballot issue advocacy in the future.
114. HB 1 was nonetheless favorably reported out of committee to the full House by a
vote of 6 to 5.
115. On the House floor, Representative Seitz again asserted that HB 1 was “clear and
concise” and contended that “[w]e’re trying to just go after with a fairly narrow brush of what
we’re really trying to prohibit.”
116. In the very same remarks, however, Representative Seitz acknowledged that the
bill’s regulation of “continuing associations” included an express caveat, because there was still
“some residual question as to [] the General Assembly’s power to regulate this aspect of a
continuing association’s [] activities.”
117. Representative Seitz also conceded that Ohio law already prohibits foreign money
in candidate elections.
118. During floor debate, Representative Brian Stewart introduced an amendment to
extend HB 1 prohibitions on “foreign nationals” to lawful permanent residents.
119. Representative Seitz opposed the amendment, based on his concerns that if HB 1
were to reach lawful permanent residents, that would make it particularly vulnerable to
constitutional challenge.
28
120. Nevertheless, the amendment was approved by a majority of the House, and HB
1—like every similar piece of legislation that the Senate had considered earlier in the year—was
modified to reach all noncitizens, including lawful permanent residents. See S.B. 215, 135th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2024); H.B. 114, 135th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2024); H.B.
305, 135th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2024); H.B. 271, 135th Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess.
(Ohio 2024).
121. The amended bill then passed the full House on a vote of 64 to 31, over strong
opposition from the minority party’s members.
122. In explaining his opposition, Representative Isaacsohn pointed out that HB 1
includes “vague language to create a culture of fear and confusion around engaging in political
activity.”
123. For example, he asked, “What is even an indirect contribution? If a board member
of the restaurant association, for example, or another corporation is a foreign national, are all of
the political contributions from that association or company’s attendant PACs or committees
subject to violations?”
124. He similarly wondered, “What about a college student whose grandfather sends
them $100 from Ireland for their birthday, and then they go and they buy some markers and some
signs and they go and protest for their rights, for their reproductive rights at an issue campaign?”
125. Ultimately, he concluded, “This bill is an affront to the people of Ohio. It attacks
their right to organize, to advocate for causes they believe in, and to engage in the deeply American
activity of coming together to fight for a better future.”
126. Representative Bride Rose Sweeney similarly objected that the House’s sudden
concern with money in elections, arguing it appeared to be pretextual, and noting that the General
29
Assembly had failed to consider other bills concerning dark money and instead only acted “to
change the rules of the game to benefit power hungry politicians that are up against the will of the
voters.”
127. Minority Leader Allison Russo accused the majority of having “crated a fear factor
around so-called foreign money,” describing it as “a fantasy that has been concocted as a Trojan
horse to once again attack the people’s fundamental freedom to direct democracy.”
128. The following day, HB 1 moved to the Senate for consideration. In speaking in
support of the bill, Senator McColley again characterized foreign money as a “clear and present
danger” without explanation and asserted that it was meant to target “international white-collar
schemes” and multi-million dollar donations—in direct contrast to the bill’s broad terms.
129. Multiple senators from both parties testified in opposition to portions of the bill.
For example, Senator Bill DeMora asserted that HB 1 would make it harder for citizens to
participate in ballot issues and would aggrandize the Attorney General’s power.
130. Senator Niraj Antani unsuccessfully sought to amend HB 1 to remove its regulation
of lawful permanent residents, echoing Representative Seitz’s concerns about the provision’s legal
vulnerability.
131. Despite this opposition and these doubts, the Senate passed HB 1 on Friday, May
31 by a vote of 24 to 7.
132. Governor DeWine signed it into law on Sunday, June 2.
133. Contemporaneous news articles reported that Governor DeWine stated, “I don’t
think anybody is worried about the average green card holder. But we are worried about somebody
who’s got enough money to tilt the scales in an election in the state of Ohio and who can’t vote.
30
But they can come in here and they don’t even live here, but they can come in here and dump a
bunch of money.”
134. HB 1 will go into effect on September 1.
D. HB 1 will impact Plaintiffs’ ability to participate in the political process.
135. Absent judicial relief, HB 1 will directly harm Plaintiffs by (1) prohibiting them
from spending on ballot issues and contributing to nonprofit organizations who may do ballot issue
advocacy, and (2) prohibiting organizational Plaintiffs OPAWL and NEOCH from receiving and
using funds from noncitizens in support of any ballot issue advocacy or related to any purpose to
influence an election.
136. Under the plain terms of HB 1, Plaintiffs Elisa Bredendiek and John Gerrath
reasonably fear that any contribution, expenditure, or independent expenditure they make in
support of a ballot issue is illegal and could lead to their investigation and even prosecution, which
may jeopardize their lawful permanent resident status or any future naturalization.
137. Plaintiffs Bredendiek and Gerrath similarly reasonably fear that any contributions
they make to nonprofits—for any purpose—could cause them to become the subject of an
investigation for violating HB 1, even if they are not ultimately prosecuted.
138. But for these fears, Plaintiffs Bredendiek and Gerrath would continue supporting
causes they care about through contributions, expenditures, and independent expenditures. Once
HB 1 goes into effect, however, they will be unwilling to do so out of fear of investigation and
prosecution.
139. Plaintiff Bredendiek will be chilled from attending rallies and demonstrations, as
she does not know whether the issues she is supporting or opposing will one day end up on the
ballot, and she would unavoidably make small expenditures, like paying for parking and gas, to
31
attend. Plaintiff Gerrath will be chilled from similar activities, including paying for and displaying
signs in his yard in support of ballot questions in the state.
140. Plaintiff Peter Quilligan, a United States citizen, has the same reasonable fears of
investigation, prosecution, and penalties as shared by Plaintiffs Bredendiek and Gerrath, because
he is married to a noncitizen and has comingled his finances with hers.
141. Should Plaintiff Quilligan still want to contribute to causes and organizations he
cares about once HB 1 goes into effect, he would need to develop a system to segregate money
within his own household.
142. Even segregating their accounts may not be enough to shield Plaintiff Quilligan and
his wife from investigation under the broad and mandatory investigatory requirements contained
in section 3517.121(G)(2) of HB 1, which require Defendants to investigate any complaints made
by government officials or any individual elector that a violation has occurred.
143. Because the terms of HB 1 are unclear, Plaintiffs have little guidance on the
parameters of the prohibited conduct.
144. For example, HB 1 expressly law does not require a ballot issue to be certified
before the ban on contributions, expenditures, or independent expenditures in support of or in
opposition to a statewide ballot issue or question kicks in, and it ambiguously conditions its ban
on nonprofit contributions to whatever the U.S. Constitution allows.
145. Without clarity, Plaintiffs will need to read the law in its broadest sense to avoid
violating its terms, broadly chilling their political speech.
146. Noncitizen Plaintiffs face additional harm from HB 1 due to its unjustified alienage
classification, infringing upon their right to equal treatment under the law.
32
147. HB 1 not only harms individuals but also organizations who previously received
contributions and associated with noncitizens in the context of their own advocacy work.
148. Organizational Plaintiffs OPAWL and NEOCH are aware of noncitizen contributors
and members that help fund their community advocacy projects, but monitoring the citizenship of
their contributors is not something these organizations have done as a matter of course in the past.
149. Now, these organizations will need to implement complicated new citizenship
status verification procedures and segregate funds accordingly, which will likely erode trust within
their communities and with key stakeholders.
150. Even then, OPAWL and NEOCH will be more likely to steer clear of ballot issue
and other advocacy work out of a reasonable fear of being investigated, fined, and/or prosecuted
by the Attorney General.
151. Plaintiffs’ fears and the resulting chill of their speech and associational conduct are
the direct consequences of HB 1, including its severe criminal and civil penalties. Indeed, the
consequences of even an alleged violation—by any elector in the state—is mandatory
investigation by the Attorney General. And if found guilty, Plaintiffs would face five-figure
penalties and prison time.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
COUNT I
Infringement of Free Speech
U.S. Const. amends. I & XIV, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Against All Defendants
152. Plaintiffs reallege and reincorporate by reference paragraphs 1–151 of this
Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
153. The First Amendment protects against the promulgation of laws “prohibiting the
free exercise [of] or abridg[ment] [of] freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I.
33
154. The First Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
155. Spending to promote or oppose ballot issues is at the very heart of the First
Amendment’s protections. Belotti, 435 U.S. at 775. “It is the type of speech indispensable to
decisionmaking in a democracy.” Id. at 777. And the Supreme Court has recognized that, “[t]he
inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend on
the identity of the source.” Id.
156. HB 1 includes several provisions that prohibit spending on ballot issues and
therefore implicate the First Amendment—both for noncitizens and for those who have close
financial relationships with them or receive funds from them. H.B. 1, 135th Gen. Assemb., Spec.
Sess. § 3517.121(B), (C), (D) (Ohio 2024).
157. Specifically, section 3517.121(B)’s prohibitions on noncitizens making direct or
indirect contributions, expenditures, or independent expenditures to support or oppose ballot issues
and on contributing to nonprofits; section 3517.121(C)’s prohibitions on committees and
nonprofits knowingly accepting or using funds received from noncitizens; and section
3517.121(D)’s prohibitions on aiding or facilitating violations of division (B) or (C) all infringe
upon protected First Amendment speech.
158. The Supreme Court has long recognized that “[c]ontributions by individuals to
support concerted action by a committee advocating a position on a ballot measure is beyond
question a very significant form of political expression.” Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S.
at 298; see also Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 870 (8th Cir.
2012) (“Independent expenditures are indisputably political speech.”).
159. HB 1 limits noncitizens’, including Plaintiffs Elisa Bredendiek’s and John
Gerrath’s, ability to speak through contributions and expenditures to ballot issues and other causes.
34
HB 1 similarly limits Plaintiff Peter Quilligan’s speech as someone married to and with finances
comingled with a noncitizen.
160. The Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit have also “rejected the argument that political
speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First
Amendment simply because such associations are not ‘natural persons.’” Citizens United, 558 U.S.
at 343 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776). “Corporations and other associations, like individuals,
contribute to the ‘discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas’ that the First
Amendment seeks to foster.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 8 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at
783). “A state cannot prohibit corporations any more than it can preclude individuals from making
contributions advocating views on ballot measures.” Austin, 832 F.2d at 949 (quoting Citizens
Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 297–98) (cleaned up).
161. HB 1 also infringes organizational Plaintiffs OPAWL’s and NEOCH’s speech rights
because organizations engage in forms of political and issue-based advocacy, and both receive
funds from noncitizens for this work.
162. The threat that a provision will operate to chill speech is itself a constitutional harm.
See Ashcroft v. Am. C.L. Union, 542 U.S. 656, 658 (2004) (“Extraordinary harm and a serious chill
upon protected speech may result where, as here, a prosecution is a likely possibility”).
163. HB 1’s enforcement provisions are also extraordinarily broad—and that breadth
further threatens to chill Plaintiffs’ core political speech. Indeed, whenever any elector in the state
of Ohio files a complaint with the Attorney General alleging a violation of HB 1, the Attorney
General is required by the plain terms of HB 1 to investigate it. H.B. 1, 135th Gen. Assemb., Spec.
Sess. § 3517.121(G)(2) (Ohio 2024).
35
164. Because of the risk that statutory provisions that could be read to reach protected
speech will operate to chill core political activities, courts have typically applied “strict scrutiny”
to such restrictions, where the law may only survive if the government can show that the restriction
(1) furthers a compelling state interest and (2) is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Citizens
United, 558 U.S. at 340; see also Cent. Me. Power Co., 2024 WL 866367, at *7, *11 (applying
strict scrutiny to state statute prohibiting political campaign spending by a “foreign government-
influenced entity”).
165. Even under the less-than-strict scrutiny that courts sometimes apply to contribution
(as opposed to expenditure) limits, the State must show that the challenged contribution limit (1)
furthers a “sufficiently important interest” and (2) “employs means closely drawn to avoid
unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.” McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 197 (quoting
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25); see also Austin, 832 F.2d at 949.
166. “[T]here is no significant state or public interest in curtailing debate and discussion
of a ballot measure.” Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 299.
167. Unlike candidate-related elections, ballot issue elections do not raise the risk of
“quid pro quo” corruption, where a candidate’s ongoing and post-election policy decisions may be
implicitly influenced by their donors. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26–27; Bellotti, 435 U.S. at
791 (1978) (“The risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate elections simply is not
present in a popular vote on a public issue.” (internal citations omitted)); Austin, 832 F.2d at 949
(same).
168. And Ohio already prohibits foreign spending in the candidate-related election
context. Ohio Rev. Code § 3517.13(W); see also 52 U.S.C. § 30121.
36
169. Furthermore, “the fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason
to suppress it.” Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790.
170. Rather, “the direct participation of the people in a referendum, if anything, increases
the need for the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources.” Id. at 790 n.29 (cleaned up).
171. Indeed, HB 1’s regulation of “independent expenditures” in the ballot issue context
is nonsensical and contrary to both the definition of the term as defined in Ohio law, see Ohio Rev.
Code § 3517.01(C)(17), and decades of Supreme Court precedent, which make clear that
“independent expenditures” may only be regulated when they contain “express advocacy” for or
against a candidate’s election, see, e.g., Wis. Right To Life, 551 U.S. at 476 (“This Court has never
recognized a compelling interest in regulating ads . . . that are neither express advocacy [promoting
a candidate’s election or defeat] nor its functional equivalent.”).
172. Even if the State could have a compelling interest in preventing foreign billionaires
from interfering in Ohio’s elections, HB 1 is not narrowly tailored to serve that goal.
173. HB 1 separately violates the First Amendment right to speech because it is an
impermissible content-based restriction: it prohibits certain disfavored speakers (noncitizens) and
speech about certain topics (ballot issues and questions) associated with a particular form of
expression (contributions and expenditures).
174. Other federal courts considering similar regulations have held that when a law
“singles out particular political speech—that which advocates the defeat of a candidate and/or
supports the election of her opponents—for negative treatment that the state applies to no other
variety of speech,” it “‘by [its] terms distinguish[es] favored speech from disfavored speech on the
basis of the ideas or views expressed,’ and thus it cannot be content-neutral.” Day v. Holahan, 34
37
F.3d 1356, 1360–61 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642
(1994)). As a result, such laws are subject to strict scrutiny. Id.
175. The same is facially true of HB 1, and it cannot survive judicial review.
176. HB 1 unconstitutionally restricts the First Amendment speech rights of Plaintiffs
and others like them because it burdens core political speech and is a content-based restriction;
and it is not narrowly tailored or sufficiently related to any compelling, or even legitimate or
important, government interest.
COUNT II
Infringement of Associational Rights
178. The “freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is
an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.” NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958);
see also Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358, 364 (1969) (“First Amendment rights [] include the right
to band together for the advancement of political beliefs.”).
179. HB 1 infringes on the associational rights of noncitizens, as well as those
individuals and organizations who wish to associate with them. Political spending is not just an
individual act of expression, but “enables like-minded persons to pool their resources in
furtherance of common political goals.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22. This is especially true in the
ballot issue advocacy context, where individuals are using the collective power of their voices and
votes to write their views into law.
38
180. Specifically, section 3517.121(B)’s prohibitions on noncitizens making direct or
indirect contributions, expenditures, or independent expenditures to support or oppose ballot issues
and on contributing to nonprofits; section 3517.121(C)’s prohibitions on committees and
nonprofits knowingly accepting or using funds received from noncitizens; and section
3517.121(D)’s prohibitions on aiding or facilitating violations of division (B) or (C) all infringe
upon associational rights because they prohibit noncitizens from associating with individuals and
organizations, and vice versa.
181. Plaintiffs Elisa Bredendiek and John Gerrath are now severely chilled from
associating with nonprofit organizations that share their values by contributing money; they are
even chilled from making minor expenditures to show their association with others who support
or oppose the same ballot issues, for example, by making or displaying a sign. Peter Quilligan,
too, is impacted as the spouse of a noncitizen, as he cannot use funds that he and his wife share to
facilitate his own associations.
182. Correspondingly, Plaintiffs OPAWL and NEOCH can no longer freely associate
with noncitizens—and in some cases, family members of noncitizens like Peter Quilligan—who
wish to support their causes and ballot advocacy work, without fear that it will make them, their
employees or volunteers, and the noncitizens vulnerable to invasive government investigation and
even potentially prosecution.
183. Here, too, HB 1’s extraordinarily broad enforcement provisions further threaten to
chill Plaintiffs’ associational rights. See Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595, 618–
19 (2021) (“When it comes to the freedom of association, the protections of the First Amendment
are triggered not only by actual restrictions on an individual’s ability to join with others to further
shared goals. The risk of a chilling effect on association is enough, ‘[b]ecause First Amendment
39
freedoms need breathing space to survive.’” (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433
(1963))).
184. Again, whenever any elector in the state of Ohio files a complaint with the Attorney
General alleging a violation of HB 1, the Attorney General is required by the plain terms of HB 1
to investigate it. H.B. 1, 135th Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. § 3517.121(G)(2) (Ohio 2024).
185. The threat of investigation alone entitles Plaintiffs to seek relief. See, e.g., White v.
Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1226 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that defendants’ “eight-month investigation into
the plaintiffs’ [associational] activities and beliefs chilled the exercise of their First Amendment
rights” and entitled the plaintiffs “to seek a remedy for this constitutional violation”); Nat’l
Commodity & Barter Ass’n v. Archer, 31 F.3d 1521, 1530 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding an
organizational plaintiff could premise claim seeking damages for First Amendment associational
rights violation upon overzealous investigative procedures that had a chilling effect on its
members’ associational rights).
186. Infringements on the right of association “may be justified by regulations adopted
to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved
through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000); Bonta,
594 U.S. at 610 (“The government may regulate in the [First Amendment] area only with narrow
specificity’”) (quoting Button, 371 U.S. at 433).
187. None of the provisions in HB 1 is supported by a state interest sufficient to justify
the resulting restrictions on the associational rights of noncitizens and their associates or Ohio
entities. And the law is not narrowly tailored, or even sufficiently related, to serve any interests, as
the new regulations dramatically change the status quo.
40
COUNT III
Overbreadth
189. HB 1 is unconstitutional under the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment because it is facially overbroad.
190. “[A] statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected
speech.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008). That is because “the threat of
enforcement of an overbroad law deters people from engaging in constitutionally protected speech,
inhibiting the free exchange of ideas.” Id. Even if a law is constitutional in some of its applications,
it is facially unconstitutional if it is substantially overbroad relative to its “plainly legitimate
sweep.” Id.
191. Overbreadth challenges have also been successful where associational rights were
ensnared in statutes which, by their broad sweep, might result in burdening innocent associations
in addition to speech. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
192. HB 1 is substantially overbroad because it regulates far more than spending in
candidate-related elections, applying also to spending on issue advocacy, including in the ballot
issue context.
193. As the Supreme Court has held, ballot issue related spending is speech entitled to
the First Amendment’s highest protections; thus, HB 1’s infringement upon it sweeps in an
enormous amount of not just innocent speech—but speech entitled to the constitution’s most
profound and significant protections.
41
194. Even if the State had an important interest in preventing foreign interference in
candidate-related elections, HB 1 extends far broader than is necessary to further that interest. And,
as alleged above, foreign contributions and expenditures to candidate-related elections are already
prohibited under other provisions of Ohio and federal law.
195. HB 1’s regulation of ballot issue-related speech is on its own fatal, but it is also
notable that its attempt to muzzle this speech is as broad as it could possibly be—targeting ballot
issue-related speech even on issues that have not yet been certified for the ballot and continuing
associations like nonprofit organizations whose primary purpose has nothing to do with politics.
196. HB 1 is also substantially overbroad because it imposes blanket spending and
contribution prohibitions on all noncitizens, sweeping in lawful permanent residents, noncitizens’
U.S. citizen family members who have comingled finances, and organizations that may have even
a single noncitizen donor or shareholder. All of these individuals are entitled to engage in that type
of speech without undue restriction from the government; thus, in this way, too, HB 1 sweeps in a
large amount of core protected speech.
197. HB 1 unnecessarily chills the core speech and associational rights of Plaintiffs and
others similarly situated who seek to engage in issue advocacy or nonprofit organizations.
198. In short, HB 1 is an unduly blunt instrument aimed at addressing a narrow state
interest that is already addressed by more appropriately tailored laws.
COUNT IV
Vagueness
U.S. Const. amends. XIV, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
199. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1–198 of this Complaint
as though set forth fully within.
42
200. HB 1 is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
201. “It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its
prohibitions are not clearly defined.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). Laws
can be vague either because they (1) fail to inform people of what they prohibit or (2) lend
themselves to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 58–
59 (1999); Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
202. Laws have heightened requirements for clarity when laws invoke criminal
penalties, especially when there is not a scienter requirement. Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside,
Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99 (1982); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 n.8
(1983) (“[W]here a statute imposes criminal penalties, the standard of certainty is higher.”).
203. Where laws—as HB 1—“interfere[] with the right of free speech or of association,
a more stringent vagueness test should apply.” Flipside, 455 U.S. at 499; see also Button, 371 U.S.
at 432 (“[S]tandards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free expression.”).
204. Multiple parts of HB 1 are unconstitutionally vague. For example, it is unclear when
the prohibition on spending in relation to ballot issues would kick in, given that HB 1 does not
require the issue be approved to appear on the ballot. H.B. 1, 135th Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess.
§ 3517.121(B)(2) (Ohio 2024).
205. Nor is it clear what an “independent expenditure” means in the ballot issue context,
when “independent expenditure” is defined as “an expenditure by a person advocating the election
or defeat of an identified candidate or candidates.” Ohio Rev. Code § 3517.01(C)(17).
206. Likewise, it is unclear what it means for a noncitizen or foreign entity to
“indirectly” contribute to a ballot issue or nonprofit organization “through any person or entity,”
43
H.B. 1, 135th Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. § 3517.121(B), (C) (Ohio 2024), or for a person to “aid
or facilitate” such a violation, id. § 3517.121(D). And HB 1 provides no clarity on what it means
to “implicitly” promise to contribute or make an expenditure. Id. § 3517.121(B)(5).
207. HB 1 also confusingly uses the term “for any purpose” multiple times in division
(C), and its use restrictions could be read to criminalize the use of noncitizen funds that were
“received” even prior to HB 1 taking effect, which leaves Plaintiffs and others guessing at what
they need to do with existing funds that may or may not be implicated given the layers of HB 1’s
vague restrictions.
208. Additionally, HB 1’s restrictions on individual noncitizens and foreign entities lack
any kind of mens rea requirement, see id. § 3517.121(B), in contrast to HB 1’s limitations on those
receiving foreign funds, see id. § 3517.121(C).
209. In attempting to add caveats to save the law, the General Assembly only introduced
more confusion. See id. § 3517.121(B)(4), (C) (applying HB 1’s restrictions to continuing
continued associations “to the maximum extent permitted by law and by the constitutions of the
United States and of this state”).
210. And HB 1’s failure to clarify which definition of “contribution” applies opens that
term up to the broadest possible meaning. See Ohio Rev. Code § 3517.01(C)(5) (defining
“contribution” in political party context); see also id. § 1716.01(E) (defining “contribution” in
charitable organization context).
211. At the same time, these ambiguities lend themselves to selective enforcement, as
the Attorney General or Secretary can decide, after the fact, what conduct is prohibited. HB 1
creates confusion for individuals of ordinary intelligence, leaving them guessing how to avoid
significant criminal penalties. Cf. Snyder v. United States, No. 23-108, 2024 WL 3165518, at *9–
44
10 (U.S. June 26, 2024) (“It is unfathomable that Congress would authorize a 10-year criminal
sentence for gifts to 19 million state and local officials without any coherent federal guidance (or
any federal guidance at all) about how an official can distinguish the innocuous from the
criminal.”). HB 1 is thus unconstitutionally vague and violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
COUNT V
Equal Protection Clause
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
213. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
214. HB 1 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution by prohibiting noncitizens, including individual Plaintiff Elisa Bredendiek, Plaintiff
John Gerrath, and organizational Plaintiff OPAWL’s members and supporters, from making
contributions, expenditures, or even independent expenditures in support of ballot issues, as well
as contributions to continuing associations that are made, received, or used for the purpose of
influencing an election, without any legitimate justification for doing so, thus denying noncitizens
equal protection of the law.
215. “Classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are
inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a prime example of a
45
‘discrete and insular’ minority . . . for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.”
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
216. A state law that delineates based on a suspect classification—like noncitizens—
“bears a heavy burden of justification.” In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721 (1973). Where a state
law adopts a suspect classification like this one, “a State must show that its purpose or interest is
both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is necessary
to the accomplishment of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest.” Id. at 721–22 (alterations
and footnotes omitted).
217. “Resident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the economy, serve in the Armed
Forces, and contribute in myriad other ways to our society. It is appropriate that a State bear a
heavy burden when it deprives them of [] opportunities.” Id. at 722.
218. HB 1 singles out noncitizens and prohibits them from spending money on ballot
issues and nonprofit organizations without compelling justification, claiming only that they should
not be able to do so because they are not able to vote. This is a wholly insufficient reason to deprive
them of the opportunity to engage in their communities by contributing to issues that they care
about and, in many cases, directly impact them.
219. That noncitizens are refused certain privileges has nothing to do with their right to
associate and engage in protected speech. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271 (noncitizen U.S.
residents receive constitutional protections, including under the First Amendment). Nor does it
justify infringing organizations like OPAWL’s associational and speech rights. Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972) (recognizing protected First Amendment right to associate with
noncitizen).
46
220. Defendants cannot satisfy their heavy burden of explaining why excluding
noncitizens from making any direct or indirect contributions to a sweeping range of issues and
entities is narrowly tailored to further a sufficiently weighty state interest.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court enter judgment:
A. Declaring that HB 1 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution;
B. Enjoining Defendants, their respective agents, officers, employees, and successors, and
all persons acting in concert with each or any of them, from taking any steps to
implement and enforce HB 1;
C. Awarding Plaintiffs their costs, expenses, and reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to,
inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and other applicable laws; and
D. Granting such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ C. Benjamin Cooper

C. Benjamin Cooper (0093103)
Trial Attorney
Kaela King (0100098)
COOPER ELLIOTT
305 West Nationwide Boulevard
Columbus, Ohio 43215
(614) 481-6000
(614) 481-6001 (fax)
[email protected]
[email protected]
Elisabeth C. Frost*
Jyoti Jasrasaria*
Melinda K. Johnson*
ELIAS LAW GROUP LLP
250 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 968-4490
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
* Pro hac vice applications forthcoming
47

Lawsuit Challenges Ohio Ban On Foreign Donations in Ballot Issues

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Case: 2:24-cv-03495-MHW-KAJ Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/27/24 Page: 1 of 47 PAGEID #: 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

OPAWL – BUILDING AAPI FEMINIST

DAVE YOST, in his official capacity as

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

official capacity as Ohio Secretary of State, and allege as follows:

NATURE OF THE CASE

parties, or ballot issues.

because of compelling interests that are unique to the candidate context.

government may impose certain limited restrictions on candidate-related contributions and

Id. at 791 n.31.

contribute even to candidates. See 52 U.S.C. § 30121(b).

6. As then-Judge Kavanaugh recognized in a decision that was summarily affirmed

7. HB 1 targets anyone who is not a U.S. citizen—including lawful permanent

spending or contributions—including to support or oppose ballot questions in virtually any

Attorney General concludes that he “implicitly promised” to make a contribution, expenditure, or

9. HB 1 will also have devastating effects on a broad array of citizens’, companies’,

that affect its constituent community—simply because, as is fundamental to its organizational

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202.

16. Plaintiff OPAWL – Building AAPI Feminist Leadership (“OPAWL”) is a nonprofit

grassroots member-led community organization whose mission is to build collective power to

noncitizen immigrants or have noncitizen family members.

17. As a fiscally sponsored project of a 501(c)(3) organization, OPAWL operates as a

to support OPAWL’s ballot issue advocacy—whether by purchasing snacks for an event or

providing materials for a phone bank.

19. HB 1 will completely silence some of OPAWL’s members—noncitizens, those

all working together to advance this shared mission.

viewed as advocating for or against any number of statewide ballot issues.

24. HB 1 threatens NEOCH in multiple ways. It puts the organization at risk of

of NEOCH will be substantially chilled by HB 1.

26. Plaintiffs Elisa Bredendiek—a German citizen—and Peter Quilligan—a U.S.

decides to allege that he is in violation of HB 1.

§ 3517.121(G)(2) (Ohio 2024).

political expression and political association.” Id.

related spending context, are generally reviewed using strict scrutiny.

campaign spending by a “foreign government-influenced entity”).1

decisionmaking in a democracy.” Id. at 777 (emphasis added).

context, because “[c]ontributions by individuals to support concerted action by a committee

contributions to or expenditures of a candidate or a candidate’s committees there is no significant

39. Indeed, “the direct participation of the people in a referendum, if anything,

. . . .” Id. at 777 (emphasis added).

and of press is accorded aliens residing in this country.”).

41. Federal campaign finance law’s candidate-related regulations reflect this

permanent residents in its definition of “foreign national.” 52 U.S.C. § 30121(b).

(Stop I-186) (Nov. 2, 2021).2

spending on ballot issues.

Ohio Const. art. II, § 1.

amendments ranging from establishing term limits to protecting reproductive freedom.

provisions and enshrine new rights.

of future amendments by the voters from a simple majority to sixty percent.

typically have very low voter turnout.

the ballot in November 2023.

effect immediately if ratified.

election and the amendment’s misleading ballot language in court.

increased threshold amendment—by a decisive 14-point margin.

power to engage in direct democracy.

significantly chill public discussion on issues of importance affecting Ohioans.