G.R. No. L-63326 July 31, 1984 FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION, petitioner vs. HONORABLE BERNARDO LL.

SALAS, NICARIO AVISADO and WARSITO CAPANGPANGAN, respondents.

Facts: In January, 1981, Nicario Avisado bought a Colt Lancer from Wheels Distributors, Inc. payable on monthly installments. Later, the obligation together with the supporting security was transferred by Wheels Distributors, Inc. to Filinvest Credit Corporation (Filinvest) with the consent of Avisado. For failure of Avisado to pay the installments due on May 1 through October 1, 1981, Filinvest filed on October 12, 1981 against him a replevin/collection suit (Civil Case No. R-21040). But this case was dismissed with prejudice at the instance of Filinvest after the defendant had agreed to update his installment payments. Later, however, Avisado again defaulted in the payment of subsequent installments, this time, those due on December 1, 1981 and the four succeeding months, which impelled Filinvest to file another replevin/collection suit against Avisado (Civil Case No. R-21996). After commencement of the action, a writ of replevin was issued against a bond duly posted, by virtue ' of which the- car was seized by the sheriff and turned over to Filinvest. Once in possession of the car, Filinvest extrajudicially foreclosed the chattel mortgage thereon. At the foreclosure sale, the car was sold to Filinvest for an amount equal to its claim against the mortgagor. Later, Filinvest resold the car to Warsito Capangpangan. However, upon motion of Avisado, the trial court issued an Order dated September 21, 1982 dismissing the complainant on the ground of res judicata.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in dismissing C.C. R-21996 on the ground of res judicata.

Held: The court a quo erred in dismissing C.C. R21996. Since the first case instituted by Filinvest against Avisado (C.C. R-21040) was for non-payment of installments different from those on which the second suit (C.C. R-21996) was based, the dismissal of the former with prejudice would not bar the filing of the latter, nor serve as basis for its dismissal. The causes of action being different, there could be no res judicata.

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G.R. No. L-28237 August 31, 1982 BAY VIEW HOTEL., INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. KER & CO., LTD., and PHOENIX ASSURANCE CO., LTD. Facts: Sometime in January, 1958, plaintiff-appellant Bay View Hotel, Inc. secured a fidelity guarantee bond from defendant-appellee Ker & Co., Ltd., for its accountable employees against acts of fraud and dishonesty. Said defendant-appellee Ker & Co., Ltd., is the Philippine general agent of Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd. a foreign corporation duly licensed to do insurance business in the Philippines. When one of the bonded employees, Tomas E. Ablaza, while acting in his capacity as cashier, was discovered by plaintiff-appellant to have had a cash shortage and unremitted collections in the total amount of P42,490.95, it filed claims for payments on the said fidelity guarantee bond but defendantappellee Ker & Co. denied and refused indemnification and payment. To enforce its claims, plaintiffappellant instituted its complaint, dated August 30, 1965 docketed as Civil Case No. 63181 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. In its answer, defendant-appellee Ker & Co. justified its denial of the claims of plaintiff-appellant on various reasons, such as non-compliance with the conditions stipulated in the insurance policy; nonpresentation of evidence regarding the various charges of dishonesty and misrepresentation against Tomas E. Ablaza and non-production of the documents to prove the alleged loss. Ker & Co. likewise averred that it was merely an agent and- as such it was not liable under the policy. On June 22, 1966, counsel for Ker & Co. filed a request for admission, furnishing plaintiff-appellant's counsel with a copy thereof requesting admission of the following facts. Plaintiff-appellant failed to make any answer to the request for admission within the period prescribed by the rules. Issue: Whether or not there are legal effects to a request for admission by the defendant-appellee under the original complaint after the said original complaint was, with leave of court, amended. Held: Admission is in the nature of evidence and its legal effects were already part of the records of the case and therefore could be availed of by any party even by one subsequently impleaded. The amendment of the complaint per se cannot set aside the legal effects of the request for admission since its materiality has not been affected by the amendment. If a fact is admitted to be true at any stage of the proceedings, it is not stricken out through the amendment of the complaint. To allow a party to alter the legal effects of the request for admission by the mere amendment of a pleading would constitute a dangerous and undesirable precedent. The legal effects of plaintiff- appellant's failure to answer the request for admission could and should have been corrected below by its filing a motion to be relieved of the consequences of the implied admission with respect to respondent Phoenix.

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G.R. No. L-31490 January 6, 1978 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BISAYA LAND TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., et al. Facts: On February 28, 1962, respondent corporation filed a motion for judgment on consent, manifesting its consent to and moving for judgment to be rendered ordering the dissolution of respondent Bisaya Land transportation Company, inc. and, in furtherance of that dissolution, ordering its board of directors to proceed to the liquidation of its assets in accordance with the provisions of the corporation law. In said motion for judgment on consent, respondent corporation did not admit having committed any act requiring its forcible dissolution, but alleged, as reason for the filing of said motion, that the pendency of the petition of quo warranto had prejudiced the corporation its business. as well as its innocent stockholders, and that its business interests that late relief be given to the corporation and to its thousands of stockholders; and that the majority of the board of directors and stockholders representing more than two-thirds of its capital stock had indicated their election to voluntarily dissolve the corporation as the most feasible remedy to the corporation's problems brought about by the respondent Miguel Cuenco. The petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, filed a manifestation stating that the motion for judgment on consent being in accordance with the petition for quo warranto, the matter of the implementation of the dissolution of respondent corporation be submitted to the discretion of the lower court. Issue: Whether or not the lower court should have rendered judgment dissolving appellee corporation on the strength of its own motion consenting to and praying for its dissolution. Held: As pointed out in the brief for petitioner-appellee Republic of the Philippines, a motion for judgment on consent is not to be equated with a judgment by confession. The former is one the provisions and terms of which are settled and a agreed upon by the parties to the action, and which is entered in the record by the consent and sanction of the court, Hence, there must be an unqualified agreement among the parties to be bound by the judgment on consent before said judgment may be entered. The court does not have the Power to supply terms, provisions, or essential details not previously agreed to by the parties. On the other hand, a judgment by confession is not a Plea but an affirmative and voluntary act of the defendant himself, Here, the court exercises a certain amount of supervision over the entry of judgment, as well as equitable jurisdiction over their subsequent status.

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G.R. No. L-63053 July 22, 1986 DESTILERIA LIMTUACO & CO., INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, et al., respondents. Facts: Private respondent, through its principal counsel, Atty. Julio B. Piquet, received the order of dismissal on January 29, 1982, and on March 1, 1982, filed its Notice of Appeal, Appeal Bond and Record on Appeal. On the other hand, Atty. Lino Anover, a former judge of the Court of First Instance, who filed his appearance as collaborating counsel for private respondent on October 13, 1981, Claims to have received the order of dismissal on February 15, 1982, and on March 16, 1982, filed, a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, alleging that private respondent had complied with the order of October 2, 1981 by filing on November 5, 1981 a Bill of Particulars, which was probably overlooked by respondent Judge. Petitioner filed an opposition to the Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal and Motion for Reconsideration,

Issue: Whether or not the appeal was duly filed on time.

Held: There is no question that the notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal which were filed by the principal counsel of private respondent on March 1, 1982 were filed on time since February 28, 1982 was a Sunday. But petitioner claims that the appeal was filed late because the collaborating counsel of private respondent received a copy of the order one day before its principal counsel received his copy. On the other hand, the collaborating counsel claims that he received said copy only on February 15, 1982. Petitioner further claims that the former rules required service on the adverse party as well as filing of the appeal papers within the reglementary period, and its counsel received the appeal papers after the lapse of said period. We do not consider these technical objections sufficient to deprive private respondent of its right of appeal.

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G.R. No. 139131. September 27, 2002 GONZALES,, Petitioner, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, and PHILIPPINE CHILDRENS MEDICAL CENTER (PCMC), Respondents

Facts: Despite the written letter-notice sent to him, petitioner failed to report for work thus constraining PCMC to drop him from the rolls, effective March 20, 1998. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). In Resolution No. 98-2359 dated September 8, 1998, the CSC upheld the action taken by PCMC. Petitioner moved for reconsideration by the CSC of Resolution 98-2359, but it was denied. When he filed a petition for review in the CA, the petition was denied for failure to comply with Section 6 (c), Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court, particularly for failure to attach certified true copies of material portions of the records and supporting papers. WHEREFORE, for being formally deficient, the instant petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing the appeal of herein petitioner based on pure technicality. Held: It was held that Section 6, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court is not to be construed as imposing the requirement that all supporting papers accompanying the petition should be certified true copies. We compared this provision with its counterpart provision in Rule 42, on petitions for review from the RTC to the CA, and noted that under the latter, only the judgments or final orders of the lower court need to be certified true copies or duplicate originals. In numerous resolutions issued by this Court we emphasized that in an appeal via a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 and in an original civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rules 46 and 56, what is required to be a certified true copy is the copy of the questioned judgment, final order or resolution. This could not have been intended by the framers of the rules. A contrary ruling would be too harsh and would not promote the underlying objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. 9 set #9
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G.R. No. L-25140 July 15, 1980 UNIVERSAL MOTORS CORPORATION, VELASCO, ET AL., defendants-appellees. plaintiff-appellant, vs. MARIANO D.

Facts: Mariano T. Velasco bought from Universal Motors Corp. a Mercedes-Benz truck on installment basis. To the balance of the purchase price of P35,243.68 he executed a promissory note and executed a chattel mortgage over the truck. He defaulted in his payments and as a consequence the Vendor asked him to surrender the truck in accordance will the term and conditions of the chattel mortgage contract. He failed and refused to surrender the truck whereupon the vendor instituted an action in the court a quo to recover the truck preparatory to foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. As an alternative, in case the truck could not be recovered, the plaintiff asked for the payment, among other things, of its value in the sum of P23,763.09 plus legal interest. By virtue of a writ of replevin issued by said court, the seller was able to repossess the truck. Both parties enter into stipulation of facts before the court. The plaintiff is asking for the recovery of the premium on replevin bond P971.47, sheriff's expenses P300.00, costs of suit P132.00, and attorney s fees.
chanrobles virtc chanr oble

Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover the expenses mentioned. Held: It undoubtedly has a right to repayment for the premium on the replevin bond it filed, the sheriff's fees, costs of this suit, and a reasonable sum as attorney's fees. These are expenses rendered necessary by the defendant's refusal to surrender voluntarily possession of the vehicle, in violation of his agreement with the plaintiff.
.vir wrobles virt

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