H U M A N R I G H T S A N D H U M A N I TA R I A N I N T E RV E N T I O N 309

only in attempts to use international law, albeit usually ‘soft’ law, to set standards
for the behaviour of states, but also in attempts to strengthen regional and global
governance (see p. 455) and thereby constrain, or perhaps redefine the nature of,
state sovereignty. However, despite the strengthening of human rights law and
increased interest in cosmopolitan thinking in general and human rights think-
ing in particular, the theoretical implications of human rights are counter-
balanced by powerful practical and sometimes moral considerations. This makes
the protection of human rights a complex and often difficult process.

Protecting human rights

The human rights regime
Since 1948, an elaborate international regime (see p. 67) has developed to
promote and protect human rights globally. At the heart of this regime contin-
ues to stand the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Although the 1945
UN Charter urged the promotion of ‘universal respect for, and observation of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’, it failed to specify the human
rights that states had to guarantee and respect. This defect was rectified by the
UN Declaration. Although the UN Declaration is not a legally binding treaty, it
is commonly seen as a form of customary international law that is used as a tool
to apply diplomatic and moral pressure to governments that violate any of its
articles. By establishing that states could no longer violate human rights without
the risk that their actions would come onto the agenda of the principal organs
of the UN, the Declaration challenged states’ exclusive jurisdiction over their
own citizens and weakened the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs.
The incorporation of the Declaration into a legally-binding codification of
human rights – in effect, human rights law – was achieved through the adoption
in 1966 of the international covenants on Civil and Political Rights and
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Collectively, the 1948 Declaration and the
two covenants are commonly referred to as the ‘International Bill of Human
Rights’.
Until the mid-1960s, the UN concentrated almost exclusively on the genera-
tion of human rights norms and standards. Subsequently, it placed greater
emphasis on their implementation. A major step in this direction was taken by
the establishment of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights, which had been one of the key proposals of the 1993 World Conference
on Human Rights in Vienna. The role of the High Commissioner is to promote
worldwide respect for the human rights enshrined in international laws by
supporting the bodies created by human rights treaties. However, the Office of
the High Commissioner has proved to be more effective in highlighting human
rights violations than it has been in enforcing human rights law. As its main
sanction remains the publication and denunciation of violations by individual
states – that is, naming and shaming – the Office relies very largely on persua-
sion and observation to improve governments’ human rights policies. The UN’s
47-member Human Rights Council, which replaced the much criticized UN
Human Rights Commission in 2006, also addresses situations of human rights
violations. However, it has no authority other than to make recommendations to
the General Assembly which, in turn, can only advise the Security Council. It has
310 GLOBAL POLITICS

A P P ROAC H E S TO . . .

HUMAN RIGHTS
Realist view implicit contract between the people and government,
Realists have tended to view a concern with human entitling citizens to rebel. The English, American and
rights as, at best, a ‘soft’ issue in international affairs, by French revolutions were all justified using such ideas.
contrast with ‘hard’, or ‘core’, concerns such as the During the twentieth century, liberals increasingly used
pursuit of security and prosperity. Other realists go such thinking to outline the basis for international
further and believe that human rights thinking in rela- legitimacy, arguing that states should be bound, prefer-
tion to international and global issues is entirely ably legally, to uphold human rights in their dealings
wrong-headed. This is because realists hold that it is with their domestic population as well as with other
impossible, and undesirable, to view international poli- states. The 1948 UN Declaration therefore has, for
tics in moral terms. Morality and the national interest liberals, a near-religious significance. Nevertheless,
are two distinct things, and states fail adequately to liberals tend to regard only civil and political rights as
serve their own citizens (and often those of other fundamental rights, and sometimes view economic
states) when they allow ethical considerations – partic- rights and any conception of group rights with grave
ularly ones as inherently vague and confused as human suspicion.
rights – to affect their behaviour. Realist objections to
the culture of human rights have at least three bases. In Critical views
the first place, they take issue with the essentially opti- Critical approaches to human rights have either tended
mistic model of human nature that underpins human to revise or recast the traditional, liberal view of
rights, which emphasizes dignity, respect and rational- human rights, or they have been openly hostile to the
ity. Second, realists are primarily concerned about idea itself. The global justice movement has used
collective behaviour, and especially the capacity of the economic and social rights as the basis of calls for a
state to ensure order and stability for their citizens. The radical redistribution of power and resources, both
national interest should therefore take precedence over within countries and between them (Shue 1996; Pogge
any individually-based conception of morality. Third, 2008). Human rights have thus been turned into a
being based on positivism, realism is keen to uphold its doctrine of global social justice, grounded in moral
scientific credentials. This implies a concern with what cosmopolitanism. Feminists, for their part, have
is, rather than with what should be. demonstrated a growing interest in the cause of human
rights. In particular, they have sought to transform the
Liberal view concept and practice of human rights to take better
The modern doctrine of human rights is very largely a account of women’s lives, highlighting the issues of
product of liberal political philosophy. Indeed, so ‘women’s human rights’ (Friedman 1995). This marks a
entangled with liberal assumptions are they that some recognition by feminist activists of the power of the
doubt whether human rights can ever properly be international human rights framework, and especially
described as ‘above’ ideological differences, bearing the its capacity to place women’s issues on mainstream
cultural imprint of western liberalism. At a philosophi- agendas. Human rights have thus been redefined to
cal level, the image of humans as ‘rights bearers’ derives include the degradation and violation of women. At
from liberal individualism. On a political level, liberals the same time, however, feminists have taken a critical
have long used the notion of natural or human rights view of rights that men have designed to protect their
to establish the basis of legitimacy. Social contract entitlement to private commerce, free speech and
theorists thus argued that the central purpose of cultural integrity, which have been used to legitimize
government is to protect a set of inalienable rights, practices such as child marriages, the trafficking of
variously described as ‘life, liberty and property’ women and child pornography (see Cultural rights or
(Locke), or as ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’ women’s rights? p. 196). The postcolonial critique of
(Jefferson). If governments become tyrannical, by human rights is examined in the main body of the text,
abusing or failing to protect such rights, they break an see pp. 316–18.
 H U M A N R I G H T S A N D H U M A N I TA R I A N I N T E RV E N T I O N 311

KEY EVENTS . . .

Major international human rights documents

1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights

1949 Geneva Conventions on the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War

1950 European Convention on Human Rights (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms)

1951 Genocide Convention (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide)

1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees

1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (came into force in 1976)

1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (came into force in 1976)

1969 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination

1975 Declaration on Torture

1981 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women

1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or
Punishment

1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child

1993 Vienna Convention on Human Rights (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties)

2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

also, like its predecessor, been criticized for being biased and inconsistent in the
exposure of human rights abuses. Not only does it include states that have them-
selves a dubious human rights record, but member states also tend to protect
each other (and developing states generally) from criticism and they have,
allegedly, been over-willing to highlight violations carried out by Israel.
One of the main features of the human rights regime is the prominent role
played within it by a wide range of NGOs. For example, over 1,500 NGOs partic-
ipated in the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, while the number
of registered international NGOs reached 37,000 by 2000, most of them claim-
ing to have some kind of human rights or humanitarian purpose. In the case of
groups such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, Médecins Sans
Frontières and Oxfam, operational NGOs work directly in the field to relieve
suffering but also campaign on behalf of those they treat to promote the obser-
312 GLOBAL POLITICS

vance of human rights treaties and humanitarian law. The most prominent
advocacy NGOs are Human Rights Watch (initially named Helsinki Watch, and
set up to respond to the activities of East European dissidents’ groups) and
Amnesty International. They exert pressure by gaining media coverage, based, in
part, on the high moral purpose that people customarily attach to their activi-
ties. In this way, NGOs have made a substantial contribution to the growth
worldwide of a human rights culture, influencing not only governments but also
transnational corporations (see p. 99), over matters such as pay and working
conditions in overseas factories. The impact of NGOs within the human rights
regime nevertheless goes far, particularly through behind-the-scenes lobbying of
government delegations and experts, and the drafting of resolutions. A
campaign by Amnesty International and the International Commission of
Jurists during 1972–3 thus initiated the process that led to the 1975 Declaration
on Torture. NGOs played a particularly prominent role in drafting the 1990
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and were highly influential in the estab-
lishment of the Land Mine Treaty of 1997. Nevertheless, NGOs also suffer from
limitations. These include that human rights NGOs cannot force governments to
change their ways, and that their impact within the UN is weakest in relation to
the Security Council, the only body with the power to enforce UN decisions.
Finally, NGOs have sometimes been criticized for adopting a ‘bandwagon’
approach, joining in on popular, or media-led, issues in the hope of enhancing
their status or attracting funding.
The protection of human rights is generally seen to be most advanced in
Europe. This largely reflects the widespread acceptance, and status, of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (1950), which was developed
under the auspices of the Council of Europe and is based on the UN Declaration.
By 2009, 48 states had signed the European Convention. The ECHR is enforced
by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France. Complaints can
be made to the Strasbourg court by signatory states or, much more commonly,
by individual citizens. By the end of 2004, over 65,000 applications had been
submitted to the European Court of Human Rights. This often creates a substan-
tial backlog, meaning that cases commonly take three to five years before they are
considered, added to the fact that they are also highly costly. Nevertheless, the
almost total compliance with the Court’s verdicts attests to the effectiveness of
this mechanism for the protection of human rights. The rate of compliance
within the time allowed for the Court is about 90 per cent. This makes the ECHR
the nearest thing to human rights ‘hard’ law.

Human rights in a world of states

The key dilemma of human rights protection is that states are the only actors
powerful enough to advance human rights, while also being the greatest human
rights abusers. This reflects the inherent tension between human rights and
foreign policy (see p. 129) to which Vincent (1986) drew attention (although he
may well have included domestic policy as well). Nevertheless, the image of
unavoidable antagonism between human rights and states’ rights is misleading.
In the first place, the trend for states to establish civil liberties and human rights
in domestic law long pre-dates the advent of the international human rights
regime. Second, international human rights standards have not been foisted on
 H U M A N R I G H T S A N D H U M A N I TA R I A N I N T E RV E N T I O N 313

G L O B A L AC TO R S . . .

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
Type: NGO • Established: 1961 • Headquarters: London • Staff: About 500
Membership: 2.2 million

Amnesty International (commonly by Amnesty members and support- mandate of Amnesty also has
called Amnesty or AI) is an interna- ers who engage in a letter-writing advantages. By focusing mainly on
tional NGO that draws attention to campaign, and publish detailed political prisoners, the organization
human rights abuses and campaigns reports. Such activities are has been able to build up a remark-
for compliance with international supported by wider campaigns, able consensus about the justice of
standards, placing a special empha- current ones including those on its cause as well as providing assis-
sis on the rights of political prison- terrorism and security, human rights tance to many victims. Amnesty
ers (the ‘forgotten prisoners’ or in China, refugees and asylum, arms therefore has a clear sense of
‘prisoners of conscience’, in the control, stopping violence against purpose and, through success in
words of Amnesty’s founder and women, poverty and human rights, individual cases, can bring a not
general secretary, 1961–66, Peter and stopping Internet repression. infrequent sense of achievement to
Benenson). From being a small Since the 1970s, Amnesty has been its members.
group of writers, academics, lawyers increasingly involved in proposing Amnesty has nevertheless been
and sympathetic journalists, AI has and drafting human rights legisla- criticized on two main grounds.
developed into a global organization tion, such as the UN’s 1975 First, its self-acknowledged tendency
with, in 2005, 52 sections worldwide Declaration on Torture. to focus disproportionately on
and a presence in about 100 more. Amnesty is widely considered to human rights abuses in relatively
An International Council represents be the single dominant force in the more democratic and open coun-
Amnesty’s various sections, interna- field of human rights advocacy, tries means that it has sometimes
tional networks and affiliated being more influential than most of been condemned for giving too little
groups. It elects the International the other groups put together attention to some of the world’s
Executive Committee, which lays (Alston 1990). In 1974, Sean worst human rights violations.
out the broad strategy of the organi- MacBride, chair of the International Amnesty’s justification for this bias
zation. The International Secretariat, Executive Committee, was awarded is both that it is inclined to focus
headed by a General Secretary, is a Nobel Peace Prize, with Amnesty public pressure where it is most
responsible for the conduct and day- itself being awarded a Nobel Peace likely to make a difference and that
to-day affairs of the organization. Prize in 1977 for ‘having it is concerned to build up credibil-
contributed to securing the ground ity, and therefore influence, in the
Significance: Amnesty primarily for freedom, for justice, and thereby global South by ensuring that abuses
targets governments, seeking to free also for peace in the world’. The in the North clearly receive atten-
political and religious prisoners, organization was awarded the UN tion. Second, Amnesty has been
ensure fair trials for those arrested, Prize in the Field of Human Rights accused of ideological bias, some-
eliminate torture, the death penalty in 1978. Amnesty’s strengths include times linked to wider criticisms of
and other harsh punishments, and its global public profile as the the doctrine of human rights, by
bring those who abuse human rights organization with the longest China, the Democratic Republic of
to justice. Its main weapons are history and the broadest name the Congo, Russia, South Korea, the
publicity, education and political recognition in the field of human USA (over Amnesty’s campaigns
pressure. These are typically exerted rights. Its reputation is bolstered by against the death penalty and the
by highlighting individual cases, in an emphasis on painstaking investi- Guantanamo Bay prison camp) and
which Amnesty staff interview gations and impartial report the Catholic Church (over its stance
victims, encourage their ‘adoption’ writing. The self-imposed limited on abortion).
314 GLOBAL POLITICS

reluctant states – by, for instance, pressure from NGOs, citizens’ campaigns or
international bodies – rather, they have been the creation of states themselves, or,
more precisely, of particular states. The USA and other western states took a
leading role in the establishment of the post-1945 human rights regime,
supported from the 1990s onwards by many post-communist states and a
growing number of developing world states. The main reason why human rights
protection is more effective in Europe than elsewhere is simply because of the
high degree of consensus among European states about the importance of
human rights.
Why, then, have states accepted, and sometimes championed, the cause of
human rights? Virtually all states, for example, have signed the UN
Declaration, with a large majority of them also having signed the two optional
international covenants. From a liberal perspective, support for international
human rights is merely an external expression of values and commitments that
are basic to liberal-democratic states. In this view, foreign affairs can, and
should, have a moral purpose; the pursuit of national interests should operate
in tandem with the global promotion of freedom and democracy. A further
reason for states to sign human rights conventions and at least support the
rhetoric of human rights is that, since 1948, this has been seen as one of the
preconditions for membership of the international community, bringing
diplomatic and possibly trade and security benefits. Support for human rights
is therefore one of the common norms that has transformed the international
system into an international society (see 10). This, nevertheless, allows for, at
times, a significant gulf between the international standards that a state
supposedly supports and how it actually behaves towards its own citizens and
towards other states. In other circumstances, states may make cynical use of the
human rights agenda. Realists, for instance, argue that, behind the cloak of
humanitarianism and moral purpose, human rights are often entangled with
considerations about the national interest (see p. 130). This is reflected in the
selective application of human rights, in which human rights failings on the
part of one’s enemies receive prominent attention but are conveniently ignored
in the case of one’s friends. The USA was therefore criticized in the 1970s for
condemning human rights violations in Soviet bloc countries, while at the
same time maintaining close diplomatic, economic and political ties with
repressive regimes in Latin America and elsewhere. For radical theorists, such
as Chomsky (see p. 228), the USA has used human rights as a moral cloak for
its hegemonic ambitions.
If the success of international human rights is judged in terms of whether
they have served to improve the behaviour of states and other bodies and, in
particular, helped to prevent acts of barbarism and systematic repression, the
record is often unimpressive. When they conflict, as they often do, state sover-
eignty usually trumps human rights. This is particularly true in the case of
powerful states, which may either simply be immune to human rights criticism,
whether expressed internally or externally, or their transgressions are not force-
fully exposed by other governments, for fear of damaging diplomatic relations
and economic interests. There is little evidence that the Soviet Union was
affected by condemnation of its human rights record, and a fear of criticism on
such grounds certainly did not prevent the Warsaw Pact invasion of Hungary in
1956, the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979,
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or Russia’s brutal suppression of the Chechen uprising in the 1990s. On the other
hand, human rights activism both inside and outside the Soviet bloc may have
contributed more subtly to the eventual collapse of the East European commu-
nist regimes. It did this by fostering a growing appetite for political freedom,
thereby helping to undermine the legitimacy of these regimes, and contributing
to the wave of popular protest that spread across eastern Europe in 1989. It is
also notable that Mikhail Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Soviet
Communist Party, 1985–91, used human rights rhetoric to justify his economic
and political reforms as well as the realignment of the Soviet Union’s relations
with the rest of the world, arguing that human rights are principles that tran-
scended the divide between capitalism and communism.
Since the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, China has been a frequent
target of human rights criticism, from the USA and from groups such as
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Human rights controversies
in China have focused on its suppression of political dissent, its widespread use
of capital punishment, its treatment of religious minorities such as supporters of
Falun Gong, political repression in the predominantly Muslim provinces of
north-western China, such as Xinjiang, and, most particularly, its occupation of
Tibet and the systematic subjugation of Tibetan culture, religion and national
identity. It is notable that China’s emergence as an economic superpower has not
been matched by an appetite for political reform. If anything, China has become
more uncompromising on human rights issues, both as an expression of
growing national assertiveness and in order to contain the pressures that have
been unleashed by economic reform. Condemnation by other governments has
also become increasingly muted as China’s economic resurgence has become
more evident.
As far as the USA is concerned, its commitment to human rights and
humanitarian law was called seriously into question by its conduct of the ‘war
on terror’ (see Does the need to counter terrorism justify restricting human
rights and basic freedoms?, p. 299). For many, September 11 marked the culmi-
nation of the period initiated by the end of the Cold War in which the growing
acceptance of human rights norms appeared to be irresistible. If the state that
had been largely responsible for constructing the post-1948 international
human rights regime appeared to violate human rights so clearly, what hope
was there that other states would be recruited to the cause?
Human rights have been particularly difficult to uphold in conflict situa-
tions. In part, this reflects the fact that power politics amongst the permanent
members of the Security Council usually prevents the UN from taking a clear
line on such matters. The world has therefore often appeared to stand by as gross
violations of human rights have taken place. This happened particularly tragi-
cally in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, in which about 800,000 mainly ethnic
Tutsis and some moderate Hutus were killed, and in the 1995 Srebrenica
massacre in which an estimated 8,000 Bosnian men and boys were killed.
However, from the 1990s onwards, greater emphasis has been placed on extend-
ing international law to ensure that those responsible for the gross breaches of
rights involving genocide (see p. 326), crimes against humanity and war crimes
are brought to account. The role and effectiveness of international criminal
tribunals and, since 2002, of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in dealing
with human rights violations is discussed in Chapter 14.