Senior Thesis
Senior Thesis
Vincent Buono
April 12, 2016
Dr. Mehan/Mr. Babendreier
Senior Thesis H
Long-Term Contracts and the Competitive Major League Baseball Team
Upon the conclusion of the 2000 Major League Baseball (hereinafter, “MLB”)
season, Texas Rangers owner Tom Hicks was forced to examine the precarious position
of his team. After winning the American League West division in the 1998 and 1999
seasons with records of 88-74 (.543 winning percentage) and 95-67 (.586), respectively,
the Rangers had plunged to a dismal record of 71-91 (.438) and finished over 20 games
out of first place. Moreover, given that the front office for the upcoming 2001 season had
been allotted an $88 million payroll, a sum exceeded by only six other organizations,
Hicks concluded that change was wholly necessary. Accordingly, General Manager Doug
Alex Rodriguez, who, as a player for the Seattle Mariners, had finished third in the voting
for the American League MVP (Most Valuable Player) of the 2000 season. Unbeknownst
to Hicks and Melvin, however, their spirited campaign to sign Rodriguez would have a
lasting effect on professional baseball, both contemporaneously and for the foreseeable
future.
The signing of Rodriguez became official on December 11, 2000, when he agreed
to a 10-year, $252 million contract with the Rangers. At the time, these privately
negotiated terms marked the most lucrative sports contract in history and doubled the
value of the next largest. In addition, only two subsequent contracts of greater worth have
been negotiated since. During the three seasons in which Rodriguez played in Texas,
however, his team did not finish with a record above .500 once and never made the
Buono 2
playoffs. The organization and their costly investment, therefore, parted ways before the
2004 season, even though Rodriguez had seven years remaining on his contract.
Although most MLB participants initially viewed the terms of the Rodriguez
contract with an air of bewilderment and scorn, given that it trounced the previously most
lucrative contracts. Indeed, following the signing of Rodriguez in the year 2000, the MLB
has witnessed the awarding of an eye-popping 57 contracts worth $100 million or more to
53 position players and pitchers. In contrast, the only contract of the 20th century
involving similar terms had been awarded to pitcher Kevin Brown in 1999 by the Los
Angeles Dodgers, a deal totaling $105 million over seven seasons. The sudden influx of
long-term contracts during the 21st century has directly caused a rapid increase in the
average salary for a major leaguer, which in 2000 was $1.9 million, but is currently over
$4 million.
with such a massive contract appears attractive to teams because of the long-term
stability enjoyed between the parties and the potential to, as the industry parlance goes,
“lock down a star player” for several years. Despite this motivation, there are a myriad of
factors impacting the well-being of not only the front office and the contracting player
but also all the team’s other players, all of which could potentially go awry and
negatively affect the organization as a result. Perhaps the greatest danger is that the
owner and team executives are potentially hindered from pursuing other key players if
they devote too considerable an amount of time and money to one individual player
Buono 3
alone. More specifically, even if the exorbitantly paid player’s performance accurately
reflects the terms of his contract and results in significantly increased production, it is
often the case that the only parties likely to enjoy any significant profit are the owner(s)
and the player, leaving others in the organization bereft of rightful benefits.
shareholders would be represented by the owners and their families, while stakeholders
would include more parties, most notably the teams’ employees, particularly the actual
players, as well as the fans. The essential promulgation of the Shareholder theory,
according to Michael Pfarrer, author of “What is the Purpose of the Firm: Shareholder
Furthermore, Pfarrer offers two modern-day terms used to describe the essence of the
Shareholder theory: “transaction cost economics (TCE) and agency theory” (88). He
affirms that both TCE and agency theory are grounded upon the assumption of self-
interested motivation in optimizing the value of the firm. Thus, Pfarrer observes that both
terms “have a ‘gloomy vision’ of human self-interest…both assume that human beings
are opportunistic, and, thus, will put their own interests before the firm’s” (88).
Accordingly, the chief underpinning of the Shareholder theory is the enhancement of the
1
See “Moral Obligations of the Modern Corporation” by Patrick Martin for further discussion.
Buono 4
On the other hand, stakeholder theorists are defined as those who “believe that
taking all constituent groups into account is the better way to maximize overall firm
performance” (89). While the ideology of both theories is aimed at the financial success
because a fair distribution of wealth among all parties would appear to induce steady
goal that “emphasizes the interdependence of organizations with their customers, clients,
suppliers, competitors, the media, and even activists” (89). In encouraging transmission
of ideas throughout the hierarchy of employees in this way, the needs of all
and that of the Shareholder theory, the former of which “looks for a process in which
firms and their stakeholders both seek their own advantage while, at the same time,
respecting the needs of others” (90). In this vein, the fructification of a MLB organization
is best attained by means of the reliance of each constituent party upon the other
constituents to maximize the team’s overall capability. The most obvious example of this
mutually affirming relationship occurs between a player, who demands money from the
front office, and the owner, who expects the player to produce certain profits, such as the
assessing the application of the Stakeholder Theory.2 The analysis utilized the salary
details for 267 players over a ten-year period, from 1990 to 1999, to determine the
correlation between the discrepancy in team salaries and overall team performance. The
evaluation of each team was administered according to two chief theories, namely
Tournament Theory3 and Equity Theory.4 While the former concept advocates salary
disparity between salaries. The study concluded that Equity Theory was more
applicable—and beneficial—to team performance (Jane 149). The chief reasoning behind
this finding is that the owners who advocated the Tournament Theory debilitated the
team roster by investing a majority of the payroll in only a few players, thus forcing the
organization to sign considerably less talented players to complete the roster. In contrast,
disciples of the Equity Theory were able to construct a stronger team on account of the
trigger within the various levels of an MLB corporation, it also introduces the risk that
the player will suffer a significant injury during his long-term contract. Michael
Dinerstein, in his analysis of the change in value of a player upon experiencing free
2
See “The Causality between Salary Structures and Team Performance: A Panel Analysis in a Professional
Baseball League” by Jane, San, and Ou for a complete analysis.
3
Tournament Theory is primarily concerned with organizational performance, and thus advocates an
increase in salary disparity in order to further incentivize certain employees. It is synonymous with the
Shareholder Theory, in which only the profits of the owner and a select few constituent parties are
considered.
4
Equity Theory is primarily concerned with equal salary dispersion as the primary means to improve
organizational performance. It is synonymous with Stakeholder Theory, in which the profits of all
constituent parties are considered.
5
In fact, the Chinese Professional Baseball League currently does not employ an unrestricted free agency
market; therefore, most players sign one-year contracts rather than long-term contracts based on the needs
of the team.
Buono 6
agency, asserts that “[t]he improvement in skill due to experience and becoming
other effects associated with aging, such as the accumulation of injuries” (23). Indeed, the
Mike Hampton, an all-star pitcher who signed an eight-year, $121 million “mega-
contract” with the Colorado Rockies before the 2001 season.6 After being traded to the
Atlanta Braves in 2003, Hampton played two full seasons and led his new team to two
consecutive division titles. After the 2005 season, however, the Atlanta pitcher had
“Tommy John surgery” and missed the 2006 and 2007 seasons. Consequently, the Braves
Other than potential injuries, though, the most apparent risk inherent in the
for each MLB player as his career progresses beyond a certain point of age,7 but any
organization willing to sign a player for many seasons can only hope that such recession
occurs after the player is no longer under the team’s control. As Dinerstein notes, “teams
have turned to incentive mechanisms to protect themselves from the risk associated with
signing a player whose future production is highly uncertain” (7). More specifically,
Dinerstein focuses on certain financial bonuses that are awarded to a player, for instance
or should he attain a personal award, such as MVP or Rookie of the Year. While
6
These and all subsequent statistics cited in this paper have been acquired from fangraphs.com.
7
In a previous study, statistician Bill James concluded that the player-age of 27 produced the best average
rate of production and a player’s performance most likely will decline in the immediately following
seasons.
Buono 7
Dinerstein concludes that such bonuses are indeed beneficial methods to motivate a
mechanisms thus may not provide the team with much insurance” (ibid). In other words,
a player whose performance has decreased significantly after signing a long-term contract
might not benefit from monetary awards because he has already begun struggling despite
intensify after a player signs a long-term contract, the empirical results in a majority of
cases demonstrate that it is neither prudent nor strategically sound to invest in one
franchise player (or a few), with such lavishness and trust, as a means to secure a
competitive baseball club for many seasons. Although an organization can easily be
induced to sign a player to a mega-contract based on his potential to be a team leader and
the promise of heightened on-field accomplishments, the notion that his health and
rather suspect proposition. Accordingly, today’s MLB teams should discontinue the
practice of committing themselves to any franchise player for so many years at such
exorbitant salaries.
viewed primarily through the lens of attempting to forge a competitive team. In a study
players, Matthew Cahill found that “there are three variables that need to be taken into
profits for all teams, subsidizing on-field performance in relation to payroll tax, and
revenue sharing” (6). While Cahill refers to a competitive and financial balance between
MLB teams, this distinction can be applied further to each organization. In an ideal
scenario, each party in an organization would employ an equal amount of effort and be
Stakeholder theory. With respect to the modern corporation, Edward Freeman affirms
that “[s]uppliers, interpreted in a stakeholder sense, are vital to the success of the firm, for
raw materials will determine the final product’s quality and price” (43). Moreover,
Freeman explains that “[employees] often have specialized skills for which there is
usually no perfectly elastic market…In return for their loyalty, the corporation is
expected to provide for them and carry them through difficult times” (42). Accordingly,
the current analysis will attempt to prove that an MLB organization is considered to be
morally sound only if the needs of each facet are appreciated equally.
with the companies which furnish the players with bats, gloves, and other equipment
needed to play the sport. Therefore, the owner must apportion sufficient funds to this
party because the ability of the team to perform is grounded upon having the proper
equipment with which to play. In other words, a supplier could easily sever ties with an
positive effects according to Freeman: “When the firm treats the supplier as a valued
Buono 9
member of the stakeholder network, rather than simply as a source of materials, the
performance on and off the field, the players could also be categorized as suppliers given
their considerable influence on ticket and merchandise sales, which account for a chief
means of revenue for an organization. Should a player openly expresses displeasure with
the terms of his contract, the owner would likely assume blame from the fans and may
occurred after the 2011 season, when shortstop José Reyes agreed to a six-year, $106
million contract with the Miami Marlins. During the transaction, owner Jeffrey Loria
reportedly assured his client that the team planned to be the final destination in the young
star’s career.8 Reyes played only one season with the Marlins before being traded to the
Toronto Blue Jays, a transaction which undoubtedly irked the fan base, given the failure
of Loria’s proposition. The Reyes fiasco, paired with a dismal record of 69-93 (.358
Since the 2012 season, the Marlins have finished last in the National League in ticket
8
See “José Reyes Reflects on What Could Have Been” on usatoday.com for more information.
9
See “Moral Obligations of the Modern Corporation” pp. 17-19.
Buono 10
In accordance with this model, owners and other parties alike have equal authority in an
compensation. In the MLB, an organization that abides by the Stakeholder model will
provide equal benefits for all of its members, including the owner, the players themselves
as both employees and suppliers, and the fans as customers. The analysis will thus defend
this model as a more appropriate means for a team’s financial success than its
MLB Contracting
Before a corporation can flourish and provide for the needs of its constituents, it
must negotiate a proper contract with each employee. A contract, according to Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary, is defined as “an agreement between two or more
to identify insofar as most MLB contracts are negotiated between front office and player,
In contrast to every other professional sports association in the United States, the
MLB does not impose a salary cap upon its member organizations. As an attempt to
Buono 11
create financial balance between teams, however, the league levies upon each
organization a luxury tax.10 In accordance with this regulation, a team whose payroll
exceeds the total sum previously agreed upon is punished with a fine, 11 the amount of
which is determined in large part by the number of times the offending organization has
committed any such offense. 12 Accordingly, while teams may repeatedly exceed their
payroll, an action which the New York Yankees franchise has willingly undertaken on a
virtually annual basis, the goal of the luxury tax is to gradually cripple an organization
that refuses to set and abide by a maximum level of player-salary expenditures for its
offseason campaigns.
consequences that will result should the validity of the agreement be compromised:
A primary case in which a breach of contract affected an MLB team’s ability to keep a
“signed” player with that team occurred in 1974. 14 Jim “Catfish” Hunter, a pitcher for the
Oakland Athletics, had signed a two-year, $50,000 contract in the offseason along with a
request to avoid tax liability for the entirety of the contract’s duration. The owner of the
10
Defined by Cambridge Online Dictionary as “a tax on expensive goods that are not necessary”
11
Each organization’s annual payroll is bargained with the MLB in the offseason.
12
The luxury tax is based on a four-year period; first-time offenders pay 17.5% of surplus to the league,
second-time offenders pay 30%, third-time offenders pay 40%, and fourth-time offenders and beyond pay
50%.
13
See The Complete Works of Aristotle, p 2192. Note that the in-text citations of Aristotle will be given in
this format in accordance with the original and separate publication of each work.
14
See Labor Relations in Professional Sports, pp. 53-54.
Buono 12
Athletics, Charles Finley, however, later refused to accept that this term was his
their contract before the end of its first year. An arbitrator found the evidence to be in
Hunter’s favor, thus justifying his decision to sign with another team before the 1975
season. In addition, the Hunter case became the prime ammunition for the Major League
exemplifies the point made by Aristotle concerning the validity of a contract. Although
Hunter had received his full salary from the front office, a disagreement as to the proper
legal agreement in its entirety. The Hunter case also induced the MLB to review and
improve the various ways in which a baseball player’s contract could be negotiated. In
1976, the owners and the players’ association agreed to implement an innovative
marketability included “player performance during the past season, length and
consistency of the player’s career, comparative salaries, and the team’s recent
performance in the standings and at the gate” (Kahn 158). The significance of final offer
arbitration’s implementation is that the market value of a player nowadays will most
likely increase should a third party representative advertise that player’s talents to each
team potentially interested in that player. Robert Berry explains that “[t]he parties
propose salary figures that need not have been submitted during prior
Buono 13
negotiations…salary arbitration has produced major gains for players” (58). Salary
arbitration in the sport today is a valuable asset by which a player will be assured that the
negotiation will be optimal for his needs, on and off the field.
Even so, the chief shortcoming of salary arbitration from the player’s perspective
is that a player is eligible for such only after having played three full seasons under the
control of his first team. Therefore, any bargaining of a contract before this three-year
period has transpired is conducted simply between the front office and the player’s
arbitration and thus cannot become a free agent, he is subject to the “reserve clause.”
Pursuant to this clause, which was implemented in 1975, an organization owns the rights
of a player’s contract for the first three seasons. Upon the completion of this period, a
Vassiliki Avgerinou offers further insight concerning the benefits of removing a player
from the reserve clause: “Economic rents previously extracted by teams are now being
allocated to players. The increased player power to bargain over their salaries and
which at first glance appears to benefit both player and owner. Such a view, however, is
More particularly, with respect the process of final offer arbitration through which a third
party foists a lasting influence on all labor disputes,15 Brien Wassner identifies a
See “Major League Baseball’s Answer to Salary Disputes and the Strike: Final Offer Arbitration: A
15
players’ salaries—even for mediocre players” (11). The most obvious reason for this
In addition to the marked upsurge of salaries, Wassner notes that FOA often
induces a “narcotic effect [which] basically motivates parties who have previously relied
upon the system to use it exclusively to solve future disputes and impasses” (11). In
accordance with this perception of FOA, an owner employing a number of players who
are eligible for arbitration in one season may become accustomed to that method of
becoming eligible for arbitration will most likely become more adept at attaining the
most lucrative contract possible. For constructing a competitive team, these economically
based endeavors can be particularly burdensome for the organization, given the increased
probability of a player’s securing a larger contract via arbitration than through the reserve
clause. Thus, each MLB team must meticulously evaluate the past on-field performance
of each player potentially to be signed in order to determine the most beneficial and
frugal agreement.
Before attempting to negotiate a contract, each party must first examine its
respective motives for making significant financial and emotional commitments to each
other. While at first glance the potential talent of the MLB player may seem to be the
only relevant concern to a team owner and his executives, there are, nevertheless,
numerous additional factors regarding the incentives of a player in signing the contract
which need to be taken into account as well. In a previous psychological study, Richard
Buono 15
Ryan partitions the ideal of motivation into two chief groups: “The most basic distinction
because it leads to a separable outcome” (55). The discrepancy between intrinsic and
long-term contract in baseball (or any sport) because the primary intentions of a player to
sign with a new team could considerably affect his on-field performance and the
In his analysis, Ryan first expounds upon the relevance of intrinsic motivation in
society: “When intrinsically motivated a person is moved to act for the fun or challenge
entailed rather than because of external prods, pressures, or rewards” (56). Such
compelling external rewards are best represented in the MLB and all professional sports
as the base salaries and financial bonuses promised to the player. Given that a player
makes a living for himself and his family by performing on the field, the notion that pure
of a player in signing a contract, the effect that the contract will have on the team and its
subsequent on-field performance must carry greater magnitude in the eyes of the player.
For example, a player whose sole motivation is to maximize his profits by signing a
lucrative, multi-year contract with a below-average team rather than sacrifice a portion of
his salary in order to play for a winning team on the field would not be an attractive target
to a team contending for a World Series title. With respect to long-term contracts, a team
often attracts a player based on the exorbitant financial terms of the contract. Even if the
Buono 16
the incentives of a single player. For example, the Detroit Tigers missed the playoffs in
2008, 2009, and 2010 despite three stellar seasons from Miguel Cabrera in which he
finished 13th, 4th, and 2nd in MVP voting, respectively. His contract, however, accounted
for over 12% of the entire players’ payroll during the three-year period and financially
debilitated the organization. On the other hand, if the player signs the mega-contract
simply because it was the highest offer he received, the organization has already put itself
at a disadvantage.
motivation, an ideal which, according to Ryan, involves numerous factors external to the
object of motivation, which in this case is the contract itself. In other words, the
impending financial worth of a player can considerably alter his mindset going into a
season, particularly if the imminent season will determine how lucrative his next contract
will be.
In accordance with this model, a majority of MLB players would likely be more
whose chief purpose for performing is to satisfy an external demand, such as the
attainment of certain, aforementioned salaries and financial bonuses, would fall under the
include those who perform merely “to avoid guilt or anxiety or to attain ego-
long-term contract, given the substantial pressure provided by the fans upon the arrival of
the player. Third, players whose focus is to accomplish any long-term goals, such as
winning a World Series, would exemplify the subcategory of “identification.” Lastly, the
term “integration” suggests its inherent meaning, specifically that the independent goals
Buono 18
of the player are matched with the values and necessities of his teammates. According to
Ryan, “Integration occurs when identified regulations have been fully assimilated to the
self” (62).
players, particularly those who sign long-term contracts, is the motivation for the players
subcategories of extrinsic motivation, given the various differences between them, could
The present analysis has been conducted by examining actual levels of production
by a considerable number of position players and pitchers who signed long-term contracts
and whose production level appear, on average, to significantly decrease after doing so.
While taking into account both extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, the analysis of
sabermetric. The former describes statistics that the average fan can easily locate in a
contrast, the latter produces statistics that are not readily apparent to the average baseball
fan and do not even appear in a traditional “box score.” More importantly, however,
and independent contribution to a team on the field because statistics reliant almost
entirely on the player himself are employed. With respect to the sample of position
addition to sabermetric statistics; for pitchers, only sabermetric statistics will be used due
Buono 19
shortly.
teams, up until recently, have primarily examined three specific statistics: batting
average, runs batted in (RBI), and home runs. In the present analysis, however, these
three figures will not be used because of the respective inconsistencies of each. More
specifically batting average, which calculates the ratio of hits (H) to at-bats (AB), does
not take into account other ways by which to reach base: namely, walks (BB), hit-by-
pitches (HBP), and sacrifice flies (SF), the last of which occurs when a teammate scores a
run as a direct result of a fly-ball out by the hitter.16 RBI, a statistic that conveys how
many times a teammate and the player himself crossed home plate as a direct result of the
player’s plate appearance (PA), often does not directly correlate to the player’s individual
ability.17 While the most valuable hitters often have comparatively high RBI totals, these
players most necessarily, and heavily, depend on the ability of their teammates to reach
base in front of them. Lastly, the home run is an insufficient statistic to apply because of
its partial reliance on external factors, particularly the dimensions of various stadia.18
percentage (SLG), and “on-base plus slugging percentage” (OPS). OBP describes the
ratio of the number of times a player reaches base to the number of plate appearances,
16
See “Stats to Avoid: Batting Average” by Neil Weinberg (Courtesy of fangraphs.com).
17
See “Stats to Avoid: Runs Batted in (“RBI”) by Neil Weinberg (Courtesy of fangraphs.com).
18
See “MLB Park Factors” (Courtesy of espn.com) to view the range of home runs hit per game in each
stadium in each season. For instance, in 2015, the range between the stadia allowing the most and least
home runs, respectively, was .8 home runs per game.
Buono 20
excluding an error by the defensive player who fields the player’s struck ball. The full
OBP is particularly valuable because it analyzes statistics that batting average ignores
In contrast, SLG takes into account the total amount of bases crossed by the
player per each at bat. The full equation for SLG is:
By assigning a numerical value to each type of hit, SLG effectively calculates the
proficiency of a player in being able to gather all types of hits. As a result, SLG is a more
telling statistic than home runs because the latter only conveys one dimension of a
player’s hitting ability, as opposed to four. Thirdly, the statistic OPS simply combines the
values OBP and SLG to provide a single numerical value of a player’s ability to reach
base while garnering extra-base hits. The importance of this figure lies in its ability to
radically distinguish different types of players. For example, a player who boasts an
above-average SLG because he is among the league leaders in home runs but is crippled
by a below-average OBP would be overmatched by a player who hits fewer home runs
but is still able to garner extra-base hits while accruing more walks and fewer strikeouts.
Buono 21
In addition to the three conventional statistics that will be used to evaluate only
hitters, a number of sabermetric figures will be utilized for the analysis. The term
sabermetric was originally coined in 1980 by Bill James, a statistician who sought to
evaluate MLB players beyond the scale of traditional statistics. The goal of baseball
to the team for owners, general managers, coaches, and fans alike. Although this unique
method of calculating the authenticity of a player’s talent is not the primary mechanism
statistics.
With regard to the position players to be considered in this evaluation, three main
Weighted Runs Created plus (wRC+), and Wins above Replacement (fWAR).20
The goal of BABIP is to determine the amount of success a hitter has when he
puts a ball in play. Nevertheless, this statistic does not account for home runs hit by the
player, as home runs are given up directly by the pitcher and do not take the defense into
account. The critical value of BABIP is that it not only accurately conveys the ability of a
player to put the ball in play with success, but also reduces if not eliminates any factor of
luck or poor defensive play because the statistic covers the player’s performance for an
19
All explanations for sabermetrics are courtesy of fangraphs.com.
20
The “f” preceding “WAR” identifies fangraphs.com as the primary source of information.
Buono 22
The key functionality of wRC+, the second sabermetric being employed here, is
that it measures how each plate appearance of a certain hitter directly affects the outcome
of a game, while negating the potential effects of playing in various stadia, a difference
often overlooked yet necessary to examine insofar as the readily apparent, various
dissimilarities of dimensions and climate between the twenty-eight cities that contain
In this equation, the abbreviations wRAA and wRC21 represent Weighted Runs above
Average and Weighted Runs Created, respectively. Although both statistics are also
useful in determining a player’s value to the team, the information conveyed by both
wRAA and wRC are succinctly represented and adequately accounted for within the
The third and final alternative statistic for consideration, fWAR, is the arguably
the essential figure for the entire realm of sabermetrics in professional baseball. It
21
The statistic wRAA calculates how many runs a player created for his team compared to the average
MLB player, while wRC takes into account every statistic highlighted by wRC+ except for the stadium
factor.
Buono 23
league player, should this so-called replacement supplant the everyday player because of
an injury or personal issue suffered by the latter. As a result, this single statistic most
soundly estimates how instrumental the role of a player has been with respect to the
Note that the calculation of a player’s fWAR includes Ultimate Zone Rating (UZR), a
sabermetric statistic that accounts for the defensive value and prowess of a player by
estimating the number of above average plays made and concomitant number of runs
saved in a given season. Although it is considered for determining fWAR, UZR will not
concerned with each player’s offensive proficiency. The database fangraphs.com cites
UZR as its primary and most reliable tool for calculating the defensive value of a player.22
The critical reference point utilized by fWAR is the estimated wins added or
subtracted to the final record of a team based on one player’s performance. According to
fWAR in a given season amounts to less than or equal to 0 are equated to bench players,
while those whose fWAR equates or exceeds 6 are likened to MVP-caliber players.
22
See the article “UZR” on fangraphs.com for more information.
Buono 24
Naturally, players whose statistics hearken to the latter echelon are more attractive
The selection of the sabermetric library is based on the value transmitted by these
statistics with respect to the competitive team. More specifically, BABIP measures how
frequently a player puts a ball in play with success, a comparatively high amount of
which provides more opportunities to score runs and win games. The value of wRC+ is
particularly suitable because it calculates how much of the team’s offensive production
was credited to one player based on his ability to take advantage of run-scoring chances.
Lastly, a team can utilize the fWAR of a player in a given season to most meaningfully
determine the benefit of employing such a player and whether the terms of his contract
and often correlate with the performance of a hitter in baseball, the standard pitching
statistics conventionally employed for years are altogether too unreliable to be included
in the present analysis. The most commonly examined figures in the conventional
pitching arena are wins (W), earned run average (ERA), and strikeouts (K). Wins are a
particularly unreliable analytical tool because the prospect of a win to a starting pitcher
depends in too large a part on his teammates. For example, if a pitcher exits a game with
a 1-0 lead in the ninth inning but the next pitcher surrenders a run, then the starting
pitcher would not receive a decision despite the fact that, for all intents and purposes, he
deserved a win. In contrast, the same pitcher, in his next start, could allow six runs in six
innings. If the team scores seven runs to take the lead before the beginning of the seventh
Buono 25
inning, however, the starter would be in line to receive a win despite his far less than
stellar outing.
The inconsistencies found in ERA can be further and perhaps even more clearly viewed
in another hypothetical situation. Suppose a starting pitcher is facing a batter with two
outs in the inning while runners occupy all three bases. The batter hits a sharp groundball
to the center fielder, allowing the runner on third base to score. The ball, however, rolls
under the fielder’s glove (without any error by the fielder) and the other three base
runners also score. In the box score, the hit is marked as a grand slam (a home run in
which four runs score) and is charged to the pitcher’s ERA, even though it could be
vehemently argued that only one or, at most, two runs should have scored on the play.
Because the spectrum of ERA does not adequately account for this type of scenario,
however, the inconsistent play of the center fielder significantly blemishes the pitcher’s
final line of performance, thereby adversely affecting the validity of the analysis of that
23
See the article titled “How to Evaluate a Pitcher, Sabermetrically” on fangraphs.com for more details.
Buono 26
Following a similar methodology to that of the analysis of hitters, these statistics provide
While the success of a hitter is partially reliant on the ability of his teammates to get on
base frequently, the achievement of a starting pitcher is heavily dependent on his defense,
as made clear in some of the hypothetical scenarios considered earlier. Accordingly, these
four statistics have been chosen insofar as they best construct the most accurate
With respect to Opponent’s BABIP, the same equation utilized for hitters will be
used in determining a pitcher’s contribution to the team over the course of a season.
While BABIP is most reliant upon the defense within the spectrum of sabermetrics, it is
generally synonymous with the seasonal performance of the pitcher. In other words, a full
season will most likely mitigate if not annul both outstanding plays by the defense, which
benefit the pitcher’s performance, and errors made by the defense, which hinder the
pitcher’s outing.
FIP, to remove the “ups and downs” of an MLB defense. The equation for FIP is
displayed below:
In contrast with ERA, which simply accounts for the number of runs charged to the
pitcher per nine innings, FIP incorporates the realities that the surrender of home runs and
Buono 27
walks are particularly detrimental to the value of a pitcher, while strikeouts and
significant innings pitched are significantly favorable. The coefficients 13, 3, and 2 listed
in front of HR, BB, and K, respectively, represent the proportional damage allowed or
thus reflect home runs, walks, and strikeouts as the three key statistical outcomes almost
entirely dependent upon the pitcher. Lastly, the constant (C) that is added to this fraction
accounts for the average ERA of all pitchers, a statistic whose value typically is in close
resemblance with the average FIP. Despite this apparent congruency between the two
statistics, a pitcher’s ERA and FIP are rarely equal; therefore, the latter accounts for how
much the pitcher benefitted or suffered statistically as a result of the defense behind him.
lower ERAs than their FIP suggests, but overall FIP captures most pitchers’ true
performance quite well.”24 In general, the purpose of employing FIP in the present
analysis is to highlight the inconsistencies within ERA and therefore represent a more
precise method of determining the valuative difference between starting pitchers in the
MLB, ranging from all-stars to pitchers promoted from the minor leagues.
The final statistic for consideration is SIERA, the newest tool created by
fangraphs.com for evaluating pitchers. While based on a scale very similar to ERA and
FIP, SIERA incorporates a more sizeable terrain for assessment in that it attempts to
accentuate the level of dominance of a pitcher in a myriad of situations. For example, one
dimension of SIERA is to calculate the number of times a pitcher induces a double play
farther than that of FIP in that the former takes into account the stadium in which the
24
See “ERA, FIP, and Answering the Right Question” (Courtesy of fangraphs.com).
Buono 28
game is played, thereby encompassing the variations between the dimensions of each
specific park. Because of the recent nature of its inception, however, there has not yet
been developed any consistently discernable equation for SIERA; rather, the value for
Despite the lack of an equation for SIERA, Matt Swartz vouches for the validity
of this novel statistic: “FanGraphs’ new-and-improved ERA estimation system now uses
different proprietary data [and] takes more interactions and quadratic terms into account
when reaching its conclusions.”25 A few additional, notable trends that result from the
increased depth of analysis are as follows: first, starting pitchers proficient at garnering
strikeouts tend to allow fewer home runs per each fly ball; second, pitchers accustomed
to surrendering a below-average number of walks per game are not likely affected by a
single walk; and third, pitchers with above-average strikeout totals also induce below-
average BABIPs. For instance, with respect to this second trend, Swartz provides as an
exemplary player Tom Glavine, a ten-time all-star who was inducted into the Baseball
Hall of Fame in 2014 following a largely successful career that spanned from 1987 to
2007. Specifically, “Glavine walked 15% of his opposing batter with first base
open—even after netting out intentional walks—but he only walked 6% of hitters the rest
of the time.”26 As a result of this pattern, Glavine produced an above-average FIP and
SIERA in nearly all of his twenty seasons, including a top-ten FIP ranking in four
separate seasons.
Similar calculative problems to that of SIERA exist when determining the fWAR
25
See "New SIERA, Part Two (of Five): Unlocking Underrated Pitching Skills" (Courtesy of
fangraphs.com).
26
Cf. note 21, supra.
Buono 29
based on his FIP on account of its dependence solely on the pitcher and its ability to
transmit how his performance in the past can affect his future value to an organization.
Other contributing factors that play a key role in calculating fWAR for pitchers are the
average figures of a replacement level pitcher, the conversion of FIP onto a “runs scale,”27
the necessary adjustment for the dimensions of each stadium, and the average number of
runs needed per win by a certain pitcher. Accordingly, insofar as there is no discernable
or official equation incorporating each of these distinct statistics, the fWAR of each
In sum, the underlying goal of the analysis undertaken for both hitters and
worth to and within an MLB organization. Each statistic that will be included in the
examination has been chosen because of its accuracy in both covering every major facet
of statistical value and removing the unpredictability of external factors such as defense,
baserunning, and stadia differences. While sabermetric statistics have been identified as
the primary source of relevant information for pitchers, conventional statistics such as
OBP, SLG, and OPS provide similar information as sabermetrics for each field player in
The evaluation of players in this analysis is simply concerned with the players’
on-field performance and the amount of money deemed worthy of investing in said
players, specifically those who have played or are currently playing under a long-term
27
Such a “runs scale” is attained by dividing the FIP value by .92 (fangraphs.com). Also cf. note 18, supra.
28
Upon the end of each season, fangraphs.com displays a sortable table of statistics so that a certain pitcher
can be compared to every other qualifying pitcher in several different categories.
Buono 30
contract paying $100 million or greater. In taking this approach, the experimentation will
such contracts, especially considering the vast number of qualifying contracts that have
been agreed upon in the twenty-first century alone. Indeed, given the unparalleled zeal
and excitement often experienced by a fan base upon the arrival of a potential star player
signed to a mega-contract, the team’s office will almost certainly benefit financially from
the mere presence of that player, regardless of his eventual, in-season performance. 29 In
intended to pass between the parties.”30 Therefore, the notion that an owner could be
convinced that investing such a vast sum of money in one hitter or pitcher is legally
wrong has virtually no ground for argument. Accordingly, the incursion of or reliance
upon long-term contracts has not yet been vehemently opposed in any legal arena.
from opportune and exciting circumstances. As the 21st century has shown, a significant
amounts of money in one player based on the proficiency of his on-field performance in
29
The excitement of having such a player on a team often engenders a noticeable increase in ticket and
merchandise sales. For instance, the signing of Alex Rodriguez in 2002 increased the attendance by almost
10% from the previous season.
30
See full definition and application on legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com.
Buono 31
previous seasons. Given the possibility that the player will continue or even increase his
consider. In addition, the increasing credibility of the term “franchise player” has initiated
in front offices the desire to outbid any other contender seeking to acquire a certain
player, no matter how exorbitant the salary may be. The resulting bidding wars have thus
proven costly for a number of organizations with respect to the overall competitive
Rodriguez himself, who played in three consecutive All-Star games and was crowned
league MVP in 2003, the Rangers suffered tremendously as a team on account of the
in the 2001 season, Rodriguez’s $22 million salary devoured over 25% of the yearly
payroll of the entire organization.31 In contrast, no other Ranger played was paid more
contract can easily be outweighed by the financial effects that such a contract has on the
term contract is the rise of the contracting player as potential leader or captain over the
course of his tenure with the organization. In most cases, a veteran player who has
succeeded in past seasons and is willing to impart his skills and knowledge of the game to
his teammates will have a positive effect both in the clubhouse and on the field. This
31
See the analysis of Team Salary Compensation conducted by baseballprospectus.com for a graphic
analysis and further explanation.
Buono 32
component of a player, however, does not necessarily transfer to the actual on-field
performance of a so-called leader, arguably the most critical factor for consideration,
given that the main goal of any professional organization is to win a championship. In
other words, the below-average achievement of a player will outweigh any benefit of
For instance, from the 2011 season to the present day, the discrepancy between a
person as a leader and as a player has considerably affected outfielder Jayson Werth and
the Washington Nationals organization. Werth, who had won a World Series with the
Philadelphia Phillies in 2008, signed a seven-year, $126 million contract and brought a
Washington Post before the 2013 season, the lasting effect of Werth on the morale and
swagger of the team was made known publicly: “One week away from his third opening
day in Washington, Werth’s [positive] influence has spread through every phase of the
Nationals’ operation, from the training room to the front office, from rookies in their first
spring training to ownership” (Kilgore). Indeed, the arrival of Werth had an immediate
impact on the Nationals, who made their first playoffs in 2012. This brief spurt of
jubilation, however, temporarily shrouded the detrimental play of Werth himself in the
first two years of his long-term contract. While his average fWAR nearly equaled 5 in his
two final seasons with the Phillies, it finished at only 1.50 at the end of both the 2011 and
2012 seasons. Moreover, after reaching base in 38% of his plate appearances in 2009 and
2010, Werth barely managed to reach base 30% of the time in Washington during the
2011 and 2012 seasons. While the intangible effect of Werth certainly benefitted the
organization upon his initial appearance, the cost of his contract paired with his sub-par
Buono 33
performance ultimately had a far greater negative impact on the team’s overall
achievement.
increase of both the team’s fan base and the sale of tickets and team merchandise.
Regardless of the on-field performance of a player, his reputation and past success often
induce a considerable surge in the sales of game tickets as well as team apparel—such as
jerseys, t-shirts, and jackets—and other memorabilia. As one baseball writer notes,
“Players with magnetic personalities or characteristics that inspire the community have
marketing potential that can increase team revenues…All-stars are often the most well-
known players and have the marketing potential and so will serve as a proxy for a
player’s marketability” (Dinerstein 15). For example, second baseman Dustin Pedroia
agreed to an eight-year, $110 million contract with the Boston Red Sox in the months
following the 2013 season. From January 1, 2014 to Opening Day on April 2, the
merchandise sales of the Red Sox more than doubled the team’s sales from the 2012
offseason, and the jersey of Pedroia became the fourth-most purchased of all MLB
players.32
competitor in a league,33 the claim that team revenue wholly or vastly supersedes team
success is illogical. Indeed, while an owner who pursues financial profit as the chief goal
of his organization would be sound business policy under the Shareholder theory, as the
owner is the primary beneficiary of all incoming funds, the success of corporations such
32
All information regarding team revenue and jersey sales is according to report conducted by NBC Sports,
as of Opening Day 2014.
33
The primary goal of a traditional business is to make a financial profit; meanwhile, the very nature of
professional team sports is to win a championship as a result of utilizing well the funds apportioned to an
organization.
Buono 34
pursuant to which parties beyond the narrow realm of team ownership have an equal
endorses is that of exciting the players who wish to form a legacy of championships and
pleasing the fans who want to witness this legacy for themselves.
A fourth and final major objection to the present thesis is the existence of
utilization by baseball teams of insurance coverage for injured players. While an injury to
a player signed to a long-term contract may negatively affect team performance, the
limited payroll becomes vulnerable to insufficient funds for other purposes, namely the
difficult to ascertain how much a team actually spends on insurance it is clear that it can
be a burden for smaller teams.”34 As an insurance policy generally covers 80% of the
contract of a player who is under team control for an extended period of time,35 an
potential ineffectiveness. If a player does not suffer from an injury or partake in any
action which would directly detriment the team financially, such as using steroids, the
organization is still required to pay the insurance company the full amount of the
proposed insurance on said player. Accordingly, a number of teams have refused to seek
34
See “Insurance in Baseball is Like a Black Hole,” on fangraphs.com for a full explanation of insurance
policies in the MLB.
35
See note 30.
Buono 35
insurance payments for players, even those signed to a long-term deal. For example,
when the San Francisco Giants signed Barry Zito to a seven-year, $126 million contract
before the 2007 season, the organization refused to buy insurance while stating that the
risk associated with the potential decrease in performance by Zito was their primary
concern.36
Aside from the deleterious effect of necessary insurance coverage for mega-
contracted players on a team’s ability to pay more attractive salaries to his teammates,
such coverage could also deplete organizational funds arising from off-field actions of the
player himself. For example, outfielder Josh Hamilton suffered from drug abuse before
the 2015 season while under a lucrative long-term contract with the Los Angeles Angels
of Anaheim. If he were to miss a majority of the season, the team would receive
insurance and would not be financially responsible for covering Hamilton’s personal
issues. Through arbitration filed by the league itself, however, Hamilton was found to be
physically able to play for the entire 2015 season, in which he posted a career-low 0.2
fWAR.
The primary concern of this thesis is the correlation of the on-field performance
of a player before and after signing a long-term contract of at least $100 million in total
value,37 and the results of such performance on his team’s competitive success. The
analysis will specifically evaluate the contracts of 30 position players and 13 pitchers
statistically in all seasons played before and after signing a new long-term deal or
36
See “Checking the Numbers: Paying the Premium” on baseballprospectus.com for more information.
37
This value was chosen both as a sound baseline of the most recently signed long-term contracts and
because only one contract exceeded $100 million in the 20th century, even while accounting for inflation.
Buono 36
position player or pitcher will be sorted into three groups based on the player’s change in
performance: those with positive, negative, or negligible, that is, less than 5.5% change
(up or down) in their performance after agreeing to the contract. In addition, the analysis
will evaluate the performance of each team in the seasons before and after employing
such a player with respect to win percentage, playoff appearances, and playoff success.
All statistics for position players and pitchers have been retrieved from
fangraphs.com and have been formatted to fit the analysis. Each position player must
have played at least 80 games in each season or have at least 400 plate appearances in
each season. Each pitcher must have started at least 25 games or have pitched at least 150
considered to have decreased if the value of the statistic has increased. For example, a
pitcher will have regressed if his FIP rose from 2.60 to 3.00 after signing a long-term
contract. Concerning fWAR, however, a decrease in numerical value for both position
The two essential patterns that the present analysis conveys are, first, that the on-
and, second, that the overall competiveness of an individual team is noticeably hampered
the 224 total figures utilized to assess the value of the 32 position players, an
overwhelming 142 (63%) imparted a negative change, while only 10 (4%) conveyed a
Buono 37
positive change. The statistic that most clearly encapsulates this drastic decrease in
performance across the board is fWAR, according to which the on-field performance of
28 of the 32 players (88%) regressed. In this vein, the nearly uniform pattern of decline
by position players carries even greater magnitude, given that fWAR is perhaps the most
revealing statistic of a player’s individual success and his contribution to his team.
contract were more subtlety reflected. More specifically, the change in individual
performance of the pitchers was not nearly as noteworthy as that of the aforementioned
the teams which employed these players, the improved performance of a few pitchers
appeared to have been cast aside in light of the financial magnitude of their respective
contracts. More specifically, of the 58 teams that employed a pitcher with a long-term
Lastly, the influence of such mega-contracts on the team itself is best represented
in the significant decrease in average win percentage. Of the 27 distinct periods of time in
which a team employed at least one long-term contract, only 7 (27%) enjoyed an increase
in winning percentage and only 7 witnessed an increase in playoff appearances. While the
total number of World Series (8) won increased by 25% for teams after employing at
least one mega-contract as compared to before doing so (6), four of the eight
championships were achieved by teams that had already appeared in a World Series in
the preceding timeframe. Therefore, the experience attained by a team amidst such a
Buono 38
tense environment could arguably have carried greater magnitude in its subsequent
appearances to the World Series than the addition of one or two “star players.”
Conclusion
the beginning of the 21st century is an issue that has long since prevailed without sizeable
resistance from within or outside the league. While certain measures have been taken to
limit the funds of any one organization, namely via the luxury tax, the lack of a salary cap
has allowed several teams to bestow exorbitant salaries upon a player without
York Yankees has made no significant attempts to deviate from its philosophy of
organization on a long-term basis. In contrast, this present analysis has been conducted in
order to undermine the claim that magnanimity and longevity breed prosperity. On an
economic level, the appendix tables demonstrate that, pursuant to the Stakeholder
Theory, a long-term contract on its own does not sufficiently benefit the organization,
insofar as the player under the agreement and the owner are unfairly promoted as
virtually exclusive parties of interest while other branches of the organization suffer. On a
practical level, the performance of a single player is most likely to decrease upon and
following the signing of a long-term contract, as the statistics presented above have
displayed. In fact, only nine players out of the forty-three (21%) with such contracts have
won a World Series38 since the year 2000, and three of those players did so as a part of a
38
These players include Matt Cain (2012, 2014), Derek Jeter (2009), Buster Posey (2014), Albert Pujols
(2006, 2011), Manny Ramirez (2004, 2007), Alex Rodriguez (2009), CC Sabathia (2009), and Barry Zito
(2010, 2012).
Buono 39
endorsed the Stakeholder Theory and revenue sharing while avoiding the employment of
smaller distinction between the highest and lowest contracts. Most recently, in 2015, on
their way to a World Series championship, the Kansas City Royals paid their most
expensive player $14 million, a value just $10 million above the average team salary. In
stark contrast, Rodriguez’s salary in 2001 exceeded the average salary in the Rangers
organization by $19 million, almost twice as much as all but one Royals’ player, and the
and prudently construct a competitive baseball club, team owners and executives should
be dissuaded from the proposition of building around a “franchise player” for the
39
Cf. note 27.
Buono 40
Works Cited
Aristotle. Rhetoric. The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation.
Avgerinou, Vassiliki. "The Economics of Professional Team Sports: Content, Trends and
<http://www.choregia.org/1.pdf>.
Berry, Robert, William Gould, and Paul Staudohar. Labor Relations in Professional
Cahill, Matthew. "Change in Major League Baseball Player Performance after Signing a
<http://fisherpub.sjfc.edu/sport_undergrad/84>.
Dinerstein, Michael. "How Major League Baseball Teams Value Players." Publications
2015.
<https://economics.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/dinerstein_michae
l_2007honors_thesis.pdf>.
<http://academic.udayton.edu/lawrenceulrich/Stakeholder%20Theory.pdf>.
Gove, Philip Babcock, ed. Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English
"Insurance in Baseball Is like a Black Hole." Fan Graphs. N.p., 11 Apr. 2015. Web. 16
a-black-hole/>.
Jane, Wen-Jhan, Gee San, and Yi-Pey Ou. "The Causality between Salary Structures and
League Baseball: Estimates from Panel Data." The Review of Economics and
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2109641>.
Kilgore, Adam. "Jayson Werth Has Made His Presence Felt throughout." Washington
Martin, Patrick. "Moral Obligations of the Modern Corporation." 13 Apr. 2013. MS.
Megdal, Howard. “All-Star José Reyes Reflects on What Could Have Been.” USA Today.
< http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2015/08/11/>.
Pfarrer, Michael. "What Is the Purpose of the Firm: Shareholder and Stakeholder
James O'Toole and Don Mayer. Abingdon: Routledge, 2010. 86-94. Print.
Ryan, Richard, and Edward Deci. "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: Classic
<https://mmrg.pbworks.com/f/Ryan,+Deci+00.pdf>.
Buono 42
Seidman, Eric. “Checking the Numbers: Paying the Premium.” Baseball Prospectus.
< http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=13011>.
Swartz, Matthew. "New SIERA, Part Two (of Five): Unlocking Underrated Pitching
<http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/new-siera-part-two-of-five-unlocking-
underrated-pitching-skills/>.
Weinberg, Neil. "ERA, FIP, and Answering the Right Question." Fan Graphs. N.p., 15
answering-the-right-question/>.
- - -. "How to Evaluate a Pitcher, Sabermetrically." Beyond the Box Score. N.p., 2 June
<http://www.beyondtheboxscore.com/2014/6/2/5758898/sabermetrics-stats-
pitching-stats-learn-sabermetrics>.
- - -. "Stats to Avoid: Batting Average." Fan Graphs. N.p., 20 Feb. 2015. Web. 17 Dec.
2015. <http://www.fangraphs.com/library/stats-to-avoid-batting-average/>.
- - -. "Stats to Avoid: Runs Batted in (RBI)." Fan Graphs. N.p., 24 Oct. 2014. Web. 17
rbi/>.
Buono 43
Appendix A: Analysis of Position Players: On-Base Percentage (OBP)
Team Season Average Win Pct. Total Playoff LCS40 World Series
s with Percentage Change Appearances Appearances Appearances
(+/-)
LTC (Wins)
on Befor Afte Before After Before After Before After
Payroll e41 r
Braves 2003- .584 .591 +1.2% 3 3 1 0 0 0
05
Braves 2014- .586 .441 -24.7% 2 0 0 0 0 0
15
Red Sox 2001- .528 .571 +8.1% 3 5 1 4 0 2 (2)
08
Red Sox 2011- .568 .491 -13.6% 1 0 0 0 0 0
12
Red Sox 2014- .599 .460 -23.2% 1 0 1 0 1 (1) 0
15
Cubs 2007- .478 .474 -0.8% 1 2 1 0 0 0
13
Reds 2000- .492 .462 -6.1% 1 0 1 0 0 0
08
Rockies 2001- .481 .473 -1.7% 1 2 0 1 0 1 (0)
11
Tigers 2008- .439 .525 +19.6% 1 4 1 3 1 (0) 1 (0)
15
Astros 2007- .542 .432 -20.3% 3 0 2 0 1 (0) 0
12
Angels 2011- .568 .538 -5.3% 3 1 1 0 0 0
15
Dodgers 1999- .505 .520 +3.0% 2 1 0 0 0 0
05
Dodgers 2012- .526 .562 +6.8% 2 3 2 1 0 0
15
Marlins 2012- .492 .428 -13.0% 0 0 0 0 0 0
14
Twins 2011- .548 .430 -21.5% 3 0 0 0 0 0
15
Mets 2005- .505 .514 +1.8% 2 1 2 1 1 (0) 0
40
The League Championship Series is the playoff series which takes place directly before the World Series.
41
“Before” denotes team performance in the number of seasons predating the signing of a player to a long-
term contract synonymous with the number of seasons after doing so.
11
Mets 2013- .457 .500 +9.4% 0 1 0 1 0 1 (0)
15
Yankees 2001- .540 .585 +8.3% 6 12 4 6 4 (4) 3 (1)
15
Phillies 2011- .563 .484 -14.0% 4 1 3 0 2 (1) 0
15
Giants 2007- .548 .515 -6.0% 3 3 1 3 1 (0) 3 (3)
15
Mariners 2013- .418 .481 +15.1% 0 0 0 0 0 0
15
Cardinals 2004- .532 .555 +4.3% 4 5 3 4 0 3 (2)
11
Rays 2012- .568 .523 -7.9% 3 1 1 0 1 (0) 0
15
Rangers 2001- .523 .444 -15.1% 2 0 0 0 0 0
03
Rangers 2014- .568 .478 -15.8% 1 1 0 0 0 0
15
Blue Jays 2008- .514 .506 -1.6% 0 0 0 0 0 0
10
Nationals 2011- .409 .548 +34.0% 0 2 0 0 0 0
15
Totals 16042 .522 .501 -4.0% 52 48 25 24 12 (6) 14 (8)
42
This number denotes the number of total teams that contained a long-term contract on its payroll. For
example, the New York Yankees employed such contracts from 2001 to 2015 and would thus be counted as
16 distinct teams.