GONZAGA-REYES January 31, 2000
GONZAGA-REYES January 31, 2000
the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction. In its complaint, private respondent is not seeking any relief under the Labor Code but seeks payment of a sum of money and damages on account of petitioner's alleged breach of its obligation under their Guard Service Contract. The action is within the realm of civil law hence jurisdiction over the case belongs to the regular courts. While the resolution of the issue involves the application of labor laws, reference to the labor code was only for the determination of the solidary liability of the petitioner to the respondent where no employer-employee relation exists. Article 217 of the Labor Code as amended vests upon the labor arbiters exclusive original jurisdiction only over the following: 1. Unfair labor practices; 2. Termination disputes; 3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment; 4. Claims for actual, moral exemplary and other form of damages arising from employeremployee relations; 5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving legality of strikes and lockouts; and 6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement. - In all these cases, an employer-employee relationship is an indispensable jurisdictional requisite; and there is none in this case. 2. Private respondent admits that there is no employer-employee relationship between it and the petitioner. The private respondent is an independent/job contractor1 who assigned security guards at the petitioner's premises for a stipulated amount per guard per month. The Contract of Security Services expressly stipulated that the security guards are employees of the Agency and not of the petitioner. Articles 106 and 107 of the Labor Code provides the rule governing the payment of wages of employees in the event that the contractor fails to pay such wages1. - It will be seen from the above provisions that the principal (petitioner) and the contractor (respondent) are jointly and severally liable to the employees for
1
Art. 106. Contractor or sub contractor. Whenever an employer enters into a contract with another person for the performance of the former's work, the employees of the contractor and of the latter's subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code. In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly employed by him. Art. 107. Indirect employer. The provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply to any person, partnership, association or corporation which, not being an employer, contracts with an independent contractor for the performance of any work, task, job or project.
their wages. This Court held in Eagle Security, Inc. vs. NLRC and Spartan Security and Detective Agency, Inc. vs. NLRC that the joint and several liability of the contractor and the principal is mandated by the Labor Code to assure compliance with the provisions therein including the minimum wage. The contractor is made liable by virtue of his status as direct employer. The principal, on the other hand, is made the indirect employer of the contractor's employees to secure payment of their wages should the contractor be unable to pay them. Even in the absence of an employer-employee relationship, the law itself establishes one between the principal and the employees of the agency for a limited purpose i.e. in order to ensure that the employees are paid the wages due them. In the above-mentioned cases, the solidary liability of the principal and contractor was held to apply to the aforementioned Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6. In ruling that under the Wage Orders, existing security guard services contracts are amended to allow adjustment of the consideration in order to cover payment of mandated increases, and that the principal is ultimately liable for the said increases. - It is clear that it is only when contractor pays the increases mandated that it can claim an adjustment from the principal to cover the increases payable to the security guards. The conclusion that the right of the contractor (as principal debtor) to recover from the principal as solidary co-debtor) arises only if he has paid the amounts for which both of them are jointly and severally liable is in line with Article 12172 of the Civil Code. - The right of reimbursement from a co-debtor is recognized in favor of the one who paid. The liability of the petitioner to reimburse the respondent only arises if and when respondent actually pays its employees the increases granted by Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6. Payment, which means not only the delivery of money but also the performance, in any other manner, of the obligation,is the operative fact which will entitle either of the solidary debtors to seek reimbursement for the share which corresponds to each of the debtors. - It is not disputed that the private respondent has not actually paid the security guards the wage increases granted under the Wage Orders in question. Neither is it alleged that there is an extant claim for such wage adjustments from the security guards concerned, whose services have already been terminated by the contractor. Accordingly, private respondent has no cause of action against petitioner to recover the wage increases. Needless to stress, the increases in wages are intended for the benefit of the laborers and the contractor may not assert a claim against the principal for salary wage adjustments that it has not actually paid. Otherwise, as correctly put by the respondent, the contractor would be unduly enriching itself by recovering wage increases, for its own benefit.
- Finally, considering that the private respondent has no cause of action against the petitioner, private respondent is not entitled to attorney's fees. Disposition Petition GRANTED. The decision of the CA REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of private respondent COMMANDO SECURITY SERVICE AGENCY, INC. is hereby DISMISSED.
Art. 1217. Payment made by one of the solidary debtors extinguishes the obligation. If two or more solidary debtors offer to pay, the creditor may choose which offer to accept. He who made payment may claim from his codebtors only the share which corresponds to each, with interest for the payment already made. If the payment is made before the debt is due, no interest for the intervening period may be demanded. . . .
staffs and was done with due notice to take effect 30 days from receipt thereof. - Complainants had accepted separation pay equivalent to 1 month pay for every year of service plus other monetary benefits, and complainants executed a waiver and quitclaim for value received. - Complaint was an afterthought in order to give semblance of credence to their position/opposition to conduct a certification election, as manifested by complainants counsel declaration in open court that they were still filing a new complaint for unfair labor practice (this case) ISSUES 1. WON the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it absolved respondents from their duty to prove losses as a just ground for retrenchment 2. WON the NLRC exceeded its jurisdiction in recognizing the waivers/quitclaims executed by petitioners as an effective bar to this complaint 3. WON the NLRC abused its discretion when it ordered the dismissal of the instant complaint and totally disregarded the labor arbiters findings of facts and petitioners motion for execution HELD 1. YES Ratio To justify retrenchment, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the losses expected should be substantial and not merely de minimis in extent; (b) the substantial losses apprehended must be reasonably imminent; (c) the retrenchment must be reasonably necessary and likely to effectively prevent the expected losses; and (d) the alleged losses, if already incurred, and the expected imminent losses sought to be forestalled must be proved by sufficient and convincing evidence. Reasoning - In termination cases, the burden of proving that the dismissal was for a valid or authorized cause rests upon the employer. - HMC merely claimed that retrenchment was undertaken to prevent losses due to the continuing decline of nickel prices and export volume in the mining industry. Additionally, it alleged that the reduction of excise taxes on mining from 5% to 1% on a graduated basis, as provided under RA. 7729, was a clear recognition by the government itself of the industry's worsening economic difficulties. These bare statements miserably fall short of the requirements to show the validity of a retrenchment - Even if, arguendo, the contentions of HMC are accepted at face value, they still fail to satisfy the jurisprudential requirements that further or expected losses must be substantial and reasonably imminent; and the dismissal of employees, reasonably necessary and likely to be effective in preventing the expected losses. 2. YES Ratio The acceptance of termination pay does not divest a laborer of the right to prosecute his employer for unfair labor practice acts. Reasoning - Quitclaims and/or complete releases are against public policy and, therefore, null and void. - Employer and employee do not stand on the same footing. The employer drove the employee to the
wall. The latter must have to get hold of money. Because, out of job, he had to face the harsh necessities of life. He thus found himself in no position to resist money proffered. His, then, is a case of adherence, not of choice. 3. YES Ratio A decision should faithfully comply with Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution. (No decision shall be rendered by any court [or quasi-judicial body] without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts of the case and the law on which it is based.) Reasoning - The NLRC was definitely wanting in the observance of the constitutional requirement. It merely raised a doubt on the motive of the complaining employees and took "judicial notice that in one area of Mindanao, the mining industry suffered economic difficulties." - The factual and legal bases of public respondent's conclusions were bereft of substantial evidence the quantum of proof in labor cases its disposition is manifestly a violation of the constitutional mandate and an exercise of grave abuse of discretion. Such decision is a nullity. Disposition Petition granted; challenged NLRC Decision set aside. Decision of Legaspi is reinstated except that Ganigan is not liable for petitioners monetary claims. HMC ordered to pay separation benefits. NOTES - On reinstatement: If reinstatement to former position, or one substantially equivalent thereto, is not feasible anymore, the employees are entitled to the grant of separation pay and full back wages. Separation pay shall be equivalent to at least 1 month salary or 1 month salary for every year of service, whichever is higher, a fraction of 6 months being considered as 1 whole year. It shall be computed from the date the petitioners were employed by private respondent until this Decision becomes final and executory. - On liability of Vice President: While the president of the erring company may be held jointly and severally liable for the obligations of the latter to its dismissed employees, such solidary liability does not extend to the vice president of the company. Absent any proof of the extent of the participation of the VP in the formulation and the implementation of management policies and programs, he cannot be held financially liable for the illegal dismissal of employees.
- His employment records show that on various dates, Wyeth reprimanded and suspended him for habitually neglecting to submit his periodic reports. > Nov. 28, 1994- W sent a notice reprimanding G for the late submission of weekly expense report > July 5, 1995- late submission of same report so W suspended him for 5 days > Oct 16 to 20, 23-27, Nov 6-10, 13-17, (all 1995)late submission of his daily call reports > Nov 20-24, 1995- didnt submit his daily call reports so W suspended him for 15 days. - Wyeth put Gustilo in charge of promoting 4 Lederle (Ws sister company) pharmaceutical products. G then submitted to W a plan of action where G committed to make an ave of 18 daily calls to physicians; submit promptly all periodic reports; and ensure 95% territory program performance for every cycle. - Gustilo failed to achieve his objectives so W sent him 2 notices charging him with willful violation of company rules and regulations and directed him to submit a written explanation. - G explained that he was overworked and an object of reprisal by his immediate supervisor, Filemon Verzano Jr. - Wyeth, upon the recommendation of a review panel, terminated Gustilos services. - G then filed with the Regional Arbiter Br. No. 6 in Bacolod City a complaint against W for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal and payment for allowances, other monetary benefits, damages and attys fees. - The Labor Arbiter found that G was illegally dismissed from employment and ordered W and Verzano to pay G jointly and severally Php 991,157.90 representing backwages, separation pay, car reimbursement, damages and attys fees. - W appealed to the NLRC in Cebu City - NLRC- affirmed but modified the Labor Arbiters decision- ordered reinstatement of G, or in lieu of reinstatement, pay his separation benefits. - Ws MR was denied so they filed with the CA a petition for Certiorari and TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction. - CA- reversed NLRCs decision and dismissed Gs complaint for illegal dismissal (as G was terminated based on A282 of the LC-gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties) but awarded him separation pay considering the mitigating factors of length of service, loyalty awards G received and Verzanos grudge against G. - G filed an MR but was denied. ISSUE WON GUSTILO is entitled to his separation pay HELD NO, Gustilo isnt entitled to his SP OR to reinstatement as there was a just cause for dismissal. Reasoning - Phil Journalists Inc v Mosqueda- SC ruled that the findings of the CA are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court - Family Planning Org of the Phils Inc v NLRC SC held that it is the employers prerogative to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary or proper for the conduct of its business or concern to provide certain disciplinary measures to
implement said rules and to assure that the same be complied with. At the same time, it is one of the fundamental duties of the employee to yield obedience to all reasonable rules, orders, and instructions of the employer, and willful or intentional disobedience thereof, as a general rule, justifies rescission of the contract of service and the preemptory dismissal of the employee." Piedad v Lanao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc.- a series of irregularities when put together may constitute serious misconduct, which under A282 of the LC, as amended, is a just cause for dismissal. - The rule embodied in the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code is that a person dismissed for cause as defined therein is not entitled to separation pay. - PLDT v NLRC and Abucay, "x x x henceforth, separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, x x x an offense involving moral turpitude x x x, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice." - Telefunken Semiconductors Employees UnionFFW v Court of AppealsWe are of course aware that financial assistance may be allowed as a measure of social justice in exceptional circumstances and as an equitable concession. We are likewise mindful that financial assistance is allowed only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character (Zenco Sales, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 234 SCRA 689). x x x." In the case at bar, there is NO exceptional circumstances to warrant the grant of financial assistance or separation pay to petitioner. G did not only violate company disciplinary rules and regulations. He falsified his employment application form by not stating therein that he is the nephew of Mr. Danao, respondent Wyeths Nutritional Territory Manager. - G manifested his slack of moral principle through his infractions. In simple term, he is dishonest. - Philippine Long Distance Telephone vs. NLRC and Abucay- [T]hose who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their motives blameless x x x." Here, petitioner failed to measure up to such requirement. Disposition Petition is DENIED ***Wyeth did not interpose an appeal to this Court. Hence, no affirmative relief can be extended to it. So it has to comply with the CAs decision to grant G his SP.
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals FACTS - Petitioner Valiao was appointed by private respondent West Negros College (WNC) as Student Affairs Office (SAO) Director, with a starting salary of P2,800 per month. Subsequently, he was assigned as Acting Director, Alumni Affairs Offfice. He was transferred to staff position and designated as Records Chief at the Registrars Office but was again re-assigned as a typist. The latest reassignment was due to his tardiness and absences, as reflected in the summary of tardiness and absences report, which showed him to have been absent or late for work from a minimum of seven to maximum of 75 minutes for the period March to October 31, 1991 and to have reported late almost every day for the period November to December 1991. - Copies of his tardiness/absences reports were furnished petitioner, along with memoranda requiring him to explain but his explanations were either unacceptable or unsatisfactory. Subsequently, reports also showed that he did not change his habits resulting in tardiness and absences. He was even caught one time manipulating the bundy clock, thus necessitating another memorandum to him asking him to explain his dishonest actuations in accomplishing the daily attendance logbook and in using the bundy clock. He received a suspension order without pay for fifteen days because of dishonesty in reporting his actual attendance. He reported back to office after serving the suspension but was another adverse report on tardiness and absences was made against the petitioner, prompting WNC to send him another memorandum with an attached tardiness and absences report. Petitioner sent a letter of appeal and explained his side to the new college president who gave petitioner another chance. The petitioner was appointed as Information Assistant effective immediately. However, petitioner did not promptly assume his post, prompting the president to call his attention. - Subsequently, WNC won a case against the official of the union before the NLRC. Petitioner was ordered to prepare a media blitz of this victory but the petitioner did not comply with the order on the ground that such a press release would only worsen the aggravated situation and strained relations between WNC management and the union officials. When petitioner reported for work on the first day of January 1993, he was relieved from his post and transferred to the College of Liberal Arts as Records Evaluator. Not for long, the Dean of the Liberal Arts sent a letter to the Human Resources Manager complaining about the petitioners poor performance and habitual absenteeism as shown in the daily absence reports. - On January 18, 1993, petitioner was again absent from work without permission or notice to his immediate superior. It turned out that he went to Bacolod City and on January 28, 1993, the petitioner was one of those arrested during a raid in the house of Toto Ruiz, a suspected drug pusher and was brought to the Bacolod Police Station along with four other suspects. The petitioner and other suspects were then charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
- Petitioner was asked to explain within 24 hours why he should not be terminated as a result of the raid and charged against him for violation of RA No. 6425 as amended. Petitioner was dismissed for failure to answer said memorandum. Subsequently, he wrote to the president of WNC explaining his side and asking for due process. The petitioner was notified through a memorandum about the grant of his request and that a hearing would be conducted. He was then placed under preventive suspension and an investigation committee was organized to conduct the probe. A notice of hearing/investigation was sent to the petitioner. - After the investigation attended by the petitioner and his counsel, with proceedings duly recorded, the investigation committee recommended the dismissal of petitioner. A notice of termination was then sent to petitioner informing him of his termination from the service for serious misconduct and gross and habitual neglect of duty. The petitioner received the notice but did not file a grievance concerning the notice of termination. - Petitioner filed a complaint against WNC for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal backwages, salary differential for salary increases and other benefits granted after his dismissal as well as for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. After due proceedings, the Labor Arbiter found no justifiable reason to place the petitioner under preventive suspension as there was no serious or imminent threat to the life or property of his coworkers. However, the Labor Arbiter found the dismissal of the petitioner to be valid due to absenteeism and tardiness and after he was accorded the procedural due process aspect of the law as reflected in the records showing that petitioner was formally investigated and given the opportunity to refute the alleged findings by the management of WNC. The Labor Arbiter held that frequent absenteeism and tardiness of the petitioner constituted not only willful disobedience but also gross and habitual neglect of duties, which are valid grounds for termination of employment. He stressed that petitioners frequent absences without proper leave of absence was not only unfair to WNC and the petitioners co-employees but also set an undesirable example to the employees under his supervision, considering that the petitioner was not a mere rank-and-file employee but one who owed more than the usual fealty to the organization. - On appeal to the NLRC, the latter affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, sustained the latters findings of facts, and made its own findings of the apprehension of the petitioner for possession of prohibited drugs. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA but this was dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioner duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA. ISSUE WON petitioner was validly dismissed from employment on the ground of serious misconduct and gross habitual neglect of duties, including habitual tardiness and absenteeism
HELD
YES - So irresponsible an employee like petitioner does not deserve a place in the workplace, and it is within the managements prerogative of WNC to terminate his employment. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must also protect the rights of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. As long as the companys exercise of those rights and prerogatives is in good faith to advance its interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under the laws or valid agreements, such exercise will be upheld. Disposition Assailed decision and resolution affirmed with modification.
ISSUE WON the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it held that the motion for execution was time-barred, and ruled as valid the two quitclaims petitioner had signed HELD NO On prescription - Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides: A judgment may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. - A similar provision is found in Art. 224 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715, viz. ART. 224. Execution of decision, orders, awards. (a) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or any Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter or Med-Arbiter, or the Voluntary Arbitrator may, motu propio, or on motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution on a judgment within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and executory, requiring a sheriff or a duly deputized officer to execute or enforce a final decision, order or award. - Periquet insists it was the private respondent that delayed and prevented the execution of the judgment in her favor, but that is not the way the SC sees it. - The original decision called for her reinstatement within ten days from receipt thereof following its affirmance by the NLRC on August 29, 1980, but there is no evidence that she demanded her reinstatement or that she complained when her demand was rejected. What appears is that she entered into a compromise agreement with CDCP where she waived her right to reinstatement and received from the CDCP the sum of P14,000.00 representing her back wages from the date of her dismissal to the date of the agreement On validity of quitclaims - After accepting the sum of P14,000.00 from the private respondent and waiving her right to reinstatement in the compromise agreement, she applied for re-employment with the CDCP and was on March 16,1987, given the position of xerox machine operator. - On June 27, 1988; she wrote the new management of the CDCP and asked that the rights granted her by the decision dated August 29, 1980, be recognized because the waiver she had signed was invalid - On September 19, 1988, the Corporate Legal Counsel of the private respondent recommended the payment to the petitioner of the additional sum of P9,544.00, representing the balance of her back pay for three years at P654. 00 per month - On November 10, 1988, the petitioner accepted this additional amount and signed another Quitclaim and Release - In her petition she is now disowning both acknowledgments - Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a
reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. Disposition Petition denied
SAROCAM V INTERORIENT MARITIME ENT. INC. AND DEMACO UNITED LTD. CALLEJO, SR.; June 27 2006
NATURE Petition for Review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the ROC of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84883, which affirmed the February 19, 2004 and April 27, 2004 Resolutions of the NLRC. FACTS - On June 27, 2000 petitioner Benjamin L. Sarocam was hired by Interorient Maritime Ent., Inc. and Demaco United Ltd., for a twelve-month contract as bosun on board M/V Despina. - While the vessel was navigating to China, petitioner suffered lumbar sprain when he accidentally fell from a ladder. On Nov.15, 2000, he was examined and found to have neuromyositis with the waist and diabetes. The examining physician prescribed medicine and recommended the signing off and hospitalization of petitioner. His employers agreed to repatriate him on Nov. 30, 2000. - On Dec. 5, 2000, petitioner was referred to the company-designated physician, Dr. Pidlaoan. Petitioner was given Alaxan tablet for his back pain and Euglocon for his elevated blood sugar. He was also advised to return for follow-up evaluation. On Dec. 13, 2000, he returned to the clinic with no more complaints of back pains and his sugar examination revealed normal results. Petitioner was then declared fit for duty effective on that day. - On March 20, 2001, petitioner executed a release and quitclaim in favor of his employers where he acknowledged the receipt of US$405.00 as his sickwages and freed his employers from further liability. - However, on Nov. 27, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint with the NLRC for disability benefit, illness allowance/reimbursement of medical expenses, damages and attorneys fees. To support his claim, he presented medical certificates issued by his 3 personal doctors, recommending a Grade VIII disability under the POEA schedule of disability grading. - On July 11, 2003, Labor Arbiter Macam dismissed the complaint, holding that petitioner was not entitled to disability benefits because he was declared fit for duty and had previously executed a release and quitclaim in favor of his employers and already received his sickness allowance. Petitioners claim for moral damages and attorneys fees were,
likewise, not awarded on the Labor Arbiters ruling that there was no evidence of bad faith and malice on the part of the employers. - Upon petitioners appeal, the NLRC issued a Resolution affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter, with the modification that petitioner was entitled to US$1,350.00 or its peso equivalent, representing his salary for three (3) months. The petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC. The Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA was dismissed. Petitioners MFR was denied by the CA. - Petitioner avers that the quitclaim he executed is invalid, as the amount he received as consideration therefor was much lower than what he should have received under the POEA Standard Employment Contract. He went on to argue that quitclaims are frowned upon by this Court as they are contrary to public policy. ISSUES 1. WON the respondents company-designated doctor be considered competent and reliable enough to declare petitioner as fit to work contrary to the declarations of three (3) independent physicians similarly finding him otherwise 2. WON the execution by petitioner of a release and quitclaim estop him from claiming disability benefits under the POEA standard employment contract HELD 1. YES - Petitioner did not question the findings of Dr. Pidlaoan and his recommendation. He questioned the doctors competency and the correctness of his findings only when he filed the complaint against respondents before the Labor Arbiter, roughly 11 months after petitioner was examined by the doctor. Petitioner consulted his personal doctors only in July and August 2001, long after he had been examined by the company-designated physician. - Dr. Pidlaoan examined and treated petitioner from the time he was repatriated up to his recovery and subsequent assessment as fit for duty on December 13, 2000. As in the German Marine case, the extensive medical attention extended by Dr. Pidlaoan enabled the latter to acquire familiarity, if not detailed knowledge, of petitioners medical condition. No doubt such specialized knowledge enabled Dr. Pidlaoan to arrive at a much more accurate appraisal of petitioners condition, as compared to another physician not privy to petitioners case from the very beginning. Indeed, the assessment of the three other personal doctors of petitioner could not have been that reliable considering that they based their conclusions on the prior findings of Dr. Pidlaoan; moreover, they examined petitioner 7 or 8 months after he was assessed as fit to work and treated him for only one day. - Furthermore and most importantly, petitioner did not question the competency of Dr. Pidlaoan and his assessment when the latter declared him as fit for duty or fit to work. - Additionally, petitioner, instead of questioning the assessment of the company-designated doctor, executed a release and quitclaim in favor of respondents, around three months after the assessment. In executing the said document, petitioner thus impliedly admitted the correctness of the assessment of the company-designated
physician, and acknowledged that he could no longer claim for disability benefits. 2. YES - While petitioner may be correct in stating that quitclaims are frowned upon for being contrary to public policy, the Court has, likewise, recognized legitimate waivers that represent a voluntary and reasonable settlement of a workers claim which should be respected as the law between the parties. Where the person making the waiver has done so voluntarily, with a full understanding thereof, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as being a valid and binding undertaking. - In the instant case, petitioner wrote the release and quitclaim with his own hand. From the document itself, the element of voluntariness in its execution is evident. Petitioner also appears to have fully understood the contents of the document he was signing, as the important provision thereof had been relayed to him in Filipino. - Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. - As a final note, let it be emphasized that the constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress employers. The commitment of this Court to the cause of labor does not prevent us from sustaining the employer when it is in the right. Disposition Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision and Resolution of the CA are AFFIRMED.
inventoried items charged to them for mishandling of company properties. - August 21, 1984: The respondents, through the union, made a formal notice of the deductions to PAL through the Manager for Catering, Mr. Reynaldo Abad. However, no action was taken by PAL. - November 4, 1984: Pursuant to the grievance machinery Step 1 of the CBA between PAL and the union, respondents filed a formal grievance. - November 21: The said grievance was submitted to the office of Mr. Abad who was on leave. - December 5: Mr. Abad was still on leave, and since in the CBA, Mr. Abad (PAL) was supposed to resolve the grievance within 5 days, the respondents thru the shop steward wrote a letter addressed to Mr. Abads office expressing their belief that the grievance was deemed resolved in their favor - December 7: Mr. Abad (finally) returned and scheduled a meeting on December 12 - the respondents refused to conduct their inventory works thereafter - December 12: Mr. Abad and the union had the meeting where the former denied the petition of the respondents, adopting the position that it was the inventory of goods was the respondents duty and that the deductions in their salaries were due to the losses in the mishandling of goods - Due to the respondents refusal to conduct inventory works in early December, Mr. Abad issued an inter-office memo asking them to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against them. The respondents argued that since their grievance in accordance with the grievance machinery step 1 of their CBA was not resolved within the 5-day period, they believed that the grievance was resolved in their favor. Mr. Abad found this reasoning unsatisfactory, THUS suspending the said respondents. - the union filed another grievance asking for the lifting of the suspension, but PAL denied the said lifting, only reducing the suspension period for respondent Ramos. - the union demanded for the reimbursement of the salaries of individual respondents during the suspension but PAL denied their demand. - the respondents filed a complaint for ILLEGAL SUSPENSION before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. Complaint dismissed, rule in favor of PAL - Respondents appealed to NLRC, NLRC ruled in favor of respondents - PALs petition for reconsideration denied, hence this case Petitioners claims (PAL) - The CBA provision on grievance machinery was established both for the union and the management (PAL), therefore, should NOT be narrowly interpreted; it is the employees duty to observe status quo (therefore, cant preempt that the decision is resolved in their favor); the management should be given chance to present their side since before the 5 day prescriptive period begins to run, there should first be the presentment of grievance and its discussion ISSUES 1. WON NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in setting aside the Arbitration Branchs decision in favor of PAL
2. WON Section 2, Article IV of the PAL-PALEA CBA3 should be narrowly interpreted, THEREFORE favoring the respondents (the prescriptive period runs after the filing of the grievance) HELD 1. NO - It has not been shown that respondent NLRC has unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins it to perform as a duty or has otherwise unlawfully excluded petitioner from the exercise of a right to which it is entitled. Ratio Judicial review by this Court in labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the labor officer or office based his or its determination, but is limited to issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion 2. YES - Even if Mr. Abad was on leave when the grievance was filed (and even if the union and respondents knew that Mr. Abad was on leave), the CBA would still apply since it is hard to believe that everything under Abad's authority would have to stand still during his absence from office. To be sure, it is to be expected that someone has to be left to attend to Abad's duties. Ratio The sympathy of the Court is on the side of the laboring classes, not only because the Constitution imposes such sympathy, but because of the one-sided relation between labor and capital. The constitutional mandate for the promotion of labor is as explicit as it is demanding. The purpose is to place the workingman on an equal plane with management with all its power and influence in negotiating for the advancement of his interests and the defense of his rights. Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less privileges in life should have more privileges in law. (in short, interpretation should be made in favor of the laborers) Reasoning - The grievance of employees is not a matter which requires the personal act of Mr. Abad and thus could not be delegated. Petitioner could at least have assigned an officer-in-charge to look into the grievance and possibly make his recommendation to Mr. Abad. It is of no moment that Mr. Abad immediately looked into the grievance upon returning to work, for it must be remembered that the grievants are workingmen who suffered salary deductions and who rely so much on their meager income for their daily subsistence and survival. - when the respondents first presented their complaint on August 21, the petitioner (through Mr. Abad) failed to act on it
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Sec. 2 Processing of Grievances xxx xxx xxx STEP 1 Any employee who believes that he has a justifiable grievance shall take the matter up with his shop steward. If the shop steward feels there is justification for taking the matter up with the Company, he shall record the grievance on the grievance form heretofore agreed upon by the parties. Two (2) copies of the grievance form properly filled, accepted, and signed shall then be presented to and discussed by the shop steward with the division head. The division head shall answer the grievance within five (5) days from the date of presentation by inserting his decision on the grievance form, signing and dating same, and returning one copy to the shop steward. If the division head fails to act within the five (5)-day regl(e)mentary period, the grievance must be resolved in favor of the aggrieved party. If the division head's decision is not appealed to Step II, the grievance shall be considered settled on the basis of the decision made, and shall not be eligible for further appeal.
- if the provision would be interpreted as to allow the management to act on their laborers complaints after the acting officer returned from a leave then the causes of the workingmen would be delayed, thus suffering a great injustice. That could not have been the intendment of the pertinent provision of the CBA, much less the benevolent policy underlying our labor laws. Disposition petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED. This judgment is immediately executory.
delegated to executive departments or subordinate officials the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. - textual interpretation of Commonwealth Act No. 548 The provision that .the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of the Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. - practicality The complexities of modern governments, the multiplication of the subjects of govtl regulations, and the increased difficulty in administering the law give rise to the adoption, within certain limits, the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations. 2. NO - The state may enact laws that may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupation if the said laws are intended to promote the welfare of the public. (police power of the State) Reasoning - precedents (US vs. Gomez, Dobbins vs. Los Angeles & People vs. Pomar) - Paradox - The apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation - No. Social justice is promoted if the greatest good is brought about to the greatest number.
operator call durations. Private respondent also used said number to make several personal calls. Based on these finding, MITD Manager Erlinda Kabigting directed respondent to explain these allegations. - instead of complying, respondent requested a formal investigation to confront and rebut the witnesses allegations. On grounds of misconduct and breach of trust, respondent was terminated. - In a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by respondent, Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera rendered a decision ordering the reinstatement of private respondent, later affirmed by NLRC. ISSUE WON the NLRC erred in ordering the reinstatement of private respondent HELD NO. Although the power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of the employer, the right to discharge employees is regulated by the States police power in line with its duty to preserve its citizens rights. - Petitioner insists that respondent was guilty of defrauding them by taking several calls through the disconnected number. However, records show that these calls were neither unusual nor made in connivance with certain subscribers as other operators shared similar experiences. Although it is quite certain that there were certain PLDT personnel who tampered with the line, the ultimate blame cannot be set solely on private respondent based on mere suspicion, but only with concrete and substantial evidence. - In the instant case, the petitioner failed to establish valid bases of the alleged misconduct, thus denying private respondent her right to due process. The requirement of notice and hearing affords the worker ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself. - Art. 4 of the Labor Code states that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor, that is, the workers welfare is of paramount importance. The Constitution furthers that the State shall afford full protection to labor, promote full employment opportunities for all and guarantee the right to security of tenure. Disposition instant petition is DISMISSED and the decision dated Nov. 16, 1992 is AFFIRMED.
Correspondent Bank in 1988, Assistant Manager of Branch Operations in 1990, Assistant Manager of the Supplies Inventory in 1991, and then Senior Assistant Manager of the Supplies Inventory in 1991-1992. In addition to the series of promotions, Dayan was the recipient of various commendations. - December 1991, the post of Purchasing Officer became vacant. The vacated position was offered to Dayan which he initially declined but, due to the insistence of his superiors, he later accepted on a temporary basis in February 1993. - 10 June 1993, Asst VP Gerlanda E. De Castro of the bank, in a memorandum, placed petitioner under suspension. - Dayan is placed under suspension due to matters presented to him in a meeting on the same morning of the suspension memo. - It appears that BPI conducted earlier interviews regarding supposed malpractices committed by Dayan during his term as Purchasing Officer. The report signed ad noted by Rololfo Bernejo (Mgr) and Victor Guillermo (Sr Mgr) contained alleged misconduct such as asking for 5% commission on purchase orders, donations totaling 5K for medical bills, overpricing BPI Family Banks passbook, etc. The report also made negative findings and observations about his work performance. - 14 June 1993, petitioner wrote a memorandum to the bank narrating what had transpired in his meeting with the bank on 10 June 1993 where he denied all the accusations against him and contested his preventive suspension. His denials and plea for compassion notwithstanding, petitioner was dismissed by respondent bank via a notice of termination, dated 25 October 1993, signed by AVP Gerlanda de Castro. In a letter of confession, dated 28 October 1993, petitioner ultimately admitted his infractions and instead asked for financial assistance. He, at the same time, executed an undated "Release Waiver and Quitclaim" acknowledging receipt of P400,000.00 financial assistance from the bank and thereby releasing and discharging it from any action or claim arising from his employment with the bank and membership in the retirement plan. - Subsequently, however, petitioner claimed that the letter and the quitclaim were signed by him under duress. On 14 February 1994, he filed a case for Illegal Dismissal and Illegal Suspension, with a prayer for an award of retirement benefits, before the Labor Arbiter. - In his decision of 30 June 1995, the Labor Arbiter upheld the validity of the dismissal of petitioner based on loss of trust and confidence and denied his claim for retirement benefits and damages. - On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the labor arbiter and declared the dismissal to be illegal on the ground that petitioner was denied due process ratiocinating that a hearing should have been afforded petitioner for a chance to confront the witnesses against him. - BPI filed with SC, a petition for certiorari questioning the NLRC decision. The Court referred the petition to CA. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the NLRC. - In its petition for review before the SC, petitioner argues that the CA has wrongly relied on unsworn statements taken by the bank from its contractual
employees. Petitioner believes that the factual conclusions of the NLRC which has acquired expertise on the matters entrusted to it should have instead been respected by the appellate court. ISSUES 1. WON CA committed an error in granting Dayans dismissal 2. WON there sufficient compliance of notice and hearing 3. WON he should be reinstated in BPI 4. WON the letter and quitclaim were obtained through deception and coercion
HELD 1. NO Ratio The CA was convinced that Dayans guilty of malfeasance and that the petitioner's dismissal had been justified under Article 282 of the Labor Code.4 Reasoning - CA did not commit error in holding to be justifiable the dismissal of Dayan from BPI as evidence of malpactice is too numerous to be ignored. Contrary to Dayans claim, the suppliers who complained executed affidavits as part of the records of the case. An employee under his supervision even narrated other incidents of malpractices. These charges were even backed up by the audit report of the banks audit team. - Dayan is not a rank and file employee. His job involves much exercise of independent judgment and discretion. A bank, being essentially imbued with public interest, cannot be compelled to continue in its employ a person whom it has lost trust and confidence. Obiter - The policy of preventively suspending an employee under investigation for charges involving dishonesty is an acceptable precautionary measure in order to preserve the integrity of vital papers and documents that may be material and relevant to the case and to which he, otherwise, would have access by virtue of his position. It was only after an exhaustive investigation that respondent bank finally decided to terminate the services of petitioner on 25 October 1993. 2. NO Ratio The law requires the employer with 2 written notices before termination can be legally affected as well as a hearing where the employee can explain his side. A consultation or conference with the employee is not a substitute for the actual observance of notice and hearing. Reasoning - The first notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which the dismissal is
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"`(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative.'
sought. The second notice informs the employee of the employers decision to dismiss him. - In the case at bench, Dayan was called to a meeting June 10 where he denied all charges against him. After which, he was issued a notice of preventive suspension. After investigation, he was given notice of dismissal. There was failure on the part of BPI to conform to the notice and hearing requirement. The preliminary meeting is not sufficient compliance rather it was merely exploratory. Where the employee denies charges against him, a hearing is necessary to thresh out any doubt. 3. NO Ratio The 2 notice and hearing rule is indispensable for a dismissal to be validly effected, but if it is for a just and valid cause, the failure to observe procedural requirements does not invalidate the dismissal of the employee. Instead, he must be granted separation pay. Whether reinstated or given separation pay, he should be paid backwages if he has been laid off without written notice 30 days in advance. For the omission, an appropriate sanction should be imposed depending on the fact and gravity of the situation. Reasoning - In the case at hand, the purpose of the notice and hearing requirement is not to comply with due process. - Art 283 originated from the Spanish Code of Commerece of 1882, which gave either party to the employer-employee relationship the right to terminate their relationship by giving notice to the other a month in advance. This was repealed by Art. 2270 of the Civil Code, then by RA 1052 or Termination Pay Law, and finally by RA1787 providing for the advance notice or payment of compensation at the rate of month for every year of service. - The Termination Pay Law is a regulatory measure to give opportunity for the employer to look for a replacement or substitute and for the employee to look for another job. The notice was not required if the dismissal is for just cause. The notice requirement is only implemented by BP130 amending the Labor Code. - The employer cannot be expected to be an entirely impartial judge of his own cause. 4. NO Ratio Quitclaims executed by employees are commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy and ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of a workers legal rights. However, if the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not be disowned unless there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting gullible person, or the terms are unconscionable on its face. Reasoning - Dayan is a managerial employee with vast experience. He cannot be willing to compromise his future by agreeing to execute a document highly prejudicial to his interest. Complainant was well aware of the consequences of his acts.
Disposition decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating the decision of the Labor Arbiter and setting aside the NLRC's decision is AFFIRMED.
shown that the party suing has some substantial relation to the third party, or that the right of the third party would be diluted unless the party in court is allowed to espouse the third partys constitutional rights. With regard the portion relating to discrimination against unskilled workers, the SC ruled that respondents have no standing as they failed to implead any unskilled worker in their petition. 2. The order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court is a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. The SC citing jurisprudence ruled that a law is presumed constitutional until the same is declared unconstitutional by judicial interpretation. This is so because suspension of the operation of the law is an interference with the official acts of the duly elected representatives of the people and also of the highest magistrate of the land. The possible unconstitutionality of a statue, on its face, does not of itself justify an injunction against good faith attempts to enforce it, unless there is showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstances that would call for equitable relief. To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of a law assailed to be unconstitutional, the party must establish that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief and must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the merits, or that there are sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and the balance of hardships tips decidedly in its favor. This higher standard reflects judicial deference towards legislation or regulations developed through presumptively reasoned democratic process. In this case, none were shown. 3. The SC also held that the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction is mooted by case law. The SC cited various cases it had earlier decided on apply RA 8042. By these rulings, the SC, in effect, affirmed the validity of the assailed provisions. Hence the enforcement of the provisions cannot be enjoined unless the SC, by final judgment declares the provisions to be unconstitutional.
ANG TIBAY, AND NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD V CIR, AND NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC. LAUREL; February 27, 1940
NATURE The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., prays for the vacation of the judgment rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of the Industrial Relations for a new trial. The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc. FACTS - CIR created by Commonwealth Act No. 103. Its functions are specifically stated therein - Nature of the CIR: > more administrative than part of judicial system > not a mere receptive organ of Govt, not passive > active: not just judicial/quasi-judicial in disputes, but also has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to consider, investigate, decide,
settle any question, matter, controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them. > mingling of executive and judicial functions (a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers) > not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure: its required to act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103) > The fact that the CIR may be said to be free from certain procedural requirements doe not mean that it can entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental requirements of due process in trials. - Primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character: (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Morgan v. U.S "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. Edwards vs. McCoy, "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration." (3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power. (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding but the evidence must be "substantial." -such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion." The statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. (5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. -Protect parties in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only
advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. (6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with the right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory authority. (7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. - The record of the proceedings had before the CIR in this particular case had no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers was due to their union affiliation. - The whole transcript of the hearing is just a record of contradictory statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own views - these statements have no evidentiary value Respondents' Comments 1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. 2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army. 3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army. 4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.) 5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and elective representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin where the industrial peace has always been the rule. 7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood. 8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. 9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein. ISSUE WON a new trial in the CIR should be granted HELD YES Ratio When a hearing before the CIR is conducted and a ruling is arrived at without any substantial evidence, and there may be more evidence to be heard, a new trial shall be granted. Reasoning - The SC found no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity. Although the CIR is a court with special nature- in that it may be said to be free from technical rules of procedure- it must still respect certain primary rights, one of which is that its decision must be based on substantial evidence. The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Disposition The motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.