Name: Samudranil Bose

Class: IR UGII
Roll No: 26
Semester: IV
Institution: Jadavpur University
Core Paper : Foreign Policy of India

Home Assignment
Topic: Indo-China Relations under Modi
Regime
Title: “Can Two Tigers share the same
Mountain?”
Mao Zedong & J. Nehru envisioned two Asian giants, “sharing a history of more than 2000 years
would march to the Dawn of New Future”. Despite steep economic growth, both reincarnating from
cusp of colonialism, have had asymmetrical relations over geostrategic & economic competition.
Kautilya's Mandala Theory observes two neighbours India(vijigishu) & China(ari) can’t be allies. Still
“balancing acts” between them constitute five levels from total opposition (level 1) occasional tactical
cooperation (level 3) to strategic collaboration (level 5). China and India are on level 3. Has Modi
succeeded to take it to Level 5?. Analyses to this question has been presented over a timeline:- i)
Differences 2014-19 ii) 2020 & Beyond with broad dimensions:- A) Strategic B) Economic C) Military
Skirmishes & NaMo 2.0.

A) Strategic Dimension:
On May 2014, China congratulated Modi to gravitate his attention, but he turned leeway to fuse
permanent ties with US, visiting DC, days before Prez Xi's India visit in September. Modi’s first
summits were Brazil BRICS (July'14); Burma East Asia Summit & Nepal SAARC(Nov'14) where he
returned with meagre FDIs of US$ 45 billion. Next year US returned favour with Obama’s surprise
visit to Indian Republic Day as Chief Guest. “US-Indo Joint Strategic Vision for Asia Pacific & Indian
Ocean” was jointly penned to help Diego Garcia & other US bases to ensure freedom of maritime
navigation & air traffic for military vessels & aircraft across South China Sea, IOR & SLOCs. But why
such eagerness?

I. Chinese Expansionism over SLOCs in South East Asia

Stalwart Geopoliticians Mackinder & Mahan enunciated, “Whoever controls IOR, Controls
Asia” tracing sea powers as more powerful than land powers. This region has maximum
maritime traffic being conveyor of world’s 60% oil supply & U$ 5.86 trillion cargo per month.
S-E Asian countries recently appealed US for securing their maritime sovereignty against
Chinese expansionism ranging from naval manoeuvres to forcefully reclaim islands of South
China Sea to construct military airstrips, ports, artificial islands for deployment of naval ships,
cruise missiles, radars, fighter jets from disputed Paracel, Spratly & Woody Grp. Of islands.
China violating UNCLOS is barging inside islands of other countries because they’re huge
reservoirs of untapped natural gas & oil. Since WWII, US took responsibility to secure oceans for
its economic interests in ASEAN & so to curtail Chinese footprints, it conducted FONOPs with
reconnaissance drones flying over SEZs. US protects BOB, Arabian Sea, Malacca, Hormuz, Palk,
Tsungaru Straits for trade contiguity.

II. “ Is Indian Ocean India’s Ocean?”

In 2014 Chinese Gen. Chi Haotin said, “India must keep in minds that it’s Indian Ocean not
India’s Ocean”. This indicated “String Of Pearls”, a geopolitical doctrine to encircle India by
constructing contiguous set of islands, strategic ports along SLOCs & chokepoints ranging from
Port. Sudan to Port. Shanghai via debt diplomacy. To secure its 80% oil import they’ve built
ports in Ceylon(Hambantota), Pakistan(Gwadar), Myanmar( Kyapkyu and Coco near Andaman
Isles), Hainan Port(near Australian Cocos Keeling Island),Bangladesh( Chittagong) & some
railroads in Sudan(Khartoum), Djibouti, Kenya & Tanzania. Prez. Xi’s “maritime Silk Road”
envisioned in Chinese Overseas Port Company(COPHC) traps host countries with outstanding
debt bills by taking over above mentioned ports to encircle IOR & BOB region.
Countermeasures: India, US, Australia & Japan in Quad(Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) protect
maritime law by curtailing expansionism, piracy, pollution & ensure rescue ops. including “Chinese
Containment Policy”(2017 ASEAN). Since 1992, 23 naval exercises have been conducted codenamed
“Exercise Malabar” & “Operation Manila Exercise”. India’s oil import pushed Modi in 2015 to tour
small isle-nations like Seychelles, Sri Lanka & Maldives, Tour of Iran, UAE, Turkey G20 summit &
Malaysia ASEAN. Indian envoy restricted China on their own turf by securing deep-water terminals &
airport at P. Hambantota,Ceylon; construct P.Chabar, Iran(150kms away from Pak-Sino P.Gwadar);
P.Payra & P.Mongla, Bangladesh; jetty hangar, airstrip in 20 yrs leased P. Victoria, Seychelles; ports in
Somalia & Egypt across Suez Canal in Red Sea. Four Indian warships joined USA–Japan task force &
anchored in S.China Sea at P.Nha Trang, Vietnam & P.Tien Sa,Philippines with attached Indian hospitals
& hangar to conduct drone surveillances.

B) Economic Dimensions:
Indo-Xi Alliance Bubble started before Modi came to power in 2013. Post Wall St. Crash, Chinese
economy plummeted with huge infrastructural deficit due to humongous surplus output in
machinery, steel, cement, Heavy Engineering, Construction & Real estate sectors. To revive, China
fell back to 2nd most populous country to absorb Chinese surplus resulting in crashed global prices
of goods after Prez. Hu Jintao’s disastrous post 2008 fiscal stimulus programme. Prez. Xi
succeeded as he solved this downturn with “ Supply-Side Structural Reform” or OBOR to dump
these surplus along different country doorsteps. Modi-Xi Sabarmati Summit, Brazil & Russia BRICS
were initial traps laid before Modi.

I. One Belt One Rd.( Neo-Silk Rd.) Vs INSTC & TAPI Gas Line
Reflecting Mackinder's Heartland Theory, BRI is a proposed economic development project to
improve trade connectivity across 3 continents with proposed 152 countries via construction of
road-railways(belt), maritime routes(road), power grid, oil & gas pipelines in them. They’ve
envisioned it to be completed by 2049(100th Anniversary of PRC) for proposed routes:- i) Neo-
Eurasian Land Belt, ii) China-Mongolia-Russo Belt, iii) China-Indo China Rd., iv) China-
Central/West Asia Belt, v) CPEC, vi)BCIM Corridor with funding of proposed banks Silk Rd.
Fund & Asian Infra. Investment Bank.
Countermeasures: Till date only 14 countries have been signatories because ORF, CNAS &
World Bank perceived Chinese act of lending infrastructural loans extended to debtor countries
negotiated in secrecy with collateral rights to a port/mine as an act of “debt-trap diplomacy” &
Neo-Colonialism. Many nations, including India’s South bloc perceive the project as violation of
its sovereign territorial integrity & India has readily opposed the CPEC & BCIM Project. In 2019
tensions escalated when Modi Government scrapped Art 370 for all J&K even for defacto
regions claimed by China & Pak. INSTC & TAPI(India-Iran-Afghan’tn-Turk'stn-Russia)gas
pipelines are alternative projects spearheaded by India to avoid Chinese intrusion in India’s
path to procure energy & ensue trade.

II. Sino-Indian Competition over Middle East

China & India envoys toured heavily across ME from 2015-16 via state visits & Turkey G20 to
secure their oil imports as both are domestically short in production. Sino-Indian energy
diplomacy impacted foreign policies of Iran & Saudi to divert their attention to these Asian
 giants as well as to counterbalance US hegemonic sanctions. Sino-Indian foreign policies in ME
are characterized by fragmented, bilateral relations with mutual respect for sovereignty & non-
intervention in internal affairs. But amidst competition of “equity oil contracts” between state-
owned companies of both nations, Chinese counterparts have so far proven to be more
efficient in winning contracts than Indian ones.

III. CAEXPO(Sino-ASEAN Expo) Vs ASEAN-India :

Since 2014, China & India have met 9 times to pen down deals with the S-E Asian countries over
SCO, East Asia & ASEAN summits over contracts for project financing, construction of
information hubs & structural transformation. Modi’s delegation appealed for ASEAN MoUs to
participate in India’s economic venture for “Make in India”; political venture of securing S.China
Sea & strategic venture to construct Indo-B'desh-Burma-Thai Vehicle Agreement & Highway
making BIMSTEC stronger. Over course of 5 years Modi has struck deals $31.81 billion Indian
exports to ASEAN & ASEAN imports worth $44.71 billion. Indian Treasury also extended $1
billion Line of Credit to ASEAN Project Development Fund & $50 million to ASEAN-India Fund.
Modi showed his gratitude for being granted trade perks over ASEAN FTA & SEZs Corridors by
inviting 10 S-E Asian PMs in 2018 Republic Day. But living under Modi utopic bubble, we came
to know that since 2015 his delegation beat around the same bush of deals tailored by Dr.Singh
under UPA 1&2. With no new arenas explored, India is far behind Sino-ASEAN deals, dubbed
CAEXPO is five times the FDI value of Indo-ASEAN.

C) Zig-zag Diplomatic Relations Engulfed in Military Skirmishes:

September 2014 marked “Sabarmati Summit” as Chinese Prez. Xi & Foreign Minister Wang Yi
visited India. Modi broke protocol & strolled with Xi along the banks of Sabarmati river as well as
signed important MoUs:- Setting up of Joint Industrial parks in Pune, Gandhingar & Guangdong,
China under aegis of inDEXTb(Sino-Gujarat Bank); installation of 5G equipments by Huawei-BSNL
& an interstate railroad between Gujarat-M'rashta-K'taka-TN. But chance of cooperation
evaporated when Chinese troops surrounded an Indian outpost at Chumar & Demchok,Ladakh &
entered Arunachal border to write China atop rocks in Mandarin. Indian troops were constructing a
Canal-Tunnel while here when Modi bluntly asked Xi what had happened, an embarrassed
president replied ‘I don’t know’, but promised to find out when he returned Beijing & issued a stern
reprimand to PLA in following dictates of party.
September 2015 in Burtse, N.Ladakh Chinese & Indian troops pelted stones at each other when the
Indo-Himalayan Troops dismantled a disputed Chinese watchtower close to mutually agreed
patrolling line.
June 2016 in Geneva, Switzerland India presented its application for membership in NSG( Nuclear
Suppliers Grp.). All four members of P5,EU countries & Russia accepted India’s membership except
China which vetoed the application on claims that if a non-NPT signatory is allowed membership
then Pakistan should too be allowed or a bad precedent may befall.
September 2016 China blamed India for funding insurgents in Tibet(TRF) & ones in Xinjiang
Autonomous Province. India too blamed China for funding Islamist terrorists in Pak, as well as
Indian insurgents like Gorkha, CPI(Maoists), ULFA etc. US & India failed to blacklist Pakistan in WTO
& UN since China vetoed against the claims of declaring Masood Azhar as International A rank
terrorist.
April 2017 Modi accompanied Dalai lama in Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh to inaugurate a hospital.
Chinese officials showed their discontent in June 2017 when the Doklam crisis erupted. Troops
from both side engaged in two-month military standoff as India & Bhutanese troops on a higher
ground restricted Chinese efforts to construct helipads, all seasoned roads in the trijunction of
Chumbi, Ha & Siliguri Valley. Doklam, strategically close to Siliguri Corridor dubbed “Chicken Neck”
which connects mainland India with its north-east is its vulnerability.
2019-20 witnessed asymmetry in Sino-Indian relations kick-starting Modi’s “Wuhan Consensus”
with Xi to resolve border disputes a year after Doklam, ended with no clear resolution. Even
Mamallapuram Summit couldn’t break border deadlock in 2018.Nepal's Olly government with
Chinese backing presented a controversial map including regions of Himachal & Utk. Modi's
Chinese diplomacy tore apart this year with spillover effects on 15th June Galwan Valley Sino-Indo
skirmish continuing till date across Pangong Lake, Daulat Begh Oldie & Patrolling Point 14.

Conclusion
NaMo before starting his innings 2.0 claimed Nehru to be an idealist & Dr. Singh as “Maun
Mantri”(Silent PM). But above analyses proved that Modi’s tenure proved to be an utter failure
whose spillover effects can be seen in 2.0. While Nehru espoused NAM as he didn’t have a clear
IFP brand & with utopian romantic idealism it cost us in 1962; Modiites failed to interpret Sino-
Indian diplomacy as they tinged it with over personalization where institutional mechanisms of
eco welfare are overridden by rhetorics/personality cult for elections. Four decades of peace &
tranquillity evaporated in weeks which cost us on 15 June Galwan & in 2017 Doklam due to Modi’s
obsession with PoK. His facade of Indo-US military treaty blew up as Rajnath Singh flew to Russia
for securing airforce contracts proving who our allies really are. The hogwash Wuhan &
Mamallapuram summits were only photograph summits as Modiites fed media populist agendas.
Chinese perceives India as pawn of G7 & US. With growing intolerance FP has evolved into
centralized majoritarianism where scholars of universities & think tanks questioning South block
are labelled “anti-nationals”. With full respect to martyred soldiers, BJP's war-weary situation
before every elections is a facade. We have failed to project ourselves as allies amidst SAARC
members but as hegemon diverting their attention to China. Our markets too are flooded by
Chinese goods. In this ongoing pandemic where India depends on even raw medical supplies,
faulty Covid kits, how far banning Chinese 5G projects, railway projects, companies, Delhi-
Manasarovar-Lhasa Trade Rd under “Atmanirbhar” banner amidst rampant unemployment will
help unfold future Sino-Indian dynamics is a mystery?

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