NON-JUDICIAL REDRESS MECHANISMS REPORT SERIES 5

POSCO’s Odisha Project

OECD National Contact Point complaints
and a decade of resistance

Dr Samantha Balaton-Chrimes
Deakin UniverSity
­About­this­report­series
this report is part of a series produced by the non-Judicial Human rights redress Mechanisms
Project, which draws on the findings of five years of research. the findings are based on over 587
interviews, with 1,100 individuals, across the countries and case studies covered by the research. non-
judicial redress mechanisms are mandated to receive complaints and mediate grievances, but are not
empowered to produce legally binding adjudications. the focus of the project is on analysing the
effectiveness of these mechanisms in responding to alleged human rights violations associated with
transnational business activity. the series presents lessons and recommendations regarding ways that:
• non-judicial mechanisms can provide redress and justice to vulnerable communities and
workers
• non-government organisations and worker representatives can more effectively utilise the
mechanisms to provide support for and represent vulnerable communities and workers
• redress mechanisms can contribute to long-term and sustainable respect and remedy of
human rights by businesses throughout their operations, supply chains and other business re-
lationships.
the non-Judicial Human rights redress Mechanisms Project is an academic research collaboration
between the University of Melbourne, Monash University, the University of newcastle, rMit University,
Deakin University and the University of essex. the project was funded by the australian research
Council with support provided by a number of non-government organisations, including COre
Coalition Uk, HomeWorkers Worldwide, Oxfam australia and actionaid australia. Principal
researchers on the team include Dr Samantha Balaton-Chrimes, Dr tim Connor, Dr annie Delaney,
Prof Fiona Haines, Dr kate Macdonald, Dr Shelley Marshall, May Miller-Dawkins and Sarah rennie.
the project was coordinated by Dr kate Macdonald and Dr Shelley Marshall. the reports represent
independent scholarly contributions to the relevant debates. the views expressed are those of the
authors and not necessarily those of the organisations that provided support.
this report was authored by Dr Samantha Balaton-Chrimes.
Correspondence concerning this report should be directed to Dr. Balaton-Chrimes via [email protected]
(email) or @SbcsbcC (twitter).

© 2015 Samantha Balaton-Chrimes. POSCO’s Odisha project: OECD National Contact Point complaints
and a decade of resistance is published under an unported Creative Commons attribution non-
commercial Share alike (CC-By-nC-Sa) licence, details of which can be found at
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/

[email protected]
https://twitter.com/caresearch_au
corporateaccountabilityresearch.net

2
Acronyms

aBP/aPG Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds/Algemene Pensioen Groep - Dutch

Pension Fund
BJD Biju Janata Dal
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party
FDi Foreign Direct investment
Fra the Scheduled tribes and Other traditional Forest Dwellers (recognition
of Forest rights) act, 2006
iDCO industrial infrastructure Development Corporation (Odisha)
kHiS korean House for international Solidarity
LiFe Legal initiative for Forests and environment
MtPa Million tons Per annum
nBiM norges Bank investment Management – norwegian Pension Fund
nCP national Contact Point
nGO non-Government Organisation
nGt national Green tribunal
nHrC national Human rights Commission (india)
nyU new york University
OeCD Organisation for economic Cooperation and Development
OtFD Other traditional Forest Dwellers
PPSS Posco Pratirodh Sangram Samiti
SOMO Stichting Onderzoek Multinationale Ondernemingen - Centre for research
on Multinational Corporations
tUaC trade Union advisory Committee
Uk United kingdom
Un United nations
UnOHCHr United nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human rights
US/USa United States (of america)

3
Lists­of­figures,­tables­and­boxes

List of tables

Table 1: POSCO case summary 11

Table 2: Avenues of resistance and remedy 23

List of figures

Figure 1: Anti-POSCO People’s Movement Protests, June 2011 29

List of Boxes

Box 1: Summary of proposed POSCO project 14

Box 2: Affected communities 18
Box 3: Some of PPSS’ closest supporters and their key activities 30
Box 4: Significant international organisations opposing POSCO’s
Odisha project 31
Box 5: Role of international groups in NCP complaints 34
Box 6: Summary of direct NCP outcomes 36

4
Executive­Summary
in 2005, korean steel giant POSCO signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Odisha
state government in india to build a US$12billion integrated steel project, involving a plant, mine
and associated infrastructure. For the ten years since then the project has faced strong opposition
from the communities affected by the proposed steel plant, who do not want to relinquish their
agricultural lands and face displacement. the conflict between the company and the communi-
ties has escalated in that time, and has involved multiple incidents of violence and intimidation
by police and other actors against anti-POSCO protestors, and filing of hundreds of criminal
cases against protesters, the legality of which has been called into question. this is a case not
only of human rights risks and harms, but also, much more broadly, of contests over development
agendas, and who gets to set them.
the POSCO project has faced multiple domestic judicial and regulatory hurdles in relation to
clearance to divert forest land (on which communities reside) for non-forest purposes, envi-
ronmental clearances, land acquisition and prospecting licences for iron ore. Some of these are
still ongoing. at the same time, the anti-POSCO Peoples’ Movement (PPSS) has engaged in
non-violent direct action, such as blockades, to prevent land acquisition, and has gained support
from a broad informal network of civil society activists in Odisha, india, korea, the United
States (US) and europe.
together, the political mobilization and judicial challenges have stalled the progress of the POSCO
project for a decade, but the conflict remains unresolved. POSCO has not categorically committed
to relocating or stopping its project, as PPSS aims for. at the time of writing, POSCO has acquired
a significant portion, but not all, of the land it needs for the plant. no construction has begun at
this stage, most likely because the company is still waiting on prospecting licences for iron ore.

The­OECD­NCP­process
in October 2012, Bhubaneshwar-based group Lok Shakti abhiyan, with international supporters
filed a complaint to the Organisation for economic Cooperation and Development (OeCD)
national Contact Points (nCP) in South korea, the netherlands and norway. the complaint
alleged that POSCO had not conducted due diligence or meaningful stakeholder negotiation
regarding the human rights and environmental impact of its proposed project, particularly the
required land acquisition, and had failed to seek to prevent or mitigate the human rights abuses
committed by the indian state in its violent efforts to acquire land for POSCO. the complaint
also argues that minority shareholders, the Dutch Pension Fund Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioen-
fonds/Algemene Pensioen Groep (aBP/aPG) and the norwegian Pension Fund Norges Bank In-
vestment Management (nBiM), should exercise leverage over POSCO to address these human
rights concerns, and consider divestment if that fails.
the nCP processes had mixed outcomes. the korean nCP rejected the case, and the norwe-
gian Pension Fund refused to cooperate. the Dutch process facilitated discussion between
aBP/aPG, the complainants’ representatives and, ultimately, POSCO, with the objective of
launching a fact-finding mission, which could then form the basis of a dialogue. However, par-
ties could not agree to the terms of the mission, and the complainants refused to engage in di-
alogue while land acquisition was ongoing, and in the absence of a fact-finding mission.

5
the major success of this nCP process is a purely policy-based one: it established that minority
shareholders have obligations regarding due diligence and facilitating access to remedy in the
event of human rights harms to which it is directly connected (even if it has not directly caused
or contributed to those harms). this raises the possibility of engaging minority shareholders,
particularly those, like national pension funds, that have unique forms of leverage, to pressure
companies engaged in human rights harms.
However, the nCP case also demonstrated that there is a lack of functional equivalence between
nCPs, as all three generated different outcomes. OeCD Watch argues that there is an ongoing
and urgent need for all nCPs to be functionally equivalent at the most robust levels of complaint
handling.
Furthermore, the failure to launch a fact-finding mission represents a missed opportunity to
make a positive impact on human rights fulfilment in Odisha. in a context where most of the
information about the project is controlled by POSCO and the largely pro-POSCO government,
and there is very little publicly available information about human rights impacts, it is unrea-
sonable for the nCP to expect communities to engage in dialogue based on such information.
this pressure demonstrates a failure to appreciate the importance of the political and economic
context for the possibilities regarding the resolution of a dispute.
in relation to the OeCD nCP process, the report therefore finds that despite some reasonable efforts
from the Dutch and norwegian nCPs, the nCP process made no identifiable positive contributions
to protecting, respecting or remedying the human rights concerns directly raised in the complaint.

Enabling­and­constraining­resistance­and­remedy
this report also examines the broader context in which the communities affected by POSCO
have sought remedy for past harms, and sought to resist future harms associated with land ac-
quisition. the report finds that the major constraints to resistance and remedy more broadly,
including but not limited to the nCP process, in this case pertain to:
• the political economy of the Odisha context, where all authoritative arms of government
are supportive of the project
• an environment of insecurity and intimidation that acts to suppress opposition to the project
• inadequate provision of information about the project’s impacts, particularly in relation
to social impacts and human rights
the report finds that the significant factors enabling resistance and remedy in this case pertain to:
• the resilience and strength of opposition to the project in the affected area
• the strength of local leadership and organization, including in the form of networks
of civil society support from other similar movements across india
• the availability of a socially and environmentally progressive judicial body, the national
Green tribunal (nGt), and a team of legal activists able to engage it
• the multi-pronged support of transnational civil society

6
Local residents in Odisha, women and children in front, sit in protest of the construction of POSCO’s steel plant in
India. Source: PPSS personal communication.

the report also finds that:

the international business and human rights discourse has had ambivalent effects in
this case. it has led POSCO, which was previously inexperienced in this area, to develop
some voluntary human rights commitments, but has not led to any tangible changes
in its business behaviour in india. Furthermore, it may have equipped POSCO with
tools to deflect criticism without making changes on the ground, thereby having an ul-
timately damaging effect on human rights fulfilment.

7
Table of Contents

Introduction 09
Methodology 10
POSCO’s Odisha project 12
Affected communities and human rights issues 14
Forcible displacement 15
Inadequate compensation 16
Obstruction of efforts to acquire Other
Traditional Forest Dweller status 17
Inadequate consultation and no consent 17
Government sponsored violence, intimidation
and questionable criminal charges 18
Environmental risks 20
Pro-POSCO villagers 21
Resistance and access to remedy: contesting
development and human rights harms 22
Legal and regulatory avenues 22
Domestic political mobilization: Anti-POSCO
People’s Movement (PPSS) and its supporters 27
Transnational civil society mobilization 30
Other avenues 33
OECD NCP process 33
Independent review assessment panel
and dialogue 37
Functional equivalence and coordination
of NCPs 39
Minority shareholding 41
The current state of play: mixed and uncertain
outcomes from multiple grievance channels 43
Factors influencing resistance and access to remedy 44
Factors constraining resistance and access to remedy 44
Political economy 44
Insecurity, intimidation and coercion 48
Inadequate information 49
Factors enabling resistance and access to remedy 50
Resilience and opposition 50
Strong local communities and organizing capacity 51
Local legal support and progressive NGT 51
Transnational multi-pronged solidarity 52
What difference did the NCPs make?: The ambivalent effects of
the international business and human rights regime 54
Lessons learnt 56
For OECD National Contact Points 56
For communities and their supporters 57
For business 58
References 59

8
Introduction
the POSCO project in Odisha is one of the most controversial industrial developments in india’s
recent history, mired in multiple layers of increasingly heightened political tensions reaching
from local villages, up through the state of Odisha to the Union of india government, and across
to korea, the US and europe. With an estimated value of US$12 billion, this project would be the
biggest foreign direct investment ever in india and has support from almost all arms of indian
and korean governments, with particularly strong support at the Odisha state government level.
the dispute between POSCO and local communities relates to land acquisition and environmental
risks. in formal terms this conflict has largely revolved around environmental impact assessments
and other administrative details, but more centrally it has been a battle over different notions of
development, and competing aspirations for the land at the proposed project site. this battle is
taking place in a highly unusual political context: Odisha is industrializing at a rapid rate, but
this approach to development has been heavily opposed by a strong and experienced network
of anti-displacement movements who protest ‘growth without inclusion’ and the severe negative
social and economic effects of displacement (Panda, 2008; Dash and Samal, 2008). at the same
time, there is a widespread consensus among Odisha’s middle class and elite that industrialization
is the key to economic growth and poverty reduction, and the media and politicians seek to
portray those who oppose industrialization as obstructing these goals.
the opposition to the project has been spearheaded by POSCO Pratirodh Sangram Samiti
(PPSS, anti-POSCO People’s Movement), a movement based in the villages that will be displaced
for the steel plant. Since a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between POSCO
and the Odisha government in 2005, the company has been held at bay partly by PPSS’ non-
violent direct action protests against land acquisition, combined with supporting activists’ use of
administrative and judicial appeals and domestic and transnational campaigning.
More recently, since around 2012, civil society groups, particularly human rights groups,
working in solidarity with PPSS at the state, national and international levels have begun to
pursue more formal channels of complaint making. this includes a complaint to the South
korean Organisation for economic Cooperation and Development (OeCD) national Contact
Point (nCP)1 (regarding POSCO) and the Dutch and norwegian nCPs regarding their national
pension fund investments in POSCO. the complaint had mixed outcomes, and a meaningful
process was only pursued through the Dutch nCP. attempts were made to establish a fact-
finding mission and subsequent dialogue between the parties, including POSCO. However, no
agreement could made on the mission and the process stalled. Consequently, the nCP case has
had no tangible impact on human rights fulfilment in this case. it did, however, establish that
minority shareholders have obligations regarding due diligence and facilitating access to remedy
in the event of human rights harms to which it is directly connected (even if it has not directly
caused or contributed to those harms), a precedent that could be useful in future campaigns.

1
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises require OECD NCPs to be established in every
OECD member state in order to promote the Guidelines and receive complaints (termed ‘specific
instances’) about OECD businesses or business operations in OECD countries.

9
at the time of writing (June 2015), construction on the POSCO project has still not commenced,
but nor has it been cancelled. Some but not all the required land has been acquired for the plant,
but the company is not proceeding with works until it has secured a mining licence for the iron
ore. PPSS continues to struggle against POSCO and the Odisha state government through protest
actions and legal cases related to forest clearances, with the support of human rights groups.
after outlining the POSCO Odisha project, a profile of the affected communities and the
human rights concerns this project raises, this report evaluates four key avenues of resistance
and the pursuit of remedy: domestic legal and regulatory channels, domestic political
mobilization, transnational civil society mobilization, and the OeCD nCP process. the report
concludes with an analysis of the factors that have enabled and constrained resistance (to the
project) and access to remedy (for the violence, intimidation and irregular land acquisition),
and some lessons learned about the use of transnational, non-judicial grievance mechanisms.
the focus throughout the report is on the opposition to the project in Jagatsinghpur district,
where the proposed steel plant is to be constructed. it is beyond the scope of this report to
explore resistance to the mining project in the khandhadhar hills, beyond a brief introduction.
importantly, this report explores both avenues of resistance and avenues through which remedy
has been sought, as grievances relate both to concerns about future harms, and appeals for
remedy of harms that have already taken place throughout the ten years since the project was
agreed with government.

­Methodology
this report is part of a series based on the findings of a three-year australian research Council
Linkage Project analysing the effectiveness of non-judicial grievance mechanisms in responding
to human rights concerns in which transnational business activity is involved. We adopt a
broad definition of non-judicial grievance mechanisms, namely, those that are mandated to
receive complaints, but are not empowered to produce legally binding adjudications. in
examining grievance mechanisms, the project considers which factors have contributed to
more or less effective outcomes, prioritising the perspectives of the adversely impacted workers
and communities seeking redress.

this case study is the companion to another report in this series, The National Contact Point
report, which compares the POSCO case with the complaints made to the Uk nCP about Uk
mining company vedanta. the vedanta case study report will also be relevant companion
reading, as it details a similar struggle, on the part of the Dongria kondh adivasi or ‘tribal’
peoples of niyamgiri, also in Odisha.

this report is informed by extensive semi-structured interviews with more than 40 people
over three visits to Odisha (in March 2012, December 2012 and December 2013) and korea
(in november 2012). these interviews were with company officials, members of PPSS, civil
society organisations in india and beyond, and other relevant experts, such as journalists. in
addition, information is drawn from relevant secondary research, including online media
articles, civil society organisations and company websites, and judicial documents.

10
Table 1: POSCO case summary

• South korean nCP (re. POSCO); norwegian nCP (re. nBiM invest-
ment in POSCO); Dutch nCP (re. aBP/aPG investment in POSCO)
• Domestic legal avenues, including national Green tribunal (nGt)
Resistance­and­redress and Odisha High Court
strategies • Domestic political mobilisation (PPSS)
• transnational civil society mobilisation
• various other mechanisms, including national Human rights
Commission (nHrC)

• Forcible displacement
• Government sponsored violence, intimidation and questionable
Human­rights­issues criminal charges
• environmental risks

• POSCO and its wholly owned subsidiary POSCO india

Companies • Dutch Pension Fund (aBP/aPG)2
• norwegian Pension Fund (nBiM)3

• affected by the steel plant in Jagatsinghpur district:

• 8 villages in the three gram panchayats of Dhinkia, Gobindapur and
Gadakujanga, a total population of 22 000 people.4
Affected­people • affected by proposed mines in keonjhar and Sundargarh districts:
• 32 villages in keonjhar, and 84 villages in Sundargarh, predominantly
scheduled tribes (Mining Zone Peoples’ Solidarity Group, 2010: ii).
• all facing potential physical and/or economic displacement.

• a 12 Million tons Per annum (MtP) green field steel plant, captive
mine(s), and associated infrastructure, including a captive port and
Business­project townships at plant and mine sites.
• US$12 billion investment – biggest Foreign Direct investment (FDi)
ever in india.

• POSCO has unrelated business activities in australia, including in

Connections­outside the controversial adani coal mining project in the Galilee Basin,
India­and­Korea,­in- Queensland, where POSCO is commissioned to build the railway
to transport the coal to abbott point (australian resources 2014).
cluding­in­the­United
• norwegian and Dutch pension funds invested in POSCO.
Kingdom­(UK)­and • Major banks and financiers invested in POSCO in the USa include
Australia Berkshire Hathaway, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of ny Mellon,
Deutsche Bank and Blackrock (iHrC and eSCr-net, 2013: 69)

2
The Dutch Pension Fund, Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP (National Civil Pension Fund) is the pension fund
for employees in the government, public and education sectors in the Netherlands. APG carries out the
administration of pensions for approximately 2.6 million Dutch people, including ABP’s assets. They are
referred to throughout this report as ABP/APG (Lok Shakti Abhiyan, 2012: 5).
3
Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) is the asset management wing of the Norwegian Central
Bank. It manages the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global on behalf of the Norwegian Ministry
of Finance, and is one of the world’s largest investment funds, with a portfolio value of approximately
$US650 billion (Norwegian NCP, 2013: 15).
4
Gram panchayats are level of democratic decision making below a district. Gram sabhas is a term used in

11
POSCO’s­Odisha­project
Under the 2005 MoU between POSCO india and the State Government of Odisha, a US$12
billion investment would facilitate construction of an integrated steel plant, mine and associated
infrastructure.5 Protests through both formal and informal avenues, discussed in detail below,
have prevented the project from advancing for nearly 10 years. However, POSCO shows no
signs of giving up. On its website, POSCO india states that “Odisha is one of the most
important places and prime project for POSCO so there is no plan to pull back and shift the
project” (POSCO-india 2015a).
this project would be the biggest foreign direct investment ever in india, and has attracted
significant support from the majority of government in Odisha, india and korea. in order to
attract this investment to the state, the State Government of Odisha offered POSCO generous

Box 1: Summary of proposed POSCO project

Integrated steel plant
12 million tonnes per annum (MtPa) (3 phases x 4MtPa each), reduced to 8MtPa
(2 phases x 4 MtPa each) after difficulties acquiring land
Mine
600 million tonnes of captive iron ore over 30 years, in keonjhar and Sundargarh
districts in khandadhar hills; and government supported access to an additional 400
million tonnes on open markets
Infrastructure and townships
Captive port at mouth of Jatadhari river, 10km from Paradip, in Dhinkia, nuagaon and
Gadakujanga panchayats (Paul, 2012: 5; MZPSG, 2010).
1500 acre township (segregated between koreans and indians) adjacent to plant
500 acre township near mining site
Other yet to be determined infrastructure, including rail and other transport, and water
Captive power plant, 1300 Mega Watt (MW) per annum capacity, to be included in
plant site

the region to refer to the meetings and decisions of the panchayats. Each panchayat entails multiple ‘palli
sabhas’ or village-level committees.
5
The MoU between the State Government of Oriss and POSCO was signed in 2005, and expired in
2010. No replacement MoU has yet been established, and both parties appeared to be operating on the
conditions of the original MoU until early 2015, when conditions for access to the iron ore changed as a
result of a change in national policy. This is discussed further below.

12
terms on which it can establish its integrated operations in india. the generous nature of these
terms has been criticized by indian steel companies that have not benefitted from the same
generosity (Mukhopadhyay, 2006),6 and by civil society for being an elite-facilitated arrangement
that is beneficial only for POSCO and not for the people of Odisha (Mukhopadhyay, 2006;
viswanath, 2008: 31).
For POSCO, this MoU provides access to large quantities of cheap, high quality iron ore that is
not available in korea that can help the company maintain commercial success and continue
to play a key role in South korea’s industrial base (Panda et al., 2008: 291). By also guaranteeing
government-facilitated access to a further 400Mt of iron ore on the open market, as well as
access to a host of other required natural resources, SeZ status, 100% equity ownership, and
cheap land and labour for its steel plant, the MoU positions POSCO at the forefront of india’s
iron ore and steel markets, and reinforces its position as a major force in international markets
(Mukhopadhyay, 2006: 45; adduci, 2012: 77).7
in return, POSCO promises that the proposed project will bring significant direct and indirect
benefits to the immediately affected and wider communities in Odisha and india, including
injecting rs12,100 crores (USD1.95 billion) 8 to the state’s GDP annually (POSCO india,
2013a), amounting to 11.5% of the state’s GDP by 2016-2017 (national Council for applied
economic research (nCaer), 2006: i), annual tax revenue of rs2620crores (USD 421 million)
(POSCO india, 2013a), and providing 870 000 jobs over 30 years, due to the cumulative impact
of POSCO-india operations (nCaer, 2006: i), 18 000 of which will be direct jobs (POSCO
india, 2013a). However, as POSCO is a sponsor of nCaer, a conflict of interest that was not
disclosed in the report, its impartiality has been questioned, and its methodology criticized
both on technical grounds that render far lower indicators of economic benefit, and because the
‘cost-benefit’ analysis did not measure any costs (Maringanti et al., 2013; MZPSG, 2010). an al-
ternative analysis, by the Mining Zone Peoples’ Solidarity network, a network of academic
researchers opposing POSCO, argues that the project will generate only 7000 direct jobs and a
maximum of 17,000 direct and indirect jobs over 5‐ 10 years, representing a reduction in un-
employment in Odisha of only 1.7% (MZPSG, 2010: ii). Many commentators, including those
that support the project, have noted that the increasing mechanization of steel production
means it provides fewer jobs in general, and those it does create require skilled labour and are
therefore unlikely to benefit Odisha’s poor (MZPSG, 2010: ii; Panda et al., 2008: 296; asher,
2009: 31). Lastly, POSCO will also contribute 2% of its profits to social causes (required under
the indian Companies act 2013), to supplement existing corporate social responsibility activities
of the POSCO tJ Park Foundation (POSCO 2015c). the company promises “larger scale CSr
and peripheral development activities will be started when the land preparation works start
after the land is cleared and handed over to POSCO” (POSCO-india –2015a).

6
The main criticism from Indian steel companies is that POSCO has been granted preferential access to
the high quality iron ore in the Khandadhar hills (this is discussed further below), and that the MoU
permits ‘swapping’, or export, of 30 of its iron ore on the condition that it imports an equivalent quantity
with a lower alumina content. Indian firms argue that they could use the iron ore domestically.
7
POSCO elected to undertake this project in India as opposed to Brazil or China, the two other locations
it considered, because of the relative generosity of these terms. Brazil refused to sell its iron ore at less than
the market rate, and China would not allow majority foreign shareholding for such an operation (Srinivas,
2005; Acharya, 2010)
8
All conversions were made at January 2015 exchange rates.

13
Affected­communities­and­human­rights­issues
the size and scale of the POSCO project in Odisha means that multiple different communities
are affected by its activities, as outlined in Box 2.

Box 2: Affected Communities

Plant area (4004 acres)
3566 acres is government land, and 438 acres is private land (occupants have titles)(POSCO
india, 2013)
3097 acres is forest land (for which the Government of Odisha has to apply for permission
to divert forest land for other purposes)(Paul, 2012: 5)
8 villages in the three gram panchayats of Dhinkia, Gobindapur and Gadakujanga, a total
population of 22 000 people (Pingle et al., 2010: 52; iHrC and eSCr-net, 2013: 12;
asher, 2009:11; MZPSG, 2010: 6).9
after the Odisha High Court issued a stay order regarding tree felling on private land,
plans changed to acquire land in two phases: Phases i & ii of 2700 acres, mostly
government land, and Phase iii of 1700 acres, including the village of Dhinkia, which has
seen the biggest protest (POSCO-india 2015a).10
the government has already acquired 1703 acres for this site, and handed it over to
POSCO (Odisha Sun Times 2015).11
Mine areas
Prospecting for 6,177 acres (MZPSG, 2010: 6), so far with no clear territorial demarcation
32 villages in keonjhar, and 84 villages in Sundargarh (MZPSG, 2010: ii)
Predominantly scheduled tribes, in particular the Paudi Bhuiyans.

9
POSCO’s estimate, drawn from a Xavier Institute of Management study (commissioned by POSCO and not
public) suggests 466 families will be immediately displaced, with a total of 718 families displaced over 20 years
(POSCO-India 2013a). The Roy Paul Committee, a Ministry of Environment and Forests committee established to
review POSCO’s environmental clearances, estimates 471 families will be immediately displaced (Paul, 2012: 5).
10
The Odisha state government’s Industrial Development Corporation (IDCO) told the Roy Paul Committee, convened
to review POSCO’s environmental impact assessments, in 2012, that the project area for the plant was reduced to
2700 acres by leaving out most of the private land in Dhinkia and Gobindapur villages, and the portion of forest land
where people from these villages grow their betel vines, changing the layout of the site (Paul, 2012: 21). POSCO’s
website explains, “We have minimized our area by changing our steel plant layout. We avoided certain densely
populated regions in Dhinkia, Gobindapur & Nuagaon and efforts are underway to minimize the displacement”(POSCO-
India 2015a). The exclusion of private land from POSCO’s plans came after the Odisha High Court issued a stay order
on tree felling on private land, in response to a petition from villagers arguing that land acquisition for POSCO did not
qualify as ‘public purpose’ under the Land Acquisition Act 1894. For further discussion of this case, see below.
11
Under section 5(vii) the 2005 MoU, land acquisition is the government’s responsibility, and POSCO must pay
the government for the land (MoU, 2005). While finalising this report, it was reported that the Government of
Odisha has asked for POSCO to either pay a sum outstanding for the 1703 acres of land the Government has
handed over to POSCO, or hand the land back (Odisha Sun Times 2015).

14
this report focuses on avenues of human rights redress pursued by people living in the proposed
plant area. People in the other areas have been less active in their protest against the POSCO
project. the exact territorial demarcation for the prospecting has been unclear and no land
acquisition has been imminent, as it has been in Jagatsinghpur. nevertheless, some scheduled
tribes in the keonjhar and Sundargarh districts have organized into protest movements,
particularly khandadhar Surakshya Sangram Samiti (asher, 2009: 19; Odisha Sun Times 2014).
Following these communities’ responses to POSCO will be an important area for future research.
the following section outlines the major human rights issues at stake in POSCO’s proposed
plant area in Jagatsinghpur. Many of the human rights concerns raised here relate to actions of
the State Government of Odisha. However, the United nations (Un) Guiding Principles on
Business and Human rights clearly state that “Business enterprises should respect human
rights. this means that they should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should
address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved” (UnOHCHr, 2011: 13).

Forcible­displacement
at the heart of the opposition to the POSCO project is a refusal on the part of the majority of the
affected communities to move from their homes. in this section, we outline the reasons why
people refuse to move, and the human rights concerns raised by the way in which POSCO and the
Government of Odisha, working to acquire the land on POSCO’s behalf, have responded to this
opposition. these include POSCO’s proposal of an inadequate (and, for many, unwanted)
compensation package; the Government of Odisha’s obstruction of applications for Other traditional
Forest Dweller status (which would entail stronger land rights), and; the inadequacy of POSCO’s
consultation and the company and government’s failure to acquire consent for the land transfer.
the majority of villagers in the three affected gram panchayats do not want to move because
they currently enjoy a profitable and sustainable small-scale agricultural livelihood that is not
easily replicable elsewhere because of the unique ecology underpinning these activities.
Displacement and move to a wage labour livelihood (guaranteed for only one member of each
family) and urbanized lifestyle would constitute a significant deterioration in their living
standards, like that which communities are aware has occurred in other parts of Odisha
(Mathur, 2009). the district of Jagatsinghpur, where the proposed plant and port are to be
constructed, hosts a highly productive and relatively (by rural indian standards) lucrative
agricultural economy. the majority of villagers cultivate a range of crops including betel,12
paddy, cashew and other tree species, as well as collecting minor forest products such as
bamboo and fuel (Pingle et al., 2010: 19), while some engage in fishing, operate shrimp farms
(pisciculture) or practice animal husbandry (iHrC and eSCr-net, 2013: 12-13). Of these
livelihood activities, betel cultivation and trading is the most lucrative, earning an average
annual profit of about rs. 200,000 [U.S. $3374] in 2010 for the owner (iHrC and eSCr-net,
2013: 12), and providing additional employment for landless labourers (asher, 2009: 12). in
addition to the income stream provided by cultivation of betel, shrimp or cashews, families in
the affected villages in Jagatsinghpur also supplement their livelihood in significant ways by

12
Paan is a mix of betel leaves and other ingredients that is consumed widely in Asia.

15
accessing common resources, including rice, fish and forest products that are gathered locally
and used for household consumption (MZPSG, 2010: 37-38). Furthermore, these livelihoods
engage all members of the family in productive work (MZPSG, 2010: 35). in a context of dete-
riorating agricultural production and associated impoverishment and marginalization of rural
populations in Odisha, this successful agricultural way of life is significant (cf. Mishra, 2011).

Inadequate­compensation
For the 718 families it calculates will be displaced, some of whom live on private land and
others on government land (POSCO india, 2013a; POSCO-india 2015a), POSCO is offering a
compensation package that exceeds the requirements of the Odisha resettlement and
rehabilitation Policy by providing equal compensation to those on government land as those
on private land, paying more generous cash compensation per decimel of lost agricultural land
and for transport, providing better quality housing to replace lost homes, and providing some
(limited) compensation for landless labourers and fisherman, as well as for paddy farms and
trees. the package also provides for skills training and one job per family after the construction
phase of the plant, with preferential hiring by contractors during the construction phase
(POSCO-india 2013c). this was agreed through a rehabilitation and Peripheral Development
advisory Committee constituted by government officials and some village representatives
(Mishra 2014: 39). interviewees in our study, consistent with other studies about the POSCO
project, report that this package has been rejected by many anti-POSCO protestors in the
affected villagers on principle, contrary to POSCO’s claims that there it has been widely
endorsed in the affected communities (MZPSG, 2010: 8; interview with Prasant Paikray, PPSS
Spokesperson, Bhubaneshwar, December 2012).
though the compensation package exceeds government requirements it has significant
shortcomings.13 Most centrally, other studies have found that community members that oppose
the package are reluctant to accept cash compensation and become wage labourers earning
significantly less than their current cash income and other resources, and with little reasonable
hope of job security given their skills (iHrC and eSCr-net, 2013: 12; MZPSG, 2010: ii). For
these people, no amount of compensation is able to replace the sustainable and abundant
(relatively speaking) land and livelihood that communities currently enjoy. Displacement and a
move to wage labour are also known to be particularly detrimental for women, whose position
within the family and community becomes diminished with loss of access to independent
resources, and general deterioration of social and community conditions in which they live
(Pingle et al., 2010: 52; Mathur, 2009). Furthermore, research from other cases suggests that cash
compensation is not able to fully address the intangible consequences of displacement, including
disruption of traditional social structures and informal social networks, undermining of social
bonds and capacity for mutual support, reduced social status in and conflict with host communities,
and generation of conditions dangerous and disadvantageous for women who lose their status in
the family and community and can become targets of hostility (Mathur, 2009).

13
The Odisha State Government Resettlement and Rehabilitation has itself been criticized for not being
sufficient to mitigate the significant risk of impoverishment and other negative but intangible harms
associated with displacement (Mathur, 2009).

16
Obstruction­of­efforts­to­acquire­Other­Traditional­Forest­Dweller­status
in order to protect their existing livelihoods and way of life, people in the villages affected by the
proposed plant construction have applied for recognition of their status as Other traditional Forest
Dwellers, a category afforded special land rights under the Scheduled tribes and Other traditional
Forest Dwellers (recognition of Forest rights) act, 2006 (herein referred to as the Forest rights
act, or Fra). this law (section ii, 3a) provides the “right to hold and live in the forest land under
the individual or common occupation for habitation or for self cultivation for livelihood.” Once
such rights are recognized, gram sabhas become the custodians of the forest land, notably through
the requirement that their consent be gained before any forest is diverted for other purposes (iHrC
and eSCr-net, 2013: 30). Government committees and other researchers have found documented
and oral evidence that many of the villagers in the three affected gram panchayats fit these criteria
(Pingle et al., 2010: 29-30; iHrC and eSCr-net, 2013: 30; Saxena, 2010: 104-105; Saikia, arupjyoti
et al., 2010: 4). For reasons of necessity related to their dependence on the forest and its products as
well as its important role in protecting against the worst effects of cyclones, these families have
been custodians of the forest with a vested interest in safeguarding its ecological uniqueness,
demonstrated through their active participation in forest protection and renewal programs over
decades (MZPSG, 2010: 48). nevertheless, the Government of Odisha and POSCO state that there
are no Other traditional Forest Dwellers (OtFD) in the affected area, and have consequently
acquired approval from MoeF to divert the forest for non-forest purposes without the villagers’
consent (POSCO-india – FaQs 2015a; Pingle et al., 2010: 2-3). this is problematic, given that two
MoeF committees found that the local government had deliberately obstructed efforts by the
affected communities to have their claims to OtFD status processed (Saxena, 2010: 104-105;
Saikia, arupjyoti et al., 2010: 4; Pingle et al., 2010: 29-30). this is discussed in more detail below.

Inadequate­consultation­and­no­consent
Our interviewees and other research suggest that affected communities first learned about the
project through media reports and the presence of unfamiliar koreans and government officials
from iDCO in their villages (iHrC and eSCr-net, 2013: 28). Since, then, formal consultations
have only taken place through two channels. the first is the public hearing mandated by the MoeF
regarding environmental impact assessments, and convened by the Orissa State Pollution Control
Board on 15 april 2007. Under indian laws and regulations, this should be the primary channel for
formal consultation regarding the project. this hearing was held in kujanga, not only inaccessible
in terms of both time and money (loss of wages) for affected villagers but a stronghold of Biju Janata
Dal (BJD) the ruling party in State government, and major supporters of POSCO. Multiple reports
suggest this consultation also took place in an environment of fear, as the government deployed
several platoons of armed paramilitary forces in the district in the days leading up to the hearing.
Multiple accounts also state that there was no opportunity to discuss the social impact of the
assessment (iHrC & eSCr-net 2013:29; Pingle et al 2010:9; MZPSG 2010:5; asher 2009: 21-23).14
the second formal meeting between some community members and POSCO (though it is based
on a presumption of consent) is the rehabilitation and Peripheral Development advisory

14
The National Green Tribunal found that the hearing was held at a time in which a new regulation (EIA
Notification 2006) was replacing an old one (EIA Notification 1994), and that the public hearing was

17
Committee of village representatives and government, convened by government, which engaged
in consultations regarding compensation in 2006 and 2010 (POSCO-india –2015a). as mentioned
above, there is evidence that the majority of the affected families have not agreed to this
compensation package and instead maintain opposition to the project in its entirety. this has been
expressed through PPSS non-violent direct actions, as well as through gram sabha resolutions
from all three panchayats indicating rejection of the project.15
Since the signing of the MoU, POSCO states that it has engaged in continuous consultation with
affected communities. On its website, POSCO india indicates that some informal consultation
practices have taken place regularly, including 188 mass meetings, 1,399 individual meetings,
and staffing of a public office in kujanga with display panels and information boards to further
explain the project to the community (POSCO-india 2015a). the company also states it engaged
in an ‘intensive awareness campaign’ including leafleting and local newspaper advertisements,
after signing the MoU (POSCO-india 2013a: 4). to our knowledge, the only formal social
impact assessment that has taken place has been a report commissioned by POSCO and
conducted by the Xavier institute of Management, however this report has not been made
public. to our knowledge, there has not been a human rights impact assessment.
POSCO states on its website that the compensation committee (rehabilitation and Peripheral De-
velopment advisory Committee) meetings, and the regular mass and individual meetings it holds
in Jagatsinghpur constitutes human rights due diligence (POSCO-india 2015a). this does not
meet the standards outlined in the Un Guiding Principles, which require drawing on internal
and/or external human rights expertise, and engaging in meaningful consultation with potentially
affected groups and other relevant stakeholders, as appropriate to the size of the business enterprise
and the nature and context of the operation (UnOHCHr, 2011: 19).

Government­sponsored­violence,­intimidation­and­questionable
criminal­charges
throughout the course of the conflict between POSCO and anti-POSCO community members,
violence, intimidation and the use of criminal charges as a means to suppress opposition have
emerged as additional human rights concerns. as early as 2005, not long after the signing of the
MoU, villagers reported that ‘henchmen’ or ‘goons’ hired by POSCO began to visit the area and

held in accordance with the (weaker) regulations outlined in the older Notification. If the environmental
clearance application had been made after 13 September 2007, it would have been held to higher
standards, which include the provision of a social impact assessment, whereas the 1994 Notification
requires only a description of the number of villages and population to be displaced, and a ‘Rehabilitation
Master Plan’ (NGT 2012: 15-16). The Orissa State Pollution Control Board and MoEF nevertheless
argued, in their case at the NGT, that they had followed the more rigorous 2006 Notification. The Court
did not entertain this argument as they were not technically required to follow the 2006 Notification.
15
The first gram sabha resolutions (Gobindapur, Dhinkia and Nuagaon) were in March 2008, immediately
after implementation of the Forest Rights Act under which such a resolution constitutes veto power if
OTFD status is recognized; the second (Gobindapur, Dhinkia and Nuagaon) was passed in February
2010, after the Ministry of Environment and Forests granted ‘final’ forest clearance on the condition that
no rights were outstanding under the Forest Rights Act; the third (Gobindapur and Dhinkia) were in
February 2011, again after the MoEF again issued clearance on the condition that no rights were
outstanding under the Forest Rights Act; the fourth (Dhinkia) was in October 2012; and the fifth (Dhinkia)
in September 2014 (IHRC and ESCR-Net, 2013: 30-31; Roy et al., 2013; MZPSG 2010:8,15; PPSS,
2013, 2014; Forest Rights Act, 2010).

18
harass people (iHrC & eSCr-net 2013:41). in response, villagers sought to protect their communities
by erecting a barricade to prevent officials from government and POSCO entering the village to
prepare for land acquisition (MZPSG, 2010: 18). Since then, media and human rights groups have
reported repeated instances of violence and intimidation, the most significant being:
• in november 2007 a large group of people (up to 500) stormed the site at which
villagers were engaged in a peaceful dharna (protest), after which the police were able
to enter the area previously blockaded by the villagers. Dozens of people were injured.
Over the following weeks police remained stationed in the area, occupying public
buildings such as schools (MZPSG, 2010: 19-20). Dr. BD Sharma, ex‐commissioner
for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled tribes, after visiting the area in December 2007,
described it as being ‘under siege’, and criticized the police for preventing movement
of people and essential goods into and out of the village. He commented that “the
presence of the police ensures that no one from the village moves out to unite with
those who could not hold out against the administration in the neighbouring villages”
(Menon and Das 2008).16
• in May 2008, 100 people were arrested and up to 20 injured when police used teargas
and batons to disperse a protest (Ceresna, 2011: 23; amnesty international, 2011).
• in June 2008, anti-POSCO villagers were returning from clearing a waterway blockage to
find a large group of ‘goons’ (up to 60). villagers were attacked with multiple weapons,
including bombs, one of which resulted in the death of Dula Mandal, while several others
were injured. the attackers hid in a building surrounded by the villagers until the police
arrived, some 24 hours later (MZPSG, 2010: 20; iHrC and eSCr-net, 2013: 42).
• in May 2010, police confronted peaceful protesters conducting a dharna at Balitutha with
rubber bullets, tear gas and batons (PPSS 2012; Economic Times 2010; Hindustan Times
2010; iHrC and eSCr-net, 2013: 37). an independent government fact-finding mission
found that over 100 were injured, some critically. the leader of this mission, retired
Justice H. Suresh of the Bombay High Court, stated that “everywhere in this country
whenever people demand justice, they get police lathis (batons) and oppression” and
demanded the immediate cancellation of the POSCO project (New Indian Express, 2010).
• in February 2013, officials from iDCO and POSCO-india commenced land acquisition
through the cutting down of betel vines and trees in the Gobindapur area. the officials
were supported by between 120 and 200 police who entered the village at 4am,
attacked protesting villagers with batons, injuring at least 12 people and, according to
video testimonies, sexually assaulting women. the protestors continued to barricade
their villages, forcing the police to withdraw and land acquisition to cease after five
days (iHrC and eSCr-net, 2013: 40; Senapati and Pradhan, 2013; amnesty international,
2013; Samadrusti televisions, 2013a). iDCO confirmed that POSCO-india staff were
officially part of the land acquisition team, and media reported that S n Singh,
General Manager Construction, POSCO india said “We are helping the administration
in guiding them on the GPS system to determine the boundaries” (Baisakh, 2013).

16
See also Sharma et al. (2008).

19
 • On 2 March 2013, a home-made bomb exploded in Patna village, killing three men,
Manas Jena, nabin Mondal and narahari Sahu, and critically injuring another, all of
whom were anti-POSCO protesters. Police took 16 hours to respond, and before
visiting the area reported to the media that the men died while making the bomb, on
the basis of claims from a pro-POSCO villager who was not present at the site during
the incident, and despite multiple claims to the contrary from people who were (iHrC
and eSCr-net, 2013: 42; engineer et al, 2013; Samadrusti televisions, 2013b).
the human rights violations suffered by villagers as a result of this climate of insecurity extend
beyond immediate harm to associated violations of the rights to health, education and work,
as villagers’ freedom of movement and access to state services is limited (iHrC and eSCr-
net, 2013: 53). Local activists have accumulated significant evidence of this violence in the
form of video footage and still photographs, some of which show POSCO officials accompanying
state agents who direct the violence.17
POSCO’s response to these episodes of police violence has been to contest the account of
events offered by PPSS and other villagers (iHrC and eSCr-net, 2013: 78-79; POSCO 2012).
POSCO india has sought to portray the movement and its supporters as ‘miscreants’ and the
violence as initiated by PPSS against pro-POSCO villagers (POSCO, 2012). When POSCO has
spoken out against violence in the area, it has been to request more police presence to
maintain law and order and “protect innocent villagers from brutal violence by the PPSS”
(POSCO 2012).
Human rights researchers suggest that police have also systematically targeted anti-POSCO
community members through “arrest and detention based on false or inadequately investigated
criminal charges, the use of ‘others’ as a catch-all group on charging documents, the link
between protest activities and arrests, and over-reliance on pre-trial detention” (iHrC and
eSCr-net, 2013: 45; alternative Law Forum, 2013). the repeated arrest and detention of PPSS
leader abhay Sahoo and other leaders, as well as the proliferation of criminal charges, have
added to the repression of opposition to the project in the area. to our knowledge, there has
been no attempt to systematically address this human rights issue, and it remains a serious
barrier to villagers’ freedom of movement.

Environmental­risks
the proposed POSCO project also entails significant environmental risks. environmental
activists and affected communities have expressed their strongest concern over the project’s
impact on water. the MoU provides for “drawal and use of water from the Mahanadi barrage at
Jobra in Cuttack or any other suitable source for construction and operation of the Overall
Project” (MoU 7(i)). this will affect potable water supplies for nearby cities of Cuttack and
Bhubaneshwar, and irrigation for the districts of Cuttack, Jagatsinghpur, kendrapada, and
khurda (iHrC and eSCr-net 2013:15). villagers are concerned about the impact of the
project on fish and shrimp breeding areas in nearby estuaries and the mouth of the Jatadhari
river (iHrC and eSCr-net 2013:15). this is of particular concern to villagers who depend on

17
Copies on file with author and available on DVD upon request via http://www.samadrusti.com

20
pisciculture for their livelihood, as they have only informal and therefore unprotected rights to
that form of livelihood and associated protection of the necessary ecology (MZPSG 2010:60-
63). in addition, concerns have been raised regarding the impact of deforestation and destruction
of sand dunes on vulnerability to cyclones, the impact of industrial waste on local ecology, and
the risks posed to marine birds and the endangered Olive ridley turtles (Ceresna 201:17;iHrC
and eSCr-net 2013:15-16; Saldhana and rao 2011).

Pro-POSCO­villagers
though the protest against POSCO has been vigorous, well organized and widespread in the
affected area, there are also a number of villagers who support the project.18 the most visible of
the pro-POSCO villagers, as they are known, are 52 families formerly residing in the POSCO
transit camp, located on the road into the affected area. these families reportedly left their
villages when tension emerged between them and anti-POSCO villagers (asher, 2009: 23;
Mishra, 2014; POSCO-india 2015a).- the company provided financial support to the camp,
providing water, electricity, some housing, and paying the families a small stipend for their
livelihood, with a view to returning them to their villages when safe to do so (POSCO-india
2015a). Human rights researchers have condemned the conditions in the camp as sub-standard,
and violating the residents’ rights to adequate housing, food, water, health, work and education
(iHrC and eSCr-net, 2013: 53-55). these conditions and the economic dependence on
POSCO are a stark contrast with the self-sufficiency these families enjoyed before their move to
camp (iHrC and eSCr-net, 2013: 63), where though they may have considered themselves
poor, they did live above the poverty line (aleaz, 2011: 53-55), and where they enjoyed a high
degree of community cohesion that has now been eroded (iHrC and eSCr-net, 2013: 62).
these families may support the project because they stand to benefit from the compensation
package, though one study found that their expectations regarding compensation were
unrealistically high (aleaz, 2011: 53-55). Given the poor conditions that have prevailed in the
transit camp, many of these families have now returned to their villages and their trust in
POSCO and the promised compensation package has reportedly been eroded (iHrC and
eSCr-net, 2013: 6, 68; Mishra, 2014). in interviews, PPSS argued that many of those who
appear to support POSCO are landless labourers whose support is based on fear of retribution
from landlords who have a vested in the project because of the greater benefits of compensation.
in addition to the 52 families in the transit camp, some other pro-POSCO groups have also
formed to counter the activities of PPSS, the most prominent of these being the United action
Committee, which has represented the pro-POSCO contingent of the community in negotiations
regarding compensation (Pattnaik, 2011: 61).

18
The polarization and heightened tensions surrounding the POSCO project make it very difficult to in-
dependently verify how many of the affected people support the POSCO project, compared to those that
oppose it. Both sides accuse the other of misrepresenting the support or opposition to the project, and
indeed support and opposition fluctuate over time. It is not the intention of this report, however, to make a
determination on this point. Rather, our concern is to analyse the redress options available to those who
do harbor grievances related to the POSCO project.

21
Resistance­and­access­to­remedy:­contesting­development
and­human­rights­harms
the human rights issues described above are a complex amalgam of threat, risk, and past and
ongoing harm, which makes it difficult to interpret this case through the Un business and
human rights framework of ‘respect, protect, remedy’ (UnOHCHr, 2011: 1). the ‘protect’ and
‘respect’ pillars of the business and human rights framework pertain quite clearly to a ‘pre-harm’
stage, while ‘remedy’ suggests a clear ‘post-harm’ stage. With its origins in tort-law, the notion of
remedy implies that the harm has occurred in the past, and that it can be remediated – often by
compensation – which will resolve the grievance.
in fact, it is quite difficult in the POSCO case to untangle the human rights concerns in a way that
is commensurate with this framework. instead, the combination of forcible land acquisition,
inadequate consultation, lack of consent, and violence and intimidation, is better described as a
web of concerns, risks, threats and harms. in this context it is difficult to establish which aspects
of the communities’ grievances call for ‘protection’ and ‘respect’ and which call for ‘remedy’.
Part of the reason for this is that the grievance that lies at the heart of this dispute is one that
exceeds the human rights framework, and might better be described as a conflict over
competing ideas of development, and who gets to define development. it is within this context
that human rights concerns arise, but the conflict is not limited to only human rights concerns.
the case also raises concerns for the affected communities and their supporters about
environmental sustainability, cultural preservation and autonomy, livelihoods, and, most
centrally, the power and authority to set development agendas. as one activist articulated it in
an online interview in april 2015, “the development model that you are trying to impose on
us is not acceptable. you want to talk about responsible mining, but we say no. Let us talk
about development of people [first], and how mining will contribute to it.” By articulating
their grievances in such broad terms, the anti-POSCO movement and its supporters include
human rights issues – past harms and future threats – but also seek to scrutinise the broader
conditions that produce these human rights concerns.
the POSCO case is therefore characterized by a multiplicity of actors, strategies and tactics for
both resisting land acquisition and the construction of the steel plant, and seeking remedy for
harms that have already taken place, primarily to do with violence, intimidation, dubious
criminal charges, and the land acquisition that has occurred to date (See table 2). rather than
conceive of these efforts as only seeking access to remedy, this report takes the approach that
resistance and remedy are largely indistinguishable from each other in this case. the following
analysis of strategies and mechanisms engaged by anti-POSCO groups therefore evaluates
them in light of what they have achieved in terms of enabling both resistance and access to
remedy for human rights harms. Where appropriate, the report expands its focus to also
encompass methods through which the anti-POSCO communities and their supporters contest
the broader development paradigm that generates human rights concerns.

Legal­and­regulatory­avenues
the POSCO project is situated in a regulatory and legal framework comprised of multiple state
and federal laws and regulations. Consequently there are numerous channels through which

22
Table 2: Avenues of resistance and remedy

Mechanism Use Impact

Complaint to korean nCP regarding Dutch nCP attempted to facilitate

POSCO, and Dutch and norwegian
OECD­NCPs nCP regarding pension fund invest-
fact-finding mission and dialogue
ments in POSCO. with no success.

Multiple challenges to forest and Privately owned land excluded from

Domestic­legal­and POSCO’s plans.
environmental clearances (to
Multiple suspensions and reconsidera-
regulatory­processes­ nGt) and land acquisition (to tions of environmental and forest clear-
Odisha High Court). ances, significantly stalling project.

Domestic­political Significantly stalls project; attracts some

PPSS engage in non-violent direct
political attention; generates time for
mobilisation action campaign for 10 years. other avenues to be pursued.

european, korean and US civil so- Provide counter-information to the

ciety groups campaign against contested accounts from POSCO
Transnational­civil
POSCO, draw attention to the pro- and government about project’s im-
society­mobilisation ject’s negative impacts, write re- pacts; generate negative publicity
search reports and target investors. for POSCO in international

opponents of the project have submitted complaints. reflecting the institutional foundations
of these forums and the norms they are mandated to enforce, the cases brought before these
forums have been technical in nature, often challenging the process through which authorisations
have been granted. However, the complainants are typically motivated by a deeper objection to
the project on ideological, environmental or social grounds.19 these cases have made the most
direct impact on addressing the rights concerns of communities as they relate to land
acquisition, albeit often in a technocratic way, and without resulting, so far, in any legal
judgments that categorically prevent the project’s progress.
Forest clearance. at the heart of the grievance associated with the clearance for diversion of
forest land is that claims to Other traditional Forest Dweller status, and therefore land rights
under the Fra, had not been settled at the time clearance was granted, and remain unsettled
today. the MoeF issued initial forest clearance on the advice of its Forestry advisory Committee
in august 2007. after a series of standard (at the time) reviews by the Supreme Court, the
MoeF issued the final clearance in December 2009, subject to clarification that the approval
was conditional on the settlement of any rights owing under the Fra (MoeF, 2011a: 1). a
series of regulatory and legal challenges ensued.
two government committees gave the opinion that the Government of Odisha was in violation
of the Fra because it had not settled what the committees judged to be valid claims to OtFD

19
In addition to these cases from affected villagers, two Odisha High Court cases were filed by other
companies claiming first rights to the prospecting licences for the Khandadhar Hills. These are discussed
further below.

23
status of people in the affected area, despite their applications (iHrC and eSCr-net, 2013: 31;
Pattnaik, 2011: 62), or taken due account of the gram sabha resolutions rejecting the forest di-
version.20 this view was shared by both the Saxena committee, convened by the MoeF and the
Ministry of tribal affairs to review the implementation of the Fra across india (Saikia,
arupjyoti et al., 2010: 4-5; Saxena 2010: 42), and the majority of the Meena Gupta committee,
which was subsequently convened specifically to look into implementation of the Fra at the
POSCO site. the majority Meena Gupta report went on to recommend that the forest clearance
of December 2009 and the two environmental clearances (for plant and port) of May and July
2007 be revoked (Pingle et al., 2010: 5,10,12).21 the Forest advisory Committee, an expert
advisory committee of the MoeF, also expressed ambivalence, recommending a ‘temporary
withdrawal’ of the forest clearance in response to the Saxena and majority Meena Gupta
majority reports (Sethi 2010).
nevertheless, the MoeF has accepted the affirmations from the State Government that there are
no outstanding OtFD claims in the area. in response to one gram sabha resolution contesting
this claim, the Odisha government responded with a strongly worded letter to the MoeF,
declaring that the resolutions were illegal as they failed to comply with the provisions of the
Orissa Gram Panchayat act (1964) and Fra and should therefore be considered fakes. Further,
the letter declared that the sarpanch of Dhinkia, Shri Sisir Mohapatra, had misused his position
to serve the interests of PPSS, of which he was secretary, and should be subject to legal action for
violations of the Odisha Gram Panchayat act (MoeF, 2011b: 1). in May 2011 the national
Minister for environment and Forests, Jairam ramesh, declared that it was the responsibility of
the state government to implement the Fra and therefore, if the Odisha government was
satisfied that its terms had been complied with, forest clearance was granted (Times of India,
2011). Given that its MoU with POSCO commits the Odisha government to facilitating all the
necessary clearances, this delegation of responsibility by the federal government creates a
significant conflict of interest for the state government.
at the time of writing, the felling of trees in the area is being contested in the nGt on technical
grounds: the state government is required to issue a validation for the final MoeF clearance
before tree felling commences and has not yet done so. the nGt ordered that the State
Government publicly issue such a validation before any more trees are felled (Mohanty 2013),
which it has so far, to our knowledge, failed to do. tree felling has therefore ceased, but this
could also be explained by the lack of security regarding the iron ore supply from the khandadhar
Hills (discussed below). Once a final validation is issued, the forest clearance becomes vulnerable
to further challenge on the grounds raised by the Saxena and majority Meena Gupta committees:
that claims to OtFD status remain unresolved.22 Legal teams from the indian legal nGO LiFe
(Legal initiative for Forests and environment) are working on this case.

20
See footnote 15 for details of gram sabha resolutions.
21
The Meena Gupta Committee issued two divergent reports. The majority report, from 3 of 4 members
(excluding Meena Gupta), was more critical. The National Green Tribunal (2012) later gave the opinion
that the majority Meena Gupta committee report exceeded its terms of reference in making this recom-
mendation, as it was not asked to comment on the legality of the clearances.
22
The Forest Department conducted only an aerial survey, which LIFE argues is inadequate. The challenges
would also raise once again the resolutions of the gram sabhas opposing the project, and the outstanding
applications for OTFD status of affected residents.

24
Environmental clearance. in 2007, the MoeF granted POSCO environmental clearances for
the port (in May), and the steel plant (in July) in a manner described by the national Centre
for advocacy Studies as ‘non-transparent’ given the insufficient time between mandatory
public hearings and the grant of the clearance (asher, 2009: 26). While the initial grievances
focused on the forest clearances, the Saxena and Meena Gupta committees also identified
serious flaws in these environmental clearances. the majority report of the Meena Gupta
committee stated that “such mechanical clearance makes a mockery of rule of law and
procedural safeguards” (Pingle et al., 2010: 9). these findings, and the creation of the new
nGt, paved the way for opponents of the project to make use of the regulatory and legal
channels associated with environmental, rather than forest, clearances, a strategy that continues
to stall the project’s environmental clearances today.
in early 2011, Prafulla Samantara of Lok Shakti abhiyan, a Bhubaneshwar-based anti-
displacement activist group, filed a complaint to the newly formed nGt arguing that the
entire project appraisal was conducted contrary to the letter and spirit of the environmental
assessment regulation, environmental impact assessment (eia) notification 2006, issued
under the environment (Protection) act (1986). He argued that the MoeF and its expert
appraisal Committee (responsible for technical judgments) had relied mainly on the assurances
of POSCO, and that this cast into doubt their conclusions (nGt, 2012: 4-5).
in March 2012, the nGt handed down its verdict. the nGt found that legal opportunity to
appeal the original 2007 clearances had passed, and the tribunal was therefore limited to
handling the aspects of the appeal that relate to the additional conditions imposed in the ‘final
order’ for environmental clearances, issued in 2011. in relation to these conditions, the nGt
ordered their suspension and directed the MoeF to review the clearance process afresh and
attach conditions and a timeline (nGt, 2012: 31-32). However, the nGt took the opportunity,
in the ruling, to criticise a number of aspects of the environmental clearance process, and to
encourage the MoeF to establish more rigorous policies to combat these issues. in particular,
the tribunal criticised the inclusion of Meena Gupta on the Fra review committee (on the
grounds that she was Secretary of the MOeF at the time the initial clearances were issued); the
scientific rigour of the eias; and the processing of eia applications in a piecemeal manner,
rather than treating the entire 12 MtPa project and associated infrastructure as a whole
(nGt, 2012). it is also notable that the public hearing was deemed compliant not with the
more rigorous 2006 eia notification, but rather with the less rigorous eia notification 1994,
as the eia fell within a transition period between the two (nGt, 2012).
in response to this order, the MoeF convened the ‘roy Paul’ committee to once again review
the clearances, this time limiting the review to the new conditions imposed in the 2011 final
order. the report consequently made a series of technical recommendations requiring further
environmental studies, and sought to clarify some of the ambiguities in the earlier assessments,
notably around the planned capacity of the project and plans for future expansion (Paul,
2012). in relation to ‘resettlement and rehabilitation’, the report commented that “there was a
general feeling that the project proponent had not done enough to gain the confidence of the
local people by funding local development plans”, and this this may be because POSCO was
unwilling to make such investments in the absence of a guarantee from the state government
regarding the project (Paul, 2012: 25), meaning a guarantee of land acquisition and iron ore
access, both which had exceeded the timelines outlined in the MoU.

25
By May 2013 POSCO had responded to the concerns of the report of the roy Paul committee
(POSCO-india 2015a). in January 2014 the MoeF granted POSCO’s request for the revalidation of
environmental clearance for a 4MtPa plant (originally granted in 2007), retrospectively revalidating
the clearance for a period of five years from 18 July 2012 (Dash, 2013). the revalidation was
subject to the recommendations of the roy Paul report (MoeF, 2014). it covers only the initial
4MtPa phase of the steel plant and captive power plant, and neither the mine nor the port
(Mohan, 2014). Consequently, though the clearances have therefore been determined technically
and legally valid, this revalidation does not address all the concerns raised by the nGt in its
judgment, particularly regarding the piecemeal nature of the clearance, and nor does it address
similar concerns raised by the majority Meena Gupta committees regarding the public hearing
(Pingle et al 2010). the widespread government pressure on the MoeF to issue the relevant
clearances is revealed in minutes of a Ministry of Steel meeting, that lament the delays in the
clearance, stating that, ‘this eC [environmental clearance] should be revalidated immediately to
avoid unnecessary noises raised by nGO and anti-project entities etc during the implementation
of land acquisition by GoO” (Ministry of Steel 2013: 1).
Prafulla Samantara filed a further case with the nGt challenging the 2014 revalidation of the
original 2007 environmental clearance. this case argued that both the 2007 clearance and 2014
revalidation had neglected ground reports submitted by experts (Business Standard, 2014). this
case is ongoing at the time of writing.
Land acquisition. in 2009 two cases were filed in the Odisha High Court by affected villagers.
the first case challenged POSCO’s acquisition of 438 acres of private land for public purposes.
the Odisha High Court accepted the petitioners’ evidence that because POSCO, a private
company, had paid for the land, the public purpose argument was invalid and the land
acquisition was therefore not compliant with the Land acquisition act (1894)(case no. 14884).
the Odisha government subsequently withdrew its plans to acquire private land, which in any
case represented a small part of the total land, and the Court therefore dismissed the case. this
case is important because it has brought about, albeit indirectly rather than through a
categorical legal judgment, a reduction in POSCO’s plans for land acquisition. However, the
reduction is relatively small and unlikely to ultimately stop the project. For this purpose, a
second petition was filed at the same time as this one.
the second petition (case no. 14885), challenged the project’s compliance with the Fra’s
provisions protecting the rights of Other traditional Forest Dwellers. in this case, the High
Court refused the petitioners’ request for an interim stay on tree felling, but did not entirely
reject their case, which is ongoing but has not been listed for hearing for a number of years.
the judgment regarding the interim stay notably made reference to there being a public
interest in the project owing to its projected economic benefits, which include ‘provid[ing]
employment to 30,000 people and [...] huge generation of revenue through excise, customs
duty vat and income tax’ (Orissa High Court, 2011: 29). the Odisha High Court has thus
exhibited some ambivalence in its findings on the POSCO case. in the private land case, the
interim order concedes some land rights to villagers; but in the forest land case the Court has
declined to protect the potential OtFD rights, instead supporting the Odisha state government’s
objectives to bring about economic growth through industrialization.

26
Domestic­political­mobilization:­Anti-POSCO­People’s­Movement
(PPSS)­and­its­supporters
Domestic political mobilization, particularly at the site of the proposed plant in Jagatsinghpur,
has played as important a role in resistance to the POSCO project as the judicial and regulatory
appeals, though in a different way. the on-the-ground opposition has acted as a physical
hurdle to land acquisition for government and POSCO officials. Meanwhile, supporters of the
movement have played key roles in provisioning alternative information; acting as intermediaries
between the movement and international supporters; and lending the POSCO case political
capital as part of a broader narrative about major political parties’ neglect of the marginalized,
rural poor. as with the legal and regulatory avenues for expressing resistance, this domestic
political mobilization has not, alone, brought about rights protections, but it has contributed
to the stalling of the POSCO project and therefore to mitigating the human rights risks
associated with land acquisition about which villagers are concerned.23
Formed within weeks of the signing of the POSCO MoU, the PPSS is a people’s movement
claiming to represent 80% of the people in the areas affected by the proposed POSCO steel
plant in Jagatsinghpur, with Dhinkia panchayat the movement’s consistent stronghold (Ceresna,
2011:20).24 the movement is structured through village committees, an inter-village general
council of 50 to 150 members (it changes over time), and a smaller core leadership group of ap-
proximately 10 people responsible for urgent decisions, led by the movement’s chairman,
abhay Sahoo, who is a member of the Communist Party of india (CPi) (Pattnaik, 2011: 54;
interview with Prasant Paikray, spokesperson PPSS, Bhubaneshwar, December 2012; interview
with abhay Sahoo, leader PPSS, Jagatsinghpur, December 2013). Members of PPSS make small
financial contributions to the movement to sustain its activities, and participate in non-violent
direct action protests. Day to day, members of the movement provide mutual support, for
example through resolving conflict to avoid having to deal with the police, or through working
on collective projects such as unblocking waterways, or preparing for cyclones (Pattnaik, 2011:
58; interview with Prasant Paikray, spokesperson PPSS, Bhubaneshwar, December 2012). PPSS
thus functions both as a resistance movement and a self-help movement that fills the gap left by
a state that they see as promoting POSCO’s interests over that of its citizens.
the movements’ objective is to prevent the POSCO project from going ahead, and its strategy
to achieve this objective is twofold: non-violent direct action, and a policy of non-engagement
with the company or government on anything other than protection of their land rights. this
is markedly different from many other corporate-community disputes, where communities
may be willing to engage with a corporation to bring about better benefit sharing.25 this highly
adversarial strategy has been a key feature in the polarization and duration of this conflict.
after some initial attempts to engage with the government of Odisha, which did not contribute
to PPSS’ objectives, the movement adopted a policy of refusing to engage with the government,

23
For a film summary of this resistance, see MZPSG 2012c.
24
PPSS maintains ties with people in other affected areas, particularly the Khandadhar Hills where the
proposed mines are located, but the strongest movement there has established itself as separate from
party influences (Asher, 2009: 20; Odisha Sun Times, 2014).
25
See other cases in this series: Wilmar, Weda Bay.

27
the law or POSCO on matters that pertain to anything other than protecting villagers’ land
rights.26 abhay Sahoo explained, “the policy that is being pursued by the government, and the
policy for which we have been resisting, are two parallel policies. they cannot meet together”
(interview with abhay Sahoo, leader PPSS, Jagatsinghpur, December 2013). He went on to
explain his concerns about using the law:
“once you move the court of law, [that] means the movement is finished. […] you see if
the apex court gives direction which is opposed to the movement, like the high court
commenting on my bail, ok i think people will start losing confidence on the movement.
[…] number two, you cannot take the judiciary for granted because judiciary, off and
on, is a parcel of the government’s mechanism. the government’s industrial policy
cannot be changed by the court of law.”
the movement therefore refuses to engage with government in relation to land acquisition
efforts, such as surveying or promoting compensation packages. its engagement with the
government and the law is limited to demanding rights under the Forest rights act in the form
of filing claims for OtFD status, and advocating rejection of the project in the gram sabhas.
the second element of PPSS’ strategy, non-violent direct action tactics, has been key to
obstructing land acquisition efforts in Jagatsinghpur. One of PPSS’ most effective strategies,
adopted as early as September 2005, three months after the MoU was signed, has been to
physically blockade the area, often with women and children (Samadrusti television, 2011;
See Figure 1). Originally this was to prevent officials from entering the area to survey and to
provide information about proposed compensation to villagers and persuade them to support
the POSCO project. as the conflict between the villagers, and the government and POSCO
escalated, the barricades, blockades and checkpoints served also to prevent police entering the
area to make arrests or harass villagers (Ceresna, 2011: 21; Pattnaik, 2011: 56-59). Blockades of
this kind have been in place on and off ever since. the persistence of villagers to sustain these
blockades, through multiple incidents (described above) of police charging at blockades with
batons and injuring non-violent protestors, played a crucial part in the government’s literal
inability, over many years, to acquire the land that POSCO seeks.
in addition to on-site non-violent direct action, PPSS organizes and engages in broader protests.
PPSS supports other anti-displacement peoples movements, for example by participating in a seven
day march to the controversial proposed vedanta University site near Puri (Ceresna, 2011: 21-22),
and in return receives the support from other people for its own protests, such as those held every
year on ‘Black Day’, 22 June, to commemorate the signing of the MoU (The Hindu, 2014).
PPSS liaises with more formal organisations, such as nGOs, legal activists or journalists, to
take advantage of their technical expertise and networks. Other organisations can make their
own decisions regarding their strategies and tactics, which, by engaging the law and other
more formal channels, are complementary to non-violent direct action and non-engagement.
However, PPSS operates on the principle of solidarity, constituted by a strict policy of non-in-

26
PPSS leadership met with Odisha Chief Minister Naveen Pattnaik in 2010. The Chief Minister promised
to visit the site to better understand the concerns of the affected communities, but his visit never took
place (Das, 2010).

28
Figure 1. anti-POSCO People’s Movement Protests, June 201127

terference from outside organisations in PPSS’ internal matters (interview with Prasant
Paikray, Spokesperson PPSS, Bhubaneshwar, December 2012). the movement expects supporters
to communicate their strategies with them, and to ultimately defer to the aspirations decided
by the movement (for example by not encouraging villagers to consider negotiating on com-
pensation). PPSS’ supporters are accustomed to working in this fashion, and have done so for
many other movements, including for the anti-vedanta movement. these supporting
organisations have engaged in a number of different strategies to campaign against the project,
including providing legal support, establishing and sustaining a vibrant alternative media and
news source that covers events relevant to POSCO and other similar cases, and conducting
research and advocacy. Of all the groups involved in the anti-POSCO campaigns, it is Odisha-
based groups that play the most important role in enabling access for outsiders to information
about PPSS’ struggle, and acting as intermediaries between the movement and international
supporters, researchers and journalists.
a more uncertain and intangible effect of the domestic mobilization around POSCO relates to
its place as part of a broader constituency of scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, farmers and
environmentalists (Baviskar, 1997). these groups have come to constitute a ‘vote bank’ to
which even india’s major parties are responsive, particularly Congress, one of india’s two

27
Source: PPSS personal communication.

29
 Box 3: Some of PPSS’ closest supporters and their key activities28

Lok Shakti Abhiyan: a loose network of anti-displacement activists, headed by Prafulla

Samantara at the Odisha state level, and connected to the national alliance of People’s
Movements, founded by Medha Patkar of narmada Bachao andolan. Lok Shakti abhiyan
supports non-violent direct actions and engages in more formal avenues of campaigning
such as the OeCD nCPs and legal cases to the Odisha High Court and the nGt. this
group was also heavily involved in the vedanta case (Lokshakti abhiyan, 2015).29
Legal Initiative for Forests and Environment (LIFE): activist lawyers advancing “envi-
ronmental democracy” through litigation, campaigns and capacity building to help
people protect areas of ecological importance. LiFe lawyers have provided legal counsel
for the cases taken to the nGt regarding POSCO.

biggest political parties (Breeding, 2011). For example, the people’s movement contesting
vedanta’s mining plans in niyamgiri, home to the Dongria kondh tribal people, was championed
by rahul Gandhi, chairman of Congress, a move described in the media as an attempt to win
(back) the ‘tribal vote’ - 8% of the population nationally (Patnaik, 2010). the POSCO case has
not attracted political attention of the same scale, but there is speculation that the silence or
equivocation of parties like Congress at the state level, when they might be expected to
support such significant investment in the state, is in order not to alienate this constituency
(Mishra and nayak, 2011). the continued vocalization of opposition to POSCO by civil
society groups at the local and state levels, in particular, is essential to the integration of this
campaign into broader narratives about marginalization of certain groups, and therefore to the
maintenance of the movement’s political capital and leverage. Given the uncompromising
support for POSCO from the ruling BJD party at state level, this leverage is unlikely to be as
successful as the Dongria kondh’s in the vedanta case, but it has likely contributed to the
delaying of the project in small ways, for example through slowing land acquisition activities
in the lead-up to 2014 state election (Economic Times 2014).

Transnational­civil­society­mobilisation
the transnational civil society mobilization around POSCO’s activities in Odisha has been
characterized by sporadic expressions of opposition to the project by actors in korea, the US and
europe. the effect of these various methods of campaigning, often disconnected from each other
but prolific when considered together, is difficult to ascertain with any certainty. to date, they
have not led to any divestment from the company, nor to any tangible changes in the behaviour of
POSCO or the Governments of india or Odisha. However, they have had the effect of introducing

28
Many of these organisations asked not to be named in this report out of fear of negative consequences
from the State and National governments.
29
See also Vedanta case study report in this series.

30
POSCO to international standards and discourses regarding business and human rights. the
ambivalent effects of POSCO’s incorporation into these circles is discussed further below.
the organisations and individuals that support the anti-POSCO campaign are organized into
overlapping but loose networks with each-other, all of which pivot around their shared
relationships with india-based activists who support PPSS. Some of these groups have been
started by indian-born researchers, activists and academics who have since lived, studied and
worked abroad, while others are northern nGOs that have reached out to indian groups and
been connected to the POSCO case through civil society networks. See Box 4 for further details.

Box 4: Significant international organisations opposing

POSCO’s Odisha project
Mining Zone Peoples’ Solidarity Network: a US-based network of researchers working
almost exclusively on the POSCO case, with a particular interest in the economic aspects
of the project (MZPSG, 2015). Many of these researchers are indian-born and have close
relationships with Odisha-based activists.
ESCR-Net: an organisation that acts as a hub for nGOs around the world working on
economic, social and cultural rights. eSCr-net also engages more actively in a small
number of cases that are emblematic of their priorities, one of which is POSCO (eSCr-
net, 2015). eSCr-net worked with the new york University (nyU) School of Law to
research and produce the report ‘Price of Steel’ (iHrC and eSCr-net, 2013).
NYU School of Law: as part of the international Human rights Clinic, nyU researchers
researched and produced the report ‘Price of Steel’ with eSCr-net (international Human
rights Clinic, 2015; iHrC and eSCr-net, 2013).
Korean Transnational Corporations Watch (in particular KHIS), SOMO, BothENDS,
and ForUM: see below – OeCD nCP complaints

efforts to raise the profile of the POSCO case through international campaigning have
increased in more recent years as more organisations have become aware of the case, and as
Bhubaneshwar-based activists have increased their international networks. though there have
been occasional small street protests, for example at POSCO’s aGM in Seoul (Wan, 2013),
most international mobilization around this case has taken the form of more formalized
research, publication of reports (iHrC and eSCr-net, 2013; MZPSG, 2010), and soliciting of
non-material support from influential actors and organisations, particularly within the Un
(Odisha Development review Collective, 2011), to exert pressure on POSCO. For example, in
October 2013, eight Un Special rapporteurs called on POSCO to halt the Odisha project
citing human rights concerns (UnOHCHr, 2013b), and in May 2014 five of these Special
rapporteurs engaged the Special Procedures function of the Un Human rights Council to
require the government of korea to respond to questions regarding how it is holding POSCO
to account in korea for the company’s actions in india (Permanent Mission of the republic of
korea to the Un 2014; Un Human rights Council 2015). this has added the POSCO case to

31
the many other high profile cases raised in global civil society discussions of land grabbing
(Balagun et al., 2014), and has facilitated connections for anti-POSCO activists in Bhubaneshwar
with activists in other parts of the world. this kind of attention has thereby had important
indirect effects on the sustenance of the anti-POSCO campaign, but little effect directly on
POSCO other than requiring the company to respond to allegations, which it consistently does
so by denying any culpability in human rights harms.30
One of the most important roles these transnational activists have played has been to provide
support for research on the human rights situation in Jagatsinghpur. Foreigners are prohibited
from visiting the site without government permission (economic times, 2012), and must face
a ‘siege-like’ security situation if they attempt to visit (iHrC and eSCr-net, 2013, p. 49). this
makes it very difficult for outsiders to obtain reliable information about the status and nature
of land acquisition, including the human rights harms alleged in association with that
acquisition. though Odisha-based activists have collected significant evidence of these harms,
particularly through video, the state government and POSCO have consistently painted these
activists as anti-industrialists with an agenda against POSCO, and have thereby tainted the
credibility of their research in the eyes of the middle class and decision makers. When
international researchers are able to verify the human rights abuses through independent
(from POSCO or government) research, they are able to offer a crucial alternative account of
the situation to intervene in perceptions of the project. though the local government support
may be too great for such research to intervene directly in indian decision-making, it does
contribute to building a broader picture of the problem that has, for example, drawn POSCO
into the OeCD nCP process.31
in addition, there has been some activism directed at POSCO’s investors. the OeCD nCP
complaints, described in more detail below, were targeted not only at POSCO, but also at the
Dutch and norwegian pension funds, both of which hold minority investments in the company.
in the US, 16 members of eSCr-net wrote to high profile private investors, including Berkshire
Hathaway, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of ny Mellon, Deutsche Bank and Blackrock. these private
financiers either failed to reply (Berkshire Hathaway and Blackrock); have argued that they have
no leverage over POSCO because of technicalities related to the nature of their financial
relationship (Bank of ny Mellon); or committed to ongoing dialogue with POSCO regarding the
situation in Odisha (P Morgan Chase and Deutsche Bank)(iHrC and eSCr-net 2013:72-73).32
Mining Zone Peoples’ Solidarity network (MZPSG, 2012a, 2012b) and Countercurrents (Coun-
tercurrents, 2014), an indian-based activist organization have run other, less directly targeted, di-
vestment campaigns. to our knowledge, no investors have divested from POSCO as a result of
these campaigns, and any impact associated with ongoing dialogue remains unclear. the impact
of investor campaigning is explored in more detail below, in relation to the Dutch nCP.

30
For example, see the press releases available on POSCO’s own website (POSCO-India 2015d).
31
In the Vedanta case, independent research of this kind has had a slightly more direct impact on decision
making in India, but this may be because it aligned with the political interests of some important political
players, such as Minister of Environment and Forests at the time, Jairam Ramesh, who had already
expressed their opposition to the Vedanta project. No such important players, other than Jual Oram
(recently appointed Minister of Tribal Affairs) have expressed such objections to the POSCO project.
32
For the letters and responses, see http://business-humanrights.org/en/letter-from-civil-society-groups-
to-posco-investors-regarding-steel-project-in-odisha-india-and-company-responses .

32
Other­avenues
in addition to these major avenues, activists in india who are not direct members of PPSS but
support PPSS’ stance against POSCO have pursued a number of other avenues of redress, none
of which have had a significant impact on the case. the national Human rights Commission
(nHrC) has visited the area twice, and both times expressed concerns about particular issues,
once about schools being used as police barracks (nHrC 2011a), and once about private real
estate companies speculating on nearby land for rehabilitation colonies (Business Standard
2012b). at other times nHrC has also issued more general recommendations to the Government
of Odisha to respect human rights in its handling of land acquisition, in particular through
appropriate resettlement and rehabilitation (nHrC, 2011b). in each of these cases, government
has promised to respond to the recommendations but interviewees for this research report they
have had no effect on the ground. a 2011 report of the national Commission for Protection of
Child rights found that living standards in the POSCO transit camp were sub-standard; that
the police were using a school as a barracks; and that children’s involvement in the PPSS
blockades was negatively affecting school attendance. However, investigators also found (and
were moved by their encounters with such students) that students unanimously chose to
participate in the protest out of concern that without their land, their future would be reduced
to a labouring class and therefore there would be no point in going to school.33 according to in-
terviewees, other similar complaints have been made to the national Women’s Commission
and the Scheduled Caste Commission, neither of which received a response.
insofar as complaints have been made to the nHrC and other similar bodies, it has been as
part of a broader strategy to pursue every available option, and a longer and broader campaign
to strengthen human rights institutions, rather than out of any real hope of immediate redress.

OECD­NCP­process
the significance and effectiveness of the OeCD nCP complaint must be understood within
this broader landscape of avenues of resistance and redress. Domestic non-judicial mechanisms
had almost no impact, and transnational civil society support very little. Domestic political mo-
bilization and domestic legal and regulatory complaints were stalling the project, but neither of
these avenues was likely to offer its conclusive termination, as the affected people and their
supporters aspired to. at this juncture, after seven years of efforts to stop POSCO, human rights
groups in india made the decision to attempt a new forum after being introduced to the
opportunity at a local workshop held by OeCD Watch.
in October 2012, Bhubaneshwar-based group Lok Shakti abhiyan, with international supporters
(see Box 5, below) filed a complaint to the OeCD nCPs in South korea, the netherlands and
norway. the complaint alleged that POSCO had not conducted due diligence or meaningful
stakeholder negotiation regarding the human rights and environmental impact of its proposed -on,

33
PPSS Leader Abhay Sahoo, the leader of PPSS, did not deny the impropriety of using children in such
protests, and used the opportunity to get support from the Commission to argue that police brutality in
land acquisition should cease so that such protests are not required (National Commission for the
Protection of Child Rights, 2011).

33
 Box 5: Role of international groups in NCP complaints
SOMO (Stichting Onderzoek Multinationale Ondernemingen / The Centre for Research
on Multinational Corporations): SOMO is a key member of OeCD Watch, which is a
network of nGOs that monitor the activity of the OeCD nCPs to enhance their role in
protecting human rights and advancing the other goals of the OeCD Guidelines. SOMO
co-hosted a training program in Odisha in 2012 on how to use the OeCD nCPs, at
which time they met anti-POSCO activists. SOMO, with BothenDS, supported these
activists with advice, particularly to Lok Shakti abhiyan, in the development of the
OeCD nCP complaints, and represented them in the netherlands in discussions with
the Dutch nCP (SOMO, 2015).
BothENDS: BothenDS is a Dutch nGO whose mission is to promote social and envi-
ronmental sustainability through supporting local initiatives in developing countries, as
well as campaigning for sustainability at national and international forums (Both enDS,
2015). BothenDS is also a member of OeCD Watch and was invited to be part of this
case by SOMO, to provide additional advisory support. BothenDS thus works with
SOMO in supporting indian groups engaged in the nCP complaint with the nCP
process in the netherlands.
ForUM: the norwegian Forum for Development and environment is a network of 50
norwegian development, environmental, peace and human rights organizations, and a
member of OeCD Watch (ForUM, 2015). ForUM represented the nCP complainants in
norway, a relationship facilitated via OeCD-Watch.
Korean Transnational Corporations Watch (KTNC-Watch): ktnC-Watch is a network
of korean nGOs working on corporate accountability in relation to human rights,
labour rights, and climate. the secretariat of ktnC-Watch was, from 2008 to 2013, held
by the korean House for international Solidarity (kHiS), a nGO that monitors and
campaigns against korean corporations committing environmental or social harms
abroad (kHiS, 2015). advocates for Public interest Law has held the secretariat since
2014. kHiS had expressed solidarity with anti-POSCO activists in Bhubaneshwar, as
well as with PPSS, prior to the nCP complaint, primarily by campaigning against
POSCO in korea. kHiS provided specific support for the drafting of the OeCD nCP
complaint, for which they were the complainants’ representatives in korea, and general
advice and guidance regarding the korean nCP and POSCO for strategic purposes.

and had failed to seek to prevent or mitigate the human rights abuses committed by the indian
state in its violent efforts to acquire land for POSCO. the complaint also argues that nBiM
(among the world’s largest investment funds) and aBP/aPG, “should seek to prevent or
mitigate the real and potential adverse impacts directly linked to their operations through
their financial relationship with POSCO” (Lok Shakti abhiyan, 2012). the complaint requested

34
that the nCPs facilitate mediation between all parties, and carry out a fact-finding mission.
Furthermore, the complaint requested that the pension funds should detail the steps they
intend to take to prevent, “through their investments in POSCO, contributing to adverse
impacts”, and that in doing so they publicly disclose minimum requirements for the continuation
of investment, that is, consider divestment (Lok Shakti abhiyan, 2012).34
the complainants in this case were realistic about their expectations regarding the nCP process.
Lok Shakti abhiyan understood that not only is the korean nCP unlikely to accept the complaint,
but that even if it did, the process would be very unlikely to halt the POSCO project, given that
nCP processes are about collaborative problem solving. the objective was, therefore, to use the
nCP process to expand international solidarity networks and increase the attention of international
audiences – particularly financiers – on the anti-POSCO campaign. the best possible outcome,
from the complainant’s perspective, would be a fact-finding mission that could lend credibility to
their statements regarding human rights harms and risks.
the european nGOs involved in this case shared the modest expectations of the indian
complainants in relation to outcomes in Odisha. their objectives were, instead, to strengthen
the international networks available to indian activist groups, while at the same time strengthening
the nCP process as an avenue for human rights redress. experienced european nGOs associated
with OeCD Watch (predominantly SOMO from Fair Green and Global alliance) suggested
that complainants couple two nCPs known from experience to be proactive in their approach
to human rights complaints, and inclined to actively facilitate problem-solving (the Dutch and
norwegian), with one ‘weak’ and inexperienced nCP known to be reluctant to accept human
rights cases (the korean) (cf. Oldenziel et al., 2010: 10). 35 the expectation was that the stronger
nCPs would coordinate with the korean nCP to simultaneously prevent early dismissal of the
case in korea, and to build the capacity of the korean nCP to handle human rights cases. the
second objective of the european nGOs was to test the nCPs’ interpretations of minority
shareholder responsibilities under a new provision in the 2011 OeCD Guidelines which states
that “if the enterprise identifies a risk of contributing to an adverse impact, then it should take
the necessary steps to cease or prevent its contribution and use its leverage to mitigate any
remaining impacts to the greatest extent possible” (OeCD, 2011: 24). this would entail
conducting human rights due diligence and exercising leverage.36 Despite hopes from complainants
that nCPs would coordinate their response to the complaint, each nCP took a separate path
and the complaints each had separate outcomes, summarized in Box 6 (below)
Overall, though a fact finding ‘review assessment panel’ and associated dialogue was suggested,
it did not eventuate and the complaints to the OeCD nCP had no tangible outcome for the
affected communities in Odisha. the issue of functional equivalence between nCPs was

34
The Norwegian NCP clarified in its final statement that the pension funds do not ‘cause or contribute’ to
human rights harms, but are rather ‘directly linked’ to them (Norwegian NCP, 2013: 40)
35
Only one of 20 specific instances (complaints) filed with the Korean NCP has been accepted, as of
April 2015 (personal communication, Korean House for International Solidarity, May 2015).
36
The Norwegian NCP final statement puts this clearly: “The NCP has examined two dimensions of the
application of this chapter of the Guidelines to NBIM: (1) the extent to which NBIM has integrated the
OECD Guidelines provisions on human rights – including due diligence — into its policies and processes;
and (2) the steps NBIM has taken — or omitted— in response to the allegations in this Specific Instance”
(Norwegian NCP, 2013: 6).

35
 Box 6: Summary of direct NCP outcomes
Dutch NCP – some progress. the Dutch nCP accepted the complaint in December 2012 and used its
good offices to facilitate a dialogue between aBP/aPG and Fair Green Global alliance (representing Lok
Shakti abhiyan). On 6 March 2013 the nCP issued a provisional final statement stating that:
aBP/aPG has and will continue to exercise its leverage over POSCO in the form of phone calls,
correspondence and face-to-face meetings with the company, and is therefore compliant with the OeCD
Guidelines (Dutch nCP, 2013: 8).
there is concern about forcible land acquisition and violence in the area, and gaps between the issues
raised in the complaint, and the response from POSCO, and “there is a need from the beginning of the
project development for the establishment of a constructive and meaningful stakeholder consultation
process between POSCO india the local communities and nGOs to identify, prevent and mitigate any
negative impact related to the project” (Dutch nCP, 2013: 6).
Parties agreed upon a draft terms of reference for an independent review and assessment of contentious
issues in Odisha that could contribute to meaningful stakeholder dialogue (Dutch nCP, 2013: 2).
this statement was provisional in the hope that the norwegian and korean nCPs might coordinate
activities to facilitate the outcomes agreed in the netherlands. However, by the end of May the other two
nCPs issued their own final statements. though the korean nCP did not pursue the case, POSCO did
write to the Dutch nCP indicating willingness to engage in dialogue with the complainants and aBP/aPG,
and to explore possibilities for an independent review assessment panel (Dutch nCP, 2013: 7). the Dutch
nCP finalised its final statement in September 2013, when it became clear that the parties could not agree
on terms for a panel, but continued informal dialogue with all parties.
Korean­NCP­–­rejected­the­complaint.­On 11 May 2013, more than six months after the complaint was
submitted (the OeCD Guidelines suggest initial assessments should be made within three months), after
some written submissions from POSCO and the complainants providing clarification on the various
aspects of the allegations in the complaint, the korean nCP declined to pursue the complaint any further
on the grounds that the impact assessments and violent encounters are the responsibility of the indian
37
government, rather than POSCO. in an ‘initial assessment’ , the South korean nCP stated that:
“the complaint is not directly related to business activities of Posco india. instead, it is related to the
administrative activities of the provincial and the central governments of india and the rulings of the indian
court, whose legality and legitimacy are not to be determined by the korean nCP. […] On the basis of the
due diligence provisions and other procedural or practical issues stated in the Guidelines, the korean nCP
cannot find any problems in the court rulings and other relevant procedures of the Posco case. therefore,
the korean nCP has decided that there will be no additional proceedings.” (korean nCP, 2013)
Norwegian­NCP­–­pension­fund­refused­cooperation­but­strong­final­statement. the norwegian nCP
was willing to offer its good offices to engage the case, but nBiM refused. in a final statement issued on 27
May 2013 (after the korean nCP), the norwegian nCP concludes that,
“nBiM violates the OeCD Guidelines chiefly on two accounts. First; by refusing to cooperate with the
OeCD nCP nBiM violates the OeCD Guidelines Procedural Guidance. Second; by not having any
strategy on how to react if it becomes aware of human rights risks related to companies in which nBiM is
invested, apart from child labour violations.” (norwegian nCP, 2013: 7)

37
An ‘initial statement’ is typically used to make public a judgment on whether or not a NCP has decided
to offer ‘good offices’ to complainants to resolve a complaint, and ‘final statements’ are issued upon
conclusion of a case that was engaged by the NCP.
38
See ‘Inadequate consultation and no consent’

36
highlighted but no progress towards such equivalence was demonstrated. the only unequivocal
success in the complaint, from the complainants’ perspective, was that the process confirmed
that minority shareholders have obligations regarding human rights due diligence, and the
exercise of leverage to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts. each of these themes
is explored in more detail below.

Independent­review­assessment­panel­and­dialogue
One of the most effective barriers to having grievance about human rights heard meaningfully
in this case has been the corporate and government influence over information about the
project in Odisha, described above.38 in particular, the only available sources of information
on human rights impacts of the project have come from civil society organisations, or from oc-
casional investigations by government commissions, such as the nHrC. there is thus a
considerable lack of reliable information regarding the social or human rights impact – present
or anticipated – of the POSCO project. in light of this significant challenge to accountability in
the POSCO case, the complainants and aBP/aPG agreed that a fact-finding mission would be
a valuable contribution towards addressing human rights concerns in this case.39
as such, the Dutch nCP-facilitated dialogue between aBP/aPG and Fair Green and Global
alliance (representing Lok Shakti abhiyan) resulted in a ‘draft terms of reference for a
review & assessment Mission’ agreed between these two parties. the terms included:
“a mission of independent, authoritative members to prepare a high level assessment
of the social, environmental and human rights aspects of all proposed POSCO
investments in Odisha;
to assess how meaningful ongoing stakeholder engagement can be set up, in which the
right to free, prior and informed consent is assured, including compliance with rights
of indigenous people and forest dwellers, as defined by the Un Declaration on the
rights of indigenous Peoples (DriP);
the Mission to be acting under the authority of the nCPs of the netherlands, norway,
South korea; at least one member must be from india or of indian origin with a sound
understanding of the local situation and context;
the findings of the Mission will be made public” (Dutch nCP, 2013: 8)
in a private communication to the author of this report, the Dutch nCP explained that it
understood the composition and process of this mission as an important safeguard for
communities to engage in dialogue. Specifically, the mission would be composed of three
members, one from South korea, one from india, and one independent chairperson; funding
would be provided by the nCP, rather than any of the parties; and anonymity would be
guaranteed for anyone who spoke with the committee.

39
A further problem for the complainants is that they are confident there are direct connections between
POSCO and the ‘goons’ that commit acts of violence and intimidation against anti-POSCO villagers, but
have been unable to prove the connection. They argue that another possible outcome of a fact-finding
mission is the proof of such a connection.

37
in July 2013, POSCO unexpectedly wrote to the Dutch nCP indicating the company’s willingness
to cooperate with the Dutch nCP’s ‘consultations’ and the review assessment Panel, but attached
a series of conditions which would preclude the process from generating new and impartial in-
formation, including the company’s right to review and reassess the findings, the exclusion of
‘issues related to the indian authorities’, and confidentiality provisions (Dutch nCP, 2013: 6).
after POSCO proposed its conditions for a review assessment panel, discussion stalled.
POSCO, aBP/aPG and Fair Green Global alliance were invited to informal meetings facilitated
by the Dutch nCP, who strongly encouraged ongoing dialogue. However, the complainants
were unwilling to engage in a dialogue in light of ongoing land acquisition efforts and the
absence of any improvement in the human rights conditions on the ground, as reported by the
local complainant, Lok Shakti abhiyan. 40 in its communications with the Dutch complainants,
the Dutch nCP maintains that both parties, but particularly the complainants, have contributed
to the failure of this process because they refused to cooperate in further dialogue (Personal
communications with Wiert Wiersema, BothenDS, January and May 2015).
this approach, which emphasizes the capacity of dialogue to resolve a problem (including in
the absence of adequate information), is problematic because of imbalances in power between
the parties, particularly in regards to information. POSCO has the advantage of having
controlled the available official information about the project, such as eias, since the project
was first proposed, while communities rely on national and transnational civil society groups
to provide counter-evidence to POSCO’s account of the situation on the ground. in this
context, and in the broader political and economic context of Odisha, POSCO faces no risks in
entering negotiations and dialogue. if discussions do not lead to an agreement, the company is
able to argue it was fulfilling its duty to consult. this power imbalance was not taken into
account in the Dutch nCP’s insistence that facilitating dialogue became the only role the nCP
can play. Disappointment in this position was expressed in an email to the Dutch nCP from
norwegian complainants ForUM: “the OeCD GL[Guidelines] do not have much to offer
victims of Hr [human rights] violations and corporate abuse. a safe, neutral space where they
can share their stories is the least we should provide, if we are to continue to promote the
Guidelines” (Gunhild Ørstavik, Forum, norway, in an email to Dutch nCP, Personal commu-
nication, May 2015). the complainants perceived that, with no change on the ground and no
fact finding mission, neither safety nor neutrality would be a condition of any dialogue.
the complainants often lack access to information (such as the Xavier institute of Management
social impact assessment, the only known assessment of the social impact of the project); the in-
formation they do provide, from civil society supporters, is often treated with scepticism by
authorities, or is not available at crucial times in which legal appeals can be lodged (see analysis
above, of legal and regulatory avenues of appeal); and they lack influence with the Odisha state
government (see analysis above of applications for OtFD status, and gram sabha resolutions
rejecting the project). While the complainants may treat POSCO’s information with scepticism

40
Another barrier to the fact finding mission is resourcing and political support. The Dutch NCP said in
its final statement that “The Netherlands NCP would contribute to such a mission provided that it is jointly
commissioned with the South Korean and Norwegian NCP and Indian authorities are consulted” (Dutch
NCP, 2013: 8).

38
as well, they do not do so from a position of power, influence or authority. therefore, for the
complainants, entering into dialogue, particularly in the context of inadequate information,
means they stand to lose their only source of leverage in resisting the project– continued
opposition. entering dialogue means that they are therefore less likely to achieve their objectives
in relation to resistance (to land acquisition) or remedy (for violence and intimidation).
applying pressure on complainants to engage in dialogue in the absence of adequate and
balanced information sources about the situation on the ground acts, therefore, not as an
enabler of resistance and access to remedy for human rights harms, but a barrier to it. a more
helpful approach from the Dutch nCP would have been to apply pressure on both parties to
come to some agreement about an independent fact finding mission. Such a mission would
need to depart significantly from the conditions suggested by POSCO, which would likely
facilitate a replication of existing information. as Gunhild Ørstavik (from ForUM in norway)
put it in an email to the Dutch nCP,
‘We may not be able to offer much more than listening, but by that we ac-
knowledge the difference between the realities faced by the people on the
ground in a “specific instance” and the policy issues we deal with as well-
educated, well- dressed northerners at air-conditioned venues. in order for a
deeper understanding we need to move out of our comfort zone, just as some
Southern partners do when they come to speak at our conferences.’ (Personal
communication, May 2015)
the complainants have formally invited both the Dutch nCP and aBP/aPG to visit Odisha in
order to better understand why they are unwilling to engage in a dialogue without appropriate
safeguards for its basis. in late 2014 and early 2015 the Dutch complainants had meetings with
aBP/aPG and the Dutch nCP to urge them to accept the invitation. the nCP refused, arguing
that it lacks the international support (from the korean and norwegian nCPs) to take effective
further action on the proposed review assessment panel, and that a visit to the site to verify why
the complainants refuse dialogue is not productive (personal communication, Herman Mulder,
Dutch nCP, May 2015).41 aBP/aPG also refused the invitation, arguing that it had visited the
project area in 2013 on the invitation of POSCO and that it did not consider it opportune to pay
another visit. it reiterated its position that it stands prepared to facilitate a dialogue between
local civil society groups and POSCO-india. aBP/aPG has not responded to additional queries
from complainants on how it further uses its leverage over POSCO, or what might trigger it to
divest (Personal communication with Wiert Wiersema, BothenDS, May 2015).

Functional­equivalence­and­coordination­of­NCPs
the 2011 OeCD Guidelines contain four principles of functional equivalence for nCPs:
visibility, accessibility, transparency and accountability.42 in relation to specific instances,
nCPs must be impartial, equitable, predictable, and operate in a way that is compatible with
the Guidelines. nCPs are required to conduct an initial assessment within three months to

41
The Dutch NCP has engaged in fact finding missions in the past, for example in the Friends of the Earth
vs. Arcelor Mittal case. See OECD Watch (2015) for further details.
42
See the Guidelines: Procedural Guidance.

39
ascertain whether or not the complaint merits further attention. if it is decided that it does, the
nCP is to offer its good offices to the parties. in doing so, the nCP may seek advice from
relevant external parties, other nCPs involved in the case, or the OeCD investment Committee
if clarification of the Guidelines is required. if a dialogue between parties is agreed, it must be
voluntary, consensual, and non-adversarial. Upon conclusion of procedures, the nCP is
expected to make the outcome public, with due respect for sensitive business or stakeholder
information. Within the bounds of these principles, governments are able to constitute their
nCPs in any institutional arrangement.
OeCD Watch and the trade Union advisory Committee (tUaC) of the OeCD have long
been concerned that functional equivalence is not a reality for nCPs (OeCD Watch, 2014: 10;
tUaC, 2014: 2). the POSCO case is exemplary in this regard. in direct responses to exactly
the same complaint, three nCPs arrived at three different conclusions: one declared the case
did not merit further assessment, one was unable to engage the relevant company (the
norwegian pension fund), while one took proactive measures to facilitate a dialogue, and
offered financial support for a fact finding mission.
Similarly, the POSCO case also exemplifies failures of coordination among nCPs. though the
Dutch nCP took a number of formal and informal steps to facilitate coordination between
nCPs, including regular communication, invitations to formal meetings, the publication of a
provisional final statement to make time for agreement among nCPs, and an invitation to the
other nCPs to co-sponsor the fact finding mission, coordination was not achieved. though
the norwegian nCP had agreed to coordinate, for reasons that are unclear this did not
happen, and, despite stating its commitment to coordinating responses to shared complaints
with other nCPs (korean nCP, 2012), the korean nCP was not willing to work with these two
nCPs (Dutch nCP, 2013: 2). the three only met to discuss the case at the annual nCP meeting
in Paris, after the norwegian and korean nCPs had finalized the cases. the Dutch nCP
commented, in its final statement, that “although each nCP has its own responsibility to deal
with its part of a multiple case, early exchanges of views and possible coordination are essential
in order to meet the OeCD Guidelines requirements of coherence between the nCPs’
approaches (principle of functional equivalence)”(Dutch nCP, 2013: 3).
the POSCO case did trigger discussions about functional equivalence and coordination at the
June 2013 OeCD nCP annual meeting in Paris, and it featured again at the 2014 meeting. there is
now informal agreement among nCPs, arising from that meeting, to take up the Dutch nCPs sug-
gestions. the Dutch nCP confirms that the OeCD Working Group on responsible Business
Conduct now shares the view that the nCP closest to the impact has the responsibility to
coordinate, while not mitigating the responsibilities of other nCPs who have received related
complaints about corporations that are not contributing, but are directly linked to the impact (e.g.
investors) (Private communication, Herman Mulder, Dutch nCP, June 2015). at this stage, it is
too soon to determine the impact of this agreement in practice. One potential problem of the
search for functional equivalence is the risk of ‘ratcheting down’ rather than up, though it is clear
that those advocating for functional equivalence have in mind equivalence with the most, rather
than the least robust nCP processes. For those in the POSCO case, a lack of functional equivalence
contributed to the lack of meaningful outcome for complainants.

40
Minority­shareholding
the Dutch nCP noted, in its final statement, that applicability of the Guidelines to the
financial sector is unequivocal: “it is no longer a question if the Guidelines in general and the
due diligence provisions in particular apply to the financial sector, but how they do apply”
(Dutch nCP, 2013:5). However, applicability to minority shareholders was, at the beginning of
this case, still in question. the Dutch nCP, working with a cooperative company with a history
of being responsive to business and human rights issues, aBP/aPG, was able to determine that
the Guidelines do, in fact, apply to minority shareholders, in particular, the provisions relating
to risk based due diligence on social and environmental issues. the Dutch nCP’s final
statement explained “the Guidelines do not make any exception for minority shareholders
nor do they indicate that the application is limited to shareholders from a certain size
onwards”(Dutch nCP, 2013: 5). the norwegian nCP agreed (norwegian nCP, 2013: 22-23).
this determination regarding the applicability of the OeCD Guidelines to minority shareholders,
represents a significant advancement in the tools available to human rights campaigners and the
communities they support. it opens the door to holding national pension funds and high profile
private financiers to account for abuses perpetrated by companies in which they are invested.
the norwegian nCP clarified that the “three basic steps” all enterprises should take, and which
should constitute the framework also for minority shareholders, are laid out in the Guidelines:
“(i) have a policy commitment to respect human rights; (ii) carry out human rights due diligence;
and (iii) provide for or cooperate in remediation of adverse human rights impacts in designated
circumstances” (norwegian nCP, 2013: 26). Both pension funds already have relevant policies.
However, how minority shareholders can be expected to exercise due diligence over a large
portfolio of investments is a difficult question, as is how they might exercise leverage in order to
facilitate remediation beyond participation in an nCP process (norwegian nCP, 2013: 40).
Due diligence. in its discussion of due diligence, the norwegian nCP gives a detailed outline regarding
expectations of minority shareholders. the nCP affirms the principle that “responsibilities are tied to
impacts: enterprises should be prepared to address the impacts they have, not just those they find of
interest” (norwegian nCP, 2013: 27) and criticizes nBiM for having “significantly narrowed the
scope of human rights that it takes into consideration in many of its policies and practices, particularly
regarding the screening of companies and active ownership” (norwegian nCP, 2013: 27) in particular
by focusing on children’s rights at the expense of other relevant human rights issues.
recognising the practical difficulties investment firms face in conducting due diligence for all
investments, the norwegian nCP elaborates at length how a minority shareholder might
undertake the four aspects of due diligence required by the guidelines: “(i) assessing actual
and potential human rights impacts; (ii) integrating and acting upon the findings; (iii) tracking
responses; and (iv) communicating” (norwegian nCP, 2013: 29). the statement encourages
integrated assessment procedures that focus on high-risk regions, sectors or companies (p.30),
and ongoing tracking of the effects of exercising leverage on companies, for example through
qualitative and quantitative indicators, and stakeholder engagement (pp.37-38). Finally, the
statement also affirms that allegations of adverse human rights impacts should be investigated
(p.41). the nCP holds up nBiM’s due diligence procedures around children’s rights as a
model. Jointly, these suggestions provide clear guidance regarding expectations of minority
shareholders in relation to human rights due diligence.

41
Exercising leverage. the affirmation from the Dutch and norwegian nCP’s that minority
shareholders have obligations in relation to human rights impact in companies in which they
are invested raises a further set of practical questions regarding how, once due diligence has
revealed a human rights issue, a minority shareholder might go about exercising leverage.
the Dutch case is unusual in the extent to which the nCP was dealing with a company already
committed to using its leverage to influence companies in which it is invested. the Dutch nCP
found in its final statement as follows:
“For more than two years aPG has actively engaged in a dialogue with POSCO about
the human rights and environmental impacts of the project in Odisha, india and has en-
couraged POSCO to apply the principles of responsible business conduct. aPG has used
its leverage and has sought ways to increase it, and has actively brought the joint
agreement with SOMO and Both enDS to the attention of POSCO and urged POSCO
to address the issues raised in the agreement. Hence the nCP finds that aPG has taken
its responsibility as a shareholder and is compliant with the requirements under the
Guidelines. it used its leverage through extensive correspondence, phone calls, as well
as face to face meetings with POSCO representatives at POSCO offices in Seoul. […]
the nCP is especially pleased with the fact that aPG is committed to continue to use its
influence bringing POSCO’s business practices in line with the Guidelines and other in-
ternational principles and standards, under the expectation that POSCO publicly agrees
to adopt these standards for all its operations including those in india and publicly
reports on their implementation.” (Dutch nCP, 2013)
the norwegian nCP’s final statement, in its criticism of nBiM for its failure to exercise leverage,
makes more concrete suggestions regarding how minority shareholders might exercise leverage.
the norwegian nCP states that “the appropriate action for an enterprise to take depends on
factors including its leverage over the other entity, how crucial the relationship is to the enterprise,
and whether terminating the relationship would have adverse human rights impacts” (norwegian
nCP, 2013: 34). it acknowledges that minority shareholders do not have the same tools available
to them as majority ones, but suggests a range of pre-investment (imposing conditions) and post-
investment (shareholder proposals, shareholder voting, engagement with management, and the
threat of divestment) tools that may be effective (norwegian nCP, 2013: 34-35). in relation to the
provision of remedy, though investors cannot be expected to provide the remedy, they should
provide access to it, for example by requiring the company to establish an operational-level
(internal) grievance mechanism (norwegian nCP, 2013: 41).
notably, both nCPs also point out that some minority shareholders have special characteristics
that render their leverage greater than their share of investment. in the case of nBiM, its
potential for leverage is increased because it is so large, because it carries “the reputation – and
to some extent the influence – of the norwegian state”, and because it has a formal and public
process for considering divestment – the Council of ethics – which is monitored by other
investors and actors. this enabled, for example, nBiM to engage Monsanto on the issue of child
labour at a time when its ownership was less than it currently is in POSCO (norwegian nCP,
2013: 42). Drawing on the Un Guiding Principles, the Dutch nCP argued that, “the size of a
share that an investor holds in a company does not determine whether there is a business
relationship for the purpose of the Guidelines. it rather is a factor to determine whether or not

42
the investor in question disposes of sufficient leverage to effectuate change in the wrongful
practices of the entity that causes the harm” (Dutch nCP, 2013: 5). as a national pension fund,
aBP/aPG fits this profile, and has been, and continues to be, willing to exercise its leverage
over POSCO, despite having only a very small investment of 0.084% in POSCO.43 this is in
contrast to the norwegian pension fund, which has a similar investment profile but was
unwilling to exercise its leverage in this case.44
However, despite aBP/aPG’s efforts, and the norwegian nCP’s criticisms of nBiM, POSCO
has made no changes to its activities on the ground in india. as Wiert Wiertsema, a
representative of BothenDS who was involved with Fair Green and Global alliance for this
complaint, explained, “POSCO is not under any serious pressure [from investors] to change
course” (interview with Wiert Wiertsema, Bothends, amsterdam, november 2013).

The­current­state­of­play:­mixed­and­uncertain­outcomes­from­multiple
grievance­channels
at the time of completing this report (May 2015), POSCO holds 1703 acres of the land it
requires for the plant, but both its forest and environmental clearances are under challenge,
and its access to iron ore remains in doubt due to a recent ordinance. it is unlikely that the
company will give up on its plans, but presently it is biding time until more certainty can be
achieved regarding raw materials. PPSS continues its resistance through its strategy of peaceful
direct action and non-engagement with POSCO. PPSS and its supporters continue to pursue
any avenues possible, focusing their attention on, firstly, legal challenges to the forest and en-
vironmental clearances POSCO has received; and, secondly, transnational civil society
mobilization with a particular focus on trying to bring fact finding missions to verify the
human rights abuses on the ground in order to improve their position vis-à-vis POSCO and
the government in their resistance efforts.
in this context, the OeCD nCP complaint occupies a peripheral but not unimportant place in
the pursuit of human rights redress and protections. the potential for systemic change inherent
in the minority shareholder opinion and guidance from norwegian nCP is important, and the
appeal for functional equivalence (equivalent to the highest, not the lowest standards) is leant
credence from the divergent response from the South korean nCP. yet, any improvement in
these areas can only be slow and iterative. Meanwhile, anti-POSCO activists remain sceptical
about the possibility that the process will bring about an improved human rights situation on
the ground, but hopeful that aBP/aPG might visit india to see for themselves why communities
refuse to negotiate with POSCO, and the risks they face by giving POSCO the credibility that
such a negotiation would afford it. Whether or not anything will come of this process before
POSCO starts construction on the large tracts of land it has already acquired remains unclear.

43
As at October 2012 (Dutch NCP, 2013: 4).
44
As of December 2012 NBIM’s holdings of shares in POSCO amounted to 1,420 million NOK,
representing 0.9 per cent ownership (Norwegian NCP, 2013: 16).

43
Factors­influencing­resistance­and­access­to­remedy
the following section draws out key themes in the analysis presented above to identify factors
that have both constrained and enabled resistance and access to remedy.

Factors­constraining­resistance­and­access­to­remedy
Political­economy
the potential of non-judicial mechanisms to facilitate resistance and/or provide access to remedy
is shaped by the political and institutional conditions under which the broader conflict plays out.
in this case, a strong relationship between POSCO and the state government of Odisha, at least
until 2015, has resulted in (albeit inconclusive) favourable outcomes for POSCO, and unfavourable
ones for POSCO’s opponents in affected villages, in many regulatory channels. the strong
networks of influential pro-industry government and business actors have also generated an envi-
ronment that is politically, and sometimes physically hostile to anti-industrialist claims, and has
delegitimised the farmers’ concerns in the eyes of Odisha’s middle class and therefore diminished
their political capital, making it harder for them to win the political support that would be
necessary for the state government to meet their demands and reject the project outright.
Until the 1980s, Odisha’s economy was predominantly agricultural, with some light manufacturing
(adduci, 2012). Where there were industrial developments, such as the state-owned rourkela steel
plant, naLCO or the Hirakud dam, these were designed to meet the needs of the state for energy, or
broader india for the expansion of its industrial base, but they did little to contribute to the state’s
economic growth (adduci, 2012). Beginning as early as the 1980s but accelerating under the BJD
government, and naveen Patnaik, Chief Minister since 1997, the state government has sought to
reorient the economy towards industrialization.45 the state government sees industrialization,
particularly through mining and value add processes (such as steel manufacturing), as the key to
generating employment (adduci, 2012: 78). this shift in state economic policy towards industrialization
and liberalization has lead to economic growth rates between 7% (in 2003/2004) (adduci, 2012: 85)
and 9% in 2012-2013 (Planning Commission, 2014: 26), consistently above the national average.
Consequently, poverty has also decreased significantly in the state, from 57.2% in 2004-2005
(60.8% in rural areas and 37.6% in urban areas) to 32.59% in 2011-2012 (35.69% in rural areas and
17.29% in urban areas). nevertheless, Odisha remains one of the poorest states in india, where
national poverty rates have dropped to 21.92% in 2011-2012 (Planning Commission 2014:28-29).
there are also criticisms that the benefits of these levels of economic growth are not evenly
distributed. the state has an unusually high proportion of Scheduled tribes, 22.85%, compared to
8.61% of the national population (Ministry of tribal affairs Statistics Division, 2013: 123).46

45
Naveen Pattnaik is son of Biju Pattnaik, the founding father of the state of Odisha. Pattnaik and his
party, BJD, were in an alliance with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) from 1998 until 2009, after which
time BJD was able to gain a majority in the Legislative Assembly alone. BJD’s platform is one of neoliberal
economic policy and industrialization. The party’s success is often attributed to the lack of a strong
opposition as neither BJP nor Congress are strong at State level. BJD is not, however, popular in tribal
areas or areas, such as Jagatsinghpur, where there are peoples’ movements.
46
The Ministry of Tribal Affairs defines tribal peoples as having indications of primitive traits, distinctive
culture, geographical isolation, shyness of contact with the community at large, and ‘backwardness’. They
are entitled to special protections under the Constitution (Ministry of Tribal Affairs, 2015).

44
among these groups, poverty rates are significantly higher than the state average: 63.52% for
scheduled tribes, and 41.39% for scheduled castes in 2011-2012 (Planning and Coordination
Department 2014: 271).
Furthermore, critics have argued that increases in mining and industry have not had the
anticipated effect of also increasing production and employment in downstream sectors such as
manufacturing (adduci, 2012: 86-88). the failure of mining-led industrialization to bring
benefit to all the people of Odisha is, in part, the result of the government’s failure to adequately
regulate the industry to ensure that private investments adhere to the rule of law, and make
adequate assessments of the costs and benefits of private (or public) industrial projects
(Maringanti et al., 2013: 71). Other critics have, in addition, attributed this ‘growth without
inclusion’ (Panda, 2008) to the parallel neglect of agriculture (Mishra, 2010). the agricultural
sector provides more employment than the industrial sector, yet the state government has
allowed the sector to stagnate through lack of investment, as well as slow but steady dispossession
of agricultural land and other forms of common property (such as forests and water resources)
that traditional agriculturalists use in farming (Mishra, 2011). Consequently, the spatial and
social concentration of poverty persists and scheduled tribes and castes continue to
disproportionately suffer the negative effects of agricultural and environmental neglect, without
benefitting from industrial growth (Mishra, 2011).
nevertheless, the state government has not wavered in its commitment to neoliberal
industrialisation policies. Odisha possesses approximately a third of india’s iron ore, a quarter
of its coal, more than half its bauxite, and almost all its chromite, as well as vast reserves of
other minerals (Department of Steel and Mines, 2015a). in order to exploit these natural
resources, the state has sought to out-compete other states to attract private, including foreign
capital, and concentrated its efforts in the iron ore and steel sectors.47 a progressively established
policy framework seeks to facilitate this investment through committing to deregulation, with
a focus on the mineral sector, and limiting the government’s role to establishment of
infrastructure through public-private partnerships (See the Odisha industrial Policy 2001,
industries Facilitation act 2004 and industrial Policy 2007), providing for government-
supported land acquisition through the creation of iDCO, and providing special security for
industrial projects through the Odisha industrial Security Forces act (2012).
iron ore and steel have been the most sought after developments by the state government. a
report by Utkal University, commissioned by POSCO, declared that “as air is to the living
beings, steel is to the national economy” (Mohanty and Mishra, 2007: 2). the state currently
has 49 MoUs with national and international steel companies for steel plants, of which
POSCO’s is the largest projected investment (Department of Steel and Mines, 2015b). in this
context, POSCO’s role in South korea’s development stands as a model the Odisha government
wishes to emulate, though under a highly liberalized economic environment, rather than the
developmental state under which POSCO was born.

47
80% of mining leases in the state since liberalization have been for private companies, and 70% of
mining licences since liberalization have been for iron ore (Adduci, 2012: 79).

45
With two major integrated steel mills in korea, in Pohang and Gwangyang, major joint ventures
with state-owned steel companies in the US (USS-POSCO, 2015) and indonesia (POSCO, 2013),
and a number of other planned and rumoured expansions in other parts of the world, POSCO
was ranked by the World Steel association in 2013 as the 6th largest producer of steel (World
Steel association, 2013).48 the company was established in 1968 as a state-owned enterprise, and
was considered by then President Park Chung Hee to be the most important company in the de-
velopment of an industrialised South korean economy. as rhyu describes,
“When his people yearned to escape from the hunger they endured during the
lean months of spring, Park envisioned the building of an industrialized nation,
with the steel industry as the engine of growth for the rest of the heavy and
chemical industries, from machinery to automobiles to shipbuilding to the
defense industries. ‘Steel is national power,’ said Park at the celebration of
POSCO’s tenth anniversary.” (rhyu and Lew, 2011: 322).
Consequently, in its foundational decades POSCO enjoyed very high levels of government support
for its operations in the form of tax incentives, subsidies and trade barriers that would not be
allowed under today’s WtO rules (tipton and Hundt, 2006), and has become accustomed to
operating with high levels of state support. POSCO was privatized in 2000 and in 2014 was rated
236th on Forbes’ Global 2000 with a market capitalisation of almost USD25 billion (Forbes, 2014).
the Odisha and indian governments have maintained, since 2005, a close relationship not only
with POSCO, but also with the korean government. in January 2010, for example, (then) President
Lee Myung-Bak was a special guest at indian national day celebrations, and had intended to visit
Jagatsinghpur for a ribbon-cutting ceremony to launch the POSCO project. Local media reported
that “Government channels are working overtime to clear hurdles faced by the steel giant and
consultations are on with the Odisha government to expedite the process” (narayan and
Subramaniam, 2010). Despite these assurances, local protesters forced organisers to cancel the
ceremony. Most recently, in november 2014 Prime Minister Modi assured current korean
President Park Geun-hye, at the east asia Summit in Myanmar that the project has his government’s
full support and that he will make efforts with the Odisha state government to resolve any
outstanding issue (Times of India, 2014). the korean government, for it part, relies only on the
nCP process to provide remedy for any concerns about human rights abuses, telling the Un
Human rights Council that the nCP can “effectively mediate the filed complaints” (Permanent
Mission of the republic of korea to the Un, 2014), though the korean nCP had already rejected
the case at that time. Both nations see themselves as standing to gain from this project and have
not demonstrated a willingness to seriously engage complaints about the project.
there is also more at stake, here, than the POSCO project alone. the Odisha government’s
strong support may be explained, in part, by POSCO’s capacity to embellish or tarnish Odisha
and india’s reputation as a hospitable host for foreign capital: the company, and the korean
government, have publicly expressed concern about “red tape” (Economic Times 2014c). the
state government of Odisha and the central government continue to publicly assure both

48
POSCO also has some other smaller investments and operations in other parts of India, including Ma-
harashtra (POSCO-India 2015a.), Jarkhand (Siddhanta, 2015) and Gujarat (Economic Times 2014a),
and a project in Karnataka that failed because of a combination of local resistance to land acquisition, and
a state-wide ‘mining scam’ (POSCO-India 2015a; The Hindu 2013).

46
POSCO and the korean government that relevant clearances will be expedited (Economic
Times 2014d, 2014e; MZPSG, 2010: 28). State and national level support for POSCO within
government and among political parties is almost unanimous.49
On the grounds that the proposed benefits are absolutely necessary for the economic
development of the state and the country, the state government of Odisha and, to a lesser
extent, the central government in india have provided high levels of support for POSCO’s
Odisha project in the form of promises of unprecedented access to cheap natural resources (at
least until recently), and commitments by the State government to expedite regulatory
clearances. in the 2005 MoU, POSCO was promised, by the State government, access to some
of india’s highest quality iron ore, in the khandadhar Hills (MZPSG, 2010: 28). in 2006, when
the Government of Odisha first recommended to the Central Government that POSCO be
granted a prospecting lease for the area, 225 other applicants were still awaiting the outcome of
their requests for the same (MZPSG, 2010: 28). the state government’s support for POSCO to
secure the prospecting lease has twice been challenged in court, each time ‘diligently defended’
by the state government, as required under the MoU.50 the Central government is yet to
approve the Odisha government’s recommendations regarding prospecting leases for POSCO,
and the area being proposed has now been reduced from an initial 6204ha to around 2000ha
(Mohanty, 2014b). in January 2015, while the central government was still considering this
recommendation, an ordinance was introduced that requires all mining licences to be
distributed on the basis of auction (ashreena, 2015). as POSCO does not yet have approval, it
will now have to bid for the desired licences like other companies, and therefore pay the
market price. Since this ordinance, the Government of Odisha has repeatedly applied pressure
on the central government to grant an exemption for POSCO (Business Standard 2015).
though there have been numerous delays and challenges to the forest and environmental
clearances, the support of the state government in overcoming these challenges has been
consistent. this support is explicitly provided for in the MoU, which requires the Odisha state
government to “facilitate all clearances and approvals of the Central Government if required”
(MoU: article 5 (iv)). Central decision making authorities have been more ambivalent at
times, for example in the MoeF’s various iterations of conditions on clearances. However,
overall the MoeF has not responded to the core concerns of authoritative investigations like
the Saxena and majority Meena Gupta committees, which expressed major concerns about the
project’s clearance applications and called for fundamental, as opposed to piecemeal and
conditional reconsideration of the approvals. On each occasion, though committees such as

49
One recent and possibly significant exception to this is the Minister for Tribal Affairs since 2014, from
BJP, Jual Oram, who is from Sundargarh district where the proposed mine site is located. He has vowed to
‘say no’ to POSCO’s mining plans, despite his fellow party members and PM Narendra Modi being in
favour of POSCO (Mohanty, 2014a). Both Congress and BJP at the all-India level have expressed
consistent strong support for POSCO, so even though both contain some members at state level that have
sought to gain political credibility in affected areas by demonstrating their solidarity with POSCO
opponents, neither party can claim any meaningful or consistent record of objection to the company and
its plans. The Leftist parties have also failed to mount a strong opposition, and have themselves been
inconsistent, sometimes claiming that the project is acceptable as long as it is moved elsewhere.
50
The MoU states that “In the event of any litigation at any stage, Government of Orissa will diligently
defend their recommendations made in favour of the Company in the appropriate judicial, quasi judicial
fora” (MoU Article 6(v)).

47
the roy Paul committee have been established, in line with procedure, to date there has not
been a comprehensive assessment of the social and environmental impacts, including claims
to OtFD status, for the project as a whole.
Overall, then, POSCO’s position as offering the nation’s biggest FDi has allowed it to gain the
support of powerful government authorities eager to industrialise, and to retain their support
for nearly 10 years through multiple regulatory and legal challenges. this has made regulatory
hurdles less effective than they might otherwise be. For example, though two well-respected
committees, the Saxena committee and the majority Meena Gupta committee, spoke out
against what they described as illegal issuing of clearances, these criticisms have been deflected
through state-government supported appeals to the benefits of industrialisation, and of the
POSCO project in particular. in this environment of near-consensus in authoritative arms of
government (including the MoeF, the state government and the Orissa State Pollution Control
Board), it is more difficult for POSCO’s opponents to have their concerns received by
authorities and the broader public as legitimate and requiring a strong response.

Insecurity,­intimidation­and­coercion
the insecurity that has characterized Jagatsinghpur district, and especially the villages of Dhinkia
and Gobindapur, has generated an environment of fear in which it is difficult for those who have
grievances to express them, either formally or informally. the police have become inaccessible to
communities, and have acted to repress the resistance to the project, including through long
periods of occupation of villages and repeated episodes of violently breaking up peaceful protests.
Police fail to respond in a timely and impartial way to complaints from anti-POSCO villagers, for
example during the bomb blast of March 2013, described above, and they are pursuing hundreds of
criminal charges against anti-POSCO villagers that human rights and legal experts argue do not
follow due process and for which there is often a lack of evidence (iHrC and eSCr-net, 2013;
alternative Law Forum, 2013).
as a consequence of this environment, many people are unable to leave their villages for fear of
arrest and detention. this constitutes an important barrier to meeting with lawyers or activists in
Bhubaneshwar or other parts of india to work together on campaigns, complaints or legal
challenges. the insecurity has also made the area inaccessible to potential sources of outside
support, particularly transnational support, as foreigners are prohibited from entering the affected
areas, are readily identifiable, and at least one group was detained by the police as they visit the
area (interview with Hyun Phil na (Phil) and Ju Jin (Ju), kHiS, Seoul, 12 november 2012). the
indian activists who take up this work take on significant personal risk to maintain contact with
villagers and obtain enough evidence and information to pursue such avenues of redress.
a further concern raised by PPSS and its supporters is that the ‘goons’ that attack anti-POSCO
villagers are directly connected to POSCO. alternative media outlets have collected hours of
footage showing police and ‘goons’ attacking villagers, but these do not prove that POSCO has
financed or otherwise arranged such attacks. this remains a contested area. regardless of
whether or not POSCO has directly caused such attacks, that they are occurring between pro
and anti-POSCO villagers means that the company is – inadvertently or otherwise - contributing
to them, and has a responsibility to mitigate these harms, both because of their direct impact,
and because of the broader impact of violence, insecurity and intimidation on the possibility
of resistance and access to remedy.

48
those who sustain open opposition to the project do so at great personal cost, including fears for
their safety, constrained freedom of movement and subsequent limited access to healthcare,
education and other services (iHrC & eSCr-net, 2013).

Inadequate­information
POSCO and the Government of Odisha have failed to provide timely, accurate and comprehensive
information to those who are going to be affected by the POSCO project, and this has
negatively affected the communities’ ability to express grievances and concerns regarding
POSCO’s current and proposed activities in two key ways. Firstly, publicly available information
about the project is dominated by studies produced by POSCO or bodies funded by POSCO,
which constitutes a conflict of interest. Secondly, there is presently a lack of clear and
unambiguous information about POSCO’s intentions in regards to the size of the steel plant,
about which concerned people might make a complaint.
the only information widely available about the nature and scope of the POSCO project is the
MoU from 2005, and the national Council for applied economic research 2006 Social Cost
Benefit analysis of the POSCO Steel Project in Odisha. the 2008 Xavier institute of Management
Social Survey and the various environmental impact assessments are not, to our knowledge,
publicly available. Furthermore, each of these has been criticized as described elsewhere in this
report. this lack of information has become an even more serious barrier since 2012, when
POSCO modified its proposed project by removing the privately owned land in Dhinkia and
other villages from its land acquisition plan, and proposing a smaller plant. POSCO’s public
statements are suggestive that the company still plans to scale up to the full 12MtPa plant and
associated mines and infrastructure once its position is more secure (POSCO, 2012). the roy
Paul report has called for a clear and unambiguous statement of the company’s intentions for
expansion (Paul, 2012: 22), and the nGt has, from its first responses to this case, called for a
comprehensive approach to impact assessments and clearances for POSCO’s proposed activities,
one which takes into account the cumulative impact of the various aspects of the project and
other existing projects in the vicinity (nGt, 2012: 26-27). in the absence of a definitive statement
regarding POSCO’s future plans, and associated impact assessments (both environmental and
social), communities and their supporters are unable to pursue formal channels of redress
because there is nothing concrete about which they can make a complaint.
this lack of information has meant that anti-POSCO activists, as well as those who are not as
adamantly against the company but remain concerned about its potential impact, have had to
resource and organize their own assessments to gather sufficient information with which to
make a judgment about the impact of the project. in varying degrees, POSCO has sought to
discredit news and reports that reflect badly on the company (for example by suggesting they
have come from sources intent on damaging the company) (POSCO india, 2008). in responses
to allegations of this kind, the company has reasserted its compliance with relevant laws and
standards without providing extra information (POSCO india, 2010). it has also labelled
research as ‘malicious propaganda’ and referred to alternative sources of information as being
driven by ‘vested interests’ (POSCO india, 2013b). to our knowledge, the Government of
Odisha, the Ministry of environment and Forests, and other relevant government bodies have
not made any public response to alternative sources of information (such as MZPSG 2010 or
iHrC & eSCr-net 2013), nor indicated the impact of these alternative reports in any publicly

49
documented decision making processes. as such, it appears that the information provided by
POSCO has dominated decisions about the project, while concerns regarding human rights or
social impacts have not occupied a central place in any decision making processes, all of which
formally focus on technicalities predominantly related to environmental impacts.51
More thorough, less contested and more publicly available impact assessments, including social
and human rights impact assessments, would make POSCO more compliant with the OeCD
Guidelines and other best practice international standards regarding human rights and mega-
projects. Such information, in addition to constituting a key part of meaningful consultation,
would provide a platform on which PPSS and its supporters could mount further complaints to
express their concerns about specific aspects of the project, as well as the project overall, through
formal channels in the indian bureaucracy and judiciary, and in public campaigns.

Factors­enabling­resistance­and­access­to­remedy
Resilience­and­opposition
PPSS has exhibited resilience in its opposition to the POSCO project, and maintained a high
level of opposition over a prolonged period of time, with sustained connections to a strong
network of activists that unconditionally supports PPSS’ anti-POSCO and anti-engagement
stance. this resilience and persistent refusal to engage in dialogue with POSCO or the
government is one of the most important factors in the failure of the POSCO project to make
progress so far. Without the physical prevention of land acquisition at crucial points in the last
decade, it is likely that POSCO may have been able to reach some key milestones in the
development of its project (particularly acquisition of the land for the plant), beyond which it
is doubtful that the project could be either moved or stopped. these highly localized forms of
political mobilization will not, alone, prevent the project moving ahead, evident in the fact that
the company now holds 1703 acres at the proposed plant site. However, they have been the
core of the resistance against the project, and have enabled also the secondary effects of
identifying the movement with a broader constituency of marginalized farmers, attracting
support from a national network of other people’s movements, and engaging the energies of
state, national and international activists for their cause.
Furthermore, the refusal on the part of the movement to enter negotiations regarding
compensation or benefit sharing has strengthened the movement’s position. this refusal has
denied POSCO and the State government the opportunity to divide the movement, for example
by offering individual incentives to particular community leaders, which has taken place in
other similar case studies in this research project (see Weda Bay report in this series). the lack
of engagement has also allowed the movement to maintain outside sources of pressure, for
example from national and international civil society and human rights groups, or complaint
channels such as the OeCD nCPs. Such sources of support may be more reluctant to support

51
A December 2014 Ordinance attached to the Land Acquisition Act (2013) further reduces the
requirements for social impact assessments and consent in land acquisition efforts associated with national
security, defence, rural infrastructure including electrification, industrial corridors and building social in-
frastructure, including public private partnerships where ownership of land continues to be vested with the
government (Economic Times 2014f ).

50
the villagers or entertain a complaint if they think that an agreement is imminent and that the
company is exercising its duties in relation to human rights due diligence and respect. From a
strategic perspective, this has been a very effective approach in mitigating the risk that POSCO
might use dialogue to deflect further criticism in regards to activities in Odisha.
Given the tendency in the OeCD nCPs and other transnational, non-judicial grievance mechanisms,
to encourage dialogue, negotiation and problem-solving over more adversarial methods of
expressing grievance, this is a particularly important finding to emerge from this case study.

Strong­local­communities­and­organizing­capacity
Further to the previous finding, the highly developed organizing capacity of the people in the
proposed plant area, and their capacity to access and build relationships with a broader
network of experienced anti-displacement activists, has been crucial in sustaining PPSS over
such a long period. the involvement of individuals with experience and leadership skills to
unite, organize, and mobilise has acted to strengthen resistance to multiple forms of coercion,
such as violence and intimidation, that might otherwise lead villagers to support a project that
may not be in their best interests and which they have expressed objections to.
the capacity of PPSS to liaise with, but remain separate from, civil society organizations and
activists at the state level has also been key to prolonging the project’s progress and sustaining
a context in which avenues of redress can still be pursued. india based activists have played a
crucial role in translating the grievances of the affected communities through more formalized
channels and acting in solidarity with, rather than on behalf of, the villagers. Odisha is a highly
unusual context, in this sense, for its long history of anti-displacement activism and the
strength of ideological alternatives available through the long-standing Left. the extent to
which communities in different geopolitical and historical contexts have networks of this kind
to draw upon and sustain their demands will be an important determinant of their capacity to
successfully adopt similar strategies to those adopted by PPSS and its supporters.

Local­legal­support­and­progressive­NGT
Of the formal channels that were pursued by activists and civil society organisations in support
of the communities opposing the POSCO project, the domestic judicial avenues, though not
successful, so far, in stopping the project altogether, have played the most important role in
facilitating resistance to the project.
as discussed above, the complaints that were filed with judicial bodies and regulatory bodies,
including the Odisha High Court and the nGt, were predominantly technical in nature, but
driven by a fundamental opposition to the POSCO project. While the Odisha High Court, the
Odisha State Pollution Control Board and the Ministry of environment Forests, with the
support of the Odisha state government, made a number of findings and judgments that
appeared to disregard expert advice about the negative environmental and social impacts of
the project, or found ways to ultimately work around those findings (for example by accepting
state assurances that there are no outstanding OtFD applications), the nGt did more to take
into account the concerns raised by complainants, within the boundaries of the law.
the nGt has emerged in the indian judicial landscape over recent years as an important body in

51
the advancement of an environmentally and socially progressive approach to industrial
development (kothari, 2014; Gill, 2014).52 the nGt, under the nGt act 2010, has powers to
review both the process through which decisions regarding environmental and forest clearances
were taken, and the merit of the decisions. the power to review the merit of decisions, and the
staffing of the tribunal with technical experts, are both new to the indian judicial system. in its
first two years it heard 185 cases and has contributed to the development of new jurisprudence
on environmental matters that strengthen the requirements, in terms of content and process, for
forest and environmental impact assessments and clearances (Dutta 2013). the emergence of a
judicial body that, in mandate and practice, works to increase environmental standards associated
with industrial development signals the availability of a new, important resource not only for
addressing concerns directly about the environment, but also closely intersecting concerns to do
with human rights, livelihoods, cultural protections and land rights, particularly in forest areas.
in turn, the possibility of making use of the nGt in this way depended upon the ability and
willingness of local legal teams to provide pro bono support for litigants. in this regard,
Prafulla Samantara of Lok Shakti abhiyan, and the legal teams at LiFe have played a key role
not only in this case, but also the vedanta case. availability and resourcing of essentially
volunteer legal teams with the expertise and connections (with litigants) to take up these cases
is therefore also crucial in making use of such avenues of justice.

Transnational­multi-pronged­solidarity
though transnational civil society campaigns against POSCO have not been as crucial as domestic
campaigns, they have played some role in contributing to resistance against the project.
Firstly, international supporters have been able to generate a level of expert support for
affected communities that is difficult to mobilise locally. Most notably, expert support for
alternative and credible research about the human rights situation on the ground (iHrC and
eSCr-net, 2013), and critique of POSCO’s claims regarding environmental impact (Centre
for Science and environment, 2015) and financial benefit (MZPSG, 2010) have provided
counter-points to the widespread claims in Odisha’s media and from the government and the
company about the impact of the project. Similarly, members of OeCD Watch, including
particularly SOMO, were instrumental in working with Odisha-based activist complainants
through the OeCD nCP process and providing support for them to develop and pursue their
complaint through this unfamiliar and highly formalized avenue. these kind of expert
assessments and assistance are resource-intensive and would be much more difficult to
establish without international support. though there has been no direct, identifiable impact
on decision making in india, these reports contain the potential for such impact, and, with the
nCP complaint, generate pressure on POSCO to be more accountable for its action (and
inaction) on an international stage. this is discussed further below.
Secondly, international supporters have been able to draw attention to the human rights
concerns in POSCO’s Odisha project in forums that activists in india often find more difficult
to access, and which generate different and complementary forms of pressure to those applied

52
See also Vedanta Case Study Report in this series.

52
locally, most notably the Un Working Group on Business and Human rights, the OeCD
nCPs, investors, international media and media and society in korea. Given the depth of
support for POSCO at home in korea and in the host country, these avenues of pressure have
not led, so far, to any dramatic changes in POSCO’s human rights practices in india. this is in
contrast to, for example, the high levels of concern in the Uk about vedanta’s human rights
record in Odisha, which ultimately led to divestment from some high profile investors, and
indirectly to further support for anti-vedanta activists in india. it remains unclear, at this
point, whether or not international pressure of this kind will have any more significant impact
on investors or POSCO, given the lack of leverage that anti-POSCO campaigners have in terms
of home or host country decision making. However, along with the material support provided
above, this increasing international attention may facilitate the creation of opportunities for
accountability through the international business and human rights regime, and it provides a
degree of moral support for the activists and the movement in Odisha.
in addition to these two roles played by international civil society, it is important to note
another unique feature of the role of international actors in the POSCO case. Often transnational
civil society support carries with it significant risks, as well as benefits, for the community.
Communities can find themselves embroiled in much larger agendas that extend beyond their
particular case, and can find their own objectives difficult to reconcile with these broader
agendas, in particular because of the relative differences in need for an urgent resolution. the
big picture campaign can be sustained over many years, but it can be difficult for communities
to sustain the same resistance (see the Wilmar and Weda Bay reports in this series). Conversely,
some nGOs that become involved in anti-displacement cases prefer to provide support for
communities to negotiate improved compensation packages and benefit sharing, and can, in-
tentionally or unintentionally, push communities in this direction rather than support their
ongoing refusal of the project altogether.
arguably, one of the reasons the POSCO case has not witnessed this dynamic is because the
community-level organization is strong and autonomous enough to enable PPSS to maintain a
distance from its supporters, even at state level, but especially at the international level. the
movement is not, therefore, subject to the same pressures from international actors. PPSS is
able to maintain networks with these actors through a tight and cohesive indian network of
activists who play a pivotal role as intermediaries. in other words, the movement is able to
enjoy the benefits of international support while mitigating many of its risks.
the requirement for intermediaries between the movement and its international supporters
gives rise to concerns amongst some international supporters that they find it difficult to access
‘authentic’ or unfiltered views of community members, and thus struggle to identify a meaningful
mandate to guide their support. While this can be a genuine cause for concern, the benefits of
this arrangement for the movement have been considerable. Furthermore, where international
organizations have a permanent local presence, building trust and communication with affected
communities has been easier. For example, Mining Zone Peoples’ Solidarity network, which
conducts research on the economic impact of the project, is run by indian expatriates with pre-
existing networks in Odisha, and has fostered an ongoing relationship with the anti-POSCO
movement. this mode of networking can therefore be described, in this case, as being difficult
but largely successful for the communities that oppose the project and for their movement.

53
What­difference­did­the­NCPs­make?:­The­ambivalent­effects
of­the­international­business­and­human­rights­regime
the Un Guiding Principles on business and human rights emphasise that grievance mechanisms
should provide opportunities for learning (UnOHCHr, 2011: 34). transnational civil society
engagement with the POSCO case, and particularly the OeCD nCP complaint, has inducted
POSCO into the international business and human rights environment through engagement
with the OeCD Guidelines for Multinational enterprises, and the Un Guiding Principles on
Business and Human rights, and associated Un Working Group on Business and Human
rights (as well as the Global Compact and iSO 26000). the evidence regarding the extent to
which POSCO’s engagement with international business and human rights practices has resulted
in improved human rights protections or remedy is ambivalent.
POSCO’s experience in india has been challenging for a company that is accustomed, because of its
exceptional standing as a national icon in South korea, to having its business plans facilitated rather
than obstructed, by government and the wider community (tipton and Hundt, 2006; rhyu and Lew,
2011). interviewees from POSCO report that prior to the Odisha project and the work of the various
Un business and human rights processes, the company lacked any systematic approach to human
rights, and was without a human rights policy, tools for conducting human rights due diligence, or
any grievance mechanism(s) on its projects (interview, POSCO, Seoul, november 2012).53
in response to the significant resistance and associated bureaucratic and judicial hurdles the
company has faced with its Odisha project, POSCO has sought to develop an approach to
human rights. throughout the period of this research (2012 to 2015) the company has informed
the author that it is developing a human rights policy, a human rights checklist for due
diligence, an internal grievance mechanism in POSCO-india, and that it is developing its
approach to stakeholder engagement, including through seeking consultant advice from Price
Waterhouse Coopers (interview, POSCO, Seoul, november 2012; Private communication from
POSCO, June 2015). at the time of writing (May 2015), only a brief set of bullet points under
the heading ‘human rights management’ in the company’s ‘Standard of Conduct’ policy, part of
its Business ethics Policy, is publicly available as evidence of a company-wide approach to
protecting human rights (POSCO, 2015e).54 internally, POSCO’s sustainability section carries
responsibility for human rights compliance, but admitted its own inexperience in this area
(interview, POSCO, Seoul, november 2012). as a result of the challenges to the project in
Odisha, and its growing awareness of the Un Business and Human rights framework, POSCO
personnel suggest that the company has also reached out to the business and human rights
community to help them, because the company is “studying the human rights now, we are

53
Names of interviewees from POSCO have been withheld at their request.
54
The human rights management policy section consists of the four following points: “We will respect
human rights as fundamental rights of mankind, and support internationally recognized human rights
standards; We will conduct due diligence to enable implementation of management system that respects
human rights; We will respect basic rights of employees guaranteed by international standards and local
laws; We will make a good faith effort to timely discuss and resolve human rights related complaints and
problems raised against us” (POSCO 2015a). The POSCO-India website states that a grievance mechanism
will be established once a compensation package is agreed, and in the meantime it is the government’s re-
sponsibility to address “any small grievances” (POSCO-India 2015a).

54
looking for the way to assess the guiding principle of general framework” (interview, POSCO,
Seoul, november 2012). POSCO joined the Global Compact, and attends the Un Business and
Human rights Working Group meetings each year in Geneva. through its engagement with
these global initiatives, POSCO has learnt more of the language of human rights and has been
prompt and consistent in its responses to criticism of its activities, for example through the
Business and Human rights resource Centre website, and in its press releases responding to
reports such as the eSCr-net and nyU ‘Price of Steel’ report (POSCO india, 2013b). in
particular, POSCO has engaged with the Dutch nCP in discussions regarding dialogue with the
affected communities and the possibility of a review assessment panel, as described above. the
company has won at least one Corporate Social responsibility award, though this primarily
highlights their governance structure rather than their human rights record (POSCO 2015b).
Despite its engagements with these initiatives, there is no publicly available evidence that POSCO
has addressed any of the substantive human rights issues associated with its project in Odisha.
violence, intimidation and coercion continue to take place in Jagatsinghpur, and the land is being
acquired without adequate consultation, and without consent of the affected communities, as
described elsewhere in this report. to our knowledge, there have still been no human rights due
diligence processes or independent fact-finding mission to determine the current or future human
rights impact of the project. POSCO’s commitments, then, have not so far translated into any
changed approach to human rights on the ground. For example, the POSCO website states that
“POSCO finds that the protests are basically orchestrated by anti-project miscreants. their
support base in the surrounding villages is almost negligible”(POSCO-india 2015a) despite
evidence to the contrary, outlined throughout this report. the company continues to deny there is
any problem, or dismisses its significance by making overly simplified statements, for example
that “POSCO does not believe in violation of human rights”(iHrC and eSCr-net, 2013: 78;
POSCO-india 2015a), and that because it is a signatory to the Global Compact and the OeCD
Guidelines, its commitment to “respecting the rights of the local community is uncompromising
and unfaltering,” (iHrC and eSCr-net, 2013: 78) without providing further information on steps
being taken to address the human rights concerns raised by their activities in Odisha.
the extent and significance of POSCO’s adoption of human rights policies and practices, and the
impact of the OeCD nCP complaint is therefore difficult to interpret. So far, POSCO’s commitments
to international human rights standards have not provided an effective avenue for seeking redress
for human rights harms or mitigation of human rights risks. instead, the nCP process has been
one through which POSCO has arguably begun to strengthen its position vis-à-vis the international
community by being able to represent itself as a responsible corporate citizen, without making
concomitant changes to its operations and business practices.
in sum, it is not clear from this case that international business and human rights tools,
including the nCP, have contributed positively to addressing the grievances introduced in the
beginning of this report. in addition to not acting as an effective avenue for addressing
narrowly interpreted human rights harms and risks, the international business and human
rights regime provides little space in which the aggrieved communities and their supporters
can articulate the expanded form of their grievance, which concerns broader claims for a peo-
ple-centred development agenda, and have it taken seriously. as one indian activist put it,
when dealing with the nCPs, “it’s your institution, your agenda and we’ll come to you – it’s
very hierarchical. We want to do it the other way around.”

55
 Lessons­learnt
the following section summarises the lessons learnt from the POSCO case for different groups
of actors regarding the possible uses and limitations of non-judicial, transnational grievance
mechanisms, particularly the OeCD nCPs, in advancing opportunities for resisting and achieving
remedy for human rights harms.

For­OECD­National­Contact­Points
• Functional­equivalence­and­coordination­of­NCPs
the norwegian and korean nCPs took an uncoordinated approach to this case, despite
receiving the same complaint, and despite the Dutch nCP’s efforts to facilitate coordination.
Furthermore, the korean nCP did not adhere to the principles of functional equivalence
outlined in the OeCD Guidelines on Multinational enterprises. if the three nCPs that were
approached with this case were well coordinated and functionally equivalent (at the robust
level of the Dutch and norwegian nCPs), the complaint could potentially have built more mo-
mentum around the review assessment panel, and the nCP process could have made a positive
contribution to human rights fulfilment in this case. instead, the nCP process has not had any
positive effect on this particular case.
• Investigative­capacity­
investigative capacity is important to alleviate imbalances and uncertainty in information, and
therefore also power. the Dutch nCP’s attempts to facilitate a fact-finding process represent
an important innovation in the potential contributions of the nCP processes. though the
mission did not succeed in this case (see immediately below), this is a function that should be
explored further in future nCP specific instances.
• Risks­of­dialogue
the Dutch nCP applied significant pressure on the complainants in this case to engage in a
dialogue with POSCO and the Dutch pension fund. though the nCP sought to establish a suf-
ficiently independent, robust and authoritative review assessment panel to provide a more in-
dependent basis for discussions, when this could not be agreed, the nCP continued to push for
dialogue. this was despite the absence of the safeguards necessary to ensure that dialogue did
not disadvantage the complainants further than they are already disadvantaged.
in future, nCPs should desist from pressuring for dialogue in the absence of such safeguards.
One possible way to begin to generate such safeguards is by exploring other options for provision
of assistance. this may require, for example, a willingness to engage with complainants ‘on their
territory’, in places and modes that are more comfortable for them, and in which their freedom
to speak is not unduly constrained by the presence of company or government actors (in effect,
the companies already enjoy this arrangement by virtue of having the resources to meet with the
nCPs, and being ‘at home’ in the professional milieu in which nCPs operate). reaching out to
complainants in this way may generate alternative ideas and suggestions for addressing human
rights complaints that are more sensitive to local context, and which do not depend on dialogue
and associated disadvantage.

56
• Political­economy
in order for nCPs to make an informed assessment about a specific instance, and about what
role an nCP process could or should play in a given specific instance, it is necessary to have
some understanding of the political economy and context of a complaint. in the POSCO case,
such an understanding would have shed light on why the complainants are unwilling to
engage in a dialogue with POSCO at present, and why a review assessment panel could be an
important first step in working through the complaint.

For­communities­and­their­supporters
• Autonomous­and­strong­communities­are­key
When a community is united, strong and resilient, it can exercise considerable leverage.
though all communities need support at national and international levels, a strong and united
community can control this kind of support, rather than be controlled by it.
• Transnational­and­national­civil­society­networks­help­but­can­be­challenging
national and international civil society organisations can provide vital support and can access
forums through which pressure can be applied that are often inaccessible to directly affected
communities, for example investors. it is therefore helpful to find allies in national and
international civil society networks to help with this work.
if these networks can connect with a well organized and credible organization that represents
the community, that can make it easier to work together.
However, partnering with national and international organisations can also lead to tensions. these
bigger organisations are likely to be dependent upon local activists and community organisations
for accurate and credible information that can help them campaign or lodge a complaint with local
groups, which puts pressure on local organisations. Conversely, local organisations need international
supporters to understand and support their goals, as decided by them, and need to be able to trust
that international organisations will pursue these goals and not others.
though these demands can make international networking difficult, they can also lead to very
successful partnerships in which the different strengths of different groups contribute to a
stronger overall campaign. Civil society groups should be prepared to sensitively negotiate
these challenges, as the european and korean groups did in the nCP process.
• Multi-pronged strategies are more effective than single avenues
an effective strategy for seeking redress for a human rights grievance is likely to require a mul-
ti-pronged strategy that engages formal and informal channels, national and transnational. no
single avenue is likely to guarantee rights fulfilment, but using multiple avenues at once can
create time and opportunities for other avenues to work more effectively. For example, non-
violent direct action and political protests can buy time in a land acquisition process for legal
activists to mount a judicial case.
• Cooperation and negotiation carry risks
transnational, non-judicial mechanisms typically require complainants to cooperate with a
company and enter a dialogue or negotiation. though this can be helpful in some cases, it can

57
 also weaken the complainant’s position as the company is able to present itself as a good
corporate citizen. Before engaging in a process that will require negotiation of this kind,
communities and their supporters should consider the risks and possible benefits and weigh
them up against the communities’ objectives.
• Information and evidence are vital
Companies and governments may not provide adequate information about the impact of a
project. if this is the case, communities should build their capacity to collect evidence of human
rights harms or other concerns. international organisations can be helpful, as they often have
more resources to conduct assessments that can serve as a counterpoint to company or
government information.

For­business
• Engagement in the international business and human rights field
Over recent years standards regarding business conduct in relation to human rights have
become increasingly codified and more widely accepted in the business community. Businesses
can expect to be held accountable to these standards wherever they operate in the world,
through a range of mechanisms including the OeCD nCPs, where the host or home country is
an OeCD nation.
Businesses should therefore familiarise themselves with these standards, and rapidly increase
their capacity to meet their human rights obligations, for example through being able to
conduct human rights due diligence assessments, and finding strategies for engaging governments
that are involved in human rights abuses that relate to the corporation’s activities.
• Understanding of local context
When businesses seek to expand their operations abroad, they need to understand the local
political, economic, social and historical context in order to anticipate bureaucratic and legal
hurdles, and, more importantly, to anticipate human rights risks and mitigate them. Due to its
sensitivity and the severity of the human rights risks, particular attention should be paid to
contexts that will entail land acquisition.
• Corporations can be held accountable for state-inflicted human rights harms
the Un Guiding Principles on Business and Human rights as well as the OeCD Guidelines
and other international standards relating to business and human rights stipulate that
corporations are responsible for human rights harms in which they are complicit. if state
officials are inflicting human rights harms for reasons related to corporate activity, it is in
incumbent upon the corporation to, firstly, actively seek to prevent that harm, and, as a sec-
ond-best option, contribute to redress if the harm has already taken place.
• Minority shareholders can be required to exercise some (limited) leverage
it is now established that minority shareholders can be held accountable, through the OeCD
nCP process, for their human rights due diligence, and efforts (or lack thereof) to exercise
leverage over companies in which they are invested if those companies are alleged to be
engaged in human rights harms.

58
• Formal commitments should be matched by meaningful changes in business practices
Commitments to voluntary schemes such as the Global Compact and iSO 26000 need to be
accompanied by meaningful changes in business practices that go beyond reporting and
policy development. Companies must engage in these voluntary schemes in good faith and
seek to actively and rapidly change and improve their business practices to comply with the
spirit, and not only the letter, of these standards.

References
acharya k (2010) inDia: Stalled korean Mining Operations Face Fresh Protests. International
Land Coalition - Commercial Pressures on Land, 21 January. available from: http://www.com-
mercialpressuresonland.org/press/india-stalled-korean-mining-operations-face-fresh-
protests (accessed 7 February 2015).
adduci M (2012) neoliberalism and class reproduction in india: the political economy of
privatisation of the mineral sector in the indian state of Orissa. Forum for Social
Economics, 41(1), 68–96.
aleaz G (2011) neoliberal development hegemony : implications for human rights - the case of
POSCO, Odisha, india. tromsø: University of tromsø.
alternative Law Forum and Delhi Forum (2013) Captive Democracy: A Fact Finding Report On
Abuse of the Criminal System to Curb dissent against the POSCO Steel Plant in Odisha.
alternative Law Forum; Delhi Forum, available from:
http://altlawforum.org/publications/captive-democracy-a-fact-finding-report-on-abuse-
of-the-criminal-system-to-curb-dissent-against-the-posco-steel-plant-in-odisha/ (accessed
5 February 2015).
amnesty international (2011) Annual Report 2011 - India. amnesty international, available
from: http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/india/report-2011 (accessed 4 February 2015).
amnesty international (2013) Urgent action: Farmers at risk of Forced eviction. available
from: http://www.amnesty.org/es/library/asset/aSa20/005/2013/en/a69a7b81-12b2-
4e80-b675-96e9ed9be47d/asa200052013en.pdf (accessed 5 February 2015).
asher M (2006) Steel not enough? Economic and Political Weekly, February 18, 555–556.
asher M (2009) Striking while the iron is hot: A case study of the Pohang Steel Company’s
(POSCO) proposed project in Orissa. Pune: national Centre for advocacy Studies,
available from: http://sanhati.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/striking-while-the-
iron-is-hot_posco-case-study.pdf.
ashreena t (2015) india’s Odisha state pitches for iron ore licence for POSCO. Reuters, 19
January. available from: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/19/india-posco-iron-
idUSL4n0Uy33S20150119 (accessed 21 January 2015).
australian resources (2014) “adani and POSCO e&C to build rail line for multibillion coal
project.” available from: http://australianresources.com.au/4069/adani-posco-ec-build-
rail-line-multibillion-coal-project (accessed 7 February 2015).

59
Baisakh P (2013) Land acquisition in proposed POSCO area temporarily halted. Tehelka.com,
available from: http://www.tehelka.com/land-acquisition-in-proposed-posco-area-tem-
porarily-halted/ (accessed 5 February 2015).
Balagun k, Barros J, Bhide a, et al. (2014) Joint public statement on behalf of displaced
communities, 22 november 2014, Cambridge, Ma, - as part of the two-day workshop
‘Global Convergences: Strategies against evictions and Displacement,’ co-sponsored by
Mit’s Displacement research and action network (Dran) and the rosa Luxemburg
Stiftung—new york Office (rLS–nyC). Copy on file with authors., available from:
http://www.rosalux-nyc.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Joint-Public-Statement.pdf
(accessed 11 February 2015).
Baviskar a (1997) tribal Politics and Discourses of environmentalism. Contributions to Indian
Sociology, 31(2), 195–223.
Both enDS (2015) Home. Both ENDS, available from: http://www.bothends.org/en/ (accessed
16 January 2015).
Breeding Me (2011) the Micro-Politics of vote Banks in karnataka. Economic & Political
Weekly, XLvi(4), 71–77.
Business Standard (2012a),“Green panel suspends Posco’s environmental clearance”, 31 March.
available from: http://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/green-panel-sus-
pends-posco-s-environmental-clearance-112033100038_1.html (accessed 5 February
2015).
Business Standard (2012b) “nHrC objects to private company buying land for Posco rehab
colony” 13 april. available from: http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-
policy/nhrc-objects-to-private-company-buying-land-for-posco-rehab-colony-
112041302007_1.html (accessed 24 april 2012).
Business Standard (2014) “nGt notice to Centre, Odisha over Posco green nod”, 20 May.
available from: http://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/ngt-notice-to-
centre-odisha-over-posco-green-nod-114052001235_1.html (accessed 20 January 2015).
Business Standard (2015) “Odisha in talks with Centre for grant of iron ore mine to Posco” 22
March. available from: http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/odisha-
in-talks-with-centre-for-grant-of-iron-ore-mine-to-posco-115032200752_1.html (accessed
27 april 2015).
Centre for Science and environment (2015) CSe analyses: eia report of POSCO’s captive port,
Jatadharmohan Creek, Paradip, Orissa. Centre for Science and Environment, available
from: http://www.cseindia.org/content/cse-analyses-eia-report-posco%e2%80%99s-
captive-port-jatadharmohan-creek-paradip-orissa (accessed 27 January 2015).
Ceresna L (2011) A Manual on Corporate Accountability in India. Cividep india.
Countercurrents (2014) “time For ethical investment in india: a Call to Divest From POSCO.”,
available from: http://www.countercurrents.org/cc280914.htm (accessed 26 January
2015).
Das, Prafulla (2010) naveen agrees to visit Posco steel plant site. The Hindu, available from:
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/naveen-agrees-to-visit-posco-steel-
plant-site/article455581.ece (accessed 7 February 2015).

60
Dash J (2013) Posco seeks revalidation of environment clearance. The Smart Investor, 31 May.
available from: http://smartinvestor.business-standard.com/market/Marketnews-178971-
Marketnewsdet-Posco_seeks_revalidation_of_environment_clearance.htm#.vnranP60jry
(accessed 17 January 2015).
Dash kC and Samal kC (2008) new mega projects in Orissa: Protests by potential displaced
persons. Social Change December, 38(4), 627–644.
Department of Steel & Mines, Orissa (2015a)“Mineral Based industries”, available from:
http://www.orissaminerals.gov.in/website/MineralProc.aspx?GL=mines&PL=2 (accessed
22 January 2015).
Department of Steel & Mines, Orissa (2015b) “State Wide Steel industry”, available from:
http://www.orissaminerals.gov.in/website/Stateindustry.aspx?GL=sip&PL=3 (accessed
22 January 2015).
Dutch nCP (2013) Final Statement aBP/aPG - Lok Shakti abhiyan, ktnC Watch, Fair Green
and Global alliance, Forum for environment and Development. Ministry of Foreign
affairs, amsterdam.
Dutta, ritwick (2013) “Law of the jungle”, 18 October in the Hindu. available from:
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/law-of-the-jungle/article5244600.ece (accessed
27 april 2015).
economic times (2010) “entry point to proposed Posco plant cleared of agitators”,15 May.
available from: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-05-
15/news/27587208_1_anti-posco-balitutha-mega-steel-plant (accessed 5 February 2015).
economic times (2014a) “Posco to invest $20 million in Gujarat: korean ambassador”, 12
november. available from: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-11-
12/news/56025505_1_chief-minister-anandi-patel-steel-coil-posco (accessed 19 January
2015).
economic times (2014b) “Development on rs 52,000 crore Posco project likely only after
polls” 23 May. available from: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-03-
23/news/48491575_1_jagatsingpur-steel-project-south-korean-giant-posco (accessed 5
February 2015).
economic times (2014c) “end red tape, win confidence of investors: South korean ambassador
Joon-gyu Lee” 10 november. available from:
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-11-10/news/55955869_1_clean-in-
dia-ambassador-joon-gyu-lee-korean-steel (accessed 7 February 2015).
economic times (2014d) “Settle Posco’s ore lease issue without delay: Centre to Odisha”, 6
april. available from: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-04-
06/news/48908553_1_geomin-minerals-khandadhar-posco-mining (accessed 19 January
2015).
economic times (2014e) “Odisha CM naveen Patnaik hopes Posco project will be back on
track”15 november. available from: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-
11-15/news/56115227_1_odisha-cm-naveen-patnaik-posco-project-posco-india (accessed
19 January 2015).

61
economic times (2014f) “Cabinet approves ordinance on amendments to Land acquisition
act”, 29 December. available from: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-
12-29/news/57495164_1_land-acquisition-act-resettlement-act-consent-clause (accessed
27 april 2015).
engineer, Meher, et al. (2013) Heightened Tensions in Posco Project Area : A Fact Finding Report.
alice news. available from http://alice.ces.uc.pt/news/?p=1938
eSCr-net (2015) ESCR-Net, available from: http://www.escr-net.org/ (accessed 16 January
2015).
Forbes (2014) “Posco on the Forbes Global 2000 List.” available from: http://www.forbes.com/com-
panies/posco/ (accessed 9 February 2015).
Forest rights act (2010) List of Dates relating to illegal Forest Clearance. available from:
http://www.forestrightsact.com/corporate-projects/item/download/41 (accessed 21
January 2015).
ForUM (2015) the norwegian Forum for Development and environment. available from:
http://www.forumfor.no/en/ (accessed 16 January 2015).
Gill Gn (2014) the national Green tribunal of india: a Sustainable Future through the
Principles of international environmental Law. Environmental Law Review, 16(3), 183–
202.
the Hindu (2013) “POSCO scraps proposed steel plant in karnataka” 17 July. available from:
http://www.thehindu.com/business/industry/posco-scraps-proposed-steel-plant-in-kar-
nataka/article4920561.ece
the Hindu (2014) “villagers opposed to POSCO steel plant observe Black Day” 23 June.
available from: http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-otherstates/vil-
lagers-opposed-to-posco-steel-plant-observe-black-day/article6140465.ece (accessed 5
February 2015).
Hindustan times, (2010) “Police set fire, beat up women and children: PPSS”, 16 May. available
from: http://www.hindustantimes.com/bhubaneshwar/police-set-fire-beat-up-women-
and-children-ppss/article1-544379.aspx (accessed 5 February 2015).
international Human rights Clinic (2015) International Human Rights Clinic, available from:
http://www.law.nyu.edu/academics/clinics/year/intlhumanrights (accessed 16 January
2015).
international Human rights Clinic and eSCr-net (2013) The Price of Steel: Human Rights and
Forced Evictions in the POSCO-India Project. new york: nyU School of Law.
korean House for international Solidarity (2015) korean House for international Solidarity.
available from: http://www.khis.or.kr/page/about_eng.asp (accessed 16 January 2015).
korean nCP (2012) email correspondence with South korean nCP kim, Seung-Jae.
korean nCP (2013) initial assessment of Complaint on violation of OeCD Guidelines for
Multinational enterprises. Copy on file with authors.
kothari a (2014) a Hundred Days Closer to ecological and Social Suicide. Economic and
Political Weekly, 49(39), 10–13.

62
Lokshakti abhiyan (2015) national alliance of People’s Movements, available from: http://napm-
india.org/Lokshakti_abhiyan (accessed 16 January 2015).
Lok Shakti abhiyan, “Specific instance – OeCD Guidelines for Multinational enterprises -
POSCO, filed by Lok Shakti abhiyan, korean trans national Corporations Watch, Fair
Green and Global alliance and Forum for environment and Development, presented to
korean OeCD national Contact Point, Dutch OeCD national Contact Point and
norwegian OeCD national Contact Point, 25 October 2012.”
http://oecdwatch.org/cases/Case_260
Maringanti a, Mathew B and naidu SC (2013) Contemporary Fault Lines in applied economic
research. economic & Political Weekly, XLviii (3), 71–77.
Mathur HM (2009) investor-Friendly Development Policies: Unsettling Consequences for the
tribal People of Orissa. The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology, 10(4).
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Orissa and M/s POSCO for es-
tablishment of an integrated Steel Plant at Paradeep (2005) available from: http://www.oris-
sa.gov.in/posco/POSCO-MoU.htm (accessed 5 February 2015).
Menon, Manju and Sanchari Das (2008), “a state of siege”The Hindu, 8 June. available from:
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-features/tp-sundaymagazine/a-state-of-
siege/article1437330.ece (accessed 5 February 2015).
Mining Zone Peoples’ Solidarity Group (2010) Iron and steal: The POSCO-India Story. USa:
Mining Zone Peoples’ Solidarity Group.
Mining Zone Peoples’ Solidarity Group (2012a) Divest from POSCO. available from: http://min-
ingzone.org/campaigns/posco/divestment (accessed 26 January 2015).
Mining Zone Peoples’ Solidarity Group (2012b) Petition to european investment Community
to disinvest from the South korean steel giant POSCO. South Asia Citizens Web,
available from: http://www.sacw.net/article2713.html (accessed 26 January 2015).
Mining Zone Peoples’ Solidarity Group (2012c) “Dividends of resistance: the POSCO-india
Story” (film), available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vSyzniOHwic (accessed
5 February 2015).
Mining Zone Peoples’ Solidarity Group, (2015) Mining Zone Peoples’ Solidarity Group. available
from: http://miningzone.org/civil-society (accessed 16 January 2015).
Ministry of Steel (Government of india) (2013) inter-Ministerial Group meeting on 25th March,
2013 - agenda Points pertaining to Ministries. available from:
http://steel.gov.in/img/iMG%20Ministires.pdf (accessed 17 January 2015).
Ministry of tribal affairs (2015) “Definition”, available from http://tribal.nic.in/Content/Defi-
nitionprrofiles.aspx (accessed 19 February 2015).
Ministry of tribal affairs Statistics Division, Statistical Profile of Scheduled Tribes in India 2013,
Delhi: Ministry of tribal affairs, 2013.
Mishra B (2006) People’s Movement at kalinga nagar: an epitaph or an epitome? Economic
and Political Weekly, 18 February.
Mishra B (2010) agriculture, industry and Mining in Orissa in the Post-Liberalisation era: an in-
ter-District and inter-State Panel analysis. Economic and Political Weekly, XLv(20), 49–68.

63
Mishra B and nayak Bk (2011) Paan or POSCO? Economic and Political Weekly, XLvi(26&27).
Mishra BC (2014) FDI in India and its impact on land acquisition & involuntary displacement- a
case study on POSCO Project at Paradeep in Odisha. Odisha administrative Service
(OaS), reproduced with permission from the author, available from: http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2389576 (accessed 23 January 2015).
Mishra Dk (2011) Behind Dispossession: State, Land Grabbing and agrarian Change in rural
Orissa. in: .
Mishra M (2010) Communicating the true ecological Cost of Development: addressing Devel-
opment and environment in Orissa, india. in: .
MoeF (2011a) POSCO: Final order and other relevant documents.31 January 2011. available
from http://envfor.nic.in/sites/default/files/Posco31012011.pdf (accessed 19 February
2015).
MoeF (2011b) POSCO: Final orders.2 May 2011. available from
http://www.moef.nic.in/downloads/public-information/Posco-final-orders-02052011.pdf
(accessed 19 February 2015).
MoeF (2014) Starred Question no. 270. available from:
http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/file/posco.doc (accessed 17 January
2015).
Mohan v (2014) Green nod to Posco, but for a much lower capacity. The Times of India,
available from: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Green-nod-to-Posco-but-for-
a-much-lower-capacity/articleshow/28913165.cms (accessed 17 January 2015).
Mohanty M (2013) national Green tribunal orders status quo on tree felling at Posco site.
Economic Times, available from: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-
05-29/news/39602392_1_clearance-prafulla-samantray-posco-site (accessed 5 February
2015).
Mohanty M (2014a) it’s still a no to Posco project, says Jual Oram. The Economic Times,
available from: http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/its-still-
a-no-to-posco-projectsays-jual-oram/articleshow/35741517.cms (accessed 19 January
2015).
Mohanty M (2014b) Odisha splits iron ore lease area for Posco, recommends notified area for
prospecting now. Economic Times, available from:
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-11-01/news/55657272_1_odisha-
government-khandadhar-mines (accessed 19 January 2015).
Mohanty Pk and Mishra BB (2007) Impact of POSCO India Project on Economic Development of
Orissa. Bhubaneshwar: the POSCO tJ Park Foundation and POSCO research institute,
Seoul, with Department of Business administration, Utkal University.
Mukhopadhyay aD (2006) the POSCO Deal: Boon or Disaster? Social Scientist, 34(3/4), 43–
54.
narayan S and Subramaniam GG (2010) Goverment in overdrive to launch Posco plant.
Economic Times, 14 January. available from:

64
 http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-01-14/news/27630715_1_posco-in-
dia-orissa-government-jagatsinghpur (accessed 27 January 2015).
national Commission for the Protection of Child rights (2011) F. no. Or/26011/24536-
2011/Comp . Copy on file with authors.
national Council for applied economic research (2006) Social Cost Benefit Analysis of the
POSCO Steel Project in Orissa. new Delhi: national Council for applied economic re-
search.
national Green tribunal (2012) appeal no. 8/2011, Judgment, Friday 30 March . national
Green tribunal, Principal Bench new Delhi.
national Green tribunal tells Posco not to cut trees until forest clearance (2014) The Times of
India, available from: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/environment/flora-
fauna/national-Green-tribunal-tells-Posco-not-to-cut-trees-until-forest-clearance/ar-
ticleshow/29343556.cms (accessed 20 January 2015).
national Human rights Commission, (2011a) “nHrC issues notice to the Orissa Government
on allegations of turning schools into police fortresses to fight anti-land acquisition
villagers”, 27 July 2011. http://nhrc.nic.in/disparchive.asp?fno=2354.
national Human rights Commission (2011b) Full Commission Camp sitting in Orissa. available
from: http://nhrc.nic.in/disparchive.asp?fno=2265 (accessed 17 May 2012).
the new indian express, (2010),“Scrap POSCO project, says fact-finding team”, 31 May.
available from: http://www.newindianexpress.com/states/odisha/article276511.ece
(accessed 5 February 2015).
norwegian nCP (2013) Final Statement: Complaint from Lok Shakti Abhiyan, Korean Transnational
Corporations Watch, Fair Green and Global Alliance and Forum for Environment and
Development vs POSCO (South Korea), ABP/APG (Netherlands) and NBIM (Norway).
Oslo: norwegian nCP, available from: http://oecdwatch.org/cases/Case_262 (accessed
11 February 2015).
Odisha Development review Collective (2011) Submission to the United nations Universal
Periodic review of india on State of Human rights due to Corporate activities, 13th
Session of the UPr Working Group of the Human rights Council (2012). Copy on file
with authors.
Odisha Sun times (2014)“War cries from khandadhar in Odisha as tribals vow to protect hill from
Posco mining”, 7 June. available from: http://odishasuntimes.com/60909/war-cries-khan-
dadhar-odisha-tribals-vow-protect-hill-posco-mining/ (accessed 19 January 2015).
Odisha Sun times (2015)“another setback for POSCO; Odisha govt movest to take back 1700 acres
of land”, 23 april. available from: http://odishasuntimes.com/124438/another-setback-for-
posco-odisha-govt-moves-to-take-back-1700-acres-of-land/ (accessed 26 april 2015).
OeCD (2011) OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. available from:
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf (accessed 11 February 2015).
OeCD Watch (2014) Assessment of NCP Performance in the 2013-2014 Implementation Cycle:
OECD Watch Submission to the 2014 Annual Meeting of the National Contact Points.
amersterdam: OeCD Watch.

65
OeCD Watch (2015) ‘Friends of the earth vs. arcelor Mittal’, available from
http://oecdwatch.org/cases/Case_199 (accessed 1 June 2015).
Oldenziel J, Wilde-ramsing J and Feeney P (2010) 10 Years On: Assessing the contribution of the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises to responsible business conduct. available
from: http://oecdwatch.org/publications-en/Publication_3550/at_download/fullfile.
Orissa High Court (2011) W.P. no. 14885, Code no. 149900. Judgment on plea for interim
relief. Copy on file with author.
Panda H, Park J and kong D-a (2008) industrialization through FDi, Displacement and
Development: POSCO-india Project in Orissa. International Area Studies Review, 11(2),
287–307.
Panda M (2008) Economic Development in Orissa: Growth without inclusion?. Mumbai: indira
Gandhi institute of Development research.
Panda rk and Sahu a (2011) trends and dimensions of rural poverty in Orissa. Orissa Review,
101–107.
Pati S and Panda S (2010) regional Disparities, inclusive Growth and Displacement in Orissa.
Mainstream Weekly, (XLviii) 6. available from
http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article1870.html (accessed 19 February 2015).
Patnaik n (2010) vedanta plans scuppered as rahul Gandhi champions tribals’ cause. The
Economic Times, available from: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-
08-27/news/27567411_1_niyamgiri-hills-dongria-kondh-rahul-gandhi (accessed 4
February 2015).
Pattnaik Sk (2011) Case study 3: Story from india. in: Organising and Mobilising in People
Centred Advocacy in South Asia, Pune: national Centre for advocacy Studies.
Paul kr (2012) Report of the Expert Committee Constituted by the Ministry of Environment and
Forests in accordance with the directions of the Hon’ble National Green Tribunal on the
Proposed Posco Project in Odisha. new Delhi: Ministry of environment and Forests.
Permanent Mission of the republic of korea to the Un (2014) The Government of the Republic of
Korea’s Response to the Second Communication from Special Procedures of the Human
Rights Council on 27 May 2014, concerning the POSCO project in India. Permanent
Mission of the republic of korea to the Un, Geneva. available from:
https://spdb.ohchr.org/hrdb/28th/rep_korea_07.08.14_(2.2014).pdf (accessed 10 May
2015)
Pingle U, Pandey D and Suresh v (2010) Majority Report of the Committee Constituted to
Investigate into the proposal submitted by POSCO India Pvt. Limited for establishment of
an Integrated Steel Plant and Captive Port in Jagatsinghpur District, Orissa. new Delhi:
Ministry of environment and Forests.
Planning and Coordination Department (2014) Odisha Economic Survey 2013-2104. Bhubaneshwar:
Planning and Coordination Department, Government of Odisha.
Planning Commission (2014) Annual Report 2013-14. new Delhi: Government of india.

66
POSCO india (2008) “POSCO-india has never tried to woo the President of PPSS financially.”
available from: http://posco-india.com/website/press-room/posco-india-has-never-
tried-to-woo-the-president-of-ppss-financially..htm (accessed 7 February 2015).
POSCO india (2010) “regarding the opinion of Ms. Meena Gupta Committee.” available from:
http://posco-india.com/website/press-room/regarding-the-opinion-of-ms.-meena-gup-
ta-committee.htm (accessed 12 February 2015).
POSCO india (2013a) POSCO’s Odisha Project in India, December 2013. Hard copy acquired
from POSCO india, Bhubaneshwar, December 2013. Copy on file with author.
POSCO india (2013b) “the price of steel, human rights and forced evictions in the POSCO
inDia project.” available from: http://posco-india.com/website/press-room/the-price-
of-steel-human-rights-and-forced-evictions-in-the-posco-india-project.htm (accessed
19 January 2015).
POSCO-india (2013c) Resettlement and Rehabilitation. Hard copy acquired from POSCO india,
Bhubaneshwar, December 2013. Copy on file with author.
POSCO-india (2015a) “FaQs”, available from: http://posco-india.com/website/press-room/faqs.htm
(accessed 9 January 2015).
POSCO-india (2015b) “Benefits”, available from: http://posco-
india.com/website/project/benefits.htm (accessed 2 February 2015).
POSCO-india (2015c) “Social Contribution”, available fromhttp://posco-india.com/website/sus-
tainability/social-contribution.htm (accessed 19 February 2015)
POSCO-india (2015d.) Press release[s] (n.d.) available from: http://posco-india.com/website/press-
room/press-release.htm (accessed 26 January 2015).
POSCO (2012) “POSCO’s clarification on alleged violation of OeCD Guidelines.” Copy on file
with authors.
POSCO (2013) “krakatau POSCO, beginning operations of Southeast asia’s first integrated
steelworks in indonesia.”, available from: http://globalblog.posco.com/krakatau_posco_be-
ginning_operations_of_southeast_asia_first_integrated_steelworks_in_indonesia/
(accessed 5 February 2015).
POSCO (2015a) “Business ethics”, available from:
http://www.posco.co.kr/homepage/docs/eng2/html/company/ethics/s91a3010050c.jsp
(accessed 19 January 2015).
POSCO (2015b) “POSCO Selected as excellent Company in CSr Management at ‘2013 east
asia 30 awards “, available from: http://globalblog.posco.com/posco-selected-excel-
lent-company-csr-management-2013-east-asia-30-
awards/#sthash.yzmqcPrm.dpufhttp://globalblog.posco.com/posco-selected-excellent-
company-csr-management-2013-east-asia-30-awards/ (accessed 13 May 2015).
PPSS (2013) “Update from Posco Pratirodh Sangram Samiti”, 4 January. Copy on file with author.
PPSS (2014) “Update from Posco Pratirodh Sangram Samiti”, 4 October. Copy on file with author.
PPSS (2012) “Update from Posco Pratirodh Sangram Samiti”, 7 December. Copy on file with author.

67
rhyu S and Lew S (2011) Pohang iron & Steel Company. in: kim B-k and vogel eF (eds), The
Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea, Cambridge, Ma; London:
Harvard University Press.
roy a, Dey n, Patkar M, et al. (2013) ‘illegal POSCO SeZ’, Letter to Economic & Political
Weekly, vol. XLviii, no.31.
Saikia, arupjyoti, ravi rebbapragada and ashish kothari (2010) Report of visit to Jagatsinghpur
(site of proposed POSCO project), Odisha, 23-24 July 2010. new Delhi: MoeF/Mota
Committee on Forest rights act, available from:
http://fracommittee.icfre.org/tripreports/Odisha/POSCO%20visit%20report,%20final,%204
.8.2010[1].pdf (accessed 3 December 2014).
Saldhana, Leo F., and Bhargavi S. rao. (2011) Tearing through the Water Landscape. Bangalore:
environment Support Group.
Samadrusti television (2011) anti Posco andolan: the right to Protest. YouTube, available
from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vJDy_rQJxUe (accessed 5 February 2015).
Samadrusti television (2013a) again For POSCO- a Madhyantara Update. YouTube, available
from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iFWvPoGF4De (accessed 5 February 2015).
Samadrusti televisions (2013b) Bombing in POSCO area: When we don’t question.. YouTube,
available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=565aksMHUaa (accessed 5 February
2015).
Saxena nC (2010) Report National Committee on Forest Rights Act, December 2010. new Delhi:
Joint Committee of the Ministry of environment and Ministry of tribal affairs.
Senapati a and Pradhan a (2013) Odisha resumes land acquisition for Posco plant. The Times of
India, 4 February. available from:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bhubaneswar/Odisha-resumes-land-acquisi-
tion-for-Posco-plant/articleshow/18326906.cms (accessed 5 February 2015).
Sethi, nitin (2010) Withdraw forest nod to POSCO: environmental panel. the times of india,
19 november. available from: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/environment/de-
v e l o p m e nt a l - i s s u e s / Wi t h d r aw - f o r e s t - n o d - t o - Po s c o - e nv i r o n m e nt -
panel/articleshow/6950726.cms (accessed 19 February 2015)
Sharma, B.D., k.n. Pandit, Chakradhar Haibru Junior, et al. (2008) Dhinkia under Virtual Siege.
People’s Union for Civil Liberties, Delhi. available from:
http://www.pucl.org/bulletins/2008/PUCLjan08.pdf
Siddhanta P (2015) “Posco, SaiL to set up r18k-cr integrated plant in Jharkhand.”The Indian Express,
21 January. available from: http://indianexpress.com/article/business/business-others/posco-
sail-to-set-up-r18k-cr-integrated-plant-in-jharkhand/ (accessed 19 January 2015).
SOMO (2015) “Welcome”. available from: http://somo.nl/ (accessed 16 January 2015).
Srinivas a (2005) Posco reveals weak-kneed state. The Times of India, 11 October. available
from: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/edit-page/Posco-reveals-weak-kneed-
state/articleshow/1259931.cms?curpg=2 (accessed 7 February 2015).
the Samadrusti (2015) the Samadrusti, available from: http://www.samadrusti.com/ (accessed
16 January 2015).

68
the times of india (2011) “Jairam ramesh clears Posco project”, 3 May. available from:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Jairam-ramesh-clears-Posco-
project/articleshow/8148693.cms (accessed 21 January 2015).
the times of india (2014) “Posco issues to be resolved: naveen” 16 november. available from:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bhubaneswar/Posco-issues-to-be-resolved-
naveen/articleshow/45164037.cms (accessed 7 February 2015).
tipton FB and Hundt D (2006) Japanese ODa and economic Development in South korea. in:
Pritcharc B (ed.), Japanese Official Development Assistance in the Asian Region: Building
Institutional Capacity in Asia 2005-06, Sydney: research institute for asia and the Pa-
cific.
tUaC (2014) TUAC Submission to the Working Party on Responsible Business Conduct. Paris:
tUaC.
Un Human rights Council, (2015) ‘Communications report of special procedures’, 9 February.
report no. a/HrC/28/85.
UnOHCHr (2011) Un Guiding Principles on Business and Human rights. new york and
Geneva: United nations.
UnOHCHr (2013a) Free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples. Geneva: United
nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human rights.
UnOHCHr (2013b) india: Urgent call to halt Odisha mega-steel project amid serious human
rights concerns. United Nations Human Rights, available from:
http://www.ohchr.org/en/newsevents/Pages/Displaynews.aspx?newsiD=13805&LangiD=
e (accessed 26 January 2015).
USS-POSCO (2015) “about UPi”, available from: http://www.ussposco.com/about_us.php
(accessed 7 February 2015).
viswanath aC, rebecca (2008) Orissa Steel Project tests india’s Mettle. Far Eastern Economic
Review, 171(9), 30–34.
Wan, Lee (2013) “More bloodshed expected around POSCO Odisha Project” The Hankyoreh,
26 March. available from:
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/579783.html (accessed 5
February 2015).
World Steel association (2013) “top steel-producing companies 2013.” available from:
http://www.worldsteel.org/statistics/top-producers.html (accessed 4 February 2015).

69
 16
20
©
corporateaccountabilityresearch.net

GRAPHIC DESIGN BY
OPF-TECH.NET