[ G.R. No.

197718, September 06, 2017 ]

PRIMITIVO MACALANDA, JR., PETITIONER, V. ATTY. ROQUE A.
ACOSTA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court are the Decision [1] dated May 3, 2011 and
Resolution[2] dated July 7, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 114847. The assailed Decision affirmed the Decision [3] dated
February 15, 2010 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 16406 which declared that Primitivo
Macalanda, Jr. (Petitioner) is not a bona fide tenant of the land owned
by Atty. Roque A. Acosta (Respondent) and which directed Petitioner
and all persons claiming right under him to vacate the land.
The pertinent facts of the case as summarized by the CA are as
follows:

Respondent Atty. Roque Acosta filed a complaint for ejectment,

collection of deliberately unpaid rentals and share of land produce plus
damages against petitioner Primitivo Macalanda, Jr. before the
Provincial Adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board, Region 1, Lingayen, Pangasinan, alleging that:
petitioner is respondent's caretaker of the latter's land; respondent
had filed civil cases against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Courts
of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, to secure the proceeds of the sale of the
produce of land but the said court dismissed the cases as the
controversy properly belonged to the agrarian courts, prompting him
to file the instant complaint; petitioner wantonly violated the
proprietary rights of respondent by ignoring the latter's demands for
accounting of the proceeds of sale of the land's harvest for several
years; and petitioner, like his father before him, is simply a caretaker
of his land, whose compensation is on a sharing basis; petitioner has
become [sic] arrogant and high-handed, considering himself as virtual
owner by illegally withholding the amounts due respondent [sic].
Respondent prayed for a judgment ordering petitioner, not being a
tenant under agrarian laws, to vacate the land and to account and pay
for the produce of the land illegally withheld from and due to
respondent, and to pay attorney's fees and damages. In his position
paper, respondent added that petitioner, without the former's
knowledge, put up a furniture and fixture shop.

In his Answer, petitioner, moving for the dismissal of the complaint on

jurisdictional grounds, alleged that: he is a tenant of the land as
established by the findings of the facts by the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan; he had been religiously paying all his
obligations to respondent; respondent earlier filed a letter-complaint
with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Urbiztondo,
Pangasinan on the issue of fixing the leasehold rentals over the subject
landholding, an issue which is substantially the same with the issue in
the instant complaint; the instant complaint is violative of the rules on
forum shopping. In his position paper, petitioner reiterated that he is a
tenant of the subject land with respondent recognizing him as such, as
evidenced by a deed of agreement and several letters by [sic]
respondent to him.[4]
The Provincial Adjudicator dismissed the complaint for prematurity and
ordered the MARO to fast track its findings, report and
recommendation on respondent's letter-complaint.

Upon appeal to the DARAB, the latter reversed the Provincial

Adjudicator and declared that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The

decision dated 08 October 2008 and order[sic] dated 18 December
2008 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. A new decision is rendered, thus:

1. DECLARING Primitivo Macalandia[sic] not a bona fide tenant of the

subject land; and

2. DIRECTING Primitivo Macalandia[sic], his successors and all persons

claiming right under him to vacate the subject land and return peaceful
possession and occupation thereof to Atty. Roque A. Acosta.

SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioner appealed the DARAB's decision to the CA. The CA in its
Decision dated May 3, 2011 affirmed the DARAB, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision dated 15

February 2010 and the Resolution dated 19 June 2010, both of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB
CASE No. 16406, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[6]
Petitioner files the instant Petition insisting that he is a tenant of
Respondent. Petitioner alleged that his occupation and cultivation of
the subject land is with the consent of Respondent. Thus, the issue to
be resolved in the instant case is whether or not there is a tenancy
relationship between Petitioner and Respondent.

The petition is unmeritorious.

At the outset, a Rule 45 petition is limited to questions of law and the
factual findings of the lower courts or quasi-judicial agencies are
conclusive on this Court.[7] The question of whether there is a tenancy
relationship between the Petitioner and Respondent is basically a
question of fact, and the findings of the CA and the DARAB as to the
fact that Petitioner is not a bona fide tenant of Respondent is entitled
to respect and nondisturbance.[8]
While there are recognized exceptions[9] to this rule, none, however, is
obtaining in the present case.
In the case of Vicente Adriano, v. Alice Tanco, Geraldine Tanco, Ronald
Tanco, and Patrick Tanco,[10] the Court held that:
Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a
landowner and a tenant once they agree, expressly or impliedly, to
undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the landowner,
as a result of which relationship the tenant acquires the right to
continue working on and cultivating the land. [11]
For tenancy relationship to exist, therefore, the following elements
must be shown to concur, to wit: (1) the parties are the landowner and
the tenant(2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is
consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is
personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee;
and, (6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or
agricultural lessee. The presence of all these elements must be proved
by substantial evidence, thus, the absence of one will not make an
alleged tenant a de jure tenant. Unless a person has established his
status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure or to
be covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under
existing tenancy laws.[12] Crucial for the creation of tenancy relations
would be the existence of two of the essential elements, namely,
consent and sharing and/or payment of lease rentals. [13] The existence
of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed and allegations that one
is a tenant do not automatically gives rise to security of tenure. [14]
Being the party alleging the existence of the tenancy relationship, the
Petitioner carries the burden of proving his allegation that tenancy
exists. [15] The Petitioner however miserably failed to prove the
existence of such tenancy relationship.
Petitioner claims that he is a bona fide tenant of Respondent. To prove
the existence of the tenancy relationship, Petitioner presented the
Deed of Agreement[16] executed by Respondent in favor of Eddie
Macalanda, wherein it stated that the subject land was "tenanted by
Goyo Macalanda". The said document was even signed by Respondent
as owner and by Petitioner as tenant of the land to signify the latter's
consent to the creation of an easement in favor of Eddie Macalanda.
Petitioner claims that the same is an evidence of acknowledgment by
Respondent as to the existence of a tenancy relationship.
We hold that the essential element of consent is not sufficiently
established because its alleged proof, that is the Deed of Agreement,
does not categorically constitute Petitioner as de jure tenant of the
subject land. In fact, in the signature portion of the Deed of
Agreement, it referred to Petitioner as a "tenant/caretaker" of the
subject land. Thus, the Deed of Agreement is ambiguous as to whether
Petitioner is a tenant or a caretaker. Other documents must be
presented to evince the consent of Respondent as to the creation of
the tenancy relationship. Sadly, aside from the said deed, Petitioner
failed to present any independent and concrete evidence to prove
consent.
Further, the essential element of sharing of harvest was also not
sufficiently established. Petitioner failed to show any evidence that
there is sharing of harvest between him and the Respondent. In his
Petition for Review before the CA, Petitioner alleged that he has
continuously cultivated and occupied the subject lot for a period of 17
years[17]. On this note, common sense dictates that Petitioner, if he is
indeed a de jure tenant, should fully know his arrangement with the
Respondent as to the sharing of harvest. Petitioner however, failed to
persuasively show their arrangement. Evidence such as receipts which
prove the sharing of the harvest between Petitioner and Respondent
were not presented in evidence.
In the case of Antonio Pagarigan, v. Angelita Yague and Shirley
Asuncion,[18]
We have consistently held that occupancy and cultivation of an
agricultural land, no matter how long, will not ipso facto make one
a de jure tenant. Independent and concrete evidence is necessary to
prove personal cultivation, sharing of harvest, or consent of the
landowner. We emphasize that the presence of a tenancy relationship
cannot be presumed; the elements for its existence are explicit in law
and cannot be done away with by mere conjectures. Leasehold
relationship is not brought about by the mere congruence of facts but,
being a legal relationship, the mutual will of the parties to that
relationship should be primordial.[19] (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, both the DARAB and the CA found that Petitioner
failed to establish the existence of a tenancy relationship. Well-settled
is the rule that factual findings of administrative bodies charged with
their specific field of expertise, are afforded great weight by the courts,
and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings were
made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they
are conclusive and binding upon this Court. The DARAB, by reason of
its mandate and functions have acquired expertise in specific matters
within their jurisdiction, and their findings deserve full respect. Without
justifiable reason, their factual findings ought not to be altered,
modified or reversed[20] especially, such as in this case, the CA affirmed
such findings of facts.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated May 3, 2011 and
Resolution dated July 7, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
114847 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 192026 October 1, 2014

AUTOMAT REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, LITO

CECILIA AND LEONOR LIM, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES MARCIANO DELA CRUZ, SR. AND OFELIA DELA
CRUZ, Respondents.
 DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Before us is a petition for review 1 assailing the Court of Appeals'

August 19, 2009 decision2 affirming the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in finding the Spouses Dela Cruz
to be lawful tenants, and its April 14, 2010 resolution denying
reconsideration.

Petitioners pray that the Court of Appeals' decision and resolution be

set aside and a new one be issued nullifying the DARAB's February 8,
2005 decision3 and June 30, 2006 resolution, 4 and reinstating the
August 28, 2001 decision5 of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) for Laguna that dismissed the petition to maintain
peaceful possession with injunction filed by respondent Spouses Dela
Cruz (respondent spouses).6

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows.

Petitioner Automat Realty and Development Corporation (Automat) is

the registered owner of two parcels of land located in Barangay Malitlit,
Sta. Rosa, Laguna, covered by TCT Nos. T-210027 and T-209077. 7

Automat acquired the 49,503-square-meter parcel of land covered by

TCT No. T-209077 from El Sol Realty and Development Corporation in
1990. In the same year, Automat also acquired the 24,562-square-
meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-210027 from Ofelia
Carpo.8 Petitioner Leonor Lim (petitioner Lim) was the real estate
broker behind Automat’s purchase of the property. Respondent
spouses sometimes referred to petitioner Lim some Sta. Rosareal
estate properties available for sale. They received a share in the
broker's fees either from the seller or buyer.9

The land was not occupied in 1990 when it was purchased by Automat.
Respondent Ofelia dela Cruz volunteered her services to petitioner Lim
as caretaker to prevent informal settlers from entering the property.
Automat agreed, through its authorized administrator, petitioner Lim,
on the condition that the caretaker would voluntarily vacate the
premises upon Automat’s demand.10

Respondent spouses’ family stayed in the property as rent-paying

tenants. They cultivated and improved the land. They shared the
produced palay with Automat through its authorized agent, petitioner
Lito Cecilia (petitioner Cecilia). He also remitted the rentals paid by
respondent Ofelia Dela Cruz to petitioner Lim in Makati and to
Automat's office in Quezon City.11

Sometime in August 2000, Automat asked respondent spouses to

vacate the premises as it was preparing the groundwork for developing
the property.12
Respondent spouses refused to vacate unless they were paid
compensation. They claimed "they were agricultural tenants [who]
enjoyed security of tenure under the law."13

On October 19, 2000, respondent spouses filed a petition for

maintenance of peaceful possession withprayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction and/or temporary restraining order against
Automat before the PARAD for Laguna.14

Automat had recovered possession ofthe property before respondent

spouses filed their petition, and it continues to have possession at
present.15

On August 28, 2001, the PARAD dismissed the complaint. It declared,

among other things, that "no agricultural tenancy can be established
between [the parties] under the attending factual
circumstances." The PARAD found it undisputed that when petitioners
16

entered the property in 1990, it was already classified as residential,

commercial, and industrial land. Thus, "it is legally impossible for [the
property] to be the subject of an agricultural tenancy relation[ship]." 17

On February 8, 2005, the DARAB reversed and set aside the PARAD's
decision. It declared respondent spouses as de juretenants of the
landholding, thus, protected by security of tenure. 18 It ordered Automat
"to maintain [the spouses] in peacefulpossession and cultivation of the
landholding."19

Automat, petitioner Lim, and petitioner Cecilia appealed with the Court
of Appeals,20 arguing that (a) the DARAB had no jurisdiction since the
property is not agricultural land, (b) the board’s finding that
respondent spouses are de juretenants was not supported by
evidence, and (c) the essential requisites for a valid agricultural
tenancy relationship are not present.21

On August 19, 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed the DARAB without
prejudice to petitioners’ right to seek recourse from the Department of
Agrarian Reform Secretary on the other issues.22

The Court of Appeals, like the DARAB, gave more weight to the
following documentary evidence:23 (a) Municipal Agrarian Reform
Office’s Job H. Candinado’s October 18, 2000 certification stating that
respondent spouses are the actual tillers of the land; 24 (b) sworn
statements by Norma S. Bartolozo, Ricardo M. Saturno, and
Resurrection E. Federiso who are residents and owners of the adjoining
lots;25 (c) Irrigation Superintendent Cesar C. Amador’s certification on
the irrigation service fee paid by respondent spouses; 26 and (d) checks
paid by respondent spouses as proof of rental. 27 Petitioners filed for
reconsideration.28 Meanwhile, the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) Region IV-A CALABARZON issued two orders, both dated March
30, 2010, exempting the property from coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).29
On April 16, 2010, petitioners filed a supplemental motion for
reconsideration informing the Court of Appeals of these exemption
orders.30

Two days earlier or on April 14,2010, the Court of Appeals had denied
reconsideration. On May 4, 2010, it noted without action the
supplemental motion for reconsideration.31

Hence, petitioners Automat, Leonor Lim, and Lito Cecilia appealed

before this court.

Petitioners submit that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Sta. Ana
v. Carpo32 in support of its ruling that the parcels of land are
agricultural in nature and that an agricultural tenancy relationship
existed between Automat and respondent spouses. 33 They also argue
that the DAR exemption orders confirmed their "consistent position
that the DARAB never had jurisdiction over the subject matter of this
case."34

Respondent spouses counter that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled

that a tenancy relationship existed between Automat and respondent
spouses.35 They argue that an implied contract of tenancy was created
when they were allowed to till the land for 10 years. 36 Consequently,
they are entitled to security of tenure as tenants. 37 They add that the
"subsequent reclassification of agricultural lands into non-agricultural
[land] after the effectivity of the (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law)
CARL does not automatically remove the land from the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program [as a] valid certificate of
exemption o[r] exclusion, or a duly approved conversion order, must
first be secured."38

The issues for resolution are as follows:

I. Whether an agricultural tenancy relationship exists between

Automat and respondent spouses; and

II. Whether the DAR exemption orders have an effect on the

DARAB’s earlier exercise of jurisdiction.

No agricultural tenancy relationship

The elements to constitute a tenancy relationship are the following:

"(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship isagricultural land; (3)
there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the
purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5)
there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee;and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee."39

There must be substantial evidence on the presence of all these

requisites; otherwise, there is no de jure tenant. 40 Only those who have
established de jure tenant status are entitled to security of tenure and
coverage under tenancy laws.41

Well-settled is the rule that he who alleges must prove. 42 Respondent

spouses filed the petition before the PARAD, praying to be maintained
in peaceful possession of the property. They were the ones claiming
they had a tenancy relationship with Automat. Thus, they had the
burden of proof to show that such relationship existed.

I.A

Actual tillers

On the first requisite, respondent spouses contend that the Municipal

Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) Officer Job A. Candanido issued a
certification on October 18, 2000 that respondent spouses are the
actual tillers of the land.43 Three farmers of adjacent lands44 testified on
the same fact — that respondent spouses are the actual
tillers.45 Irrigation Superintendent Cesar Amador also issued a
certification that respondent spouses paid the irrigation service fees. 46

Petitioners counter with MARO Officer Candanido’s March 23, 2001

amended certification. This later certification states that there are "No
Records of Tenancy or written Agricultural Leasehold Contract to any
farmer/tiller"47 in relation to the property.

This court has held that a MARO certification "concerning the presence
or the absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending
parties, is considered merely preliminary or provisional, hence, such
certification does not bind the judiciary."48

The amended certification does not bind this court. Several elements
must be present before the courts can conclude that a tenancy
relationship exists. MARO certifications are limited to factual
determinations such as the presence of actual tillers. It cannot make
legal conclusions on the existence of a tenancy agreement.

Thus, petitioners’ reliance on the amended MARO certification fails to

persuade.

Nevertheless, the finding in the original MARO certification on the

presence of actual tillers is closely related to the nature of the land.
This brings us to the second requisite that the property must be
agricultural land.

I.B

Not agricultural land

Petitioners submit that the two parcels of land were classified as
industrial prior to the effectivity of CARL on June 15, 1988. This was
done through the Municipal Zoning Ordinance of Sta. Rosa Laguna No.
XVIII, series of 1981, approved on December 2, 1981 by the then
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, now the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board or HLURB. 49 This classification was
reiterated in the town plan or Zoning Ordinance No. 20-91 of Sta. Rosa,
Laguna, approving the town plan classifying the lands situated in
Barangay Malitlit as industrial land.50

Respondent spouses counter that the reclassification of the lands into

non-agricultural was done in 1995, after the effectivity of CARL, by
virtue of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution as approved by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. 811, seriesof 1995. Section
20 of the Local Government Code 51 governs the reclassification of land
in that "[a] city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed by
the Sanggunian after conducting public hearing for the purpose,
authorize [sic] the reclassification of agricultural lands. . . ." 52

Respondent spouses then argue that a subsequent reclassification

does not automatically remove the land from CARP coverage. "A valid
certificate of exemption [or] exclusion,or a duly approved conversion
order, must first be secured. . . ."53

The land in this case cannot be considered as agricultural land.

First, it is undisputed that the DAR Region IV-A CALABARZON had

already issued two orders,54 both dated March 30, 2010, exempting the
property from CARP coverage.55 These orders were submitted before
the Court of Appeals56 and raised again before this court. The orders
provide in part:

Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, series of 1990 ruled that "Lands
already classified as commercial, industrial or residential use and
approved by the HLURB prior to the effectivity of RA No. 6657 on June
15, 1988 no longer need any conversion clearance. Moreover, the term
agricultural lands as defined in Section 3 (c) of RA 6657 do not include
those lands already classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial. The case at hand shows that the subject
property is within the non-agricultural zone prior to 15 June 1988.

Further, said lands reclassified to non-agricultural prior to June 15,

1988 ceased to be considered as"agricultural lands" and removed from
the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

After a careful evaluation of the documents presented, this office finds

substantial compliance by the applicant with the documentary
requirements prescribed under DAR Administrative Order No. 04,
Series of 2003.57 (Emphasis supplied)

The exemption orders clearly provide that the lands were reclassified
to non-agricultural prior to June 15, 1988, or prior to the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 6657 known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988 (CARL).58

Section 3(c) of the CARL defines "agricultural land" as "land devoted to

agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial land."

This meaning was further explained by DAR Administrative Order No.

1, Series of 1990, otherwise known as the Revised Rules and
Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands to
NonAgricultural Uses:

. . . . Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as

defined in R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its
predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning
ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15
June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use. 59 (Emphasis in
the original)

While the earlier Republic Act No. 3844, 60 otherwise known as the
Agricultural Land Reform Code, focuses on actual use of the land when
it defines "agricultural land"as "land devoted to any growth, including
but not limited to crop lands, salt beds, fish ponds, idle land 61 and
abandoned land62 as defined in paragraphs 18 and 19 of this Section,
respectively,"63 this must be read with the later Republic Act No. 6675
(CARL) that qualifies the definition with land classifications.

Second, in Sta. Ana v. Carpo 64 cited at length by the Court of Appeals,

this court found that the PARAD and the Court of Appeals both acted
without jurisdiction in ruling that "the land had become non-
agricultural based on a zoning ordinance of 1981 – on the strength of a
mere vicinity map."65

In Sta. Ana, the land owner had the burdenof proof in filing a complaint
for ejectment due to non-payment of lease rentals. In the instant case,
respondent spouses have the burden of proving all elements of
tenancy in filing their petition to be maintained in peaceful possession
of the property. Unlike the facts in Sta. Ana, respondent spouses do not
contend that the reclassification of the land was by a "mere vicinity
map." Their contention is that it was made only in 1995, thus, the land
remains within CARP coverage unless petitioners secure a certificate of
exemption or exclusion, or a duly approved conversion order.

As earlier discussed, petitioners have secured exemption orders for the

lands.

I.C

Consent; nature of relationship

Respondent spouses allege that petitioners "never contest[ed] nor
refute[d] [respondent’s] cultivation and occupation of residence in the
land (since 1990) for the past ten (10) years or so." 66 This brings us to
the third requisite on consent.

Respondent spouses argue that petitioners’ inaction or failure to refute

their occupation and cultivation of the land for the past 10 years,
coupled with the acceptance of payments for use of the land, is
"indicative of consent, if not acquiescence to . . . tenancy
relations."67 They contend that a "[t]enancy relationship may be
deemed established by implied agreement [when a] land owner allows
another [to] cultivate his land in the concept of a tenant for a period of
ten (10) years."68 They add that Automat cannot deny the authority of
administrator, petitioner Cecilia, whose acts are binding on the land
owner.69

On the other hand, petitioners argue that the acts of the parties "taken
in their entirety must be demonstrative of an intent to continue a prior
tenancy relationship established by the landholder." 70 There should be
"no issue . . . [on] the authority of the overseer to establish a real right
over the land."71

Petitioners contend that there is no prior tenancy relationship to speak

of between respondent spouses and Automat. Petitioner Cecilia
executed an affidavit submitted to the DARAB categorically denying
respondent spouses’ allegations that he instituted them as agricultural
tenants.72 Petitioner Lim executed a similar affidavit "debunking
[respondent spouses’] claim that they were instituted as agricultural
tenants."73 Petitioners, thus, emphasize that petitioners Cecilia and
Lim’s authority to establish a real right over the land has been properly
questioned, and no special power of attorney 74 has been presented by
respondent spouses on such authority.75

The PARAD agreed in that "it would be totally behind [sic] human
comprehension for Automat to institutea tenant on their untenanted
lands [as] [i]t has been of public knowledge that landowners were
paying millions of pesos a hectare just to get rid of their tenants in
Sta.Rosa, Laguna since 1989 so that they could fully and freely
[dispose] and [use] their lands. . . . it would be easier for this Office to
believe and be convinced that, in deed [sic], if ever petitioners were
allowed entry into the land it would be for any other purposes other
than the establishment of a tenancy [relationship]." 76

This court has ruled that "[t]enancyis not a purely factual relationship
dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land [but] is also
a legal relationship."77 Tenancy relationship cannot bepresumed. The
allegation of its existence must be proven by evidence, and working on
another’s landholding raises no presumption of an agricultural
tenancy.78 Consequently, the landowner’s consent to an agricultural
tenancy relationship must be shown.
While this court agrees with the conclusion that no agricultural tenancy
relationship can exist in thiscase, we find that the element of consent
in establishing a relationship, not necessarily of agricultural tenancy, is
present.

This court finds that Automat consented to a relationship with

respondent spouses when (a) through petitioner Lim,it constituted
respondent Ofelia dela Cruz as caretaker of the property with the
understanding that she would vacate when asked by Automat, and (b)
it accepted rental payments from respondent spouses.

First, petitioner Lim executed an affidavit stating that "Mrs. Ofelia dela
Cruz or Nida volunteered to act as caretakerof the properties bought
by Automat Realty only for the purpose ofpreventing squatters from
entering the same and on the understandingthat she would vacate the
properties voluntarily when asked todo so by Automat Realty." 79

Automat confirmed this agreement entered into by petitioner Lim on

its behalf when it included such allegation in the statement of facts in
its memorandum with this court.80

While Automat questioned petitioners Lim and Cecilia’s authority to

establish a real right over the property in that "[r]espondents had not
shown any special power of attorney showing that Cecilia was
authorized by Automat Realty to install any agricultural tenant on the
latter’s properties,"81 it never denied giving consent to installing
respondent spouses as caretakers of the land.

Second, while both petitioners Lim and Cecilia denied in their affidavits
being the authorized administrator of Automat, 82 petitioner Cecilia
nevertheless confirms accepting checks as rental payments from
respondent spouses for convenience, considering that he often went to
Makati where petitioner Lim holds office and Quezon City where
Automat has its office.83

Automat never denied receipt of these rentals.

Respondent spouses’ petition for maintenance of peaceful possession

filed with the PARAD alleged that "as regards the sharing arrangement
derived from the rice/palay harvests, petitioners were verbally
instructed to deliver the same to . . . Lito Cecilia who was authorized to
collect for and in behalf of Automat every cropping period, the amount
of Fifteen Thousand Five Hundred Pesos covering the two (2) parcels of
land."84 They attached photocopies of five (5) checks in the name of
Automat for the following amounts: (a) 8,000.00 dated December 31,
1993; (b) 7,500.00 dated December 31, 1993; (c) 7,500.00 dated
January 5, 1995; (d) 8,000.00 dated January 10, 1995; and (e) 7,500.00
dated June 22, 1997.85

I.C.1

Civil lease
Automat is considered to have consented to a civil lease. 86

Article 1643 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]n the lease of things,
one of the parties binds himself to give to another the enjoyment or
use of a thing for a price certain, and for a period which may be
definite or indefinite. . . ."

The Civil Code accommodates unwritten lease agreements such as

Article 1682 that provides: "The lease of a piece of rural land, when its
duration has not been fixed, is understood to have been for all the time
necessary for the gathering of the fruits which the whole estate leased
may yield in one year, or which it may yield once, although two or
more years may have to elapse for the purpose."

On the other hand, Article 1687 states that "[i]f the period for the lease
has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent
agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from
week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is
to be paid daily. . . ." Applying this provision, "the contract expires at
the end of such month [year, week, or day] unless prior thereto, the
extension of said term has been sought by appropriate action and
judgment is, eventually, rendered therein granting the relief." 87

Under the statute of frauds, an unwritten lease agreement for a period

of more than one year is unenforceable unless ratified. 88

Respondent spouses were allowed to stay in the property as caretakers

and, in turn, they paid petitioners rent for their use of the property.
Petitioners’ acceptance of rental payments may be considered as
Ratification89 of an unwritten lease agreement whose period depends
on their agreed frequency of rental payments.

I.C.2

Builder, planter, sower

In the alternative, if the facts can show that the proper case involves
the Civil Code provisions on builders, planters, and sowers, respondent
spouses may be considered as builders, planters, or sowers in good
faith, provided such is proven before the proper court.

Article 448 of the Civil Code provides that if the landowner opts to
"appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting," he must pay
indemnity to the builder, planter, or sower in good faith in accordance
with the relevant provisions of the Code:

ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built,
sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his
own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or
planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the
proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obligedto buy
the land ifits value is considerably more than that of the building or
trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the
land does not choose to appropriate the building ortrees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in
case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.

....

ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor;

but only the possessor ingood faith may retain the thing until he has
been reimbursed therefor.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith

with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in
the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the
expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have
acquired by reason thereof.

....

Art. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be
refunded to the possessor in good faith; but he may remove the
ornaments with which he has embellished the principal thing if it
suffers no injury thereby, and if his successor in the possession does
not prefer to refund the amount expended. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 448 of the Civil Code on builders, planters, and sowers in good
faith applies when these parties have a claim of title over the
property.90 This court has expanded this limited definition in
jurisprudence:

This Court has ruled that this provision covers only cases in which the
builders, sowers or planters believe themselves to be owners of the
land or, at least, to have a claim of title thereto. It does not apply when
the interest is merely that of a holder,such as a mere tenant, agent or
usufructuary. From these pronouncements, good faith is identified by
the belief that the land is owned; or that — by some title — one has
the right to build, plant, or sow thereon.

However, in some special cases, this Court has used Article 448 by
recognizing good faith beyond this limited definition. Thus, in Del
Campo v. Abesia, this provision was applied to whose house — despite
having been built at the time he was still co-owner — overlapped with
the land of another. This article was also applied to cases wherein a
builder had constructed improvements with the consent of the owner.
The Court ruled that the law deemed the builder tobe in good faith. In
Sarmiento v. Agana, the builders were found to be in good faith despite
their reliance on the consent of another, whom they had mistakenly
believed to be the owner of the land.91 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent spouses alleged in their petition before the PARAD that
they "introduced various agricultural improvements purposely to make
the said landholdings productive, harvests of which were remitted and
delivered to . . . AUTOMAT through its administrator LITO
CECILIA. . . ."92 The Court of Appeals’ recitation of facts also state that
respondent spouses "cultivated the area, improved the same and
shared the palay produced therein to the owner, Automat,through its
authorized agent, Lito Cecilia."93

Petitioners allege in their memorandum before this court that at the

time Automat purchased the property, these "were not irrigated and
they were not planted to rice or any other agricultural crop." 94 No
further allegations were made on whether the property was planted
with trees or crops after its purchase in 1990, until respondent spouses
were asked to vacate in 2000. However, this court is not a trier of facts
and can only entertain questions of law. 95 This court also applies the
rule that damages must be proven in order to be awarded. 96

The causes of action of respondent spouses, if these can be supported

by the facts and evidence, may be pursued in the proper case either
under builder, planter, or sower provisions, or civil lease provisions
before the proper court.

II

DARAB jurisdiction

Petitioners submit that in light of the exemption orders, "[a]s a matter

of law, the subject properties were never subject to the jurisdiction of
the DARAB, which issued the decision erroneously affirmed by the
Court of Appeals."97

In the same breath, petitioners recognize the PARAD’s jurisdiction in

praying that this court "reinstat[e] the Decision of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudication (PARAD) for the Province of Laguna
dated August 28, 2001 in Reg Case No. R-0403-0041, dismissing the
‘Petition to Maintain Peaceful Possession with Injunction’ filed by the
respondents."98

The DARAB has "primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and
appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving
the implementation of the [CARP] . . . and other agrarian laws and their
implementing rules and regulations:"99

RULE II

Jurisdiction Of The Adjudication Board

SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction.–

The Board shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original
and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes
involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos.
228, 229, and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic
Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and
their implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction
shall include but not be limited to cases involving the following:

a) The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or

juridical, engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all
agricultural lands covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws;

b) The valuation of land, and the preliminary determination and

payment of just compensation,fixing and collection of lease
rentals, disturbance compensation, amortization payments, and
similar disputes concerning the functions of the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP);

c) The annulment or cancellation oflease contracts or deeds of

sale or their amendments involving lands under the
administration and disposition of the DAR or LBP;

d) Those cases arising from, or connected with membership or

representation in compact farms, farmers’ cooperatives and
other registered farmers’ associations or organizations, related to
lands covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws;

e) Those involving the sale, alienation, mortgage, foreclosure,

pre-emption and redemption of agricultural lands under the
coverage of the CARP orother agrarian laws;

f) Those involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of

Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation
Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration
Authority;

g) Those cases previously falling under the original and exclusive

jurisdiction of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations under
Section 12 of Presidential No. 946, except sub-paragraph (q)
thereof and Presidential Decree No. 815.

It is understood that the aforementioned cases, complaints or petitions

were filed with the DARAB after August 29, 1987.

Matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of

Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 and other agrarian laws as
enunciated by pertinent rules shall be the exclusive prerogative of and
cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR.

h) And such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns

referred to it by the Secretary of the DAR.

SECTION 2. Jurisdiction of the Regional and Provincial Adjudicators. –

The RARAD and the PARAD shall have concurrent original jurisdiction
with the Board to hear, determine and adjudicate all agrarian cases
and disputes, and incidents in connection therewith, arising within their
assigned territorial jurisdiction.100 (Emphasis supplied)

"Agrarian dispute" has been defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act
No. 6657101 as referring to "any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise,
over lands devoted to agriculture. . . ."

This court has held that "jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a

quasijudicial office or government agency, over the nature and subject
matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material
allegationstherein and the character of the relief prayed for
irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any
or all such reliefs."102

The petition filed by respondent spouses before the PARAD alleged

that "AUTOMAT REALTY AND DEV’T CORP. . . is the registered owner of
two (2) parcels of agricultural land. . .", 103 respondent spouses were
"instituted as tenant-tillers of the two (2) parcels of rice landholdings
by . . . AUTOMAT through its authorized administrator LITO
CECILIA",104 and that "shares of the harvests of . . . AUTOMAT were paid
and delivered in the form of checks payable in cash in the name of . . .
AUTOMAT. . . ."105

However, jurisdiction is conferred by law, and "an order or decision

rendered by a tribunal or agency without jurisdiction is a total
nullity."106

The DAR exemption orders have determined with certainty that the
lands were reclassified as non-agricultural prior to June 15, 1988.
Consequently, the petition filed by respondent spouses in 2000 before
the PARAD did not involve "lands devoted to agriculture" and,
necessarily, it could not have involved any controversy relating to such
land.1âwphi1 Absent an "agrarian dispute," the instant case cannot fall
under the limited jurisdiction of the DARAB as a quasi-judicial body.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' August
19, 2009 decision and April 14, 2010 resolution are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The PARAD's decision dated August 28, 2001 and DARAB's
decision dated February 8, 2005 are declared NULL and VOID for lack
of jurisdiction, without prejudice to the filing of a civil case with the
proper court.

SO ORDERED.
 January 22, 2020

G.R. No. 241353

DANILO ROMERO, VICTORIO ROMERO AND EL ROMERO,

REPRESENTING THEIR DECEASED FATHER LUTERO ROMERO,
PETITIONERS, VS. CRISPINA SOMBRINO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J:

Security of tenure may be invoked only by tenants de jure and not by

those who are not true and lawful tenants but became so only through
the acts of a supposed landholder who had no right to the
landholdings. Tenancy relation can only be created with the consent of
the landholder who is either the owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal
possessor of the land.1

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 (Petition) under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the heirs of Lutero Romero
(Lutero), i.e., petitioners Danilo Romero, Victorio Romero, and El
Romero (petitioners Heirs of Lutero), against respondent Crispina
Sombrino (respondent Sombrino), assailing the Decision3 dated
January 22, 2018 (assailed Decision) and the Resolution4 dated June 8,
2018 (assailed Resolution) rendered by the Court of Appeals, Cagayan
de Oro City (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 07367-MIN.

The Essential Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

As culled from the records of the instant case, the essential facts and
antecedent proceedings are as follows:

The instant Petition centers on a two-hectare portion of Lot No. 23, Pls-
35 located at Marauding Annex, Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte (subject
property), with an aggregate area of 12.0717 hectares, covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. P-2261, which is registered in the name
of Lutero after the latter's homestead application was approved in
1967.5

The final and executory Decision of the Court, Third Division in Teodora
Saltiga de Romero, et al. v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 1093076

Prior to the present controversy, the subject property was subject of a

legal dispute involving Lutero and his siblings, the heirs of the late
spouses Eugenio Romero (Eugenio) and Teodora Saltiga (Teodora)
(collectively referred to as the Sps. Romero). The Sps. Romero begot
nine children, i.e., Lutero, Eutiquio, Ricardo, Generosa, Diosdada,
Mindalina, Lucita, Presentacion and Gloriosa. The issue regarding the
ownership and possession of the subject property was dealt with in two
civil cases tried jointly before the Regional Trial Court of Lanao Del
Norte, Branch 7 (RTC):

1. Civil Case No. 591, entitled Teodora Saltiga de Romero, et al.

v. Lutero Romero, et al. - for Reconveyance with Damages and
Cancellation of Registration of Mortgage

2. Civil Case No. 1056, entitled Lutero Romero, et al. v. Spouses

Meliton Pacas, et al. - for Annulment of three Affidavits of Sales,
Recovery of Possession with Damages

In sum, it was alleged by the petitioners in Civil Case No. 591, i.e.,
Teodora, Presentacion, Lucita, Gloriosa, and Mindalina, that Lutero
merely held the subject property in trust for the benefit of the heirs of
his father Eugenio since the latter was actually the one who first
applied for the homestead, but such application was denied because
Eugenio was already disqualified to apply for a homestead, having
previously applied for a homestead over another parcel of land with
the maximum limit of 24 hectares. Moreover, it was alleged that Lutero
employed fraud in procuring the homestead patent covering the
subject property.7

In addition, the petitioners in Civil Case No. 591 also claimed that
Lutero subsequently sold the subject property by allegedly executing
three affidavits of sale in favor of the respondents in Civil Case No.
1056, i.e., spouses Lucita and Meliton Pacas, spouses Presentacion and
Sabdullah Mama, and spouses Gloriosa and Dionisio Rasonable. Hence,
it was alleged that Lutero no longer has any claim over the subject
property pursuant to these affidavits of sale.8

The RTC rendered a Decision dated March 11, 1991 in favor of Lutero,
declaring the three affidavits of sale null and void and ordering the
respondents in Civil Case No. 1056 to surrender possession of the
subject property to Lutero. On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the
RTC.9

The consolidated cases were then resolved with finality by the Court
in Teodora Saltiga de Romero, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.10 (De
Romero v. CA). In the said case, the Court held that Lutero is the true
and lawful landowner of the subject property, having exclusively
acquired the subject property after successfully applying for a
homestead patent over the land in 1967. Lutero's exclusive ownership
over the subject property was even recognized by some of Lutero's
sisters, i.e., Gloriosa, Presentacion, and Lucita.11

The Decision in De Romero v. CA likewise found that the family

patriarch, Eugenio, never owned the subject property. Eugenio himself
tried to apply for a homestead patent over the subject property, but
this was denied "because he was disqualified by virtue of the fact that
he already had applied for the maximum limit of 24 hectares to which
he was entitled [pertaining to land located on the adjacent lot; and the]
land in question could not therefore have passed on from him to his
children."12

Furthermore, the said Decision held that the supposed sale of the
subject property by Lutero in favor of the respondents in Civil Case No.
1056 was null and void for being violative of Section 118 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141,13 which prohibited the alienation of a
homestead within five years from the issuance of the patent.14

After the Court's Decision in De Romero v. CA became final and

executory, the petitioners Heirs of Lutero filed a Motion for the
Issuance of a Writ of Execution before the RTC on March 10, 2003. On
June 16, 2003, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution.15

However, the implementation of the Writ of Execution was held in

abeyance because respondent Sombrino filed a Motion for
Intervention, alleging that she was a tenant of the subject property.
The RTC allowed the intervention and granted respondent Sombrino
the opportunity to present evidence to show good cause why the Writ
of Execution should not be implemented against her.16

After due hearing and deliberation, the RTC ordered the

implementation of the Writ of Execution, as shown by the Sheriffs
Report. Subsequently, a Writ of Demolition was issued by the RTC on
March 29, 2005. On April 5, 2005, respondent Sombrino was ousted
from the subject property.17
Complaint for Illegal Ejectment and Recovery of Possession before the
Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board

Because respondent Sombrino failed to successfully assert her right to

possess the subject property before the RTC, she sought recourse
before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(PARAD) of Iligan City by filing a Complaint for Illegal Ejectment and
Recovery of Possession (PARAD Complaint) against the petitioners
Heirs of Lutero. The case was docketed as DARAB Case No. X-543-LN-
2005.

In the PARAD Complaint, respondent Sombrino alleged that she was

the actual tenant-cultivator of the subject property as she and her late
husband Valeriano were installed as tenants over the subject property
in 1952 by the alleged original owners of the subject property, the Sps.
Romero, until the said spouses were succeeded by Lucita and her heirs
as landowners.18 Hence, respondent Sombrino asked that her security
of tenure as tenant of the subject property be upheld and that she be
allowed to peacefully possess and cultivate the subject property.

The Ruling of the PARAD

In the Decision19 dated October 28, 2005, the PARAD rule4 in favor of
respondent Sombrino and declared her to be a de jure tenant of the
subject property. The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, decision is hereby

rendered as follows[:]

1. Declaring complainant Crispina Sombrino to be a de

jure tenant and ordering her reinstatement to the subject
landholding[;]

2. Ordering herein respondents and/or any person in

occupation/possession of the subject landholding to
vacate and turn-over its possession to the complainant;

3. Directing the MARO, DAR of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte

to execute an agricultural leasehold contract between the herein
parties pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 5, Series of 1993[;]

4. All other claims are denied for lack of basis.

SO ORDERED.20

The PARAD held that respondent Sombrino was able to establish that
she was installed as tenant by the Sps. Romero in 1952. According to
the PARAD, "[w]hile indeed, there [was] no tenancy relations that
[existed] between [respondent Sombrino] and [the petitioners Heirs of
Lutero] as there were no shares received by [the latter,] x x x it is as if
[Lutero] succeeded the ownership of the subject land from Spouses
Eugenio and Teodora Romero[; thus, the petitioners Heirs of Lutero]
who inherited the property [were] bound to [assume] and respect the
tenancy rights of [respondent Sombrino]."21 Hence, the PARAD held
that "[o]nce such relationship is established, the tenant shall be
entitled to security of tenure."22

The petitioners Heirs of Lutero filed a Motion for Reconsideration,

which was denied by the PARAD in the Order dated January 12, 2006.
Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners Heirs of Lutero appealed before the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). The
appeal was docketed as DARAB Case No. 14261.

The Ruling of the DARAB

In the Decision23 dated June 28, 2010, the DARAB denied the appeal
for lack of merit. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal

is DISMISSED and the assailed Decision dated 28 October 2005 is
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.24

The DARAB held that through the final and executory judgment in Civil
Case Nos. 591 and 1056, the petitioners Heirs of Lutero were vested
ownership over the subject property.25 However, since Section 10 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 384426 states that the agricultural leasehold
relation shall not be extinguished by mere sale, alienation, or transfer
of the leaseholding and that the transferee shall be subrogated to the
rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor; the
agricultural leasehold relation instituted between the Sps. Romero and
respondent Sombrino "is preserved even in case of transfer of the legal
possession of the subject property."27

The petitioners Heirs of Lutero filed a Motion for Reconsideration on

September 1, 2010,28 which was denied by the DARAB in the
Resolution29 dated February 26, 2016.

Hence, the petitioners Heirs of Lutero filed a Petition for

Review30 under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the CA. The
appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 07367-MIN.

The Ruling of the CA

In the assailed Decision, the CA denied the appeal for lack of merit.
The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, Petition for Review

is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Decision dated June 28,
2010 and Resolution dated February 26, 2016 of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.31
According to the CA, respondent Sombrino sufficiently established by
substantial evidence the essential elements of tenancy:

Indeed, respondent sufficiently established by substantial evidence the

essential elements of tenancy. The late Spouses Eugenio and Teodora
Romero are the landowners; respondent, together with her late
husband, is their tenant. The subject matter of their relationship is
agricultural land, a farm land. They mutually agreed to the cultivation
of the land by respondent and share in the harvest. The purpose of
their relationship is clearly to bring about agricultural production. After
the harvest, respondent pays rental as well as the irrigation fees.
Lastly, respondent's personal cultivation of the land was conceded by
Lucita Romero Pacas, [who] succeeded her parents the Spouses
Eugenio and Teodora Romero, thru a leasehold agreement which
became the contract between the parties.32

Thus, the CA held that the petitioners Heirs of Lutero are bound to
respect the leasehold relationship between the Sps. Romero and
respondent Sombrino:

Given the foregoing, the petitioners are bound to respect the leasehold
relationship between the late Spouses Eugenio and Teodora Romero
and respondent notwithstanding the transfer of legal possession of the
subject agricultural land. Accordingly, respondent cannot be
dispossessed of her possession and cultivation of the subject
agricultural land without any valid and just cause. Security of tenure is
a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself
and deprivation of their land holdings is tantamount to deprivation of
their only means of livelihood. Perforce, the termination of the
leasehold relationship can take place only for causes provided by law x
x x as specified in Sections 8, 28 and 36 of R.A. No. 3844. A perusal of
these provisions will show that no such valid cause exists in the
present case warranting the termination of the leasehold relationship.
Hence, the rights of respondent as tenant should be respected.33

Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners Heirs of Lutero filed a Motion for

Reconsideration34 dated February 7, 2018, which was denied by the
CA in the assailed Resolution.

Hence, the instant Petition before the Court.

On January 14, 2019, respondent Sombrino filed her Comment35 dated

December 14, 2018 to the instant Petition wherein she asserted that
she was able to duly establish her tenancy with respect to the subject
property.36 Despite the Court's Resolution37 dated March 13, 2019
requiring the petitioners Heirs of Lutero to file their Reply, the latter
failed to do so.

Issue

Stripped to its core, the critical issue is whether there exists an

agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship between the petitioners
Heirs of Lutero and respondent Sombrino. Otherwise stated, is
respondent Sombrino a tenant de jure that enjoys security of tenure as
guaranteed by tenancy laws?

The Court's Ruling

The instant Petition is meritorious. Respondent Sombrino is not a

tenant de jure and does not enjoy the security of tenure accorded to
agricultural tenants. There is no tenancy relationship between the
petitioners Heirs of Lutero and respondent Sombrino.

Propriety of a Factual Review

Preliminarily, the Court is aware that the determination of whether a

person is an agricultural tenant is basically a question of fact.38 As a
general rule, questions of fact are not proper subjects of appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as this mode of appeal
is confined to questions of law.39

Nevertheless, the foregoing general rule admits of several exceptions

such as when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises and conjectures; when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; and when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts.40

The Court finds that the aforesaid exceptions to the general rule apply
in the instant case. Therefore, the Court shall proceed to rule on the
main issue.

Agricultural Leasehold Tenancy

According to RA. 1199, as amended, otherwise known as the

Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines, an agricultural leasehold
tenancy exists "when a person who, either personally or with the aid of
labor available [from] members of his immediate farm household,
undertakes to cultivate a piece of agricultural land susceptible of
cultivation by a single person together with members of his immediate
farm household, belonging to or legally possessed by, another in
consideration of a fixed amount in money or in produce or in both."41

The existence of a tenancy relation is not presumed. According to

established jurisprudence, the following indispensable elements must
be proven in order for a tenancy agreement to arise:

1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural

lessee;

2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;

3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship;

4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural

production;
 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and

6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or

agricultural lessee.

The absence of any of the requisites does not make an occupant,

cultivator, or a planter a de jure tenant which entitles him to security of
tenure under existing tenancy laws.42

However, if all the aforesaid requisites are present and an agricultural

leasehold relation is established, the same shall confer upon the
agricultural lessee the right to continue working on the landholding
until such leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee
shall be entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be
ejected therefrom unless authorized by the Court for causes herein
provided.43 In case of death or permanent incapacity of the
agricultural lessor, the leasehold shall bind the legal heirs.44

To recall, in the instant case, the PARAD, as concurred by the DARAB

and the CA, found that an agricultural leasehold tenancy relation exists
between respondent Sombrino and the petitioners Heirs of Lutero
because the supposed original landowners of the subject property, i.e.,
the Sps. Romero, allegedly entered into a tenancy agreement with
respondent Sombrino in 1952. And because the leasehold relation
subsists and binds the legal heirs of the agricultural lessors even upon
the latter's death, Lutero and, subsequently, his heirs are bound by
this leasehold relation.

Respondent Sombrino failed to provide substantial evidence on the

existence of an agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship between
herself and the Sps. Romero

The Court finds that respondent Sombrino failed to provide sufficient

evidence that there was, in the first place, an agricultural leasehold
tenancy agreement entered into by herself and the alleged
landowners, the Sps. Romero.

Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. An assertion that one is a

tenant does not automatically give rise to security of tenure. Nor does
the sheer fact of working on another's landholding raise a presumption
of the existence of agricultural tenancy. One who claims to be a tenant
has the onus to prove the affirmative allegation of tenancy.45 Hence,
substantial evidence is needed to establish that the landowner and
tenant came to an agreement in entering into a tenancy relationship.

Considering the foregoing, jurisprudence has held that self-serving

statements regarding supposed tenancy relations are not enough to
establish the existence of a tenancy agreement.46 Moreover,
certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a
certain person is a tenant are merely provisional, not conclusive on the
courts, and have little evidentiary value without any corroborating
evidence.47 There should be independent evidence establishing the
consent of the landowner to the relationship.48

In the instant case, the pieces of documentary evidence presented by

respondent Sombrino do not provide proof that the latter and the Sps.
Romero came into an agreement as to the establishment of an
agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship.

As explained by the DARAB, "[t]o prove her claim, [respondent

Sombrino submitted] the Joint Affidavit of Sarillo Bacalso and Neil
Ocopio, whom she allegedly hired in several occasions as planters,
mud boat operators and thresher operators[.]"49

Such evidence severely fails to establish the existence of a tenancy

agreement. At most, the aforementioned Joint Affidavit merely
establishes that respondent Sombrino occupied and cultivated the
subject property at some point in time.

In Heirs of Florentino Quilo v. Development Bank of the Philippines-

Dagupan Branch, et al.,50 the Court held that an affidavit of the same
nature as the said Joint Affidavit fails to prove consent of the
landowner. In the said case, the Court explained that such document in
no way confirms that the alleged tenant's presence on the land was
based on a tenancy relationship that the landowners had agreed to as
"[m]ere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land does not
automatically convert the tiller into an agricultural tenant recognized
under agrarian laws."51

In believing that respondent Sombrino was able to establish the

existence of a tenancy agreement with the Sps. Romero, the DARAB
also gave credence to "the Affidavit of the Barangay Agrarian Reform
Committee (BARC) Chairman."52

In Soliman, et al. v. Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc., et

al.,53 the Court held that the certifications issued by a BARC Chairman
to the effect that the alleged tenants were actually cultivating the
agricultural land deserve scant consideration in determining the
existence of a tenancy relationship. Citing the findings of the court a
quo, the Court held therein that "[o]bviously, the barangay captain x x
x whose attestation appears on the document-was not the proper
authority to make such determination [because even] certifications
issued by administrative agencies and/or officials concerning the
presence or the absence of a tenancy relationship are merely
preliminary or provisional and are not binding on the courts."54

With respect to acknowledgment receipts presented by respondent

Sombrino showing the payment of irrigation fees and rentals to
Lucita,55 such pieces of documentary evidence fail to show that the
Sps. Romero installed respondent Sombrino as a tenant of the subject
property. The said receipts merely establish that, at most, respondent
Sombrino entered into an arrangement with Lucita and not with the
Sps. Romero.
More doubt is engendered in the mind of the Court as to the existence
of the alleged agricultural tenancy agreement because of the
undisputed fact that "Eugenio Romero died sometime in 1948."56 To
recall, at the heart of respondent Sombrino's claim of tenancy is her
allegation that Eugenio, together with Teodora, installed her as tenant
in 1952. Needless to say, with the death of Eugenio in 1948, contrary
to the contention of respondent Sombrino, it was impossible for
Eugenio to have instituted respondent Sombrino as tenant of the
subject property.

All in all, the Court finds that respondent Sombrino failed to discharge
her burden of proving that a tenancy relationship existed between her
and the Sps. Romero.

Assuming that it even existed, the supposed tenancy agreement was

invalid as it was not entered into with the true and lawful landowner of
the subject property

Even assuming arguendo that the Sps. Romero indeed entered into a
tenancy agreement with respondent Sombrino in 1952, such
agreement would not have created a valid tenancy relationship.

Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true
and lawful landowner who is the owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal
possessor of the land. It cannot be created by the act of a supposed
landowner, who has no right to the land subject of the tenancy, much
less by one who has been dispossessed of the same by final
judgment.57

The Court's ruling in Heirs of Teodoro Cadeliña v. Cadiz, et al.58 is on

all fours. In the said case, the respondents-farmers therein claimed
that the alleged landowner, Nicanor Ibuna, Sr. (Ibuna), validly installed
them as tenants. Analogous to the instant case, by virtue of a final and
executory judgment recognizing the ownership of the petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest, Teodoro Cadeliña (Teodoro), over the subject
property therein as the latter was a holder of a homestead patent, the
respondents-farmers were ousted from the land. As in the instant case,
the respondents-farmers filed complaints for reinstatement of
possession of the land before the DARAB.

In dismissing the respondents-farmers' claim of tenancy relationship,

the Court explained that a tenancy relationship could only be created
with the true and lawful landowner who was the owner, lessee,
usufructuary or legal possessor of the land. Since Ibuna was not the
true and lawful landowner, he could not have validly installed the
respondents-farmers as tenants of the land. Further, the Court held
therein that upholding Ibuna as the legal possessor of the land was
inconsistent with Teodoro's homestead, which was already deemed
valid in a final and executory judgment, since a homestead applicant
was required to occupy and cultivate the land for his own and his
family's benefit, and not for the benefit of someone else, viz.:
In this case, Ibuna's institution of respondents as tenants did not give
rise to a tenure relationship because Ibuna is not the lawful landowner,
either in the concept of an owner or a legal possessor, of the
properties. It is undisputed that prior to the filing of the complaint with
the DARAB, the transfers of the properties to Ibuna and his
predecessor, Andres Castillo, were declared void in separate and
previous proceedings. Since the transfers were void, it vested no rights
whatsoever in favor of Ibuna, either of ownership and possession. x x x

Notably, upholding Ibuna as the legal possessor of the properties is

inconsistent with petitioners' homestead since a homestead applicant
is required to occupy and cultivate the land for his own and his family's
benefit, and not for the benefit of someone else. x x x 59

In the instant case, to reiterate, it has already been decided in the

Court's final and executory Decision in De Romero v. CA that:

x x x Eugenio Romero was never the owner of the land in question

because all he bought from the Jaug spouses were the alleged rights
and interests, if there was any, to the said land which was then part of
the public domain. The Jaugs could not have sold said land to Eugenio
as they did not own it. Eugenio Romero was not granted, and could not
have been granted, a patent for said land because he was disqualified
by virtue of the fact that he already had applied for the maximum limit
of 24 hectares to which he was entitled. The land in question could not
therefore have passed on from him to his children.60

Moreover, De Romero v. CA definitely held that Lutero's homestead

patent over the subject property was validly acquired and he was the
true and lawful landholder of the subject property, viz.:

On the other hand, Lutero Romero applied for a homestead patent over
the land in question and his application was duly approved. The
appellants have not established that there was any fraud committed in
this application. In fact it appears that there was even a hearing
conducted by the Bureau of Lands on the application because a certain
Potenciano Jaug had been contesting the application. Under the
presumption of law, that official duty has been regularly performed,
there appears to be no ground to question the grant of the patent to
Lutero Romero in 1967.

His sisters Gloriosa, Presentacion, and Lucita apparently recognized

Lutero's ownership of the property when in 1969 they sought the help
of the mayor of Kapatagan to convince Lutero to execute affidavits of
sale in their favor.61

In sum, with the finality of De Romero v. CA, it can no longer be

disputed that the Sps. Romero never became the owners of the subject
property. Neither did they become the lessee, usufructuary or legal
possessor of the subject property. Hence, the Sps. Romero had no
capacity whatsoever to install respondent Sombrino as a leasehold
tenant on the subject property. Consequently, neither could the heirs
of the Sps. Romero (aside from Lutero) validly enter into any tenancy
agreement over the subject property.

Given the foregoing, with the absence of the first essential requisite of
an agricultural tenancy relationship, i.e., that the parties to the
agreement are the true and lawful landholders and tenants,
respondent Sombrino cannot be considered a de jure tenant who is
entitled to security of tenure under existing tenancy laws. And
corollarily, there being no agricultural tenancy relationship existing in
the instant case, the PARAD and DARAB acted beyond their jurisdiction
when they ordered the petitioners Heirs of Lutero, among other things,
to restore possession of the subject property to respondent Sombrino.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision

dated January 22, 2018 and Resolution dated June 8, 2018 rendered by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07367-MIN are REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE. The Decision dated October 28, 2005 rendered by the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board and the Decision dated
June 28, 2010 rendered by the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Complaint for
Illegal Ejectment and Recovery of Possession in DARAB Case No. X-
543-LN-2005 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154048 November 27, 2009

STANFILCO EMPLOYEES AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES

MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, Petitioner,
vs.
DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC. (STANFILCO DIVISION), ORIBANEX
SERVICES, INC. and SPOUSES ELLY AND MYRNA
ABUJOS, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before this Court is the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by

petitioner Stanfilco Employees Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Multi-
Purpose Cooperative (SEARBEMCO). It assails:

(a) the decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.

66148 dated November 27, 2001; and

(b) the CA’s resolution3 of June 13, 2002 in the same case,
denying SEARBEMCO’s motion for reconsideration.

THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

On January 29, 1998, SEARBEMCO, as seller, and respondent DOLE

Philippines, Inc. (Stanfilco Division) (DOLE), as buyer, entered into a
Banana Production and Purchase Agreement 4 (BPPA). The BPPA
provided that SEARBEMCO shall sell exclusively to DOLE, and the latter
shall buy from the former, all Cavendish bananas of required
specifications to be planted on the land owned by SEARBEMCO. The
BPPA states:

The SELLER agrees to sell exclusively to the BUYER, and the BUYER
agrees to buy all Cavendish Banana of the Specifications and Quality
described in EXHIBIT "A" hereof produced on the SELLER’S plantation
covering an area of 351.6367 hectares, more or less, and which is
planted and authorized under letter of instruction no. 790 as amended
on November 6, 1999 under the terms and conditions herein
stipulated. The SELLER shall not increase or decrease the area(s)
stated above without the prior written approval of the BUYER.
However, the SELLER may reduce said area(s) provided that if the
SELLER replaces the reduction by planting bananas on an equivalent
area(s) elsewhere, it is agreed that such replacement area(s) shall be
deemed covered by the Agreement. If the SELLER plants an area(s) in
excess of said 351.6367 hectares, the parties may enter into a
separate agreement regarding the production of said additional
acreage. SELLER will produce banana to the maximum capacity of the
plantation, as much as practicable, consistent with good agricultural
practices designed to produce banana of quality having the standards
hereinafter set forth for the duration of this Banana Production and
Purchase Agreement.

SEARBEMCO bound and obliged itself, inter alia, to do the following:

V. SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS OF THE SELLER

xxx

p.) Sell exclusively to the BUYER all bananas produced from the subject
plantation, except those rejected by the BUYER for failure to meet the
specifications and conditions contained in Exhibit "A" hereof. In the
case of any such rejected bananas, the SELLER shall have the
right to sell such rejected bananas to third parties, for
domestic non-export consumption. The SELLER shall only sell
bananas produced from the plantation and not from any other source.
[Emphasis supplied.]

Any dispute arising from or in connection with the BPPA between the
parties shall be finally settled through arbitration. To quote the BPPA:

IX. ARBITRATION OF DISPUTE

All disputes arising in connection with this Agreement shall be finally

settled under the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the
International Chamber of Commerce by three (3) Arbitrators appointed
in accordance with said Rules. The Arbitration shall be held in a venue
to be agreed by the parties. Judgment upon the award rendered may
be entered in any Philippine Court having jurisdiction or application
may be made to such court for judicial acceptance of the award and as
order of enforcement, as the case may be.

On December 11, 2000, DOLE filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court5 (RTC) against SEARBEMCO, the spouses Elly and Myrna Abujos
(spouses Abujos), and Oribanex Services, Inc. (Oribanex) for specific
performance and damages, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and of a temporary restraining order. DOLE
alleged that SEARBEMCO sold and delivered to Oribanex, through the
spouses Abujos, the bananas rejected by DOLE, in violation of
paragraph 5(p), Article V of the BPPA which limited the sale of rejected
bananas for "domestic non-export consumption." DOLE further alleged
that Oribanex is likewise an exporter of bananas and is its direct
competitor.

DOLE narrated in its complaint how SEARBEMCO sold and delivered the
rejected bananas to Oribanex through the spouses Abujos:
 9.) That, however, on April 12, 2000 at about 5:00 o’clock in the
afternoon, [DOLE] through its authorized security personnel
discovered that defendant SEARBEMCO, in violation of Section
5(p) Article V of the Banana Production and Purchase Agreement,
packed the bananas rejected by [DOLE] in boxes marked
"CONSUL" in Packing Plant 32 in DAPCO Panabo and sold and
delivered them to defendant Abujos;

10.) That about 373 "CONSUL" marked boxes were packed and
knowingly sold by defendant SEARBEMCO to ORIBANEX
SERVICES, INC. through defendants Abujos who carried and
loaded the same on board a blue Isuzu Canter bearing plate no.
LDM 976 and delivered to defendant ORIBANEX for export at the
TEFASCO Wharf covered by Abujos Delivery Receipt, a copy of
which is hereto attached as Annex "B";

11.) That the following day, April 13, 2000, again the same
security found that defendant SEARBEMCO continued to pack the
bananas rejected by plaintiff in boxes marked as "CONSUL" and,
in violation of paragraph 5(p) Article V of the Banana Production
and Purchase Agreement, sold and delivered them to defendant
ORIBANEX SERVICES, INC., for export, through defendants
Abujos;

12.) That about 648 "CONSUL" marked boxes were packed and
knowingly sold by defendant SEARBEMCO to ORIBANEX
SERVICES, INC., through defendants Abujos who carried and
loaded the same on board a red Isuzu Forwarder, bearing plate
no. LCV 918, and delivered to defendant ORIBANEX for export at
the TEFASCO Wharf covered by Abujos Delivery Receipt, a copy
of which is hereto attached and marked as Annex "C";

13.) That the sale of a total of 712 boxes of rejected bananas

covering April 12 and 13, 2000, or any other dates prior thereto
or made thereafter by defendant SEARBEMCO to defendant
ORIBANEX SERVICES, INC. through defendant Abujos is in utter
violation of the Agreement between plaintiff [DOLE] and
defendant SEARBEMCO that SEARBEMCO may sell bananas
rejected by plaintiff to parties for domestic non-export
consumption only.

SEARBEMCO responded with a motion to dismiss on the grounds of

lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, lack of cause
of action, failure to submit to arbitration which is a condition precedent
to the filing of a complaint, and the complaint’s defective verification
and certification of non-forum shopping.6 SEARBEMCO argued that:

1) the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board

(DARAB) has exclusive jurisdiction over the action filed by DOLE,
pursuant to Sections 1 and 3(e) of Administrative Order No. 09,
Series of 19987 (AO No. 9-98) and Section 5(a) and (c) of
Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 1999 8 (AO No. 2-99) of the
 Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), since the dispute between
the parties is an agrarian dispute within the exclusive
competence of the DARAB to resolve;

2) the filing of the complaint is premature, as the dispute

between DOLE and SEARBEMCO has not been referred to and
resolved by arbitration, contrary to Article IX of the BPPA and
Article V, Sec. 30(g)9 of AO No. 9-98 of the DAR;

3) it did not violate Section 5(p), Article V of the BPPA, since the
rejected bananas were sold to the spouses Abujos who were
third-party buyers and not exporters of bananas; and

4) the complaint is fatally defective as the Board of Directors of

DOLE did not approve any resolution authorizing Atty. Reynaldo
Echavez to execute the requisite Verification and Certification
Against Forum Shopping and, therefore, the same is fatally
defective.

DOLE opposed SEARBEMCO’s motion to dismiss alleging, among

others, that:

1) the dispute between the parties is not an agrarian dispute

within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB under Republic Act
No. 665710 (RA No. 6657); and

2) the Arbitration Clause of the BPPA is not applicable as, aside

from SEARBEMCO, DOLE impleaded other parties (i.e., the
spouses Abujos and Oribanex who are not parties to the BPPA) as
defendants.11

Subsequently, DOLE filed on February 2, 2001 an amended

complaint,12 the amendment consisting of the Verification and
Certification against forum shopping for DOLE executed by Danilo C.
Quinto, DOLE’s Zone Manager.

THE RTC RULING

The RTC denied SEARBEMCO’s motion to dismiss in an Order dated

May 16, 2001.13 The trial court stated that the case does not involve an
agrarian conflict and is a judicial matter that it can resolve.

SEARBEMCO moved for the reconsideration of the RTC Order. 14 The

RTC denied the motion for lack of merit in its Order of July 12, 2001. 15

THE CA RULING

On July 26, 2001, SEARBEMCO filed a special civil action

for certiorari16 with the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC for denying its motion to dismiss and the subsequent
motion for reconsideration.
SEARBEMCO argued that the BPPA the parties executed is an agri-
business venture agreement contemplated by DAR’s AO No. 9-98.
Thus, any dispute arising from the interpretation and implementation
of the BPPA is an agrarian dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the DARAB.

In a decision dated November 27, 2001, 17 the CA found that the RTC
did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying SEARBEMCO’s motion to
dismiss and motion for reconsideration.1avvphi1

The CA ruled that "the [DAR] has no jurisdiction, under said [AO No. 9-
98], over actions between [SEARBEMCO] and [DOLE] for enforcement
of the said Agreement when one commits a breach thereof and for
redress by way of specific performance and damages inclusive of
injunctive relief."18 It held that the case is not an agrarian dispute
within the purview of Section 3(d) of RA No. 6657, 19 but is an action to
compel SEARBEMCO to comply with its obligations under the BPPA; it
called for the application of the provisions of the Civil Code, not RA No.
6657.

The CA likewise disregarded SEARBEMCO’s emphatic argument that

DOLE’s complaint was prematurely filed because of its failure to first
resort to arbitration. The arbitration clause under the BPPA, said the
CA, applies only when the parties involved are parties to the
agreement; in its complaint, DOLE included the spouses Abujos and
Oribanex as defendants. According to the CA, "if [DOLE] referred its
dispute with [SEARBEMCO] to a Panel of Arbitrators, any judgment
rendered by the latter, whether for or against [DOLE] will not be
binding on the [spouses Abujos] and [Oribanex], as case law has it that
only the parties to a suit, as well as their successors-in-interest, are
bound by the judgment of the Court or quasi-judicial bodies." 20

On SEARBEMCO’s argument that the Verification and Certification

Against Forum Shopping under DOLE’s amended complaint is defective
for failure to state that this was based on "personal knowledge," the CA
ruled that the omission of the word "personal" did not render the
Verification and Certification defective.

SEARBEMCO moved for reconsideration of the decision, but the CA

denied the motion for lack of merit in its resolution of June 13, 2002. 21

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

In the present petition, SEARBEMCO submits that the CA erred in ruling

that:

1.) the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint of DOLE, considering that the case involves an agrarian
dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB;
 2.) the complaint of DOLE states a cause of action, despite the
fact that SEARBEMCO has not violated any provision of the BPPA;
and

3.) the filing of the complaint is not premature, despite DOLE’s

failure to submit its claim to arbitration – a condition precedent to
any juridical recourse.

THE COURT’S RULING

We do not find the petition meritorious.

DOLE’s complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the regular

courts, not the DARAB.

SEARBEMCO mainly relies on Section 5022 of RA No. 6657 and the

characterization of the controversy as an agrarian dispute or as an
agrarian reform matter in contending that the present controversy falls
within the competence of the DARAB and not of the regular courts. The
BPPA, SEARBEMCO claims, is a joint venture and a production,
processing and marketing agreement, as defined under Section 5 (c) (i)
and (ii) of DAR AO No. 2-99;23 hence, any dispute arising from the BPPA
is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. SEARBEMCO also
asserts that the parties’ relationship in the present case is not only
that of buyer and seller, but also that of supplier of land covered by the
CARP and of manpower on the part of SEARBEMCO, and supplier of
agricultural inputs, financing and technological expertise on the part of
DOLE. Therefore, SEARBEMCO concludes that the BPPA is not an
ordinary contract, but one that involves an agrarian element and, as
such, is imbued with public interest.

We clarify at the outset that what we are reviewing in this petition is

the legal question of whether the CA correctly ruled that the RTC
committed no grave abuse discretion in denying SEARBEMCO’s motion
to dismiss. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA
decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled
upon was presented to the appellate court; we have to examine the CA
decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the
presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the RTC ruling
before it, not on the basis of whether the RTC ruling on the merits of
the case was correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that
the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the
challenged RTC ruling. A court acts with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when its action was
performed in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of discretion. The abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of the law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason or passion or personal
hostility.24

As the CA found, the RTC’s action was not attended by any

grave abuse of discretion and the RTC correctly ruled in
denying SEARBEMCO’s motion to dismiss. We fully agree with
the CA.

Section 3(d) of RA No. 6657 is clear in defining an agrarian dispute:

"any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold,
tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture,
including dispute concerning farm-workers’ associations or
representations of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing
or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of
lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of
transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and
other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and
tenant, or lessor and lessee."25

RA No. 6657 is procedurally implemented through the 2003 DARAB

Rules of Procedure where Section 1, Rule II 26 enumerates the instances
where the DARAB shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction. A
notable feature of RA No. 6657 and its implementing rules is the focus
on agricultural lands and the relationship over this land that serves as
the basis in the determination of whether a matter falls under DARAB
jurisdiction.

In Heirs of the Late Hernan Rey Santos v. Court of Appeals,27 we held

that:

For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a

tenancy relationship between the parties. x x x. In Vda. De
Tangub v. Court of Appeals (191 SCRA 885), we held that the
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform is limited to the
following: a.) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of
agrarian reform; b.) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure
related problems; and c.) approval and disapproval of the conversion,
restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential,
commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses. [Emphasis
supplied].

The case of Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court of

Appeals28 lists down the indispensable elements for a tenancy
relationship to exist: "(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant
or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of
the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between
the landowner and the tenant or the agricultural lessee."
The parties in the present case have no tenurial, leasehold, or any
other agrarian relationship that could bring their controversy within the
ambit of agrarian reform laws and within the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
In fact, SEARBEMCO has no allegation whatsoever in its motion to
dismiss regarding any tenancy relationship between it and DOLE that
gave the present dispute the character of an agrarian dispute.

We have always held that tenancy relations cannot be presumed. The

elements of tenancy must first be proved by substantial evidence
which can be shown through records, documents, and written
agreements between the parties. A principal factor, too, to consider in
determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is the intent of the
parties.29

SEARBEMCO has not shown that the above-mentioned indispensable

elements of tenancy relations are present between it and DOLE. It also
cannot be gleaned from the intention of the parties that they intended
to form a tenancy relationship between them. In the absence of any
such intent and resulting relationship, the DARAB cannot have
jurisdiction. Instead, the present petition is properly cognizable by the
regular courts, as the CA and the RTC correctly ruled.

Notably, the requirement of the existence of tenurial relationship has

been relaxed in the cases of Islanders CARP-Farmers Beneficiaries
Muti-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. v. Lapanday Agricultural and Dev’t.
Corporation30 and Cubero v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative,
Inc.31 The Court, speaking through former Chief Justice Panganiban,
declared in Islanders that:

[The definition of ‘agrarian dispute’ in RA No. 6657 is] broad enough to

include disputes arising from any tenurial arrangement beyond the
traditional landowner-tenant or lessor-lessee relationship. xxx
[A]grarian reform extends beyond the mere acquisition and
redistribution of land, the law acknowledges other modes of tenurial
arrangements to effect the implementation of CARP.32

While Islanders and Cubero may seem to serve as precedents to the

present case, a close analysis of these cases, however, leads us to
conclude that significant differences exist in the factual circumstances
between those cases and the present case, thus rendering the rulings
in these cited cases inapplicable.

Islanders questioned (through a petition for declaration of nullity filed

before the RTC of Tagum City) the lack of authority of the farmer-
beneficiaries’ alleged representative to enter into a Joint Production
Agreement with Lapanday. The farmers-beneficiaries assailed the
validity of the agreement by additionally claiming that its terms
contravened RA No. 6657.

Cubero likewise involved a petition to declare the nullity of a Joint

Venture Agreement between the farmer-beneficiaries and Laguna West
Multi-Purpose Cooporative, Inc. The successors of the farmer-
beneficiaries assailed the agreement before the RTC of Tanauan,
Batangas for having been executed within the 10-year prohibitory
period under Section 27 of RA No. 6657.

In both cases, the Court ruled that the RTC lacked jurisdiction to hear
the complaint and declared the DARAB as the competent body to
resolve the dispute. The Court declared that when the question
involves the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the
management, cultivation, and use of an agricultural land covered by
CARP, the case falls squarely within the jurisdictional ambit of the DAR.

Carefully analyzed, the principal issue raised in Islanders and Cubero

referred to the management, cultivation, and use of the CARP-covered
agricultural land; the issue of the nullity of the joint economic
enterprise agreements in Islanders and Cubero would directly affect
the agricultural land covered by CARP. Those cases significantly did not
pertain to post-harvest transactions involving the produce from CARP-
covered agricultural lands, as the case before us does now.

Moreover, the resolution of the issue raised in Islanders and Cubero

required the interpretation and application of the provisions of RA No.
6657, considering that the farmer-beneficiaries claimed that the
agreements contravened specific provisions of that law. In the present
case, DOLE’s complaint for specific performance and damages before
the RTC did not question the validity of the BPPA that would require
the application of the provisions of RA No. 6657; neither did
SEARBEMCO’s motion to dismiss nor its other pleadings assail the
validity of the BPPA on the ground that its provisions violate RA No.
6657. The resolution of the present case would therefore involve, more
than anything else, the application of civil law provisions on breaches
of contract, rather than agrarian reform principles. Indeed, in support
of their arguments, the parties have capitalized and focused on their
relationship as buyer and seller. DOLE, the buyer, filed a complaint
against SEARBEMCO, the seller, to enforce the BPPA between them
and to compel the latter to comply with its obligations. The CA is thus
legally correct in its declaration that "the action before the RTC does
not involve an agrarian dispute, nor does it call for the application of
Agrarian Reform laws. x x x. The action of [DOLE] involves and calls for
the application of the New Civil Code, in tandem with the terms and
conditions of the [BPPA] of [SEARBEMCO] and [DOLE]."33

We find SEARBEMCO’s reliance on DAR AO No. 9-98 and AO No. 2-99

as bases for DARAB’s alleged expanded jurisdiction over all disputes
arising from the interpretation of agribusiness ventures to be
misplaced. DARAB’s jurisdiction under Section 50 of RA No. 6657
should be read in conjunction with the coverage of agrarian reform
laws; administrative issuances like DAR AO Nos. 9-98 and 2-99 cannot
validly extend the scope of the jurisdiction set by law. In so ruling,
however, we do not pass upon the validity of these administrative
issuances. We do recognize the possibility that disputes may exist
between parties to joint economic enterprises that directly pertain to
the management, cultivation, and use of CARP-covered agricultural
land. Based on our above discussion, these disputes will fall within
DARAB’s jurisdiction.

Even assuming that the present case can be classified as an agrarian

dispute involving the interpretation or implementation of agribusiness
venture agreements, DARAB still cannot validly acquire jurisdiction, at
least insofar as DOLE’s cause of action against the third parties – the
spouses Abujos and Oribanex – is concerned. To prevent multiple
actions, we hold that the present case is best resolved by the trial
court.

DOLE’s complaint validly states a cause of action

SEARBEMCO asserts that the pleading containing DOLE’s claim against

it states no cause of action. It contends that it did not violate any of
the provisions of the BPPA, since the bananas rejected by DOLE were
sold to the spouses Abujos who are third-party buyers and are not
exporters of bananas – transactions that the BPPA allows. Since the
sole basis of DOLE’s complaint was SEARBEMCO’s alleged violation of
the BPPA, which SEARBEMCO insists did not take place, the complaint
therefore did not state a cause of action.

Due consideration of the basic rules on "lack of cause of action" as a

ground for a motion to dismiss weighs against SEARBEMCO’s
argument.

In the case of Jimenez, Jr. v. Jordana,34 this Court had the opportunity to
discuss the sufficiency of the allegations of the complaint to uphold a
valid cause of action, as follows:

In a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of

the material allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint. This hypothetical
admission extends to the relevant and material facts pleaded in, and
the inferences fairly deductible from, the complaint. Hence, to
determine whether the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint
constitutes a cause of action, the test is as follows: admitting the truth
of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer?

To sustain a motion to dismiss, the movant needs to show that the

plaintiff’s claim for relief does not exist at all. On the contrary, the
complaint is sufficient "if it contains sufficient notice of the cause of
action even though the allegations may be vague or indefinite, in
which event, the proper recourse would be, not a motion to dismiss,
but a motion for a bill of particulars.35

In applying this authoritative test, we must hypothetically assume the

truth of DOLE’s allegations, and determine whether the RTC can render
a valid judgment in accordance with its prayer.

We find the allegations in DOLE’s complaint to be sufficient basis for

the judgment prayed for. Hypothetically admitting the allegations in
DOLE’s complaint that SEARBEMCO sold the rejected bananas to
Oribanex, a competitor of DOLE and also an exporter of bananas,
through the spouses Abujos, a valid judgment may be rendered by the
RTC holding SEARBEMCO liable for breach of contract. That the sale
had been to the spouses Abujos who are not exporters is essentially a
denial of DOLE’s allegations and is not therefore a material
consideration in weighing the merits of the alleged "lack of cause of
action." What SEARBEMCO stated is a counter-statement of fact and
conclusion, and is a defense that it will have to prove at the trial. At
this point, the material consideration is merely what the complaint
expressly alleged. Hypothetically assuming DOLE’s allegations of
ultimate sale to Oribanex, through the spouses Abujos, to be true, we
hold – following the test of sufficiency in Jordana – that DOLE’s prayer
for specific performance and damages may be validly granted; hence,
a cause of action exists.

The filing of the complaint is not premature since arbitration

proceedings are not necessary in the present case

SEARBEMCO argues that DOLE failed to comply with a condition

precedent before the filing of its complaint with the RTC, i.e., DOLE did
not attempt to settle their controversy through arbitration proceedings.
SEARBEMCO relies on Article V, Section 30(g) of DAR AO No. 9-98 36 and
Section 10 of DAR AO No. 2-9937 which provide that "as a rule,
voluntary methods such as mediation or conciliation, shall be preferred
in resolving disputes involving joint economic enterprises."
SEARBEMCO also cites Section IX of the BPPA which provides that all
disputes arising out of or in connection with their agreement shall be
finally settled through arbitration.

Following our conclusion that agrarian laws find no application in the

present case, we find – as the CA did – that SEARBEMCO’s arguments
anchored on these laws are completely baseless. Furthermore, the
cited DAR AO No. 2-99, on its face, only mentions a "preference," not a
strict requirement of referral to arbitration. The BPPA-based argument
deserves more and closer consideration.

We agree with the CA ruling that the BPPA arbitration clause does not
apply to the present case since third parties are involved. Any
judgment or ruling to be rendered by the panel of arbitrators will be
useless if third parties are included in the case, since the arbitral ruling
will not bind them; they are not parties to the arbitration agreement. In
the present case, DOLE included as parties the spouses Abujos and
Oribanex since they are necessary parties, i.e., they were directly
involved in the BPPA violation DOLE alleged, and their participation are
indispensable for a complete resolution of the dispute. To require the
spouses Abujos and Oribanex to submit themselves to arbitration and
to abide by whatever judgment or ruling the panel of arbitrators shall
make is legally untenable; no law and no agreement made with their
participation can compel them to submit to arbitration.
In support of its position, SEARBEMCO cites the case of Toyota Motor
Philippines Corp. v. Court of Appeals 38 which holds that, "the contention
that the arbitration clause has become dysfunctional because of the
presence of third parties is untenable. Contracts are respected as the
law between the contracting parties. As such, the parties are thereby
expected to abide with good faith in their contractual commitments."
SEARBEMCO argues that the presence of third parties in the complaint
does not affect the validity of the provisions on arbitration.

Unfortunately, the ruling in the Toyota case has been superseded by

the more recent cases of Heirs of Augusto L. Salas, Jr. v. Laperal Realty
Corporation39 and Del Monte Corporation-USA v. Court of Appeals.40

Heirs of Salas involved the same issue now before us: whether or not
the complaint of petitioners-heirs in that case should be dismissed for
their failure to submit the matter to arbitration before filing their
complaint. The petitioners-heirs included as respondents third persons
who were not parties to the original agreement between the
petitioners-heirs and respondent Laperal Realty. In ruling that prior
resort to arbitration is not necessary, this Court held:

Respondent Laperal Realty, as a contracting party to the Agreement,

has the right to compel petitioners to first arbitrate before seeking
judicial relief. However, to split the proceedings into arbitration for
respondent Laperal Realty and trial for the respondent lot buyers, or to
hold trial in abeyance pending arbitration between petitioners and
respondent Laperal Realty, would in effect result in multiplicity of suits,
duplicitous procedure and unnecessary delay. On the other hand, it
would be in the interest of justice if the trial court hears the complaint
against all herein respondents and adjudicates petitioner’s rights as
against theirs in a single and complete proceeding. 41

The case of Del Monte is more direct in stating that the doctrine held in
the Toyota case has already been abandoned:

The Agreement between petitioner DMC-USA and private respondent

MMI is a contract. The provision to submit to arbitration any dispute
arising therefrom and the relationship of the parties is part of that
contract and is itself a contract. As a rule, contracts are respected as
the law between the contracting parties and produce effect as between
them, their assigns and heirs. Clearly, only parties to the
Agreement, i.e., petitioners DMC-USA and its Managing Director for
Export Sales Paul E. Derby, and private respondents MMI and its
Managing Director Lily Sy are bound by the Agreement and its
arbitration clause as they are the only signatories thereto. Petitioners
Daniel Collins and Luis Hidalgo, and private respondent SFI, not parties
to the Agreement and cannot even be considered assigns or heirs of
the parties, are not bound by the Agreement and the arbitration clause
therein. Consequently, referral to arbitration in the State of California
pursuant to the arbitration clause and the suspension of the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 2637-MN pending the return of the
arbitral award could be called for but only as to petitioners DMC-USA
and Paul E. Derby, Jr., and private respondents MMI and Lily Sy, and
not as to other parties in this case, in accordance with the recent case
of Heirs of Augusto L. Salas, Jr. v. Laperal Realty Corporation, which
superseded that of [sic] Toyota Motor Philippines Corp. v. Court of
Appeals.

xxxx

The object of arbitration is to allow the expeditious determination of a

dispute. Clearly, the issue before us could not be speedily and
efficiently resolved in its entirety if we allow simultaneous arbitration
proceedings and trial, or suspension of trial pending arbitration.
Accordingly, the interest of justice would only be served if the trial
court hears and adjudicates the case in a single and complete
proceeding.42

Following these precedents, the CA was therefore correct in its

conclusion that the parties’ agreement to refer their dispute to
arbitration applies only where the parties to the BPPA are solely the
disputing parties.

Additionally, the inclusion of third parties in the complaint supports our

declaration that the present case does not fall under DARAB’s
jurisdiction. DARAB’s quasi-judicial powers under Section 50 of RA No.
6657 may be invoked only when there is prior certification from
the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (or BARC) that the dispute
has been submitted to it for mediation and conciliation, without any
success of settlement.43 Since the present dispute need not be referred
to arbitration (including mediation or conciliation) because of the
inclusion of third parties, neither SEARBEMCO nor DOLE will be able to
present the requisite BARC certification that is necessary to invoke
DARAB’s jurisdiction; hence, there will be no compliance with Section
53 of RA No. 6657.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition

for certiorari for lack of merit. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 34,
Panabo City, is hereby directed to proceed with the case in accordance
with this Decision. Costs against petitioner SEARBEMCO.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178266 July 21, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SAMUEL and LORETA VANZUELA, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Civil Procedure. The petitioner People of the Philippines
(petitioner) seeks the reversal of the Order 2 dated May 18, 2007,
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30 of Surigao City,
which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter the
criminal case for estafa filed by private complainant Veneranda S.
Paler (Veneranda) against respondents Samuel Vanzuela (Samuel) and
his wife, Loreta Vanzuela (Loreta) (respondents). The case ostensibly
involves an agrarian dispute, hence, according to the RTC, within the
exclusive original

jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board

(DARAB).

The antecedents are as follows:

Veneranda is the wife of the late Dionisio Paler, Sr. 3 who is the
registered owner of a parcel of irrigated riceland, containing an area of
more than four (4) hectares, situated in Barangay Mabini (Roxas),
Mainit, Surigao del Norte, and covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 5747.4 One (1) hectare of this riceland (subject property)
was cultivated by the respondents as agricultural tenants for more
than ten (10) years, with an agreed lease rental of twelve and one half
(12½) cavans of palay, at 45 kilos per cavan, per harvest. The
respondents allegedly failed to pay the rentals since 1997. Initially,
Veneranda brought the matter before the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) Office in Mainit, Surigao del Norte, but no amicable
settlement was reached by the parties. Thus, Veneranda filed a
criminal complaint for estafa against the respondents.

Consequently, respondents were charged in an Information 5 dated

February 28, 2002 which reads:
That in about and during the period from 1997 to 2001 in Brgy. Roxas,
Mainit, Surigao del Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, said spouses Samuel and Loreta Vanzuela,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, having
leased and occupied the farmland of Veneranda S. Paler and other
heirs of the late Dionesio Paler, Sr., and having harvested and
accounted for a total of 400 sacks of palay for the past 10 harvest
seasons of which 25% thereof were hold (sic) in trust by them or a total
value of ₱80,000.00, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert said sum of
₱80,000.00 to their own use and benefit to the damage and prejudice
of said Veneranda Paler and other heirs of the late Dionesio Paler, Sr.
in the aforementioned sum of ₱80,000.00.

Contrary to law.

Upon arraignment, respondents pleaded not guilty. During pre-trial,

the parties agreed that the respondents had been the agricultural
tenants of Veneranda for more than ten (10) years; and that the palay
was harvested twice a year on the subject property. Thereafter, trial on
the merits ensued. After the prosecution rested its case, the
respondents filed a Demurrer to Evidence, 6 praying that the criminal
case be dismissed for failure of the petitioner to establish the
culpability of the respondents beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner
filed a Comment/Opposition7 arguing that the respondents, as
agricultural tenants, were required by law to hold the lease rentals in
trust for the landowner and thereafter turn over the same to the latter.

In an Order8 dated May 18, 2007, the RTC dismissed the criminal case
ratiocinating, thus:

From the averments of the information, the admissions of the parties

and the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it is easily discernable
(sic) that the instant case pertains to the non-payment of rentals by
the accused to the private complainant, involving a lease of an
agricultural land by the former from the latter. This being so, the
controversy in the case at bench involves an agrarian dispute which
falls under the primary and exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), pursuant
to Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure, x x x.

Citing our ruling in David v. Rivera 9 and Philippine Veterans Bank v.

Court of Appeals,10 the RTC opined that it had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case because the controversy had the character
of an "agrarian dispute." The trial court did not find it necessary to rule
on the respondents’ Demurrer to Evidence and, in fact, no mention of it
was made

in the assailed Order of May 18, 2007. Hence, this petition raising the
following issues:
 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
BRANCH 30, SURIGAO CITY HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CHARGE
FOR ESTAFA EVEN IF IT INVOLVES AGRICULTURAL TENANTS OF
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT; [AND]

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE SEEMING "EXEMPTION" FROM

CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF AGRICULTURAL TENANTS FOR
ESTAFA WOULD CONTRAVENE THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 1,
ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION, SPECIFICALLY THE "EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE."11

Petitioner, on one hand, contends that, under Section 57 of Republic

Act (RA) 6657, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law" (CARL), Special Agrarian Courts (SACs) were vested with
limited criminal jurisdiction, i.e., with respect only to the prosecution of
all criminal offenses under the said Act; that the only penal provision in
RA 6657 is Section 73 thereof in relation to Section 74, which does not
cover estafa; that no agrarian reform law confers criminal jurisdiction
upon the DARAB, as only civil and administrative aspects in the
implementation of the agrarian reform law have been vested in the
DAR; that necessarily, a criminal case for estafa instituted against an
agricultural tenant is within the jurisdiction and competence of regular
courts of justice as the same is provided for by law; that the cases
relied upon by the RTC do not find application in this case since the
same were concerned only with the civil and administrative aspects of
agrarian reform implementation; that there is no law which provides
that agricultural tenants cannot be prosecuted for estafa after they
have misappropriated the lease rentals due the landowners; and that
to insulate agricultural tenants from criminal prosecution for estafa
would, in effect, make them a class by themselves, which cannot be
validly done because there is no law allowing such classification.
Petitioner submits that there is no substantial distinction between an
agricultural tenant who incurs criminal liability for estafa for
misappropriating the lease rentals due his landowner, and a non-
agricultural tenant who likewise incurs criminal liability for
misappropriation.12

Finally, petitioner posits that, at this point, it is premature to discuss

the merits of the case because the RTC has yet to receive in full the
evidence of both parties before it can render a decision on the merits.
Petitioner also claims that it is pointless to delve into the merits of the
case at this stage, since the sole basis of the assailed RTC Order is
simply lack of jurisdiction.13

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that share tenancy is now

automatically converted into leasehold tenancy wherein one of the
obligations of an agricultural tenant is merely to pay rentals, not to
deliver the landowner's share; thus, petitioner's allegation that
respondents misappropriated the landowner's share of the harvest is
not tenable because share tenancy has already been abolished by law
for being contrary to public policy. Accordingly, respondents contend
that the agricultural tenant's failure to pay his lease rentals does not
give rise to criminal liability for estafa. Respondents stand by the ruling
of the RTC that pursuant to Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB New Rules
of Procedure, the DARAB has jurisdiction over agrarian disputes; and
that respondents did not commit estafa for their alleged failure to pay
their lease rentals. Respondents submit that a simple case for
ejectment and collection of unpaid lease rentals, instead of a criminal
case, should have been filed with the DARAB. Respondents also submit
that, assuming arguendo that they failed to pay their lease rentals,
they cannot be held liable for Estafa, as defined under Article 315,
paragraph 4, No. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, because the liability
of an agricultural tenant is a mere monetary civil obligation; and that
an agricultural tenant who fails to pay the landowner becomes merely
a debtor, and, thus, cannot be held criminally liable for estafa. 14

Ostensibly, the main issue we must resolve is whether the RTC has
jurisdiction over the crime of estafa, because the assailed order is
premised on the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
However, should our resolution be in the affirmative, the more crucial
issue is whether an agricultural tenant, who fails to pay the rentals on
the land tilled, can be successfully prosecuted for estafa.

For the guidance of the bench and bar, we find it appropriate to

reiterate the doctrines laid down by this Court relative to the
respective jurisdictions of the RTC and the DARAB.

The three important requisites in order that a court may acquire

criminal jurisdiction are (1) the court must have jurisdiction over the
subject matter; (2) the court must have jurisdiction over the territory
where the offense was committed; and (3) the court must have
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.15

First. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that the jurisdiction of a tribunal

over the subject matter of an action is conferred by law. It is
determined by the material allegations of the complaint or information
and the law at the time the action was commenced. Lack of jurisdiction
of the

court over an action or the subject matter of an action, cannot be

cured by the silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent of the
parties. Thus, the jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action
and the subject matter thereof cannot be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss; otherwise,
the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the
defendant. Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the
end of the litigation.16

In the instant case, the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter
because the law confers on it the power to hear and decide cases
involving estafa. In Arnado v. Buban,17 we held that:

Under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, "the penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period shall be imposed if the amount of the fraud is over ₱12,000.00
but does not exceed ₱22,000.00; and if such amount exceeds the
latter sum, the penalty provided x x x shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one (1) year for its additional ₱10,000.00 x x x." Prision
mayor in its minimum period, ranges from six (6) years and one (1)
day to eight (8) years. Under the law, the jurisdiction of municipal trial
courts is confined to offenses punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years, irrespective of the amount of the fine.

Hence, jurisdiction over the criminal cases against the [respondents]

pertains to the regional trial court. x x x

The allegations in the Information are clear -- Criminal Case No. 6087
involves alleged misappropriation of the amount of ₱80,000.00.

Second. The RTC also has jurisdiction over the offense charged since
the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction.

Third. The RTC likewise acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the
respondents because they voluntarily submitted to the RTC's authority.
Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the
person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its
territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over
all issues that the law requires the court to resolve. 181avvphi1

Thus, based on the law and material allegations of the information

filed, the RTC erroneously concluded that it lacks jurisdiction over the
subject matter on the premise that the case before it is purely an
agrarian dispute. The cases relied upon by the RTC, namely, David v.
Rivera19 and Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, 20 are of
different factual settings. They hinged on the subject matter of
Ejectment and Annulment of Certificate of Land Ownership Awards
(CLOAs), respectively. It is true that in Machete v. Court of
Appeals21 this Court held that RTCs have no jurisdiction over cases for
collection of back rentals filed against agricultural tenants by their
landowners. In that case, however, what the landowner filed before the
RTC was a collection suit against his alleged tenants. These three
cases show that trial courts were declared to have no jurisdiction over
civil cases which were initially filed with them but were later on
characterized as agrarian disputes and thus, within DARAB's
jurisdiction. No such declaration has been made by this Court with
respect to criminal cases.

Instead, we have Monsanto v. Zerna,22 where we upheld the RTC’s

jurisdiction to try the private respondents, who claimed to be tenants,
for the crime of qualified theft. However, we stressed therein that the
trial court cannot adjudge civil matters that are beyond its
competence. Accordingly, the RTC had to confine itself to the
determination of whether private respondents were guilty of the crime.
Thus, while a court may have authority to pass upon the criminal
liability of the accused, it cannot make any civil awards that relate to
the agrarian relationship of the parties because this matter is beyond
its jurisdiction and, correlatively, within DARAB's exclusive domain.

In the instant case, the RTC failed to consider that what is lodged
before it is a criminal case for estafa involving an alleged
misappropriated amount of ₱80,000.00 -- a subject matter over which
the RTC clearly has jurisdiction. Notably, while the RTC has criminal
jurisdiction conferred on it by law, the DARAB, on the other hand, has
no authority to try criminal cases at all. In Bautista v. Mag-isa Vda. de
Villena,23 we outlined the jurisdiction of the DARAB, to wit:

For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of

Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

Executive Order 229 vested the DAR with (1) quasi-judicial powers to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters; and (2) jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,
except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources. This law divested the regional trial courts of their
general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters.

Under Republic Act 6657, the DAR retains jurisdiction over all agrarian
reform matters. The pertinent provision reads:

Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby

vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,
except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department
of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources.

It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but

shall proceed to hear and decide all cases, disputes or controversies in
a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity
and the merits of the case. Toward this end, it shall adopt a uniform
rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination of every action or proceeding before it.

xxx xxx xxx

Subsequently, in the process of reorganizing and strengthening the

DAR, Executive Order No. 129-A24 was issued; it created the DARAB to
assume the adjudicatory powers and functions of the DAR. Pertinent
provisions of Rule II of the DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure read:

SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original Jurisdiction. — The

Adjudicator shall have primary and exclusive original jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate the following cases:
1.1. The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical,
engaged in the management, cultivation, and use of all agricultural
lands covered by Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), and other related
agrarian laws;

xxx xxx xxx

1.4. Those cases involving the ejectment and dispossession of tenants

and/or leaseholders;

xxx xxx xxx

Section 3(d) of RA 6657, or the CARL, defines an "agrarian dispute"

over which the DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction as:

(d) . . . refer[ing] to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,

whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands
devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of
such tenurial arrangements including any controversy relating to
compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers,
tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and
beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. 25

Clearly, the law and the DARAB Rules are deafeningly silent on the
conferment of any criminal jurisdiction in favor of the DARAB. It is
worth stressing that even the jurisdiction over the prosecution of
criminal offenses in violation of RA 6657 per se is lodged with the SACs
and not with the DARAB.26 While indeed, the parties admit that there is
an agricultural tenancy relationship in this case, and that under the
circumstances, Veneranda as landowner could have simply filed a case
before the DARAB for collection of lease rentals and/or dispossession of
respondents as tenants due to their failure to pay said lease rentals,
there is no law which prohibits landowners from instituting a criminal
case for estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, against their tenants. Succinctly put, though the
matter before us apparently presents an agrarian dispute, the RTC
cannot shirk from its duty to adjudicate on the merits a criminal case
initially filed before it, based on the law and evidence presented, in
order to determine whether an accused is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.

However, we must reiterate our ruling in Re: Conviction of Judge

Adoracion G. Angeles,27 that while we do not begrudge a party's
prerogative to initiate a case against those who, in his opinion, may
have wronged him, we now remind landowners that such prerogative
of instituting a criminal case against their tenants, on matters related
to an agrarian dispute, must be exercised with prudence, when there
are clearly lawful grounds, and only in the pursuit of truth and justice.

Thus, even as we uphold the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject
matter of the instant criminal case, we still deny the petition.

Herein respondents were charged with the crime of estafa as defined

under Article 315, paragraph 4, No. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code,
which refers to fraud committed —

By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money,

goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust
or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even
though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or
by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.

We viewed the cases invoked by the petitioner, namely, People v.

Carulasdulasan and Becarel28 and Embuscado v. People29 where this
Court affirmed the conviction for estafa of the accused therein who
were also agricultural tenants. In People v. Carulasdulasan and
Becarel,30 this Court held that -

From the facts alleged, it is clear that the accused received from the
sale of the abaca harvested by them a sum of money which did not all
belong to them because one-half of it corresponds to the landlord's
share of the abaca under the tenancy agreement. This half the
accused were under obligation to deliver to the landlord. They
therefore held it in trust for him. But instead of turning it over to him,
they appropriated it to their own use and refused to give it to him
notwithstanding repeated demands. In other words, the accused are
charged with having committed fraud by misappropriating or
converting to the prejudice of another money received by them in trust
or under circumstances which made it their duty to deliver it to its
owner. Obviously, this is a form of fraud specially covered by the penal
provision above cited.1awphi1

In Embuscado v. People,31 the accused appealed to this Court his

conviction for the crime of theft by the Court of First Instance even as
the information charged him with Estafa and of which he was convicted
by the City Court. This Court ruled that the accused was denied due
process when the Court of First Instance convicted him of a crime not
charged in the information, and then reinstated with modification the
ruling of the City Court convicting him of estafa.

Unfortunately for the petitioner, these cited cases are inapplicable.

People v. Carulasdulasan and Becare 32 involved a relationship of
agricultural share tenancy between the landowner and the accused. In
such relationship, it was incumbent upon the tenant to hold in trust
and, eventually, account for the share in the harvest appertaining to
the landowner, failing which the tenant could be held liable for
misappropriation. As correctly pointed out by the respondents, share
tenancy has been outlawed for being contrary to public policy as early
as 1963, with the passage of R.A. 3844. 33 What prevails today, under
R.A. 6657, is agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship, and all
instances of share tenancy have been automatically converted into
leasehold tenancy. In such a relationship, the tenant’s obligation is
simply to pay rentals, not to deliver the landowner’s share. Given this
dispensation, the petitioner’s allegation that the respondents
misappropriated the landowner’s share of the

harvest – as contained in the information – is untenable. Accordingly,

the respondents cannot be held liable under Article 315, paragraph 4,
No. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.

It is also worth mentioning that in Embuscado v. People, 34 this Court

merely dwelt on the issue of whether the accused charged with estafa
could be convicted of the crime of theft. Issues of tenancy vis-a-vis
issues of criminal liability of tenants were not addressed. Thus, the
dissenting opinion of then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in the said case is
worth mentioning when he opined that:

It is also my opinion that the petitioner cannot be found guilty of estafa

because the mangoes allegedly misappropriated by him were not
given to him in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under
any obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the
same, as provided for in Art. 315, par. 4, No. 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Code. What was entrusted to him for cultivation was a landholding
planted with coconut and mango trees and the mangoes, allegedly
misappropriated by him, were the fruits of the trees planted on the
land. Consequently, the action, if any, should have been for accounting
and delivery of the landlord's share in the mangoes sold by the
petitioner.35

In fine, we hold that the trial court erred when it dismissed the criminal
case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. However, we find
no necessity to remand the case to the trial court for further
proceedings, as it would only further delay the resolution of this case.
We have opted to rule on the merits of the parties’ contentions, and
hereby declare that respondents cannot be held liable for estafa for
their failure to pay the rental on the agricultural land subject of the
leasehold.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 165676 November 22, 2010

JOSE MENDOZA,* Petitioner,

vs.
NARCISO GERMINO and BENIGNO GERMINO, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the petition for review on certiorari 1 filed by petitioner Jose

Mendoza to challenge the decision 2 and the resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 48642.4

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefly
summarized below.

On June 27, 1988, the petitioner and Aurora C. Mendoza 5 (plaintiffs)

filed a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Rosa,
Nueva Ecija against respondent Narciso Germino for forcible entry. 6

The plaintiffs claimed that they were the registered owners of a five-
hectare parcel of land in Soledad, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija (subject
property) under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34267. Sometime in
1988, respondent Narciso unlawfully entered the subject property by
means of strategy and stealth, and without their knowledge or
consent. Despite the plaintiffs’ repeated demands, respondent Narciso
refused to vacate the subject property.7

On August 9, 1988, respondent Narciso filed his answer, claiming,

among others, that his brother, respondent Benigno Germino, was the
plaintiffs’ agricultural lessee and he merely helped the latter in the
cultivation as a member of the immediate farm household. 8

After several postponements, the plaintiffs filed a motion to remand

the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB), in view of the tenancy issue raised by respondent Narciso.

Without conducting a hearing, and despite respondent Narciso’s

objection, the MTC issued an order on October 27, 1995, remanding
the case to the DARAB, Cabanatuan City for further proceedings. 9

On December 14, 1995, the plaintiffs 10 filed an amended complaint

with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), impleading
respondent Benigno as additional defendant.
The plaintiffs alleged that Efren Bernardo was the agricultural lessee of
the subject property. Respondent Benigno unlawfully entered the
subject property in 1982 or 1983 through strategy and stealth, and
without their knowledge or consent. He withheld possession of the
subject property up to 1987, and appropriated for himself its produce,
despite repeated demands from the plaintiffs for the return of the
property. In 1987, they discovered that respondent Benigno had
transferred possession of the subject property to respondent Narciso,
who refused to return the possession of the subject property to the
plaintiffs and appropriated the land’s produce for himself. The subject
property was fully irrigated and was capable of harvest for 2 cropping
seasons. Since the subject property could produce 100 cavans of palay
per hectare for each cropping season, or a total of 500 cavans per
cropping season for the five-hectare land, the plaintiffs alleged that the
respondents were able to harvest a total of 13,000 cavans of palay
from the time they unlawfully withheld possession of the subject
property in 1982 until the plaintiffs filed the complaint. Thus, they
prayed that the respondents be ordered to jointly and severally pay
13,000 cavans of palay, or its monetary equivalent, as actual
damages, to return possession of the subject property, and to pay
₱15,000.00 as attorney’s fees.11

On January 9, 1996, the respondents filed their answer denying the

allegations in the complaint, claiming, among others, that the plaintiffs
had no right over the subject property as they agreed to sell it to
respondent Benigno for ₱87,000.00. As a matter of fact, respondent
Benigno had already made a ₱50,000.00 partial payment, but the
plaintiffs refused to receive the balance and execute the deed of
conveyance, despite repeated demands. The respondents also
asserted that jurisdiction over the complaint lies with the Regional Trial
Court since ownership and possession are the issues. 12

THE PARAD RULING

In a March 19, 1996 decision, PARAD Romeo Bello found that the
respondents were mere usurpers of the subject property, noting that
they failed to prove that respondent Benigno was the plaintiffs’ bona
fide agricultural lessee. The PARAD ordered the respondents to vacate
the subject property, and pay the plaintiffs 500 cavans of palay as
actual damages.13

Not satisfied, the respondents filed a notice of appeal with the DARAB,
arguing that the case should have been dismissed because the MTC’s
referral to the DARAB was void with the enactment of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6657,14 which repealed the rule on referral under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 316.15

THE DARAB RULING

The DARAB decided the appeal on July 22, 1998. It held that it acquired
jurisdiction because of the amended complaint that sufficiently alleged
an agrarian dispute, not the MTC’s referral of the case. Thus, it
affirmed the PARAD decision.16

The respondents elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.17

THE CA RULING

The CA decided the appeal on October 6, 2003. 18 It found that the MTC
erred in transferring the case to the DARAB since the material
allegations of the complaint and the relief sought show a case for
forcible entry, not an agrarian dispute. It noted that the subsequent
filing of the amended complaint did not confer jurisdiction upon the
DARAB. Thus, the CA set aside the DARAB decision and remanded the
case to the MTC for further proceedings.

When the CA denied19 the subsequent motion for reconsideration, 20 the

petitioner filed the present petition.21

THE PETITION

The petitioner insists that the jurisdiction lies with the DARAB since the
nature of the action and the allegations of the complaint show an
agrarian dispute.

THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENTS

The respondents submit that R.A. No. 6657 abrogated the rule on
referral previously provided in P.D. No. 316. Moreover, neither the
Rules of Court nor the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (RRSP)
provides that forcible entry cases can be referred to the DARAB.

THE ISSUE

The core issue is whether the MTC or the DARAB has jurisdiction over
the case.

OUR RULING

We deny the petition.

Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint

It is a basic rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined

by the allegations in the complaint. 22 It is determined exclusively by
the Constitution and the law. It cannot be conferred by the voluntary
act or agreement of the parties, or acquired through or waived,
enlarged or diminished by their act or omission, nor conferred by the
acquiescence of the court. Well to emphasize, it is neither for the court
nor the parties to violate or disregard the rule, this matter being
legislative in character.23
Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,24 as amended by R.A. No. 7691,25 the
MTC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer. The RRSP 26 governs the remedial aspects
of these suits.27

Under Section 5028 of R.A. No. 6657, as well as Section 34 29 of

Executive Order No. 129-A,30 the DARAB has primary and exclusive
jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate
all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and other agrarian laws and
their implementing rules and regulations.

An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to, among

others, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture. 31 For a case to
involve an agrarian dispute, the following essential requisites of an
agricultural tenancy relationship must be present: (1) the parties are
the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3)
there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is
personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvest or payment of
rental.321avvphil

In the present case, the petitioner, as one of the plaintiffs in the MTC,
made the following allegations and prayer in the complaint:

3. Plaintiffs are the registered owners of a parcel of land covered

by and described in Transfer Certificate of Title Numbered 34267,
with an area of five (5) hectares, more or less situated at Bo.
Soledad, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija. x x x;

4. That so defendant thru stealth, strategy and without the

knowledge, or consent of administrator x x x much more of the
herein plaintiffs, unlawfully entered and occupied said parcel of
land;

5. Inspite of x x x demands, defendant Germino, refused and up

to the filing of this complaint, still refused to vacate the same;

6. The continuos (sic) and unabated occupancy of the land by the

defendant would work and cause prejudice and irreparable
damage and injury to the plaintiffs unless a writ of preliminary
injunction is issued;

7. This prejudice, damage or injury consist of disturbance of

property rights tantamount to deprivation of ownership or any of
its attributes without due process of law, a diminution of
plaintiffs’ property rights or dominion over the parcel of land
subject of this dispute, since they are deprived of freely entering
or possessing the same;

8. The plaintiffs are entitled to the relief demanded or prayed for,

and the whole or part of such relief/s consist of immediately or
permanently RESTRAINING, ENJOINING or STOPPING the
 defendant or any person/s acting in his behalf, from entering,
occupying, or in any manner committing, performing or suffering
to be committed or performed for him, any act indicative of, or
tending to show any color of possession in or about the
tenement, premises or subject of this suit, such as described in
par. 3 of this complaint;

9. Plaintiffs are ready and willing to post a bond answerable to

any damage/s should the issuance of the writ x x x;

10. As a consequence of defendant’s malevolent refusal to vacate

the premises of the land in dispute, plaintiffs incurred litigation
expenses of P1,500.00, availing for the purpose the assistance of
a counsel at an agreed honorarium of P5,000.00 and P250.00 per
appearance/ not to mention the moral damages incurred due to
sleepless nights and mental anxiety, including exemplary
damages, the award and amount of which are left to the sound
discretion of this Honorable Court.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that

pending the resolution of the issue in this case, a restraining order be
issued RESTRAINING, ENJOINING, or STOPPING the defendant or any
person/s acting in his behalf, from ENTERING OR OCCUPYING the
parcel of land, or any portion thereof, described in paragraph 3 of this
complaint, nor in any manner committing, performing or suffering to
be committed or, performed for him, by himself or thru another, any
act indicative of, or tending to show any color of possession in or about
the premises subject of this suit;

THEREAFTER, making said writ of preliminary injunction PERMANENT;

and on plaintiffs’ damages, judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the sum alleged in paragraph 10
above.

GENERAL RELIEFS ARE LIKEWISE PRAYED FOR.33

Based on these allegations and reliefs prayed, it is clear that the action
in the MTC was for forcible entry.

Allegation of tenancy does not divest the MTC of jurisdiction

Although respondent Narciso averred tenancy as an affirmative and/or

special defense in his answer, this did not automatically divest the MTC
of jurisdiction over the complaint. It continued to have the authority to
hear the case precisely to determine whether it had jurisdiction to
dispose of the ejectment suit on its merits. 34 After all, jurisdiction is not
affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an
answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become
dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant. 35
Under the RRSP, the MTC is duty-bound to conduct a preliminary
conference36 and, if necessary, to receive evidence to determine if
such tenancy relationship had, in fact, been shown to be the real
issue.37 The MTC may even opt to conduct a hearing on the special and
affirmative defense of the defendant, although under the RRSP, such a
hearing is not a matter of right. 38 If it is shown during the hearing or
conference that, indeed, tenancy is the issue, the MTC should dismiss
the case for lack of jurisdiction.39

In the present case, instead of conducting a preliminary conference,

the MTC immediately referred the case to the DARAB. This was
contrary to the rules. Besides, Section 2 40 of P.D. No. 316, which
required the referral of a land dispute case to the Department of
Agrarian Reform for the preliminary determination of the existence of
an agricultural tenancy relationship, has indeed been repealed by
Section 7641 of R.A. No. 6657 in 1988.

Amended complaint did confer jurisdiction on the DARAB

Neither did the amendment of the complaint confer jurisdiction on the

DARAB. The plaintiffs alleged in the amended complaint that the
subject property was previously tilled by Efren Bernardo, and the
respondents took possession by strategy and stealth, without their
knowledge and consent. In the absence of any allegation of a tenancy
relationship between the parties, the action was for recovery of
possession of real property that was within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts.42

The CA, therefore, committed no reversible error in setting aside the

DARAB decision. While we lament the lapse of time this forcible entry
case has been pending resolution, we are not in a position to resolve
the dispute between the parties since the evidence required in courts
is different from that of administrative agencies. 43

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 6, 2003 Decision

and October 12, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 48642 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

August 17, 2015

G.R. No. 200751

MONICO LIGTAS, Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

The uncontested declaration of the Department of Agrarian Reform

Adjudication Board that Monico Ligtas was a tenant negates a finding
of theft beyond reasonable doubt. Tenants having rights to the harvest
cannot be deemed to have taken their own produce.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, assailing the Court of Appeals Decision 2 dated March 16, 2010
and the Resolution3 dated February 2, 2012.4 The Court of Appeals
affirmed the Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court finding Monico Ligtas
(Ligtas) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of theft. 6

Ligtas was charged with the crime of theft under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code.7 The Information provides:

That on or about the 29th day of June 2000 at Sitio Lamak, Barangay
San Juan, Municipality of Sogod, Province of Southern Leyte, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent of gain, entered into the abaca plantation
belonging to one Anecita Pacate, and once inside the plantation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously harvested 1,000
kilos of abaca fibers, valued at Php29,000.00 at Php29.00 per kilo,
without the consent of said owner, Anecita Pacate, to her damage and
prejudice in the aforestated amount of Twenty Nine Thousand Pesos
(Php29,000.00), Philippine currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

Ligtas pleaded not guilty.9

The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses during trial: Efren Cabero
(Cabero), Modesto Cipres (Cipres), Anecita Pacate, SPO2 Enrique
Villaruel, and Ernesto Pacate.10

According to the prosecution witnesses, Anecita Pacate was the owner

of an abaca plantation situated at Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan,
Sogod, Southern Leyte.1âшphi1 On June 29, 2000, Cabero, the
plantation’s administrator, and several men, including Cipres, went to
the plantation to harvest abaca upon Anecita Pacate’s instructions. At
about 10:00 a.m., Cabero and his men were surprised to find Ligtas
harvesting abaca at the plantation. Ligtas was accompanied by three
(3) unidentified men. Allegedly, Ligtas threatened that there would be
loss of life if they persisted in harvesting the abaca. Cabero reported
the incident to Anecita Pacate and the police. 11
On July 2, 2000, Cabero and Cipres went back to the plantation and
conducted a survey on the condition of the plantation. They found that
1,000 kilos of abaca, valued at ₱28.00 per kilo, were harvested by
Ligtas.12

On July 3, 2000, Ligtas and Anecita Pacate confronted each other

before the Sogod Police Station. 13 Ligtas admitted to harvesting the
abaca but claimed that he was the plantation owner. 14

The defense presented three (3) witnesses during trial: Ligtas; Pablo
Palo, his neighbor; and Delia Ligtas, his wife. 15 According to Ligtas, he
had been a tenant of Anecita Pacate and her late husband, Andres
Pacate since 1993.16 Andres Pacate installed him as tenant of the 1.5
to two hectares of land involved in the criminal case. 17

Ligtas allegedly "made his first harvest in 1997." 18 He then gave

Anecita Pacate her share to the harvest. 19 However, he could not
remember the exact amount anymore.20 Previously, Ligtas and Pablo
Palo were workers in another land, around 15 hectares, owned by
Anecita Pacate and Andres Pacate.21

Ligtas alleged that on June 28, 2000, Anecita Pacate sent workers to
harvest abaca from the land he cultivated. Ligtas prevented the men
from harvesting the abaca since he was the rightful tenant of the
land.22

Furthermore, Ligtas denied harvesting abaca at the plantation on June

29, 2000. He claimed that he was with Cabero and Cipres attending a
barangay fiesta at Sitio Hubasan, San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte,
when the alleged harvesting happened.23

Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department of Agrarian

Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sogod, Southern Leyte for
Maintenance of Peaceful Possession on November 21, 2000. 24 On
January 22, 2002, the DARAB rendered the Decision 25 ruling that Ligtas
was a bona fide tenant of the land.26

While records are bereft as to when the DARAB Decision was formally
offered as evidence before the trial court, records are clear that the
DARAB Decision was considered by both the trial court 27 and Court of
Appeals28 and without any objection on the part of the People of the
Philippines.29

In the Decision dated August 16, 2006, the Regional Trial Court held
that "the prosecution was able to prove the elements of
theft[.]"30 Ligtas’ "defense of tenancy was not supported by concrete
and substantial evidence nor was his claim of harvest sharing between
him and [Anecita Pacate] duly corroborated by any witness." 31 His
"defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification . . . by
prosecution witnesses."32

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Monico Ligtas guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft, this court hereby renders
judgment, sentencing him:

1. To suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9)

months and ten (10) days as minimum to eight (8) years and eight (8)
months as maximum;

2. To indemnify the offende[d] party:

a. The amount of ₱29,000.00forthevalue of the abaca stole[n];

b. The amount of P5000.00 as moral damages;

c. The amount of ₱10,000.00 as litigation expenses/attorney’s

fees;

3. To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.33

The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. 34 According
to it, "the burden to prove the existence of the tenancy
relationship"35 belonged to Ligtas. He was not able to establish all the
essential elements of a tenancy agreement.36

The Court of Appeals declared that Ligtas’ reliance on the DARAB

Decision "declaring him as a bonafide tenant of the . . . land is
irrelevant in the case at bar":37

Jurisprudence is replete with cases declaring that "findings of or

certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his
authorized representative, in a given locality concerning the presence
or absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties,
are merely preliminary or provisional and are not binding upon the
courts.["]38

As to the ownership of the land, the Court of Appeals held that Ligtas
had taken conflicting positions. While he claimed to be a legitimate
tenant, Ligtas also assailed Anecita Pacate’s title over the land. Under
Rule 131, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a tenant cannot deny the
title of his or her landlord at the time of the commencement of the
tenancy relation.39

The Court of Appeals remained unconvinced as to Ligtas’ allegations

on ownership. "He claims that the parcel of land owned by [Anecita
Pacate] is different from the subject abaca land. However, such
assertion was based merely on the testimony of the municipal
assessor, not an expert competent to identify parcels of land." 40
More importantly, the Court of Appeals ruled that Ligtas committed
theft by harvesting abaca from Anecita Pacate’s plantation. 41 Ligtas
had constructive possession of the subject of the theft without the
owner’s consent.42 "The subject of the crime need not be carried away
or actually taken out from the land in order to consummate the crime
of theft."43

Furthermore, Ligtas’ argument that the abaca did not constitute as

personal property under the meaning of Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code was erroneous.44 Following the definition of personal
property, the abaca hemp was "capable of appropriation [and] [could]
be sold and carried away from one place to another." 45 The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding that about 1,000 kilos of
abaca were already harvested.46 Hence, all the elements of theft under
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code were sufficiently established by
the prosecution.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Ligtas’ defense of alibi could not
excuse him from criminal liability.47 His alibi was doubtfully established.
"[W]here an accused’s alibi is established only by himself, his relatives
and friends, his denial of culpability should be accorded the strictest
scrutiny."48

Ligtas’ attack on the credibility of the witnesses did not prosper. 49 He

failed to show that the case was initiated only through Anecita Pacate’s
quest for revenge or to ensure that Ligtas would be evicted from the
land.50

The Court of Appeals dismissed Ligtas’ appeal and affirmed the trial
court’s Decision finding Ligtas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of theft
under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.51 The dispositive portion
of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the

assailed Decision dated . . . August 16, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
of Sogod, Southern Leyte, Branch 39, in Criminal Case No. R-225,
finding accused-appellant Monico Ligtas guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, is
hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.

SO ORDERED.52

Ligtas filed a Motion for Reconsideration,53 which the Court of Appeals

denied on February 2, 2012.54

II

On April 4, 2012, Ligtas filed this Petition assailing the Court of Appeals
Decision and Resolution.55 This court required People of the Philippines
to file its Comment on the Petition within 10 days from notice. 56
The issues for consideration of this court are:

First, whether questions of fact may be raised in a petition for review

on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court;

Second, whether the DARAB Decision, finding petitioner Monico Ligtas

as tenant of the land owned by private complainant Anecita Pacate and
located at Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte is
conclusive or can be taken judicial notice of in a criminal case for theft;
and

Third, whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it

upheld the conviction of petitioner Monico Ligtas for theft under Article
308 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Petition is meritorious.

III

Petitioner argues that the findings of fact of both the trial court and
Court of Appeals must be revisited for being "conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on record and premised on the supposed
absence of evidence on the claim of petitioner [as] tenant." 57

Only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review under Rule
4558 of the Rules of Court.59 Factual findings of the Regional Trial Court
are conclusive and binding on this court when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.60 This court has differentiated between a question of law and
question of fact:

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the

correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or
when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being
admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises
as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of
the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole,
and the probability of the situation.61 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner admits that the Petition raises substantially factual issues

that are beyond the scope of the Rule he seeks redress
from.62 However, there are exceptions to the rule that only questions of
law should be the subject of a petition for review under Rule 45:

(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or

conjectures, (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible, (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion, (4)
when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts, (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting, (6) when in making its findings, the CA
went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee, (7) when the CA’s
findings are contrary to those by the trial court, (8) when the findings
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based, (9) when the acts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent, (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record, or (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion.63 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

This court has held before that a re-examination of the facts of the
case is justified "when certain material facts and circumstances had
been overlooked by the trial court which, if taken into account, would
alter the result of the case in that they would introduce an element of
reasonable doubt which would entitle the accused to acquittal." 64

The issue of tenancy, in that whether a person is an agricultural tenant

or not, is generally a question of fact. 65 To be precise, however, the
existence of a tenancy relationship is a legal conclusion based on facts
presented corresponding to the statutory elements of tenancy. 66

The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its assailed

Decision when it held that all the essential elements of the crime of
theft were duly proven by the prosecution despite petitioner having
been pronounced a bona fide tenant of the land from which he
allegedly stole.67 A review of the records of the case is, thus, proper to
arrive at a just and equitable resolution.

IV

Petitioner claims that private complainant’s filing of criminal charges

was motivated by ill will and revenge. 68 The charges were designed to
remove petitioner from the land he has legitimately occupied as
tenant.69

Telling is the fact that petitioner filed his Complaint before the DARAB
on November 21, 2000, while the Information for Theft was filed on
December 8, 2000.70

Petitioner argues that he has sufficiently established his status as

private complainant’s tenant.71 The DARAB Decision is entitled to
respect, even finality, as the Department of Agrarian Reform is the
administrative agency vested with primary jurisdiction and has
acquired expertise on matters relating to tenancy relationship. 72

The findings of the DARAB were also supported by substantial

evidence.73 To require petitioner to prove tenancy relationship through
evidence other than the DARAB Decision and the testimonies of the
witnesses is absurd and goes beyond the required quantum of
evidence, which is substantial evidence. 74
Also, according to petitioner, the DARAB Decision has attained finality
since private complainant did not file an appeal. The DARAB’s finding
as to the parties’ tenancy relationship constitutes as res judicata.75

On the other hand, respondent argues that the Court of Appeals

correctly disregarded the DARAB Decision.76 The trial court could not
have taken judicial notice of the DARAB Decision:

While the DARAB . . . ruled that petitioner is a bonafide tenant of

Pacate, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents
of the records of other cases even when such cases have been tried or
are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both
cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same
judge.77 (Citation omitted)

Moreover, according to respondent, petitioner invokes conflicting

defenses: that there is a legitimate tenancy relationship between him
and private complainant and that he did not take the abaca
hemp.78 Nevertheless, respondent maintains that petitioner failed to
prove all the essential elements of a tenancy relationship between him
and private complainant.79 Private complainant did not consent to the
alleged tenancy relationship.80 Petitioner also failed to provide
evidence as to any sharing of harvest between the parties. 81

We hold that a DARAB decision on the existence of a tenancy

relationship is conclusive and binding on courts if supported by
substantial evidence.

Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not binding on criminal

proceedings. This court has ruled in a number of cases that:

It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that

administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for the
same act or omission. Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is
not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa. One thing is
administrative liability; quite another thing is the criminal liability for
the same act.

....

Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as

the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and
administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should
not necessarily be binding on the other. Notably, the evidence
presented in the administrative case may not necessarily be the same
evidence to be presented in the criminal cases. 82 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)

However, this case does not involve an administrative charge

stemming from the same set of facts involved in a criminal proceeding.
This is not a case where one act results in both criminal and
administrative liability. DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-2000 involves a
determination of whether there exists a tenancy relationship between
petitioner and private complainant, while Criminal Case No. R-225
involves determination of whether petitioner committed theft.
However, the tenancy relationship is a factor in determining whether
all the elements of theft were proven by the prosecution.

In its Decision dated January 22, 2002, the DARAB found:

All the necessary requisites in order to establish tenancy relationship

as required in the above-quoted Supreme Court ruling, has been
established by the evidence submitted by plaintiff; And these
evidences were not controverted by any evidence submitted by the
respondent.

In fine, this board found plaintiff a bonafide tenant of the land in

question and as such is entitled to a security of tenure, in which case
he shall not be dispossessed of his holdings by the landowner except
for any of the causes provided by law and only after the same has
been proved before, and the dispossession is authorized by the Court
and in the judgment that is final and executory[.] 83 (Citations omitted)

The dispositive portion of the DARAB Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, premises being considered, judgment is hereby

rendered, finding Monico Ligtas a bonafide tenant of the land subject in
this case and well described in paragraph three (3) in the complaint,
and ordering as follows, to wit:

1. The respondent and all other persons acting for and in her
behalf to maintain plaintiff in the peaceful possession of the land
in dispute;

2. The MARO of Sogod, Southern Leyte, and concurrently the

cluster Manager of Sogod Bay DAR Cluster to call the parties and
assist them in the execution of a leasehold contract covering the
land in dispute, and for the parties to respect and obey such call
of the said MARO in compliance with the legal mandate.

3. Ordering the respondent to pay plaintiff the amount of Five

Thousand (₱5,000.00) Pesos representing the expenses incurred
by plaintiff in vindicating his right and other actual expenses
incurred in this litigation.

Other relief sought are hereby ordered dismissed for lack of evidence.

No cost.

SO DECIDED.84

Private complainant did not appeal the DARAB’s findings.

Findings of fact of administrative agencies in the exercise of their

quasi-judicial powers are entitled to respect if supported by substantial
evidence.85 This court is not tasked to weigh again "the evidence
submitted before the administrative body and to substitute its own
judgment [as to] the sufficiency of evidence."86

The DARAB is the quasi-judicial tribunal that has the primary

jurisdiction to determine whether there is a tenancy relationship
between adverse parties.87 This court has held that "judicial
determinations [of the DARAB] have the same binding effect as
judgments and orders of a regular judicial body." 88 Disputes under the
jurisdiction of the DARAB include controversies relating to:

tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or

otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms
or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.89

In Salazar v. De Leon,90 this court upheld the Department of Agrarian

Reform’s primary jurisdiction over agrarian disputes, which includes
the relationship between landowners and tenants. 91 The DARAB
Decision is conclusive and binding on courts when supported by
substantial evidence.92 This court ruled that administrative res
judicata exists in that case:

Significantly, respondent did not appeal the Decision dated 17

November 1995 of the DARAB in DARAB Case # II-380-ISA’94;
consequently, the same has attained finality and constitutes res
judicata on the issue of petitioner’s status as a tenant of respondent.

Res judicata is a concept applied in the review of lower court decisions

in accordance with the hierarchy of courts. But jurisprudence has also
recognized the rule of administrative res judicata: "The rule which
forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by
competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial
facts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting
within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general
judicial powers. . . It has been declared that whenever final
adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on the property
and rights of the citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a
writ of error or a certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded as
res judicata." To be sure, early jurisprudence was already mindful that
the doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to
decisions rendered by what are usually understood as courts without
unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof; and that the more
equitable attitude is to allow extension of the defense to decisions of
bodies upon whom judicial powers have been conferred.93 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
In Encinas v. Agustin, Jr.,94 this court clarified that res judicata applies
only to decisions rendered by agencies in judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings and not to purely administrative proceedings:

The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies
only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of
administrative powers. Administrative powers here refer to those
purely administrative in nature, as opposed to administrative
proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial character.

In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a) taking

and evaluating evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the
evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported
by the facts proved. The exercise of quasi-judicial functions involves a
determination, with respect to the matter in controversy, of what the
law is; what the legal rights and obligations of the contending parties
are; and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of the
respective rights and obligations of the parties. 95 (Citations omitted)

We find it necessary to clarify the two concepts of res judicata: bar by

prior judgment and conclusiveness of judgment. In Social Security
Commission v. Rizal Poultry and Livestock Association, Inc., et al.,96 this
court discussed and differentiated the two concepts of res judicata:

Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as

enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure;
and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c).

There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where
the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be
barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an
absolute bar to the second action.

But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but
no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as
to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined
and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept
of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of judgment." Stated
differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a
competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be
litigated between the parties and their privies, whether or not the
claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the
same.

Thus, if a particular point or question is in issue in the second action,

and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular
point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or
their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same
point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit. Identity
of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue.

The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the
new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by
a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3)
the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4)
there must be as between the first and second action, identity of
parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Should identity of
parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two
cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a "bar by prior judgment"
would apply. If as between the two cases, only identity of parties can
be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as
"conclusiveness of judgment" applies.97 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)

In Martillano v. Court of Appeals,98 the DARAB Decision finding for the

existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties was declared
by this court as conclusive on the parties. 99 As in this case, the DARAB
Decision100 in Martillano attained finality when the landowner did not
appeal the Decision.101 This court ruled that the doctrine of res
judicata applies:

Under the afore-cited sections of RA 6657, the Department of Agrarian

Reform is empowered, through its adjudicating arm the regional and
provincial adjudication boards, to resolve agrarian disputes and
controversies on all matters pertaining to the implementation of the
agrarian law. Section 51 thereof provides that the decision of the
DARAB attains finality after the lapse of fifteen (15) days and no
appeal was interposed therefrom by any of the parties.

In the instant case, the determination of the DARAB in DARAB

Case No. 062-Bul ‘89, there being no appeal interposed therefrom,

attained finality. Accordingly, the matter regarding the status of
Martillano as a tenant farmer and the validity of the CLT and
Emancipation Patents issued in his favor are settled and no longer
open to doubt and controversy.

....

We recall that DARAB Case 062-Bul ‘89 was for the cancellation of
petitioner’s CLT and Emancipation patents. The same effect is sought
with the institution of DARAB Case No. 512-Bul ‘94, which is an action
to withdraw and/or cancel administratively the CLT and Emancipation
Patents issued to petitioner. Considering that DARAB Case 062-Bul ‘89
has attained finality prior to the filing of DARAB Case No. 512-Bul ‘94,
no strenuous legal interpretation is necessary to understand that the
issues raised in the prior case, i.e., DARAB Case No. 062-Bul ‘89, which
have been resolved with finality, may not be litigated anew.
The instant case is complicated by the failure of the complainant to
include Martillano as party-defendant in the case before the
adjudication board and the DARAB, although he was finally impleaded
on appeal before the Court of Appeals.

The belated inclusion of Martillano as respondent in the petition will

not affect the applicability of the doctrine of bar by prior
judgment. What is decisive is that the issues which have already been
litigated in a final and executory judgment precludes, by the principle
of bar by prior judgment, an aspect of the doctrine of res judicata, and
even under the doctrine of "law of the case," the re-litigation of the
same issue in another action. It is well established that when a right or
fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive
upon the parties and those in privity with them. The dictum therein
laid down became the law of the case and what was once irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule or decision, continues to be
binding between the same parties as long as the facts on which the
decision was predicated, continue to be the facts of the case before
the court. Hence, the binding effect and enforceability of that dictum
can no longer be resurrected anew since said issue had already been
resolved and finally laid to rest, if not by the principle of res judicata, at
least by conclusiveness of judgment. 102 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)

In Co v. People, et al.,103 this court held that "the doctrine of

conclusiveness of judgment also applies in criminal cases." 104 Petitioner
in that case was charged with the violation of Republic Act No. 1161,
as amended, for the alleged non-remittance of Social Security System
contributions.105 This court upheld the findings of the National Labor
Relations Commission in a separate case, which declared the absence
of an employer-employee relationship and had attained finality. 106 This
court held that:

The reasons for establishing the principle of "conclusiveness of

judgment" are founded on sound public policy. . . . It is allowable to
reason back from a judgment to the basis on which it stands, upon the
obvious principle that where a conclusion is indisputable, and could
have been drawn only from certain premises, the premises are equally
indisputable with the conclusion. When a fact has been once
determined in the course of a judicial proceeding, and a final judgment
has been rendered in accordance therewith, it cannot be again
litigated between the same parties without virtually impeaching the
correctness of the former decision, which, from motives of public
policy, the law does not permit to be done.

Res judicata has two concepts. The first is bar by prior judgment under
Rule 39, Section 47 (b), and the second is conclusiveness of judgment
under Rule 39, Section 47 (c). Both concepts are founded on the
principle of estoppel, and are based on the salutary public policy
against unnecessary multiplicity of suits. Like the splitting of causes of
action, res judicata is in pursuance of such policy. Matters settled by a
Court’s final judgment should not be litigated upon or invoked again.
Relitigation of issues already settled merely burdens the Courts and
the taxpayers, creates uneasiness and confusion, and wastes valuable
time and energy that could be devoted to worthier cases. 107 (Citations
omitted)

In VHJ Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of

Appeals,108 this court ruled that tenancy relationship must be duly
proven:

[A] tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence

to prove this allegation. The principal factor in determining whether a
tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual
relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land.
It is also a legal relationship.109 (Citation omitted)

The DARAB, in DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-2000, held that all the
essential elements of a tenancy relationship were proven by
petitioner.110 It found that there was substantial evidence to support
petitioner’s claim as tenant of the land. 111 In rendering the Decision,
the DARAB examined pleadings and affidavits of both petitioner and
private complainant.112 It was convinced by petitioner’s evidence,
which consisted of sworn statements of petitioner’s witnesses that
petitioner was installed as tenant by Andres Pacate sometime in
1993.113 Petitioner and Andres Pacate had an agreement to share the
produce after harvest.114 However, Andres Pacate had died before the
first harvest.115 Petitioner then gave the landowner’s share to private
complainant, and had done so every harvest until he was disturbed in
his cultivation of the land on June 29, 2000. 116

We emphasize that after filing her Answer before the DARAB, private
complainant failed to heed the Notices sent to her and refused to
attend the scheduled hearings.117 The DARAB even quoted in its
Decision the reason offered by private complainant’s counsel in his
Motion to Withdraw as counsel:

That as early as the preliminary hearings of the case, the respondent

has already shown her intention not to participate the proceedings of
the case for reasons known only to her;

That despite the advi[c]e of the undersigned, respondent stood pat

with her decision not to participate in the proceedings of the case;

That in view of this predicament, the undersigned can do nothing

except to withdraw as he is now withdrawing as counsel for the
respondent of the above-entitled case[.]118

It is true that trial courts are not mandated to take judicial notice of
decisions of other courts or even records of other cases that have been
tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. 119 In
declaring that the DARAB’s findings on the tenancy relationship
between petitioner and private complainant are immaterial to the
criminal case for theft, the Court of Appeals120 relied on Cornes, et al.
v. Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc., et al.121

In Cornes, petitioners, who were farmers of a 21-hectare agricultural

land in Tarlac that was principally devoted to sugar and rice and who
claim the rights of their predecessors-in-interest, filed separate
Complaints before the Provincial Adjudication Board of Region III in
Tarlac, Tarlac. They claimed that when the registered owner of the
land, Josefina Roxas Omaña, sold the land to respondents, respondents
were aware of the tenancy relationship between petitioners and
Josefina Roxas Omaña.122

Respondents offered a compensation package to petitioners in

exchange for the renunciation of their tenancy rights under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. However, they failed to comply
with their obligations under the terms of the compensation
package.123 Petitioners then filed a series of Complaints before the
DARAB. The cases were consolidated and resolved by the Provincial
Adjudicator.124

The Provincial Adjudicator ruled, among other things, that "there was
no tenancy relationship [that] existed between the parties." 125 He
found that petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest were mere
hired laborers, not tenants. Tenancy cannot be presumed from
respondents’ offer of a compensation package.126

On appeal, the DARAB reversed the Decision of the Provincial

Adjudicator. It found that there was an implied tenancy between the
parties. Petitioners were deemed tenants of the land for more than 30
years. They were entitled to security of tenure.127

The Court of Appeals reversed the DARAB Decision and reinstated the
Provincial Adjudicator’s Decision. It held that there was no substantial
evidence to prove that all the requisites of tenancy relationship
existed. However, despite the lack of tenancy relationship, the
compensation package agreement must be upheld. 128

This court affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision. 129 It held that
petitioners failed to overcome the burden of proving the existence of a
tenancy relationship:

At the outset, the parties do not appear to be the landowner and the
tenants. While it appears that there was personal cultivation by
petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest of the subject
landholding, what was established was that petitioners’ claim of
tenancy was founded on the self-serving testimony of petitioner
Rodolfo Cornes that his predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the landholding for more than 30 years and had engaged
in a "50-50" sharing scheme with JOSEFINA and JOSEFINA’s
grandmother, the previous owner thereof. Self-serving statements in
pleadings are inadequate; proof must be adduced. Such claims do not
suffice absent concrete evidence to support them. The burden rests on
the shoulders of petitioners to prove their affirmative allegation of
tenancy, which burden they failed to discharge with substantial
evidence. Such a juridical tie must be aptly shown. Simply put, he who
alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and from
the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. The same
rule applies to administrative cases. In fact, if the complainant, upon
whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a
satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the
respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or
defense. . . .

Neither was it shown to the satisfaction of this Court that there existed
a sharing of harvests in the context of a tenancy relationship between
petitioners and/or their predecessors-in-interest and JOSEFINA.
Jurisprudence is illuminating to the effect that to prove such sharing of
harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be presented. None
was shown. No receipts were presented as testaments to the claimed
sharing of harvests. The only evidence submitted to establish the
purported sharing of harvests was the testimony of petitioner Rodolfo
Cornes. The sharing arrangement cannot be deemed to have existed
on the basis alone of petitioner Rodolfo Cornes’s claim. It is self-serving
and is without evidentiary value. Self-serving statements are deemed
inadequate; competent proof must be adduced. If at all, the fact alone
of sharing is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship.

We also sustain the conclusion reached by the Provincial Adjudicator

and the Court of Appeals that the testimony of Araceli Pascua, an
employee of the DAR in Victoria, Tarlac, that the subject landholding
was tenanted cannot overcome substantial evidence to the contrary.
To prove the alleged tenancy no reliance may be made upon the said
public officer’s testimony. What cannot be ignored is the precedent
ruling of this Court that the findings of or certifications issued by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, in a
given locality concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy
relationship between the contending parties, are merely preliminary or
provisional and are not binding upon the courts. This ruling holds with
greater effect in the instant case in light of the fact that petitioners, as
herein shown, were not able to prove the presence of all the
indispensable elements of tenancy. 130 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)

Thus, in Cornes, this court did not categorically hold that the DARAB’s
findings were merely provisional and, thus, not binding on courts. What
was deemed as a preliminary determination of tenancy was the
testimony of the Department of Agrarian Reform employee stating that
the land involved was tenanted. Further, the tribunals had conflicting
findings on whether petitioners were bona fide tenants.

In this case, records are bereft as to whether private complainant

appealed the DARAB Decision. Thus, it is presumed that the Decision
has long lapsed into finality.131 It is also established that private
complainant participated in the initial stages of the DARAB
proceedings.132 Therefore, the issue of the existence of a tenancy
relationship is final as between the parties. We cannot collaterally
review the DARAB’s findings at this stage. The existence of the final
Decision that tenancy exists creates serious doubts as to the guilt of
the accused.

VI

According to petitioner, the elements of theft under Article 308 of the

Revised Penal Code were not established since he was a bona
fide tenant of the land.133 The DARAB’s recognition of petitioner as a
legitimate tenant necessarily "implie[d] that he ha[d] the authority to
harvest the abaca hemp from [private complainant’s land]." 134 This
shows that petitioner had no criminal intent.

As to the existence of another element of theft—that the taking was

done without the consent of the owner—petitioner argues that this,
too, was negated by his status as private complainant’s tenant:

The purported lack of consent on the part of the private complainant

as alleged by the prosecution, is misplaced. In fact, it was even
improper for . . . Anecita Pacate to stop or prevent petitioner from
harvesting the produce of the landholding because as tenant,
petitioner is entitled to security of tenure. This right entitled him to
continue working on his landholding until the leasehold relation is
terminated or until his eviction is authorized by the DARAB in a
judgment that is final and executory.135 (Citation omitted)

Petitioner argues that the constitutional presumption of innocence

must be upheld:

Well-settled is the rule that where "inculpatory facts and circumstances

are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent
with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and
is not sufficient to support a conviction." In acquitting an appellant, we
are not saying that he is lily-white, or pure as driven snow. Rather, we
are declaring his innocence because the prosecution’s evidence failed
to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. For that is what the basic
law requires. Where the evidence is insufficient to overcome the
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, then his "acquittal
must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law." 136 (Citations
omitted)

The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the findings of the trial
court finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of theft.

Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ARTICLE. 308. Who are Liable for Theft. — Theft is committed by any
person who, with intent to gain but without violence against or
intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal
property of another without the latter's consent.

Theft is likewise committed by:

1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the
same to the local authorities or to its owner;

2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of

another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or object of the
damage caused by him; and

3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where

trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and without the
consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather
fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm products.

The essential elements of theft are: (1) taking of personal property; (2)
the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking was done without
the owner’s consent; (4) there was intent to gain; and (5) the taking
was done without violence against or intimidation of the person or
force upon things.137

Tenants have been defined as:

persons who — in themselves and with the aid available from within
their immediate farm households — cultivate the land belonging to or
possessed by another, with the latter’s consent, for purposes of
production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share
tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or
ascertainable in produce or money or both under the leasehold
tenancy system.138 (Citation omitted)

Under this definition, a tenant is entitled to the products of the land he

or she cultivates. The landowner’s share in the produce depends on
the agreement between the parties. Hence, the harvesting done by the
tenant is with the landowner’s consent.

The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy

between petitioner and private complainant negates the existence of
the element that the taking was done without the owner’s consent. The
DARAB Decision implies that petitioner had legitimate authority to
harvest the abaca. The prosecution, therefore, failed to establish all
the elements of theft.

In Pit-og v. People,139 this court acquitted petitioner of theft of

sugarcane and banana crops on the basis of reasonable doubt. 140 The
prosecution failed to prove lack of criminal intent on petitioner's
part.141 It failed to clearly identify "the person who, as a result of a
criminal act, without his knowledge and consent, was wrongfully
deprived of a thing belonging to him." 142 There were doubts as to
whether the plants taken by petitioner were indeed planted on private
complainant's lot when petitioner had planted her own plants adjacent
to it.143 Thus, it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt that the
property belonged to private complainant. This court found that
petitioner "took the sugarcane and bananas believing them to be her
own. That being the case, she could not have had a criminal intent." 144

In this case, petitioner harvested the abaca, believing that he was

entitled to the produce as a legitimate tenant cultivating the land
owned by private complainant. Personal property may have been
taken, but it is with the consent of the owner.

No less than the Constitution provides that the accused shall be

presumed innocent of the crime until proven guilty. 145 "[I]t is better to
acquit ten guilty individuals than to convict one innocent
person."146 Thus, courts must consider "[e]very circumstance against
guilt and in favor of innocence[.]" 147 Equally settled is that "[w]here the
evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is consistent with
guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must be given the
benefit of doubt and should be acquitted."148

In view of petitioner's acquittal based on reasonable doubt, we find it

unnecessary to discuss further the other errors raised by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals

Decision dated March 16, 2010 and the Resolution dated February 2,
2012 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Monico Ligtas
is ACQUITTED of the crime of theft under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code. If detained, he is ordered immediately RELEASED, unless
he is confined for any other lawful cause. Any amount paid by way of a
bailbond is ordered RETURNED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 185669 February 1, 2012

JUAN GALOPE, Petitioner,

vs.
CRESENCIA BUGARIN, Represented by CELSO
RABANG, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Petitioner Juan Galope appeals the Decision 1 dated September 26, 2008
and Resolution2 dated December 12, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 97143. The CA ruled that there is no tenancy
relationship between petitioner and respondent Cresencia Bugarin.

The facts and antecedent proceedings are as follows:

Respondent owns a parcel of land located in Sto. Domingo, Nueva

Ecija, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-229582. 3 Petitioner
farms the land.4

In Barangay Case No. 99-6, respondent complained that she lent the
land to petitioner in 1992 without an agreement, that what she
receives in return from petitioner is insignificant, and that she wants to
recover the land to farm it on her own. Petitioner countered that
respondent cannot recover the land yet for he had been farming it for
a long time and that he pays rent ranging from ₱4,000 to ₱6,000 or 15
cavans of palay per harvest. The case was not settled. 5

Represented by Celso Rabang, respondent filed a petition for recovery

of possession, ejectment and payment of rentals before the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), docketed
as DARAB Case No. 9378. Rabang claimed that respondent lent the
land to petitioner in 1991 and that the latter gave nothing in return as
a sign of gratitude or monetary consideration for the use of the land.
Rabang also claimed that petitioner mortgaged the land to Jose
Allingag who allegedly possesses the land.6

After due proceedings, the Provincial Adjudicator dismissed the

petition and ruled that petitioner is a tenant entitled to security of
tenure. The Adjudicator said substantial evidence prove the tenancy
relationship between petitioner and respondent. The Adjudicator noted
the certification of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) that
petitioner is the registered farmer of the land; that Barangay Tanods
said that petitioner is the tenant of the land; that Jose Allingag affirmed
petitioner’s possession and cultivation of the land; that Allingag also
stated that petitioner hired him only as farm helper; and that
respondent’s own witness, Cesar Andres, said that petitioner is a
farmer of the land.7

On appeal, the DARAB disagreed with the Adjudicator and ruled that
petitioner is not a de jure tenant. The DARAB ordered petitioner to pay
rentals and vacate the land, and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
to assist in computing the rentals.

The DARAB found no tenancy relationship between the parties and

stressed that the elements of consent and sharing are not present. The
DARAB noted petitioner’s failure to prove his payment of rentals by
appropriate receipts, and said that the affidavits of Allingag, Rolando
Alejo and Angelito dela Cruz are self-serving and are not concrete proof
to rebut the allegation of nonpayment of rentals. The DARAB added
that respondent’s intention to lend her land to petitioner cannot be
taken as implied tenancy for such lending was without consideration. 8
Petitioner appealed, but the CA affirmed DARAB’s ruling that no
tenancy relationship exists; that the elements of consent and sharing
are not present; that respondent’s act of lending her land without
consideration cannot be taken as implied tenancy; and that no receipts
prove petitioner’s payment of rentals.9

Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition. Petitioner alleges that

the CA erred

[I.]

x x x IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE DECISION OF THE DARAB AND

IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE OF
THE PETITIONER THAT HE IS INDEED A TENANT[;]

[II.]

x x x IN RELYING MAINLY ON THE ABSENCE OF RECEIPTS OF THE

PAYMENTS OF LEASE RENTALS IN DECLARING THE ABSENCE OF
CONSENT AND SHARING TO ESTABLISH A TENANCY
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND THE
RESPONDENT[; AND]

[III.]

x x x WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE PETITIONER HAS NOT

DISCHARGED THE BURDEN [OF] PROVING BY WAY OF
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE HIS ALLEGATIONS OF TENANCY
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE RESPONDENT.10

The main issue to be resolved is whether there exists a tenancy

relationship between the parties.

Petitioner submits that substantial evidence proves the tenancy

relationship between him and respondent. Specifically, he points out
that (1) his possession of the land is undisputed; (2) the DAR certified
that he is the registered farmer of the land; and (3) receipts prove his
payment of irrigation fees. On the absence of receipts as proof of
rental payments, he urges us to take judicial notice of an alleged
practice in the provinces that payments between relatives are not
supported by receipts. He also calls our attention to the affidavits of
Jose Allingag, Rolando Alejo and Angelito dela Cruz attesting that he
pays 15 cavans of palay to respondent.11

In her comment, respondent says that no new issues and substantial

matters are raised in the petition. She thus prays that we deny the
petition for lack of merit.12

We find the petition impressed with merit and we hold that the CA and
DARAB erred in ruling that there is no tenancy relationship between
the parties.
The essential elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are: (1)
the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2)
the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is
consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is
personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee;
and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee.13

The CA and DARAB ruling that there is no sharing of harvest is based

on the absence of receipts to show petitioner’s payment of rentals. We
are constrained to reverse them on this point. The matter of rental
receipts is not an issue given respondent’s admission that she receives
rentals from petitioner. To recall, respondent’s complaint in Barangay
Case No. 99-6 was that the rental or the amount she receives from
petitioner is not much.14 This fact is evident on the record 15 of said case
which is signed by respondent and was even attached as Annex "D" of
her DARAB petition. Consequently, we are thus unable to agree with
DARAB’s ruling that the affidavits 16 of witnesses that petitioner pays 15
cavans of palay or the equivalent thereof in pesos as rent are not
concrete proof to rebut the allegation of nonpayment of rentals.
Indeed, respondent’s admission confirms their statement that rentals
are in fact being paid. Such admission belies the claim of respondent’s
representative, Celso Rabang, that petitioner paid nothing for the use
of the land.

Contrary also to the CA and DARAB pronouncement, respondent’s act

of allowing the petitioner to cultivate her land and receiving rentals
therefor indubitably show her consent to an unwritten tenancy
agreement. An agricultural leasehold relation is not determined by the
explicit provisions of a written contract alone. 17 Section 518 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform
Code, recognizes that an agricultural leasehold relation may exist upon
an oral agreement.

Thus, all the elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are

present. Respondent is the landowner; petitioner is her tenant. The
subject matter of their relationship is agricultural land, a farm
land.19 They mutually agreed to the cultivation of the land by petitioner
and share in the harvest. The purpose of their relationship is clearly to
bring about agricultural production. After the harvest, petitioner pays
rental consisting of palay or its equivalent in cash. Respondent’s
motion20 to supervise harvesting and threshing, processes in palay
farming, further confirms the purpose of their agreement. Lastly,
petitioner’s personal cultivation of the land 21 is conceded by
respondent who likewise never denied the fact that they share in the
harvest.

Petitioner’s status as a de jure tenant having been established, we now

address the issue of whether there is a valid ground to eject petitioner
from the land.
Respondent, as landowner/agricultural lessor, has the burden to prove
the existence of a lawful cause for the ejectment of petitioner, the
tenant/agricultural lessee.22 This rule proceeds from the principle that a
tenancy relationship, once established, entitles the tenant to a security
of tenure.23 The tenant can only be ejected from the agricultural
landholding on grounds provided by law.24

Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844 enumerates these grounds, to wit:

SEC. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.– Notwithstanding any

agreement as to the period or future surrender of the land, an
agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of
his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by
the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing
it is shown that:

(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate

family will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the
landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital
or school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes: Provided;
That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance
compensation equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in
addition to his rights under Sections [25] and [34], except when
the land owned and leased by the agricultural lessor is not more
than five hectares, in which case instead of disturbance
compensation the lessee may be entitled to an advance notice of
at least one agricultural year before ejectment proceedings are
filed against him: Provided, further, That should the landholder
not cultivate the land himself for three years or fail to
substantially carry out such conversion within one year after the
dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in
bad faith and the tenant shall have the right to demand
possession of the land and recover damages for any loss incurred
by him because of said dispossession;

(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any

of the terms and conditions of the contract or any of the
provisions of this Code unless his failure is caused by fortuitous
event or force majeure;

(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding

for a purpose other than what had been previously agreed upon;

(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices

as determined under paragraph 3 of Section [29];

(5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement

thereon is substantially damaged or destroyed or has
unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or negligence of the
agricultural lessee;
 (6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it
falls due: Provided, That if the non-payment of the rental shall be
due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a
result of a fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be a
ground for dispossession, although the obligation to pay the
rental due that particular crop is not thereby extinguished; or

(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in

violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of Section [27].

Through Rabang, respondent alleged (1) nonpayment of any

consideration, (2) lack of tenancy relationship, (3) petitioner
mortgaged the land to Allingag who allegedly possesses the land, and
(4) she will manage/cultivate the land. 25 None of these grounds were
proven by the respondent.

As aforesaid, respondent herself admitted petitioner’s payment of

rentals. We also found that a tenancy relationship exists between the
parties.

On the supposed mortgage, Allingag himself denied it in his

affidavit.26 No such a deed of mortgage was submitted in evidence.
Rabang’s claim is based on a hearsay statement of Cesar Andres that
he came to know the mortgage from residents of the place where the
land is located.27

That Allingag possesses the land is also based on Andres’s hearsay

statement. On the contrary, Allingag stated in his affidavit that he is
merely petitioner’s farm helper.28 We have held that the employment of
farm laborers to perform some aspects of work does not preclude the
existence of an agricultural leasehold relationship, provided that an
agricultural lessee does not leave the entire process of cultivation in
the hands of hired helpers. Indeed, while the law explicitly requires the
agricultural lessee and his immediate family to work on the land, we
have nevertheless declared that the hiring of farm laborers by the
tenant on a temporary, occasional, or emergency basis does not
negate the existence of the element of "personal cultivation" essential
in a tenancy or agricultural leasehold relationship. 29 There is no
showing that petitioner has left the entire process of cultivating the
land to Allingag. In fact, respondent has admitted that petitioner still
farms the land.30

On respondent’s claim that she will cultivate the land, it is no longer a

valid ground to eject petitioner. The original provision of Section 36 (1)
of R.A. No. 3844 has been removed from the statute books 31 after its
amendment by Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389 32 on September 10, 1971, to
wit:

SEC. 7. Section 36 (1) of the same Code is hereby amended to read as

follows:
(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon
recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited for
residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban
purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to
disturbance compensation equivalent to five times the average of the
gross harvests on his landholding during the last five preceding
calendar years.

Since respondent failed to prove nonpayment of rentals, petitioner

may not be ejected from the landholding.1âwphi1 We emphasize,
however, that as long as the tenancy relationship subsists, petitioner
must continue paying rentals. For the law provides that nonpayment of
lease rental, if proven, is a valid ground to dispossess him of
respondent’s land. Henceforth, petitioner should see to it that his
rental payments are properly covered by receipts.

Finally, the records show that Allingag, petitioner’s co-respondent in

DARAB Case No. 9378, did not join petitioner’s appeal to the CA. If
Allingag did not file a separate appeal, the DARAB decision had
become final as to him. We cannot grant him any relief.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE the Decision dated

September 26, 2008 and Resolution dated December 12, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97143.

The petition filed by respondent Cresencia Bugarin in DARAB Case No.

9378 is hereby DISMISSED insofar as petitioner Juan Galope is
concerned.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170346 March 12, 2007

HEIRS OF NICOLAS JUGALBOT, Represented by LEONILA B.

JUGALBOT, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF VIRGINIA A. ROA,
Represented by LOLITA R. GOROSPE,
Administratrix, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Petitioners, Heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot, represented by their attorney-in-

fact Leonila Jugalbot, assail the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated
October 19, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 81823 where the petitioners’ title
to the disputed property, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. E-103, was cancelled and the previous title, TCT No. T-11543,
was reinstated in the name of Virginia A. Roa. The appellate court
reversed the Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Central Office in DARAB Case No.
7966, affirming the Decision4 of the Provincial Adjudicator and the
Order5 denying the motion for reconsideration in DARAB Case No. X
(06-1358) filed in Misamis Oriental, for Cancellation of TCT No. E-103,
Recovery of Possession and Damages.

On September 28, 1997, an Emancipation Patent (EP) was issued to

Nicolas Jugalbot based on the latter’s claim that he was the tenant of
Lot 2180-C of the Subdivision plan (LRC) TSD-10465, subject property
of the case at bar, with an area of 6,229 square meters, located at
Barangay Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. The subject property was
registered in the name of Virginia A. Roa under Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-11543, the same being issued on April 1, 1970 in the
name of "Virginia A. Roa married to Pedro N. Roa." The property was
originally registered in the name of Marcelino Cabili from whom
Virginia A. Roa purchased the same sometime in 1966. 6

Nicolas Jugalbot alleged that he was a tenant of the property

continuously since the 1950s. On a Certification dated January 8, 1988
and issued by Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Team Leader
Eduardo Maandig, the subject property was declared to be tenanted as
of October 21, 1972 and primarily devoted to rice and corn. On March
1, 1988, the Emancipation Patent was registered with the Register of
Deeds and Nicolas Jugalbot was issued TCT No. E-103. 7

On August 10, 1998, the heirs of Virginia A. Roa, herein private

respondents, filed before the DARAB Provincial Office of Misamis
Oriental a Complaint for Cancellation of Title (TCT No. E-103), Recovery
of Possession and Damages against Nicolas Jugalbot, docketed as
DARAB Case No. X (06-1358).8

On October 23, 1998, a Decision was rendered by the DARAB

Provincial Adjudicator dismissing private respondents’ complaint and
upholding the validity of the Emancipation Patent. Private respondents’
motion for reconsideration was denied.9

On appeal, the DARAB Central Office affirmed the Provincial

Adjudicator’s decision on the sole ground that private respondents’
right to contest the validity of Nicolas Jugalbot’s title was barred by
prescription. It held that an action to invalidate a certificate of title on
the ground of fraud prescribes after the expiration of one year from the
decree of registration.10

On November 10, 2003, the DARAB denied private respondents’

motion for reconsideration,11 hence they filed a petition for review
before the Court of Appeals which was granted. The appellate court
reversed the Decision and Resolution of the DARAB Central Office on
four grounds: (1) the absence of a tenancy relationship; (2) lack of
notice to Virginia Roa by the DAR; (3) the area of the property which
was less than one hectare and deemed swampy, rainfed and
kangkong-producing; and (4) the classification of the subject property
as residential, which is outside the coverage of Presidential Decree No.
27.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

The sole issue for determination is whether a tenancy relationship

exists between petitioners Heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot, and private
respondents, Heirs of Virginia A. Roa, under Presidential Decree No. 27.
Simply stated, are petitioners de jure tenants of private respondents?

As clearly laid down in Qua v. Court of Appeals 12 and subsequently

in Benavidez v. Court of Appeals,13 the doctrine is well-settled that the
allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the land in question does
not automatically make the case an agrarian dispute. It is necessary to
first establish the existence of a tenancy relationship between the
party litigants. The following essential requisites must concur in order
to establish a tenancy relationship: (a) the parties are the landowner
and the tenant; (b) the subject matter is agricultural land; (c) there is
consent; (d) the purpose is agricultural production; (e) there is
personal cultivation by the tenant; and (f) there is a sharing of harvests
between the parties.14

Valencia v. Court of Appeals15 further affirms the doctrine that a

tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. Claims that one is a tenant
do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. The elements of
tenancy must first be proved in order to entitle the claimant to security
of tenure. There must be evidence to prove the allegation that an
agricultural tenant tilled the land in question. Hence, a perusal of the
records and documents is in order to determine whether there is
substantial evidence to prove the allegation that a tenancy relationship
does exist between petitioner and private respondents. The principal
factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. 16

Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the

alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship, as
ruled in Isidro v. Court of Appeals.17 The intent of the parties, the
understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written
agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to
law, are even more important.18

Petitioners allege that they are bona fide tenants of private

respondents under Presidential Decree No. 27. Private respondents
deny this, citing inter alia, that Virginia A. Roa was not given a notice
of coverage of the property subject matter of this case; that Virginia A.
Roa and the private respondents did not have any tenant on the same
property; that the property allegedly covered by Presidential Decree
No. 27 was residential land; that the lot was paraphernal property of
Virginia A. Roa; and the landholding was less than seven (7) hectares.
The petition is devoid of merit.

The petitioners are not de jure tenants of private respondents under

Presidential Decree No. 27 due to the absence of the essential
requisites that establish a tenancy relationship between them.

Firstly, the taking of subject property was done in violation of

constitutional due process. The Court of Appeals was correct in
pointing out that Virginia A. Roa was denied due process because the
DAR failed to send notice of the impending land reform coverage to the
proper party. The records show that notices were erroneously
addressed and sent in the name of Pedro N. Roa who was not the
owner, hence, not the proper party in the instant case. The ownership
of the property, as can be gleaned from the records, pertains to
Virginia A. Roa. Notice should have been therefore served on her, and
not Pedro N. Roa.

Spouses Estonina v. Court of Appeals19 held that the presumption

under civil law that all property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal
partnership applies only when there is proof that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition
during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. 20 In Spouses
Estonina, petitioners were unable to present any proof that the
property in question was acquired during the marriage of Santiago and
Consuelo Garcia. The fact that when the title over the land in question
was issued, Santiago Garcia was already married to Consuelo as
evidenced by the registration in the name of "Santiago Garcia married
to Consuelo Gaza," does not suffice to establish the conjugal nature of
the property.21

In the instant case, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the phrase
"married to" appearing in certificates of title is no proof that the
properties were acquired during the spouses’ coverture and are merely
descriptive of the marital status of the person indicated therein. The
clear import from the certificate of title is that Virginia is the owner of
the property, the same having been registered in her name alone, and
being "married to Pedro N. Roa" was merely descriptive of her civil
status.22 Since no proof was adduced that the property was acquired
during the marriage of Pedro and Virginia Roa, the fact that when the
title over the land in question was issued, Virginia Roa was already
married to Pedro N. Roa as evidenced by the registration in the name
of "Virginia A. Roa married to Pedro N. Roa," does not suffice to
establish the conjugal nature of the property.

In addition, the defective notice sent to Pedro N. Roa was followed by a

DAR certification signed by team leader Eduardo Maandig on January
8, 1988 stating that the subject property was tenanted as of October
21, 1972 and primarily devoted to rice and corn despite the fact that
there was no ocular inspection or any on-site fact-finding investigation
and report to verify the truth of the allegations of Nicolas Jugalbot that
he was a tenant of the property. The absence of such ocular inspection
or on-site fact-finding investigation and report likewise deprives
Virginia A. Roa of her right to property through the denial of due
process.

By analogy, Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals 23 applies to the case
at bar since there was likewise a violation of due process in the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law when the
petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection and investigation to
be conducted by the DAR before acquisition of the property was to be
undertaken. Neither was there proof that petitioner was given the
opportunity to at least choose and identify its retention area in those
portions to be acquired.24 Both in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law and Presidential Decree No. 27, the right of retention and how this
right is exercised, is guaranteed by law.

Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27 and the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law govern the extraordinary method
of expropriating private property, the law must be strictly construed.
Faithful compliance with legal provisions, especially those which relate
to the procedure for acquisition of expropriated lands should therefore
be observed. In the instant case, no proper notice was given to Virginia
A. Roa by the DAR. Neither did the DAR conduct an ocular inspection
and investigation. Hence, any act committed by the DAR or any of its
agencies that results from its failure to comply with the proper
procedure for expropriation of land is a violation of constitutional due
process and should be deemed arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Secondly, there is no concrete evidence on record sufficient to

establish that Nicolas Jugalbot or the petitioners personally cultivated
the property under question or that there was sharing of harvests,
except for their self-serving statements. Clearly, there is no showing
that Nicolas Jugalbot or any of his farm household cultivated the land
in question. No proof was presented except for their self-serving
statements that they were tenants of Virginia A. Roa. Independent
evidence, aside from their self-serving statements, is needed to prove
personal cultivation, sharing of harvests, or consent of the landowner,
and establish a tenancy relationship.

Furthermore, in the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, it was

undisputed that Nicolas Jugalbot was a soldier in the United States
Army from June 15, 1946 to April 27, 194925 and upon retirement,
migrated to the United States and returned to the Philippines
sometime in 1998.26 It was established that Jugalbot’s wife Miguela and
daughter Lilia P. Jugalbot are residents of 17623 Grayland Avenue,
Artesia, California, U.S.A., where Nicolas Jugalbot spent his
retirement.27 Thus, the DAR, in particular its team leader Eduardo
Maandig, haphazardly issued a certification dated January 8, 1988 that
the subject property was tenanted as of October 21, 1972 by Nicolas
Jugalbot and primarily devoted to rice and corn without the benefit of
any on-site fact-finding investigation and report. This certification
became the basis of the emancipation patent and subsequently, TCT
No. E-103 issued on March 1, 1988, which was less than two months
from the issuance of the unsubstantiated DAR certification.
Coincidentally, October 21, 1972 is the date Presidential Decree No. 27
was signed into law.

Neither was there any evidence that the landowner, Virginia A. Roa,
freely gave her consent, whether expressly or impliedly, to establish a
tenancy relationship over her paraphernal property.

As declared in Castillo v. Court of Appeals,28 absent the element of

personal cultivation, one cannot be a tenant even if he is so designated
in the written agreement of the parties.29

In Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,30 we ruled that the respondents’

self-serving statements regarding their tenancy relations could not
establish the claimed relationship. The fact alone of working on
another’s landholding does not raise a presumption of the existence of
agricultural tenancy. Substantial evidence does not only entail the
presence of a mere scintilla of evidence in order that the fact of
sharing can be established; there must be concrete evidence on record
adequate enough to prove the element of sharing. 31 We further
observed in Berenguer, Jr.:

With respect to the assertion made by respondent Mamerto Venasquez

that he is not only a tenant of a portion of the petitioner’s landholding
but also an overseer of the entire property subject of this controversy,
there is no evidence on record except his own claim in support thereof.
The witnesses who were presented in court in an effort to bolster
Mamerto’s claim merely testified that they saw him working on the
petitioner’s landholding. More importantly, his own witnesses even
categorically stated that they did not know the relationship of Mamerto
and the petitioner in relation to the said landholding. x x x The fact
alone of working on another’s landholding does not raise a
presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. Other
factors must be taken into consideration like compensation in
the form of lease rentals or a share in the produce of the
landholding involved. (Underscoring supplied)

xxxx

In the absence of any substantial evidence from which it can be

satisfactorily inferred that a sharing arrangement is present between
the contending parties, we, as a court of last resort, are duty-bound to
correct inferences made by the courts below which are manifestly
mistaken or absurd. x x x

Without the essential elements of consent and sharing, no

tenancy relationship can exist between the petitioner and the
private respondents. (Underscoring supplied)32

Bejasa v. Court of Appeals33 likewise held that to prove sharing of

harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be presented as self-
serving statements are deemed inadequate. Proof must always be
adduced.34 In addition –

The Bejasas admit that prior to 1984, they had no contact with
Candelaria. They acknowledge that Candelaria could argue that she did
not know of Malabanan’s arrangement with them. True enough
Candelaria disavowed any knowledge that the Bejasas during
Malabanan’s lease possessed the land. However, the Bejasas claim
that this defect was cured when Candelaria agreed to lease the land to
the Bejasas for ₱20,000.00 per annum, when Malabanan died in 1983.
We do not agree. In a tenancy agreement, consideration should be in
the form of harvest sharing. Even assuming that Candelaria agreed to
lease it out to the Bejasas for ₱20,000 per year, such agreement did
not create a tenancy relationship, but a mere civil law lease. 35

Thirdly, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy

relationship. In Caballes v. Department of Agrarian Reform,36 we
restated the well-settled rule that all the requisites must concur in
order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties and the
absence of one or more requisites does not make the alleged tenant
a de facto tenant as contradistinguished from a de jure tenant. This is
so because unless a person has established his status as a de
jure tenant he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by
the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy
laws.37 The security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy laws may be
invoked only by tenants de jure, not by those who are not true and
lawful tenants.38

As reiterated in Qua,39 the fact that the source of livelihood of the

alleged tenants is not derived from the lots they are allegedly
tenanting is indicative of non-agricultural tenancy relationship. 40

Finally, it is readily apparent in this case that the property under

dispute is residential property and not agricultural property. Zoning
Certification No. 98-084 issued on September 3, 1998 clearly shows
that the subject property Lot 2180-C covered by TCT No. T-11543 with
an area of 6,229 square meters and owned by Virginia A. Roa is
located within the Residential 2 District in accordance with paragraph
(b), Section 9, Article IV of Zoning Ordinance No. 880, Series of 1979
issued by the City Planning and Development Office of Cagayan de Oro
City.41 To bolster the residential nature of the property, it must also be
noted that no Barangay Agrarian Reform Council was organized or
appointed by the DAR existed in Barangay Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro
City, as all lands have been classified as residential or commercial, as
certified by Barangay Captain of Lapasan.42

In Gonzales v. Court of Appeals,43 we held that an agricultural

leasehold cannot be established on land which has ceased to be
devoted to cultivation or farming because of its conversion into a
residential subdivision. Petitioners were not agricultural lessees or
tenants of the land before its conversion into a residential subdivision
in 1955. Not having been dispossessed by the conversion of the land
into a residential subdivision, they may not claim a right to
reinstatement.44

This Court in Spouses Tiongson v. Court of Appeals 45 succinctly ruled

that the land surrounded by a residential zone is always classified as
residential. The areas surrounding the disputed six hectares are now
dotted with residences and, apparently, only this case has kept the
property in question from being developed together with the rest of
the lot to which it belongs. The fact that a caretaker plants rice or corn
on a residential lot in the middle of a residential subdivision in the
heart of a metropolitan area cannot by any strained interpretation of
law convert it into agricultural land and subject it to the agrarian
reform program.46

Despite the apparent lack of evidence establishing a tenancy

relationship between petitioners and private respondents, the DARAB
improperly recognized the existence of such a relationship in complete
disregard of the essential requisites under Presidential Decree No. 27.
DARAB committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in issuing an Emancipation Patent to Nicolas Jugalbot.

Once again, Benavidez v. Court of Appeals47 is illustrative in its

pronouncement that an alleged agricultural tenant tilling the land does
not automatically make the case an agrarian dispute which calls for
the application of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the assumption of
jurisdiction by the DARAB. It is absolutely necessary to first establish
the existence of a tenancy relationship between the party litigants.
In Benavidez, there was no showing that there existed any tenancy
relationship between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the case
fell outside the coverage of the Agricultural Tenancy Act; consequently,
it was the Municipal Trial Court and not the DARAB which had
jurisdiction over the controversy between petitioner and private
respondent.48

Verily, Morta, Sr. v. Occidental49 ruled that for DARAB to have

jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship
between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold
over a dispute, it would be essential to establish all the indispensable
elements of a landlord-tenant relationship:

The regional trial court ruled that the issue involved is tenancy-related
that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. It relied on the
findings in DARAB Case No. 2413 that Josefina Opiana-Baraclan
appears to be the lawful owner of the land and Jaime Occidental was
her recognized tenant. However, petitioner Morta claimed that he is
the owner of the land. Thus, there is even a dispute as to who is the
rightful owner of the land, Josefina Opiana-Baraclan or petitioner Morta.
The issue of ownership cannot be settled by the DARAB since it is
definitely outside its jurisdiction. Whatever findings made by the
DARAB regarding the ownership of the land are not conclusive to settle
the matter. The issue of ownership shall be resolved in a separate
proceeding before the appropriate trial court between the claimants
thereof.50

At any rate, whoever is declared to be the rightful owner of the land,

the case cannot be considered as tenancy-related for it still fails to
comply with the other requirements. Assuming arguendo that Josefina
Opiana-Baraclan is the owner, then the case is not between the
landowner and tenant. If, however, Morta is the landowner, Occidental
cannot claim that there is consent to a landowner-tenant relationship
between him and Morta. Thus, for failure to comply with the above
requisites, we conclude that the issue involved is not tenancy-related
cognizable by the DARAB. 51

In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals,52 the jurisdiction of the

Department of Agrarian Reform is limited to the following: (a)
adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian
reform; (b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related
problems; and (c) approval and disapproval of the conversion,
restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential,
commercial, industrial and other non-agricultural uses. 53

To recapitulate, petitioners are not de jure tenants of Virginia A. Roa,

to which Presidential Decree No. 27 is found to be inapplicable; hence,
the DARAB has no jurisdiction over this case. The DARAB not only
committed a serious error in judgment, which the Court of Appeals
properly corrected, but the former likewise committed a palpable error
in jurisdiction which is contrary to law and jurisprudence. For all the
foregoing reasons, we affirm the appellate court decision and likewise
hold that the DARAB gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction on the grounds that the subject matter of the present
action is residential, and not agricultural, land, and that all the
essential requisites of a tenancy relationship were sorely lacking in the
case at bar.

On one final note, it may not be amiss to stress that laws which have
for their object the preservation and maintenance of social justice are
not only meant to favor the poor and underprivileged. They apply with
equal force to those who, notwithstanding their more comfortable
position in life, are equally deserving of protection from the courts.
Social justice is not a license to trample on the rights of the rich in the
guise of defending the poor, where no act of injustice or abuse is being
committed against them.54

As the court of last resort, our bounden duty to protect the less
privileged should not be carried out to such an extent as to deny
justice to landowners whenever truth and justice happen to be on their
side. For in the eyes of the Constitution and the statutes, EQUAL
JUSTICE UNDER THE LAW remains the bedrock principle by which our
Republic abides.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81823 promulgated on October 19, 2005
is AFFIRMED. The Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City is ordered
to CANCEL Transfer Certificate of Title No. E-103 for having been
issued without factual and legal basis, and REINSTATE Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-11543 in the name of Virginia A. Roa. The city
Assessor’s Office of Cagayan de Oro is likewise directed
to CANCEL Tax Declaration No. 80551 issued to Nicolas Jugalbot
and RESTORE Tax Declaration No. 270922 in the name of Virginia
Angcod Roa. The heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot, represented by Leonila B.
Jugalbot or any other person claiming a right or interest to the disputed
lot through the latter’s title are directed to VACATE the premises
thereof and peaceably turn over its possession to petitioners Heirs of
Virginia A. Roa, represented by Lolita R. Gorospe. No pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

[ G.R. No. 175098, August 26, 2015 ]

ISMAEL V. CRISOSTOMO, PETITIONER, VS. MARTIN P. VICTORIA,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure praying that the July 31, 2006
Decision1 and the October 20, 2006 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals Eighth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 94107 be reversed and set
aside, and that the April 4, 2005 Decision3 and March 17, 2006
Resolution4 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
be reinstated.

The assailed July 31, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals reversed
and set aside the April 4, 2005 Decision and March 17, 2006 Resolution
of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. It
recognized respondent Martin P. Victoria (Victoria) as the bona fide
tenant of a parcel of riceland owned by petitioner Ismael V. Crisostomo
(Crisostomo). The assailed October 20, 2006 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals denied Crisostomo's Motion for Reconsideration.

The April 4, 2005 Decision and March 17, 2006 Resolution of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board sustained the April
7, 2003 Decision5 of the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator of Bulacan, which ruled in favor of Crisostomo in his action
to eject Victoria from the subject riceland.

In a Complaint for Ejectment filed before the Office of the Provincial

Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Bulacan, Crisostomo alleged that he,
along with his deceased brother Jose Crisostomo, were the registered
owners of a parcel of riceland with an area of 562,694 square meters.
This was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-68421 and
located in Sta. Barbara, Baliuag, Bulacan. On June 21, 1973, he and his
brother allegedly entered into a lease contract with David Hipolito
(Hipolito) over a portion of the riceland (disputed portion). The contract
was supposedly in effect until Hipolito's death on December 2, 1999.
As Hipolito died without any known heirs, Crisostomo was set to
reclaim possession and to take over cultivation of the disputed portion.
However, in January 2000, Victoria entered the disputed portion and
began cultivating it without the knowledge and consent of Crisostomo.
Crisostomo confronted Victoria, who insisted that he had tenancy
rights over the disputed portion.6

In his Answer, Victoria claimed that Hipolito was his uncle. He

alleged that even during the lifetime of Hipolito, it was he who was
doing farmwork on the disputed portion and that he did so with
Crisostomo's knowledge. He added that from the time Hipolito became
bedridden, it was he who performed all duties pertaining to tenancy,
including the delivery of lease rentals and corresponding shares in the
harvest to Crisostomo. He asserted that Crisostomo's act of receiving
lease rentals from him amounted to implied consent, which gave rise
to a tenancy relationship between them.7

In its April 7, 2003 Decision,8 the Office of the Provincial Agrarian

Reform Adjudicator of Bulacan ruled in favor of Crisostomo and ordered
Victoria, together with all persons claiming rights under him, to vacate
the disputed portion and surrender its possession to Crisostomo.9

The Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, noting that

the essential element of consent was absent, held that Victoria could
not be deemed the tenant of the disputed portion. It further held that
implied tenancy could not arise in a situation where another person is
validly instituted as tenant and is enjoying recognition as such by the
landowner.10

In its April 4, 2005 Decision,11 the Department of Agrarian Reform

Adjudication Board denied Victoria's Appeal. In its March 17, 2006
Resolution,12 it denied Victoria's Motion for Reconsideration.
 In its assailed July 31, 2006 Decision,13 the Court of Appeals Eighth
Division reversed the rulings of the Office of the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator of Bulacan and of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board. It recognized Victoria as bona fide tenant
of the disputed portion.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that "Hipolito, as the legal possessor,

could legally allow [Victoria] to work and till the landholding"14 and
that Crisostomo was bound by Hipolito's act. It added that Crisostomo
"had been receiving his share of the harvest from [Victoria], as
evidenced by the numerous receipts indicating so."15 It emphasized
that "[t]he receipts rendered beyond dispute [Victoria's] status as the
agricultural tenant on the landholding."16 It further noted that as an
agricultural tenant, Victoria was entitled to security of tenure who,
absent any of the grounds for extinguishing agricultural leasehold
relationships, "should not be deprived of but should continue his
tenancy on the landholding."17

In its assailed October 20, 2006 Resolution,18 the Court of Appeals

Eighth Division denied Crisostomo's Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, this Petition was filed.

For resolution is the issue of whether respondent Martin P. Victoria

is a bona fide tenant of the disputed portion.

Section 6 of Republic Act No. 3844, otherwise known as the

Agricultural Land Reform Code, identifies the recognized parties in an
agricultural leasehold relation:

SECTION 6. Parties to Agricultural Leasehold Relation. —

The agricultural leasehold relation shall be limited to the
person who furnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil
law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person
who personally cultivates the same.

Proceeding from Section 6 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, the

Court of Appeals capitalized on Hipolito's supposed status as "legal
possessor" of the disputed portion, a status that was deemed to
emanate from his having been the lessee. Thus, the Court of Appeals
concluded that "Hipolito, as the legal possessor, could legally allow
[respondent] to work and till the landholding"19 thereby making
respondent a tenant whose security of tenure petitioner must now
respect.
 The Court of Appeals is in error. Hipolito's status as the
acknowledged tenant did not clothe him with the capacity to designate
respondent as a tenant.

This court has settled that tenancy relations cannot be an expedient

artifice for vesting in the tenant rights over the landholding which far
exceed those of the landowner. It cannot be a means for vesting a
tenant with security of tenure, such that he or she is effectively the
landowner.

Even while agrarian reform laws are pieces of social legislation,

landowners are equally entitled to protection. In Calderon v. Dela
Cruz:20

It is true that RA 3844 is a social legislation designed to

promote economic and social stability and must be
interpreted liberally to give full force and effect to its clear
intent. This liberality in interpretation, however, should not
accrue in favor of actual tillers of the land, the tenant-
farmers, but should extend to landowners as well. . . . The
landowners deserve as much consideration as the tenants
themselves in order not to create an economic dislocation,
where tenants are solely favored but the landowners
become impoverished.21 (Emphasis supplied, citation
omitted)

In Valencia v. Court of Appeals,22 this court grappled with the

consequences of a lessee's employment of farmhands who
subsequently claimed the status of tenants. Insisting on a tenant's
right to security of tenure, these farmhands refused to vacate and
surrender possession of the subject land despite the landowner's
demands:

Contrary to the impression of private respondents, Sec.

6 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, does not automatically
authorize a civil law lessee to employ a tenant without the
consent of the landowner. The lessee must be so
specifically authorized. For the right to hire a tenant is
basically a personal right of a landowner, except as may he
provided by law. But certainly nowhere in Sec. 6 does it say
that a civil law lessee of a landholding is automatically
authorized to install a tenant thereon. A different
interpretation would create a perverse and absurd situation
where a person who wants to be a tenant, and taking
advantage of this perceived ambiguity in the law, asks a
third person to become a civil law lessee of the landowner.
Incredibly, this tenant would technically have a better right
over the property than the landowner himself. This tenant
would then gain security of tenure, and eventually become
owner of the land by operation of law. This is most unfair to
the hapless and unsuspecting landowner who entered into
a civil law lease agreement in good faith only to realize
 later on that he can no longer regain possession of his
property due to the installation of a tenant by the civil law
lessee.1aшphi1

On the other hand, under the express provision of Art.

1649 of the Civil Code, the lessee cannot assign the lease
without the consent of the lessor, unless there is a
stipulation to the contrary. In the case before us, not only is
there no stipulation to the contrary; the lessee is expressly
prohibited from subleasing or encumbering the land, which
includes installing a leasehold tenant thereon since the
right to do so is an attribute of ownership. Plainly stated
therefore, a contract of civil law lease can prohibit a civil
law lessee from employing a tenant on the land subject
matter of the lease agreement. An extensive and correct
discussion of the statutory interpretation of Sec. 6 of R.A.
No. 3844, as amended, is provided by the minority view
in Bernas v. Court of Appeals.23 (Emphasis supplied)

As explained in Valencia, Section 6 of the Agricultural Land Reform

Code was not designed to vest in the enumerated persons—the owner,
civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor—a capacity that they
did not previously have. Stated otherwise, Section 6 was not the
enabling legislation that, from the moment of its adoption, was to
"allow"24 them, as the Court of Appeals posits, to furnish landholding
to another who shall personally cultivate it, thereby making that other
person a tenant.

Valencia explained that Section 6 of the Agricultural Land Reform

Code is a subsequent restatement of a "precursor"25 provision:
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1199. This precursor reads:

SECTION 8. Limitation of Relation. — The relation of

landholder and tenant shall be limited to the person who
furnishes land, either as owner, lessee, usufructuary, or
legal possessor, and to the person who actually works the
land himself with the aid of labor available from within his
immediate farm household.

Valencia noted that Section 8 assumed a pre-existing tenancy

relation. From its epigraph "Limitation of Relation," the import and
effect of Section 8 is not to enable or (to use the word of the Court of
Appeals) to "allow" the persons enumerated to make a tenant of
another person. Rather, it is simply to settle that whatever relation
exists, it shall be limited to two persons only: first, the person who
furnished the land; and second, the person who actually works the
land. "Once the tenancy relation is established, the parties to that
relation are limited to the persons therein stated."26

As it was with the precursor, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1199, so

it is with Section 6 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code:
 Section 6 as already stated simply enumerates who are
the parties to an existing contract of agricultural tenancy,
which presupposes that a tenancy already exists. It does
not state that those who furnish the landholding, i.e., either
as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor,
are automatically authorized to employ a tenant on the
landholding. The reason is obvious. The civil lease
agreement may be restrictive. Even the owner himself may
not be free to install a tenant, as when his ownership or
possession is encumbered or is subject to a lien or
condition that he should not employ a tenant thereon. This
contemplates a situation where the property may be
intended for some other specific purpose allowed by law,
such as, its conversion into an industrial estate or a
residential subdivision.1aшphi127

Limiting the relation to these two persons, as well as preventing

others from intruding into this relation, is in keeping with the rationale
for adopting Section 6 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code:

According to Mr. Justice Guillermo S. Santos and CAR Executive

Judge Artemio C. Macalino, respected authorities on agrarian reform,
the reason for Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 3844 and Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 1199 in
limiting the relationship to the lessee and the lessor is to "discourage
absenteeism on the part of the lessor and the custom of co-tenancy"
under which "the tenant (lessee) employs another to do the farm work
for him, although it is he with whom the landholder (lessor) deals
directly. Thus, under this practice, the one who actually works the land
gets the short end of the bargain, for the nominal or 'capitalist' lessee
hugs for himself a major portion of the harvest." This breeds
exploitation, discontent and confusion. . . . The kasugpong,
kasapi, or katulong also works at the pleasure of the nominal tenant.
When the new law, therefore, limited tenancy relation to the
landholder and the person who actually works the land himself with the
aid of labor available from within his immediate farm household, it
eliminated the nominal tenant or middleman from the picture.

Another noted authority on land reform, Dean Jeremias U.

Montemayor, explains the rationale for Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 1199, the
precursor of Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 3844:

Since the law establishes a special relationship in

tenancy with important consequences, it properly pinpoints
the persons to whom said relationship shall apply. The spirit
of the law is to prevent both landholder absenteeism and
tenant absenteeism. Thus, it would seem that the
discretionary powers and important duties of the
landholder, like the choice of crop or seed, cannot be left to
the will or capacity of an agent or overseer, just as the
cultivation of the land cannot be entrusted by the tenant to
some other people. Tenancy relationship has been held to
be of a personal character.28 (Citations omitted)
 The Court of Appeals banks on the following statement made by this
court in its 1988 Decision in Co v. Intermediate Appellate Court:29

As long as the legal possessor of the land constitutes a

person as a tenant-farmer by virtue of an express or
implied lease, such an act is binding on the owner of the
property even if he himself may not have given his consent
to such an arrangement. This is settled jurisprudence. The
purpose of the law is to protect the tenant-farmer's security
of tenure, which could otherwise be arbitrarily terminated
by an owner simply manifesting his non-conformity to the
relationship.30 (Citation omitted)

However, the factual context in Co, which engendered the quoted

pronouncement, is not entirely identical with that of this case. This
statement should, thus, not be taken as binding in this case.

Co involved a parcel which was originally owned by Toribio Alarcon.

Sometime before the Second World War, Alarcon entered into a
tenancy relation with Miguel Alfonso. In 1955, Alarcon leased out the
same parcel to Republic Broadcasting System (DZBB). During this
time, Alfonso maintained his tenancy. In 1968, Joveno Roaring started
helping Alarcon cultivate the land. Subsequently, Roaring took over the
cultivation "in his own right."31 Roaring's status as such was
consolidated when, with Alfonso's death in 1976, he took over the
tenancy. Much later, the parcel was acquired by Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank in a foreclosure sale. The parcel was then acquired
by Anderson Co and, still much later, by Jose Chua. As Co and Chua
asked Roaring to vacate the parcel, Roaring filed a Complaint for
maintenance of possession and damages.32

The statement from Co that the Court of Appeals quoted was made
in the course of this court's consideration of Roaring's relation with
DZBB. As this court recounted, DZBB was the party receiving shares
from the harvest. Thus, DZBB exercised and benefitted from the rights
and prerogatives that normally accrue to the landowner. Stated
otherwise, in Co, there was a clear finding that DZBB stood in the
shoes of the landowner:

We also find that Roaring, besides paying rentals,

regularly shared the harvest from the lot with the DZBB,
which accepted the same and included it in the raffle of
prizes held during the regular Christmas program for its
employees. That the DZBB was not much interested in such
share and that its board of directors had not adopted a
resolution recognizing the agricultural lease in favor of
Roaring should not signify that the lease does not exist. The
acts of the DZBB clearly show that it had impliedly allowed
Roaring, in his own right, to continue with the original lease
arrangement it had with his father-in-law. Notably, the
latter's possession and cultivation of the land from the time
 it was leased to the DZBB in 1955 and until his death in
1976 were never questioned by the company.

As long as the legal possessor of the land constitutes a

person as a tenant-farmer by virtue of an express or
implied lease, such an act is binding on the owner of the
property even if he himself may not have given his consent
to such an arrangement. This is settled jurisprudence. The
purpose of the law is to protect the tenant-farmer's security
of tenure, which could otherwise be arbitrarily terminated
by an owner simply manifesting his non-conformity to the
relationship.33

There is nothing in this case to indicate that Hipolito exercised

rights and prerogatives that accrue to the landowner and which could
imply that he was in such a situation where he could exercise a
landowner's competencies. Hipolito was not clothed with authority to
"allow" respondent to be the tenant himself. Hipolito, as lessee, was
entitled to possession of the disputed portion, and legally so. He was,
in this sense, a "legal possessor." However, his capacities ended here.
There was nothing that authorized him to enter into a tenancy relation
with another.

II

Even if Section 6 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code were to be

interpreted loosely, petitioner as the landowner never consented to
making respondent a tenant.

This court has settled the requisites for tenancy, the core of which is
the element of consent. All these requisites must be demonstrated by
substantial evidence; otherwise, the person claiming to be a tenant is
not entitled to security of tenure:

Tenants are defined as persons who — in themselves

and with the aid available from within their immediate farm
households — cultivate the land belonging to or possessed
by another, with the latters consent, for purposes of
production, sharing the produce with the landholder under
the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a
price certain or ascertainable in produce or money or both
under the leasehold tenancy system.

Based on the foregoing definition of a tenant,

entrenched in jurisprudence are the following essential
elements of tenancy: 1) the parties are the landowner and
the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of
the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent
 between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of
the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5)
there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between
landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. The presence
of all these elements must be proved by substantial
evidence. Unless a person has established his status as a
de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure and is
not covered by the Land Reform Program of the
Government under existing tenancy laws. Tenancy
relationship cannot be presumed. Claims that one is a
tenant do not automatically give rise to security of
tenure.34 (Emphasis supplied)

This court has previously recognized implied consent as sufficing to

vest security of tenure in a person claiming to be a tenant. In Ponce v.
Guevarra35 and Joya v. Pareja,36 this court considered the
landowners' acts of personally negotiating for extensions and for better
terms with the persons purporting to be tenants as having placed them
in estoppel or otherwise demonstrating their ratification of tenancy.

Here, the Court of Appeals relied on petitioner's having supposedly

received shares of the harvest from respondent and his issuance of the
corresponding receipts as demonstrating his implied consent to
respondent's tenancy.

We disagree.

While the receipts issued by petitioner bore respondent's name,

petitioner never failed to similarly indicate the name of David Hipolito,
the person who, petitioner maintains, is the valid lessee. Petitioner
annexed copies of several of these receipts to his Petition. These
receipts consistently indicated:

J.G.N. TRADING

Tarcan, Concepcion, Baliwag, Bulacan

No. ...

Petsa ...........

Tinanggap kay MARTIN VICTORIA (DAVID HIPOLITO) ng STA. BARBARA,

BALIUAG, BULACAN and kabuuang . . . kaban ng palay na may timbang
. . . kilo.37

Petitioner may have acknowledged actual delivery made by

respondent. However, his consistent inclusion of Hipolito's name
indicates that, to his mind, it was still Hipolito, albeit through another
person making actual delivery, sharing the produce with him.
Respondent was recognized only as an agent acting for Hipolito.
 Concededly, there is some ambiguity to these receipts. For instance,
' one could make a case for saying that respondent and Hipolito were
co-tenants cooperating in delivering the produce to petitioner. Indeed,
the receipts could have used more definite language such as "for the
account of," "on behalf of," or "para kay." We reiterate however, the
requisites of tenancy must be established by substantial evidence.
Logically, it is for the person averring tenancy to adduce such
evidence. Here, the evidence does not work to respondent's interest.
At best, it evinces an ambiguity; at worst, it proves that he was only an
agent.

Just as damaging to respondent's cause is petitioner's act of

demanding that respondent vacate and surrender possession of the
disputed portion as soon as Hipolito died. Stated otherwise, as soon as
the lease period that petitioner and Hipolito agreed upon expired,
petitioner expected that the disputed portion was to be restored to his
possession.

This definitively settles that, in petitioner's mind, only Hipolito was

entitled to possession precisely because it was only with Hipolito that
petitioner agreed to cede possession for a definite duration.
Conversely, this definitively settles that petitioner never recognized
respondent as having any personal right to possess the disputed
portion.

The Court of Appeals merely noted that petitioner issued receipts to

respondent and stopped at that. As we have demonstrated, a more
exacting consideration of the totality of petitioner's actions belies any
consent or subsequent ratification of respondent's alleged tenancy.

To hold that respondent is the bona fide tenant of the disputed

portion would be to extend petitioner's dispossession for a period much
longer that he had originally contemplated. It puts him at the mercy of
a person whom he recognized as a tenant. This is precisely the
"economic dislocation" that this court warned against in Calderon. To
hold as such would be to permit agrarian reform laws to be used as a
convenient artifice for investing in a supposed tenant rights that far
exceed those of the owner.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED.

The assailed Decision dated July 31, 2006 and the assailed Resolution
dated October 20, 2006 of the Court of Appeals Eighth Division in CA-
G.R. SP No. 94107, which recognized respondent Martin P. Victoria as
the bona fide tenant of the disputed portion, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The July 4, 2005 Decision and March 17, 2006 Resolution of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board are REINSTATED.

Respondent Martin P. Victoria and all those claiming rights under

him are ordered to vacate and surrender possession of the disputed
portion to petitioner Ismael V. Crisostomo.

SO ORDERED.
 [ G.R. No. 219670. June 27, 2018 ]

J.V. LAGON REALTY CORP., REPRESENTED BY NENITA L. LAGON

IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT, PETITIONER, V. HEIRS OF
LEOCADIA VDA. DE TERRE, NAMELY: PURIFICACION T.
BANSILOY, EMILY T. CAMARAO, AND DOMINADOR A. TERRE, AS
REPRESENTED BY DIONISIA T. CORTEZ, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed, and

claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of
tenure.1

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules

of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the 23 March 2015
Decision2 and 29 July 2015 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 05331-MIN. The assailed issuances affirmed in toto the
13 April 2012 Decision4 of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 14553.

THE FACTS

The case stemmed from a complaint for illegal ejectment, payment

of disturbance compensation, and damages filed by Leocadia Vda. De
Terre (Leocadia) against petitioner J.V. Lagon Realty Corporation (J V.
Lagon) before the Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD), docketed as DARAB
Case No. R-1205-0001-97.

It was alleged in the complaint that sometime in 1952, Antonio

Pedral (Pedral) instituted Leocadia and her spouse, Delfin Terre (the
spouses Terre)),5 to work as share tenants over his 5-hectare
agricultural landholding known as Lot 587 located at Tacurong, Sultan
Kudarat. Three (3) years later, Pedral sold the land to Jose
Abis (Abis) who, in turn, sold the same to Augusto
Gonzales (Gonzales) in 1958.(awÞhi(

During the said transfers of ownership, the spouses Terre were

allegedly retained as tenants of the entire 5-hectare landholding. In the
1960s, Gonzales reduced their tillage to 2.5 hectares, and the other
half of the land was given to Landislao Bedua and Antonillo Silla to till.
On their 2.5 hectares, the Spouses Terre constructed a house and that
of their daughter's.

In 1988, the spouses Terre were surprised when they were informed
that J.V. Lagon had already bought the entire 5-hectare land from the
heirs of Gonzales. Later on, J.V. Lagon constructed a scale house within
the 2.5 hectare land tilled by the spouses Terre. In 1989, J.V. Lagon
warned the spouses to stop cultivating the land because the whole lot
was to be developed for commercial or industrial use. In that same
year, Delfin died, purportedly due to mental anguish over the turn of
events. In 1990, J.V. Lagon filled the eastern portion of the land with
earth and boulders.

On 7 May 1991, Leocadia filed a complaint before the Barangay

Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC). The following day, on 8 May 1991,
a complaint was also lodged before the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer (MARO). No appropriate action, however, was taken on the said
complaints until the dispute was eventually brought before the PARAD
on 19 June 1997.6

Leocadia claimed that the works done by J.V. Lagon were

tantamount to conversion of the land for non-agricultural purposes.
Also, Leocadia averred that she was not duly notified in writing about
the sale between Gonzales and J.V. Lagon. Thus, her 180-day right of
redemption pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, as
amended by R.A. No. 6389,7 did not commence. Accordingly, it was
prayed that she be allowed to exercise her right of redemption over
the land, the expenses thereof to be shouldered by the Land Bank of
the Philippines.

In her bid to prove the existence of tenancy, Leocadia relied, inter

alia, on the following documents: (a) 23 April 1997 Certification issued
by Geronimo P. Arzagon, Municipal Mayor of Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat,
certifying that the spouses Terre were actual tenants of the land;8 (b)
Pedral's affidavit dated 4 July 1987, confirming his consent for the
spouses Terre to be his agricultural tenants at a 70-30 sharing of
harvest in their favor;9 (c) affidavit dated 28 July 1997, executed by
MARO Perfecto Bergonia, Jr. stating that Terre, a tenant, filed a
complaint on 7 July 1991, concerning her illegal ejectment.10

On the other hand, J.V. Lagon countered that Leocadia had no cause
of action simply because there was no tenancy to speak of. J.V. Lagon
asseverated that Lot 587 had ceased to be agricultural and was
already classified as commercial, the same having been utilized as the
site of the Rural Bank of Tacurong. Also, at the time the landholding
was purchased from Gonzales in 1988, no tenant was found cultivating
the land.

Further, J.V. Lagon argued that there was a dearth of evidence to

prove the allegation of tenancy, in that it was not even established as
to whom Leocadia had paid rentals to. In the same vein, it raised the
affirmative defense of prescription, contending that the complaint was
filed more than three (3) years after the cause of action accrued in
1988.

The PARAD Ruling

In its 3 April 2002 decision,11 the PARAD ruled in favor of J.V. Lagon.
It opined that Leocadia's complaint was already barred by prescription
and laches, as the cause of action accrued in 1988 when J.V. Lagon
constructed a scale house in the allegedly tenanted area. Also, the
PARAD ruled that the filing of the complaint with the MARO in 1991 did
not toll the running of the prescriptive period because it was the
DARAB that had jurisdiction over agrarian disputes.

With respect to the issue on redemption, the PARAD observed that

as vendee, J.V. Lagon failed to give Leocadia a written notice of the
sale. Nevertheless, it resolved to deny the claim for redemption on the
finding that Leocadia had actual knowledge of the sale as early as
1988 when she confronted J.V. Lagon about the scale house.

Anent the question of whether there was tenancy, the PARAD held
that Leocadia failed to establish her status as a de jure tenant. It found
scant evidentiary value on the documents she presented. In so ruling,
the PARAD pointed out that Pedral, as former owner, could attest to
the condition of the land only from 1947 to 1955 when he was still the
owner thereof, and not after he had already sold the property.
Moreover, the PARAD was of the view that certifications issued by
administrative agencies or officers as regards tenancy relations are
merely provisional in nature.

Finally, the PARAD was convinced that the disputed real property
was not an agricultural land. It noted that the Rural Bank of Tacurong
was situated at the heart of the subject landholding; and that per
photocopy of the Urban Land Use Plan as certified by the Office of the
City Planning and Development Coordinator, the said land was already
classified as commercial.12 The dispositive portion reads:
 WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgement is
hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the herein complaint filed on June 17,

1991 barred by prescription;

2. Complainant's claim for disturbance

compensation is denied for lack of merit;

3. Complainant's right to redeem the property is

also denied for lack of merit; and,

4. Other claims are likewise denied for lack of

merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, Leocadia filed an appeal before the DARAB.

The DARAB Ruling

In its 13 April 2012 decision, the DARAB reversed and set aside the
PARAD's ruling. It held that Leocadia's action was not barred by
prescription because the filing of the complaint with the BARC on 7
May 1991 tolled the running of the prescriptive period.

In contrast to the PARAD's analysis, the DARAB found probative

value on the documents Leocadia presented. It concluded that tenancy
existed, as evinced by the fact that Leocadia's house was erected
inside the subject landholding; and such fact was attested to by the
affidavits of the former MARO Perfecto Bergonia and of Mayor
Geronimo P. Arzagon of Tacurong City.13

Similarly, the DARAB opined that Pedral's affidavit declaring that he

installed the Spouses Terre as share tenants sufficiently proved the
existence of tenancy relationship. Citing Section 10 of R.A. No.
3844,14 it held that tenancy is attached to the land regardless of
whoever may have become the owner thereof. Thus, Leocadia's status
as a tenant was not extinguished by the successive transfers of
ownership from Pedral to Abis, and then to Gonzales, and finally to J.V.
Lagon, as the latter assumed the rights and obligations of the
preceding transferors.

The DARAB further ruled that Leocadia was entitled to redeem the
land from J.V. Lagon. It cited Section 12 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended
by R.A. No. 638915 which provides that the right of redemption may be
exercised within 180 days from notice in writing which shall be served
by the vendee on all lessees affected and on the DAR upon registration
of the sale. In view of the PARAD's finding that J.V. Lagon failed to give
notice in writing of the sale, the DARAB declared that Leocadia's right
of redemption did not prescribe, a written notice of the sale being an
indispensable requirement of the law.

Lastly, Leocadia's prayer for disturbance compensation was

granted. The DARAB ratiocinated that J.V. Lagon merely alleged that
the land was no longer agricultural; and that J.V. Lagon failed to
support its allegation as no tax declarations, DAR certification or city
zoning certification were shown to prove the land's classification as
commercial. The decretal portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed

decision dated April 3, 2002 and Resolution dated
December 13, 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new judgment rendered:

1. Declaring herein complainant a bona fide tenant

over the lot in suit entitled to security of tenure;

2. Upholding complainant's right of redemption

and for this purpose, the Land Bank of the
Philippines, thru its Regional branch or office
concerned is directed to finance her right of
redemption;

3. In case the land in suit had already been lawfully

converted to commercial use, complainant is
entitled to payment of disturbance
compensation pursuant to Section 36, par. 1 of
RA 6389.

No pronouncement as to claims and counterclaims for

insufficient evidence.

Dissatisfied, J.V. Lagon filed a Rule 43 petition for review before the
CA. Meanwhile, on 18 October 2013, Leocadia died, prompting her
heirs to file a manifestation with motion for substitution16 before the
CA.

The CA Ruling

In the assailed 23 March 2015 decision, the CA affirmed in toto the

DARAB's ruling. It held that Leocadia was able to establish that she
was the tenant of the subject landholding. Such tenancy commenced
in 1952 when Pedral, the original owner, installed her and Delfin as
share tenants. The appellate court espoused a similar view that the
documents Leocadia presented substantiated her claim of tenancy.

Considering that there was tenancy between Pedral and Leocadia,

the CA decreed that there was subrogation of rights to Abis, then to
Gonzales, and finally to J.V. Lagon, as landowners. The tenancy
relationship was not terminated by changes of ownership pursuant to
Section 10 of R.A. No. 3844.17 Likewise, the CA sustained the DARAB's
finding that, as a tenant, Leocadia was entitled to redeem the land
consequent to the lack of written notice of the sale. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision

dated April 13, 2012 and the Resolution dated September
13, 2012 of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board in DARAB Case No. 14553 declaring
Leocadia V da. De Terre as bona fide tenant under Republic
Act No. 3844 is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.18

In the assailed 29 July 2015 Resolution, the CA resolved to deny J.V.

Lagon's motion for reconsideration, and to grant the motion for
substitution filed by the heirs of Leocadia.19

The Present Petition

J.V. Lagon submits in this petition for review on certiorari, that the
subject landholding is no longer agricultural; that Leocadia's cause of
action has already prescribed; and that she has no right to redeem the
property nor to receive disturbance compensation. Stripped to its core,
the petition before the Court posits the kernel argument that there is
no tenancy relation between J.V. Lagon and Leocadia.

In their comment, the heirs of Leocadia contend that there is no

need to adduce evidence to prove Leocadia's status as a bona
fide tenant because tenancy is attached to the land irrespective of
whoever becomes its subsequent owner. Taking cue from the DARAB's
findings, they maintain that the filing of the complaint with the BARC
on 7 May 1991 tolled the running of the prescriptive period. As a final
point, the heirs of Leocadia assert that she is entitled to redeem the
landholding because the law speaks of written notice of the sale and
not actual or personal knowledge thereof.

The pleadings and the arguments proffered beckon the Court to

examine a singular point of law on which all the matters raised are
inevitably hinged.

ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A TENANCY

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN J.V. LAGON REALTY
AND LEOCADIA.

THE COURT'S RULING

The petition is impressed with merit.

 There is a tenancy relationship if the following essential elements
concur: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the
purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5)
there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or
agricultural lessee.20

All of the above requisites are indispensable in order to create or

establish tenancy relationship between the parties. The absence of at
least one requisite does not make the alleged tenant a de facto one,
for the simple reason that unless an individual has established one's
status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure
guaranteed by agricultural tenancy laws.21

The onus rests on Leocadia to prove her affirmative allegation of

tenancy.22 It is elementary that one who makes an affirmative
allegation of an issue has the burden of proving the same; and in the
case of the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. The
same rule applies in proceedings before the administrative tribunals. In
fact, if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving his
cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon
which he bases his claim, the respondent is under no obligation to
prove his exception or defense.23

To recapitulate, Leocadia presented the following documents to

prove the existence of tenancy: (a) 23 April 1997 certification issued
by Geronimo P. Arzagon, Municipal Mayor of Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat,
that the Spouses Terre were actual tenants of the land; (b) Pedral's
affidavit dated 4 July 1987 confirming his consent for the Spouses
Terre to be his agricultural tenants at a 70-30 sharing of harvest in
their favor; (c) affidavit dated 28 July 1997, executed by MARO
Perfecto Bergonia, Jr. stating that Terre, a tenant, filed a complaint on
7 July 1991, concerning her illegal ejectment.

The issue of tenancy, whether a person is an agricultural tenant or

not, is generally a question of fact. To be precise, however, the
existence of a tenancy relationship is a legal conclusion based on facts
presented corresponding to the statutory elements of tenancy.24 Both
the DARAB and the CA appreciated the aforementioned pieces of
evidence as sufficient to prove Leocadia's de jure status as a tenant in
the subject landholding.

This is untenable.

Accordingly, it is crucial to go through the evidence and documents

on record in order to arrive at a proper resolution of the case.

Pedral's affidavit
does not prove
that there is
tenancy between
Leocadia and J.V.
Lagon.

It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the

facts that are of his own personal knowledge; that is, those which are
derived from his own perception.25 Therefore, even if the Court were
to take hook, line, and sinker Pedral's declaration that he installed
Leocadia and Delfin as tenants, such declaration may be accorded
probative value only during the interim period within which he was the
owner of the land. The logic behind is simple, i.e., Pedral ceased to
have any personal knowledge as to the status and condition of the land
after he had sold the same to Abis. Put differently, absence of personal
knowledge rendered Pedral an incompetent witness to testify on the
existence of tenancy from the moment the land was passed on to Abis
and his subsequent transferees.

To recall, the land was involved in three transfers over the course of
33 years, to wit: Pedral to Abis, Abis to Gonzales, and finally from
Gonzales to J.V. Lagon. This series of transfers shows that Pedral was
not J.V. Lagon's immediate predecessor-in-interest. When J.V. Lagon
became the absolute owner of the land, it was subrogated to the rights
and obligations of Gonzales, not Pedral 's. Gonzales was the person
privy to the sale that brought forth J.V. Lagon's ownership. In short,
title to the land was derived from Gonzales. This being the case, the
DARAB and the CA erred when they relied upon Pedral's affidavit to
support the conclusion that J.V. Lagon acquired a tenanted land.
Whether or not the land was tenanted at the time of J.V. Lagon's entry
is a matter already beyond the competence of Pedral to testify on.

Leocadia anchors her claim against J.V. Lagon on Section 10 of the

Agricultural Land Reform Code which, in essence, states that the
existence of an agricultural leasehold relationship is not terminated by
changes in ownership in case of sale or transfer of legal
possession.26 The fundamental theory of her case parlays the notion
that she was an agricultural lessee during the period of Abis' and
Gonzales' respective ownership of the land spanning from 1955-1988;
such that at the time J.V. Lagon came into possession, there was a
subsisting tenancy which the latter assumed by operation of law.

The evidence on record, however, is bereft of any affirmative and

positive showing that tenancy was maintained on the land throughout
the three decades leading to J.V. Lagon's acquisition in 1988. Before
Leocadia's claims against J.V. Lagon can prosper, it must first be
established that the latter acquired land which was tenanted. On this
premise, the scope of judicial inquiry inexorably backtracks to
Gonzales' epoch. Were there agricultural tenants on the land during
Gonzales' ownership? The answer could have easily been supplied by
none other than Gonzales himself who was in the best position to
attest on the status of the land acquired by J.V. Lagon. A testimony or
an affidavit from Gonzales would have served to substantiate
Leocadia's allegation that she had been a tenant on the land prior to
J.V. Lagon's entry. Unfortunately, the record only contains an affidavit
from Pedral, a person whose ownership of the land is, borrowing Justice
Leonen's term, "thrice-removed" from J.V. Lagon.

Being the party alleging the existence of tenancy relationship,

Leocadia carried the burden of proving her allegation. With only
Pedral's affidavit as proof, the Court is unable to agree with the DARAB
and the CA that tenancy was established by substantial evidence. As
explained above, Pedral's affidavit leaves much to be desired, and it is
inadequate basis to support a conclusion that Leocadia remained as a
tenant on the land throughout the three decades preceding J.V.
Lagon's ownership. Agricultural tenancy is not presumed.27 It is a
matter of jurisprudence that tenancy is not purely a factual relationship
dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land.28 More
importantly, it is a legal relationship the existence of which must be
proven by the quantum of evidence required by law.

Absence of harvest
sharing belies
claim of tenancy
relationship.

In Landicho v. Sia,29 the Court declared that independent evidence,

such as receipts, must be presented to show that there was a sharing
of the harvest between the landowner and the tenant. Bejasa v.
CA30 similarly held that to prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any
other evidence must be presented, as self-serving statements are
deemed inadequate. Proof must always be adduced.31 In another
case, the Court ruled against the existence of tenancy for failure of the
alleged tenant to substantiate the element of sharing of harvest, viz:

Here, there was no evidence presented to show sharing

of harvest in the context of a tenancy relationship between
Vicente and the respondents. The only evidence submitted
to establish the purported sharing of harvests were the
allegations of Vicente which, as discussed above, were self-
serving and have no evidentiary value. Moreover,
petitioner's allegations of continued possession and
cultivation do not support his cause. It is settled that mere
occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land does not
automatically convert a tiller or farm worker into an
agricultural tenant recognized under agrarian laws. It is
essential that, together with the other requisites of tenancy
relationship, the agricultural tenant must prove that he
transmitted the landowner's share of the harvest.32

The DARAB and the CA committed reversible error when they failed
to notice that not a single receipt or any other credible evidence was
adduced to show sharing of harvest in the context of tenancy. The
record only contains the allegation that there is a 1/3-2/3 system of
harvest sharing with Pedral, and 70-30 for Abis and
Gonzales.33 Substantial evidence necessary to establish the fact of
sharing cannot be satisfied by a mere scintilla of evidence; there must
be concrete evidence on record adequate to prove the element of
sharing.34 As reiterated in VHJ Construction v. CA,35

In Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the

respondents' self-serving statements regarding tenancy
relations could not establish the claimed relationship. The
fact alone of working on another's landholding does not
raise a presumption of the existence of agricultural
tenancy. There must be substantial evidence on record
adequate enough to prove the element of sharing.

xxx

To prove such sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other

evidence must be presented. Self-serving statements are
deemed inadequate; competent proof must be adduced.

Further to the lack of receipts, the record is likewise devoid of

testimony from either Pedral, Abis or Gonzales acknowledging the fact
that they received a share in the harvest of a tenant. In the absence of
receipts or any concrete evidence from which it can be inferred that
Leocadia transmitted the landowner's share of her produce, the Court
is constrained to declare that not all elements of tenancy relationship
are present.

The MARO's
affidavit and the
municipal mayor's
certification do not
prove tenancy.

It is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that certifications of

administrative agencies and officers declaring the existence of a
tenancy relation are merely provisional. They are persuasive but not
binding on the courts, which must make their own findings.36 As held
in Soliman v. PASUDECO (Soliman):37

The certifications attesting to petitioners' alleged status

as de jure tenants are insufficient. In a given locality, the
certification issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or
an authorized representative, like the MARO or the BARC,
concerning the presence or the absence of a tenancy
relationship between the contending parties, is considered
merely preliminary or provisional, hence, such certification
does not bind the judiciary.

The ruling in Soliman was echoed in the later case of Automat

Realty v. Spouses Dela Cruz,38 viz:

This court has held that a MARO certification concerning

the presence or the absence of a tenancy relationship
 between the contending parties, is considered merely
preliminary or provisional, hence, such certification does
not bind the judiciary.

Several elements must be present before the courts can

conclude that a tenancy relationship exists. MARO
certifications are limited to factual determinations such as
the presence of actual tillers. It cannot make legal
conclusions on the existence of a tenancy agreement.

The Court's pronouncement in the foregoing cases applies with

equal force to the certification issued by the municipal mayor of
Tacurong. Like the MARO's affidavit, the municipal mayor's certification
deserves scant consideration simply because the mayor is not the
proper authority39 vested with the power to determine the existence
of tenancy. Besides, the MARO and the mayor merely affirmed the fact
that Leocadia lived in a hut erected on the subject landholding.40 If we
subscribe to the DARAB's fallacy, then anyone who squats on an
agricultural land or constructs a hut with the consent of the owner
becomes a tenant. It bears to stress that mere occupation or
cultivation of an agricultural land does not automatically convert a
tiller or farmworker into an agricultural tenant recognized under
agrarian laws.41

While tenancy presupposes physical presence of a tiller on the land,

the MARO's affidavit and the mayor's certification fall short in proving
that Leocadia's presence served the purpose of agricultural production
and harvest sharing. Again, it cannot be overemphasized that in order
for a tenancy to arise, it is essential that all its indispensable elements
must be present.42

All told, the evidence on record is inadequate to arrive at a

conclusion that Leocadia was a de jure tenant entitled to security of
tenure. The requisites for the existence of a tenancy relationship are
explicit in the law, and these elements cannot be done away with by
conjectures.43

As a final word, the Court sees no more reason to belabor the other
points raised by the parties, particularly on the right of redemption and
entitlement to disturbance compensation. It is the juridical tie of
tenancy relationship that breathes life to these kindred rights provided
for by our agricultural laws. There being no tenancy relationship, the
issues raised on these points have thus become moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed

23 March 2015 Decision and 29 July 2015 Resolution of the
CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 05331-MIN are
hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is
entered DISMISSING the complaint against petitioner J.V.
Lagon Realty Corporation.

SO ORDERED.