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Religion, Landscape and Material
Culture in Pre-modern South Asia

This book highlights emerging trends and new themes in South Asian history.
It covers issues broadly related to religion, materiality, and nature from
differing perspectives and methods to offer a kaleidoscopic view of Indian
history until the late eighteenth century. The essays in the volume focus on
understanding questions of pre-modern religion, material culture processes,
and their spatial and environmental contexts through a study of networks of
commodities and cultural and religious landscapes. From the early history
of coastal regions such as Gujarat and Bengal to material networks of
political culture, from temples and their connection with maritime trade to
the importance of landscape in influencing temple-building, from regions
considered peripheral to mainstream historiography to the development
of religious sects, this collection of articles maps the diverse networks and
connections across regions and time.
The volume will be of great interest to scholars and researchers of history,
archaeology, museum and heritage studies, religion, especially Hinduism,
Sufism, and Buddhism, and South Asian studies.

Tilottama Mukherjee teaches in the Department of History, Jadavpur


University, Kolkata. She holds a PhD. in History from the University of
Cambridge. She is the author of Political Culture and Economy in eighteenth-
century Bengal: Networks of Exchange, Consumption and Communication
and is the co-editor of An Earthly Paradise: Trade, Politics and Culture in
Early Modern Bengal.

Nupur Dasgupta is a Professor of History and has been teaching in the


Department of History, Jadavpur University, India, since 1991. Her area of
interest is Ancient Indian History and Archaeology and History of Science,
Technology and Medicine (Ancient–Modern). She was the recipient of the
Charles Wallace Fellowship at the School of Oriental and African Studies,
University of London.
Archaeology and Religion
in South Asia

Series Editor: Himanshu Prabha Ray, Ludwig Maximillian University Munich,


Germany; former Chairperson of the National Monuments Authority, Ministry of
Culture, Government of India and former Professor, Centre for Historical Studies,
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India

Editorial Board: Gavin Flood, Academic Director, Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies;
Jessica Frazier, Academic Administrator, Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies; Julia
Shaw, Institute of Archaeology, University College, London; Shailendra Bhandare,
Ashmolean Museum, Oxford; Devangana Desai, Asiatic Society, Mumbai; and
Vidula Jaiswal, Jnana Pravaha, Varanasi, former Professor, Banaras Hindu University

This series, in association with the Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies, reflects on
the complex relationship between religion and society through new perspectives
and advances in archaeology. It looks at this critical interface to provide alternative
understandings of communities, beliefs, cultural systems, sacred sites, ritual practices,
food habits, dietary modifications, power, and agents of political legitimisation.
The books in the Series underline the importance of archaeological evidence in the
production of knowledge of the past. They also emphasise that a systematic study
of religion requires engagement with a diverse range of sources such as inscriptions,
iconography, numismatics and architectural remains.

Power, Presence and Space


South Asian Rituals in Archaeological Context
Edited by Henry Albery, Jens-Uwe Hartmann and Himanshu Prabha Ray

Religion, Landscape and Material Culture in Pre-modern South Asia


Edited by Tilottama Mukherjee and Nupur Dasgupta

Women and Monastic Buddhism in Early South Asia


Rediscovering the Invisible Believers
Second Edition
Garima Kaushik

The Archaeology of the Natha Sampradaya in Western India, 12th to 15th CE


Vijay Sarde

For a full list of titles in this series, please visit https://www​.routledge​.com​/


Archaeology​-and​-Religion​-in​-South​-Asia​/book​-series​/AR
Religion, Landscape
and Material Culture in
Pre-modern South Asia

Edited by Tilottama Mukherjee and


Nupur Dasgupta
First published 2023
by Routledge
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2023 selection and editorial matter, Tilottama Mukherjee and Nupur
Dasgupta; individual chapters, the contributors.
The right of Tilottama Mukherjee and Nupur Dasgupta to be identified as
the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual
chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the
publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered
trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent
to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record has been requested for this book
ISBN: 978-0-367-53650-3 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-032-44777-3 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-09565-1 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003095651
Typeset in Sabon
by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India
Contents

List of figures vii


List of maps ix
List of tables x
Contributors xi
Preface xv

Introduction 1
NUPUR DASGUPTA AND TILOTTAMA MUKHERJEE

PART I
Sacred Spaces and Cultural Landscapes 15

1 The Archaeology of Sacred Spaces: Re-examining Early


Coastal Temples in Gujarat 17
HIMANSHU PRABHA RAY

2 Mathura: Exploring a Complex Associative Cultural


Landscape (From 2nd Century BCE to 2nd Century CE) 36
INDIRA BANERJEE

3 Perfumes in 16th–18th Century India: A ‘Religious-Cultural’


Artefact and the Formation of a Scent-Landscape 53
AMRITA CHATTOPADHYAY

4 Patronage as Political Proxy: 18th-Century State-Building and


Religious Patronage in Ajmer and Pushkar 78
ELIZABETH M. THELEN
vi Contents
PART II
Religious Traditions and Texts 99

5 Anthologies of Difference: Situating the Anthologies of


Sādhanamālā and Caryāpada in the Sacred Space of Tantric
Buddhism 101
RITWIK BAGCHI

6 The Transformative Presence of Sufis in the Medieval Indian


Environment: Anecdotes of Miraculous Conversion and
Islamicisation in Chishti Literature from the Delhi Sultanate 124
RAZIUDDIN AQUIL

7 Conversion and Translation: Life and Work of Dom Antonio


do Rosario 148
DEEPASHREE DUTTA

PART III
The Material and the Sacred in Bengal 171

8 Settlements of Kasimbazar and Murshidabad, 1650–1800 CE 173


GARGI CHATTOPADHYAY

9 Physical Environment, Customary Practices, and the English


East India Company Regime: A Narrative of Salt Smuggling in
Late 18th-Century Lower Deltaic Bengal 200
ARIJITA MANNA

10 Rise of Gaudiya Vaishnavism and Evolution of Bengali Platter


in 16th to 18th Centuries 223
PRITAM GOSWAMI

11 Early Medieval Material Culture of Coastal Bengal with


Special Reference to the Site of Kankandighi 242
DURGA BASU

Index 271
Figures

1.1 Temple at Gop in Jamnagar district. The temple of Gop is


perhaps the earliest remaining stone temple of Saurashtra,
Gujarat, located on the bank of the Vartu river and south-
west of the Gop hill. It has a square plan, bigger than what
can be seen at present. The walls are grey, plain, vertical,
undecorated, and over that there is a pyramidal shikhara
(spire) formed of tiers 19
1.2 Temple at Dwarka unearthed during archaeological
excavations. The Dwarakadheesh temple in Dwarka is
dedicated to Krishna. The original early medieval temple
was enlarged in the 15th–16th century. The image shows
the forecourt with intricate carvings on the exterior,
depictions of elephants, and different Vishnu avataras 22
8.1 Rivalry between the Dutch and English over Raw Silk
Exports: 1700—1745 CE 186
8.2 Comparison of Raw Silk Exports by the English Company,
Dutch Company and the Asian Merchants (in Eng. Lb.) 187
8.3 Steady deterioration of the Kasimbazar river between the
1740s and 1790s: A Timeline 190
11.1a Pilkhana mound, Kankandighi 248
11.1b Trench 248
11.2a Index trench: Description of layers 249
11.2b Index trench: Description of layers 250
11.3 Plan of structure 251
11.4 Brick Brick-built square platform 252
11.5a Ceramics 252
11.5b Ceramics 253
11.5c Ceramics 253
11.5d Ceramics 254
11.5e Ceramics 254
viii Figures
11.6  A huge storage jar 255
11.7   Iron implements 256
11.8   Gaṇa image 257
11.9  Buddhist deity Jambhala 257
11.10a Decorated bricks 258
11.10b Decorated bricks 258
11.10c Decorated bricks 259
11.11 Mahishasuramardini 260
11.12 Seated Buddha 260
11.13 Elephant image 261
11.14 Image of Marici 262
Maps

1.1 Map of Gujarat showing the location of coastal temples.


A black and white outline map of Gujarat showing the
location of temples and Buddhist sites, many along the
western seaboard of Saurashtra from Dwarka in the north
to Somnath in the south 18
8.1 Residential-Business enclaves in and around Murshidabad 191
9.1 Location map of Salt districts. Based on the map of
the Deputy Surveyor General in charge of the Surveyor
General’s office, published in 1856 201
9.2 Locational advantage of the Mandalghat pargana. Archival
records suggest its proximity to the Damodar, Rupnarayan,
and Hugli rivers. Hence a map of the meeting place of the
three rivers has been illustrated to show the locational
advantage of the pargana. This map is based on the map of
Deputy Surveyor General in charge of Surveyor General’s
office published in 1856 207
11.1 Physiographical map of Malda district 243
Tables

8.1 Kasimbazar and Murshidabad in Contemporary Accounts 177


9.1 Salt seized at different Golas in 1204 BS (1798 CE) 205
9.2 An account of total death and casualties in the years of
1788 /1789 CE 213
9.3 Allowance of Tookra salt 216
Contributors

Raziuddin Aquil is a Professor at the Department of History, University


of Delhi. He has published widely on religious traditions, literary prac-
tices, and political culture in medieval and early modern India. His books
include Sufism, Culture, and Politics: Afghans and Islam in Medieval
North India; The Muslim Question: Understanding Islam and Indian
History; Lovers of God: Sufism and the Politics of Islam in Medieval
India; and Days in the Life of a Sufi: 101 Enchanting Stories of Wisdom.
He has also edited Sufism and Society in Medieval India; with Partha
Chatterjee, History in the Vernacular; with David Curley, Literary
and Religious Practices in Medieval and Early Modern India; and with
Tilottama Mukherjee, An Earthly Paradise: Trade, Politics and Culture
in Early Modern Bengal.
Ritwik Bagchi is a PhD candidate in the Department of History, Jadavpur
University. He has done his post-graduation and MPhil from the same
university. The title of his MPhil dissertation is ‘Exploring Tantric
Buddhism in the Pāla-Sena Context (Bihar and Bengal) through the Study
of Two Sanskrit Buddhist Texts (c. 8th–c. 12th CE)’. He has presented
papers on the nature and origin of Tantric Buddhism in Bengal in several
international seminars and conferences.
Indira Banerjee is a PhD candidate in the Department of History, Jadavpur
University. She has done her post-graduation and MPhil from the same
department. The title of her MPhil dissertation is ‘Bharhut and Mathura:
Exploring the Cultural Features of Two Early-Historic Sites (From Late
Centuries BCE to Early Centuries CE)’. She has presented papers on the
religion and cultural dynamic of Bharhut and Mathura in the Early-
Historic period in many international seminars and conferences.
Durga Basu is a former Professor and Head of the Department of
Archaeology, Calcutta University. Currently, she is a Senior Fellow of the
Indian Council for Social Science Research (ICSSR); Director, Institute
of Business Management and Research, Kolkata; President, Society for
Heritage, Archaeology and Management; and Vice-President of Kolkata
xii Contributors
Society for Asian Studies. She is also a Visiting Professor at Ramakrishna
Mission Institute of Culture, Indology Department, Kolkata. She special-
ises in Buddhist studies, Historical archaeology, Indian art and architec-
ture. She has presented papers at several international conferences held
in Ireland, Jordan, Cambodia, Philippines, Iran, Vietnam, Sri Lanka,
Bangladesh, France, the UK, and Switzerland. Her authored and edited
books include The N.B.P. Culture of Eastern India; Folk Architecture
of Asian Countries: A Comparative Study; Bharatatattva Vol.3; Sister
Nivedita’s Interpretation of Swami Vivekananda and Cross-cultural
multidisciplinary philosophy; and Research Methodology, Tools and
Techniques in Social Science.

Amrita Chattopadhyay is a PhD candidate at the Centre for Historical


Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Her research inter-
ests focus on Mughal history, material culture, sensory objects, trade
and maritime studies of medieval India and the early modern world. She
wrote an MPhil dissertation titled, ‘Perfumery Culture in Mughal India:
Technology, Consumption and Commodification’, and her ongoing doc-
toral research is on Mughal material culture. Her research was funded
by DAAD-BMBF’s Namaste+ fellowship in the year 2020. She has also
presented papers at a few national and international conferences. Her
articles include, ‘A Study of Aromatic Woods in Seventeenth-Century
India: Circulation of Aloewood and Sandalwood through Facilitating
Port Cities and Trade Networks,’ published in Crossroads, 2022.

Gargi Chattopadhyay holds a PhD in history from Jadavpur University,


Kolkata. Her interest areas include micro history and the role of ecol-
ogy and its implications in the late medieval and early modern Bengal.
Her other academic concerns include oral traditions and folklores of
Bengal and their socio-political and economic ramifications. She works
as an independent researcher, has published many articles in journals and
edited volumes, and is currently working on her book manuscript.

Nupur Dasgupta is a Professor of History and has been teaching in the


Department of History, Jadavpur University, since 1991. Her area of
interest is Ancient Indian History and Archaeology and History of
Science, Technology and Medicine (Ancient–Modern). She was the
recipient of the Charles Wallace Fellowship at the School of Oriental
and African Studies, University of London. She was invited as a Visiting
Fellow at the Department of AIHC and the Department of History,
University of Calcutta and the Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich.
She has authored books titled, The Dawn of Technology in Indian
Protohistory, Calcutta, 1997 and Suvarnatantra: A Treatise on Alchemy,
Delhi, 2009. She has edited several volumes on environmental history,
history of science, technology, medicine, and material culture. She has
Contributors  xiii
authored several articles published in national and international journals
and edited volumes.

Deepashree Dutta is pursuing her PhD from the Centre for Historical
Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. Her PhD focusses on the political
and literary culture of the kingdom of Mallabhum in Bengal from the
late sixteenth to the early nineteenth centuries. For her MPhil from CHS,
JNU, she worked on the activities and literary works of the Portuguese
missionaries in early modern Bengal. Her research is supported by the
ICSSR Doctoral Fellowship, 2021–2022.

Pritam Goswami is a PhD candidate at the Department of History, Jadavpur


University, Kolkata, working on the formation of the various gastro-
nomic spaces in the subah of Bengal between the sixteenth and late eight-
eenth centuries. He has done his MPhil from Visva-Bharati University,
Shantiniketan, on the evolution of the dietary habits and culinary culture
among the colonial middle class in early twentieth century Bengal. His
research is supported by the UGC Senior Research Fellowship. His inter-
est areas include socio-cultural studies, culinary history, and religious
movements in pre-modern and colonial Bengal.

Arijita Manna is a PhD candidate in the Department of History, Jadavpur


University, Kolkata. Her PhD thesis is on the salt industry in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth century Bengal. Her MPhil dissertation
was on salt smuggling in late eighteenth century Bengal. She has pre-
sented papers in seminars and published articles.

Tilottama Mukherjee teaches in the Department of History, Jadavpur


University, Kolkata. She holds a PhD in History from the University
of Cambridge. She is the author of Political Culture and Economy in
eighteenth-century Bengal: Networks of Exchange, Consumption and
Communication and is the co-editor of An Earthly Paradise: Trade,
Politics and Culture in Early Modern Bengal. She is at present working
on early modern travel accounts.

Himanshu Prabha Ray is Research Fellow at the Oxford Centre for Hindu
Studies, Oxford. She was the first Chairperson of the National Monuments
Authority, Ministry of Culture in New Delhi, India, from 2012 to
2015, and former Professor, Centre for Historical Studies, Jawaharlal
Nehru University. She is the editor of the Routledge Archaeology and
Religion in South Asia series. Her recent books include Coastal Shrines
and Transnational Maritime Networks across India and Southeast Asia
(2021), Archaeology and Buddhism in South Asia (2018), Buddhism
and Gandhara: An Archaeology of Museum Collections (ed. 2018),
The Archaeology of Sacred Spaces: The Temple in Western India, 2nd
Century BCE–8th Century CE (with Susan Verma Mishra, 2017), The
xiv Contributors
Return of the Buddha: Ancient Symbols for a New Nation (2014), and
The Archaeology of Seafaring in Ancient South Asia (2003).

Elizabeth M. Thelen is a historian of law, society, and religion in early


modern Rajasthan and an honorary research fellow at the University of
Exeter. She holds a PhD in History from the University of California,
Berkeley, and is the author of Urban Histories of Rajasthan: Religion,
Politics and Society (1550–1800) (2022). She is also an editor of the
digital resource ‘Lawforms: Digitised Legal Documents from the Indo-
Persian World’ (lawforms​.exeter​.ac​​.uk).
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On Jackson’s part this conduct was peculiarly surprising, because
more than a month before he had written to Governor Claiborne[196]
at New Orleans a secret denunciation of Burr and Wilkinson,
couched in language which showed such intimate knowledge of
Burr’s plans as could have come only from Burr himself or Adair. In
accepting Burr’s disavowals, December 14, Jackson did not mention
to Burr his denunciatory letter written to Claiborne, November 12, in
which he had said, “I fear treachery has become the order of the
day.” Like Senator Smith, he was satisfied to secure his own safety;
and upon Burr’s denial of treasonable schemes, Jackson, although
he did not write to Claiborne to withdraw the secret charges, went
on building boats, providing supplies, and enlisting men for Colonel
Burr’s expedition. His motives for this conduct remained his own
secret. Many of the best-informed persons in Tennessee and
Kentucky, including Burr’s avowed partisans, held but a low opinion
of Jackson’s character or veracity. Eight years afterward Jackson and
John Adair once more appeared on the stage of New Orleans history,
and quarrelled, with charges and counter-charges of falsehood and
insinuations of treason.
“Whatever were the intentions of Colonel Burr,” wrote Adair in a
published letter,[197] “I neither organized troops at that time, nor did
I superintend the building of boats for him; nor did I write confidential
letters recommending him to my friends; nor did I think it necessary,
after his failure was universally known, to save myself by turning
informer or State witness.”
By that time the people of Nashville had heard what was doing in
Ohio and Kentucky. The public impeachment of the conspirators
checked enlistments and retarded purchases; but Burr seemed to
fear no such personal danger as had prevented his return to
Blennerhassett’s island. The Governor and Legislature of Ohio had
taken public measures to seize boats and supplies as early as
December 2; Burr had been driven from Kentucky, and
Blennerhassett had fled from his island, by December 11; but ten
days later Burr was still fitting out his boats at Nashville, undisturbed
by the people of Tennessee. December 19 the President’s
proclamation reached Nashville,[198] but still nothing was done.
At last some unmentioned friend brought to Burr a secret
warning that the State authorities must soon take notice of his
armaments. The authorities at Nashville could no longer delay
interference, and Burr was made to understand that his boats would
be seized, and that he was himself in danger unless he should
immediately escape; but between December 19 and 22 he was
undisturbed. The announcement that Graham was expected to arrive
December 23 probably decided his movements; for on the 22d he
hastily abandoned all except two of his boats, receiving back from
Jackson seventeen hundred and twenty-five dollars and taking the
two boats and other articles for his voyage.[199] Jackson afterward
declared that he suffered in the end a loss of five hundred dollars by
a note which Burr had induced him to indorse, and which was
returned from New York protested. Without further hindrance Burr
then floated down the Cumberland River, taking with him a nephew
of Mrs. Jackson, furnished by his uncle with a letter of introduction
to Governor Claiborne,—a confidence the more singular because
Governor Claiborne could hardly fail, under the warnings of General
Jackson’s previous secret letter, to seize and imprison Burr and every
one who should be found in his company.
Thus, by connivance, Burr escaped from Nashville three days
after news of the President’s proclamation had arrived. The
Government had two more chances to stop him before reaching
Natchez. He must join Blennerhassett and Comfort Tyler at the
mouth of the Cumberland, and then move down the Ohio River past
Fort Massac, garrisoned by a company of the First Infantry,
commanded by a Captain Bissell. Having passed Massac, he must
still run the gauntlet at Chickasaw Bluff, afterward called Memphis,
where another military post was stationed. The War Department
sent orders, November 27, to the officers commanding at Massac
and Chickasaw Bluff to be on their guard.
December 22 Burr left Nashville, while Adair at about the same
time started for New Orleans on horseback through the Indian
country. At the mouth of the Cumberland, Burr joined
Blennerhassett, who had with him the boats which had succeeded in
escaping the Ohio militia. The combined flotilla contained thirteen
boats, which carried some sixty men and as many stand of arms, the
arms being stowed in cases as cargo. December 25 Burr sent a note
to Captain Bissell announcing that he should soon reach Fort Massac
on his way South, and should stop to pay his respects. Bissell had
received neither the President’s proclamation nor the orders from the
Secretary of War. As an old friend of Burr, he sent a cordial welcome
to the party. In the night of December 29 the boats passed the fort,
and landed about a mile below. The next morning Captain Bissell
went in his own boat to pay his respects to Colonel Burr, who
declined invitations to breakfast and dinner, but asked a furlough of
twenty days for a Sergeant Dunbaugh, who had been persuaded to
join the expedition. Bissell gave the furlough December 31, and
Burr’s party at once started for the Mississippi. Five days afterward,
January 5, Bissell received a letter, dated January 2, from Andrew
Jackson, as Major-General of Tennessee militia, warning him to stop
any body of men who might attempt to pass, if they should appear
to have illegal enterprises in view. The President’s proclamation had
not yet reached Fort Massac, nor had Captain Bissell received any
instructions from Washington.[200]
The proclamation, dated November 27, and sent immediately to
the West, reached Pittsburg December 2,[201] and should, with
ordinary haste, have reached Fort Massac—the most important point
between Pittsburg and Natchez—before December 15. The orders
which accompanied it ought to have prevented any failure of
understanding on the part of Captain Bissell. Bissell’s reply to
Jackson, dated January 5, reached Nashville January 8, and was
forwarded by Jackson to Jefferson, who sent it to Congress with a
message dated January 28. Twenty-three days were sufficient for
the unimportant reply; forty days or more had been taken for the
orders to reach Massac, although they had only to float down the
river. That some gross negligence or connivance could alone explain
this shortcoming was evident; but the subject was never thought to
need investigation by President or Congress. The responsibility for
Burr’s escape was so equally distributed between the President
himself, the War Department, and the many accomplices or dupes of
Burr in Kentucky and Tennessee, that any investigation must have
led to unpleasant results.
Burr for the moment escaped, and everything depended on the
action of Wilkinson. Dayton and the other conspirators who
remained in the Eastern States thought it a matter of small
consequence whether Burr carried with him a party of sixty men or
of six hundred. Doubtless the unexpected energy shown by the
people and the legislatures of Ohio and Kentucky proved the futility
of attempting to revolutionize those States; but if Wilkinson were
true to Burr, and if the city of New Orleans should welcome him, it
remained to be seen whether the Government at Washington could
crush the rebellion. A blockade of the Mississippi was no easy affair,
and slow in its results; England, France, and Spain might have much
to say.
Meanwhile Humphrey Marshall and his friend Daveiss enjoyed the
triumph they had won. In spite of silent opposition from the
Republican leaders, Marshall drove the Kentucky Legislature into an
inquiry as to the truth of the charge that Judge Sebastian was a
Spanish pensioner. Sebastian instantly resigned. The committee took
no notice of this admission of guilt, but summoned Judge Innis to
testify. Very reluctantly Innis appeared before the committee and
began his evidence, but broke down in the attempt, and admitted
the truth of what had been alleged.[202] Before the close of the year
Daveiss and Marshall drove Burr and Adair out of the State, forced
Sebastian from the bench, humiliated Innis, and threw ridicule upon
young Henry Clay and the other aggressive partisans of Jefferson,
besides placing Jefferson himself and his Secretary of State in an
attitude neither dignified nor creditable. Of all the persons connected
with the story of Burr’s expedition, Daveiss and Marshall alone
showed the capacity to conceive a plan of action and the courage to
execute the plan they conceived; but Jefferson could not be
expected to feel satisfaction with services of such a nature. A few
months later he appointed another person to succeed Daveiss in the
office of district-attorney.
CHAPTER XIII.
Samuel Swartwout and Peter V. Ogden, the young men whom Burr
and Dayton charged with the duty of carrying despatches to
Louisiana, crossed the Alleghanies in August and floated down the
Ohio River to Louisville.[203] There they stopped to find Adair, for
whom they brought letters from Burr. After some search Swartwout
delivered the letters, and continued his journey. Adair never made
known the contents of these papers; but they probably contained
the same information as was conveyed in the despatches to
Wilkinson which came in their company.
Supposing Wilkinson to be at St. Louis, the two young men
bought horses and rode across the Indiana Territory to Kaskaskias;
but finding that the General had gone down the Mississippi, they
took boat and followed. At Natchez they learned that the object of
their search had gone up the Red River. Swartwout was obliged to
follow him; but Ogden went to New Orleans with despatches from
Burr to his friends in that city.
Among the mysteries that still surround the conspiracy, the
deepest covers Burr’s relations in New Orleans. That he had
confederates in the city was proved not only by Ogden’s carrying
letters, but also by Erick Bollman’s arrival by sea, as early as
September 27, with a duplicate of Burr’s letter of July 29 to
Wilkinson; and above all, by the significant disappearance of Burr’s
letters carried by Ogden and Bollman to persons in New Orleans.
The persons implicated proved their complicity by keeping Burr’s
letters and his secret.
One of these correspondents was almost certainly Judge Prevost,
Burr’s stepson, whom Jefferson had appointed District Judge for the
Territory of Orleans. That Daniel Clark was another hardly admits of
doubt. Swartwout assured Wilkinson of the fact;[204] but apart from
this evidence, the same reasons which obliged Burr to confide in
Wilkinson required him to confide in Clark. The receivers of the
letters, whoever they were, hastened to make their contents known
to every one whom they could trust. Immediately after the arrival of
Bollman and Dayton about October 1, before any serious alarm had
risen in Ohio, the town of New Orleans rang with rumors of Burr’s
projects. The news excited more consternation than hope; for
although the creoles had been bitter in complaints of Claiborne’s
administration and of the despotism imposed upon them by
Congress, they remembered their attempt to revolt in 1768, and
were far from eager to risk their safety again. Nevertheless, the
temper of the people was bad; and no one felt deeper anxiety as to
the number of Burr’s adherents than Governor Claiborne himself.
Nearly three years had elapsed since Dec. 20, 1803, when the
Spanish governor surrendered Louisiana to the United States, and
the history of the Territory during that time presented an
uninterrupted succession of bickerings. The government at
Washington was largely responsible for its own unpopularity in the
new Territory, its foreign and domestic policy seeming calculated to
create ill-feeling, and after creating it, to keep it alive. The President
began by appointing as Governor of Louisiana a man who had no
peculiar fitness for the place. Claiborne, in contrast with men like
Wilkinson, Burr, and Daniel Clark, rose to the level of a hero. He was
honest, well-meaning, straightforward, and thoroughly patriotic; but
these virtues were not enough to make him either feared or
respected by the people over whom he was to exercise despotic
powers; while Claiborne’s military colleague, Wilkinson, possessed
fewer virtues and a feebler character. The French Prefect, Laussat,
who remained for a time in New Orleans to protect French interests,
wrote his Government April 8, 1804, an interesting account of the
situation as seen by French eyes:[205]
“It was hardly possible that the government of the United States
should have made a worse beginning, and that it should have sent
two men (Messrs. Claiborne, governor, and Wilkinson, general) less fit
to attract affection. The first, with estimable private qualities, has little
capacity and much awkwardness, and is extremely beneath his place;
the second, already long known here in a bad way, is a flighty, rattle-
headed fellow, often drunk, who has committed a hundred
impertinent follies. Neither the one nor the other understands a word
of French or Spanish. They have on all occasions, and without
delicacy, shocked the habits, the prejudices, the character of the
population.”
Claiborne began his sway, assuming that the creoles were a
kindly but ignorant and degraded people, who must be taught the
blessings of American society. The creoles, who considered
themselves to be more refined and civilized than the Americans who
descended upon them from Kentucky and Tennessee, were not
pleased that their language, blood, and customs should be
systematically degraded, in defiance of the spirit in which the treaty
of cession had been made. Their anger was not without an element
of danger. England and France could safely defy public opinion and
trample on prostrate races. Their empire rested on force, but that of
Jefferson rested on consent; and if the people of New Orleans
should rebel, they could not be conquered without trouble and
expense, or without violating the free principles which Jefferson was
supposed to represent.
The colonists in Louisiana had been for a century the spoiled
children of France and Spain. Petted, protected, fed, paid, flattered,
and given every liberty except the rights of self-government, they
liked Spain[206] and loved France, but they did not love the English
or the Americans; and their irritation was extreme when they saw
Claiborne, who knew nothing of their society and law, abolish their
language, establish American judges who knew only American law,
while he himself sat as a court of last resort, without even an
attorney to advise him as to the meaning of the Spanish law he
administered. At the same time that as judge he could hang his
subjects, as intendant he could tax them, and as governor he could
shoot the disobedient. Even under the Spanish despotism, appeal
might be made to Havana or Madrid; but no appeal lay from
Claiborne’s judgment-seat.
Before this temporary system was superseded, the creoles
already yearned for a return to French or Spanish rule. They had but
one hope from the United States,—that, in the terms of the treaty,
Louisiana might be quickly admitted into the Union. This hope was
rudely dispelled. Not only did Congress treat their claims to self-
government with indifference, but the Territory was divided in
halves, so that it must be slower to acquire the necessary population
for a State; while as though to delay still longer this act of justice,
the growth of population was checked by prohibiting the slave-trade.
Years must pass before Louisiana could gain admission into the
Union; and even when this should happen, it must be the result of
American expansion at creole expense.
Jefferson’s Spanish policy, which kept the country always on the
verge of a war with Spain, prevented the French and Spanish
population from feeling that their submission was final. In case of
war between the United States and Spain, nothing would be easier
than to drive Claiborne away and replace Casa Calvo in the
government. Claiborne soon found himself confronted by an
opposition which he could neither control nor understand. Even the
leading Americans joined it. Daniel Clark, rich, eccentric, wild in his
talk and restless in his movements, distinguished himself by the
personal hatred which he showed for Claiborne; Evan Jones, another
wealthy resident, rivalled Clark; Edward Livingston, who had come to
New Orleans angry with Jefferson for removing him as a defaulter
from office, joined the old residents in harassing the Governor; while
the former Spanish officials, Casa Calvo and Morales, remained at
New Orleans under one or another pretext, keeping the Spanish
influence alive, and maintaining communications with Governor
Folch of West Florida, who controlled the Mississippi at Baton Rouge,
and with General Herrera, who commanded the Spanish force in
Texas. So bad was the state of feeling that when Oct. 1, 1804, the
new territorial system was organized, Messrs. Boré, Bellechasse,
Cantrelle, Jones, and Daniel Clark, whom the President had named
as members of the legislative council, refused to accept the office;
while Messrs. Sauvé, Destréhan, and Derbigny were deputed by a
popular assembly to present their grievances at Washington. Two
months elapsed before Governor Claiborne could form any council at
all; not until Dec. 4, 1804, was a quorum obtained.
No pretence of disguising their feelings was made by the Spanish
population. In French minds the power of Bonaparte was a stronger
reliance than the power of Spain; no Frenchman willingly admitted
that Napoleon meant to sacrifice Louisiana forever.[207]
“The President’s Message,” wrote Governor Claiborne to Madison,
Dec. 11, 1804,[208] “has been translated into the French language,
and I will take care to have it circulated among the people. It will tend
to remove an impression which has heretofore contributed greatly to
embarrass the local administration; to wit, that the country west of
the Mississippi would certainly be re-ceded to Spain, and perhaps the
whole of Louisiana. So general has been this impression, particularly
as relates to the country west of the Mississippi, that many citizens
have been fearful of accepting any employment under the American
government, or even manifesting a respect therefor, lest at a future
time it might lessen them in the esteem of Spanish officers.”
Under the remonstrances of Sauvé, Destréhan, and Derbigny,
and at the intercession of John Randolph, Congress was induced to
yield a single point. The Act of March 2, 1805, gave Louisiana
ordinary Territorial rights, an elected legislature, and a delegate to
Congress. After its passage, Claiborne wrote to Madison that the
people were disappointed; and in fact the concessions were so trivial
as to irritate rather than soothe. Claiborne, whom the people
obstinately disliked, was re-appointed governor under the Act, and
nothing in reality was changed.
Burr visited New Orleans in June and July, 1805. The new
Legislature assembled, Nov. 4, 1805, when Claiborne found himself
surrounded by a council partly elected by the Legislature, and a
Legislature wholly elected by the people. He was soon at odds with
both. The leader of opposition was Daniel Clark; and for a moment
in May, 1806, the quarrel went so far that the two legislative bodies
were on the point of voluntary disbandment, and a majority of the
council actually resigned. The Legislature chose Daniel Clark as their
delegate to Congress. Claiborne thought that the choice was made
merely out of personal spite; but no sooner did he hear of Burr’s
disunion scheme than he wrote to Madison,[209]—
“If this be the object of the conspirators, the delegate to Congress
from this Territory, Daniel Clark, is one of the leaders. He has often
said that the Union could not last, and that had he children he would
impress early on their minds the expediency of a separation between
the Atlantic and Western States.”

In the same month of May Lieutenant Murray of the artillery, an


intimate friend of Daniel Clark, came with a Lieutenant Taylor from
Fort Adams to New Orleans, and heard the ordinary conversation of
society.
“Lieutenant Taylor and myself,” he afterward testified,[210] “were
invited to dine with a gentleman there whose name was on the list
before mentioned [of persons engaged in an expedition against
Mexico]; it was Judge Workman. We three dined together. After the
cloth was removed, Mr. Lewis Kerr came in.... After a number of
inquiries about Baton Rouge and the Red River country, they
proceeded to lay open their plan of seizing upon the money in the
banks at New Orleans, impressing the shipping, taking Baton Rouge,
and joining Miranda by way of Mexico.... When I told Mr. Clark that I
was calculated on as the officer to attack Baton Rouge, he advised me
by all means to do it. He urged as an inducement that he was coming
on to Congress, and would do all he could in my favor; that he would
represent to the Government that it would require a large force to
retake it; and he further observed that, at any rate, if the Government
should be disposed to trouble me, before they could send off a
sufficient force I should be in a situation to take care of myself.”
This attempt to seduce officers of the United States army into
Burr’s conspiracy was flagrant; for although Burr’s name was not
mentioned, no one could fail to see that the seizure of government
money in the banks at New Orleans was an act of treason, and that
the attack on West Florida implied a permanent military
establishment on the Gulf.
June 7, 1806, the first Louisiana legislature adjourned, and
Governor Claiborne felt relief as deep as was felt by Jefferson at
escaping the stings of John Randolph; but although for a time
Claiborne flattered himself that his difficulties were lessening, he
soon became aware that some mystery surrounded him which he
could not penetrate. General Herrera began to press upon the Red
River from Nacogdoches in Texas with a force considerably stronger
than any which Claiborne could oppose to him. The militia showed
indifference. August 28 the Governor wrote to the Secretary of War
that the French population would not support the government in
case of hostilities.[211] September 9 he wrote to Cowles Meade, then
acting-governor of the Mississippi Territory, a letter of uneasiness at
the behavior of Wilkinson’s troops: “My present impression is that all
is not right. I know not whom to censure, but it seems to me that
there is wrong somewhere.” The militia could not be stimulated to
action against Herrera, and the feeling of hostility between
Americans and creoles was so bitter that Claiborne intervened for
fear of violence.[212]
October 6, 1806, the Governor returned to New Orleans after a
tour of inspection. Erick Bollman had been then ten days in the city,
and young Ogden had arrived about October 1, bringing Burr’s
despatches. According to Bellechasse and Derbigny the creole
society was already much excited; but this excitement showed itself
to Claiborne in a display of assumed stolidity.
“There is in this city,” wrote Claiborne to the Secretary of War
October 8,[213] “a degree of apathy at the present time which
mortifies and astonishes me; and some of the native Americans act
and discourse as if perfect security everywhere prevailed.... I fear the
ancient Louisianians of New Orleans are not disposed to support with
firmness the American cause. I do not believe they would fight
against us; but my present impression is that they are not inclined to
rally under the American standard.”
Claiborne’s spirits fluctuated from day to day as he felt the
changes in a situation which he could not fathom. October 17 he
was elated because the militia of New Orleans unexpectedly, and
contrary to the tenor of all its previous conduct, made a voluntary
tender of services. November 7 he was again discouraged; and
November 15, and even as late as November 25, he fell back into
despondency. During all that time the enemies whom he feared were
Spaniards in Texas and West Florida; the thought of conspiracy
among the apathetic creoles had not yet entered his mind.
Yet around him the city was trembling with excitement; and of all
persons in the city Daniel Clark was the one whose conduct showed
most signs of guilty knowledge. A few months later, he collected
affidavits from four or five of the most important gentlemen in New
Orleans to show what his conduct had been. At the moment when
Bollman and Ogden arrived, Clark was preparing for his journey to
Washington, where he meant to take his seat in Congress as the
Territorial delegate. The news brought by Bollman and Ogden that
Burr was on his way to New Orleans placed him in a dilemma. Like
Senator Smith and Andrew Jackson, his chief anxiety regarded his
own safety; and he adopted an expedient which showed his usual
intelligence. An affidavit of Bellechasse,[214] on whose character he
mainly depended, narrated that—
“in the month of October, a very few days before Mr. Clark left this
city to go to Congress, he called together a number of his friends, and
informed them of the views and intentions imputed to Colonel Burr,
which were then almost the sole topic of conversation, and which,
from the reports daily arriving from Kentucky, had caused a serious
alarm; and he advised them all to exert their influence with the
inhabitants of the country to support the Government of the United
States and to rally round the Governor, although he thought him
incapable of rendering much service as a military man,—assuring
them that such conduct only would save the country if any hostile
projects were entertained against it, and that this would be the best
method of convincing the Government of the United States of the
attachment of the inhabitants of Louisiana, and of the falsity of all the
reports circulated to their prejudice. And Mr. Clark strongly
recommended to such members of the Legislature as were then
present not to attend any call or meeting of either House in case
Colonel Burr should gain possession of the city, stating that such a
measure would deservedly expose every individual concerned to
punishment, and would occasion the ruin of the country.”
According to Bellechasse, the society of New Orleans between
Oct. 1 and Oct. 15, 1806, was in serious alarm. Burr’s intentions
formed “almost the sole topic of conversation;” daily reports were
arriving from Kentucky, although in Kentucky, down to October 1, no
alarm existed, and Burr’s intentions were not even developed. Each
of the four affidavits which Clark obtained, one of them signed by
Peter Derbigny, affirmed that about the middle of October, 1806,
Burr’s projects were the general theme of conversation in the city;
but nothing was more certain than that this knowledge of Burr’s
projects must have come not from Kentucky, but from Burr’s own
letters and from the messages brought by Ogden and Bollman.
Clark, having thus secured himself from the charge of abetting
Burr, sailed for the Atlantic coast, and in due time made his
appearance at Washington; but neither he nor Bellechasse nor
Derbigny nor Bouligny, although officers of the government, giving
each other excellent advice, communicated to Governor Claiborne
what they knew about Burr’s plans. From October 1 to November
25, the projects of Burr were “the exclusive subject of every
conversation” in the city, yet the single official who ought to have
been first informed, and who bore all responsibility, had not a
suspicion that any conspiracy existed. Claiborne’s isolation was
complete. This isolation was natural, since all the gentlemen of New
Orleans quarrelled with the Governor; but the same silence was
preserved where their social relations were friendly. Neither Clark
nor any of the persons who talked so much with each other about
Burr’s projects communicated with General Wilkinson, who was in
full sympathy with their hatred of Claiborne. Wilkinson stood in
relations of close confidence with Clark; intimate letters passed
between them as late as October 2.[215] Clark knew that Wilkinson
was Burr’s most intimate friend; yet he neither warned Claiborne nor
Wilkinson nor President Jefferson, although as early as October 15
he warned a number of other gentlemen who needed no warning,
and although October 17 the militia of New Orleans, evidently in
consequence of his advice, tendered their services to the Governor.
For two months, between September 27 and November 25,
Burr’s emissaries were busy in New Orleans, without suspicion or
hindrance from the United States authorities; while every prominent
Frenchman in the Territory knew the contents of Burr’s letter to
Wilkinson as soon as Wilkinson could have known them. That Burr
had few active adherents might be true; but nothing showed that
Bollman regarded the result of his mission as unfavorable. Toward
the end of October Bollman sent letters by a certain Lieutenant
Spence, who reached Lexington in due course, and November 2
delivered his despatches to Burr;[216] but whatever their contents
may have been, they were not so decisive against Burr’s hopes as to
stop his movement. The people of New Orleans were careful not to
commit themselves, but they guarded Burr’s secret with jealousy.
They warned no United States official of the danger in which the city
stood; they wrote no letters to the President; they sent no message
to Burr forbidding his approach.
This was the situation in New Orleans Nov. 25, 1806, the day
when District-Attorney Daveiss at Frankfort made his second attempt
to procure an indictment against Burr, and when President Jefferson
at Washington was startled into energy by receiving a letter, almost
equivalent to a confession, from General Wilkinson. From the Ohio
River to the Gulf of Mexico the conspiracy had numerous friends;
and in New Orleans it had the most alarming of all qualities,—
silence.
Meanwhile young Samuel Swartwout, after parting from his
friend Ogden, had slowly ascended the Red River, pursuing General
Wilkinson, as Evangeline pursued Gabriel, even as far as “the little
inn of the Spanish town of Adayes.” The military point for Wilkinson
to decide was whether he should make an effort to drive the
Spaniards back to their town of Adayes, or whether he should allow
them to fix themselves on the Red River. The movements of the
Spanish General Herrera, who had brought a considerable mounted
force to Nacogdoches, were supposed at the moment by many
persons to have been made in concert with Burr; but in reality they
were doubtless intended only to derange the plan, recommended by
Armstrong and Monroe to Jefferson, by which Texas should be
seized for the United States, while West Florida for the moment
should be left aside. The Spanish government saw the danger, and
sent a little army of some fifteen hundred men to the Red River,
where they posted a strong garrison at Bayou Pierre, and pressed
close upon Natchitoches. The Americans, instead of taking the
offensive and advancing with five thousand men, as Wilkinson
wished, to the Rio Grande, were thrown upon the defensive, and
trembled for New Orleans, protected only by a French militia which
neither Claiborne nor Wilkinson could trust.
Under orders from Washington, General Wilkinson reached
Natchitoches September 22, and found the Spaniards in force
between his own post and the Sabine. For a few days Wilkinson
talked loudly, after his peculiar manner. War seemed imminent.
September 28 he wrote from Natchitoches a letter to Senator Smith
of Ohio, the contractor for his supplies:[217]—
“I have made the last effort at conciliation in a solemn appeal to
Governor Cordero at Nacogdoches, who is chief in command on this
frontier. Colonel Cushing bore my letter, and is now with the Don. I
expect his return in four days; and then,—I believe, my friend, I shall
be obliged to fight and flog them.”
Governor Cordero, whose object was probably no more than to
restrict American possession within the narrowest possible limits,
withdrew his troops from Bayou Pierre, September 27, to the west
bank of the Sabine, and left open to Wilkinson the road to the
eastern bank. The Spanish forces recrossed the Sabine before
September 30, but a week later, October 8, General Wilkinson had
not begun his ostentatious march, of some fifty miles, to retake
possession of the east bank of the river.
On the evening of October 8, General Wilkinson was sitting with
Colonel Cushing, of the Second Infantry, alone in the Colonel’s
quarters at Natchitoches, discussing the military problem before
them, when a young man was introduced who said that his name
was Swartwout, and that he brought a letter of introduction from
General Dayton. After some little ordinary talk, Colonel Cushing
having for a moment been called out of the room, Swartwout slipped
into General Wilkinson’s hands a packet which he said contained a
letter from Colonel Burr. Wilkinson received the letter, and soon
afterward retired to his chamber, where he passed the rest of the
evening in the labor of deciphering Burr’s long despatch of July 29.
[218]

If the falsehoods contained in the letters of Burr and Dayton


found any credit in Wilkinson’s mind, they should have decided him
to follow his old bent toward revolution. Everything beckoned him
on. His secret relations, nearly twenty years old, with the Spanish
officials guaranteed to him the connivance of the Spanish force. The
French militia of Louisiana, deaf to Governor Claiborne’s entreaties,
would have seen with pleasure Claiborne deposed. About five
hundred United States troops were under Wilkinson’s command on
the Red River, of whom few were native Americans, or cared for the
Government except to obtain their pay. In New Orleans a breath
would blow away the national authority; and what power would
restore it? If it were true, as Burr wrote, that a British fleet stood
ready to prevent a blockade of the Mississippi, the success of the
Western empire seemed assured.
Severance of the ties that bound him to Dayton and Burr was not
a simple matter for Wilkinson. That they were old friends was
something; and that all three had fought side by side under the
walls of Quebec in the winter of 1776, with the father of young Peter
Ogden for a friend, and with Benedict Arnold for their commander,
was still more; but the most serious difficulty was that Wilkinson
stood in the power of these men, who knew his thoughts and could
produce his letters, and who, in case of his deserting them, would
certainly do their utmost to destroy what character he possessed.
Whatever may have been his reflections, Wilkinson took at once
measures to protect his own interests. Like Senator Smith, Andrew
Jackson, and Daniel Clark, his first step was to provide against the
danger of being charged with misprision of treason. The morning
after Swartwout’s arrival, Wilkinson took Colonel Cushing aside, and
after telling him the contents of Burr’s letter, announced that he
meant to notify the President of the plot, and that after making
some temporary arrangement with the Spaniards, he should move
his whole force to New Orleans. In one sense this avowal was an act
of patriotism; in another light it might have been regarded as an
attempt to sound Colonel Cushing, whose assistance was necessary
to the success of the plot.
In any case the deliberation of his conduct proved no eagerness
to act. A week passed. Although time pressed, and Burr was to
move down the Ohio River November 15, Wilkinson did not yet warn
the President or the authorities in Mississippi and Tennessee, or the
commanding officers at Fort Adams or Chickasaw Bluffs. About
October 15 a troop of militia reached Natchitoches; and Wilkinson
confided his plans to Colonel Burling, who accompanied it. One
might almost have suspected that he was systematically sounding
his officers. Not until October 21 did he send the promised letter to
President Jefferson, and in that letter he did not so much as mention
Burr’s name.[219] He spoke of the expedition as destined for Vera
Cruz. “It is unknown under what authority this enterprise has been
projected, from whence the means of its support are derived, or
what may be the intentions of its leaders in relation to the Territory
of Orleans.” The communication was so timed as to reach
Washington after Burr should have passed down the Ohio; and it
was so worded as to protect Wilkinson in case of Burr’s failure, but
in no event to injure Burr.
After sending this despatch to Washington by a special
messenger, Wilkinson wrote October 23 a letter of mysterious
warning to Lieutenant-Colonel Freeman, who commanded at New
Orleans.[220] He wrote also a letter to Burr, which he afterward
recovered at Natchez and destroyed.[221] He sent his force forward
to the Sabine, and passed ten days in making an arrangement with
the Spanish officers for maintaining the relative positions of the
outposts. Not until November 5 did he return to Natchitoches. Then,
at last, his movements became as rapid as they had hitherto been
dilatory.
November 7 he wrote to Colonel Cushing from Natchitoches:[222]
“On the 15th of this month Burr’s declaration is to be made in
Tennessee and Kentucky. Hurry, hurry after me; and if necessary, let
us be buried together in the ruins of the place we shall defend!” He
had at last chosen his part; and having decided to act as the savior
of the country, he began to exaggerate the danger. “If I mistake not,
we shall have an insurrection of blacks as well as whites to
combat.”[223] “I shall be with you by the 20th instant,” he wrote to
Freeman the same day;[224] “in the mean time be you as silent as
the grave!” He left Natchitoches November 7, and reached Natchez
on the 11th, whence he wrote “from the seat of Major Minor” a
letter of alarm to the President, confiding to the messenger an oral
account of Burr’s letter, for Jefferson’s benefit:[225]—
“This is indeed a deep, dark, and widespread conspiracy,
embracing the young and the old, the Democrat and the Federalist,
the native and the foreigner, the patriot of ’76 and the exotic of
yesterday, the opulent and the needy, the ‘ins’ and the ‘outs;’ and I
fear it will receive strong support in New Orleans from a quarter little
suspected.... I gasconade not when I tell you that in such a cause I
shall glory to give my life in the service of my country; for I verily
believe such an event to be probable, because, should seven
thousand men descend from the Ohio,—and this is the calculation,—
they will bring with them the sympathies and good wishes of that
country, and none but friends can be afterward prevailed on to follow
them. With my handful of veterans, however gallant, it is improbable I
shall be able to withstand such a disparity of numbers.”
If this was not gasconade, it sounded much like intoxication; but
on the same day the writer indulged in another cry of panic. He
should have written to Governor Claiborne a month before; but
having made up his mind to speak, he was determined to terrify:
[226]—

“You are surrounded by dangers of which you dream not, and the
destruction of the American government is seriously menaced. The
storm will probably burst in New Orleans, where I shall meet it, and
triumph or perish!”
If the courage of Claiborne did not, on the arrival of this letter,
wholly desert him, his heart was stout; but he had yet another shock
to meet, for on the same day that Wilkinson at Natchez was
summoning this shadowy terror before his eyes, Andrew Jackson at
Nashville was writing to him in language even more bewildering than
that of Wilkinson:[227]—
“I fear treachery has become the order of the day. This induces
me to write you. Put your town in a state of defence; organize your
militia, and defend your city as well against internal enemies as
external. My knowledge does not extend so far as to authorize me to
go into details, but I fear you will meet with an attack from quarters
you do not at present expect. Be upon the alert! Keep a watchful eye
on our General [Wilkinson], and beware of an attack as well from your
own country as Spain! I fear there is something rotten in the state of
Denmark.... Beware of the month of December!... This I will write for
your own eye and for your own safety. Profit by it, and the ides of
March remember!”
A storm of denunciations began to hail upon Claiborne’s head;
but buffeted as he was, he could only bear in silence whatever fate
might be in store, for General Wilkinson, who was little more
trustworthy or trusted than Burr himself, arrived in New Orleans
November 25, and took the reins of power.
CHAPTER XIV.
For several days after Wilkinson’s arrival at New Orleans he left
the conspirators in doubt of his intentions. No public alarm had yet
been given; and while Colonel Cushing hurried the little army
forward, Wilkinson, November 30, called on Erick Bollman, and had
with him a confidential interview. Not until December 5 did he tell
Bollman that he meant to oppose Burr’s scheme; and even then
Bollman felt some uncertainty. December 6 the General at length
confided to the Governor his plan of defence, which was nothing less
than that Claiborne should consent to abdicate his office and invest
Wilkinson with absolute power by proclaiming martial law.
Considering that this extraordinary man knew himself to be an
object of extreme and just suspicion on Claiborne’s part, such a
demand carried effrontery to the verge of insolence; and the tone in
which it was made sounded rather like an order than like advice.
“The dangers,” said he,[228] “which impend over this city and
menace the laws and government of the United States from an
unauthorized and formidable association must be successfully
opposed at this point, or the fair fabric of our independence,
purchased by the best blood of our country, will be prostrated, and
the Goddess of Liberty will take her flight from this globe forever.
Under circumstances so imperious, extraordinary measures must be
resorted to, and the ordinary forms of our civil institutions must for a
short period yield to the strong arm of military law.”
Claiborne mildly resisted the pressure, with much good temper
refusing to sanction either the impressment of seamen, the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the declaration of martial
law, or the illegal arrest of suspected persons, while he insisted on
meeting the emergency with the ordinary legal means at his
disposal. Wilkinson was obliged to act in defiance of his advice.
Sunday, December 14, arrests at New Orleans began. Bollman
was first to be seized. Swartwout and Ogden had been arrested at
Fort Adams. These seizures, together with that of Bollman’s
companion, Alexander, and Wilkinson’s wild talk, spread panic
through the city. The courts tried to interpose, and applied for
support to Governor Claiborne. The Governor advised Wilkinson to
yield to the civil authorities; but Wilkinson refused, thus establishing
in the city something equivalent to martial law. He knew, or
believed, that both Judge Workman and Judge Prevost were
engaged in the conspiracy with Burr, and he was obliged to defy
them, or to risk his own success. The only effect of the attempt to
enforce the writ of habeas corpus in favor of the prisoners was to
draw out what had been hitherto concealed,—Burr’s letter of July 29.
Not until December 18 did Wilkinson send a written version of that
letter to the President.[229] In order to warrant the arrests of
Swartwout and Ogden, Wilkinson, December 26, swore to an
affidavit which embodied Burr’s letter.
This step brought the panic in New Orleans to a climax.
Wilkinson’s military measures were evidently directed rather against
the city than against Burr. His previous complicity in the projects of
Burr was evident. His power of life and death was undisputed. Every
important man in New Orleans was a silent accomplice of Burr, afraid
of denunciation, and at Wilkinson’s mercy. He avowed publicly that
he would act with the same energy, without regard to standing or
station, against all individuals who might be participants in Burr’s
combination; and it would have been difficult for the best people in
New Orleans to prove that they had no knowledge of the plot, or
had given it no encouragement. The creole gentlemen began to
regret the mild sway of Claiborne when they saw that their own
factiousness had brought them face to face with the chances of a
drumhead court-martial.
Wilkinson’s violence might have provoked an outbreak from the
mere terror it caused, had he not taken care to show that he meant
in reality to protect and not to punish the chief men of the city. After
the first shock, his arrests were in truth reassuring. The people could
afford to look on while he seized only strangers, like Bollman and
Alexander; even in Swartwout and Ogden few citizens of New
Orleans took much personal interest. Only in case the General had
arrested men like Derbigny or Edward Livingston or Bellechasse
would the people be likely to resist; and Wilkinson showed that he
meant to make no arrests among the residents, and to close his
eyes against evidence that could compromise any citizen of the
place. “Thank God!” he wrote to Daniel Clark, December 10,[230]
“your advice to Bellechasse, if your character was not a sufficient
guaranty, would vindicate you against any foul imputation.” In
another letter, written early in January, he added,[231]—
“It is a fact that our fool [Claiborne] has written to his
contemptible fabricator [Jefferson], that you had declared if you had
children you would teach them to curse the United States as soon as
they were able to lisp.”
Claiborne had brought such a charge only a few weeks before,
and Wilkinson must have heard it from Claiborne himself, who had
already written to withdraw it on learning Clark’s advice to
Bellechasse. Nevertheless Wilkinson continued,—
“Cet bête [Claiborne] is at present up to the chin in folly and
vanity. He cannot be supported much longer, for Burr or no Burr we
shall have a revolt if he is not removed speedily. The moment
Bonaparte compromises with Great Britain will be the signal for a
general rising of French and Spaniards; and if the Americans do not
join, they will not oppose. Take care! Suspicion is abroad; but you
have a friend worth having.”

Clark’s business correspondents in New Orleans delivered to


Wilkinson a letter which came to them from Burr without address,
but which was intended for Bollman.[232] “For your own sake,” said
the General, “take that letter away! Destroy, and say nothing of it!” A
year later, when the frightened crew of conspirators recovered from
their panic and began to turn upon him with ferocity on account of
his treason to them and to Burr, Wilkinson wrote to Daniel Clark a
last letter, mentioning in semi-threatening language the written
evidence in his possession against Clark himself, and adding,[233]—
“Much pains were taken by Bollman to induce me to believe you
were concerned. Swartwout assured me Ogden had gone to New
Orleans with despatches for you from Burr, and that you were to
furnish provisions, etc. Many other names were mentioned to me
which I have not exposed, nor will I ever expose them unless
compelled by self-defence....”
Wilkinson never did expose them, nor did he molest in any
serious degree the society of New Orleans.
Had Wilkinson been satisfied to secure the city without
magnifying himself, he might perhaps have won its regard and
gratitude; but he could do nothing without noise and display. Before
many days had passed he put an embargo on the shipping and set
the whole city at work on defences. He spread panic-stricken stories
of Burr’s force and of negro insurrection. He exasperated the judges
and the bar, alienated Claiborne, and disgusted the creoles. Nothing
but a bloody convulsion or an assault upon the city from Burr’s
armed thousands could save Wilkinson from becoming ridiculous.
Jan. 12, 1807, the Legislature met. Probably at no time had
Burr’s project received much avowed support, even among those
persons to whom it had been confided. Men of wealth and character
had no fancy for so wild a scheme. The conduct of Daniel Clark was
an example of what Burr had to expect from every man of property
and standing. The Legislature was under the influence of
conservative and somewhat timid men, from whom no serious
danger was to be expected, and whose fears were calculated to
strengthen rather than to weaken the government; yet it was true
that Burr had counted upon this meeting of the Legislature to
declare Louisiana independent, and to offer him the government. He
was to have waited at Natchez for a delegation to bring him the
offer; and he was supposed to be already at Natchez. The city had
been kept for a month in a state of continual alarm, distracted by
rumors, and expecting some outbreak from day to day, assured by
Wilkinson that Burr with seven thousand men might appear at any
moment, with a negro insurrection behind him and British ships in
the river, when suddenly John Adair rode into town, and descended
at the door of Madame Nourage’s boarding-house. Judge Prevost,
Burr’s stepson, was so indiscreet as to announce publicly that
General Adair, second in command to Burr, had arrived in town with
news that Burr would follow in three days, and that it would soon be
seen whether Wilkinson’s tyranny would prevail.[234] The same
afternoon Lieutenant-Colonel Kingsbury of the First Infantry, at the
head of a hundred and twenty men, appeared at the door of the
hotel and marched Burr’s second in command to prison. Adair
afterward claimed that if he had been allowed forty-eight hours no
one could have arrested him, for he had more friends in New
Orleans than the General had; but even he must have seen that the
conspiracy was dead. For a moment his arrest, and a few others
made at the same time, caused excitement, and Wilkinson ordered
detachments of troops to patrol the city; but thenceforward
confidence began to return and soon the crisis passed away, carrying
with it forever most of the discontent and danger which had marked
the annexation of Louisiana. If New Orleans never became
thoroughly American, at least it was never again thoroughly French.
Unfortunately for Wilkinson’s hopes of figuring in the character of
savior to his country, Burr’s expedition met with an inglorious and
somewhat ridiculous end before it came within sight of Wilkinson or
his command. After leaving Fort Massac, the little flotilla entered the
Mississippi, and in a few days reached Chickasaw Bluffs, where a
small military post of nineteen men was stationed, commanded by a
second lieutenant of artillery, who had received no more instructions
than had been received by Captain Bissell. So far from stopping the
flotilla, Lieutenant Jackson was nearly persuaded to join it, and
actually accepted money from Burr to raise a company in his service.
[235] January 6, leaving Chickasaw Bluffs, the flotilla again
descended the river until, January 10, it reached the mouth of Bayou
Pierre, about thirty miles above Natchez. There Burr went ashore,
and at the house of a certain Judge Bruin he saw a newspaper
containing the letter which he had himself written in cipher to
Wilkinson July 29, and which Wilkinson had published December 26.
From the moment Burr saw himself denounced by Wilkinson, his
only hope was to escape. The President’s proclamation had reached
the Mississippi Territory; Cowles Meade, the acting-governor, had
called out the militia. If Burr went on he would fall into the hands of
Wilkinson, who had every motive to order him to be court-martialled
and shot; if he stayed where he was, Cowles Meade would arrest
and send him to Washington. Moving his flotilla across the river, Burr
gave way to despair. Some ideas of resistance were entertained by
Blennerhassett and the other leaders of the party; but they were
surprised to find their “emperor” glad to abdicate and submit.
January 17 Burr met Acting-Governor Cowles Meade and
surrendered at discretion. His conversation at that moment was such
that Meade thought him insane.[236] January 21 he caused his cases
of muskets, which had been at first secreted in the brush, to be sunk
in the river. After his surrender he was taken to Washington, the
capital of the Territory, about seven miles from Natchez. A grand-
jury was summoned, and the attorney-general, Poindexter,
attempted to obtain an indictment. The grand-jury not only threw
out the bill, but presented the seizure of Burr and his accomplices as
a grievance. The very militia who stopped him were half inclined to
join his expedition. Except for a score of United States officials, civil
and military, he might have reached New Orleans without a check.
Fortunately neither the civil nor the military authorities of the
national government were disposed to be made a jest. The grand-
jury could grant but a respite, and Burr had still to decide between
evils. If he fell into Wilkinson’s hands he risked a fate of which he
openly expressed fear. During the delay his men on the flotilla had
become disorganized and insubordinate; his drafts on New York had
been returned protested; he knew that the military authorities at
Fort Adams were determined to do what the civil authorities had
failed in doing; and his courage failed him when he realized that he
must either be delivered to President Jefferson, whom he had
defied, or to General Wilkinson, whom he had tried to deceive.
Feb. 1, 1807, after sending to his friends on the flotilla a note to
assure them of his immediate return,[237] Burr turned his back on
them, and left them to the ruin for which he alone was responsible.
Disguised in the coarse suit of a Mississippi boatman, with a soiled
white-felt hat, he disappeared into the woods, and for nearly a
month was lost from sight. Toward the end of February he was
recognized in a cabin near the Spanish frontier, about fifty miles
above Mobile; and his presence was announced to Lieutenant
Gaines, commanding at Fort Stoddert, near by. Gaines arrested him.
After about three weeks of confinement at Fort Stoddert he was sent
to Richmond in Virginia. In passing through the town of Chester, in
South Carolina, he flung himself from his horse and cried for a
rescue; but the officer commanding the escort seized him, threw him
back like a child into the saddle, and marched on. Like many another
man in American history, Burr felt at last the physical strength of the
patient and long-suffering government which he had so persistently
insulted, outraged, and betrayed.
Not until the end of March, 1807, did Burr reach Richmond; and
in the mean while a whole session of Congress had passed,
revolution after revolution had taken place in Europe, and a new
series of political trials had begun for President Jefferson’s troubled
Administration. The conspiracy of Burr was a mere episode, which
had little direct connection with foreign or domestic politics, and no
active popular support in any quarter. The affairs of the country at
large felt hardly a perceptible tremor in the midst of the excitement
which convulsed New Orleans; and the general public obstinately
refused to care what Burr was doing, or to believe that he was so
insane as to expect a dissolution of the Union. In spite of the
President’s proclamation of Nov. 27, 1806, no special interest was
roused, and even the Congress which met a few days later, Dec. 1,
1806, at first showed indifference to Burr and his affairs.
If this was a matter for blame, the fault certainly lay with the
President, who had hitherto refused to whisper a suspicion either of
Burr’s loyalty or of the patriotism which Jefferson believed to
characterize Louisiana, the Mississippi Territory, and Tennessee. Even
the proclamation had treated Burr’s enterprise as one directed
wholly against Spain. The Annual Message, read December 2,
showed still more strongly a wish to ignore Burr’s true objects. Not
only did it allude to the proclamation with an air of apology, as
rendered necessary by “the criminal attempts of private individuals
to decide for their country the question of peace or war,” but it
praised in defiance of evidence the conduct of the militia of
Louisiana and Mississippi in supporting Claiborne and Wilkinson
against the Spaniards:—
“I inform you with great pleasure of the promptitude with which
the inhabitants of those Territories have tendered their services in
defence of their country. It has done honor to themselves, entitled
them to the confidence of their fellow-citizens in every part of the
Union, and must strengthen the general determination to protect
them efficaciously under all circumstances which may occur.”
On some subjects Jefferson was determined to shut his eyes. He
officially asserted that the Orleans militia had done honor to
themselves and won the confidence of their fellow-citizens at a
moment when he was receiving from Governor Claiborne almost
daily warnings that the Orleans militia could not be trusted, and
would certainly not fight against Spain.
By this course of conduct Jefferson entangled himself in a new
labyrinth of contradictions and inconsistencies. Until that moment,
his apparent interests and wishes led him to ignore or to belittle
Burr’s conspiracy; but after the moment had passed, his interests
and convictions obliged him to take the views and share the
responsibilities of General Wilkinson. Thus John Randolph found
fresh opportunities to annoy the President, while the President lost
his temper, and challenged another contest with Luther Martin and
Chief-Justice Marshall.
After shutting his ears to the reiterated warnings of Eaton,
Truxton, Morgan, Daveiss, and even to the hints of Wilkinson
himself; after neglecting to take precautions against Burr, Wilkinson,
or the city of New Orleans, and after throwing upon the Western

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