IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO:02 of 2024

SOCIETY FOR EQUILITY PETITIONER

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA RESPONDENT

WRITE PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

The Honourable Supreme Court of INDIA has the jurisdiction in this matter
under Article 32 of the Constitution of India which reads as follows:

“32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part (1)The right to
move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the
rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed

(2)The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs,
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo
warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of
any of the rights conferred by this Part.”

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FACTS OF THE CASE
1. The Union of Indus is a multicultural society characterized by its diverse
ethnic backgrounds, languages, and religious practices. The national motto,
"unity in diversity," epitomizes this cultural amalgamation.

2. Following the recent elections, the Central Government sought to fulfil its
election promises by introducing legislative measures aimed at protecting
individual private choices. Consequently, the Parliament enacted the "Protection
of Private Choice Act, 2023."

3. The Act allows owners of residential premises in urban areas to freely choose
their tenants and lessees. Importantly, the Act prohibits discrimination against
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.

4. In the aftermath of the Act’s enactment, property owners in urban areas

began openly advertising tenant preferences in daily newspapers, including
stipulations such as "only married couples," "only vegetarians," and alarmingly,
"no minorities," "no single women." These advertisements led to widespread
discriminatory practices.

5. A notable incident involved a cine actress and unwed mother who sought an
apartment near her child's school. Despite her genuine need, the property owner,
influenced by the Resident's Welfare Association, refused to lease the
apartment, citing her status as a single unwed mother and a member of the film
industry.

6. The Society for Equality, an NGO led by actress Ms. Ramya Singh, filed a
Writ Petition in the Supreme Court of Indus. The petition challenges the
constitutional validity of the Protection of Private Choice Act, 2023. The
Society argues that the Act is a legislative guise for perpetuating historical
discriminations entrenched in society.

7.The petitioner contends that the Act contradicts the constitutional philosophy
of equality and undermines the progress made by laws like the Equality Act of
2010 in the UK. The petitioner emphasizes that the Act facilitates
discrimination against minorities, women, and professionals in certain
industries, violating fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution.

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ISSUE.
1.Is write petition maintainable under law.
2.Is the protection of private choice act 2023 violating the constitutional
provision.
3.Whether the right to equality enshrined in the constitution is affected

GROUNDS
1.
2.
3.

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 1. IS THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE
The writ petition is maintainable in the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
india because [A] Article 32 grants the right to petitioners as there is a
violation of fundamental rights, [B] Alternate remedy is no bar to the
jurisdiction of Supreme Court

A. [Article 32 grants the right to petitioners as there is a

violation of fundamental rights.

Article 321 provides right to move the Supreme Court , acting in a

bona fide manner, in case of violation of fundamental right, for the
benefit of the society at large. Thus in the present case, by virtue of
power conferred under Article 32 of the constitution Supreme Court
has jurisdiction to entertain the present writ .

2. In this present case there is clear violation of the fundamental right

thus the Act facilitates discrimination against minorities, women, and
professionals in certain industries, violating fundamental rights
enshrined in the Constitution

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B. Alternate remedy is no bar to the jurisdiction of
Supreme Court.
1. The Counsel humbly submits that in Romesh Thappar vs
The State Of Madras 1950 AIR 124, 1950 SCR 594 2 case the
Supreme Court ruled that such a petition in which there is a
violation of fundamental rights can come straight to the
Supreme Court without going to the High Court first. The
Court stated that unlike Art. 226 and Art. 32 confer a
Fundamental Right on the individual and imposes obligation
on the Supreme Court which it must discharge when a
person complains of infringement of a Fundamental Right.
Art. 32 provides a guaranteed remedy for the enforcement of
the Fundamental Rights and constitutes the Supreme Court
as the guarantor and protector of Fundamental Rights. This
proposition has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in a
number of cases.
2. The petitioner has the locus standi in the present case and all
the requirements of instituting Writ Petition have been
fulfilled in the present case. The violation of Fundamental
Rights which are the basic structure of the Constitution also
makes this Court competent to decide the question.

2.Is the protection of private choice act 2023 violating

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the constitutional provision
Equality Before Law (Article 14)

Article 14 declares that 'the State shall not deny to any person equality before
the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India'.

Thus Article 14 uses two expressions "equality before the law” and “equal
protection of the law”. The phrase "equality before the law” finds a place in
almost all written Constitutions that guarantees fundamental rights.' Both these
expressions have, however, been used in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.2

The first expression “equality before law' is of English origin and the second
expression has been taken from the American Constitution. Both these
expressions aim at establishing what is called “equality of status” in the
Preamble of the Constitution. While both the expressions may seem to be
identical, they do not convey the same meaning. While 'equality before the law
is a somewhat negative concept implying the absence of any special privilege in
favour of individuals and the equal subject of all classes to the ordinary law.
“Equal protectionof the law" is a more positive concept implying equality of
treatment in equal circumstances.

In State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar,5 Patanjali Sastri, C.J., rightly
held—the second expression is corollary of the first and it is difficult to imagine
a situation in which the violation of the equal protection of laws will not be the
violation of the equality before law. Thus, in substance the two expressions
mean one and the same thing.

Equality before law and absolute equality.—The concept of equality does not
mean absolute equality among human beings which is physically not possible to
achieve. It is a concept implying absence of any special privilege by reason of
birth, creed or the like in favour of any individual, and also the equal subject of
all individuals and classes to the ordinary law of the land. As Dr. Jennings puts
it : “Equality before the law means that among equals the law should be equal
and should be equally administered, that like should be treated alike. The right
to sue and be sued, to prosecute and be prosecuted for the same kind of action
should be same for all citizens of full age and understanding without
distinctions of race, religion, wealth, social status or political
influence".!

Equality before Law and Rule of Law.—The guarantee of equality before the
law is an aspect of what Dicey calls the rule of law in England. It means that no

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man is above the law and that every person, whatever be his rank or conditions,
is subject to the jurisdiction of ordinary courts. “With us”, Dicey wrote “every
official from the Prime Minister down to constable or a Collector of taxes is
under the same responsibility for
every act done without legal justification as any other citizen”. Rule of law
requires that no person shall be subjected to harsh, uncivilised or discriminatory
treatment even when the object is the securing of the paramount exigencies of
law and order.3

Professor Dicey gave three meanings of the Rule of Law thus

1. Absence of Arbitrary Power or Supremacy of the law. It means the

absolute supremacy of law as opposed to the arbitrary power of the
Government. In other words—"a man may be punished for a breach of law, but
he can be punished for nothing else”.

2. Equality before the law. It means subjection of all classes to the ordinary
law of the land administered by ordinary law courts. This means that 'no one is
above law with the sole exception of the monarch who can do no wrong'. Every
one in England, whether he is an official of the State or a private individual, is
bound to obey the same law. Thus, public officials do not hold a privileged
position in Great Britain. In Great Britain there is one system of law and one
system of courts for all, i.e., for public officials and private persons.

3. The Constitution is the result of the ordinary law of the land. It means that the
source of the right of individuals is not the written Constitution but the rules as
defined and enforced by the courts.

The first and the second aspects apply to Indian system but the third aspect of
the Dicey's rule of law does not apply to Indian system as the source of rights of
individuals is the Constitution of India. The Constitution is the Supreme Law of
the land and all laws passed by the legislature must be consistent with the
provisions of the Constitution.

Article 14 permits classification but prohibits class legislation.—The equal

protection of laws guaranteed by Article 14 does not mean that all laws must be
general in character. It does not mean that the same laws should apply to all
persons. It does not mean that every law must have universal application for, all
persons are not, by nature, attainment or circumstances in the same position.
The varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate
treatment. From the very nature of society, there should be different laws in
different places and the Legislature controls the policy and enacts laws in the
best interest of the safety and security of the State. In fact identical treatment in

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unequal circumstances would amount to inequality. So, a reasonable
classification is not only permitted but is necessary if society is to progress.3

Thus, what Article 14 forbids is class-legislation but it does not forbid

reasonable classification. The classification, however, must not be “arbitrary,
artificial or evasive" but must be based on some real and substantial distinction
bearing a just and reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the
legislation. Article 14 applies where equals are treated differently without any
reasonable basis. But where equals and unequal’s are treated differently, Article
14 does not apply. Class legislation is that which makes an improper
discrimination by conferring particular privileges upon a class of persons
arbitrarily selected from a large number of persons, all of whom stand in the
same relation to the privilege granted that between whom and the persons not so
favoured no reasonable distinction or substantial difference can be found
justifying the inclusion of one and the exclusion of the other from such
privileges

Test of Reasonable Classification.-While Article 14 forbids class

legislation, it does notforbid reasonable classification of persons, objects and
transactions by the legislature for the purpose of achieving specific ends. But
classification must not be“arbitrary, artificial or evasive". It must always rest
upon some real and substantial distinction bearing a just and reasonable relation
to the object sought to be achieved by the legislature. Classification to be
reasonable must fulfil the following two conditions :

(1) the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which

distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of
the group; and

(2) the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be
achieved by the Act.'

The differentia which is the basis of the classification and the object of the Act
are Iwo distinct things. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between
the basis of classification and the object of the Act which makes the
classification. It is only when there is no reasonable basis for a classification
that legislation making such classification may be declared discriminatory.
Thus, the Legislature may fix the age at which persons shall be deemed
competent to contract between themselves but no one will claim that
competency. No contract can be made to depend upon the stature or colour of
the hair. Such a classification will be arbitrary.?

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The true meaning and scope of Article 14 have been explained in a number of
cases} by the Supreme Court. In re Special Court Bill case, Chandrachud,
J., reformulated new propositions to be followed regarding the applicability of
Article 14. This has been rightly criticised by Mr. Seervai as making the well-
settled principles unsettled and creating confusion and uncertainty and
encouraging litigation. The principles laid down by Das, J., in Dalmia's case
has not been disputed by Chandrachud, J., and therefore there was no need
to reformulate the same unless it was necessary to add something to the existing
principles." In view of this, the propositions laid down in Dalmia's case still
holds good governing a valid classification and are as follows :
(1) A law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if
on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not
applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by itself.
(2) There is always presumption in favour of the constitutionality of a statute
and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear
transgression of constitutional principles.
(3) The presumption may be rebutted in certain cases by showing that on the
fact of the statute, there is no classification at all and no difference peculiar to
any individual or class and not applicable to any other individual or class, and
yet the law hits only a particular individual or class.
(4) It must be presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly
appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems
made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate
grounds.
(5) In order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the court may take
into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of report, the history
of the times legislation.
(6) The Legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its
restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest.
(7) While good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a
Legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or the
surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the court on which the
classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of
constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there
must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain
individuals or corporations to be hostile or discriminating legislation.
(8) The classification may be made on different basis, e.g., geographical or
according to objects or occupations or the like.

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(9) The classification made by a legislature need not be scientifically perfect or
logically complete.' Mathematical nicety and perfect equality are not required.-
Equality before the law does not require mathematical equality of all persons in
all circumstances. Equal treatment does not mean identical treatment.
Similarity, not identity, of treatment is enough.
(10) There can be no discrimination both in the substantive as well as the
procedural law. Article 14 applies to both.4 If the classification satisfies the test
laid down in the above propositions, the law will be declared constitutional. The
question whether a classification is reasonable, and
proper or not, must, however, be judged more on commonsense than on legal
subtleties.5

Article 19 of the Constitution guarantees to the citizens of

India the following six fundamental freedoms :
(a) Freedom of Speech and Expression.
(b) Freedom of Assembly.
(c) Freedom to form Associations or Unions or Co-operative Societies.
(d) Freedom of movement.
(e) Freedom to reside and to settle.
(f) [***
(g) Freedom of profession, occupation, trade or business.

Freedom of movement (Article 19(1)(d) and 19(5)]

Article 19(1)(d) guarantees to all citizens of India the right “to move freely
throughout the territory of India”. This right is, however, subject to reasonable
restrictions mentioned in clause (5) of Article 19, i.e., (1) in the interest of
general public or (2) for the protection of the interest of any Scheduled Tribe.

Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution guarantees to its citizens a right to go

wherever they like in Indian territory without any kind of restriction
whatsoever. They can move not merely from one State to another but also from
one place to another within the same State. This freedom cannot be curtailed by
any law except within the limits prescribed
under Article 19(5). What the Constitution lays stress upon is that the entire
territory is one unit so far the citizens are concerned.' Thus the object was to
make Indian citizens national minded and not to be petty and parochial

Grounds of Restrictions.—The State may under clause (5) of Article 19

impose
reasonable restrictions on the freedom of movement on two grounds :---

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(1) in the interests of general public,
(2) for the protection of the interest of Scheduled Tribes.

Freedom of Residence (Article 19(1)(e) and 19(5)]

According to Article 19(1)(e) every citizen of India has the right “to reside and
settle in any part of the territory of India”. However, under clause (5) of Article
19 reasonable restriction may be imposed on this right by law in the interest of
the general public or for the protection of the interest of any Scheduled Tribe.
The object of the clause is to remove internal barriers within India or any of its
parts. The words "the territory of India” as used in this Article indicate freedom
to reside anywhere and in any part of the State of India.

It is to be noted that the right to reside and right to move freely throughout the
country are complementary and often go together Therefore, most of the cases
considered under Article 19(1)(d) are relevant to Article 19(1)(e) also. This
right is subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of
general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribes.
Thus, where a prostitute, under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women
and Girls Act, 1956, was ordered to remove herself from the limits of a busy
city or the restriction was placed on her movement and residence, it was held to
be a reasonable restriction.2

Freedom of Profession, Occupation, Trade or Business

(Articles 19(1)(g) and 19(6)]
Article 19(1)(g)guarantees that all citizens shall have the right to practise
any carry on a profession
a) imposing reasonable restriction on this right in the interest of public',
(b) prescribing professional technical qualifications necessary or practising
any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business,
(c) enabling the State to carry on any trade or business to the exclusion of
citizens wholly or partial
Abdul hafeez attar

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