23-5572 l6hn

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2023 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
FISCHER v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 23–5572. Argued April 16, 2024—Decided June 28, 2024

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposes criminal liability on anyone
who corruptly “alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, docu-
ment, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair
the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding.”
18 U. S. C. §1512(c)(1). The next subsection extends that prohibition
to anyone who “otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official
proceeding, or attempts to do so.” §1512(c)(2). Petitioner Joseph
Fischer was charged with violating §1512(c)(2) for his conduct on Jan-
uary 6, 2021. On that day, Congress convened in a joint session to
certify the votes in the 2020 Presidential election. While they did so,
a crowd of supporters of then-President Donald Trump gathered out-
side the Capitol, and some eventually forced their way into the build-
ing, breaking windows and assaulting police. App. 189. This breach
of the Capitol delayed the certification of the vote. The criminal com-
plaint alleges that Fischer was among those who invaded the building.
Fischer was charged with various crimes for his actions on January 6,
including obstructing an official proceeding in violation of §1512(c)(2).
He moved to dismiss that charge, arguing that the provision criminal-
izes only attempts to impair the availability or integrity of evidence.
The District Court granted his motion in relevant part. A divided
panel of the D. C. Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceed-
ings.
Held: To prove a violation of §1512(c)(2), the Government must establish
that the defendant impaired the availability or integrity for use in an
official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or other things used
in an official proceeding, or attempted to do so.
(a) To determine the scope of the residual “otherwise” clause in
§1512(c)(2), the Court must decide how it is linked to its “surrounding
2 FISCHER v. UNITED STATES
Syllabus
words,” Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 536 (plurality opinion),

and “ ‘give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of [the] statute.’ ”
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 404 (quoting United States v.
Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539). The Court considers both “the spe-
cific context” in which (c)(2) appears “and the broader context of the
statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 341.
(1) Section 1512(c)(1) describes particular types of criminal con-
duct in specific terms. The purpose of (c)(2) is, as the parties agree, to
cover some set of “matters not specifically contemplated” by (c)(1). Re-
public of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U. S. 848, 860. Perhaps Congress sought
to criminalize all obstructive acts in §1512(c), and having named a few
examples in (c)(1), devised (c)(2) to prohibit the rest. But (c)(2) could
have a narrower scope if Congress designed it to fill inadvertent gaps
in the focused language of (c)(1).
One way to discern the reach of an “otherwise” clause is to look for
guidance from whatever examples come before it. Two general princi-
ples are relevant. First, the canon of noscitur a sociis teaches that a
word is “given more precise content by the neighboring words with
which it is associated.” United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 294.
And under the related canon of ejusdem generis, a general or collective
term at the end of a list of specific items is typically controlled and
defined by reference to those specific items that precede it. Southwest
Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U. S. 450, 458. These approaches to statu-
tory interpretation track the common sense intuition that Congress
would not ordinarily introduce a general term that renders meaning-
less the specific text that accompanies it.
Under these principles, the “otherwise” provision of §1512(c)(2) is
limited by the list of specific criminal violations that precede it in (c)(1).
If, as the Government asserts, (c)(2) covers all forms of obstructive con-
duct beyond §1512(c)(1)’s focus on evidence impairment, Congress
would have had little reason to provide any specific examples at all.
And the sweep of subsection (c)(2) would swallow (c)(1), leaving that
narrower provision with no work to do.
Tethering subsection (c)(2) to the context of (c)(1) recognizes the dis-
tinct purpose of each provision. Subsection (c)(1) refers to a defined
set of offense conduct—four types of actions that, by their nature, im-
pair the integrity or availability of records, documents, or objects for
use in an official proceeding. Reading the “otherwise” clause as having
been given more precise content by (c)(1), subsection (c)(2) makes it a
crime to impair the availability or integrity of records, documents, or
objects used in an official proceeding in ways other than those specified
in (c)(1). For example, it is possible to violate (c)(2) by creating false
evidence—rather than altering incriminating evidence. Subsection
Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 3
Syllabus
(c)(2) also ensures that liability is still imposed for impairing the avail-
ability or integrity of other things used in an official proceeding beyond
the “record[s], document[s], or other object[s]” enumerated in (c)(1),
such as witness testimony or intangible information.
(2) It makes sense to read (c)(2) as limited by (c)(1) in light of the
history of the provision. The Enron accounting scandal exposed a loop-
hole in §1512. At that time, the statute imposed liability on anyone
who, among other things, corruptly persuaded another person to shred
documents. But it curiously failed to impose liability on a person who
destroyed records himself. The parties agree that Congress enacted
§1512(c) as part of the broader Sarbanes-Oxley Act to plug this loop-
hole. It would be peculiar to conclude that in closing the Enron gap,
Congress created a catch-all provision that reaches beyond the scenar-
ios that prompted the legislation.
(b) The broader context of §1512 in the criminal code confirms that
(c)(2) is limited by the scope of (c)(1). Federal obstruction law consists
of numerous provisions that target specific criminal acts and settings,
much of which would be unnecessary if (c)(2) criminalized essentially
all obstructive conduct. Given the Court’s obligation to give meaning
where possible to each word and provision in the Code, Taylor, 529
U. S., at 404, the Court’s narrower interpretation of subsection (c)(2)
is the superior one.
An unbounded interpretation of subsection (c)(2) would also render
superfluous the careful delineation of different types of obstructive
conduct in §1512 itself. That section provides a reticulated list of
nearly two dozen means of committing obstruction with penalties
ranging from three years to life in prison, or even death. The Govern-
ment’s reading would lump together under (c)(2) disparate types of
conduct for which Congress had assigned proportionate sentences.
(c) The Government’s theory would also criminalize a broad swath
of prosaic conduct, exposing activists and lobbyist to decades in prison.
Our usual approach in obstruction cases has been to “resist reading”
particular sub-provisions “to create a coverall statute.” Yates, 574
U. S., at 549 (plurality opinion). Nothing in the text or statutory his-
tory gives the Court a reason to depart from that practice today. And
the Government’s interpretation would give prosecutors broad discre-
tion to seek a 20-year maximum sentence for acts Congress saw fit to
punish with far shorter sentences. By reading (c)(2) in light of (c)(1),
the Court affords proper respect to “the prerogatives of Congress” in
carrying out the quintessentially legislative act of defining crimes and
setting the penalties for them. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U. S. 593,
600.
64 F. 4th 329, vacated and remanded.
Syllabus
ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS,

ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. JACKSON, J.,
filed a concurring opinion. BARRETT, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
[email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors.

_________________
No. 23–5572
_________________
JOSEPH W. FISCHER, PETITIONER v.

UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[June 28, 2024]
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the

Court.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposes criminal liabil-
ity on anyone who corruptly “alters, destroys, mutilates, or
conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to
do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or
availability for use in an official proceeding.” 18 U. S. C.
§1512(c)(1). The next subsection extends that prohibition
to anyone who “otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes
any official proceeding, or attempts to do so.” §1512(c)(2).
We consider whether this “otherwise” clause should be read
in light of the limited reach of the specific provision that
precedes it.
I
This case concerns the prosecution of petitioner Joseph
Fischer for his conduct on January 6, 2021. That day, both
Houses of Congress convened in a joint session to certify the
votes in the 2020 Presidential election. While they did so,
a crowd of supporters of then-President Donald Trump
gathered outside the Capitol. As set forth in the criminal
complaint against Fischer, some of the crowd eventually
“forced entry” into the building, “breaking windows,” and

“assaulting members of the U. S. Capitol Police.” App. 189.
This breach of the Capitol caused Members of Congress to
evacuate the Chambers and delayed the certification pro-
cess. The complaint alleges that Fischer was one of those
who invaded the building.
According to the complaint, about an hour after the
Houses recessed, Fischer trespassed into the Capitol and
was involved in a physical confrontation with law enforce-
ment. Fischer claimed in Facebook posts that he “pushed
police back about 25 feet,” and that he “was inside the [Cap-
itol] talking to police.” Id., at 193–194. Body camera foot-
age shows Fischer near a scrum between the crowd and po-
lice who were trying to eject trespassers from the building.
Id., at 195–196.
A grand jury returned a seven-count superseding indict-
ment against Fischer. Six of those counts allege that
Fischer forcibly assaulted a federal officer, entered and re-
mained in a restricted building, and engaged in disorderly
and disruptive conduct in the Capitol, among other crimes.
See id., at 181–185; 18 U. S. C. §§111(a), 231(a)(3),
1752(a)(1), (a)(2); 40 U. S. C. §§5104(e)(2)(D), (G). Those six
counts carry maximum penalties ranging from six months’
to eight years’ imprisonment.
In Count Three, the only count now before us, the Gov-
ernment charged Fischer with violating 18 U. S. C.
§1512(c)(2). Fischer moved to dismiss that count, arguing
that the provision criminalizes only attempts to impair the
availability or integrity of evidence. The District Court
granted his motion in relevant part. It concluded that the
scope of Section 1512(c)(2) is limited by subsection (c)(1)
and therefore requires the defendant to “ ‘have taken some
action with respect to a document, record, or other object.’ ”
2022 WL 782413, *4 (DC, Mar. 15, 2022) (quoting United
States v. Miller, 589 F. Supp. 3d 60, 78 (DC 2022)).
Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 3
A divided panel of the D. C. Circuit reversed and re-

manded for further proceedings. Judge Pan, writing for the
court, held that the word “otherwise” in Section 1512(c)(2)
means that the provision unambiguously covers “all forms
of corrupt obstruction of an official proceeding, other than
the conduct that is already covered by §1512(c)(1).” 64
F. 4th 329, 336 (2023). Judge Walker concurred in part and
concurred in the judgment because he read the mens rea
element of the statute—“corruptly”—as requiring a defend-
ant to act with “an intent to procure an unlawful benefit.”
Id., at 361 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Judge Katsas dissented. In his view, the language in sub-
section (c)(1) narrows the language that comes after the
word “otherwise” in subsection (c)(2). He therefore con-
strued Section 1512(c)(2) as applying “only to acts that,”
like the ones specified in (c)(1), “affect the integrity or avail-
ability of evidence” at an official proceeding. Id., at 363.
We granted certiorari. 601 U. S. ___ (2023).
II
The controversy before us is about the scope of the resid-
ual “otherwise” clause in Section 1512(c)(2). On the one
hand, Fischer contends that (c)(2) “applies only to acts that
affect the integrity or availability of evidence.” Brief for Pe-
titioner 8. On the other, the Government argues that (c)(2)
“capture[s] all forms of obstructive conduct beyond Section
1512(c)(1)’s focus on evidence impairment.” Brief for
United States 13.
Resolving such a dispute requires us to determine how
the residual clause is linked to its “surrounding words.”
Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 536 (2015) (plurality
opinion); see, e.g., United States v. Hansen, 599 U. S. 762,
774–775 (2023). In doing so, “we must ‘give effect, if possi-
ble, to every clause and word of [the] statute.’ ” Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 404 (2000) (quoting United States v.
Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538–539 (1955)). To that end, we
consider both “the specific context” in which (c)(2) appears

“and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robin-
son v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 341 (1997); see, e.g., Pul-
sifer v. United States, 601 U. S. 124, 133 (2024) (choosing
between “two grammatically permissible ways” to read a
sentencing statute “by reviewing text in context”).
A
1
Section 1512 provides:
“(c) Whoever corruptly—
“(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record,
document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the
intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for
use in an official proceeding; or
“(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any
official proceeding, or attempts to do so,
“shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than 20
years, or both.”
Subsection (c)(1) describes particular types of criminal
conduct in specific terms. To ensure the statute would not
be read as excluding substantially similar activity not men-
tioned, (c)(2) says it is also illegal to engage in some broader
range of unenumerated conduct.
The purpose of the “otherwise” clause is therefore, as the
parties agree, to cover some set of “matters not specifically
contemplated” by (c)(1). Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U. S.
848, 860 (2009); see Brief for Petitioner 12; Brief for United
States 12–13. The problem is defining what exactly Con-
gress left for (c)(2). Perhaps Congress sought to criminalize
all obstructive acts in Section 1512(c), and having named a
few examples in (c)(1), devised (c)(2) to prohibit the rest in
one go. The point of (c)(1) would then be to illustrate just
one type of conduct among many (c)(2) prohibits; it would
be subsidiary to the overarching prohibition in (c)(2). But
Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 5
(c)(2) could well have a narrower scope if Congress designed

it with the focused language of (c)(1) in mind. Subsection
(c)(1) would then prohibit particular types of obstructive
conduct and (c)(2) would fill any inadvertent gaps that
might exist.
One way to discern the reach of an “otherwise” clause is
to look for guidance from whatever examples come before
it. Two general principles are relevant. First, the canon of
noscitur a sociis teaches that a word is “given more precise
content by the neighboring words with which it is associ-
ated.” United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 294 (2008).
That “ avoid[s] ascribing to one word a meaning so broad
that it is inconsistent with” “the company it keeps.” Gus-
tafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 575 (1995). And under
the related canon of ejusdem generis, “a ‘general or collec-
tive term’ at the end of a list of specific items” is typically
“ ‘controlled and defined by reference to’ the specific classes
. . . that precede it.” Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596
U. S. 450, 458 (2022) (quoting first Ali v. Federal Bureau of
Prisons, 552 U. S. 214, 225 (2008); then Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, 532 U. S. 105, 115 (2001)); accord, Bis-
sonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC, 601 U. S. 246,
252 (2024). These approaches to statutory interpretation
track the common sense intuition that Congress would not
ordinarily introduce a general term that renders meaning-
less the specific text that accompanies it.
To see why, consider a straightforward example. A zoo
might post a sign that reads, “do not pet, feed, yell or throw
objects at the animals, or otherwise disturb them.” If a vis-
itor eats lunch in front of a hungry gorilla, or talks to a
friend near its enclosure, has he obeyed the regulation?
Surely yes. Although the smell of human food or the sound
of voices might well disturb gorillas, the specific examples
of impermissible conduct all involve direct interaction with
and harassment of the zoo animals. Merely eating or talk-
ing is so unlike the examples that the zoo provided that it
would be implausible to assume those activities were pro-

hibited, even if literally covered by the language.
The idea is simply that a general phrase can be given a
more focused meaning by the terms linked to it. That prin-
ciple ensures—regardless of how complicated a sentence
might appear—that none of its specific parts are made re-
dundant by a clause literally broad enough to include them.
See Yates, 574 U. S., at 545–546 (plurality opinion). For
instance, a football league might adopt a rule that players
must not “grab, twist, or pull a facemask, helmet, or other
equipment with the intent to injure a player, or otherwise
attack, assault, or harm any player.” If a linebacker shouts
insults at the quarterback and hurts his feelings, has the
linebacker nonetheless followed the rule? Of course he has.
The examples of prohibited actions all concern dangerous
physical conduct that might inflict bodily harm; trash talk
is simply not of that kind. See 64 F. 4th, at 365–366
(Katsas, J., dissenting).
Similarly improbable consequences can result from un-
tethering an “otherwise” provision from the rest of a crimi-
nal statute. Take Begay v. United States, 553 U. S. 137
(2008) (abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. United
States, 576 U. S. 591 (2015)). The question there was
whether driving under the influence qualified as a “violent
felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). A
“violent felony” was defined in relevant part by ACCA as a
crime, punishable by more than a year’s imprisonment, that
“ ‘is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives,
or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious poten-
tial risk of physical injury to another.’ ” 553 U. S., at 139–
140 (quoting 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2000 ed.)). We
recognized that, depending on the context, “the word ‘oth-
erwise’ can”—though not “must”—“refer to a crime that is
similar to the listed examples in some respects but different
in others.” 553 U. S., at 144 (emphasis deleted). And we
held that while driving under the influence certainly may
Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 7
present a serious risk of physical injury, such an offense

was so dissimilar from the previously enumerated exam-
ples that it could not be classified as a “violent felony” under
the statute. Id., at 142–146. The list of crimes that pre-
ceded the residual clause—burglary, arson, extortion, and
the use of explosives—focused on “purposeful, violent, and
aggressive conduct.” Id., at 144–145 (internal quotation
marks omitted). And if that focus did not extend to the re-
sidual clause, ACCA’s 15-year mandatory minimum sen-
tence would apply to a host of offenses “not typically com-
mitted by those whom one normally labels ‘armed career
criminals’ ” and that were “far removed . . . from the delib-
erate kind of behavior associated with violent criminal use
of firearms.”1 Id., at 146–147.
The “otherwise” provision of Section 1512(c)(2) is simi-
larly limited by the preceding list of criminal violations.
The offenses enumerated in subsection (c)(1) cover someone
who “alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, docu-
ment, or other object . . . with the intent to impair the ob-
ject’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceed-
ing.” Complex as subsection (c)(1) may look, it simply
consists of many specific examples of prohibited actions un-
dertaken with the intent to impair an object’s integrity or
availability for use in an official proceeding: altering a rec-
ord, altering a document, concealing a record, concealing a
document, and so on. That list is followed immediately by
a residual clause in (c)(2). Guided by the basic logic that
Congress would not go to the trouble of spelling out the list
in (c)(1) if a neighboring term swallowed it up, the most sen-
——————
1 The dissent explains that we subsequently held the ACCA residual
clause void for vagueness. See post, at 8 (opinion of BARRETT, J.) (citing
Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. 591, 597 (2015)). That our answer to
the narrow question presented in Begay did not resolve a broader consti-
tutional defect in the statute says little about whether the reasoning of
Begay is relevant here.
sible inference is that the scope of (c)(2) is defined by refer-

ence to (c)(1).
If, as the Government asserts, (c)(2) covers “all forms of
obstructive conduct beyond Section 1512(c)(1)’s focus on ev-
idence impairment,” Brief for United States 13, there would
have been scant reason for Congress to provide any specific
examples at all. The sweep of subsection (c)(2) would con-
sume (c)(1), leaving that narrower provision with no work
to do. Indeed, subsection (c)(1) would be an elaborate
pumpfake: a list of four types of highly particularized con-
duct, performed with respect to a record, document, or ob-
ject and “with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or
availability for use in an official proceeding,” followed in the
very next subsection—in the same sentence, no less—by a
superseding prohibition on all means of obstructing, influ-
encing, or impeding any official proceeding. Construing
Section 1512 in such a way gets the “familiar” analysis we
apply to these types of statutes “exactly backwards,” elimi-
nating specific terms because of broad language that follows
them, rather than limiting the broad language in light of
narrower terms that precede it. Bissonnette, 601 U. S., at
252, 255.
Tethering subsection (c)(2) to the context of (c)(1) recog-
nizes the distinct purpose of each provision. See A. Scalia
& B. Garner, Reading Law 208 (2012) (“evident purpose”
helps define scope of catchall provision). As we have ex-
plained, subsection (c)(1) refers to a defined set of offense
conduct—four types of actions that, by their nature, impair
the integrity or availability of records, documents, or ob-
jects for use in an official proceeding. When the phrase
“otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official
proceeding” is read as having been given more precise con-
tent by that narrower list of conduct, subsection (c)(2)
makes it a crime to impair the availability or integrity of
records, documents, or objects used in an official proceeding
in ways other than those specified in (c)(1). For example, it
Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 9
is possible to violate (c)(2) by creating false evidence—ra-

ther than altering incriminating evidence. See, e.g., United
States v. Reich, 479 F. 3d 179, 185–187 (CA2 2007) (So-
tomayor, J.) (prosecution under subsection (c)(2) for trans-
mitting a forged court order). Subsection (c)(2) also ensures
that liability is still imposed for impairing the availability
or integrity of other things used in an official proceeding be-
yond the “record[s], document[s], or other object[s]” enu-
merated in (c)(1), such as witness testimony or intangible
information. See, e.g., United States v. Mintmire, 507 F. 3d
1273, 1290 (CA11 2007) (prosecution under subsection
(c)(2) based in part on the defendant’s attempt to orches-
trate a witness’s grand jury testimony).
The dissent supposes that because the word “otherwise”
in (c)(2) can mean “in a different manner,” “by other
means,” or “in other respects,” (c)(1) and (c)(2) are “distinct
and independent prohibitions.” Post, at 2, 5 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). But the word “otherwise” is not by
itself “sufficient to demonstrate that the examples do not
limit the scope of the clause.” Begay, 553 U. S., at 144 (em-
phasis deleted). “Otherwise” can link a set of examples to
a general phrase and give it more definite meaning—even
in statutory sentences that rival the complexity of Section
1512(c). See Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U. S. 431, 437–438
(1982); Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers, 493 U. S. 67, 91–
92 (1989).
2
It makes sense to read subsection (c)(2) as limited by
(c)(1) in light of the history of the provision.
Prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Section 1512 imposed
criminal liability on anyone who “knowingly uses intimida-
tion or physical force, threatens, or corruptly persuades an-
other person” to, among other things, shred documents. 18
U. S. C. §1512(b)(2)(B) (2000 ed.). But the Enron account-
ing scandal revealed a loophole: Although Enron’s “outside
auditor, Arthur Andersen LLP, had systematically de-

stroyed potentially incriminating documents,” the statute
curiously failed to “impos[e] liability on a person who de-
stroys records himself.” Yates, 574 U. S., at 535–536 (plu-
rality opinion). As a result, prosecutors had to prove that
higher-ups at Enron and Arthur Andersen persuaded some-
one else to shred documents rather than the more obvious
theory that someone who shreds documents is liable for do-
ing so. See S. Rep. No. 107–146, p. 7 (2002).
The parties agree that to plug this loophole, Congress en-
acted Section 1512(c)—the provision at issue here—as part
of the broader Sarbanes-Oxley Act. It would be peculiar to
conclude that in closing the Enron gap, Congress actually
hid away in the second part of the third subsection of Sec-
tion 1512 a catchall provision that reaches far beyond the
document shredding and similar scenarios that prompted
the legislation in the first place. The better conclusion is
that subsection (c)(2) was designed by Congress to capture
other forms of evidence and other means of impairing its
integrity or availability beyond those Congress specified in
(c)(1).
B
1
The broader context of Section 1512 in the criminal code
confirms that (c)(2) is limited by the scope of (c)(1). Federal
obstruction law consists of numerous provisions that target
specific criminal acts and settings. See 18 U. S. C. ch. 73.
Much of that particularized legislation would be unneces-
sary if (c)(2) criminalized essentially all obstructive con-
duct, as the Government contends. Section 1503(a), for ex-
ample, makes it a crime to “corruptly, or by threats or force,
or by any threatening . . . communication, endeavor[ ] to in-
fluence, intimidate, or impede” any juror or court officer.
Section 1504 covers attempting to influence jurors through
written communications. Section 1505 covers anyone who
Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 11
corruptly obstructs congressional inquiries or investiga-

tions. Section 1507 covers picketing or parading in certain
locations “with the intent of interfering with, obstructing,
or impeding the administration of justice.” Section 1509 co-
vers the obstruction of the exercise of rights or performance
of duties under court orders. Section 1510(a) covers ob-
struction of federal criminal investigations through bribery.
Section 1511(a) covers certain obstruction of state or local
law enforcement with the intent to facilitate illegal gam-
bling. And Sections 1516, 1517, and 1518 address obstruc-
tive acts in specific contexts, including federal audits, ex-
aminations of financial institutions, and inquiries into
healthcare-related offenses.
If the Government were correct, then the “otherwise ob-
structs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding” pro-
vision—which is buried in subsection (c)(2) of Section
1512—would largely obviate the need for that broad array
of other obstruction statutes. In light of our obligation to
give meaning where possible to each word and provision in
the Code, Taylor, 529 U. S., at 404, our narrower interpre-
tation of subsection (c)(2) is the superior one.
2
An unbounded interpretation of subsection (c)(2) would
also render superfluous the careful delineation of different
types of obstructive conduct in Section 1512 itself. That
section provides a reticulated list of nearly two dozen
means of committing obstruction, with varying degrees of
culpability and penalties ranging from three years to life in
prison, or even death. Section 1512(a)(2)(B)(iv), for exam-
ple, authorizes up to 30 years’ imprisonment for someone
who uses or attempts to use physical force against another
person with the intent of causing him to be absent from an
official proceeding. See §1512(a)(3)(B)(ii) (specifying pun-
ishment). Section 1512(d)(1), by contrast, authorizes only
three years’ imprisonment for someone who harasses an-

other person and thereby dissuades him from attending an
official proceeding.
Reading (c)(2) to cover all forms of obstructive conduct
would override Congress’s careful delineation of which pen-
alties were appropriate for which offenses. Most instances
of those prohibited acts would instead fall under subsection
(c)(2)’s sweeping reach, which provides a 20-year maximum
term of imprisonment. Such a reading of subsection (c)(2)
would lump together disparate types of conduct for which
Congress had assigned proportionate penalties in (a)(2) and
(d)(1).2
3
The Government’s responses to this surplusage problem
are not convincing.
It first argues that because other provisions in Section
1512 would allow conviction in some circumstances on a
“lesser mens rea than ‘corruptly,’ ” they have “a broader
compass” than (c)(2). Brief for United States 34. For in-
stance, the Government contends that subsection (b) can be
violated by “knowing use of intimidation or threats, or mis-
leading conduct.” Id., at 35. But the Government concedes
that “Congress did not define ‘corruptly’ for purposes of Sec-
tion 1512.” Id., at 44. And while the Government suggests
that “corruptly” is “ ‘normally associated with wrongful, im-
moral, depraved, or evil’ conduct,” ibid. (quoting Arthur An-
dersen LLP v. United States, 544 U. S. 696, 705 (2005)), it
——————
2 The dissent maintains we have “ ‘glosse[d] over the absence of any
prescribed minimum.’ ” Post, at 14 (quoting Yates, 574 U. S., at 569

(KAGAN, J., dissenting)). Congress might have thought (c)(2) prohibited
conduct of varying severity. But it does not follow that it designed (c)(2)
to reach forms of conduct already covered in Chapter 73 with far lower
maximum sentences. It would be improper to substitute for those fine-
grained statutory distinctions the charging discretion of prosecutors and
the sentencing discretion of district courts.
Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 13
never persuasively explains how “knowingly us[ing ] intim-

idation” or “threat[s]” against someone is not “wrongful.”
§1512(b). The same is true for most other subparts of Sec-
tion 1512 that the Government identifies as having a lesser
mens rea than (c)(2). Brief for United States 34; see, e.g.,
§1512(a)(1)(A) (criminalizing anyone who “kills or attempts
to kill another person, with intent to” prevent attendance
in an official proceeding); §1512(a)(2)(B)(iv) (criminalizing
anyone who “uses physical force . . . against any person” in-
tending to cause them to be absent from an official proceed-
ing). None of those other provisions has a mens rea the Gov-
ernment may more readily establish than the “corruptly”
mens rea of subsection (c)(2).
The Government also contends that its interpretation
creates no surplusage because Section 1512’s other “provi-
sions sweep more broadly than an official proceeding.” Tr.
of Oral Arg. 64; Brief for United States 34. To be sure, sub-
sections (a)(2)(C), (b)(3), and (d)(2) criminalize various
means of preventing someone from giving a judge or law
enforcement officer information relating to the commission
or possible commission of a federal offense or a violation of
conditions of supervised release. And subsections (d)(3) and
(4) make it a crime to harass someone and thereby dissuade
them from arresting or prosecuting a person alleged to have
committed a federal offense. None of these crimes requires
an “official proceeding.” But not much if any conduct cov-
ered by those provisions would escape the Government’s ex-
pansive interpretation of subsection (c)(2). For a person to
have violated (c)(2), “an official proceeding need not be
pending or about to be instituted.” §1512(f )(1). And be-
cause interference with an arrest or with communications
to authorities about federal offenses could very well ob-
struct the initiation of future official proceedings, the Gov-
ernment’s reading of (c)(2) would still often consume viola-
tions of (a)(2)(C), (b)(3), and (d)(2), (3), and (4).
The dissent tries to solve this surplusage problem by ar-

guing that conduct only violates (c)(2) if it has a “ ‘relation-
ship in time, causation, or logic’ ” with an official proceed-
ing. Post, at 11 (quoting United States v. Aguilar, 515 U. S.
593, 599 (1995)). Assuming there is such a requirement, it
would simply mean that the defendant’s actions “must have
the natural and probable effect” of interfering with the pro-
ceeding. Id., at 599 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Such a bar on prosecutions based on “speculative” theories
of obstruction, id., at 601, would hardly cabin the reach of
(c)(2).
The dissent points out that our reading creates some sur-
plusage, too. See post, at 12–13. In a wide-ranging scheme
like Chapter 73, it is true that some provisions will inevita-
bly cover some of the same conduct. But “surplusage is
nonetheless disfavored,” and our “construction that creates
substantially less of it is better than a construction that cre-
ates substantially more.” 64 F. 4th, at 374 (Katsas, J., dis-
senting).
III
On the Government’s theory, Section 1512(c) consists of
a granular subsection (c)(1) focused on obstructive acts that
impair evidence and an overarching subsection (c)(2) that
reaches all other obstruction. Even setting surplusage
aside, that novel interpretation would criminalize a broad
swath of prosaic conduct, exposing activists and lobbyists
alike to decades in prison. As the Solicitor General
acknowledged at oral argument, under the Government’s
interpretation, a peaceful protester could conceivably be
charged under §1512(c)(2) and face a 20-year sentence. Tr.
of Oral Arg. 51–52. And the Government would likewise
have no apparent obstacle to prosecuting under (c)(2) any
lobbying activity that “influences” an official proceeding
and is undertaken “corruptly.” Those peculiar results “un-
Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 15
derscore[ ] the implausibility of the Government’s interpre-

tation.” Van Buren v. United States, 593 U. S. 374, 394
(2021).
Our usual approach in obstruction cases has been to “re-
sist reading” particular sub-provisions “to create a coverall”
statute, as the Government would have us do here. Yates,
574 U. S., at 549 (plurality opinion); see also Marinello v.
United States, 584 U. S. 1, 6–11 (2018); Arthur Andersen,
544 U. S., at 703–704. And there is no reason to depart
from that practice today. Nothing in the text or statutory
history suggests that subsection (c)(2) is designed to impose
up to 20 years’ imprisonment on essentially all defendants
who commit obstruction of justice in any way and who
might be subject to lesser penalties under more specific ob-
struction statutes. See, e.g., §§1503(b)(3), 1505. If Con-
gress had wanted to authorize such penalties for any con-
duct that delays or influences a proceeding in any way, it
would have said so. Instead, Section 1512 mentions “rec-
ord,” “document,” or other “object” 26 times. See 18 U. S. C.
§§1512(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B)(i), (ii), (iii), 1512(b)(2)(A), (B), (C),
1512(c)(1), 1512(f ).
Rather than transforming this evidence-focused statute
into a one-size-fits-all solution to obstruction of justice, we
cabin our reading of subsection (c)(2) in light of the context
of subsection (c)(1). Doing so affords proper respect to “the
prerogatives of Congress” in carrying out the quintessen-
tially legislative act of defining crimes and setting the pen-
alties for them. Aguilar, 515 U. S., at 600. We have long
recognized that “the power of punishment is vested in the
legislative, not in the judicial department,” United States v.
Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95 (1820), and we have as a result
“ ‘traditionally exercised restraint in assessing the reach of
a federal criminal statute,’ ” Marinello, 584 U. S., at 11
(quoting Aguilar, 515 U. S., at 600). The Government’s
reading of Section 1512 would intrude on that deliberate
arrangement of constitutional authority over federal
crimes, giving prosecutors broad discretion to seek a 20-

year maximum sentence for acts Congress saw fit to punish
only with far shorter terms of imprisonment—for example,
three years for harassment under §1512(d)(1), or ten years
for threatening a juror under §1503.
For all these reasons, subsection (c)(2)’s “surrounding
words” suggest that we should not give this “otherwise” pro-
vision the broadest possible meaning. Yates, 574 U. S., at
536 (plurality opinion). Although the Government’s all-en-
compassing interpretation may be literally permissible, it
defies the most plausible understanding of why (c)(1) and
(c)(2) are conjoined, and it renders an unnerving amount of
statutory text mere surplusage. Given that subsection
(c)(2) was enacted to address the Enron disaster, not some
further flung set of dangers, it is unlikely that Congress re-
sponded with such an unfocused and “grossly incommensu-
rate patch.” 64 F. 4th, at 376 (Katsas, J., dissenting). We
therefore decline to adopt the Government’s interpretation,
which is inconsistent with “the context from which the stat-
ute arose.” Bond v. United States, 572 U. S. 844, 860 (2014).
* * *
To prove a violation of Section 1512(c)(2), the Govern-
ment must establish that the defendant impaired the avail-
ability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of rec-
ords, documents, objects, or as we earlier explained, other
things used in the proceeding, or attempted to do so. See
supra, at 9. The judgment of the D. C. Circuit is therefore
vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. On remand, the D. C. Circuit
may assess the sufficiency of Count Three of Fischer’s in-
dictment in light of our interpretation of Section 1512(c)(2).
It is so ordered.
Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 1
JACKSON, J., concurring

_________________
No. 23–5572
_________________

UNITED STATES
[June 28, 2024]
JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring.

On January 6, 2021, an angry mob stormed the United
States Capitol seeking to prevent Congress from fulfilling
its constitutional duty to certify the electoral votes in the
2020 Presidential election. See ante, at 1–2. The peaceful
transfer of power is a fundamental democratic norm, and
those who attempted to disrupt it in this way inflicted a
deep wound on this Nation. But today’s case is not about
the immorality of those acts. Instead, the question before
this Court is far narrower: What is the scope of the partic-
ular crime Congress has outlined in 18 U. S. C. §1512(c)(2)?
In the United States of America, “men are not subjected
to criminal punishment because their conduct offends our
patriotic emotions or thwarts a general purpose sought to
be effected by specific commands which they have not diso-
beyed. Nor are they to be held guilty of offenses which the
statutes have omitted, though by inadvertence, to define
and condemn.” Viereck v. United States, 318 U. S. 236, 245
(1943). Our commitment to equal justice and the rule of law
requires the courts to faithfully apply criminal laws as writ-
ten, even in periods of national crisis, see, e.g., Cramer v.
United States, 325 U. S. 1, 46–48 (1945), and even when the
conduct alleged is indisputably abhorrent, cf. Michaels v.
Davis, 601 U. S. ___, ___ (2024) (JACKSON, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 3).
Notwithstanding the shocking circumstances involved in

this case or the Government’s determination that they war-
rant prosecution, today, this Court’s task is to determine
what conduct is proscribed by the criminal statute that has
been invoked as the basis for the obstruction charge at issue
here. I join in the Court’s opinion because I agree with the
majority that §1512(c)(2) does not reach “ ‘all forms of ob-
structive conduct’ ” and is, instead, “limited by the preced-
ing list of criminal violations” in §1512(c)(1). Ante, at 7–8.
I write separately to explain why and how that interpreta-
tion of §1512(c) follows from the legislative purpose that
this statute’s text embodies.
I
Our goal in interpreting any statute should be “to give
effect to the intent of Congress.” United States v. American
Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 542 (1940). There is
no question that intent is generally expressed through the
text of a statute. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson,
456 U. S. 63, 68 (1982). “[H]ewing closely to Congress’s
will” as embodied in the statute that it wrote “is especially
important” when construing laws like this one, which im-
plicate the possible imposition of punitive sanctions. Pugin
v. Garland, 599 U. S. 600, 612 (2023) (JACKSON, J., concur-
ring).
Here, the majority rightly interprets the scope of
§1512(c)(2) by “look[ing] for guidance from” the statutory
“examples [that] come before” it—those listed in
§1512(c)(1). Ante, at 5. In my view, the examples that Con-
gress opts to include in the text of a statute evince its inten-
tions concerning what the rule covers and thereby help ex-
press a particular legislative purpose.
The majority’s football-based example is illustrative. In
a football league, says the majority, “a rule that players
must not ‘grab, twist, or pull a facemask, helmet, or other
equipment with the intent to injure a player, or otherwise
Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 3
attack, assault, or harm any player,’ ” should not be inter-

preted as being directed at hurt feelings, because the listed
“prohibited actions all concern dangerous physical conduct
that might inflict bodily harm; trash talk is simply not of
that kind.” Ante, at 6. I agree. I would add that it is like-
wise clear from the listed prohibited acts that such a rule is
also not addressing far more serious and unexpected con-
duct than the kinds of acts that the preceding examples de-
scribe, which can result in serious and foreseeable physical
injuries during a rough-and-tumble football game. By con-
trast, if a player were to shoot or poison another player, the
rule’s drafters would expect the police to be called, not a
referee. Thus, we conclude that the rule is best understood
to be inapposite with respect to conduct at both extremes of
the universe of harmful acts in which a player might con-
ceivably engage.
We recognize this intuitive fact—that there is a certain
category of conduct the rule is designed to prohibit—be-
cause we recognize, albeit implicitly, that the drafters of
this rule have included these particular examples for a rea-
son. We understand that, given the preceding list of exam-
ples, this rule was adopted with a clear intent concerning
its scope. So, though a broad conception of “harm” is “liter-
ally covered by the language” of the rule, ibid., we appreci-
ate that the rule’s drafters did not intend for that term to
take on its most expansive meaning. Instead, the examples
help illuminate what the drafters actually intended the rule
to cover. From the preceding list, we can confidently dis-
cern that the drafters meant to proscribe only conduct that
risks injuries with severity akin to facemask pulling, not
trash talk or murder.1
——————
1 The majority invokes the canons of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem gen-
eris to support this inference. See ante, at 5. Those canons are useful
interpretive tools, but in my view, they are ultimately only devices used
in furtherance of achieving our goal of determining “the intent of Con-
gress.” United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534,
The upshot is that, when interpreting the scope of a par-

ticular statute or rule, our assessment of the words that the
drafters used informs our understanding of what the rule
was designed to do.2 Discerning the rule’s purpose is criti-
cal when a court is called upon to interpret the provision.
II
Turning to the statutory provision at issue here, the pur-
pose of §1512(c), reflected in its text, is clear. Subsection
(c)(1) is indisputably focused on persons who engage in a
particular kind of obstructive conduct: Anyone who “cor-
ruptly . . . alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record,
document, or other object, . . . with the intent to impair the
object’s integrity or availability for use in an official pro-
ceeding.” Subsection (c)(2), in turn, is directed at criminal
conduct that “otherwise” achieves a similar result. I there-
fore agree with the majority that §1512(c)(2)’s reach is nar-
rower than the Government contends. As the majority
holds, §1512(c)(2) “makes it a crime to impair the availabil-
ity or integrity of records, documents, or objects used in an
official proceeding in ways other than those specified in
(c)(1)” and to “impai[r] the availability or integrity of other
things used in an official proceeding beyond the ‘record[s],
document[s], or other object[s]’ enumerated in (c)(1).”
——————
542 (1940). “There is no invariable rule for the discovery of that inten-
tion.” Ibid. As one treatise explains, such canons are “not . . . rule[s] of
law” but rather “one of various factors to be considered.” A. Scalia & B.
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 212 (2012); see
also id., at 196–198. We apply these canons because we understand that
their principles are consistent with how users of language—including
legislators—convey meaning. See id., at 212 (“Any lawyer or legislative
drafter who writes two or more specifics followed by a general residual
term without the intention that the residual term be limited may be
guilty of malpractice”). As such, they are valid indicia of Congress’s pur-
pose.
2 Other indicia of the drafters’ intent, such as the rule’s context or en-
actment history, can further inform our understanding of the rule. See
infra, at 5–8.
Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 5
Ante, at 8–9.
This understanding of §1512(c)’s text and purpose is en-
tirely consistent with the statute’s enactment history. Con-
gress enacted §1512(c) as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
which “was prompted by the exposure of Enron’s massive
accounting fraud and revelations that the company’s out-
side auditor, Arthur Andersen LLP, had systematically de-
stroyed potentially incriminating documents.” Yates v.
United States, 574 U. S. 528, 535–536 (2015) (plurality
opinion). When introducing what later became §1512(c) on
the Senate floor, Senator Lott emphasized that its principal
purpose was to target document destruction, which was, at
the time, prohibited “only if . . . a subpoena ha[d] been is-
sued for the evidence that ha[d] been destroyed or altered.”
148 Cong. Rec. S6545 (July 10, 2002). “[T]his section,” he
explained, “would allow the Government to charge obstruc-
tion against individuals who acted alone, even if the tam-
pering took place prior to the issuance of a grand jury sub-
poena.” Ibid. Similarly, the Senate Report accompanying
the proposed statute noted that “current federal obstruction
of justice statutes relating to document destruction [were]
riddled with loopholes and burdensome proof require-
ments.” S. Rep. No. 107–146, p. 6 (2002). According to the
Senate Report, §1512(c) was drafted to fill these gaps:
“When a person destroys evidence with the intent of ob-
structing any type of investigation and the matter is within
the jurisdiction of a federal agency, overly technical legal
distinctions should neither hinder nor prevent prosecution
and punishment.” Id., at 7.
Conversely, there is no indication whatsoever that Con-
gress intended to create a sweeping, all-purpose obstruction
statute. As the majority notes, “[f]ederal obstruction law
consists of numerous provisions that target specific crimi-
nal acts and settings.” Ante, at 10. Outside of the Govern-
ment’s proposed interpretation of §1512(c), Congress has
never enacted “a one-size-fits-all solution to obstruction of
justice.” Ante, at 15.3 Meanwhile, many States have done

just that. See J. Decker, The Varying Parameters of Ob-
struction of Justice in American Criminal Law, 65 La.
L. Rev. 49, 77, and n. 236 (2004) (collecting statutes).4 The
drafters of the Model Penal Code, too, proposed such a gen-
eral obstruction crime. See ALI, Model Penal Code §242.1,
p. 201 (1980) (“A person commits a misdemeanor if he pur-
posely obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of
law or other governmental function by force, violence, phys-
ical interference or obstacle, breach of official duty, or any
other unlawful act”).
Given that Congress has never before passed a similarly
broad obstruction law when others have long existed, it is
highly unlikely that Congress intended for subsection (c)(2)
to establish a first-of-its-kind general federal obstruction
crime. Nothing in the enactment history of §1512(c) sug-
gests that Congress believed that it was creating an all-en-
compassing statute that would obviate the need for any
other obstruction prohibitions.
This conclusion is further reinforced by the fact that, un-
like §1512(c)(2), nearly all of the broad, all-purpose obstruc-
tion statutes that various States have enacted are classified
as misdemeanors. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. §18–8–102(3)
(2023); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2921.31(B) (Lexis 2024). As a
——————
3 That is not to say, of course, that Congress could not enact such a
statute if it so chose. “We have traditionally exercised restraint in as-

sessing the reach of a federal criminal statute . . . out of deference to the
prerogatives of Congress,” United States v. Aguilar, 515 U. S. 593, 600
(1995), not because broad criminal proscriptions are beyond the scope of
Congress’s power.
4 See also, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. §18–8–102(1) (2023) (“A person commits
obstructing government operations if he intentionally obstructs, impairs,

or hinders the performance of a governmental function by a public serv-
ant, by using or threatening to use violence, force, or physical interfer-
ence or obstacle”); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2921.31(A) (Lexis 2024) (“No
person . . . shall do any act that hampers or impedes a public official in
the performance of the public official’s lawful duties”).
Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 7
result, these types of obstruction crimes are generally pun-

ishable by up to a year of incarceration. See 1 W. LaFave,
J. Israel, N. King, & O. Kerr, Criminal Procedure §1.8(c),
pp. 557–558 (4th ed. 2015). That is so for a reason: As the
Model Penal Code’s drafters explained, “the existence of a
residual misdemeanor offense” allows for the “appropri-
ately narrow definition of the serious forms of obstruction
carrying felony penalties.” §242.1, Comment 2, at 203. “A
broad residual offense . . . provides a hedge against the in-
genuity of offenders,” since “[n]ot all forms of obstruction
can be anticipated and precisely proscribed in specific of-
fenses.” Ibid. But, at the same time, that kind of broad
criminal statute “must incorporate certain limitations lest
it nullify policy decisions expressed elsewhere.” Ibid. In
other words, these broad misdemeanor obstruction statutes
are “amalgam[s] of generality and constraint.” Ibid.
The Government’s interpretation of §1512(c)(2), by con-
trast, exhibits all the generality of these catchall misde-
meanor obstruction provisions while displaying none of
their restraint. Section 1512(c)(2) is a felony, and it im-
poses a 20-year maximum sentence—one of the more severe
potential punishments in Chapter 73 of the U. S. Code.
That stands in contrast with Congress’s specification that
other serious obstructive acts warrant “far shorter terms of
imprisonment—for example, three years for harassment
under §1512(d)(1), or ten years for threatening a juror un-
der §1503.” Ante, at 16.
Finally, it is worth remembering the statutory context in
which Congress chose to prohibit the obstruction-related
conduct we are considering today. The statute Congress
wrote addresses this matter in a 13-word phrase, enumer-
ated “2,” that is located within subsection (c) of a much
broader §1512, which itself consists of “a reticulated list of
nearly two dozen means of committing obstruction.” Ante,
at 11. However we might interpret Congress’s drafting
choices in other contexts, we should be wary of finding that
a statute addresses significant criminal conduct when none

of the available indicia of congressional intent, including
the prohibition’s placement, suggest that Congress in-
tended that result. Here, it beggars belief that Congress
would have inserted a breathtakingly broad, first-of-its-
kind criminal obstruction statute (accompanied by a sub-
stantial 20-year maximum penalty) in the midst of a signif-
icantly more granular series of obstruction prohibitions
without clarifying its intent to do so—not in the text of the
provision itself, nor in the surrounding statutory context,
nor in any statement issued during the enactment process.
* * *
In my view, the Court properly interprets §1512(c)(2) in
the opinion it issues today. It also rightly vacates the judg-
ment below and remands this case for further proceedings.
Joseph Fischer was charged with violating §1512(c)(2) by
corruptly obstructing “a proceeding before Congress, specif-
ically, Congress’s certification of the Electoral College vote.”
App. 183. That official proceeding plainly used certain rec-
ords, documents, or objects—including, among others, those
relating to the electoral votes themselves. See Tr. of Oral
Arg. 65–67. And it might well be that Fischer’s conduct, as
alleged here, involved the impairment (or the attempted
impairment) of the availability or integrity of things used
during the January 6 proceeding “in ways other than those
specified in (c)(1).” Ante, at 8. If so, then Fischer’s prosecu-
tion under §1512(c)(2) can, and should, proceed. That issue
remains available for the lower courts to determine on re-
mand.
Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 1
BARRETT, J., dissenting

_________________
No. 23–5572
_________________

UNITED STATES
[June 28, 2024]
JUSTICE BARRETT, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and

JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting.
Joseph Fischer allegedly joined a mob of rioters that
breached the Capitol on January 6, 2021. At the time, Con-
gress was meeting in a joint session to certify the Electoral
College results. The riot forced Congress to suspend the
proceeding, delaying it for several hours.
The Court does not dispute that Congress’s joint session
qualifies as an “official proceeding”; that rioters delayed the
proceeding; or even that Fischer’s alleged conduct (which
includes trespassing and a physical confrontation with law
enforcement) was part of a successful effort to forcibly halt
the certification of the election results. Given these prem-
ises, the case that Fischer can be tried for “obstructing, in-
fluencing, or impeding an official proceeding” seems open
and shut. So why does the Court hold otherwise?
Because it simply cannot believe that Congress meant
what it said. Section 1512(c)(2) is a very broad provision,
and admittedly, events like January 6th were not its target.
(Who could blame Congress for that failure of imagination?)
But statutes often go further than the problem that in-
spired them, and under the rules of statutory interpreta-
tion, we stick to the text anyway. The Court, abandoning
that approach, does textual backflips to find some way—
any way—to narrow the reach of subsection (c)(2). I re-

spectfully dissent.
I
The case for the Government’s interpretation is straight-
forward. It can be accomplished in three paragraphs, as
compared to the Court’s many, many more. Ante, at 4–12.
Start with the verbs: To “obstruct” and to “impede” mean
to “hinder” or “retard” something’s “passage” or “progress.”
10 Oxford English Dictionary 668 (2d ed. 1989); 7 id., at
705. We have previously explained that these words are
“broad.” Marinello v. United States, 584 U. S. 1, 7 (2018).
To “influence” is similarly expansive, meaning “[t]o affect
the condition of ” or “to have an effect on” something. 7 Ox-
ford English Dictionary, at 940. The object of these verbs is
an “official proceeding,” defined to include “a proceeding be-
fore the Congress.” 18 U. S. C. §1515(a)(1)(B).1 So (c)(2)
covers all sorts of actions that affect or interfere with official
proceedings.
“[O]therwise,” which introduces 18 U. S. C. §1512(c)(2),
does not narrow its scope. “Otherwise” means “in a differ-
ent manner,” “by other means,” or “in other respects.” 10
Oxford English Dictionary, at 984; Webster’s Third New In-
ternational Dictionary 1598 (2002). It is often used to in-
troduce a “catchall phras[e].” Texas Dept. of Housing and
Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, 576
U. S. 519, 535 (2015). Here, “otherwise” tells the reader
how (c)(1) and (c)(2) fit together. Subsection (c)(1) prohibits
“alter[ing], destroy[ing], mutilat[ing], or conceal[ing] a rec-
ord, document, or other object” with “intent to impair [its]
integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding.” In
other words, (c)(1) targets document and object spoliation—
——————
1 The D. C. Circuit held, and this Court does not dispute, that Con-
gress’s joint session on January 6, 2021, qualifies as an “ ‘official proceed-

ing.’ ” 64 F. 4th 329, 342 (2023).
Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 3
classic means of obstruction. Subsection (c)(2) then prohib-

its obstructing, influencing, or impeding an official proceed-
ing by means different from those specified in (c)(1), thereby
serving as a catchall. The “enumerated” crimes in (c)(1) and
the “unenumerated crimes” in (c)(2) are similar “on one spe-
cific dimension”: “the particular similarity specified after
the ‘otherwise.’ ” Begay v. United States, 553 U. S. 137,
150–151 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Here,
that means that each crime represents one means through
which to obstruct, influence, or impede an official proceed-
ing.
Joseph Fischer allegedly participated in a riot at the Cap-
itol that forced the delay of Congress’s joint session on Jan-
uary 6th. Blocking an official proceeding from moving for-
ward surely qualifies as obstructing or impeding the
proceeding by means other than document destruction.
Fischer’s alleged conduct thus falls within (c)(2)’s scope.
II
A
Opting for a narrower approach, the Court declines to
take (c)(2) on its own terms. Instead, it borrows the eviden-
tiary focus of (c)(1) to hold that a defendant violates (c)(2)
only by “impair[ing] the availability or integrity for use in
an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or . . .
other things used in the proceeding.” Ante, at 16. Other
means of obstructing a proceeding—say, by shutting it
down—are out.
This interpretation might sound faithful to the statute,
because the limit comes from a related provision rather
than thin air. But snipping words from one subsection and
grafting them onto another violates our normal interpretive
principles. “ ‘[W]e ordinarily resist reading words or ele-
ments into a statute that do not appear on its face.’ ” Dean
v. United States, 556 U. S. 568, 572 (2009) (quoting Bates v.
United States, 522 U. S. 23, 29 (1997)). And “ ‘[w]here Con-

gress includes particular language in one section of a stat-
ute but omits it in another section of the same Act,’ ” we
generally presume that Congress did so intentionally. Rus-
sello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting
United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F. 2d 720, 722 (CA5
1972) (per curiam)). The Court’s reasons for departing from
these rules are thin.
1
The Court begins with the noscitur a sociis and ejusdem
generis canons. Ante, at 5. The noscitur canon counsels
that “words grouped in a list should be given related mean-
ings.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law §31, p. 195
(2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is particu-
larly useful when interpreting “ ‘a word [that] is capable of
many meanings.’ ” McDonnell v. United States, 579 U. S.
550, 569 (2016) (quoting Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367
U. S. 303, 307 (1961)). See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,
513 U. S. 561, 573–575 (1995) (employing the canon to in-
terpret “communication” in the statutory list “ ‘prospectus,
notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication’ ”).
The ejusdem canon applies when “a catchall phrase” follows
“an enumeration of specifics, as in dogs, cats, horses, cattle,
and other animals.” Scalia & Garner §32, at 199. We often
interpret the catchall phrase to “embrace only objects simi-
lar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding
specific words.” Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U. S.
105, 115 (2001). See, e.g., Washington State Dept. of Social
and Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537
U. S. 371, 375, 385 (2003) (employing the canon to construe
the general term in the statutory list “ ‘execution, levy, at-
tachment, garnishment, or other legal process’ ”).
These canons are valuable tools. But applying either to
(c)(2) is like using a hammer to pound in a screw—it looks
like it might work, but using it botches the job. Unlike the
Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 5
pattern to which the noscitur canon applies, §1512(c) is not

a list of terms that includes an ambiguous word. So the
Court does not do what it does when applying noscitur: se-
lect between multiple accepted meanings of the words “ob-
structs,” “influences,” and “impedes.” Instead, it modifies
those words by adding an adverbial phrase: obstructs, in-
fluences or impedes by “impair[ing] the availability or in-
tegrity for use in an official proceeding of records, docu-
ments, or objects.” Ante, at 16 (emphasis added). The
ejusdem canon is an equally poor fit. Unlike the pattern to
which ejusdem applies, (c)(2) is “not a general or collective
term following a list of specific items to which a particular
statutory command is applicable.” United States v. Aguilar,
515 U. S. 593, 615 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Instead, (c)(1) and (c)(2) are “distinct
and independent prohibitions.” Ibid. Though they share a
subject and an adverb—“[w]hoever corruptly”—the two
clauses contain different verbs that take different objects.
§1512(c). Moreover, (c)(1) has a separate mens rea provi-
sion that further disrupts the connection between the
clauses.
To my knowledge, we have never applied either of these
canons to a statute resembling §1512(c). Rather than iden-
tify such a case, the Court invents examples of a sign at the
zoo and a football league rule. Ante, at 5–6. The zoo exam-
ple (“do not pet, feed, yell or throw objects at the animals,
or otherwise disturb them”) does not help, because it mim-
ics the typical ejusdem format of specific words followed by
a catchall. The list of specific verbs makes clear that the
cleanup phrase (“otherwise disturb”) is limited to conduct
that involves direct interaction with the animals. But in
the absence of a laundry list followed by a catchall, it is hard
to see why the ejusdem canon fits. Ali v. Federal Bureau of
Prisons, 552 U. S. 214, 225 (2008) (“The absence of a list of
specific items undercuts the inference embodied in ejusdem
generis that Congress remained focused on the common at-

tribute when it used the catchall phrase”). And §1512(c)
does not follow the laundry-list-plus-catchall pattern.
The Court’s football example is only slightly better. As a
refresher:
“[A] football league might adopt a rule that players
must not ‘grab, twist, or pull a facemask, helmet, or
other equipment with the intent to injure a player, or
otherwise attack, assault, or harm any player.’ If a
linebacker shouts insults at the quarterback and hurts
his feelings, has the linebacker nonetheless followed
the rule? Of course he has. The examples of prohibited
actions all concern dangerous physical conduct that
might inflict bodily harm; trash talk is simply not of
that kind.” Ante, at 6.
Put aside that it is hard to imagine anyone describing
“trash talk” as inflicting an “injury” or “harming” a player
in a football game. The league rule plainly forecloses the
possibility. Consistent with the noscitur canon, “harm”
takes its meaning from its companions “attack” and “as-
sault.” And while the Court tries to track §1512(c)’s struc-
ture by adding an extra intent clause, the two clauses in its
example are still tightly focused on actions directed at the
player. (After all, who is wearing the facemask, helmet, or
other equipment?) Given that shared theme, it is easy to
understand that the first clause’s focus on physical conduct
limits the (only slightly) more general clause. But
§1512(c)’s subsections are not so closely related—(c)(1) fo-
cuses specifically on objects in a proceeding, and (c)(2)
broadens the lens to the proceeding itself.
Consider a rule that actually mirrors §1512(c):
“Any player who:
“(1) punches, chokes, or kicks an opposing player
with the intent to remove him from the game; or
“(2) otherwise interrupts, hinders, or interferes with
Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 7
the game,
“shall be suspended.”
While the specific verbs in the first clause involve actions
directed at an opposing player, the second clause is a sepa-
rate prohibition with an entirely different object. Imagine
that, just before the opposing team’s kicker attempts a field
goal, players leave the sidelines and storm the field, some
tackling referees in the process. Those players have surely
“interrupt[ed], hinder[ed], or interfer[ed] with the game,”
even though they have not physically injured any opponent.
This hypothetical, not the Court’s, is analogous to
§1512(c)—and it supports the Government’s interpretation.
2
The Court next recruits help from Begay, which inter-
prets an “otherwise” clause in the Armed Career Criminal
Act. Ante, at 6; 553 U. S., at 140. The ACCA defines a “vi-
olent felony” as a felony that “is burglary, arson, or extor-
tion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves con-
duct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury.” 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Begay holds that the
example crimes limit the catchall clause to “crimes that are
roughly similar . . . to the examples themselves.” 553 U. S.,
at 143. So too here, the Court reasons, the list of crimes in
(c)(1) limits the “otherwise” clause in (c)(2).
But §1512(c) is structured differently than the statute in
Begay. While §1512(c) contains two distinct criminal pro-
hibitions—(c)(1) and (c)(2)—the statutory definition in Be-
gay contained a list of examples followed immediately by a
residual clause. The latter structure more readily supports
interpreting the general clause in light of the specifics,
much like a statute to which the ejusdem canon would ap-
ply. Moreover, the residual clause at issue in Begay called
out for a limiting principle—what is a “serious potential
risk of physical injury?” The breadth itself was a cue that
the interpreter should read back to find some limit. See id.,
at 142–143. Subsection (c)(2)’s “otherwise” clause, by con-
trast, stands on its own.
Postscript: Seven years after Begay was decided, we held
ACCA’s residual clause void for vagueness. Johnson v.
United States, 576 U. S. 591, 597 (2015). So the clause is
not only distinguishable, but also a poor model for statutory
interpretation.
3
The Court argues that “there would have been scant rea-
son for Congress to provide any specific examples” in (c)(1)
if (c)(2) covered all forms of obstructive conduct. Ante, at 8.
Conduct like destroying and concealing records “obstructs,
influences, or impedes a[n] official proceeding,” so Congress
could have enacted just (c)(2) and been done with it. On the
Government’s interpretation, the Court asserts, the second
prohibition swallows the first. If (c)(1) has any function, it
must be to cast light (and impose limits) on (c)(2).
What the Court does not say is that its rewrite also elim-
inates the need for (c)(1)’s examples. The Court’s interpre-
tation assumes that Congress used a convoluted, two-step
approach to enact a prohibition on “impair[ing] the integ-
rity or availability of records, documents, or other objects
for use in an official proceeding.” So why didn’t Congress
just say that? And if the Court is right about what (c)(2)
means, why do we need the specific examples in (c)(1)?
Those acts are already covered. The problem of (c)(2) sub-
suming (c)(1) is therefore not unique to my theory.
It bears emphasis, though, that the broad overlap makes
sense, given the statute’s backstory. When the Enron scan-
dal occurred, Congress (along with the general public) was
taken aback to discover that seemingly criminal conduct
was actually not a federal crime. As it then existed, §1512
had a loophole: It imposed liability on those who persuaded
others to destroy documents, but not on the people who
Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 9
themselves destroyed documents. Ante, at 9–10. Congress

enacted §1512(c) to close this “Enron gap.” Subsection (c)(1)
deals with the particular problem at hand—document de-
struction. Subsection (c)(2) reflects Congress’s desire to
avoid future surprises: It is “a catchall for matters not spe-
cifically contemplated—known unknowns.” Republic of
Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U. S. 848, 860 (2009).
So contrary to the Court’s suggestion, it would not be “pe-
culiar” for (c)(2) to cover conduct “far beyond the document
shredding and similar scenarios that prompted the legisla-
tion in the first place.” Ante, at 10. Enron exposed more
than the need to prohibit evidence spoliation—it also ex-
posed the need to close statutory gaps. And in any event,
statutes often reach beyond the “principal evil” that ani-
mated them. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,
523 U. S. 75, 79 (1998). That is not grounds for narrowing
them, because “it is ultimately the provisions of our laws
rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by
which we are governed.” Ibid.
4
While the Court insists that (c)(1) limits (c)(2), it cannot
seem to settle on the “common attribute” in the first subsec-
tion that cabins the second. See Ali, 552 U. S., at 225. On
one hand, the Court says that “(c)(2) makes it a crime to
impair the availability or integrity of records, documents, or
objects used in an official proceeding.” Ante, at 8 (emphasis
added). This “physical evidence” limitation tracks the Dis-
trict Court’s interpretation. See United States v. Miller, 589
F. Supp. 3d 60, 78 (DC 2022). On the other hand, the Court
says that (c)(2) prohibits “impairing the availability or in-
tegrity of other things used in an official proceeding,” such
as “witness testimony” or “intangible information.” Ante, at
9. This broader “evidence impairment” theory resembles
Judge Katsas’s interpretation. 64 F. 4th 329, 363 (CADC
2023) (dissenting opinion).
Both formulations are problematic—and not only because

both are atextual. The first, focused solely on physical
items, would leave (c)(2) with almost no work to do. Sub-
section (c)(1) already prohibits “alter[ing], destroy[ing], mu-
tilat[ing], or conceal[ing]” documents, records, or objects.
This essentially covers the waterfront of acts that impair
the integrity or availability of objects. True, (c)(2) could also
encompass “cover[ing] up, falsif[ying], or mak[ing] a false
entry in” a record or document. See 18 U. S. C. §1519. But
it seems “unlikely” that Congress used the “expansive” lan-
guage of (c)(2) “to address such narrow concerns.” 64 F. 4th,
at 344. The somewhat amorphous “other things” limitation
has the benefit of giving (c)(2) a wider berth, but it is un-
clear how the Court landed on it. The term does not appear
in (c)(1) or in §1512’s surrounding subsections, which refer
specifically to records, documents, objects, and testimony.
The “other things” formulation comes from the Court, not
Congress.
The Court’s uncertainty about the relevant “common at-
tribute” is a tell that Congress did not intend to define (c)(2)
by reference to (c)(1). Indeed, “[h]ad Congress intended to
limit [§1512(c)(2)]’s reach” as the Court asserts, it “easily
could have written” the catchall to say “otherwise impair
the integrity or availability of records, documents, objects,
or other things for use in an official proceeding.” Ali, 552
U. S., at 227; see ante, at 8–9.2 It did not, and we should
not pretend that it did.
B
The Court relies on statutory context to “confir[m] that
——————
2 Indeed, Congress could have looked to 18 U. S. C. §1505 as a model.
That statute makes it a crime to “willfully withhol[d], misrepresen[t],

remov[e] from any place, concea[l], cove[r] up, destro[y], mutilat[e],
alte[r], or by other means falsif[y] any documentary material, answers to
written interrogatories, or oral testimony” with the intent to obstruct
“any civil investigative demand.” §1505 (emphasis added).
Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 11
(c)(2) is limited by the scope of (c)(1).” Ante, at 10. As the

Court sees it, interpreting (c)(2) according to its plain text
would render other obstruction provisions, within §1512
and throughout Chapter 73, superfluous. Ante, at 10–12.
The Court exaggerates. Subsection (c)(2) applies only to
conduct that obstructs an “official proceeding.” The Court
highlights several provisions that cover obstruction of in-
vestigations. See, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §§1510(a), 1511(a), 1516,
1517, 1518, 1519. The circuits have held that criminal in-
vestigations do not qualify as “official proceedings.” See,
e.g., United States v. Ermoian, 752 F. 3d 1165, 1172 (CA9
2013); United States v. Ramos, 537 F. 3d 439, 463 (CA5
2008). Likewise, not every provision in §1512 relates to an
official proceeding; instead, several target the obstruction
of communications to judges and law enforcement about the
commission of federal offenses. 18 U. S. C. §§1512(a)(1)(C),
(a)(2)(C), (b)(3), (d)(1)(2).
The Court responds by stressing that for purposes of
§1512, “an official proceeding need not be pending or about
to be instituted.” §1512(f )(1); ante, at 13. Because obstruc-
tion of investigations or communications could end up ob-
structing the initiation of a future official proceeding, the
Court reasons that (c)(2) may still swallow those other pro-
visions. But we have previously construed federal obstruc-
tion offenses similar to §1512(c) to require a tighter link be-
tween the obstructive conduct and the relevant proceeding.
Under the “nexus” requirement, the defendant’s conduct
must have a “relationship in time, causation, or logic” with
the proceeding. Aguilar, 515 U. S., at 599 (adopting nexus
requirement for §1503’s omnibus clause). And the defend-
ant must act in “contemplation” of a “particular official pro-
ceeding.” Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U. S.
696, 708 (2005) (adopting nexus requirement for
§1512(b)(2)). The circuits have unanimously applied this
requirement to §1512(c). See United States v. Young, 916
F. 3d 368, 386 (CA4 2019) (collecting cases). This element
eliminates much of the overlap that the Court perceives be-

tween (c)(2) and the provisions that do not require an “offi-
cial proceeding.”
Moreover, §§1512(a)(1)(A) and (d)(1) prohibit preventing
the mere attendance of any person in an official proceeding.
Preventing attendance will not always have the effect of ob-
structing, influencing, or impeding the proceeding. And
§1512(d)(1) makes it a crime to intentionally harass some-
one and thereby dissuade her from testifying in an official
proceeding. In contrast to (c)(2), this provision—which car-
ries a significantly lower maximum penalty—does not re-
quire a defendant to act “corruptly.”
This is not to deny that (c)(2)—if allowed its broad, ordi-
nary meaning—overlaps with several offenses in Chapter
73. See ante, at 10–11. Even so, (c)(2) still leaves a healthy
amount of work for other obstruction offenses. And besides,
“substantial” overlap “is not uncommon in criminal stat-
utes.” Loughrin v. United States, 573 U. S. 351, 358, n. 4
(2014); see also Hubbard v. United States, 514 U. S. 695,
714, n. 14 (1995) (opinion of Stevens, J.). “The mere fact
that two federal criminal statutes criminalize similar con-
duct says little about the scope of either.” Pasquantino v.
United States, 544 U. S. 349, 358, n. 4 (2005). That is espe-
cially true here, because Congress enacted (c)(2) after it had
already enacted other subsections of §1512, as well as ob-
struction offenses like §§1503 and 1505. The redundancy
argument would have more force if (c)(2) “render[ed] super-
fluous an entire provision passed in proximity as part of the
same Act.” Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 543 (2015)
(plurality opinion) (emphasis added). As it stands, the
canon against surplusage does not provide any reason to ar-
tificially narrow (c)(2)’s scope.
In any event, the Court’s formulation does not begin to
cure the statutory overlap. Killing a person with the intent
to prevent the production of a record in an official proceed-
ing constitutes conduct that impairs the availability of a
Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 13
record for an official proceeding. 18 U. S. C. §1512(a)(1)(B).

Using physical force against a person to influence testi-
mony in an official proceeding counts as impairing the in-
tegrity of “other things” used in an official proceeding.
§1512(a)(2)(A). And impairing the availability or integrity
of documents for use in an official proceeding will often “in-
fluenc[e], obstruc[t], or imped[e] . . . the due administration
of justice.” §1503(a); see also §1515(a)(1)(A) (“ ‘official pro-
ceeding’ ” includes “a proceeding before a judge or court of
the United States”). Examples abound. See, e.g., §§1505,
1512(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(B), (b)(1), (b)(2), (d)(1). “[T]he canon
against surplusage merely favors that interpretation which
avoids surplusage”—and on that score, the Court’s inter-
pretation fares no better than mine. Freeman v. Quicken
Loans, Inc., 566 U. S. 624, 635 (2012).
In fact, the broader statutory context works against the
Court’s interpretation. Congress did not select the verbs
“obstruct,” “influence,” and “impede” at random. Those
words were already in §1503, which prohibits “corruptly or
by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or commu-
nication, influenc[ing], obstruct[ing], or imped[ing] . . . the
due administration of justice.” We have described this
“ ‘Omnibus Clause’ ” as a “catchall,” because it follows sev-
eral specific proscriptions against coercive behavior toward
jurors and court officers. Aguilar, 515 U. S., at 598. Courts
have routinely declined to “rea[d] the omnibus clause” as
limited to “acts similar in manner to those prescribed by the
statute’s specific language.” United States v. Howard, 569
F. 2d 1331, 1333, 1335 (CA5 1978) (collecting cases). And
Justice Scalia agreed that ejusdem generis did not apply to
limit the Omnibus Clause, “one of the several distinct and
independent prohibitions contained in §1503 that share
only the word ‘Whoever,’ which begins the statute, and the
penalty provision which ends it.” Aguilar, 515 U. S., at 615
(opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). Section
1512(c) follows the very same pattern.
C
The Court concludes with an appeal to consequences:
Construing (c)(2) broadly would “expos[e] activists and lob-
byists alike to decades in prison.” Ante, at 14. This fear is
overstated.
To begin with, the Court ignores that (c)(2) requires proof
that a defendant acted “corruptly.” The meaning of this
term is unsettled, but all of its possible definitions limit the
scope of liability. On one proposed interpretation, a defend-
ant acts corruptly by “ ‘us[ing] unlawful means, or act[ing]
with an unlawful purpose, or both.’ ” United States v. Rob-
ertson, 103 F. 4th 1, 8 (CADC 2023) (approving jury instruc-
tions for (c)(2)). On another, a defendant acts “corruptly” if
he “act[s] ‘with an intent to procure an unlawful benefit ei-
ther for himself or for some other person.’ ” 64 F. 4th, at 352
(Walker, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(quoting Marinello, 584 U. S., at 21; alterations omitted).
Under either, the “corruptly” element should screen out in-
nocent activists and lobbyists who engage in lawful activity.
And if not, those defendants can bring as-applied First
Amendment challenges.
The Court also emphasizes (c)(2)’s 20-year maximum
penalty. Ante, at 14–15. But it simultaneously “glosses
over the absence of any prescribed minimum.” Yates, 574
U. S., at 569 (KAGAN, J., dissenting). “Congress presuma-
bly enacts laws with high maximums and no minimums
when it thinks the prohibited conduct may run the gamut
from major to minor.” Ibid. Indeed, given the breadth of
its terms, (c)(2) naturally encompasses actions that range
in severity. Congress presumably trusted District Courts
to impose sentences commensurate with the defendant’s
particular conduct.
* * *
There is no getting around it: Section 1512(c)(2) is an ex-
pansive statute. Yet Congress, not this Court, weighs the
Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 15
“pros and cons of whether a statute should sweep broadly

or narrowly.” United States v. Rodgers, 466 U. S. 475, 484
(1984). Once Congress has set the outer bounds of liability,
the Executive Branch has the discretion to select particular
cases to prosecute within those boundaries. By atextually
narrowing §1512(c)(2), the Court has failed to respect the
prerogatives of the political branches. Cf. ante, at 15. I re-
spectfully dissent.

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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2023 1

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FISCHER v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

No. 23–5572. Argued April 16, 2024—Decided June 28, 2024

words,” Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 536 (plurality opinion),

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS,

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

JOSEPH W. FISCHER, PETITIONER v.

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the

Opinion of the Court

“forced entry” into the building, “breaking windows,” and

Opinion of the Court

A divided panel of the D. C. Circuit reversed and re-

Opinion of the Court

consider both “the specific context” in which (c)(2) appears

Opinion of the Court

(c)(2) could well have a narrower scope if Congress designed

Opinion of the Court

would be implausible to assume those activities were pro-

Opinion of the Court

present a serious risk of physical injury, such an offense

Opinion of the Court

sible inference is that the scope of (c)(2) is defined by refer-

Opinion of the Court

is possible to violate (c)(2) by creating false evidence—ra-

Opinion of the Court

auditor, Arthur Andersen LLP, had systematically de-

Opinion of the Court

corruptly obstructs congressional inquiries or investiga-

Opinion of the Court

three years’ imprisonment for someone who harasses an-

prescribed minimum.’ ” Post, at 14 (quoting Yates, 574 U. S., at 569

Opinion of the Court

never persuasively explains how “knowingly us[ing ] intim-

Opinion of the Court

The dissent tries to solve this surplusage problem by ar-

Opinion of the Court

derscore[ ] the implausibility of the Government’s interpre-

Opinion of the Court

crimes, giving prosecutors broad discretion to seek a 20-

JACKSON, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

JOSEPH W. FISCHER, PETITIONER v.

JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring.

JACKSON, J., concurring

Notwithstanding the shocking circumstances involved in

JACKSON, J., concurring

attack, assault, or harm any player,’ ” should not be inter-

JACKSON, J., concurring

The upshot is that, when interpreting the scope of a par-

JACKSON, J., concurring

JACKSON, J., concurring

justice.” Ante, at 15.3 Meanwhile, many States have done

statute if it so chose. “We have traditionally exercised restraint in as-

obstructing government operations if he intentionally obstructs, impairs,

JACKSON, J., concurring

result, these types of obstruction crimes are generally pun-

JACKSON, J., concurring

a statute addresses significant criminal conduct when none