DeCaro Understandingapplyingprinciples 2017
DeCaro Understandingapplyingprinciples 2017
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Synthesis, part of a Special Feature on Practicing Panarchy: Assessing Legal Flexibility, Ecological Resilience, and Adaptive
Governance in U.S. Regional Water Systems Experiencing Climate Change
ABSTRACT. Environmental governance systems are under greater pressure to adapt and to cope with increased social and ecological
uncertainty from stressors like climate change. We review principles of social cognition and decision making that shape and constrain
how environmental governance systems adapt. We focus primarily on the interplay between key decision makers in society and legal
systems. We argue that adaptive governance must overcome three cooperative dilemmas to facilitate adaptation: (1) encouraging
collaborative problem solving, (2) garnering social acceptance and commitment, and (3) cultivating a culture of trust and tolerance for
change and uncertainty. However, to do so governance systems must cope with biases in people’s decision making that cloud their
judgment and create conflict. These systems must also satisfy people’s fundamental needs for self-determination, fairness, and security,
ensuring that changes to environmental governance are perceived as legitimate, trustworthy, and acceptable. We discuss the implications
of these principles for common governance solutions (e.g., public participation, enforcement) and conclude with methodological
recommendations. We outline how scholars can investigate the social cognitive principles involved in cases of adaptive governance.
Key Words: adaptive governance; cognition; cooperation; environmental law; legitimacy; social decision making
1
Department of Urban and Public Affairs, Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of Louisville, 2Brandeis School of Law,
Department of Urban and Public Affairs, and Center for Land Use and Environmental Responsibility, University of Louisville, 3Department of
Urban and Public Affairs, University of Louisville, 4U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
proportional allocations, yearly planning) that give stakeholders one study on collaborative water governance, disagreement about
more autonomy and flexibility to tailor their solutions to what constituted a "watershed" (Step 1 Understanding) altered
emergent social-ecological conditions (Schlager and Heikkila the types of solutions that were considered (Step 2 Planning), and
2011). As another example, the federal U.S. Administrative this resulted in a less innovative, ecologically worse solution
Procedures Act, which governs government decision making and (Vreudenhill et al. 2010).
public engagement, could be amended to create more robust legal
We illustrate how cognitive and social cognitive biases can disrupt
supports for community-based governance and public-
the decision-making process to adversely affect adaptation. We
government collaboration (Bingham 2009, 2010). Finally,
also approach this analysis from the perspective of societal
environmental regulations could be updated periodically in light
cooperation. The idea of a complex cooperative dilemma captures
of new scientific findings (Clarvis et al. 2014, Craig and Ruhl
the fundamental social-psychological problem society faces when
2014).
dealing with major societal issues like climate change adaptation.
Social cognition This theoretical lens reveals relevant psychological processes
The success of solutions like these will hinge on multiple factors involved in society’s struggle for adaptive environmental
that affect readiness for change, cooperation, and compliance in governance.
societies (Dietz et al. 2003, Armitage 2007). We examine adaptive
environmental governance through a lens of social cognition (Lee SOCIETAL COOPERATION IN ADAPTIVE
and Harris 2013), cooperation (Parks et al. 2013), and decision GOVERNANCE
making (Cornforth 2009). From a social-psychological standpoint, the underlying problem
faced in adaptive environmental governance is one of cooperation
Governance systems are socially constructed, so their design, and coordination in a complex social dilemma (Dietz et al. 2003,
function, and performance are affected by social cognition and Armitage 2007). Social dilemmas are situations in which there are
decision making (e.g., Tyler 1990, Cornforth 2009). There are competing motivations, within oneself and the broader society,
many psychological analyses of environmentally responsible to pursue narrow self-interest versus the collective interest or
behavior (Kollmuss and Agyeman 2002, Cornforth 2009, Steg common good (Hardin 1968, Parks et al. 2013). This problem
and Vlek 2009), and some have focused on adaptation to climate contributes to the challenge of understanding, planning, and
change (Moser and Ekstrom 2010, Swim et al. 2011). However, managing (i.e., deciding) how to govern SESs.
few have considered psychological dimensions of adaptive
environmental law and governance (Castro 2012). Basic characteristics and challenges of societal cooperation have
been extensively described in social science (see Hardin 1968,
We highlight the social cognitive and decision-making aspects of Parks et al. 2013 for review). The purpose of the current article
adaptive environmental governance. We show how social systems is not to provide a detailed overview of cooperative decision
and processes, like news media, popular discourse, and group making in social dilemmas or discuss new ways to conduct
relations (e.g., prejudice, competition), interact with human cooperative studies (see, for example, Bowles 2008, Poteete et al.
psychology to shape adaptive governance. When legal innovations 2010, Anderies et al. 2011). Instead, by participating in the
are introduced, these mediating social systems debate and Adaptive Water Governance Project, which was a comprehensive
reinterpret them, fundamentally transforming their practical and legal study of six U.S. water basins (Cosens et al. 2014a), we
symbolic meaning (Silbey 1989). These alterations ultimately observed that some ecologists, policymakers, and legal scholars
affect social acceptance (Moghaddam 2008), implementation were unaware of core cooperative dilemmas involved in adaptive
(Castro and Batel 2008), and outcomes (Castro 2012). As will be environmental governance. By highlighting these dilemmas, we
shown, adaptive governance is also influenced by perceptions of draw much-needed attention to crucial dimensions of social
legitimacy (Tyler 2006) and fundamental social-psychological cognition and decision making that fundamentally shape adaptive
needs, such as security and procedural justice, i.e., decision- environmental governance.
making fairness (Sheldon et al. 2001, Tyler 2006).
Cooperative dilemmas have received considerable attention in
General decision making water governance (e.g., Schlager and Heikkila 2011, Larson et al.
To synthesize these concepts and understand how they influence 2013, Sarker 2013). However, few studies examine water
decision making in adaptive governance, we build on a framework governance from a legal-psychological standpoint. Doing so may
introduced by Moser and Ekstrom (2010). The framework reveal essential design features for adaptive environmental
outlines three general decision making steps that may be involved governance, because governance solutions need to be designed
in climate change adaptation: (1) understanding, (2) planning, with people’s psychological makeup in mind (e.g., Ostrom 1998,
and (3) managing. During understanding, decision makers Castro 2012, Parks et al. 2013).
initially define the problem and search for more information.
During planning, decision makers set goals and develop solutions Three cooperative challenges
to the problem, as currently defined. During management, Adaptive environmental governance poses at least three
decision makers implement and potentially monitor the chosen cooperative challenges that need to be addressed in legal and
solutions. institutional design: (1) encouraging collaborative problem
solving despite inherent conflict, (2) garnering social acceptance
These general steps help us to conceptualize when decisions may and commitment, and (3) cultivating a culture of tolerance for
go wrong. A decision can be stopped prematurely or conducted change and uncertainty, while improving legitimacy and helping
poorly at any step (Moser and Ekstrom 2010). For example, in to secure society through law and order.
Cognitive Principles
Mental Models Simplistic mental representations of complex problems can lead to inaccurate conclusions that adversely affect policy
design, cooperation, and compliance.
(A): Watershed systems and problems can be conceptualized, or framed, in multiple ways. These frames may be difficult to
reconcile and may focus attention on particular solutions, preventing consideration of other, more novel options.
(B): Simple mental models (e.g., equating greenhouse gases with pollution) influence policy and can lead to popular
misconceptions that reduce acceptance.
(C): Simple representations may lead to overly simple solutions, or panaceas.
Loss Aversion People’s natural aversion to losses can cause them to resist change, especially if the change is perceived (or framed) as a
loss of power, endowments, or lifestyle.
1
Primary source: Castro (2012).
The laws themselves are also sometimes designed around faulty relationships: for example, species protection (e.g., fish) can
mental models. Environmental law in the United States assumes sometimes override people’s needs (e.g., agricultural irrigation,
that SESs are simple linear systems, underestimating their industry). This issue has caused lawsuits that undermine
dynamism, interconnectedness, and uncertainty (Green et al. cooperation and stall multistakeholder negotiations (e.g., b et al.
2015). The Adaptive Water Governance Project identified this 2014a, Gunderson et al. 2014). Thus, scholars argue that the act
heuristic mental model as a major barrier to adaptation in many leads to piecemeal, maladaptive ecosystem management (Arnold
SESs (Ruhl 2011, Cosens et al. 2014a). For example, the U.S. and Gunderson 2013). Some policies lock in solutions indefinitely,
Endangered Species Act requires habitat protection for explicitly preventing change. The Prior Appropriation Doctrine
endangered species, but has been criticized for ignoring broader allocates specific amounts of water to existing users based on
ecosystem dynamics and other species in the ecosystem. The act historic water conditions. This policy is problematic because
has also been criticized for ignoring complex social issues and climate change has altered historic water patterns, and new
stakeholders and water uses have entered many watersheds (e.g., (Chaffin et al. 2014a). Experts disagree about how to define and
Benson et al. 2014). Other policies prevent government agencies measure resilience, the relative importance of social issues in
from responding to problems in a timely fashion. For example, resilience, and its ethical or normative implications for society.
the U.S federal Administrative Procedures Act and National Many overviews already exist (e.g., Davidson 2010, Cote and
Environmental Policy Act generally require extensive upfront Nightingale 2012), so we do not review the debate. However, this
judicial review, public engagement, and cost-benefit analysis problem is important, because it represents another cognitive
before agencies can test novel solutions to environmental issues barrier to adaptive governance (e.g., Gray et al. 2015).
(Craig and Ruhl 2014). These policies are based on unrealistic
expectations about the level of certainty decision makers can have Loss aversion
upfront, about complex SESs (Craig 2010, Sugihara et al. 2012). Loss aversion is another cognitive bias with potentially far-
reaching impacts on adaptation. Generally speaking, decision
Members of the general public, including news reporters and makers are loss averse: they dislike and avoid losses (Tversky and
policymakers, also have faulty mental models of SESs that impede Kahneman 1981, Kahneman 2003). Thus, loss aversion can be a
adaptation. According to Weber and Stern (2011), people have barrier to change when people perceive change as a loss
simplistic models of climate change. Laypersons wrongly equate (Kahneman 2003). Unfortunately, many environmentally
greenhouse gases like CO2, which contribute to global warming, responsible behaviors seem like a loss simply because they
with air pollutants that quickly disperse without human represent a departure from the status quo or involve personal
intervention. Laypersons also confuse localized weather events sacrifice (e.g., reducing water use; Winter 2000, Cornforth 2009).
with climate. For example, some may believe global warming is Environmental innovations can also be strategically portrayed as
false because of a recent cold-weather event (e.g., Moskowitz a loss for political gain (Weber and Stern 2011). For example,
2014). These misconceptions reduce the perceived need for long- Hardisty et al. (2010) demonstrated that political conservatives
term policy changes and undermine public support (Reynolds et in the United States (i.e., Republicans) tend to perceive taxes as
al. 2010). a loss. As a result, otherwise identical carbon mitigation policies
Additional problems with mental models arise because complex were viewed less favorably when they were called a carbon tax
issues can be interpreted or framed in different ways, and these instead of a carbon offset.
frames can be difficult to reconcile. For example, Arnold (2014) The barriers generated by loss aversion are more systemic than
identified 16 ways that watershed systems can be framed in simple framing. Lifestyles and power relationships are deeply
environmental law. Many of these frames contradict one another entrenched in society. Changes to environmental governance
(e.g., economic highways versus sacred places). This issue is often disrupt existing social structures, so any change in
problematic because contradictory watershed frames can increase environmental governance risks being seen as a loss of power
conflict (e.g., Chaffin et al. 2014b), hinder coordination (Kemp et al. 1998, Cote and Nightingale 2012), thereby increasing
(Vreudenhill et al. 2010), and stall important decisions at the resistance to change (e.g., Attari et al. 2009, Lavergne et al. 2010).
problem definition stage (Moser and Ekstrom 2010). Therefore, There are many cases in which government officials deliberately
reconciling competing mental models is often a crucial step in defied laws requiring public participation because they viewed
adaptive governance (e.g., Arnold 2014, Chaffin et al. 2014b; see participation as a loss of control (e.g., Arnstein 1969, Castro and
Ostrom 2005, Pahl-Wostl 2009 for discussion). Batel 2008, Marshall 2008). This problem occurred frequently in
Vreudenhill et al. (2010) illustrated how difficult it is to reconcile the water basins studied by the Adaptive Water Governance
mental models. They surveyed professionals involved in a river Project and contributed to poor social-ecological outcomes (e.g.,
project on the Netherlands’s Waal River, which was tasked to Arnold et al. 2014). These examples illustrate that loss aversion
address concerns ranging from flooding, economic vitality, and affects both government officials and the general public.
ecosystem restoration. They found that the professionals (e.g., Loss aversion is also embedded in legal systems. Specifically, the
hydrologists, geologists, planners) had different definitions of aforementioned lifestyle losses and losses of power represent
what constituted a watershed and different scale preferences for endowment effects, in which individuals avoid losing something
dealing with these problems. For example, some experts defined they possess (Kahneman 2003). Endowments effects are
a watershed strictly in terms of its hydrological characteristics entrenched in United States environmental law to stabilize
whereas others defined it into terms of its geographic or political economies and protect property rights (Doremus 2003, Korobkin
characteristics. They could not agree on an ideal scale to work 2003). Some of these legal provisions have been identified as
within (e.g., local vs. regional), so they turned to an ambiguous barriers to climate change adaptation (Doremus and Hanemann
law for guidance. The law stated that landowners are responsible 2007, Craig 2010). For example, as previously described, the U.
for maintaining discharges to the river. However, the law did not S. Prior Appropriation Doctrine gives historic water users first
clarify which landowners or their geographic location. They priority during water shortages. This provision protects senior
settled on local landowners, because this could be more easily claims on water, but also impedes necessary reform and
defended and would reduce the number of stakeholders involved, cooperation when new collaborative agreements and more flexible
simplifying the problem. However, this decision eliminated and inclusive water allocations are needed to address climate
superior, less costly, equally effective options further downstream, change (e.g., Huber 2011, Ruhl 2011, Schlager and Heikkila 2011,
and it precluded potentially helpful actors from participating, Arnold and Gunderson 2013, Benson et al. 2014).
which could cause problems in the future.
Leverage points
Similar problems arise with social-ecological resilience, a These cognitive biases cannot be solved easily and require more
foundational concept in adaptive environmental governance research to address. Therefore, rather than outline specific
solutions that are unlikely to succeed, we discuss potential 2016 for review). One way to counteract this issue may be to
concerns with a few of the most prominent solutions seen in the frankly communicate the need for new defaults, however
literature. challenging that may be (Moller et al. 2006). As previously
described, loss aversion is also incorporated into environmental
Individuals and governments often apply rigid and flawed mental
law (Doremus and Hanemann 2007). Reframing will not help
models to environmental policies and are averse to changes
these structural manifestations of loss aversion; they must be
(losses) in these policies. These biases often operate without
addressed with changes to the legal system itself (Craig 2010,
conscious awareness and interact with context (Winter 2000,
Huber 2011, Kosters and Van der Heijden 2015).
Swim et al. 2011). Unfortunately, many of the solutions proposed
by scholars in the cognitive and decision sciences fail to Thus, rigid mental models and loss aversion may be addressed
acknowledge the complex nature of SESs and instead emphasize with strategies targeting knowledge change, framing, and change
relatively simple solutions based on a few psychological principles in defaults. However, structural issues, and the potential for these
(see Poteete et al. 2010, Ostrom 2009 for discussion). strategies to be undermined, limit their effectiveness in isolation.
Compartmentalizing these problems in that way may not be Many of the problems outlined are amplified by shortcomings in
effective. social cognition. Thus, scholars of adaptive governance need to
also consider how social cognitive biases influence societal
Public education and social learning cooperation and receptiveness to adaptation.
Many solutions focus on the informational aspects of the problem
(e.g., Cornforth 2009, Weber and Stern 2011). It is assumed that SOCIAL COGNITIVE BIASES
if people were better informed about facts, then they would make The outlined cognitive biases increase people’s susceptibility to
better decisions, reconcile their mental models, and work well certain social cognitive biases (Table 1). These biases can
together (McKenzie-Mohr 2000). Two of the most common undermine cooperation and increase conflict over proposed
examples of this are environmental education campaigns (e.g., changes to environmental governance systems. Many of these
Weber and Stern 2011) and social learning (e.g., Ostrom 2005, biases are preyed upon by powerful stakeholders in society and
Beratan 2007), which places diverse stakeholders in direct amplified by social systems, reinforcing their detrimental effects
communication, so that they can learn from one another and on adaptation.
develop more trusting, cooperative relationships (Gerlack and
Heikkila 2011). Social framing effects
Weber and Stern (2011) described how people’s cognitive
We argue that these solutions are necessary but insufficient. limitations cause them to take social cognitive shortcuts that make
Knowledge is only one part of behavioral change and adaptation. it easier for them to be influenced by interest groups who oppose
For example, individuals may be knowledgeable, but not adaptive environmental governance, using strategic social frames.
motivated to adapt. They may not have sufficient economic, We extend that description by incorporating broader lessons from
organizational, or legal opportunities to alter their behavior, and social cognition.
adaptation may go against social norms (McKenzie-Mohr 2000,
Steg and Vlek 2009, Malone et al. 2013). Education and social At least three aspects of social cognition increase susceptibility
learning also pose practical challenges that reduce their to social framing. These mechanisms reinforce one another.
effectiveness, such as figuring out how to structure the social 1. To save time and cognitive resources, people look to their
learning process and how to properly educate and engage the accepted social groups for important information (Long
public (Monroe et al. 2008, Reed 2008, Gerlak and Heikkila 2011, 1958, Levine 1999). For instance, laypersons rely on popular
Leach et al. 2013). Information campaigns can also be distorted media coverage and respected figureheads in their
by powerful stakeholders in society (Weber and Stern 2011). ideological community (e.g., family, religious leaders,
Strategic framing politicians) to understand climate change (Weber 2010).
A popular solution for loss aversion is to subtly adjust default Unfortunately, these sources are often not scientific experts,
policy options and organizational settings toward more and they may be motivated to resist climate change policy
ecologically responsible defaults (Gattig and Hendrickx 2007, for political reasons (McCright et al. 2014).
Cornforth 2009). People tend to stick with default option settings 2. People feel threatened by information that contradicts their
because of loss aversion, status quo bias, and other reasons. worldview (Winter 2000), and they ignore or devalue
Changing these defaults to be more ecologically friendly could perspectives that contradict their beliefs (Nickerson 1998).
use people’s natural inclination for loss aversion to societal They also seek out similar others (in-groups) who share their
advantage, e.g., default thermostat settings, default social policies beliefs, further insulating and reinforcing those beliefs
(Thaler and Sustein 2008). Information could also be reframed (Abrams et al. 1990, Wood et al. 1996). Thus, erroneous
to mask potential losses and emphasize other dimensions of the mental models are socially reinforced and difficult to change
issue, potentially reducing loss aversion, e.g., portraying carbon (Stern and Easterling 1999, Sunstein 2000).
taxes as carbon offsets (Hardisty et al. 2009).
3. Laypeople use cognitive shortcuts to understand
These strategies may help. However, recent research indicates that probabilities, such as the perceived likelihood that an
defaults tend to be scrutinized in broader public discourse and environmental catastrophe is imminent. These subjective
are resisted as secretive, manipulative, and circumventing probability estimates are easily distorted by extraneous
legitimate democratic processes, undermining trust and information, like the emotional labels used to describe
cooperation (e.g., Yee 2012; see Leonard 2008, Jung and Mellers important events and how often they are discussed in the
media (Lichtenstein et al. 1978, Loewenstein et al. 2001, government officials in Lisbon used this strategy to circumvent a
Kahneman 2003). For example, imbalanced coverage of UN directive to involve the public in urban planning projects. They
fringe scientific beliefs can distort public perceptions of agreed with democratic participation in principle but argued that
environmental trends, like the cause and effects of climate their citizens were not knowledgeable, interested, or democratic
change (Weber and Stern 2011). enough to participate.
Legal innovation can also be undercut by equivocation (Castro
2012). For example, because the UN Directive did not clarify
Climate change framing “adequate participation,” Lisbon government officials were able
As just one example, climate change can be strategically framed to use very minimal forms of public engagement (e.g., public
to evoke an emotional response and to distort facts for political hearings), which maintained their decision-making control, and
purposes, discouraging societal support for adaptive say that they satisfied the directive (Castro and Batel 2008). This
environmental policies. According to a review by Weber and Stern type of rationalization occurs frequently in environmental
(2011), when news outlets cover climate change, they focus on governance (e.g., Clement 2010, National Civic League 2013) and
controversial issues and provocative events. They also use is a common barrier to public participation in adaptive water
emotional labels and feature fringe guests who have extreme governance (e.g., Arnold et al. 2014, DeCaro et al. 2017), as
beliefs to increase their viewership and attempt to show all sides previously noted in our discussion of government reliance on
of an argument (see also Boykoff and Boykoff 2004). As a result, centralization and principles of rational choice theory (Marshall
important issues are presented in emotional terms with a 2008, Ostrom 2010).
disproportionate emphasis on climate change skepticism.
Symbolic policy
U.S. news media inadvertently give interest groups who oppose
Another social cognitive barrier to adaptive governance is
new environmental policies an ideal platform to undermine
symbolic policy activity. Symbolic policies often arise because of
societal cooperation (Lever-Tracy 2010, Farrell 2016). For
competition among interest groups for political influence and
example, conservative political leaders routinely frame
economic resources (Edelman 1960, 1985, Meyer and Rowan
environmental policies negatively, preying on the public’s
1977). These symbolic policies are designed to improve one’s public
cognitive biases. They pit environmental responsibility against
image and mobilize constituents, without making substantive
economic security, strategically portraying climate change
policy contributions. For example, many governmental and
adaptation as a loss, for example: sustainability versus jobs
commercial actors in the U.S. National Estuary Program
(Schlichting 2013). They use emotional labels like “the war on
symbolically participate in collaborative programs, without
coal” (McGinley 2011, Smith 2012) to frighten and anger their
making any substantive contribution to policy or adaptive
social supporters, strategically mobilizing them against climate
ecosystem management (see also Lubell et al. 2010, Westphal and
change policy (see Edelman 1960, Bauer and Gaskell 2008
Zajac 2013). Similarly, many U.S. municipalities join climate
generally).
protection networks and espouse goals to reduce greenhouse gas
Popular misconceptions about climate change spread by the emissions, but few implement actual policies (Krause 2011).
media and further amplified by people’s social networks have Symbolic policy was also identified as a problem by environmental
polarized U.S. environmental politics (Weber and Stern 2011, groups in the U.S.’s Anacostia River system, which claimed that
McCright et al. 2014). According to Gallup polls, the public several green urban development projects (e.g., a LEED certified
generally agreed with the scientific community’s concern for sports stadium) were merely symbolic gestures (Arnold et al. 2014).
climate change in 1997 but began to diverge along conservative
versus liberal political party lines in 2001, creating a large Leverage points
bipartisan gap (Dunlap and McCright 2010). This pattern Some social scientists have suggested using social framing effects
coincides with documented political lobbying and financial to societal advantage by portraying environmental policies and
support from opposition leaders in major oil and gas companies, governance systems in ways that will mobilize stakeholder groups
religious groups, and powerful conservatives (Schlichting 2013, to support adaptation (e.g., Thaler and Sustein 2008, Cornforth
Stoknes 2014, Farrell 2016). Hence, political affiliation (in-group 2009). However, strategic social framing appears to be unreliable
bias) now reliably predicts support for environmental policy by itself. This approach is backfiring in U.S. discourse, for example,
innovation (e.g., Gromet et al. 2013). regarding climate change policy. Both sides of the argument in U.
S. politics have been engaging in social framing for decades, and
Social representations the general public is more polarized than ever (Dunlap and
Similar to framing effects, Castro (2012) described several specific McCright 2010). Political posturing can undermine credibility and
social representations (Moscovici 1988), or societal interpretations trust, and enflame conflict (Jung and Mellers 2016), undermining
of environmental law, that people commonly use to subtly cooperation (Tyler 2006). More specifically, social representations
undercut legal innovations in environmental governance. are inherent to social discourse (Levine 1999), so social frames are
always open to counter debate and reframing (Castro 2012).
For example, people can agree with legal innovations in principle
but disagree with concrete instances of their application (agreeing Symbolic policy is an impediment to real change in adaptive
in principle). This behavior allows actors to simultaneously governance and should be avoided (e.g., Lubell 2004, Lubell et al.
support legal innovations they ultimately oppose, disguising their 2010, Arnold et al. 2014). However, most policy activity is nuanced,
noncompliance. Landowners often agree with protecting involving both genuine and symbolic elements. It is important to
biodiversity (e.g., Endangered Species Act), but object to having recognize this contingency. For example, ecological restoration
restrictions on their own land (Opotow and Brook 2003, Castro projects are sometimes used both to build symbolic support and
and Mouro 2011). Castro and Batel (2008) described how improve ecosystems (Berrone et al. 2009, Kim and Lyon 2013). In
addition, cooperative activities that seem symbolic can actually dimensions of human governance and are central drivers of
yield important indirect social benefits like trust, acceptance, and human motivation and decision making (Deci and Ryan 1987,
social learning (e.g., Leach et al. 2013). Trust can smooth policy 2000, Tyler 2006, van Prooijen 2009, Leotti et al. 2010).
deliberations, helping parties endure contentious negotiations
Procedural justice is the perception that decision-making
long enough to reach tangible agreements that improve ecological
procedures are fair and support one’s political voice or decision-
conditions (Leach and Sabatier 2005, Chaffin et al. 2014b; see
making control (Tyler 2006, Colquitt 2001). Self-determination
Kenney 2000 for discussion). Finally, novel solutions can take
refers to being able to pursue goals in ways that align with one’s
decades to produce tangible results (e.g., Birgé et al. 2014, Chaffin
core values and support one’s sense of agency (Ryan and Deci
et al. 2014b).
2006). Security refers to predictability and orderliness (Sheldon
People desire fairness, transparency, and consistency from et al. 2001), which is necessary for long-term planning and
government, especially on issues of conflict and uncertainty coordination (Ostrom 1990, Craig et al. 2017). Security also
(Tyler 2006). Therefore, regardless of how treacherous it may influences commitment, because people often do not want to obey
seem, there may be no substitute for genuine public discourse and rules or cooperate with others when they think others can exploit
open communication about proposed legal innovations and other them or disobey rules with impunity (Hardin 1968, Ostrom 1990,
solutions. Public discourse may be especially necessary if society Milinski and Semmann 2002).
values democracy and cooperative problem solving (Ostrom 1971,
When governance systems satisfy these fundamental needs,
Shivakumar 2005), or regards democracy and cooperation as
perceptions of legitimacy and subsequent trust, social acceptance,
essential elements of adaptive governance (Dietz et al. 2003, Pahl-
and internalized motivation tend to increase (Tyler 2006, Frey et
Wostl 2009).
al. 2004, Deci and Ryan 1987, 2000). Internalized motivation and
LEGITIMACY, TRUST, AND FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL- social acceptance are important because they promote voluntary
PSYCHOLOGICAL NEEDS compliance and more sustainable cooperation (Pelletier 2002,
Legitimacy plays a central role in governance. A government or DeCaro et al. 2015).
social policy that is viewed as legitimate builds trust, facilitates Participatory democracy
cooperation and rule compliance, and helps smooth contested Participatory democracy (participation) is fundamental to
social dilemmas (DeCremer and Tyler 2005, Tyler 2006). For legitimacy (Tyler 2006) and may be essential to adaptive
example, Tyler and Degoey (1995) found that perceived legitimacy environmental governance (von Korff et al. 2010, Cosens 2013).
and trust in government officials predicted compliance with water Participatory practices include stakeholders in the feedback,
conservation restrictions in California, USA during a drought. design, decision making, or implementation of governance
Similarly, Leach and Sabatier (2005) reported that perceived systems. Participation can promote cooperation and improve
legitimacy and trust smoothed negotiations concerning a ecological outcomes by satisfying fundamental needs for
contentious water policy, improving policy outcomes (see also procedural justice and self-determination, which encourage
Syme et al. 1999). policy acceptance and internalized motivation (e.g., Leach and
Legitimacy and trust may be especially important for adaptive Sabatier 2005, Lavergne et al. 2010, McComas et al. 2011; see
governance (Ostrom 1998, Cosens 2013). Trust helps society Frey et al. 2004, DeCaro and Stokes 2008, 2013 for review). When
endure contentious and uncertain situations, and people look to properly implemented, participation can also facilitate social
legitimate governance systems for reassurance during crisis and learning (Pahl-Wostl 2009, Leach et al. 2013), diversity (Reed
transformation (Tyler 2006). Legitimacy helps people cope with 2008, Huitema et al. 2009), and social-ecological fit (DeCaro and
stressors during adaptation, maintaining a sense of order and Stokes 2013), which are major components of adaptive
stability amid change (Craig et al. 2017, see also Lind and van governance systems (Marshall 2008, Ruhl 2011). Participatory
den Bos 2002). processes can also increase transparency and accountability,
improving security, compliance, and environmental justice
Participatory and regulatory aspects of governance, like voting, (Ostrom 1990, Bullard and Johnson 2000). Clear communication,
deliberation, monitoring, and enforcement, influence perceptions combined with fair and transparent participation in governance,
of legitimacy and subsequent cooperation (Tyler 1990, 2006, can reassure societal stakeholders during difficult times and help
Ostrom 1998, DeCaro et al. 2015). However, these features are build a sense of security and trust needed to cope with change
complex and can easily backfire (e.g., Bowles 2008, Reed 2008). constructively (e.g., Tyler 2006, McComas et al. 2011, Cosens
Careful consideration of fundamental needs can help clarify when 2013, Craig et al. 2017).
and why governance interventions backfire, potentially improving
institutional design (Tyler 1990, Frey et al. 2004, Moller et al. However, participation can also backfire, reinforcing power
2006). We describe the relationship among legitimacy, trust, and inequities in society and generally undermining the potential
fundamental needs to demonstrate important motivational benefits through misapplication (e.g., Chess and Purcell 1999,
constraints on participatory and regulatory mechanisms, which Irvin and Stansbury 2004, Turnhout et al. 2010) and outright
may affect the legitimacy and acceptance of adaptive manipulation (e.g., Arnstein 1969, Clement 2010). Some of these
environmental governance systems. problems occur because participatory processes are extremely
complex (Fung 2006, Margerum 2008). Designing and properly
Procedural justice, self-determination, and security implementing participatory processes is not a simple task (Chess
Fundamental social-psychological needs for procedural justice and Purcell 1999, van Korff et al. 2010). Many factors affect
(Tyler 2006), self-determination (Moller et al. 2006), and security participatory democracy (Reed 2008), including social cognitive
(Hobbes 1651/1909, Ostrom 1998) strongly influence legitimacy, constraints.
trust, and cooperation. These fundamental needs represent core
DeCaro and Stokes (2008, 2013) reviewed case studies of and Hychka 2015; see DeCaro and Stokes 2013 for review). It
environmental governance from the standpoint of fundamental may be necessary to use multiple types of participation to satisfy
needs, legitimacy, and cooperation. They demonstrated that different stakeholders and address new needs that arise during
government officials and scholars underestimate the social different stages of participation. Planning and design pose
cognitive complexities involved in participation, contributing to its different participatory challenges than implementation and
misapplication. For example, there is a popular misconception that conflict resolution for instance (Howard 2010, von Korff et al.
specific types of participation (e.g., deliberative democracy) are 2010).
superior and generate the same perceptions of procedural justice
Some legal scholars have started to envision legal frameworks to
and self-determination regardless of culture or context (e.g.,
improve participatory processes and facilitate adaptive
Arnstein 1969, Hunt and Haider 2001). This misconception results
governance. Cosens (2013) discusses principles of legitimacy in
in overly simple solutions and over application of specific solutions
U.S. administrative law, suggesting that government agencies seek
(Ostrom 2009, Adams and Hulme 2001), which ultimately
to increase their (1) evidence-based legitimacy, by basing decisions
undermines legitimacy (DeCaro and Stokes 2013). Some
on sound science, (2) order-based legitimacy, by increasing
government officials fear losing control (Bailey and Grossardt
transparency, (3) systemic legitimacy, by creating reasonable
2010). Other officials believe that participatory processes are all
checks and balances among government agencies and procedures,
interchangeable (e.g., Castro and Batel 2008), ignoring their
and (4) procedural legitimacy, by increasing public participation
essential differences (Reed 2008). This inaccuracy leads to
and communication (see also Esty 2006).
superficial participation and exploitation (e.g., National Civic
League 2013). Bingham (2009, 2010) and the National Civic League have drafted
proposed amendments to the U.S. Administrative Procedures Act
The U.S. administrative legal system was reformed to correct
and city charters, which may address order, systemic, and
serious shortcomings in participatory democracy (Arstein 1969,
procedural aspects of legitimacy. Specifically, the amendments
Bingham et al. 2005), including environmental injustice (Bullard
(1) broaden and clarify what constitutes adequate participation
and Johnson 2000, Cosens 2013). However, these problems still
and (2) create an official liaison to facilitate public participation
largely exist because they are systemic. Structural inequities and
and train government employees. These provisions may prevent
popular misconceptions about participation are built into
and correct many of the problems we have identified with
governance systems and implemented in everyday practice (e.g.
ambiguity and superficial participation.
Arnold 2004, Shilling et al. 2009, National Civic League 2013).
Problems with participatory democracy were major barriers to Craig and Ruhl (2014) also outlined amendments to the U.S.
adaptive governance and positive ecological outcomes in every Administrative Procedures Act. Their amendments give
basin studied by the Adaptive Water Governance Project, such as government agencies more flexibility to make adaptive decisions,
the Anacostia (Arnold et al. 2014), Columbia (Cosens and Fremier without sacrificing public engagement. If these amendments are
2014), and Klamath (Chaffin et al. 2014b). combined with Bingham’s (2009, 2010) amendments, they may
reduce agency fear of public involvement, encouraging better
Leverage points public engagement. Specifically, instead of undergoing constant
Several aspects of participation influence subjective perceptions of external judicial review and public scrutiny, which has been
procedural justice and self-determination, such as transparency, identified as a barrier to agency experimentation and adaptation
neutrality (nonbias), timeliness, honesty, voice and choice or (e.g., Gunderson et al. 2014), agencies would be reviewed
“inclusiveness,” rationales, and opportunity for appeal or periodically (e.g., every three to five years), giving them time to
“accountability” (Tyler 1988, Lawrence et al. 1997, Moller et al. test different solutions and develop better understanding of
2006). These factors can interact, are affected by context, and may complex problems. Similar solutions emerged in some U.S.
change throughout the life of a social-ecological dilemma (e.g., watersheds (e.g., Columbia River, Cosens and Fremier 2014) and
Howard 2010). Therefore, we recommend that government officials community-based governance systems with overall positive
and scholars take an adaptive approach to both the design and outcomes (e.g., Ostrom 1990, 2014), providing preliminary
study of participatory processes (von Korff et al. 2010, Munarreto support for this approach.
et al. 2014). This approach should include assessments of social-
ecological conditions and perceptions to guide adaptation and Regulatory systems
ensure proper fit (DeCaro and Stokes 2013). Regulatory systems (e.g., monitoring, enforcement) are
commonly used to ensure security and encourage cooperation
For example, Turner et al. (2014) interviewed approximately 70
(Hardin 1968, Rachlinski 1999). Credible safeguards against
households from 12 reef-dependent communities in the Caribbean.
uncooperative behavior are needed to protect conservation
They found that perceptions of legitimacy, inclusiveness,
agreements and enforce rules (Hardin 1968). Enforcement can
accountability, and other factors (e.g., fair enforcement) differed
facilitate trust (Ostrom 1990, 1998) and increase rule compliance,
across communities based on specific elements of participatory
by deterring defectors and creating a safer, more secure
democracy, enforcement, planning, and decision making. These
environment for cooperators to thrive, without being exploited
differences highlighted potential areas for improvement for specific
by others (Yamagishi 1986, Gächter 2007, Rustagi et al. 2010).
communities, like increased devolution of control and involvement
Effective and appropriate enforcement can, therefore, increase the
of NGOs to facilitate collaborations (see also, Sarkki et al. 2015).
perceived legitimacy of governance systems (Tyler 1990, 2006).
Additional improvements may be identified by assessing
Indeed, most environmental governance systems have some kind
stakeholder perceptions and preferences for particular types of
of regulatory system to encourage cooperation (e.g., Cox et al.
participation (e.g., Chase et al. 2002, Luyet et al. 2012, Druschke
2010, Heikkila et al. 2011, Sutinen and Kuperan 1999). Hence,
regulatory activities, like monitoring and enforcement (e.g., when chosen by election and participatory design, than when
financial penalties), are fundamental aspects of environmental imposed. Sinner and Salmon (2003) described a case (Convery
governance and are important to adaptive governance (Dietz et and McDonnell 2003) in which the Irish Government sought to
al. 2003, Marshall 2008). introduce a levy on plastic bags to improve natural scenic
conditions and support ecotourism. Some storeowners initially
However, regulatory systems can also backfire. Regulatory
opposed the levy, because they feared it would overburden
systems can increase conflict and decrease cooperation (e.g.,
customers and be perceived as distasteful. Government responded
Peluso 1993), if they are perceived as coercive, improper, or unfair
by consulting storeowners, revising the policy (e.g., to include
(Tyler 1990). Regulations can also decrease intrinsic, voluntary
exceptions for particular goods), and educating the general public
forms of cooperation that are essential to long-term
on rationales for the levy. These steps increased policy acceptance
environmental governance (Bowles 2008, Frey et al. 2004).
and subsequent cooperation for the levy, and they reflect several
Voluntary motivations for cooperating, like moral obligation and
dimensions of procedural justice and self-determination
belief in the inherent importance of an environmental policy, are
(Lawrence et al. 1997, Moller et al. 2006). An analogous policy
important because it is not possible to perfectly monitor resource
situation is currently underway in the U.S. Anacostia River
systems or enforce environmental policies (Sutinen and Kuperan
(Brittain and Rich 2015).
1999). Moreover, complex social-ecological dilemmas often
require some voluntary effort for stakeholders to overcome DeCaro et al. (2015) also proposed that regulatory systems be
setbacks, solve emergent problems, and persist despite personal used to empower stakeholders by helping them reach shared goals
cost (DeCaro and Stokes 2008, Ostrom 2000, 2014). and not simply to force compliance. Specifically, their results
suggested that having the ability to enforce rules that were chosen
Several psychological processes may be involved when regulations
by the group was empowering, whereas enforcing rules that were
are counterproductive (Bowles 2008, DeCaro et al. 2015).
imposed externally seemed unjustified and illegitimate, or
Regulatory systems can: (1) signal distrust encouraging
oppressive (see also Tyler 1990). Ostrom (1990, 2000) further
stakeholders to behave uncooperatively (Mulder et al. 2006); (2)
argued that effective regulatory systems incorporate components
reframe formerly moral obligations (doing what is right) as
of restorative justice, which educate and rehabilitate rule
economic transactions, making more voluntary ethical behavior
violators, helping build community and develop trust (see also
optional, or seem like a purchasable service (Tenbrunsel and
van Ness et al. 2013).
Messick 1999); (3) make stakeholders dependent on enforcement
by convincing them that others are cooperating only because they Supporting this idea, Ostrom’s (1990, 2010) analysis of
fear punishment (Chen et al. 2009); and (4) undermine self- community-based governance systems demonstrates that
determination, creating active resistance and reducing intrinsic effective regulatory systems often co-occur with participatory
motivation (Brehm and Brehm 1981, Moller et al. 2006). processes and are rarely introduced without endorsement by the
governed (see also Cox et al. 2010). They also used graduated
Leverage points sanctioning systems, in which punishments increased in severity
The primary behavioral challenge in designing regulatory systems with each violation, beginning with a warning, education, and
is to discourage defectors without undermining more internal open dialogue (see also, Dollar and Ray 2015). Similar approaches
motivations, or increasing conflict (Bowles 2008). It is therefore have been successful at larger scales, for example, with river
important to ensure security without threatening fundamental compacts and treaties (Schlager et al. 2012) and complex
needs for procedural justice and self-determination (DeCaro et polycentric irrigation networks spanning local, regional, and
al. 2015). One way to do this is to allow stakeholders to participate national governance (Sarker 2013).
in the design of rules and their enforcement. Doing so helps to
justify or legitimize regulatory systems (Tyler 1990, 2006), After analyzing interstate river compacts in Western U.S. basins,
preserving underlying fundamental needs and cooperative Schlager and Heikkilla (2011) concluded that state governments
motivations (see DeCaro et al. 2015 for review). need to be proactive in supporting multistakeholder decision
making, monitoring, and enforcement, to increase cooperation
For example, in an experimental test, DeCaro et al. (2015) found and compliance. Furthermore, more effective conflict resolution
that monitoring and enforcement (i.e., economic fines) had mechanisms are needed to mitigate serious disputes and maintain
different effects on cooperative motivations and performance, cooperative ties (see also Ostrom 1965, 1994). Stakeholders in
depending on whether groups voted on conservation rules (voted- interstate water agreements may resolve disputes more
enforce group), or had the same rules imposed on them without cooperatively when there are voluntary mechanisms for conflict
a vote (imposed-enforce group). In particular, compared to resolution, in addition to courts (Leach and Sabatier 2005,
groups that had rules imposed on them, groups that voted and Schlager et al. 2012).
could enforce had higher perceptions of procedural justice and
self-determination, security, group cohesion, rule acceptance, and The examples illustrate that fundamental needs play a pivotal role
internalized motivation. The voted-enforce group also cooperated in effective participatory and regulatory processes underlying
better and conserved a limited resource longer, even after adaptive governance. These examples also highlight the
enforcement was later removed (see Epstein 2017 for a replication importance of social cognitive constraints, such as legitimacy, on
study involving 93 real-world forest user groups). democratic decision making and enforcement. Laws targeting
participatory democracy and enforcement must be based on
Similarly, many case studies (e.g., Ostrom 1990, Cox et al. 2010) sound principles of social cognition and governance, to ensure
and experiments (e.g., Tyran and Feld 2006, Markussen et al. they accomplish their intended aims of facilitating adaptive
2014, Hilbe et al. 2014) find that enforcement is more effective governance.
Finally, during stabilization, these legal changes may be In-depth social cognitive analysis, using stakeholder interviews and
sufficiently entrenched in society’s norms and governance systems surveys, could help clarify how these processes unfold (e.g., Kubo
to become common knowledge and practice. However, they will and Supriyanto 2010, McComas et al. 2011, Castro 2012, Turner
continue to be contested by certain groups and remain open to et al. 2014). For example, why did the Settlement Group choose to
reframing and re-emergence. These processes are also open to cooperate despite substantial legal barriers and social conflict,
investigation from an integrative standpoint. which were also faced in the Florida Everglades? It would also be
useful to assess how perceptions of procedural justice, self-
Integrative case studies determination, and legitimacy influenced the creation of
To better understand underlying cognitive and social cognitive potentially transformative agreements, like the 2010 Klamath River
decision-making factors involved in adaptive governance, we Restoration Agreement (e.g., Leach and Sabatier 2005, DeCaro and
propose that scholars use Castro’s (2006, 2012) stages of legal Stokes 2013).
innovation framework to guide their case studies. For example,
scholars in the Adaptive Water Governance Project (Cosens et al. Social policy experiments
2014a) could revisit their cases to investigate how cooperation Each of the principles discussed poses unique barriers to adaptive
and adaptation may have been influenced by each of the principles governance. These principles also have context-specific aspects,
discussed (Table 1). We suggest that scholars focus on the pivotal which will require additional scientific understanding and on-the-
events in each basin, highlighting particularly crucial turning ground practical experimentation to fully understand. Thus, rather
points and their potential social cognitive factors. Future research than propose prespecified solutions that are likely to fail out of
can also consider how the three cooperative themes we identified context, we advocate for more rigorous social policy
are impacted: social acceptance, collaborative problem-solving, experimentation (see also, McKenzie-Mohr 2000, Moser and
and societal tolerance for change. Such an approach would clarify Ekstrom 2010). Craig and Ruhl’s (2014) model amendments to U.
the social dynamics of adaptation and generate integrative S. federal Administrative Procedures Act are one example. These
hypotheses for future research. amendments give government agencies more authority to test
alternative ecosystem management approaches. However,
For example, the Florida Everglades have seen decades of
experimentation needs to be much broader.
litigation over who is responsible for past mistakes and who has
legal jurisdiction to manage the system, i.e., federal or state In the United States, President Obama issued an Executive Order
government. This litigation has undermined broad-scale (White House, Office of the Press Secretary 2015) establishing a
cooperation and hindered experimental approaches to ecosystem Social and Behavioral Science Team to study behavioral
management. This stagnation is partially caused by excessive foundations of public policy. In addition, some municipalities and
external judicial and public review required by statutes like the U. regional governments have adopted McKenzie-Mohr’s (2000,
S. Administrative Procedures Act and National Environmental 2013) community-based social marketing (CBSM) approach to test
Policy Act (Gunderson et al. 2014). The conflict could be new environmental policies, with positive environmental outcomes
reassessed from a social cognitive decision-making perspective, (e.g., Sinner and Salmon 2003, Felson and Pickett 2005). In CBSM,
identifying mental models, social frames, issues of participatory policymakers and scientists identify specific behaviors to promote
democracy and regulation, and other factors that may be or discourage and then research key cognitive and social cognitive
responsible for such sustained cooperative failure. It would also decision-making barriers. Afterward, they design preliminary
be informative to contrast cases like this one with instances in solutions and pilot test these at smaller scales. Finally, they revise
which stakeholders were more cooperative. and generalize the solutions to broader scales, with continued
assessment.
In the Klamath River basin (Chaffin et al. 2014b), several years
of litigation and negotiations ensued over changing historic water These approaches seem synonymous with adaptive governance
user rights to adapt to climate change. However, after (Chaffin et al. 2014a) and should probably become the norm for
experiencing years of prolonged cooperative failure, some of the both societal problem solving (Fairweather and Davidson 1986)
embattled stakeholders decided to communicate about the and water governance (von Korff et al. 2010, Pahl-Wostl et al. 2010,
dilemma more broadly, discussing goals and potential areas of Cookey et al. 2016).
common ground to manage the basin cooperatively (Settlement
Group). In 2010, the group drafted a Klamath Basin Restoration Civic education, leadership, and media
Agreement to improve cooperation, reallocate scarce water Leadership is also vital for adaptation (Westley et al. 2011, 2013).
resources, and restore river habitat for protected species. During We encourage formal governments, professional societies, and
this process, groups engaged in social representations, contesting leaders in the general public (e.g., grassroots organizations) to
and renegotiating the meaning and function of the existing laws engage in more direct and frank public education and advocacy.
and current governance systems; they also protested restrictive Members of society must be knowledgeable about adaptive
participatory processes, seeking more inclusive, subjectively fair governance: what it is, why it is necessary, and its challenges. Such
ways to influence critical decisions (see Ostrom 1965, Arnold 2014 education will enable individuals to (1) better tolerate the
for analogous cases). These processes are still unfolding, and the uncertainty and conflict associated with adaptation and (2)
future of governance in the Klamath is still unknown (Chaffin et constructively participate in adaptive governance. Failure to
al. 2014b). However, by studying these kinds of processes as they sufficiently grasp the core principles of adaptive governance (e.g.,
unfold, we may develop a better understanding of the bridges and complexity, uncertainty, self-organization, and cooperative
barriers that influence societal cooperation and adaptive problem-solving) may be the single most important psychological
governance. barrier to adaptive governance (e.g., (Ostrom 1998, Shivakumar
2005, Chokshi 2016).
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transparency, accountability, inclusiveness, and fairness (Chaffin Castillo, M.-C. Lopez, R. Tobias, B. Vollan, and A. Wutich. 2011.
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