Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. City of Davao (2003)
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. City of Davao (2003)
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. City of Davao (2003)
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner PLDT paid a franchise tax equal to three percent (3%) of the
gross receipts. The franchise tax was paid "in lieu of all taxes on this
franchise or earnings thereof" pursuant to RA No. 7082 amending its charter,
Act No. 3436. The exemption from "all taxes on this franchise or earnings
thereof" was subsequently withdrawn by R.A. No. 7160 (Local Government
Code of 1991), which at the same time gave local government units the
power to tax businesses enjoying a franchise on the basis of income
received or earned by them within their territorial jurisdiction. Subsequently,
RA No. 7925 was passed exempting Globe and Smart from payment of local
franchise tax. The issue in this case is whether or not the franchise of
petitioner PLDT giving it tax exemption, being a special law, should prevail
over the LGC, a general law, giving the City of Davao the power to impose
the franchise tax on PLDT. Petitioner further argues that as between two
laws on the same subject matter (LGC and RA No. 7925), which are
inconsistent, that which is passed later prevails as it is the latest expression
of the legislative will.
The Supreme Court held that after petitioner's tax exemption by RA
No. 7092 had been withdrawn by the LGC, no amendment to re-enact its
previous tax exemption has been made by Congress. The phrase "in lieu of
all taxes" in special franchises granting tax exemptions must be interpreted
strictly against the taxpayer and it should give way to the peremptory
language of Sec. 193 of the LGC specifically providing for the withdrawal of
such exemption privileges. The Court also held that the rule that a special
law must prevail over the provisions of a later general law does not apply in
this case.
Finally, the ruling of the Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF)
that petitioner's exemption from local taxes has been restored must give
way to the ruling of the Court of Tax Appeals which is the special court
created for the purpose of reviewing tax cases, unlike the BLGF which was
created only for the purpose of providing consultative services and technical
assistance to local governments and the general public on local taxation and
other related matters. TIESCA
SYLLABUS
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J : p
Sec. 10. Tax Provisions. — The grantee shall be liable to pay the
same taxes on their real estate, buildings and personal property
exclusive of this franchise, as other persons or telecommunications
entities are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay. In addition
hereto, the grantee, its successors or assigns, shall pay a franchise tax
equivalent to three percent (3%) of all gross receipts transacted under
this franchise, and the said percentage shall be in lieu of all taxes on
this franchise or earnings thereof; Provided, That the grantee shall
continue to be liable for income taxes payable under Title II of the
National Internal Revenue Code. The grantee shall file the return with
and pay the taxes due thereon to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue or his duly authorized representatives in accordance with the
National Internal Revenue Code and the return shall be subject to audit
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. (Italicized added)
Similar provisions ("in lieu of all taxes" and equality clauses) are also
found in the franchises of Cruz Telephone Company, Inc., 5 Isla Cellular
Communications, Inc., 6 and Islatel Corporation. 7
We shall now turn to the other points raised in the motion for
reconsideration of PLDT. TSHcIa
Nor does the term "exemption" in § 23 of R.A. No. 7925 mean tax
exemption. The term refers to exemption from certain regulations and
requirements imposed by the National Telecommunications Commission
(NTC). For instance, R.A. No. 7925, § 17 provides: "The Commission shall
exempt any specific telecommunications service from its rate or tariff
regulations if the service has sufficient competition to ensure fair and
reasonable rates or tariffs." Another exemption granted by the law in line
with its policy of deregulation is the exemption from the requirement of
securing permits from the NTC every time a telecommunications company
imports equipment. 9
Second. PLDT says that the policy of the law is to promote healthy
competition in the telecommunications industry. 10 According to PLDT, the
LGC did not repeal the "in lieu of all taxes" provision in its franchise but only
excluded from it local taxes, such as the local franchise tax. However, some
franchises, like those of Globe and Smart, which contain "in lieu of all taxes"
provisions, were subsequently granted by Congress. The result is that while
the holders of franchises granted prior to January 1, 1992, when the LGC
took effect, had to pay local franchise tax in view of the withdrawal of their
local tax exemption, those whose franchises were granted after January 1,
1992, because of the "in lieu of all taxes" provisions contained therein, were
exempted from such local tax. It is argued that it is this disparate situation
which R.A. No. 7925, § 23 seeks to rectify.
One can speak of healthy competition only between equals. For this
reason, the law seeks to break up monopoly in the telecommunications
industry by gradually dismantling the barriers to entry and granting to new
telecommunications entities protection against dominant carriers through
equitable access charges and equal access clauses in interconnection
agreements and through the strict policing of predatory pricing by dominant
carriers. 11 Interconnection among carriers is made mandatory to prevent a
dominant carrier from delaying the establishment of connection with a new
entrant and to deter the former from imposing excessive access charges. 12
That is also the reason there are franchises 13 granted by Congress
after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7925 which do not contain the "in lieu of all
taxes" clause, just as there are franchises, also granted after March 16,
1995, which contain such exemption from other taxes. 14 If, by virtue of §
23, the tax exemption granted under existing franchises or thereafter
granted is deemed applicable to previously granted franchises (i.e.,
franchises granted before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7925 on March 16,
1995), then those franchises granted after March 16, 1995, which do not
contain the "in lieu of all taxes" clause, are not entitled to tax exemption.
The "in lieu of all taxes" provision in the franchises of Globe and Smart,
which are relatively new entrants in the telecommunications industry,
cannot thus be deemed applicable to PLDT, which had virtual monopoly in
the telephone service in the country for a long time, 15 without defeating the
very policy of leveling the playing field of which PLDT speaks.
Third. Petitioner argues that the rule of strict construction of tax
exemptions does not apply to this case because the "in lieu of all taxes"
provision in its franchise is more a tax exclusion than a tax exemption.
Rather, the applicable rule should be that tax laws are to be construed most
strongly against the government and in favor of the taxpayer.
This is contrary to the uniform course of decisions 16 of this Court
which consider "in lieu of all taxes" provisions as granting tax exemptions.
As such, it is a privilege to which the rule that tax exemptions must be
interpreted strictly against the taxpayer and in favor of the taxing authority
applies. Along with the police power and eminent domain, taxation is one of
the three necessary attributes of sovereignty. Consequently, statutes in
derogation of sovereignty, such as those containing exemption from
taxation, should be strictly construed in favor of the state. A state cannot be
stripped of this most essential power by doubtful words and of this highest
attribute of sovereignty by ambiguous language. 17
Indeed, both in their nature and in their effect there is no difference
between tax exemption and tax exclusion. Exemption is an immunity or
privilege; it is freedom from a charge or burden to which others are
subjected. 18 Exclusion, on the other hand, is the removal of otherwise
taxable items from the reach of taxation, e.g., exclusions from gross income
and allowable deductions. 19 Exclusion is thus also an immunity or privilege
which frees a taxpayer from a charge to which others are subjected.
Consequently, the rule that tax exemption should be applied in strictissimi
juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the government applies
equally to tax exclusions. To construe otherwise the "in lieu of all taxes"
provision invoked is to be inconsistent with the theory that R.A. No. 7925, §
23 grants tax exemption because of a similar grant to Globe and Smart.
Petitioner cites Cagayan Electric Power & Light Co., Inc. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue 20 in support of its argument that a "tax
exemption" is restored by a subsequent law re-enacting the "tax
exemption." It contends that by virtue of R.A. No. 7925, its tax exemption or
exclusion was restored by the grant of tax exemptions to Globe and Smart.
Cagayan Electric Power & Light Co., Inc., however, is not in point. For there,
the re-enactment of the exemption was made in an amendment to the
charter of Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co.
Indeed, petitioner's justification for its claim of tax exemption rests on
a strained interpretation of R.A. No. 7925, § 23. For petitioner's claim for
exemption is not based on an amendment to its charter but on a circuitous
reasoning involving inquiry into the grant of tax exemption to other
telecommunications companies and the lack of such grant to others. 21
Surely, Congress could more clearly and directly have granted tax exemption
to all franchise holders or amended the charter of PLDT to again exempt it
from tax if this had been its purpose.
The fact is that after petitioner's tax exemption by R.A. No. 7082 had
been withdrawn by the LGC, 22 no amendment to re-enact its previous tax
exemption has been made by Congress. Considering that the taxing power
of local government units under R.A. No. 7160 is clear and is ordained by the
Constitution, petitioner has the heavy burden of justifying its claim by a clear
grant of exemption. 23
Tax exemptions should be granted only by clear and unequivocal
provision of law on the basis of language too plain to be mistaken. 24 They
cannot be extended by mere implication or inference. Thus, it was held in
Home Insurance & Trust Co. v. Tennessee 25 that a law giving a corporation
all the "powers, rights reservations, restrictions, and liabilities" of another
company does not give an exemption from taxation which the latter may
possess. In Rochester R. Co. v. Rochester , 26 the U.S. Supreme Court, after
reviewing cases involving the effect of the transfer to one company of the
powers and privileges of another in conferring a tax exemption possessed by
the latter, held that a statute authorizing or directing the grant or transfer of
the "privileges" of a corporation which enjoys immunity from taxation or
regulation should not be interpreted as including that immunity. Thus:
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr. and
Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Belosillo, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Austria- Martinez,
JJ., join dissent of J. Puno.
Puno, J., please see dissent.
Vitug, J., concur; a statute effectively limiting the constitutionally-
delegated tax powers of LGU's can only be done in a clear and express
manner.
Panganiban, J., took no part; same reason given in original Decision.
Carpio, J., see separate opinion.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., dissenting:
The sole issue in the case at bar is whether petitioner Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company, Inc. (PLDT) is liable to pay the franchise tax
imposed by the City of Davao. The issue can be resolved only by untangling
the different laws dealing with local government and the telecommunications
industry. It is thus necessary to first lay down these laws.
On January 1, 1992, the Local Government Code took effect. The Code
pertinently provides:
In accord with this Code, the City of Davao enacted Ordinance No. 519,
Series of 1992. It provides:
On March 19, 1992, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7229 entitled
"An Act approving the merger between Globe Mackay Cable and Radio
Corporation and Clavecilla Radio System and the consequent transfer of the
franchise of Clavecilla Radio System granted under Republic Act No. 402, as
amended, to Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation, extending the life
of said franchise and repealing certain sections of RA No. 402, as amended."
Section 3 thereof provides:
Sec. 9. . . .
Section 5 provides:
On March 27, 1992, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7294 entitled
"An Act granting Smart Information Technologies, Inc. (SMART) a franchise to
establish, maintain, lease and operate integrated
telecommunications/computer/electronic services, and stations throughout
the Philippines for public domestic and international communications, and
for other purposes." Section 9 of the Act provides:
Again, I am unable to agree with the majority. With due respect, the
majority fails to grasp the processes of deregulation followed in the
telecommunications industry. The key move to take before deregulating is to
break up the monopoly or oligopoly in control of the industry. For with a
monopoly or oligopoly enjoying a stranglehold on the industry, the market
forces cannot have a free play and prices in the industry will be dictated by
the lucre of commerce. For this reason, petitioner PLDT's monopoly had to
be broken. Among others, the law made interconnection among carriers
mandatory and provided for equitable access charges and equal access
clauses in interconnection agreements. With this provision, the law busted
the biggest barrier to the effective entry of new players in the
telecommunications industry. The next step in deregulation is to level the
playing field. The mechanism for leveling the playing field is installed in
Section 23 of the law which requires equality of treatment in the
telecommunications industry. In no uncertain terms, it orders that "any
advantage, favor, privilege, exemption, or immunity granted under existing
franchise, or may hereafter be granted, shall ipso facto become part of
previously granted telecommunications franchises and shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the grantees of such franchises . . . ." A
level playing field is indispensable to prevent predatory pricing on the part of
any player in the industry. Without a level playing field, competition will be
unfair and prices in the industry will not be determined by market forces but
by unregulated greed. Inexplicably, the majority would deny to petitioner
PLDT the right to a level playing field. Its reasons are tenuous to say the
least. Its prime reason is that petitioner PLDT had enjoyed virtual monopoly
in the telephone service in the country for a long time. 7 The monopoly
status of petitioner PLDT is past and should be viewed in its proper historical
perspective. In the early years of our economic history, monopolies in certain
industries had to be allowed. They have to be entertained in industries which
are high-risk, capital intensive and indispensable to economic growth. No
company will risk venture capital in these industries unless they are
accorded favored treatment, usually a monopoly status, for a certain time.
Even then, administrative mechanisms were put in place to regulate their
activities especially their pricing policies to protect the interest of the
consuming public. Indeed, a great part of the United States would still be a
wilderness if it did not allow monopolies in its railroad and
telecommunications industries. We adopted this proven strategy and allowed
monopolies in some of our industries like electric power, transportation and
telecommunications. It is in line with this strategy that Congress granted to
petitioner PLDT a monopoly status for a certain time. No company would
then invest in our telecommunications industry but petitioner PLDT did,
assumed the risk and undeniably played a vital role in our economic
development which cannot be dismissed as insignificant. For this reason, our
Constitution does not ban monopolies as evil per se for they are not. AcISTE
CARPIO, J.:
On the other hand, the franchise of Globe contained no "in lieu of all
taxes" clause.
The Local Government Code of 1991, 2 which took effect on January 1,
1992, repealed Section 9 (b) of Clavecilla's franchise with respect to local
taxes. Sections 137, 151, and 193 of the Local Government Code of 1991
provide that —
In the case of a newly started business, the tax shall not exceed
one-twentieth (1/20) of one percent (1%) of the capital investment. In
the succeeding calendar year, regardless of when the business started
to operate, the tax shall be based on the gross receipts for the
preceding calendar year, or any fraction thereon, as provided herein."
The rates of taxes that the city may levy may exceed the
maximum rates allowed for the province or municipality by not more
than fifty percent (50%) except the rates of professional and
amusement taxes."
Clearly, Congress did not intend to re-enact any of the provisions in the
franchise of Clavecilla that had already been repealed by prior laws.
Tax exemptions must be clear and unequivocal. A taxpayer claiming a
tax exemption must point to a specific provision of law conferring on the
taxpayer, in clear and plain terms, exemption from a common burden. Any
doubt whether a tax exemption exists is resolved against the taxpayer. Tax
exemptions cannot arise by mere implication, much less by an implied re-
enactment of a repealed tax exemption clause. In the instant case, there is
even no implied re-enactment of Section 9 (b) of Clavecilla's old franchise
since Section 11 of RA No. 7229 expressly states that only unrepealed
provisions of Clavecilla's franchise shall continue in force and effect.
Measured against these well-recognized principles of taxation, PLDT's claim
to tax exemption based on the franchise of Globe must necessarily fail.
PLDT also relies on Smart's franchise which PLDT claims contains the
"in lieu of all taxes" clause. PLDT points to Section 9 of Republic Act No.
7294, Smart's franchise, which states —
The grantee shall file the return with and pay the tax due
thereon to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized
representative in accordance with the National Internal Revenue Code
and the return shall be subject to audit by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue." (Italics supplied)
RA No. 7294 took effect on May 27, 1992, after the effectivity of the
Local Government Code of 1991. Thus, the withdrawal of tax exemptions in
the Local Government Code cannot apply to Smart. Applying the equality
clause in Section 23 of RA No. 7925, PLDT claims that the "in lieu of all
taxes" clause in Smart's franchise should also benefit PLDT.
PLDT's reliance on the "in lieu of all taxes" clause in Smart's franchise
is misplaced for two reasons. First, Republic Act No. 7716 abolished the
franchise tax on telecommunications companies effective January 1, 1996.
To replace the 3 percent franchise tax in Section 227 (now Section 119) of
the National Internal Revenue Code, RA No. 7716 imposed a 10 percent VAT
on telecommunications companies under Section 102 (now Section 108) of
the Tax Code. As explained by PLDT, "presently, the telecommunications
companies do not anymore pay a franchise tax of varying percentages and
instead pay a uniform VAT of 10%." 4 The franchise tax in Section 119 of the
Tax Code still exists but is now applicable only to "electric, gas and water
utilities" and no longer to telecommunications companies.
The franchise tax is imposed only on franchise holders, while the VAT
is imposed on all sellers of goods and services, whether or not they hold
franchises. The franchise tax is now imposed in Section 119 of the Tax Code,
while the VAT on telecommunications companies is imposed in Section 108
of the Tax Code. The Tax Code defines the VAT as an indirect tax which can
be passed on to the buyer. The Tax Code precludes payment of a "VAT on
the VAT" by excluding the VAT in computing the gross receipts. This is not
the case of the franchise tax. Certainly, the franchise tax is a different tax
from the VAT.
Smart's franchise states that the 3 percent "franchise tax" shall be "in
lieu of all taxes." Clearly, it is the franchise tax that shall be in lieu of all
taxes referred to in Section 9, and not the VAT or any other tax. Following
the rule on strict interpretation of tax exemptions, the "in lieu of all taxes"
clause cannot apply when what is paid is a tax other than the franchise tax.
Since the franchise tax on telecommunications companies has been
abolished, the "in lieu of all taxes" clause has now become functus officio,
rendered inoperative for lack of a franchise tax. Revenue Memorandum
Circular No. 5-96 issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue stating
that the VAT shall be "in lieu of all taxes" since it merely replaced the
franchise tax is void for lack of a legal basis.
Second, the "in lieu of all taxes" clause in Smart's franchise refers only
to taxes, other than income tax, imposed under the National Internal
Revenue Code. The "in lieu of all taxes" clause does not apply to local taxes.
The proviso in the first paragraph of Section 9 of Smart's franchise states
that the grantee shall "continue to be liable for income taxes payable under
Title II of the National Internal Revenue Code." Also, the second paragraph of
Section 9 speaks of tax returns filed and taxes paid to the "Commissioner of
Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative in accordance with
the National Internal Revenue Code." Moreover, the same paragraph
declares that the tax returns "shall be subject to audit by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue." Nothing is mentioned in Section 9 about local taxes. The
clear intent is for the "in lieu of all taxes" clause to apply only to taxes under
the National Internal Revenue Code and not to local taxes. Even with respect
to national internal revenue taxes, the "in lieu of all taxes" clause does not
apply to income tax.
If Congress intended the "in lieu of all taxes" clause in Smart's
franchise to also apply to local taxes, Congress would have expressly
mentioned the exemption from municipal and provincial taxes. Congress
could have used the language in Section 9 (b) of Clavecilla's old franchise, as
follows:
". . . in lieu of any and all taxes of any kind, nature or description
levied, established or collected by any authority whatsoever, municipal,
provincial or national, from which the grantee is hereby expressly
exempted, . . ." (Italics supplied)
However, Congress did not expressly exempt Smart from local taxes.
Congress used the "in lieu of all taxes" clause only in reference to national
internal revenue taxes. The only interpretation, under the rule on strict
construction of tax exemptions, is that the "in lieu of all taxes" clause in
Smart's franchise refers only to national and not to local taxes. ScCEIA
PLDT cites Philippine Railway Co. v. Nolting 5 to support its claim 6 that
the "in lieu of all taxes" clause includes exemption from local taxes.
However, in Philippine Railway the franchise of the railway company
expressly exempted it from municipal and provincial taxes, as follows:
4. Davao Gulf Lumber Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 293 SCRA 76,
88 (1998).
9. 3 RECORD OF THE SENATE 827 (January 17, 1995); 4 RECORD OF THE SENATE
52 (January 24, 1995); See R.A. No. 7925, § 16:
11. 3 RECORD OF THE SENATE, 810 (Jan. 16, 1995); 3 RECORDS OF PLENARY
PROCEEDINGS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 552 (Dec. 5, 1994).
12. RECORD OF THE SENATE 872 (April 20, 1994); id., p. 557.
13. E.g., R.A. No. 8198 (Unicorn Communications Corporation; July 11, 1996); R.A.
No. 8675 (Mati Telephone Corporation; June 25, 1998); R.A. No. 8676
(Western Misamis Oriental Telephone Cooperative, Inc.; June 25, 1998); R.A.
No. 8677 (Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc.; June 25, 1998); R.A.
No. 8678 (Sear Telecommunications Inc.; June 25, 1998); R.A. No. 8690
(Santos Telephone Corporation, Inc.; July 2, 1998); R.A. No. 8955 (Polaris
Telecommunications, Inc.; Sept. 2, 2000); R.A. No. 8956 (Odiongan
Telephone Corporation; Sept. 2, 2000); R.A. No. 8959 (Palawan Telephone
Company, Inc.; Sept. 7, 2000); R.A. No. 8961 (L.M. United Telephone
Company, Inc.; Sept. 7, 2000); R.A. No. 8962 (Iriga Telephone Company, Inc.;
Sept. 7, 2000); R.A. No. 8992 (Primeworld Digital Systems, Inc.; Jan. 5, 2001);
R.A. No. 9002 (Click Communications, Inc.; Jan. 21, 2001); R.A. No. 9101
(Tupi Telephone Cooperative, Inc.; April 9, 2001); R.A. No. 9116 (Solid
Broadband Corporation; April 15, 2001); R.A. No. 9117 (Battlex, Inc./Bataan
Telephone Exchange; April 15, 2001); R.A. No. 9124 (Zenith
Telecommunications Company, Inc.; April 20, 2001); R.A. No. 9130
(Connectivity Unlimited Resource Enterprise, Inc.; April 24, 2001); and R.A.
No. 9133 (Pampanga Telephone Company, Inc.; April 24, 2001).
14. E.g., R.A. No. 7961 (Cruz Telephone Company, Inc.; March 29, 1995); R.A. No.
8004 (Millennia Telecommunications Corporation; April 27, 1995); R.A. No.
8065 (Isla Cellular Communication, Inc.; June 19, 1995); R.A. No. 8095 (Islatel
Corporation; July 6, 1995); R.A. No. 8153 (Rex Electronics Communications
System, Inc.; September 23, 1995).
15. Compare: "Free competition in the industry may also provide the answer to a
much-desired improvement in the quality and delivery of this type of public
utility, to improved technology, fast and handy mobile service, and reduced
user dissatisfaction. After all, neither PLDT nor any other public utility has a
constitutional right to a monopoly position in view of the Constitutional
proscription that no franchise certificate or authorization shall be exclusive in
character or shall last longer than fifty (50) years (ibid., Section 11; Article
XIV, Section 5, 1973 Constitution; Article XIV, Section 8, 1935 Constitution).
Additionally, the State is empowered to decide whether public interest
demands that monopolies be regulated or prohibited (1987 Constitution,
Article XII, Section 19)." (PLDT v. National Telecommunications Commission ,
190 SCRA 717, 737 (1990)).
16. Province of Tarlac v. Alcantara, 216 SCRA 790 (1992), where real property
taxes were held not included in the exemption granted to all electric
franchise holders by the "in lieu of all taxes" provision of P.D. No. 551; Manila
Gas Corp. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 104 Phil. 727 (1958), where the
Court ruled that the rights and privileges which the "in lieu of all taxes"
provision exempts from taxation are those enjoyed by the grantee of the
franchise and not by the public in general; Philippine Telephone and
Telegraph Company v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 58 Phil. 639 (1933),
where the exemption was not extended to the income tax on the dividends
paid and delivered to stockholders as they ceased to be corporate property
and have already become property of the stockholders.
17. Memphis Gas-Light Co. v. Taxing District, 109 U.S. 398, 27 L.Ed. 976 (1883).
19. NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1997, §§ 32(b) and 34.
21. All along, we simply assume that Globe and Smart enjoy exemption from local
taxation.
22. See Manila Electric Company v. Province of Laguna, 306 SCRA 750, 760
(1999), citing City Government of San Pablo v. Reyes, 305 SCRA 353, 362
(1999).
23. Light Rail Transit Authority v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals, 342 SCRA
692 (2000); Commissioner of Customs v. Court of Tax Appeals, 328 SCRA
822 (2000); Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 293 SCRA 76 (1998).
30. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 605, 619
(1997).
1. Resolution, pp. 4-5. These subsequent laws are vital. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration should take them into account and its resolution should not
be limited to the laws granting exemptions to Globe and Smart.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Id. at 6.
6. Ibid.
7. Id. at 9.
8. Id. at 8.
CARPIO, J.:
1. Section 23 of RA No. 7925.
3. The first two sections of RA No. 7229 provide as follows: "Section 1. The
merger between Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation and Clavecilla
Radio System, with Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation thenceforth
known as GMCR, Inc., and hereinafter referred to as the grantee as the
surviving corporation, is hereby approved.
7. RA Nos. 8955, 8956, 8959, 8961, 8962, 8992, 9002, 9101, 9116, 9117, 9124,
9130, 9133 and 9149.
12. RA Nos. 7961, 8004, 8065, 8095, 8198, 8675, 8676, 8677, 8678, 8690, 8955,
8956, 8959, 8961, 8962, 9002, 9101, 9117, 9130, 9133, and 9149.
13. RA Nos. 7961, 8065, 8095, 8198, 8678, 8955, 8956, 8959, 8961, 8962, 9002,
9101, 9117, 9124, 9130, 9133 and 9149.