311795
311795
Robert A. Huttenback Source: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1975), pp. 1-29 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/311795 . Accessed: 01/02/2011 02:47
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(x975),pp.
I-29.
Printedin GreatBritain.
The'Great Game' thePamirs the in and Hindu-Kush: British The Conquest Hunza of andNagar
ROBERT A. HUTTENBACK California Institute Bechnology of Pasadena, California THE motivationsfor imperialadvancehave, over the years, caused considerable debate among historians.It has been thought by some that a law of the turbulentfrontierforced the expansionof empire, for a regionof ordersurrounded an areaof disorder eventually, by had for its own protection,to conquerthe area of turbulence.Thus, empireswouldinexorably advancetheir borders until they reachedsome greatnaturalbarrier the frontiers anotherstablepower. or of Although there was not yet much talk of the 'scientificfrontier,' BritishIndia was by the mid-nineteenth centurystretching evernorthwardtowardsthe greatbarrier ranges.On the otherside of the mountains, another power, Imperial Russia, was advancing inexorably towardsthe samelofty peaks,and fearof foreigninvasionwas another prime cause for territorialaggrandizement. can be said with coIt siderable assurancethat anxiety, first over French and then over Russianinvasion,was the chief influenceon British Indian foreign policy throughout nineteenthcentury.It is a commonmisconcepthe tion that the great northernrangesconstitutedan effectivebarrierto intercoursebetween India and Central Asia. Although the passes through mountains the weresufficiently difficult preclude passage to the of largebodiesof men and heavymaterial,tradersand smallbandsof irregulars had, over the centuries,made theirway in both directions. That dangeralwayslurkedbeyondthe passes seemedto be one of the compellinglessonsof Indian history.It consequently becameof paramount importanceto guard againstthe peril of a Russianinvasion, even thoughthe limitations both gold and armedmightalmostpreof cluded the direct acquisitionof the hostile lands to the north of the Indian plains. In addition,more sophisticated Britishstatesmenand officialsrealizedthe fragilityof an imperialstructurewhose strength
ffi
ROBERT A. HUTTENBACK
restedlargelyon a mythwhichwouldlose its powerwith the adventof doubt. Hence, it was unrestand dissidenceon the frontierthat presentedthe mostimmediatedanger. Owing,perhaps,to its largelyephemeral nature,the whole evanescentstruggle becameromanticized the'Great into Game.) Kipling's Kim playedit, so did a myriadof fictionalheroes.Sir Henry Forsythwas sentto pacifythe landsto the northof Kashmir: 'Forall his greatbrain, he was a man of one idea, and that idea "the North safeguarded." Mere men, himselfinclu-ded, werefor him no morethan pawnsin the greatgameto be playedout betweentwo empires, the chessboard on of CentralAsia.'l In one of L. AdamsBeck'sstories,a young soldieris killed on the frontier.'I am not sorryfor Harry,'the hero avers,'He knew we all know that he was on guardhere holdingthe outposts against blood and treacheryand terriblethings-playing the Great Game....'2 G. A. Henty, the doyenof late-nineteenth centuryadventure story writers,waxed eloquentin the introductionof one of his numerous Imperialepics addressed 'My Dear Lads:' to
In thesepagesyou will see the strengthand the weakness thesewild people of of the mountains;theirstrengthlying in theirpersonalbravery,their determination to preservetheir freedom at all costs, and the nature of their country.Their weaknessconsistsin their want of organization, their tribal jealousies,and theirimpatienceof regularhabitsand of the restraintnecessary to renderthem good soldiers.But when led and organizedby English officers thereare no bettersoldiers the world.... Guidedby British in advice, led by Britishofficers,and it may be, paid by Britishgold, . . . [the tribal North] is likely to prove an invaluableally to us when the day comes that Russiabelievesherselfstrongenoughto move forwardtowardthe goal of all her hopes and effiorts the last fifty years, the conquestof India....3 of
The curiousbreedof romantic'men on the spot' who guardedthe frontiermarchesdid, indeed,believethemselves engagedin a struggle of cosmicsignificance, in thisillusionthey weresupported only and not by the writersof fictionbut by a pressand public becomingevermore enamoredof imperial grandeurand of the irresistiblestrength of Britain's armsand her nationalvirtue.Besides,the game was not very expenslve termsot elt ler men or treasure. ln The inhospitable landsto the northof the Vale of Kashmir werethe playing-board the 'Great Garne,'and-until the mid-I87os, the for
1MaudDiver, TheGreat Amulet (London,I9 I4), 453. Quotedin A. J. Greenberger, TheBritish Image India(London,I 969), p. 95. of 2 Ibid.,p. 96. 3 G. A. Henty, ForName andFameor, Through Afghan the Passes (New York, no date), III-IV.
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Britishwere satisfiedto leave directjurisdictionover these northern marchesin the weak handsof the Maharajaof Kashmirthroughhis Waziri-Wazarat Gilgit.Butsubsequently, at despitean undertaking by Prince Gortchakovin April I 875,4 that the Russian Government would not extendits dominions CentralAsia beyondtheir existing in limitseitherin the vicinityof Bokhara Krasnovodsk the Attrek or and (whichmeantthat both Wakhan Badakshan and wereto be considered part of Afghanistan),Englishmenin India were again envisaging Russianmen and artilleryrumblingoverthe passesof the HinduKush and the Pamirs.As Sir Douglas Forsyth,the leader of two British expeditions Kashgaria(ChineseTurkestan), to remarked:
NationalArchivesof India, New Delhi [NAI], NovemberI875, sec. proc. I4, copy of PrinceGortchakov Russianambassador London,Count Schouvalov, to in I I May, I875 (conf.).Original dispatchdated5 April, I875. in St. Petersburg.
4
ROBERT A. HUTTENBACK
So long as the mistakenidea was held that the Pamirwas really the 'roof' of the world and quite impassableto troops, it mattered little how far Kashmirpenetratedin that direction,or who held the petty principalities of the Hindoo-Kush.But as the mists of ignorance are gradually being dissipated,we are brought face to face with facts and are compelled to acknowledge dangerfroma quarterwhencewe have a right to expectloyal assistance.
Forsythassertedthat it was common knowledgethat the Dogra Governmenthad in every way impeded British eSorts to become acquaintedwith the countryand people beyondGilgit. Accordingto whathe had heardin Kashgar, unlessthe Britishtookdirectcommand of the region,troublewas to be expected.On the militaryquestionof whetherRussiawould ever thinkof sendinga forcevia the Pamirsto the Indus, Forsythcould oSer no opinion: 'but that the road is far easierthan was supposed,and that it presentsnone of the obstacles which renderthe Karakorum route next to impossible.'It was Forsyth'sopinionthat Russia'sconquestof Khiva and her rapid advance towardsthe Oxus had greatly raisedher prestigeon the frontier,in Afghanistan even in the Punjab. and
The generalidea is that Russia is the risingpower, that she is destinedto advancestill further,that Englandis afraidof her, and will do nothing to oppose her progress,or to help those who would preservethemselves froin being swallowedup. Consequently they consult on the wisdomof making friendswith the comingpower.
Forsythurgedthe creationof agenciesin Gilgit and Kashgar,and the establishment British of paramountcy Balkhand Badakshan. in Russian influencehad to be counteracted. While Britishmerchantswere, for instance,not allowedintoAfghanistan, Russian agentsandcaravans, he contended,werewelcomedin Kabul.s It is easy to understand how the rapid Russianadvance through Central Asiacastdoubton the credibility Gortchakov's of undertaking. Yet the viceroy,Lord Northbrook, the good senseto discountenhad ance much of what Forsythhad to say. He did not believe that the Maharajaof Kashmirwas disloyal,that there was secretintercourse betweenKashmir Afghanistan, thatRussianagentsvisitedBalkh and or and Kabul. But even if it did not take root immediately, familiar the seedthatForsyth sowedhadactuallyfallenon fertileground.Afterthree successiveopponentsof Indian expansion, the viceregal chair was
s India Oice Library,London [IOL], sec. letter 22, 2I June, I875, encl. 3. Secretand PoliticalLettersreferred in thisand subsequent to footnotesall emanated fromthe Governor Generalin Counciland were addressed the Secretary State to of for India.
THE
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aboutto be occupiedby an outspoken prophetof the 'forward school,' LordLytton.6 Evenbeforehe assumed officein April I876, Lyttonhad writtento Salisburyat the India Officeprivately:'I have often been told by personswhom I believe to be competentjudges of Russian sentiment,that the very word Cashmere exercisesa powerfulcharm over the Muscoviteimagination. . .'7 In London,also,the pendulum had swung. 'By the personaltestimonyof Britishofficers,'an India Officeminutepaperof 29July I875, read;
we are gradually learning about what ought to be a subject of serious consideration with the Govt.of India that Gilgitis the bestroadfromIndia to CentralAsia; that we shouldhave an agent in that district....8
On I7 and I8 November I876, Lord Lytton met Ranbir Singh, Gulab Singh'sson and successor Maharaja Kashmir,at Mahdoas of pore.The viceroymadeit clearto RanbirSingh,whomhe claimedto have 'in my pocket,'g that he wantedthe northern reachesof the state to comeunderthe moreeSectivecontrolof Srinagar a proposition to which Ranbir Singh agreed.'The viceroythen expressed wish to his station a Britishofficerat Gilgit. This proposalwas not new to the Indian Government, it had been first mooted in I874 by Sir D. as Forsyth,but to the Maharajah evidentlycame unexpectedly.'10 a it In letter to the viceroy, Ranbir Singh, on 26 November, questioned Lytton'sassurancethat the Britishofficerto be stationedin Gilgit wouldnot involvehimself internalaSairs.He referred his unhappy in to experience with Dr. H. Cayley,the British joint commissioner Leh, in who, while in Ladakh,had frequently interfered with and even superseded the maharaja's orders,and who, when the maharajahad complainedto the Government India, had not even been reprimanded. of RanbirSinghinsistedthat the prerogatives the proposedofficialbe of clearlydefinedand that he be distinctlyordered abstainfromclaimto ing jurisdiction local matters.1l these requests,Lytton acceded, in To and the maharaja, a consequence, no choicebut to agreeto the as had Britishproposals. RanbirSinghwasin an unenviable position.He knewhe wastotally dependenton Britishgood will and that there were many officialsof
Maharajaof Kashmir,whom it describedas 'one of our most loyal feudatories'.India Oice minutepap. of 2gJuly I875, on sec. letter22, 2I June I875. 9 IOL, Lyttonpaps., Lyttonto Rawlinson,5 August I876. 0 NAI, July I877, sec. proc. 28, app. V. Ibid.,maharaja viceroy,26 NovemberI877. to
6 LordLyttonwas viceroyfrom I876 to I880. 7 IOL, Lyttonpaps., Lyttonto Salisbury, March I876. I4 8 The India Oice was, however, inclined to work through the
ROBERT A. HUTTENBACK
the Government India who would favorthe annexation his state of of to British India.He wasalsoawarethat C:alcutta aboutto forcehim was to assumenew responsibilities the environsof Gilgit, ones which in wouldonly benefitthe Britishand embroilhim in conflicts with which past historyhad proved he could not adequatelycope. In October I877, the important stateof C:hitral tied to Kashmir treaty,and was by at the end of the year) C:aptain John Biddulpharrivedin Gilgit to assumehis duties as Britishofficeron special duty. His instructions indicatedthat his chiefduty was: to furnish reliable intelligence theprogress events of of beyond Kashmir the frontier. . and. . . in consultation theKashmir . with authorities, cultivate to friendly relations thetribes with beyond border viewto bringing the in them gradually under control influence Kashmir.12 the and of fIe was to keep a close eye on the Pamirpassesfor) as Lyttonput it: CWe shall . . . considerit from the firstincumbentupon the Government of India to prevent, at any cost, the establishment within this outlyingcountryof the politicalpreponderance any otherPower.'13 of The Russo-Turkish of I877, followedby a new RussianmoveWar ment in the directionof India and an attempt by St. Petersburg to enterinto an alliancewith Afghanistan, broughtLytton'sRussophobia to full flower.CFrom Karakorum the BaroghilPass,therefore>' the to he wrotein full spate, 'ourultimateboundary shouldbe the greatmountain range or watershed;and our officersin C:ashmere have accordingly been instructed. . .'14The Russiansreactedto the thwartingof their designsin Europeat the Congress Berlinby forcinga mission of on Sher Ali, the ruler of Afghanistan, I878, and, although the in RussianpartywithdrewunderBritishpressure, was too late. Lytton it was determined wrar on with Afghanistan, late in I878 hostilities and erupted. The disintegration the Afghansituation,of course,had its eSects of upon the volatile hill states of northernKashmir.Instabilityon the frontierand the Chinesereconquest Kashgar,which had enjoyed of some years of independenceunder Yakub Beg, prompted Ghazan Khan, the Mir of Hunza,althoughhe had pledgedhis fealtyto Kashmir alongwith the rulerof Nagarin about I84I, once moreto send a tributeof nine gold mushals (valuedat threeEnglishpoundsin all) to the Chineseauthorities now reestablished Turkestan. in This had been
12 p. 13 14
(London,I963),
I I9 ,
Ibid.
IOL sec. letter 79,
9
SeptemberI878.
the customin formerdays,and the mir receivedin returnajagir (land previousto YakubBeg's grant)held by his familyin Chineseterritory ascendancy, yambu (lumpsof silvereach worth about five temporary XI8)) eighteen pieces of silk, and three horses (an increaseof five yambu, nine pieces of silk, and one horseover what the Chinesehad sent Hunza in the past).1sIt was a fair enoughreturnon what was a essentially very smallinvestment. with remonstrated GhazanKhan,pointingout that WhenBiddulph as a dependentof Kashmirhe had no right to pay tributeto another state, the mir repliedthat it was not againstany agreementto send are and that it wasprofitablebesides:'Wukeels emissaries Kashgar, to you not forbidden: knowthis well. Thereis no necessityto write. For Biddulph [to a greatman,it is verydisrespectful writeunnecessarily].'l6 continuedto protest,but to no eSect,17especiallyas China made it But Hunza her feudatory.18 the result quite clear that she considered was that Ghazan Khan and his tiny principalityearned for themselvesa notablylow place in Britishaffections. To exacerbatethe situationfurther,Ghazan Khan,-late in I878, by fort,which,garrisoned 50 Kashmiri joined in an attackon Chaprot road. But on troops,was the main Dograpiedd terre the Hunza-Gilgit of the Government India, throughKashmir,forced the attackersto retreat.As Lyttonwrotein FebruaryI879:
our object . . . is to acquire, throughthe ruler of Kashmir)the power of command as makingsuchpoliticaland militaryarrangements will effectually the passesof the Hindu Kush. With this object,we shall take every opportunity of strengtheningour control over the country lying south of the mountain slopes ... and of attaching the Chiefs, through Kashmir, to to in Britishinterests.... Our officers Kashmirwill be instructed discourage and counteractall tendenciesof the Kunjod [Hunza] chiefs towardsacknowledgementof any superiorauthorityother than that of the Kashmir Ruler.... We may thus succeedin retainingand settlingdown within our political systemall the countrywhich falls within our geographicfrontier. And althoughwe desireto realizeour plans graduallyby pacificmeans)we consider fromthe Srstincumbentupon the Government it shall nevertheless of India to prevent) at any cost, the establishmentwithin this outlying of countryof the politicalpreponderance any other power....19
5-I3 AprllI878. 1sIOL,sec.letterI48, 8July I878, encl.,Gilgitdiary, 2I Khanto Biddulph, AprilI878. Ibid., encl.,Ghazan Khan,24 AprilI878. to Ibid., Biddulph Ghazan Ibid., I 7, Gilgitdiary,2 I-28 May I 878. encl. such British officials, as NeyElias, I879. Some 49, l9IOL,sec.letter 28 February to themhad in thejointcommissionerLeh,feltthattheBritish somehow establish behind passes the he 'hidden anything,' wrote, 'How wewatch can selves Kashgar. in 16 17 18
1tOBERT A. HUTTENBACK
Within a few months,however,Britishpolicy effecteda complete volte-face. Biddulph's inability to supply significantintelligence,as a consequence being on the wrongside of the mountainsand 'on the of road to nowhere,'20 combinedwith constantobstruction the Kashby mirdurbar makehimlargelyineffectual. to Shouldviolencehaveerupted along the border,Gilgit was too far from any majorBritishmilitary cantonment saveeitherthe dignityof the British or the life of its to Raj agent in Gilgit. The Kashmir military contingent of one infantry regimentat Gilgit and Skardoand two at Astor,on which the British officerdepended,was totallyinadequateto any emergency. The units werechronically understrength, officers the wereincompetent, the and men ill-trained.A BritishofEcervisiting the vicinity noted that the Dograsoldiers were armedonly with flint muskets which, 'wouldtake aboutfive minutesto load . . . if the bulletwith its inequalities not did happento stickin the barrel.'2l To emphasize weakness the Britishpositionin Gilgit, Ghazan the of Khan, supportedby the irregulars Darel and Ponial, advancedto of investGilgit.At the root of Hunzadisaffection againlay Chaprot,the fortress situatedat the point wherethe territory Hunza, Nagarand of Kashmirmet. To the Mir of Hunza, Chaprotpresenteda constant threatso long as it was garrisoned Dogra troops.To Kashmir,the by positionwas vital becauseit dominatedthe route betweenGilgit and Hunza and protectedthe formeragainstflankattacksfromthe north. It was only throughtreacherywithin the ranksof the besiegersthat Gilgitwas saved.The incidentprovidedyet anotherargumentfor the removalof the Britishagentin Gilgit. Of greatersignificance than anythinghappeningin the vicinity of Gilgit) was the wave of anger that swept Britain as a result of thesecondAfghanwar. The Conservatives weresweptout of officeby the Liberals whatamounted a massive in to repudiation Lytton's of forward policy. As a consequence, LordRipon replacedLyttonas viceroy,and on the Isth of July, I88I, he wrote Lord Harringtonat the India OfEce:
. . . it hasbeendecidedto withdraw GilgitAgency,and, . . . the Maharaja the of Kashmirhas been so informed.The reasonsfor this step are various;but it may be brieflystated that neitherthe Government India, nor, apparof ently, the Maharaja Kashmir,is at presentin a positionto answerfor the of safetyof a BritishOHicer Gilgit in the event of a suddenattackupon the in
as here [Leh] and at Gilgit.' Sec. letter 228, 6 NovemberI879, encl., fIenvey to Lyall, 2I SeptemberI879, enclosingdemi-oS.Elias to Henvey, I3 SeptemberI879. 20 Henvey,quotedin Alder,;Northern Frontier, I 32. p. 21 Ibid.,p. I 35
THE
while on and unrulytribesof the neighbourhood; place by the independent of formedfor the establishment the Agency the otherhand, the expectations have not been fulISlled.22
urgedthe mountingof a punitive As a final act, the bellicoseBiddulph expeditionagainstHunza. 'We shall never be secureor peaceablein Gilgit,'he wrote,'if hostileactslike the recentonesare passedover . . . shouldbe madeof Hunzaonce andforall . . .'23 I thinka goodbusiness But coolerheadsprevailed,at least for th-etime being. The Panjdehincidentof March I885 and the very real dangerof promptedLord DuSerin,who had war with Russiaover Afghanistan assumedthe viceroyaltyin December I884, once more to reassess and the policytowards tribalstatesbetweenthe Vail of Kashmir British ColonelW. S. A. Lockdispatched the Hindu Kush. He consequently hart, in the middleof the next year, to examineonce morethe whole by was Lockhart accompanied a considerable region.24 of the northern escort, including an experiencedsurveyor,a doctor, an intelligence officer,and an armedcontingentof men from his own regiment.His the through to were'to determine whatextentIndiais vulnerable orders Hindu Kushrange....'2s the It tookLockhart bestpartof two yearsto completehis investigathe that a largeRussianarmycouldnevertraverse tions.He concluded bandsmost northernmountainbarrier,but that small, lightly-armed he certainlycould. To guardagainstthis contingency once moreproof posed the establishment a Britishpresencein Gilgit. This time the garrisonshouldnot consistentirelyof Dogra troops,but also of local to levies formedinto mobile scout detachments be led by I9 British by and officers supported a batteryof Punjabiartillery.26 Nagarwere to in Changes the statusquo in Hunza and neighboring In recommendations. NovemberI886, the add urgencyto Lockhart's Ali to viceroy forsvarded London the news that SaSdar Khan had murderedhis three brothersand his father,Ghazan Khan, and had
IOL, sec. letter I03, I5 July I88I. BritishMuseum,Kimberleypaps., 43564, Biddulphto Henvey, zo December I 880. wrote Cross,'the insatiable swallowedup half a continent,'Duffierin 24 CHaving that it is a real grievanceif they themselves chaps (the Russians)have persuaded are not allowed to confiscatea few hundredsquaremiles of anothergentleman's to property....' IOL, Crosspaps., Duffierin Cross,27 May I887. confidentialreportof their Gilgit missionhas and Woodthorpe 25 The Lockhart fromthe India OfficeLibraryand is not to be foundin Delhi. Fortundisappeared ately, Aldersaw it beforeit vanishedfromLondon,and refersto it in Alder,J%orthern p. Frontier, I55. pp. I55-7 26 Ibid.>
22 23
IO
ROBERT A. HUTTENBACK
appropriated throneof Hunza to himself.27 20 the On January I888, a combinedforce of 2,000 men from Hunza and Nagar once more expelledthe Kashmiri garrisons fromChaprotand neighboring Chalt, and threatenedNomal, only I5 miles from Gilgit itself.28 Although Nomal was not taken and the originalpositionwas restored,the incidentwas disquieting,29 especially SaSdar despitehavingimmedias Ali, ately tenderedhis allegiance Kashmir, to had enteredinto correspondence with China,and wasrumored have a Chinese to representative his side.30 Lord Dufferinreferred the state, which had never at to really attractedmuch attention in Calcutta previously,in a letter to the India Oice. 'Thougha petty State of not much militarystrength,' he wrote, Hunza notwithout is importance. it Chinese From Turkistan bereached can bya passorpasses hitherto unexplored immediately thenorthacross and to theKilik Pass,lies the gap between Afghanistan China.By pushing and through gapin however this insignificant number, by becoming or successors ofthe Chinese Kashgar, in whichcan hardlyagain be an independent Mussulman power,the Russians mightat any time, if the suzerainty of Kashmir not previously were established, acquire veryinconvenient rights or claimsoverKanjut[Hunza]. country no doubt, The is, roughanddifficult, the embarrassment but causedby its turning the Russians to should none lessbe material. the 6. For theseand otherreasons, cannot we recognise rightsin Hunza. is imperative in thisquarter should Chinese It that we keepthe Chinese and every otherpowerto the northof the barrier formed the line of the by Himalayas HinduKush;and thoughit may be and at moment enter anydiscussion the Chinese inexpedient this to into with Government the upon question, mustin practice we maintain rightto dealwithHunzadirect, our notwithstanding its nominal suzerainty China.3l to The peacefuldemarcation Afghanistan's of easternfrontier,formalized a protocol by signedin St. Petersburg inJuly I887, mightwell have ushered an era of Anglo-Russian in amity in centralAsia. For Herat, considered key to India by many strategists, the was served Afghanistan. uncertainty the Pamirs definitelypreto But in produced negative
27 IOL, sec./front.letter I-C, I8 November I886, memo. regarding aSairsbeyond the frontierof India, rec. OctoberI 886. NW 28 IOL, sec.'sletter432F,6 March I888, Peshawar conf. diary, 22 FebruaryI888. 29 IOL, sec./front. letter56, IO April I888. It was again decidedthat the road between Chaprotand Gilgitshouldbe improved.The Afghan frontierdemarcation of I886and a program road of buildingin the Punjabmanifested Britishconcernwith the northernand northwestern frontiers. 30 IOL, sec. /front.letter,30 June I 888. 31 IOL, sec's.letter2796F, 3I DecemberI888, Peshawar conf.diary,22 December I888, Chitraland Russia.
I I
reactionsfar outweighingthe positiveeffectsof the settlementof the Afghanboundary fromthe HariRud to the Oxus.EveryRussianin the regionbecame a fit object of suspicion.'A Russianofficerwith some diary anxiouslyreported,'has attendants,' Peshawarconfidential the been seen in the Pamirdesertcatchingbutterflies.'32 For some months, Sir MortimerDurand, foreignsecretaryto the closestfriendsand advisors, Government India and one of Dufferin's of had been of the opinionthat the Gilgit Agencywould have to be reIn districts strengthened. a storedand the Britishgrip on the northern of persuasivememorandum 2I May I887, he stronglyadvocateda returnto the forward policy. Everyeffortshouldbe made'. . . to bring them [the tribesof the Hindo Kush] underour influence,to open up their countryas far as possiblefor the movementof our officersand troops,and to organisethem for the purposesof defenceagainstany externalenemy. . .'33 The Hunza-Nagar captureof Chalt and Chaprothelped convince the assessed situation Duffterin Lockhart Durandhad probably that and accurately,and, as a consequence,Captain AlgernonDurand, the was on foreignsecretary's youngerbrother, ordered yet anothermission his to the Gilgitfrontier. I passedGilgit,'Durandinformed brother, 'As He 'I heard that a RussianOfficerhad just been to Hunza.'34 was who, with a small quite right, the officerwas CaptainGromchevsky, escort,had foundhis way throughthe fearedgap betweenthe Pamirs and ChineseTurkestan.Thus, as Durand observed,'the game had
begun.'35
for Pressure rapidlyincreased a returnto a policymorereminisnow Kashmir],'Durand cent of Lytton's.'As the suzerainpower [vis-d-vis [in contended,'the responsibilities the northernmarches]of Kashmir became ours and it was-recognisedthat the Hindu-Kushfor these The hundredsof miles must be our naturalfrontier.'36 returnof the British to Gilgit, Durand asserted,was necessaryto facilitate 'the and watchingand controlof the countrysouthof the Hindu-Kushn the organisation a forcewhichwouldbe ablein time of troubleto prevent of any GOUt demainby a small body of troopsacting acrossthe passes.'37 in wroteto the foreignsecretary T. C. Plowden,the resident Kashmir, the that the unrestin Hunza and Nagar, 'renders revivalof the Gilgit
conf. diary, 3I December I888, Peshawar 32 IOL, for. sec's. letter 2796F, December I888. memo. on the present position 33 NAI, October I887, sec. procs. 286-29I, 2I May I887. Central Asia, H.M.D. (Durand), I899), p. 60-I. 34 Algernon Durand, The Making of a Frontier (London, 37 Ibid., p. IR0. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid., p. 2.
22
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I2
ROBERT A. HUTTENBACK
Agencyand the introduction a firmand stab]epolicy a measureof of primary importance.'38 Gromchevsky's to Hunzacombinedwith a visit rumoredChinesepresenceto causemountingalarm. On 2 I JuneSirJohn Walsham, Britannic Her Majesty's ambassador to Peking,addressed Prince Ch'ing and the ministersof the Tsungli Yamen.He admittedthat Hunzapaid Chinaan annualtributeof one and a halfouncesof gold dust,forwhichpresents weregivenin return, and that it was probablyon this groundthat the Chineseclaimedthe allegianceof the state. 'But,'Walsham contended, whatever may be the foundation the claim,I am convinced the for that possibility embarrassing of questions arisingwill be best avoidedby my notifying YourHighness YourExcellencies the Chiefof Kunjut and that [Hunza]has also long been a feudatory Kashmir, of receiving yearly a pension payingtribute. wouldbe impossible and It therefore the Indian for Government allowthispettyborder to chieftain createdisturbances to on Indian withimpunity, in reliance hispretensions be a tributary soil and on to Stateto the Chinese Empire.39 The Chinesesaw fit to make no reply, and in July I889 the Gilgit Agency was reopenedwith AlgernonDurand in charge. The agent, who was alreadyin Kashmir, proceeded his new postwithoutdelay. to At the sametime, CaptainFrancisYounghusband the IStDragoon of Guards,was deputedto explorethe variouspassesleading to Hunza fromthe east and the north.40 purposeof Younghusband's The journey was twofold.He was to impress Mir of Hunza with the benefitsof the allegianceto the British,in view of the fact that the mir had recently informed residentin Kashmirthat the ChineseAmbanin Kashgar the proposed visit Hunza.4lThe residenthad been orderedto cajolethe to mir into discouragingthe mission without 'seeming to attach any specialimportance the matter,'and Younghusband to support to was the resident's effiorts. Younghusband alsoto visit the Kirghiz,who, was in the neighborhood Shahidulla(beyondthe Karakorams), of lived on the trade route from India to Chinese Turkestan.They were the constantvictimsof Hunza raids,and Younghusband to intercede was on their behalfwith the mir.42 Durandarrived Gilgiton 5 July, I889 and was at once orderedto in proceedto Hunza and Nagar:
38 I 888. 39
Ibid.,encl. I3, Walshamto TsungliYamen,2I June I888. IOL, sec/front.letter98, 5 July I889, encl. memo regarding affairsbeyond the NW frontierof India, Kashmir,Chitral,etc. 41 IOL, sec./front. letter98, 5 July I889. 42 Ibid.
40
THE
GREAT GAME
I3
. . . to counteract Chinese Russian the and attempts establish influence to an in thoseparts,to explainto the Chiefsthe position aSairs,to acquaint of themwiththewishes Government, to offier of and themincreased subsidies of Rs. 2000 eachperannum conditional thecessation raiding the upon of by Kanjutis Shimshal in valleyand elsewhere, the grantof freeaccessto and theircountries British by officers whenever considered necessary.43 He left Gilgit for Hunza and Nagar on I4 August and immediately upon his arrival encountereddifficultieswith SaSdar of Hunza, Ali whom he describedas 'a delicate-looking young man of twenty-two, with shifty Mongolianeyes, and a chestnut-coloured small peaked beardand moustache. The face was a delicateoval in shape,and weak in expression.'44 Hunzachiefwas displeased beingproferred The at the samesubsidyas his Nagarneighbor,and demandedan additionalRs. soo. Durandwas incensedat his attitude. He nowjudged SaSdar Ali to be 'cowardly, shifty,and with a ridiculous idea of his own importance.'45 he avoideda seriousconfrontation grantingSaSdar but by Ali's sons Rs. 500. Durandthen informedthe mir that the paymentof the subsidywas dependent uponhis preventing furtherHunzaraidson the Kirghizand upon his havingno furtherintercourse with the Russians or the Chinese.After some grumbling,SaSdarAli agreed to all of Durand's conditions exceptingthe last, for he contendedthat he could not totally terminate his relationshipwith his Chinese neighbors in virtue of his holdinga jagir in Yarkand.The Britishemissary, for his part, acceptedthe compromise,46 informedhis superiors and that both Hunza and Nagar 'have agreed to the conditions attached by the Governmentof India to their increased subsidies and unreservedly expressedthemselvesanxiousto serve the BritishGovernment.'47 Meanwhile,Younghusband had arrivedin Leh on 3I July. After making contact with the Kirghiz, he started for the no-man'sland aroundShahidulla,and reachedit on 2I August. The Kirghizcomplained that the Chinese oSered them no protection against the rapacious predators fromHunza, and proferred their allegianceto the British. Younghusband, promising forward to theirrequest Calcutta, to gave the tribesmensome money to repair their fort, and left on 3
43IOL, sec./front.letter I 05, 3 DecemberI 889. 44Durand, 7Che Making a Frontier, I59. of p. 45Ibid.,p. I63. 46IOL, sec./front.letter I05, 3 December I889, encl. 9, for. sec. to resident, 6 September I889. 47Ibid.,encl., memo.regarding aiairs beyondthe NW frontier India,c. Septemof ber I889. The Nagarchiefwasjudged most cooperative.
I4
ROBERT A. HUTTENBACK
September, bearingordersnot to returnto India via Hunza (wherehe was to have met Durand)becauseof the mir'shostileattitude.48 Younghusband's partyof I 7, amplyprovisioned with overthreetons of grainfor the horses,half that weightin flourand rice for the men, and a smallflockof sheepand goats,marchedfromShahidulla high in spirits,determinedto exploretwo unknownpasses-first the Saltoro, leadingfrom ChineseTurkestan into Baltistan,and secondthe Shimshal,whichconnectedTurkestan Hunza. Closeby MountGodwin and Austen (k-2) and legendaryGasherbrum. Younghusband advanced, but the assaulton the Saltorofailed,proving,at least, that it was impassable an invadingarmy.The Shimshal successfully to was negotiated, and on the Hunza side, Younghusband receivedan invitationfrom SaSdar Ali, whose attitude towardsthe Britishhad during the latter phasesof Durand's visit at leastfor the time beingsoftened. Younghusband replied with presentsand, before marchingback through the pass, announced his intentionto take advantageof the mir'sinvitait tion a few dayslater. The young officerwas not without his difficulties.The terrainhe traversedwas frequentlyclose to impossible.and the natives of the regionoften far fromfriendly,but he maintainedhis equanimityand the sublimeself-confidence typicalof the late Victorian: so
That I was able to do what I did was mainly due to the fact that I was an Englishman,that I stood for the BritishEmpire,and I had at my disposal not only the authority but the good name which England during long centurieshad established.... . . . I was the representative England.I was . . . the embodiment,the of incarnationof the spirit which animates England.... And I could feel Englandexpectingme to bear myselfin a mannerworthyof her....49
Once back on the north side of the pass, Younghusband found his mail fromIndia,whichincludedin it a letterinforming that Caphim tain Gromchevsky, officerwho had visited Hunza in the previous the year,was approaching India throughthe Pamirs,and a few dayslater he encountered'a tall, fine-looking beardedman in a Russianuniform.'50 Gromchevsky Younghusband and took an immediatelikingto each other and spent several happy hours together. 'I thoroughly enjoyed that meeting with a Russian officer,'Younghusband later remarked.
48 IOL, sec./front.letter I74, 3 December I889, encl. memo. regardingaffairs beyondthe NW frontierof India, NovemberI889. 49 GeorgeSeaver, Francis Younghusband (London,I 952), p. I 23. 50 Ibid., I 25. p.
THE
GREAT GAME
I5
We and the Russiansare rivals,but I am sure that individualRussianand like Englishofficers eachothera greatdeal betterthantheydo the individuals of nationswith which they are not in rivalry.We are both playingat a big game, and we shouldnot be onejot betteroSfor tryingto concealthe fact.5l
crossedthe KurbuPass Younghusband AfterleavingGromchevsky, Pass, and once Pamir,exploredthe Khunjerab on the Taghdumbash more enteredHunza throughthe MintakaPass. As the Britishparty imapproachedGulmit, it lingeredbrieflyso that an appropriately changed into his pressiveentrance could be made. Younghusband Ali's tent escortedby SaSdar uniformand approached scarletfull-dress clad in theirbestriflegreen.Thirteengunswere escorts, his six Gurkha of firedin saluteby the waitingmen of Hunza,while hundreds people covered the hillsidesand crowdedabout the line of march. At the Ali, was entranceto the tent, Younghusband met by SaSdar and as he remarked:
of to . I wasastonished findmyselfin the presence a manwith a complexion of almostEuropeanfairness,and with reddishhair. His features,too, were of an entirelyEuropeancast, and, dressedin Europeanclothes, he might anywherehave been takenfor a Greekor Italian. He was now dressedin a magnificentbrocade robe and a handsometurban, presentedby Colonel Lockhart.He had a swordand revolverfastenedround his waist, and one man with a drawn sword and anotherwith a repeatingrifle stood behind him.52
and Ali foundSaSdar arrogant overAs had Durand,Younghusband bearing.It must have infuriatedthe indomitableBritish Oicer to of that realizethatthe manwasundertheimpression the Empress India of of the Czarof Russia,and the Emperor ChinawerechieEs neighborAli ing tribes! SaSdar claimed descentfrom a nymph of the Hinduthe Kushandfelt that he andAlexander Greatwere patternscut from the same bolt.53He incessantlyaskedfor more presents,and Youngagainst warning to had husband constantly bearin mindGromchevsky's chidedthe mirfor Alis greed.WhenYounghusband cateringto SaSdar not Ali so havingreceivedGromchevsky cordially,SaSdar promised to let the Russiansinto Hunza again. He would not, however,despite that assertion he had alreadydonesoncommithimselfto stop Durand's All road unlesshis subsidywere raised.54 in raidingthe Leh-Yarkand Ali concludedthat SaSdar 'wasa cur at heart,and all, Younghusband in the last degreeunworthyof ruling so fine a race as the people of
51 52
p.
272.
aiairs beyond letter4, 7 January I890, encl., memo.regarding 54 IOL, sec./front. the NW frontierof India, DecemberI889.
I6
ROBERT A. HUTTENBACK
Hunza.'55 did not thinkthat SaSdar would be He Ali quieteduntil he was cowedby a superior force.56 Nevertheless, visit endedrelatively the amicably, and when Younghusband left Hunza on 23 November SaSdar deputedhis brother,MahomedNazim, to Ali escorthis British guestto Gilgit. The reportsfiled by Durand and Younghusband had a profound eSect on the viceroy,LordLansdowne. was He gratifiedthat between the Karakoram the Shimshal and Passes,'no practicable militaryroute debouches into the Indusvalleyfromthe north.'57 the other On hand, the existenceof the MintakaPass,on the directroad fromYarkand to Hunza,was causefor alarm,for it had been unknown priorto Younghusband's journey. The viceroywas convincedthat the sented no obstacleto a lightly equippedforce, and he Pamirspreseriouslycontemplatedthe invasionof Hunza and the depositionof the suspect SaSdar Ali: The successful invasion Hunzaand the destruction the Raja'sfort of of would oneblowdissipate at theseviews[thelocaldread Hunza]; of raiding on the Yarkand wouldceaseforever;andthe road Rajawouldsinkto his proper position thatofaninsignificant tributary theBritish of Government. Ourpractical assumption sovereignty to the HinduKush,and our of up determinationmakethe traderoutefromLehto Yarkand to safe,willleave usno alternative force,shouldSafdar Khan, but Ali as is mostlikely,not actup to his word.Suchan expedition moreover wouldbe an excellent object lesson,and show the surrounding tribes,who look on the British Government an inexhaustible as source fromwhichto drawmoney,that there bayonets are behind rupees....58 the Itwas, however,to take some two yearsbefore the viceroycould discover pretextto justifyhis purpose. a I89I was to be a year of crisison the Pamirs.Rumorsof activity were given substance the captureand expulsionof Russian by Younghusband the region.SaSdar and his ambitious from Ali neighbor,Uzr Khan, son of the Tham Nagar,Jafr Khan, were the of apparently once more layingplans seizeChaltand Chaprot, notNomal.And to if Durand was morethan active in attemptingto counteractany and all threats to positionandthatof the British alongthe his Raj northern frontier. He cajoled tribes and constantlyattempted to the improve the roads between Gilgitand the outlyingforts.But the new agent'srole was not an one. Althoughlessso than in the daysof easy Durand's predecessor, John Biddulph,the Gilgit Agency was still in large part under the jurisdiction Kashmir of the authorities; Durand'wasreallyansweryet ssSeaver, Eounghusband, p. I32. 56 See fn.54. 57 IOL, sec./front. 43,28 April letter I890. 58 Ibid.
THE
GREAT GAME
able for the propergovernment progress the Gilgit district,and and of forthe discipline controlof the troops.'59 and Eventually, modus a vivendi was achieved.Durandorganized,unofficially, what he called a Committeeof PublicSafety,consisting the Kashmiri of Governor, Dogra the militarycommander, himself.This committeemet periodically and to determinepolicy, and, on the whole, the agent's advice was followed.60
In May I 89I, it becameknownthat the repairof the Gilgit-Nomal road by Kashmirisappersand minerswas arousingstrongfeelingsin both Hunzaand Nagar.Uzr Khan had essentially replacedhis pacifically-inclinedfather, and had murderedtwo of his youngerbrothers, thus aligninghis state in commoncause with his bellicoseneighbor. Durand reportedthat both chiefs had declaredit their intention to resistany attemptsto repairthe road past Nomal. 'In anticipationof the advancefromGilgit [towards Hunza] rocksare being piled on the edge of cliffis alongwhichthe Hunzaroadrunsn the Raja'sattitude and is defiantand improper.'6l exacerbate situationfurther, To the Durand informedhis superiors that SaSdar was maintaininghis relations Ali not only with the Chinese,but with the RussianConsulat Kashgar.62 'Therewas not muchtime to think,'Durandwrotelater,
. . . and I decidedat once to make a dash for Chalt . . . I gave the orderat threein the afternoon, and by dusktwo hundredmen of the KashmirBody Guardregiment) little Gurkhas and Dogras,were over the rope bridgeand on their way, with their full complementof ammunitionand rations.63
Durandnot only strengthened positionat Nomal,but marched the to Chalt, even thoughthe tribesmen lookedupon it 'as on the stringsof their wives' paijamas.'64 Conversations with the Hunza and Nagar vakils ensued,and an uneasypeace returnedto the frontier,while the strengthof Durand's Kashmiriforces and the Ponial levies, Raja Akbar Khan's merry men, as Durand called them, was carefully assessedby the tribesmenof Hunza and Nagar. Durandreturnedto 59 Durand, rheMakinga Frontier, of p. X6.
60 With the advent of Durand'ssuccessor, Dr. Robertson,the situationbecame more reminiscent Biddulph's of time. Robertsonclaimedthat the Dogra governor ruinedhis opponents throughhis powerto commandeer forcedlabor,whichhe often did whenthe rice cropwasin needof harvesting. Robertson suggested that the agent, at least for a time, be vestedwith the civil authority.IOL, Elgin paps., 37 Elgin to
I89I,
Ibid.
I8
ROBERT A. HUTTENBACK
Gilgit on June 2I) convinced that his thrust had for the moment averted an explosion,'but I had no hope that the settlementwas permanent, I knew Uzr Khan'sambitionto make himselfmaster for of Chalt,andthe HunzaChiefwasbusybreaking everyone of the terms of his agreement with US....S65 Therewaslittle doubtthat Durandwasanxiousto cometo gripswith SaSdar Khan. The Britishofficerrecalledall too vividly his rude Ali treatmentat the handsof the Hunza chief, SaSdar Ali's loud protestation of allegiance China,and his stateddetermination, attacked,to to if fightand awaitthe arrivalof Chineseassistance.66 Durandpointedout that he had beenwillingto allowSaSdar to sendan annualdeputaAli tion to Kashgar,but that the mir had, in return, to accept British suzerainty,to exclude Russianand Chineseofficials,and to refrain fromraidingthe Yarkand roadand otherregionsbeyondthe boundsof his state. Durandagain contendedthat SaSdar had agreedto these Ali stipulationsbut that he had then broken his word. He had communicatedwith both the Russiansand the Chinese.He had been disrespectfulto the Maharajaof Kashmir, and he had kidnappeda numberof Kashmiris. 'My idea,' Durandwrote,
is that we have no time to lose if Hunza is not to fall under Chineseand Russianinfluence,and that we shouldbe preparedto settle once and for all with Nagar this autumn. . . . The eXecton the frontierof our crushingHunzawould be very great. . . . By the paymentof subsidiesalone we cannot obtain the hold we must have on this frontier.... The time has come to make these people feel the iron hand up to now concealedunderthe velvet glove....67
No doubt, Durandwas particularly aironted by a communication he had receivedfrom SaSdar in the summerof I89I. 'The letter in Ali whichwithoutreason hadwritten you pompous words. . . wasreceived,' the mir noted. '. . . PleaseGod we have the strengthto fight until the arrivalof the Kha Kan of China.May it be knownto you.'68 In a memorandum 4 SeptemberDurandurged the subduingof of of Hunzaand Nagar,'at the leastsign of opposition our wishes.'He of
65 66
Ibid., 243 p
Durand contendedthat Hunza had been subjectto Kashmirsince I868 and Nagarsince I 869. Hunzaannuallypaid Kashmir tributeof two horses,two hounds a and twentyouncesof gold in returnforwhichthe mir receiveda subsidy.The Nagar tributeconsisted twenty-onetolas (about8 I /2 ounces)of gold dust and a basket of of apricots.(At leastpartof the basisof SafdarAli's claimedsubordination China to was thejagir he held in Yarkand.)IOL, sec./front.letter I-C, z5 OctoberI89I, encl. 5, A. G. Durandto Prideaux,zx July I 89 I .
67 68
I89I.
THE
GREAT GAME
I9
of at of requested stationing 200 Gurkhas Gilgitand the assignment the the fourteenmore officersto the garrison.He recommended addition of more mobile artilleryon transportmules to the brigadeof three regimentsand a mule batteryalreadyunderhis command.He asked in his that LieutenantJ.Manners-Smith, assistant Gilgit,be deputedto of construction a spendthe winterin Chitral,and urgedthe immediate to telegraphline fromSrinagar Gilgit.69 Ten days later, Durandexpandedon his alreadystatedviews. The British,he contended,had to controlall the countryto the crestof the Hindu Kush. This policy had alreadybeen followedin Chitralto the to west and in Ladakhto the east. It would be only consistent pursue the same coursein Hunza. He proposedthat in October troops be moved up to Chalt, and that the rulersof Hunza and Nagar be informedthat owingto the RussianThreat,Britishtroopsmusthavefree in and theirterritory orderto hold the frontier. accessto theirborders At the firstovertmoveby eitherHunzaor Nagar,Britislltroopsshould Ali, occupythe states,deposeSaSdar and replacehim by his 5- or 6ex-Wazircuryear-oldson, who would be advisedby the pro-British rentlyin exile in Chitral.Evenif Nagarremainedfriendly,Uzr I(han to shouldbe removed.'He is dangerous the rulingchief,who wouldbe glad to get rid of him.970 the concerning courseof eventsbeyondthe northThe memorandum west frontierfor SeptemberI89I reported:
The Hunza Raja has written to the British Agent at Gilgit promising not to allow any Russians to enter his territory, but declining to allow messengers from the Gilgit Agency to go to Captain Younghusband [who was once again in the field] with letters via Hunza. He is being told in reply that his refusal cannot be regarded as satisfactory, and that in future he will be expected to send through, and help to the utmost of his ability, any messenger despatched by the officersof the Agency. The Chief permitted one messenger to go to Captain Younghusband, but told him that he would not be allowed to return through Hunza territory. This incident is an additional proof of the necessity for bringing the Hunza Chief to order at the earliest opportunity.7l
Ali's of As a consequence this intelligenceand the reportsof SaSdar Lord Lanswith the Russiansand Chinese,72 continuingintercourse
69 70
Ibid., encl. 6, memo.by A. G. Durand,4 SeptemberI89I. Ibid., encl. 8, memo. by A. G. Durand, I4 SeptemberI89I.
71IOL, sec./front.letter I7X, I4 OctoberI89I. fromHunza was 72 The evidenceof Hunza duplicitywas rathervague. A mission whom it ignored.The apparentlyin Kashgarat the same time as Younghusband, and gave presentsto Petrovsky,the Russianconsul-general, emissaries supposedly at had a secretmeetingwith the Russiangovernor-general Osh.
20
ROBERT A. HUTTENBACK
the He requests. approved dispatch downeaccededto mostof Durand's and ten officers(makinga total of I6)73to Gilgit. In of 200 Gurkhas of addition,the Government India would permitthe stationingof the Kashmirbattery currentlyin Gilgit at any forwardsite selected by Durand.The equipmentof the Kashmirmountainbatteryat Jammu was to be improved (the existing guns were to be replaced by 7for for in pounders) preparation its futuredeparture Gilgit.Lieutenant deputationto Chitralwas approved,and Captain Manners-Smith's was in to assistant the resident Kashmir, designated W. H. M. Stewart;, of in his replacement Gilgit.Finally,the Government Indiawaswilling and Gilgit.74 a to construct telegraphline betweenSrinagar the Amidstall the furor,GeorgeMacartney, Britishofficerstationed held no designson gave it as his opinionthat the Russians in Kashgar, their sphereof influence, within what the Britishconsidered territory of and were not anxiousfor war despite their apprehension Younghusbandin the Pamirs.On the contrary,he suspectedthat the whole incidenthad been staged, 'not with a view to a definiteassertionof of, occupation the Pamirs, over,and an immediate jurisdiction Russian which the but in orderto forcea protestfromus respecting treatment had CaptainYounghusband been subjectedto, and therebypave the Officeintimateda The on way to pourparlers the Pamirs.'75 iForeign conconcededthat Macartney's and similarpossibility,76 the viceroy of But jecture might be true.77 if this somewhatalteredassessment the Russianthreat presageda mellowingof the British Indian attitude to Russia,it avas be of little use to the Mir of Hunza.In a note towards to Ali had reiteratednot only his determination to Durand, SaSdar excludeRussians,Afghans,and Chinesefrom his realm, but also his to intentionof allowingno Englishmen crossHunza on their way to Yarkandand Kashgar.'I had with my own mouth beggedof you' he wrote,
with Kashgar,Yarkand,and the Pamirsthrough to kindlystop intercourse my country,and said I would not let your men pass throughmy country
IOL, sec./front.letter I-C, 25 OctoberI89I. statecouncil,23 September of to Ibid.,encl. I 3, resident actingpresident Kashmir Durandhad great diEculty with the telegraphline from Gilgit to Srinagar, I89I. and it was not operatingproperlyeven by I892. The line from India to Kashmir was often out of orderfor as long as eight monthsout of the year. Alder, Jorthern p. Frontier, 23I. 75 IOL, sec./front. letter X I 2, I 6 DecemberI 89 I, encl. I, G. Macartneyto for. dept., Govt. of India, I 3 SeptemberI 89 I . 76 IOL, home corres.,sec. and pol., For. OS. to India OS., minute paper, 2I OctoberI 89 I . /front. letter2 I 2, I 6 DecemberI 89 I . 77 IOL, sec.
73 74
2 I
towards the up-country,and had said that all persons coming for the Chinese,Russians,and Afghanswith the objectof going towardsGilgit will be sent back.You and we have enteredinto thosepromises.78 The movement of troops under Durand's command to Chalt at the end of October, with the announced intention of building roads to Hunza and Nagar, set light to the train which was to result in the longanticipated explosion. By mid-November, Durand was prepared to commence the road-building program. On the I6th it was noticed that the men of Hunza were gathering at Mayun, and those of Nagar at Nilt. Durand consequently prepared for war, and within ten days had all in readinessat Chalt. He had under his command I 88 men of the sth Gurkha regiment, 30 men of the xoth Punjab Infantry (the Gilgit Agency bodyguard), three regiments of Kashmir Imperial Service troops, a few sappersand miners, I60 irregularsfrom Ponial, a Kashmir mountain battery, two guns of the Hazara mountain battery, and a gatling gun. Durand's total force thus amounted to some ,ooo men, but as Gilgit and posts along his line of communications had to be garrisoned, only about I000 men (and xooo coolies) were available for operations beyond Chalt. On 29 November, Durand sent ultimatums to both Jafr Khan of Nagar and SaSdarA1; Khan of Hunza. The notes were peremptory in the extreme. The chiefs were informed that the Russian threat in the Pamirs necessitatedthe Britishgaining free access to Hunza and Nagar, although there was no intention of interfering in internal aSairs: decidedto make a road from has, therefore, . . . The supremeGovernment Gilgit to Ghaltwherea fort will be built and from Chalt to Hunza/Nagar, of As or so far beyondthat place as may be necessary. a feudatory the British you Government, are now calleduponto give any aid in yourpowertowards of the construction the road. I am furtherdirectedto informyou that, in so far as {t concernsthe road beyond Chalt, which will pass through your will territery, refusalon your part to permitits construction be accepted. no Tha road must be made. Unlessyou instantlycomplywith the demandsof thve SupremeGovernment,troopswill enter your territory,and the road till be constructedin spite of any oppositionyou may offier.Three days fromthisdate will be allowedyou, duringwhichyouransweris awaited,and the I warn you that, shouldit not be completelysatisfactory, troopsunder my commandwill move forward,and carry out the order of the Government....79 On the second day, Durand's emissary returned without his horse,
Ali letter I-C, 25 OctoberI89I, encl. 9, SaSdar to Durand,no 78 Ibid.,sec./front. date (sometime in September). Ali and 79 IOL, sec./front.letter 5I, 23 March Ig92n encl. 3, Durandto SaSdar Jafr Khan, 29 NovemberI89 I .
22
ROBERT A. HUTTENBACK
bearinglettersfromthe two chiefs.Jafr Khan'smessagespokeof the friendshiphe and SaSdarAli had always manifestedtowards the British. and Ali] I and my nephew[SaSdar werenot smallpersons, nowyou have and thanothers, you havewasted as me counted and my nephew smaller by will Its feelings. punishment be awarded and ourfriendship well-wishing words.80 (God).Therecan be no tastein further the HolyPreserver Ali SaSdar insisted,as indeed he had many times before,that his only that he would of with the Government Indiastipulated agreement but to barhis territory the Chineseand the Russians, not that he would not to allowthe British crossit, andcertainly to builda road.He wrote: yourarmyfromGilgit havecome brought . . . At thistime devilhaving [it] you a written letterfullof threats haveforwarded to Chalt,andhaving you not This to these well-wishers. should havebeendone,because aredoing has aboutgivingtheroad.... Fromoldentimesthis county been pretences of subject the GrandKhakan(Emperor China).... Fromoldentimes to of havingeatenthe wealthof the Emperor China,how can we not have to bullets enough ? to bullets enough lastfora year Wehopewe havegolden of towards Court the has us lastfora year.From no sortof failing happened reach of the Government India.Fromeverysidewe willmakeourpetition At Government. thattimeyourheadwillgo ontothegallows.81 the English The firsteveningof Decemberfound Durandand his men camped what lay ahead,Durand acrossthe Hunza River.As he contemplated reflected: But and peace, I hadfailed. as I layunder . . . I haddonemybestto preserve and of to the stars,listening the talkand laughter the bivouac, wentover I of againandagainin mymindtheevents thelastfewmonths, knewthatI on had to hadleftno stoneunturned avoidwar.The tribesmen rushed their quick to strike and was fate,thediewascast,andall thatremained to strike hard.82 December2nd dawnedclearand cold, and well beforefirstlight the buglessoundedreveille.CoSeewas brewed,and while it was still dark the men fell into theirpositionsand the marchtowardsthe enemywas from but underway. The path was precipitous, 200 Pathanengineers the civilianfirmof Speddingand Companydid their best to makethe By routepassable. one o'clock,the enemypositionat Nilt was reached; mule was lost alongthe way. only one ammunition apparently picture.The wallsbuilt a musthavepresented formidable Thefortress werefifteento twentyfeethighand by of stonereinforced heavytimbers
80 81
Ibid.,encl. 4, Jafr Khan to Durand,30 NovemberI89I. Ali Ibid.,SaSdar to Durand, I DecemberI 89I . p. of 82 Durand, rhe Making a Frontier, 252.
THE
GREAT GAME
23
twelve feet thick in most places. Large square towers stood at the corners.Accessto the place was guardedby a rushingmountaintorand G. underLieutenants H. Boisragon Badrent. The sth Gurkhas, cock, mounteda frontalassault,while the Ponialis and some men of CaptainR. H. the 20thPunjabRifles,led by CaptainColinMackenzie, scrambled the heightthat up LieutenantManners-Smith, Twigg, and dominatedthe bastion. The Ponialis fired from the summit. The into the trenchwhere descended Britishoicers and the 20th Punjabis the fort actuallystood,and openedan assaultthere. the Froma bluffoverlooking river,andnot I50 yardsfromthe enemy, Captain Bradshawand some of the Kashmiri sepoys commenced firing. They were soonjoined by Captain C. A. Molony with some and ofthe 20thPunjabis the gatlinggun, andby Lieutendozensoldiers not The ant R. St. G. Gorton,with two seven-pounders. tribesmen, at positions,were becomingdemoralized their best fighting from fixed despitethe intrinsicstrengthof their defenses.Althoughthe artillery had little actual eSect, it served to intensifythis mood. Finally, a followedby the blowingup of chargeby IOO men of the sth Gurkhas, the Nilt fort'smain gate by CaptainAylmer,carriedthe positionand an the day for the British.The action cost the defenders estimated80 lost 'dead,while the attackers six killed and 30 wounded.Includedin this last group were LieutenantsBadcock,Forton, and Boisragon, CaptainAylmer, and Durand himself,who immediatelydesignated GeorgeRobertsonas politicalofficerin his place, and Surgeon-Major of CaptainL. J. E. Bradshaw the 3sth BengalInfantry,militarycommander.As a resultof the attackon Nilt, CaptainAylmerand Lieutenant Boisragonwere awarded the Victoria Cross, and Lieutenant ServiceOrder. Badcock Distinguished the of to The problemof Nilt was easycompared the prospect capturing outworks,which the forts of Thol and Mayun, and their supporting straddled Hunza River to the northof Nilt, and which had to be the forceswereto advanceinto the heartof Hunzaand takenif the British On werenonplussed. the 8th an abortive Nagar.For a time the British and attackon Thol had to be abandoned, the followingday emissaries from Hunza oSered to negotiateon the basis of the withdrawalof Durand's ultimatum;but the termswere declined.The Britishvented manner by playingfootball.The in their frustration a characteristic men of Hunza and Nagar, thinking the game some strange and bachas. by magicalritual,responded beatingdrumsand firingtheirsher Four days after the attemptedattack on Thol, a surpriseattack on Mayumwent awry.
24
ROBERT A. HUTTENBACK
The dilemma confounding Britishwas not totally unlike that the facedby Wolfewhenconfronted the Heightsof Abraham.I200 feet by of apparently sheercliShad to be scaledto dislodgethe tribesmen from redoubtsthat were the key to the defenseof Thol Fort and the neighboringziyarat (shrine).Throughthe courage a DogranamedNagdu, of a difficultbut negotiablepath was discovered, on the morningof and 20 December, LieutenantManners-Smith 50 Gurkhas, led followedby Lieutenant H. Taylorand 50 Dogras,on the difficultascent.At one F. point, the party took the wrong path and was faced by a precipice. Severaltimes the soldiershad to retracetheir steps.But progress was steadyif slow, and fortunately the British,they were not discovered for until it was too late. A stiS Eghtstill lay ahead,but positionafterposition fell until panic apparentlyseized the tribesmenon both sides of the riverand, abandoning thoughtsof further all resistance, they made a headlongdash for home. For his part in the battle on the heights above Thol, Lieutenant Manners-Smith was awarded the Victoria Cross,makinga total of three for the campaign.83 war was now The essentiallyover. All that remainedwas to dictate the terms of the
peace. 84
As the Nagarruler, JafrKhan,wasconsidered have beenthe pawn to of his son, Uzr Khan, he was not deposed. SaSdar Ali,85his wazir, Dadu, and Uzr Khan all fled the country.Uzr Khan in time returned and was exiledto Kashmir,but SaSdar and his wazirweredeposed Ali largelyon the basisof some mundaneand ambiguous correspondence with Russianand Chineseauthorities found in the fort at Baltit, the capital of Hunza.s6Durand'sfriend, the ex-wazir Humayun, was recalledfrom Chitraland installedin his old position,while Muhammad lSazim AKhan, half-brother SaSdarAli Khan, who had the of earlierescorted Younghusband Gilgit,was createdmir. He ruledfor to many years and was neverto forgetto whom he owed his position.87 Lieutenant C. V. F. Townshend,of the Central India Horse, was
83 A number of Orders of Merit, which Durand judged the 'native army' equivalent of the Victoria Cross, were awarded the rank and Sle. The large number of Victoria Crosses won in the Hunza campaign leads to the conclusion that the brief war was arduous and that perhaps the medal became more diEcult to earn as time went on. 84 NAI, September I892, sec. F. procs., 396-472. 8s SaSdarAli retired to his jagir in Yarkand. 86 Correspondence (though not complete) dealing with the Hunza-Nagar campaign was published in C. 662I (I892). 87 'The Autobiography of Sir Mohamed Nazim Khan, K.C.I.E., Mir of Hunza,' translated from the Urdu by his grandson (the present mir), Jamal Khan. There is a copy of this unpublished work in the library of the University of California, Berkeley.
THE
GREAT GAME
25
appoirltedmilitary governorof Hunza, and a strong contingentof troopswas sent 'to Gulmat,Girchaand Misgarto examinethe road, and impressremotevillagesby the militarydisplay.'88 In AugustI892, Younghusband appointedpoliticaloicer, and was the occupation Hunzawas assigned somewhat than IOO Kashof to less miritroopsconnectedby smalloutposts with Gilgit,85 milesaway.By late I894, the situation was apparentlyso stable that the political officerin Hunza vvasremoved,leavingthe commander the garrison of eSectivelyin charge. The tightening of the British (ostensiblythe Kashmiri)grip orl Hunza and Nagar broughtinto greaterprominencethe questionof Hunza'srelationship China.GeorgeMacartney Kashgarattempto in ted to summarize situatiorl. the ISt.-The Chineseauthorities receivetributefrom the Raja of Hunza generally a yearin themonthof September once whenthe Rajasendsup a deputation threeor fourpersons Kashgar. offiering of to His consists two of or three bagsof smallnuggets gold,of thevalueof roughly xoo,which of Rs. are presented with a petitionaddressed the Taotai of Kashgar. to The petition I suppose, a nature is, of similar thatformerly by the Raja to sent of Sikkim the Chinese to Resident Tibet.In return the offiering, in for the Raja's envoys backto Hunzapresents moneyamounting Rs. goo take in to to Rs. I200together various with pieces silk. of 2nd. The Chinese authorities consider, Rajaof Hunzabeinga vassal, the theyhavetheright issue to orders him.In I888, thethenTaotai Kashgar to of wrote Raja.It wasto order to cease the him raiding Shahidula. letter) at His I believe, littleheeded, it appears Rajacommitted raidsoon was for the a afterthe receipt it.89 of According a furtherdispatchfromMacartney, to writtenjust before the commencement hostilities,the tEaotaaof Kashgarhad assured of Nazur Ali, the emissaryfrom Hunza, that he would prevent an invasionby the British.He woulddeputean officerto the statewho 'will be furnished with all necessary placards which,testifying the factthat to Hunza is Chineseterritory,vvillprevent foreignerscoming into the State indiscriminately.'g As soon as the Chinesebecameawareof the Britishincursions into Hunza, the tEaotaaof Kashgar remindedthe viceroy and the commander-in-chief Hunza was and had been) sfromolden times a that
88 IOL, sec./front. letter8, I3 JanuaryI892, encl. memo.regarding aSairsbeyond the NW frontierof India, DecemberI89I. Also C. 662I, no. I7, viceroyto sec. of state, 3I DecemberI89I. 89 IOL, sec./front.letter 5I, 23 March I892, encl. I, Macartneyto for. dept., Govt. of India, 24 OctoberI89 I . 90 Ibid.,encl. 2, Macartney for. dept., Govt. of India, 23 NovemberI89I. to
26
ROBERTA. HUTTENBACK
to allow a of dependency the ChineseEmpire.'Durandwas prepared was envoy to crossHunza to talk with him at Gilgit, and he Chinese of and the Government opinionto the viceroy to willing conveyChinese feudatory but India, he wasunderordersto treatHunzaas a rebellious of the Kashmirand to admit no foreignrightson the Indian side of Macartneyreportedthat M. Petrovsky,the Russian Kush.91 Hindu intervene in in consul Kashgar,had tried to force the Chinese to of Sarikolshould a and Hunza, had even threatened Russianinvasion it announced as his intention consequently not they do so. The viceroy the Britishpositionand emphasizing writeto the Taotai, explaining to India had no designson Chineseterritory.g2 that action in to Furthermore, the India Office,the viceroyjustiSedthe paperswhich and Hunza Nagarby claimingthat the largelyinnocuous had been foundin the fort at Baltithad provedthat the Russians had Ali SaSdar to temporizeuntil the spring,when Russiantroops urged come to his aid: would none werestopped in intrigues Hunza that showed Russian papers .. . These werein progress communications Secret campaign. soonby lastwinter's too hadbeen Ali and the between Russians SaSdar Khan;a Hunzadeputation in the hadbeensentto theHunzaChief presents Turkistan; to sent Russian had askedthe the of name 'His Majesty WhiteCzar';and M. Petrovsky and Government, British with to Chief givehima copyof hisagreement the to Younghusband the Gilgit Captain from and tointercept sendhimletters Agency.93 Ali, in to also quoted a letter from Gromchevsky SaSdar Lansdowne as soon as 'some whichthe Russianexplorerpromisedto visit Hunza that the dearEnglishguests'had left. The viceroydid, however,admit had no of conclusion the messagehad pointedout that Gromchevsky Royal manpoliticalpurposeto hisjourney.'I have not receivedany As place.594 a final date,' the Russianhad written,'to any particular of a will of the reportedthe discovery Lansdowne strangecoincidence,
aSairs beyond the IOL, sec./front. letter 34, 2 March I892, memo. regarding NW frontier of India, February I 892. 92 Ibid. The India Office Library copy of secret I892. 93 IOL, sec./front. letter 96, 3I May Gilgit Agency, memorandum, no. 88 on the reorganization of the and political attached to it a newspaper clipping which claims to prepared by S. C. Bayley, has in which Baron Vrevsky, be a translation from the official Russian Turkestan Gazette, of a Hunza delegation Turkestan, refused the request the governor-generalof Russian were well treated and that for arms, etc. Reuters then reported that the emissaries and commercial intercourse between Hunza and tentative plans for communication Russian Central Asia were concluded. 44 Ibid.
91
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late Ghazan Khan, in which he had convenientlydesignatedthe NazimKhan,his nomineeforthe throneof Hunza,Muhammad British heir.95 The Britishposition on Chinese rights in Hunza was intimately Nazim with the whole questionof the Pamirs.Muhammad associated and his wazir,Humayun,as soon as they had assumedoffice,claimed Pamir,includingRaskam,on behalfof the wholeof the Taghdumbash at Younghusband, least, was far from convincedabout the Hunza.96 but validityof the claim,97 was quite willing to take full advantageof of 'In the new mir'scontention. principlethe Government Indiafavour the idea of getting the "no man'sland" . . . filled up by the Chinese, the As subjectto futuredelimitationof boundaries.'98 a consequence, of viceroywroteto the secretary state:
Pamir. . .. . . . With regardto the Hunza Chief'sclaim to the Taghdumbash the Residentin Kashmirhas been told that, if Chinawould hold the Taghof the dumbasheffiectively, Government India will not be disposed,under present conditions,to press the Hunza claim; seeing, however, that it is probablethat Russia will occupy the Taghdumbashif China retired, the claim should not at presentbe altogetherabandoned....99
of Whatthe Government India clearlywantedwas an Indiafrontier assumption and alongthe HinduKushand Pamirs, Chinese established on over at least some of the territory the otherside of of responsibility the range.To alienateChinaover Hunzawould thus clearlynot be in the British interest. Macartneyfelt that the British should permit Hunza to continue paying tribute to China in return for a British to the consulat Kashgar, rightof merchants travelvia Sarikol,and the establishmentof British trading privileges in Chinese Turkestan he Generally, was sympato equivalent thoseenjoyedby the Russians. thetic to the Chineseposition.'In six years,'he wrote, 'we have taken no less than three countries,Burma,Sikkimand Hunza, which they but it well deserved, is true,to losefor theirbad government, to which had they, nevertheless, somesortof claim.'100 Ali, The Chinese,for theirpart, askedwhy SaSdar who was the sub95IOL, sec./front.letter96, 3I May I892. 4 to 96 Ibid.,encl. 4, Manners-Smith resident, April I892. letter96, 3I May I892, encl. I4, note by F. E. Younghusband, 97 IOL, sec./front. 20 April I892. to 98 Ibid.,encl. 2, I33F, sec. to the for. dept., Govt. of Indian resident,I6January
I893-
Ibid., sec./front.letter I20, 5 July I892, memo. regardingaSairs beyond the 99 NW frontierof India,June I892. Ibid., 100 encl. 6, Macartneyto H. M. Durand, I6 FebruaryI892.
Durandshould had beendeposed.'Colonel troopsto go 'Great ofthe Emperor,' own limits, and orderthe ject troopswithin your of Kanjutfromanxietyandgive them your keep the people Kashgar: will This back. relieve Ali, himself,wroteplaintivelyfrom forthe SaSdar mind.'10l of of not givingpassage peace no otherfaultthanthat been subjectto the Emcommitted 'I have times Kanjut has deny becausefrom olden give passage the road. . . I do not for road; not of China; of perors I could of the Government India.' In conclusion, the salt have eaten no avail. thatI but it was to Mir of Nazim as the new begged he for reinstatement,102 'The Chineserecognized due In course, the represented the officialenthronement. of at but askedto be of the Government Hunza, the foreigndepartment Government,' Chinese in Kashmir, the informed resident of the newruler India that installation Ministers earnestness, the The with officials. Chinese world requested much has of presence one of itsas a tangible proofto the take shouldplacein The of thispoint accord. look areactingin complete wouldon the concession have and England HerMajesty's Government China in this but that matter forsuch are to thisproposal evident,it will notforma precedent objections understanding that to it agreedon the occasions....103 on future claim althoughit was discussed; was if he so question neverreally Hunzatribute continuethe custom The Mir of Hunzacould to the act. agreed tacitly that the politicalsignilScance ChangHung Tao, if he attributedno emissary, and General desired Chinese giftsfor the mir Atthe end of May, the includedamonghis acceptanceof He apparently in arrivedHunza. buttonand a peacockfeather,the a 'The Envoy is hat a adornedwith unfortunateimplications. would have had of India commented, which the demeanour,' Government in The friendly Government. British of Chinese theauthority the it has been settledbetweenthe to disposed assert that but in been informed claimsare to be satisfied at Agent GilgithasGovernment Chinese tllat Nazim's at and British Chinese of a Chinese representative. Muhammed . is not . . The Envoy. . the presence by full this beyond can be allowed; nothing installation; dealings theHunzaChief.l04 with haveanydirect to Robertson,then officiating The itself, Surgeon-Major IndianGovernment. In the ceremony the British agentin Gilgit,represented I892. British Durand,c. February
28 A. G. Taotaiof Kashgarto G. Durand,no date. for. dept., Govt. of India, to Ali SaSdar to A. May I892, encl. I7, 02 Ibid.,encl., 3I sec./front.letter96, 103 IOL, beyond the I 892. memo. regardingaSairs I892, resident,I 6 May I20, 5 July letter 104 Ibid.,sec./front. I892. of frontier India,June NW
101Ibid.,encl.
2,
A. HUTTENBACK ROBERT
THE
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with a sanad fromthe Maharajaof Kashmir, new rulerwas presented over Hunzawas clearly suzerainty underthe termsof which Kashmiri established.The Chinese envoy played his part with good grace; althoughthe contentionthat Chinahad given up all claim to Hunza was clearly an exaggeration.Even Whitehall, usually resentfulof was at frontierwars and antagonistictowardsnew responsibilities, least resigned.'I regret,'the new secretaryof state for India, Lord so of 'the wroteto Lansdowne, necessity advancing greata Kimberley, intrigues. am I Russian in distance fromourfrontier orderto counteract obligedto admitthat we cannotsafelyleavesuchpoints. . . reluctantly Hunza and Nagar ... open to them....'105 to Conditions the northof the Hindu Kush and Pamirsmight still be in flux, but at least Britishhegemonynow stretchedto the very crestsof the northernbarrierRanges- limitingthe anticipatedthreat fromthe otherplayerin 'the GreatGame.'
105 IOL, Lansdownepaps., Kimberleyto Lansdowne,24 November I892. The extent to which the Russianthreat south of the Hindu Kush was real is open to speculation.The writingsof individualRussianofficersand the frequentpolemics in the Russianmilitarypressled manyBritishofficialsto feel the dangerwas immiwere all too prone nent. But the evidencewas at best limited,and Britishstatesmen when they read words such as those ascribedto Prince to cluck selfFapprovingly of Hunzacampaign I892: 'VOUS nous avez Galitzinewhen he heardof the successful Frontzer) 307. p. fermela porteau nez.' Alder,J%orthern