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FINAL ESSAY BY AZIZ ELMURODOV INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL GROUP 3-1A-07

Under what conditions and within what frames is closer regional cooperation possible in Central Asia? To answer this question comprehensively, it is of critical importance to refer to the nature of statehood experience, bilateral and multilateral relations of our neighboring states. To begin with, it would be necessary to take a short retrospective look at the history of formation of Central Asian international relations. As such and in terms of emergence of traditional nation-states such as coined by Cardinal Richelieu, Central Asia perhaps never had international relations, or more mildly speaking, had to stay far away, both due to geographic and cultural reasons, from the virtues of the world statehood experience. Even when the time was seemingly ripe for Central Asian countries to be a part of world politics in the beginning of the XX century, the harsh Soviet rule forced by Bolsheviks deterred enlightened Jadids of Turkistan from pursuing their rights for self-determination. The rigorous Soviet rule lasted more than seven decades gradually leading to overall dramatic decline in the way the Central Asian people identified themselves. Eventually, when the idea about Soviet Union proved no more sustainable, independence came to be spontaneous burden rather than gift that none of these states have exercised for a long time but hence had to shoulder together. The rest of the tale is well known and it tells us about the newly emerged states efforts to undertake different models of development. At this very point we cant ignore an important historic factor that Central Asia has never ceased to be a playground where Great Gamers actively pursued and still pursue their strategic interests. During the first eight to ten years of our independence we used to hear much about the sensitiveness of the times that fragile transitional period dictated upon our republics. Likewise today Central Asia is living through controversial transitional period when understanding of its specific needs and tendencies, strengths and weaknesses may turn to be critically important in consolidating it into a single transforming entity. For example, there are many burning issues

confronting the CA today. Notably, raging controversy over the rational distribution of transboundary water resources, terrorism, drug-trafficking and crime, corruption, ecological cataclysm and ethnic conflicts are factors that lead to regional instability of all political, economic and ethnic character. As the European Union noted in 20081, water management is the most sensitive environmental issue in Central Asia, which, if not addressed in due time, could develop into a serious security threat for the entire region in the medium term. Moreover, the Central Asian drama is amplified by increasingly rising interests of global powers in the region. After all the five Central Asian states are situated at the crossroads of great powers and are perfect source of oil and gas, a market for consumer goods. Since recent years China, an untraditional player, has been intensively engaging in Central Asia, triggering a new Great Game in a region where Europe, Russia and the US have all long sought influence. According to Niklas Swanstro, a Swedish scholar and Associate Professor and Program Director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies, presently Chinese expansion in the region is only slowed by the current Russian, however decreasing, influence and the competing US attempts to exert influence over the region. Beijing has developed a prioritized policy orientation towards Central Asia, in contrast to the American policy, which seems to have a much more reluctant ad hoc presence based on the war against terrorism2. China is seeking markets and energy resources, Russia is eager to regain it leadership status within the CIS as well as that of a superpower in the international arena, and the Central Asian regimes consider the SCO as their guarantee for political survival. Interpreted as a Russian extension of the Soviet Union idea, the CIS never functioned as a regional grouping. This is why we can no way assume that CIS can ever be a reliable shelter for Central Asian Countries to forge constructive regional cooperation. What concerns SCO, it can and in fact does offer tangible security provisions in the region but still remains weak in terms of serving as a framework for genuine regional cooperation. One weighty argument that would persuasively prove this confident claim right is the presence of two major powers, Russia and China, which reasonably leads me to suppose that more or less, now or then certain division in interests take place or stay highly potential that invariably affect normal functioning of the organization. There is need
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Stephen Hodgson, EUCAM, Strategic Water Resources in Central Asia: in search of a new international legal order. No. 14 - May 2010 2 Niklas Swanstrom, China and Central Asia: a new Great Game or traditional vassal relations? Journal of Contemporary China (2005), 14(45), November, 569584

to develop long-term understanding of SCOs role in terms of its capacity to sustain itself furthermore in a constantly changing world and grow strong into what it was initially supposed to be. Russian strategic need for this agreement is building security umbrella in Central Asia in close partnership with China. However, with increasingly rising Chinese interests in the region, is Russia ready to share it with the Sun Wukong!? Moreover, despite widely popular views in west that SCO is posing a counterbalancing power against Northern Alliance, what should it mean for Central Asian countries!? So far there are too many questions that we need to go through in order to better understand our options. Implications coming from inside of the region and not imposed from outside should serve as preconditions for Central Asian integrity. Given the presently existing tensions, disagreement and absence of political will, it is difficult but still possible to give draw certain guidelines that would be recipes for Central Asian transformation. First of all Central Asian dialogue should begin with negotiations from below. Building a sense of solidarity, unanimity and mutual understanding especially among Central Asian youth, a driving force, is more than highly spoken and empty words. In fact, youth-oriented programs aimed at bringing CA youth together is perhaps today as much effective as never before. For example, exchange programs in education like that of Bologna and Erasmus Mundus of Europe would be perfect beginning. Second of all, Central Asian dialogue is up to willful efforts of leaders of our countries. Without their predispositions apparently we can do too little. Also the last but not the least important thing for us to finally understand is that regional cooperation is not an alternative option. It is a have-to-do prerogative. There is no way to escape cooperation because we cant not choose with whom to collaborate similarly as we cant choose with whom we want be neighbors. In 2007 the doyen of Central Asian presidents, the Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, has for a number of years been proposing insistently a Union of Central Asian States3, if only for the sake of organizing the distribution of water and energy resources. He is supported by the Kyrgyz and, increasingly, by the Tajiks. The proposed Union would primarily deal with interstate border issues, trade, visa regimes, tourism and security. If realized, the CAU
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The future of Central Asia : from the predictable to the desirable. http://www.diploweb.com/The-future-of-Central-Asiafrom.html

would represent a counter-balance to the existing Russian-dominated Collective Security Organization and the Chinese-Russian-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In his proposal, the Kazakh President said: "In the region, we share economic interest, cultural heritage, language, religion, and environmental challenges, and face common external threats. The founding fathers of the European Union could only wish they had so much in common. We should direct our efforts towards closer economic integration, a common market and a single currency.4" In conclusion Central Asias centrality in world affairs was exchanged to relative insignificance during the Soviet occupation and today the region is plagued by many problems. In addition to terrain that stretches from burning desserts to ice cold mountains, the lack of infrastructure and an almost endemic problem with drugs and militarized conflicts, especially ethnic conflicts, hinders development. However, Central Asia, as a consequence of its increasingly important position in world affairs through its oil and gas findings and its strategic location, has been called Chinas Dingwei 5 (Lebensraum), the beginning of the New Great Game as Peter Hopkirk has defined it, the emergence of a Grand Chessboard as Zbigniew Brzezinski has formulated it, or as the start of the final clash of civilizations as Samuel Huntington has described it. Soon or later, to a large extent or little, everybody will or will have to get involved in common regional affairs of ours, not a single state can afford to stay out of the game. And there can be no talk about easy solution to our problems, including the water conflict. For now all we can do is to pave the way for sustainable dialogue among the concerned parties.

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Central Asian Union, Wikipedia Niklas Swanstrom, China and Central Asia: a new Great Game or traditional vassal relations? Journal of Contemporary China (2005), 14(45), November, 569584