GR 104215

GR 104215
DECISION PUNO, J.: Petitioner Erectors, Inc. challenges the jurisdiction of respondent Labor Arbiter Julio F. Andres, Jr. to hear and decide the complaint 1 for underpayment of wages and non-payment of overtime pay filed by private respondent Florencio Burgos, an overseas contract worker. The facts are undisputed: In September 1979, petitioner recruited private respondent to work as service contract driver in Saudi Arabia for a period of twelve (12) months with a salary of US$165.00 and an allowance of US$165.00 per month. They further agreed that private respondent shall be entitled to a bonus of US$ 1,000.00 if after the 12-month period, he renews or extends his employment contract without availing of his vacation or home leave. Their contract dated September 20, 1979, was duly approved by the Ministry of Labor and Employment. The aforesaid contract was not implemented. In December, 1979, petitioner notified private respondent that the position of service driver was no longer available. On December 14, 1979, they executed another contract which changed the position of private respondent into that of helper/laborer with a salary of US$105.00 and an allowance of US$105.00 per month. The second contract was not submitted to the Ministry of Labor and Employment for approval. On December 18, 1979, private respondent left the country and worked at petitioner's Buraidah Sports Complex project in Saudi Arabia, performing the job of a helper/laborer. He received a monthly salary and allowance of US$210.00, in accordance with the second contract. Private respondent renewed his contract of employment after one year. His salary and allowance were increased to US$231.00. Private respondent returned to the Philippines on August 24, 1981. He then invoked his first employment contract. He demanded from the petitioner the difference between his salary and allowance as indicated in the said contract, and the amount actually paid to him, plus the contractual bonus which should have been awarded to him for not availing of his vacation or home leave credits. Petitioner denied private respondent's claim. On March 31, 1982, private respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint against the petitioner for underpayment of wages and non-payment of overtime pay and contractual bonus. On May 1, 1982, while the case was still in the conciliation stage, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 797 creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) took effect. Section 4(a) of E.O. No. 797 vested the POEA with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment." 2 Despite E.O. No. 797, respondent Labor Arbiter proceeded to try the case on the merits. On September 23, 1983, he rendered a Decision 3 in favor of private respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads: "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent to pay the complainant as follows:
1. The sum of US$2,496.00 in its peso equivalent on August 25, 1981 as difference between his allowance as Service Driver as against his position as Helper/Laborer; 2. The sum of US$1,000.00 in its peso equivalent as of the same date, as his contractual bonus. The complaints for non-payment/underpayment of overtime pay and unpaid wages or commission are DISMISSED for lack of merit." 4 Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). It questioned the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter over the case in view of the enactment of E.O. No. 797. In a Resolution dated July 17, 1991, 5 respondent NLRC dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld the Labor Arbiter's jurisdiction. It ruled: "To begin with, the Labor Arbiter has the authority to decide this case. On May 29, 1978, the Labor Arbiters were integrated into the Regional Offices under P.D. 1391. On May 1, 1980, P.D. 1691 was promulgated giving the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and Employment the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment. There is no dispute that the Labor Arbiter had the legal authority over the case on hand, which accrued and was filed when the two above mentioned Presidential Decrees were in force." 6 Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari reiterating the argument that: "The NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in affirming the Labor Arbiter's void judgment in the case a quo." 7 It asserts that E.O. No. 797 divested the Labor Arbiter of his authority to try and resolve cases arising from overseas employment contract. Invoking this Court's ruling in Briad Agro Developinent Corp. vs. Dela Cerna, 8 petitioner argues that E.O. No. 797 applies retroactively to affect pending cases, including the complaint filed by private respondent. The petition is devoid of merit. The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action. 9 On March 31, 1982, at the time private respondent filed his complaint against the petitioner, the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree No. 1691 10 and Presidential Decree No. 1391 11 which vested the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims arising out of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment." 12 At the time of the filing of the complaint, the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction over the same. E.O. No. 797 did not divest the Labor Arbiter's authority to hear and decide the case filed by private respondent prior to its effectivity. Laws should only be applied prospectively unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. 13 We fail to perceive in the language of E.O. No. 797 an intention to give it retroactive effect. The case of Briad Agro Development Corp. vs. Dela Cerna 14 cited by the petitioner is not applicable to the case at bar. In Briad, the Court applied the exception rather than the general rule. In this case, Briad Agro Development Corp. and L.M. Camus Engineering Corp. challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment over cases involving workers' money claims, since Article 217 of the Labor Code, the law in force at the time of the filing of the complaint, vested in the Labor Arbiters exclusive jurisdiction over such cases. The Court dismissed the petition in its Decision dated June 29, 1989. 15 It ruled that the enactment of E.O. No. 111, amending Article 217 of the Labor Code, cured the Regional Director's lack of jurisdiction by giving the Labor Arbiter and the
Regional Director concurrent jurisdiction over all cases involving money claims. However, on November 9,1989, the Court, in a Resolution, 16 reconsidered and set aside its June 29 Decision and referred the case to the Labor Arbiter for proper proceedings, in view of the promulgation of Republic Act (R.A.) 6715 which divested the Regional Directors of the power to hear money claims. It bears emphasis that the Court accorded E.O. No. 111 and R.A. 6715 a retroactive application because as curative statutes, they fall under the exceptions to the rule on prospectivity of laws. E.O. No.111, amended Article 217 of the Labor Code to widen the workers' access to the government for redress of grievances by giving the Regional Directors and Labor Arbiters concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving money claims. This amendment, however, created a situation where the jurisdiction of the Regional Directors and the Labor Arbiters overlapped. As a remedy, R.A. 6715 further amended Article 217 by delineating their respective jurisdictions. Under R.A. 6715, the Regional Director has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving money claims provided: (1) the claim is presented by an employer or person employed in domestic or household service, or househelper under the Code; (2) the claimant, no longer being employed, does not seek reinstatement; and (3) the aggregate money claim of the employee or househelper does not exceed P5,000.00. All other cases are within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. E.O. No. 111 and R.A. 6715 are therefore curative statutes. A curative statute is enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings, instruments or acts of public authorities which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain existing legal requirements. The law at bar, E.O. No. 797, is not a curative statute. It was not intended to remedy any defect in the law. It created the POEA to assume the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services. Accordingly, it gave the POEA "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including seamen." 17 The rule on prospectivity of laws should therefore apply to E.O. No. 797. It should not affect jurisdiction over cases filed prior to its effectivity. Our ruling in Philippine-Singapore Ports Corp. vs. NLRC 18 is more apt to the case at bar. In this case, PSPC hired Jardin to work in Saudi Arabia. Jardin filed a complaint against PSPC for illegal dismissal and recovery of backwages on January 31, 1979 with the Labor Arbiter. PSPC questioned the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter because at that time, the power to hear and decide cases involving overseas workers was vested in the Bureau of Employment Services. We held: "When Jardin filed the complaint for illegal dismissal on January 31, 1979, Art. 217 (5) of the Labor Code provided that Labor Arbiters and the NLRC shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all cases arising from employer-employee relations unless expressly excluded by this Code. At that time Art. 15 of the same Code had been amended by P.D. No. 1412 which took effect on June 9, 1978. The pertinent provision of the said presidential decree states: Article 15. Bureau of Employment Services. (a) x x x (b) The Bureau shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims, arising out of or by virtue of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, except seamen. The decisions of the Bureau shall be final and executory subject to appeal to the Secretary of Labor whose decision shall be final and inappealable. Considering that private respondent Jardin's claims undeniably arose out of an employer-employee relationship with petitioner PSPC and that private respondent worked overseas or in Saudi Arabia, the Bureau of Employment Services and not the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the case. x x x
Art. 15 was further amended by P.D. No. 1691 which took effect on May 1, 1990. Such amendment qualifies the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Employment Services as follows: (b) The regional offices of the Ministry of Labor shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims, arising out of or by virtue of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment except seamen: Provided that the Bureau of Employment Services may, in the case of the National Capital Region, exercise such power, whenever the Minister of Labor deems it appropriate. The decisions of the regional offices or the Bureau of Employment Services if so authorized by the Minister of Labor as provided in this Article, shall be appealable to the National Labor Relations Commission upon the same grounds provided in Article 223 hereof. The decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission shall be final and inappealable. Hence, as further amended, Art. 15 provided for concurrent jurisdiction between the regional offices of the then Ministry of Labor and Bureau of Employment Services in the National Capital Region. It is noteworthy that P.D. No. 1691, while likewise amending Art. 217 of the Labor Code, did not alter the provision that Labor Arbiters shall have jurisdiction over all claims arising from employer-employee relations unless expressly excluded by this Code. The functions of the Bureau of Employment Services were subsequently assumed by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) on May 1, 1982 by virtue of Executive Order No. 797 by granting the POEA original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including seamen. (Sec. 4 (a); Eastern Shipping Lines v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration [POEA], 200 SCRA 663 [1991]). This development showed the legislative authority's continuing intent to exclude from the Labor Arbiter's jurisdiction claims arising from overseas employment. These amendments notwithstanding, when the complaint for illegal dismissal was filed on January 31, 1979, under Art. 15, as amended by P.D. No. 1412, it was the Bureau of Employment Services which had jurisdiction over the case and not the Labor Arbiters. It is a settled rule that jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action (Municipality of Sogod v. Rosal, 201 SCRA 632, 637 [1991]). P.D. 1691 which gave the regional offices of the Ministry of Labor concurrent jurisdiction with the Bureau of Employment Services, was promulgated more than a year after the complaint was filed. (Italics supplied) In sum, we hold that respondent NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the jurisdiction of respondent Labor Arbiter over the complaint filed by private respondent against the petitioner. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
GR 10076
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC
G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993 ALBINO S. CO, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. NARVASA, C.J.: In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken vessel - and in payment of his share of the expenses of the salvage operations therein stipulated - petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00. 1 The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."
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A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by the salvage company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime charged, and his being sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to indemnify the salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00.
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Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible error for the Regional Trial Court to have relied, as basis for its verdict of conviction, on the ruling rendered on September 21, 1987 by this Court in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 3 - i.e., that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. This was because at the time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a
Circular of the Ministry of Justice. That Circular (No. 4), dated December 15, 1981, pertinently provided as follows: 2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
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Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Res. No. 438, s. 1981, Virginia Montano vs. Josefino Galvez, June 19, 1981; Res. No. 707, s. 1989; Alice Quizon vs. Lydia Calingo, October 23, 1981, Res. No. 769, s. 1981, Alfredo Guido vs. Miguel A. Mateo, et. al., November 17, 1981; Res. No. 589, s. 1981, Zenaida Lazaro vs. Maria Aquino, August 7, 1981). This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another issued on August 8, 1984 (Ministry Circular No. 12) - almost one (1) year after Albino Co had delivered the "bouncing" check to the complainant on September 1, 1983. Said Circular No. 12, after observing inter alia that Circular No. 4 of December 15, 1981 appeared to have been based on "a misapplication of the deliberation in the Batasang Pambansa, . . . (or) the explanatory note on the original bill, i.e. that the intention was not to penalize the issuance of a check to secure or guarantee the payment of an obligation," as follows: 4 Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency having interpreting authority may reverse its administration interpretation of a statute, but that its review interpretation applies only prospectively (Waterbury Savings Bank vs. Danaher, 128 Conn., 476; 20 a2d 455 (1941), in all cases involving violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 where the check in question is issued after this date, the claim that the check is issued as a guarantee or part of an arrangement to secure an obligation collection will no longer be considered a valid defense. Co's theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction. Citing Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 101 Phil. 561, the Appellate Court opined that the Que doctrine did not amount to the passage of new law but was merely a construction or interpretation of a preexisting one, i.e., BP 22, enacted on April 3, 1979.
From this adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, Albino Co appealed to this Court on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. By Resolution dated September 9, 1991, the Court dismissed his appeal. Co moved for reconsideration under date of October 2, 1991. The Court required comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General. The latter complied and, in its comment dated December 13, 1991, extensively argued against the merits of Albino Co's theory on appeal, which was substantially that proffered by him in the Court of Appeals. To this comment, Albino Co filed a reply dated February 14, 1992. After deliberating on the parties' arguments and contentions, the Court resolved, in the interests of justice, to reinstate Albino Co's appeal and adjudicate the same on its merits. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines," according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code, a
declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have, a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal . . . 5
The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many cases. These include: Buyco v. PNB, 961 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which divested the Philippine National Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in payment of loans, does not apply to an offer of payment made before effectivity of the act; Largado v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that RA 2613, s amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior courts jurisdiction over guardianship cases, could not be given retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90, amending Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no retroactive application; People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, holding that a person cannot be convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central, when the alleged violation occurred before publication of the Circular in the Official Gazette; Baltazar v. C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive application to P.D. No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of tenants from rice and corn farmholdings, pending the promulgation of rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, adjudging that RA 6389 whichremoved "personal cultivation" as a ground for the ejectment of a tenant cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory statement for retroactivity; Tac-An v. CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the old Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not be accorded retroactive effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding that RA 6389 should have only prospective application; (see also Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294 and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).
The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and circulars, to wit: ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a circular or ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive effect adversely to a taxpayer: Sanchez v. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No. 900590 of the Commission on Elections, which directed the holding of recall proceedings, had no retroactive application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it was ruled that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given retrospective effect so as to entitle to permanent appointment an employee whose temporary appointment had expired before the Circular was issued.
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The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, "although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason whyunder Article 8 of the New Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . .'"
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So did this Court hold, for example, in Peo. v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 611: It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on
the matter was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). 6 Our decision in People v. Mapa, 7reversing the aforesaid doctrine, came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reverse of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? . . .
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . ."The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis interpretation legis vim obtinet" - the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and where he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on, the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishment of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society. So, too, did the Court rule in Spouses Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 97973) and Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al (G.R. No 97998), Jan. 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 515, 527-528: 8 We sustain the petitioners' position, It is undisputed that the subject lot was mortgaged to DBP on February 24, 1970. It was acquired by DBP as the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977, and then sold to the petitioners on September 29, 1979.
At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended was that enunciated in Monge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by these decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco vs. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1061]).
The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions enunciating new doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]" . . .
when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions is well set forth in the oft-cited case of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]. The Chicot doctrine advocates the imperative necessity to take account of the actual existence of a statute prior to its nullification, as an operative fact negating acceptance of "a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity.
Thus, in this Court's decision in Taada v. Tuvera, 9 promulgated on April 24, 1985 - which declared "that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,shall have no force and effect," and as regards which declaration some members of the Court appeared "quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect . . . (the) decision might have on acts done in reliance on the validity of these presidential decrees . . ." - the Court said: . . . . The answer is all too familiar. In similar situation is in the past this Court, had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank (308 U.S. 371, 374) to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects - with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those who have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified. Much earlier, in De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 - concerning the effects of the invalidation of "Republic Act No. 342, the moratorium legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32, issued by the then President Osmea, suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable by war sufferers," and which had been "explicitly held in Rutter v. Esteban (93 Phil. 68 [1953] 10 . . . (to be) in 1953 'unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer . . ." - the Court made substantially the same observations, to wit: 11
. . . . The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and purposes amere scrap of paper. . . . It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. lt may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be compiled with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity,, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed theirpositions, what could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence is a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a, period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: 'The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, - with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official (Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]). This language has been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil. 1002 [1953]) and the decision in Manila Motor Co. Inc. v. Flores (99 Phil. 738 [1956]). An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (L-21114, Nov. 28, 1967, 21 SCRA 1095). Again, treating of the effect that should be given to its decision in Olaguer v. Military Commission No 34, 12 - declaring invalid criminal proceedings conducted during the martial law regime against civilians, which had resulted in the conviction and incarceration of numerous persons - this Court, in Tan vs. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686, at p. 700, ruled as follows: In the interest of justice and consistently, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be applied prospectively only to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted person or the State shows that there was serious denial of
constitutional rights of the accused, should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer possible, the accused should be released since judgment against him is null on account of the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process. xxx xxx xxx
The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before the military tribunals and commissions during the ten-year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were created under general orders issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers is an operative fact that may not just be ignored. The belated declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their consequences which occurred long before our decision in Olaguer was promulgated and which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic. Thus did this Court rule in Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533, where the question arose as to whether the nullity of creation of a municipality by executive order wiped out all the acts of the local government abolished. 13
It would seem then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court's decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 - should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
Inveighing against this proposition, the Solicitor General invokes U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, applying the familiar doctrine that in crimes mala prohibita, the intent or motive of the offender is inconsequential, the only relevant inquiry being, "has the law been violated?" The facts in Go Chico are substantially different from those in the case at bar. In the former, there was no official issuance by the Secretary of Justice or other government officer construing the special law violated; 15 and it was there observed, among others, that "the defense . . . (of) an honest misconstruction of the law under legal advice" 16 could not be appreciated as a valid defense. In the present case on the other hand, the defense is that reliance was placed, not on the opinion of a private lawyer but upon an official pronouncement of no less than the attorney of the Government, the Secretary of Justice, whose opinions, though not law, are entitled to great weight and on which reliance may be placed by private individuals is reflective of the correct interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provision; this, particularly in the case of penal statutes, by the very nature and scope of the authority that resides in as regards prosecutions for their violation. 17 Senarillos vs. Hermosisima, supra, relied upon by the respondent Court of Appeals, is crucially different in that in said case, as in U.S. v. Go Chico, supra, no administrative interpretation antedated the contrary construction placed by the Court on the law invoked.
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling
reason why the doctrine of mala prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein above set out and discussed, negating criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial Court are reversed and set aside, and the criminal prosecution against the accused-petitioner is DISMISSED, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED. Padilla, Regalado, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1 As found by the Court of Appeals, the agreement was between Co, representing Mayflower Shipping Corporation, and Geronimo B. Bella, representing Tans-Pacific Towage, Inc. The expenses for refloating were apportioned chiefly between FGU Insurance and Development Bank of the Philippines, which respectively contributed P2,329,022.00 and P1,579,000.00. SEE Rollo, pp. 9, 20-21.
2 Otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law".
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3 The ruling is contained in an extended resolution on a motion for reconsideration, promulgated by the Special Former Second Division of the Court on September 21, 1987, written for the division by Paras, J., with whom concurred Fernan, Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ. In that resolution, the Court gave its "stamp of approval" on the decision of the Court of Appeals holding inter alia that "It is now settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guarantee." 4 Emphasis supplied.
5 Exceptions to the rule of prospectivity are collated, e.g., in the textbook of retired Justice Edgardo A. Paras (Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1984 ed., Vol. 1, pp. 22-23) viz : 1) laws remedial in nature; 2) penal law favorable to accused, if ; after not habitual delinquent; 3) laws of emergency nature under police power : e.g., tenancy relations (Vda. de Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 47 O.G. 4259, Valencia et al. v. Surtida et al., May 31, 1961); 4) curative laws; 5) substantive right declared for first time unless vested rights impaired (Unson v. del Rosario, Jan. 29, 1953; Belen v. Belen, 49 O.G. 997; Peo v. Alejaga, 49 OG 2833).
6 106 Phil. 713 and 103 Phil. 500, respectively, both involving prosecutions for illegal possession of firearms, and both holding that appointment by the Provincial Governor or Provincial Commander of a person as a "secret agent" or "confidential agent" "sufficiently placed him under the category of a 'peace officer' . . . who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code is exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearm.
7 SEE Ilagan v. People, Jan. 29, 1974, 55 SCRA 361.
8 The title of the cited Monge case is Monge, et al. v. Angeles, et al., and is reported in 101 Phil., 563 [1957], while that of the cited Tupas case is Tupas v. Damasco, et al., reported in 132 SCRA 593 [1984].
9 136 SCRA 27, 40-41.
10 And several other rulings set forth in a corresponding footnote in the text of the decision.
11 SEE also Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144 (1987) (Citing Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533 where the question arose as to whether the judicial nullification of an executive order creating a municipality wiped out all the acts of the local government abolished); Tan v. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686 (1990); Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 378 (1991); Union of Filipino Employees v. Vivar, Jr., 205 SCRA 200 (1992); Peralta v. Civil Service Commission, 212 SCRA 425.
12 150 SCRA 144 (1987).
13 SEE also Cruz v. Enrile, 160 SCRA 700 [1988] and Res. of February 26, 1991; and Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 378 [1991]. 14 SEE footnote 3, supra.
15 Act No. 1696 of the Philippine Commission punishing any person who shall expose, or cause or permit to be exposed, to public view . . . any flag, banner, emblem, or device used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identify those in armed rebellion against the United States, . . .
16 14 Phil. 128, 133-134.
17 Estrella vs. Orendain, 37 SCRA 640; Noblejas vs. Salas, 67 SCRA 47.
79060
G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993 ALBINO S. CO, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. NARVASA, C.J.: In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken vessel - and in payment of his share of the expenses of the salvage operations therein stipulated - petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00. 1 The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by the salvage company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime charged, and his being sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to indemnify the salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00.
Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible error for the Regional Trial Court to have relied, as basis for its verdict of conviction, on the ruling rendered on September 21, 1987 by this Court in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 3 - i.e., that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. This was because at the time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a
Circular of the Ministry of Justice. That Circular (No. 4), dated December 15, 1981, pertinently provided as follows: 2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Res. No. 438, s. 1981, Virginia Montano vs. Josefino Galvez, June 19, 1981; Res. No. 707, s. 1989; Alice Quizon vs. Lydia Calingo, October 23, 1981, Res. No. 769, s. 1981, Alfredo Guido vs. Miguel A. Mateo, et. al., November 17, 1981; Res. No. 589, s. 1981, Zenaida Lazaro vs. Maria Aquino, August 7, 1981). This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another issued on August 8, 1984 (Ministry Circular No. 12) - almost one (1) year after Albino Co had delivered the "bouncing" check to the complainant on September 1, 1983. Said Circular No. 12, after observing inter alia that Circular No. 4 of December 15, 1981 appeared to have been based on "a misapplication of the deliberation in the Batasang Pambansa, . . . (or) the explanatory note on the original bill, i.e. that the intention was not to penalize the issuance of a check to secure or guarantee the payment of an obligation," as follows: 4 Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency having interpreting authority may reverse its administration interpretation of a statute, but that its review interpretation applies only prospectively (Waterbury Savings Bank vs. Danaher, 128 Conn., 476; 20 a2d 455 (1941), in all cases involving violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 where the check in question is issued after this date, the claim that the check is issued as a guarantee or part of an arrangement to secure an obligation collection will no longer be considered a valid defense. Co's theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction. Citing Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 101 Phil. 561, the Appellate Court opined that the Que doctrine did not amount to the passage of new law but was merely a construction or interpretation of a preexisting one, i.e., BP 22, enacted on April 3, 1979.
From this adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, Albino Co appealed to this Court on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. By Resolution dated September 9, 1991, the Court dismissed his appeal. Co moved for reconsideration under date of October 2, 1991. The Court required comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General. The latter complied and, in its comment dated December 13, 1991, extensively argued against the merits of Albino Co's theory on appeal, which was substantially that proffered by him in the Court of Appeals. To this comment, Albino Co filed a reply dated February 14, 1992. After deliberating on the parties' arguments and contentions, the Court resolved, in the interests of justice, to reinstate Albino Co's appeal and adjudicate the same on its merits. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines," according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code, a
declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have, a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal . . . 5
The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many cases. These include: Buyco v. PNB, 961 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which divested the Philippine National Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in payment of loans, does not apply to an offer of payment made before effectivity of the act; Largado v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that RA 2613, s amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior courts jurisdiction over guardianship cases, could not be given retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90, amending Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no retroactive application; People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, holding that a person cannot be convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central, when the alleged violation occurred before publication of the Circular in the Official Gazette; Baltazar v. C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive application to P.D. No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of tenants from rice and corn farmholdings, pending the promulgation of rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, adjudging that RA 6389 whichremoved "personal cultivation" as a ground for the ejectment of a tenant cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory statement for retroactivity; Tac-An v. CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the old Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not be accorded retroactive effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding that RA 6389 should have only prospective application; (see also Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294 and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).
The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and circulars, to wit: ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a circular or ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive effect adversely to a taxpayer: Sanchez v. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No. 900590 of the Commission on Elections, which directed the holding of recall proceedings, had no retroactive application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it was ruled that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given retrospective effect so as to entitle to permanent appointment an employee whose temporary appointment had expired before the Circular was issued.
The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, "although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason whyunder Article 8 of the New Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . .'"
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So did this Court hold, for example, in Peo. v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 611: It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on
the matter was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). 6 Our decision in People v. Mapa, 7reversing the aforesaid doctrine, came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reverse of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? . . .
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . ."The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis interpretation legis vim obtinet" - the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and where he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on, the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishment of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society. So, too, did the Court rule in Spouses Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 97973) and Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al (G.R. No 97998), Jan. 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 515, 527-528: 8 We sustain the petitioners' position, It is undisputed that the subject lot was mortgaged to DBP on February 24, 1970. It was acquired by DBP as the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977, and then sold to the petitioners on September 29, 1979.
At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended was that enunciated in Monge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by these decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco vs. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1061]).
The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions enunciating new doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]" . . .
when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions is well set forth in the oft-cited case of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]. The Chicot doctrine advocates the imperative necessity to take account of the actual existence of a statute prior to its nullification, as an operative fact negating acceptance of "a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity.
Thus, in this Court's decision in Taada v. Tuvera, 9 promulgated on April 24, 1985 - which declared "that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,shall have no force and effect," and as regards which declaration some members of the Court appeared "quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect . . . (the) decision might have on acts done in reliance on the validity of these presidential decrees . . ." - the Court said: . . . . The answer is all too familiar. In similar situation is in the past this Court, had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank (308 U.S. 371, 374) to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects - with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those who have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified. Much earlier, in De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 - concerning the effects of the invalidation of "Republic Act No. 342, the moratorium legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32, issued by the then President Osmea, suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable by war sufferers," and which had been "explicitly held in Rutter v. Esteban (93 Phil. 68 [1953] 10 . . . (to be) in 1953 'unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer . . ." - the Court made substantially the same observations, to wit: 11
. . . . The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and purposes amere scrap of paper. . . . It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. lt may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be compiled with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity,, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed theirpositions, what could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence is a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a, period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: 'The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, - with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official (Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]). This language has been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil. 1002 [1953]) and the decision in Manila Motor Co. Inc. v. Flores (99 Phil. 738 [1956]). An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (L-21114, Nov. 28, 1967, 21 SCRA 1095). Again, treating of the effect that should be given to its decision in Olaguer v. Military Commission No 34, 12 - declaring invalid criminal proceedings conducted during the martial law regime against civilians, which had resulted in the conviction and incarceration of numerous persons - this Court, in Tan vs. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686, at p. 700, ruled as follows: In the interest of justice and consistently, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be applied prospectively only to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted person or the State shows that there was serious denial of
constitutional rights of the accused, should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer possible, the accused should be released since judgment against him is null on account of the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process. xxx xxx xxx
The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before the military tribunals and commissions during the ten-year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were created under general orders issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers is an operative fact that may not just be ignored. The belated declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their consequences which occurred long before our decision in Olaguer was promulgated and which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic. Thus did this Court rule in Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533, where the question arose as to whether the nullity of creation of a municipality by executive order wiped out all the acts of the local government abolished. 13
It would seem then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court's decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 - should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
Inveighing against this proposition, the Solicitor General invokes U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, applying the familiar doctrine that in crimes mala prohibita, the intent or motive of the offender is inconsequential, the only relevant inquiry being, "has the law been violated?" The facts in Go Chico are substantially different from those in the case at bar. In the former, there was no official issuance by the Secretary of Justice or other government officer construing the special law violated; 15 and it was there observed, among others, that "the defense . . . (of) an honest misconstruction of the law under legal advice" 16 could not be appreciated as a valid defense. In the present case on the other hand, the defense is that reliance was placed, not on the opinion of a private lawyer but upon an official pronouncement of no less than the attorney of the Government, the Secretary of Justice, whose opinions, though not law, are entitled to great weight and on which reliance may be placed by private individuals is reflective of the correct interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provision; this, particularly in the case of penal statutes, by the very nature and scope of the authority that resides in as regards prosecutions for their violation. 17 Senarillos vs. Hermosisima, supra, relied upon by the respondent Court of Appeals, is crucially different in that in said case, as in U.S. v. Go Chico, supra, no administrative interpretation antedated the contrary construction placed by the Court on the law invoked.
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling
reason why the doctrine of mala prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein above set out and discussed, negating criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial Court are reversed and set aside, and the criminal prosecution against the accused-petitioner is DISMISSED, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED. Padilla, Regalado, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1 As found by the Court of Appeals, the agreement was between Co, representing Mayflower Shipping Corporation, and Geronimo B. Bella, representing Tans-Pacific Towage, Inc. The expenses for refloating were apportioned chiefly between FGU Insurance and Development Bank of the Philippines, which respectively contributed P2,329,022.00 and P1,579,000.00. SEE Rollo, pp. 9, 20-21.
2 Otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law".
3 The ruling is contained in an extended resolution on a motion for reconsideration, promulgated by the Special Former Second Division of the Court on September 21, 1987, written for the division by Paras, J., with whom concurred Fernan, Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ. In that resolution, the Court gave its "stamp of approval" on the decision of the Court of Appeals holding inter alia that "It is now settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guarantee." 4 Emphasis supplied.
5 Exceptions to the rule of prospectivity are collated, e.g., in the textbook of retired Justice Edgardo A. Paras (Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1984 ed., Vol. 1, pp. 22-23) viz : 1) laws remedial in nature; 2) penal law favorable to accused, if ; after not habitual delinquent; 3) laws of emergency nature under police power : e.g., tenancy relations (Vda. de Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 47 O.G. 4259, Valencia et al. v. Surtida et al., May 31, 1961); 4) curative laws; 5) substantive right declared for first time unless vested rights impaired (Unson v. del Rosario, Jan. 29, 1953; Belen v. Belen, 49 O.G. 997; Peo v. Alejaga, 49 OG 2833).
6 106 Phil. 713 and 103 Phil. 500, respectively, both involving prosecutions for illegal possession of firearms, and both holding that appointment by the Provincial Governor or Provincial Commander of a person as a "secret agent" or "confidential agent" "sufficiently placed him under the category of a 'peace officer' . . . who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code is exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearm.
7 SEE Ilagan v. People, Jan. 29, 1974, 55 SCRA 361.
8 The title of the cited Monge case is Monge, et al. v. Angeles, et al., and is reported in 101 Phil., 563 [1957], while that of the cited Tupas case is Tupas v. Damasco, et al., reported in 132 SCRA 593 [1984].
9 136 SCRA 27, 40-41.
10 And several other rulings set forth in a corresponding footnote in the text of the decision.
11 SEE also Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144 (1987) (Citing Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533 where the question arose as to whether the judicial nullification of an executive order creating a municipality wiped out all the acts of the local government abolished); Tan v. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686 (1990); Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 378 (1991); Union of Filipino Employees v. Vivar, Jr., 205 SCRA 200 (1992); Peralta v. Civil Service Commission, 212 SCRA 425.
12 150 SCRA 144 (1987).
13 SEE also Cruz v. Enrile, 160 SCRA 700 [1988] and Res. of February 26, 1991; and Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 378 [1991]. 14 SEE footnote 3, supra.
15 Act No. 1696 of the Philippine Commission punishing any person who shall expose, or cause or permit to be exposed, to public view . . . any flag, banner, emblem, or device used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identify those in armed rebellion against the United States, . . .
16 14 Phil. 128, 133-134.
17 Estrella vs. Orendain, 37 SCRA 640; Noblejas vs. Salas, 67 SCRA 47.
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 115213 December 19, 1995 WILSON DIU and DORCITA DIU, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PETER LYNDON BUSHNELL and PATRICIA PAGBA, Respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Before us is an appeal by certiorari from the judgment of the Court of Appeals 1setting aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran, Branch 16, 2without prejudice to the refiling of the case by petitioners after due compliance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the "Katarungang Pambarangay Law."
Prefatorily, the Court desires to digress and call attention to the lamentable saga of delay in the dispensation of justice and the regrettable abuse of judicial processes exemplified by this case. For, if just to collect an indebtedness of P7,862.55 incurred way back in 1988, the proceedings had to go through all the rungs of the judicial ladder and still present the prospect of hereafter infringing again upon the time of this Court and three other courts, such protraction being manipulated by trifling with the very law which ironically was intended to prevent such delay, then the bench and the bar should soberly reflect thereon and now take stock of themselves. Indeed, it is not improbable that there are other cases agonizing under the same ennui created by our courts.
Coming now to the case at hand, it appears that on several occasions from January 8, 1988 up to and until April 18, 1989, private respondent Patricia Pagba purchased on credit various articles of merchandise from petitioners' store at Naval, Biliran, all valued at P7,862.55, as evidenced by receipts of goods marked as Annexes "A" to "O" of petitioner's Manifestation filed in the trial court, dated August 9, 1991. Private respondents failed to pay despite repeated demands.
Petitioners brought the matter before the Barangay Chairman of Naval and the latter set the case for hearing, but private respondents failed to appear. When the case was again set for hearing, the parties appeared but they failed to reach an amicable settlement. Accordingly, the barangay chairman issued a Certification to File Action. 3Petitioners then filed their complaint for a sum of money before the Municipal Trial Court of Naval.
Private respondents, in their Answer, 4while admitting the indebtedness to petitioner, interposed two counterclaims, namely, (1) one for P6,227.00 as alleged expenses for maintenance and repair of the boat belonging to petitioners, and (b) another for P12,000.00 representing the cost of the two tires which petitioners allegedly misappropriated. Private respondents likewise alleged that despite the confrontations before the barangay chairman, petitioners refused to pay their just and valid obligations to private respondent and her husband.
Aside from petitioners claim and private respondents' counterclaims, the Municipal Trial Court of Naval also resolved the issue on whether or not there was compliance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 on conciliation. In resolving the said issue, the trial court relied on the case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy 5which held that: While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking exemption thereto, they instead invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking affirmative relief from it. What is more, they participated in the trial of the case by cross-examining the respondent. Upon this premise, petitioner cannot now be allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which they had submitted themselves voluntarily. 6
However, said lower court dismissed the complaint by ruling against the admissibility of Exhibits "E-1" to "E-15", which are the receipts of good marked as Annexes "A" to "O" of petitioners' manifestation therein, for not having been properly identified in court. 7 On private respondents' counterclaims, said trial court also ruled that the same had been settled when the contending parties entered into a compromise agreement which was approved on January 9, 1989 by the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Branch 16, in another action between them, that is, Civil Case No. B-0719. 8 Due to the dismissal of the complaint, petitioners appealed to the aforementioned Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Said appellate court, however, did not find it necessary to pass upon the issue of the alleged non-compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508 but, instead, decided the appeal on the merits. Modifying the decision of the lower court, the Regional Trial Court held that: The case should have proceeded to its conclusion under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure and the regular procedure prescribed in the Rules of Court applies to the special cases only in a suppletory capacity insofar as they are not inconsistent. . . .
The claim of the plaintiff is less than P10,000.00. It properly falls under the Rule on Summary Procedure. The only pleadings allowed are complaints, compulsory counterclaims and cross claims pleaded in the answer, and the answers thereto. The case could have been decided based on affidavits of the witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues defined in the order of the Court, after the preliminary conference, together with the position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by the parties.
The need for a formal offer, identification and cross-examination on Exhibits "E-1" to "E-15" was not necessary. The said exhibits were inadmissible (sic). The receipts constituted evidence of indebtedness and their possession by the plaintiff at the commencement of the suit gives rise to the legal presumption that the debts in the total amount of P7,862.66 have not been paid.
Where, under the contract of sale, the ownership of the goods has passed to the buyer and he wrongfully neglects or refuses to pay for the goods according to the terms of the contract of sale, the seller may maintain an action against him for the price of the goods. 9
Accordingly, it rendered judgment in favor of herein petitioners and ordered private respondent Patricia Pagba to pay the former the amount of P7,862.55 plus legal interest from July, 1991, P1,000.00 as attorney fees, and the costs of suit.
Private respondents then went to the Court of Appeals, raising just two issues, viz.: (1) whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in not making a factual finding that herein petitioners did not comply with Presidential Decree No. 1508; and (2) whether or not said Regional Trial Court erred in not dismissing the appeal or case for non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508. 10 Respondent Court of Appeals set aside the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, on the ground that there had been no compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508, with this ratiocination: It is, therefore, clear that if efforts of the barangay captain to settle the dispute fails, the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo shall be constituted with the end in view of exploring all possibilities of amicable settlement. If no conciliation or settlement has been reached pursuant to the aforesaid rules, the matter may then be brought to the regular courts.
In the case at bar, it has been established that there was no valid conciliation proceeding between the parties. The efforts of the barangay captain of Catmon, Naval, Biliran to mediate the dispute between the parties having failed, the Pangkat ng Tagapamayapa should have been constituted for purposes of settling the matter. However, the Pangkat was not constituted, instead, a Certification to File Action was issued by the barangay captain in favor of respondent spouses Diu. In the same case of Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 690, the Supreme Court ruled that the "Punong Barangay has no right to say that referral to the Pangkat was no longer necessary merely because he himself has failed to work out an agreement between the petitioner and private respondent. Dispute should not end with the mediation proceeding before the Punong Barangay because of his failure to effect a settlement . . . . In Bejer vs. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 566, it was held that "failure to avail of conciliation process under P.D. 1508, . . . renders
the complaint vulnerable to a timely motion to dismiss." Inasmuch as petitioner has pleaded in his answer the lack of cause of action of respondent, objection to the complaint has been timely made. 11
The basic issue to be resolved in the instant petition is whether or not the confrontations before the Barangay Chairman of Naval satisfied the requirement therefor in Presidential Decree No. 1508. This Court finds for petitioners.
It must be noted that Presidential Decree No. 1508 has been repealed by codification in the Local Government Code of 1991 12 which took effect on January 1, 1992. The basic complaint was filed by petitioners before the trial court on July 10, 1991 before the effectivity of the Local Government Code. Nevertheless, Sections 4 and 6 of the former law have been substantially reproduced in Sections 410 (b) and 412, respectively, of the latter law. The pertinent provisions read as follows: Sec. 410. PROCEDURE FOR AMICABLE SETTLEMENT. - (b) . . . . If he (lupon chairman) fails in his mediation effort within fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of the parties before him, he shall forthwith set a date for the constitution of the pangkat in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
Sec. 412. CONCILIATION. - (a) Precondition to filing of Complaint in Court. - No complaint . . . shall be filed or instituted in court . . . unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman . . . . In the case at bar, it is admitted that the parties did have confrontations before the Barangay Chairman of Naval although they were not sent to the pangkat as the same was not constituted. Their meetings with said barangay chairman were not fruitful as no amicable settlement was reached. This prompted the issuance of the following Certification to File Action. 13 This is to certify that:
Respondent, Patricia Pagba admitted her indebtedness with complainant but she refused to pay because according to her, complainant has also an unsettled accounts (sic) with her husband. Hence no settlement/conciliation was reached and therefore the corresponding complaint for the dispute may now be filed in court.
Date(d) this 10th day of July 1991. (Sgd.) JHONY C. JEREZ Lupon Pangkat Chairman Attested:
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(Sgd.) IRENEO DOCALLOS Lupon/Pangkat Secretary
According to private respondent, however, the above certification is "falsified" since no pangkat was constituted. She, therefore, insists that petitioners have not complied with the mandatory provision of Presidential Decree No. 1508 on compulsory arbitration. We disagree.
While no pangkat was constituted, it is not denied that the parties met at the office of the barangay chairman for possible settlement. 14 The efforts of the barangay chairman, however, proved futile as no agreement was reached. Although no pangkat was formed, we believe that there was substantial compliance with the law. It is noteworthy that under Section 412 of the Local Government Code aforequoted, the confrontation before the lupon chairman OR the pangkat is sufficient compliance with the pre-condition for filing the case in court.
This is true notwithstanding the mandate of Section 410 (b) of the same law that the barangay chairman shall constitute a pangkat if he fails in his mediation efforts. Section 410 (b) should be construed together with Section 412, as well as the circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to the case. On this score, it is significant that the barangay chairman or punong barangay is himself the chairman of the lupon under the Local Government Code. 15 From the foregoing facts, it is undeniable that there was substantial compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508 which does not require strict technical compliance with its procedural requirements. Under the factual antecedents, it cannot be said that the failure of the parties to appear before the pangkat caused any prejudice to the case for private respondents considering that they already refused conciliation before the barangay chairman and, as will hereafter be discussed, their sham insistence for a meeting before the pangkat is merely a ploy for further delay. We are thus forced to remind them that technicalities should not be made to desert their true role in our justice system, and should not be used as obstructions therein.
The court a quo was likewise correct in invoking the doctrine in Tijam and, as indicated by the factual scenario in this case, private respondents are clearly in estoppel to assail the jurisdiction of the two lower courts. It is also worth stressing that while the case was filed when Presidential Decree No. 1508 was still in force, the procedural provisions of the Local Government Code, which we have earlier noted as being supportive of the validity of the conciliation proceedings, are also applicable to this case. Statutes regulating procedure in courts are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense. 16 To indulge private respondents in their stratagem will not only result in a circuitous procedure but will necessarily entail undue and further delay and injustice. This is inevitable if this Court should dismiss the complaint and require the parties to meet before the pangkat, only to bring the case all over again through the hierarchy of courts and ultimately back to us for decision on the merits. Obviously, this is the game plan of private respondents. For, when private respondents appealed to respondent court, they did not at all assail the propriety or correctness of the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court holding them liable to petitioners for the sum of money involved. Such primary substantive issue, therefore, has been laid to rest, but private respondents would wish to keep the case alive merely on a conjured procedural issue invoking their supposed right to confrontation before the pangkat.
However, from the very start of this action, private respondents failed to show or evince any honest indication that they were willing to settle their obligations with petitioners, notwithstanding the efforts of the latter to submit the matter to conciliation. It is, therefore, quite obvious that their insistence on technical compliance with the requirements of the barangay conciliation process is a dilatory maneuver. This is an evident and inevitable conclusion since the main argument of respondents in this petition is only the supposed failure of petitioners to comply with the barangay conciliatory procedure and not the denial or repudiation of their indebtedness.
We do not agree with the findings of respondent appellate court that inasmuch as private respondents pleaded in their answer the alleged lack of cause of action of petitioners, an objection to the complaint had been timely made. It will be readily observed that said defense was only one of the six affirmative defenses cryptically alleged in single short sentences in private respondents' Answer in the court a quo, running the implausible gamut from supposed defects in parties to res judicata and up to capacity to sue, without any statement of the facts on which they would rely to support such drivel. This calculated travesty of the rules on pleadings betrays the ulterior motives of private respondents and cannot be countenanced.
The failure of private respondents to specifically allege that there was no compliance with the barangay conciliation procedure constitutes a waiver of that defense. All that they alleged in their Answer in the trial court was that "the complaint states no cause of action" without giving even the semblance of any reason to support or explain that allegation. On the other hand, they admitted the confrontations before the barangay chairman in paragraph 13 of their Answer. 17 Since private respondents failed to duly raise that issue, their defense founded thereon is deemed waived, especially since they actually did not pursue the issue before the case was set for hearing. Also, the conciliation procedure under Presidential Decree No. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower courts had already acquired over the subject matter and private respondents as defendants therein. 18 ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED. The judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 30962 is hereby SET ASIDE, and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran, Branch 16, in Civil Case No. B-0842 is hereby REINSTATED, with costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Puno, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1 CA-G.R. SP No. 30962, promulgated on January 17, 1994; penned by Justice Manuel C. Herrera, with the concurrence of Justices Cezar D. Francisco and Buenaventura J. Guerrero.
2 Civil Case No. B-0842; Judge Enrique C. Asis, presiding. 3 Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 30962, 17. 4 Ibid., id., 19-21.
5 L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29. 6 Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 30962, 26-27. 7 Ibid., id., 28. 8 Ibid., id., 27.
9 Ibid., id., 12-16. 10 Ibid., id., 6-7.
11 Ibid., id., 104.
12 Sections 399-422, Chapter 7, Title One, Book III, R.A. No. 7160. 13 Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 30962, 97. 14 TSN, August 11, 1992, 21.
15 Sec. 399. LUPONG TAGAPAMAYAPA. - (a) There is hereby created in each barangay a lupong tagapamayapa, hereinafter referred to as the lupon, composed of the punong barangay as chairman and ten (10) to twenty (20) members. . . . .
16 People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764 (1946); Liam Law vs. Olympic Sawmill Co., et al., L-30771, May 28, 1984, 129 SCRA 439. 17 Rollo, 24.
18 Agbayani, et al. vs. Belen, etc., et al., G.R. No. 65629, November 24, 1986, 145 SCRA 635; Fernandez, et al. vs. Militante, etc., et al., G.R. No. 59801, May 31, 1988, 161 SCRA 695.
G.R. No. 103702 December 6, 1994 MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, QUEZON; MAYOR JUAN K. UY; COUNCILORS: DEOGRACIAS R. ARGOSINO III, BENITO T. CAPIO, EMMANUEL R. CORTEZ, NORMANDO MONTILLA, LEONARDO C. UY, FIDEL C. AURELLANA, PEDRO C. CARABIT, LEONARDO D. AURELLANA, FABIAN M. MEDENILLA, TRINIDAD F. CORTEZ, SALVADOR M. MEDENILLA, CERELITO B. AUREADA and FRANCISCA A. BAMBA, Petitioners, vs. HON. ANTONIO V. MENDEZ, SR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, 4th Judicial Region, Gumaca, Quezon; MUNICIPALITY OF SAN ANDRES, QUEZON; MAYOR FRANCISCO DE LEON; COUNCILORS: FE LUPINAC, TOMAS AVERIA, MANUEL O. OSAS, WILFREDO O. FONTANIL, ENRICO U. NADRES, RODELITO LUZOIR, LENAC, JOSE L. CARABOT, DOMING AUSA, VIDAL BANQUELES and CORAZON M. MAXIMO, Respondents. VITUG, J.:
On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued, pursuant to the then Sections 68 and 2630 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso
of the same province, the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios.
Executive Order No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the President and coursed through the Provincial Board of Quezon, of the municipal council of San Narciso, Quezon, in its Resolution No. 8 of 24 May 1959. 1
By virtue of Executive Order No. 174, dated 05 October 1965, issued by President Diosdado Macapagal, the municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality beginning 01 July 1963 by operation of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1515. 2The executive order added that "(t)he conversion of this municipal district into (a) municipality as proposed in House Bill No. 4864 was approved by the House of Representatives."
On 05 June 1989, the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, in Gumaca, Quezon, against the officials of the Municipality of San Andres. Docketed Special Civil Action No. 2014-G, the petition sought the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No. 353 and prayed that the respondent local officials of the Municipality of San Andres be permanently ordered to refrain from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices. 3Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General, 4the petitioning municipality contended that Executive Order No. 353, a presidential act, was a clear usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature and in violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Hence, petitioner municipality argued, the officials of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres had no right to exercise the duties and functions of their respective offices that righfully belonged to the corresponding officials of the Municipality of San Narciso.
In their answer, respondents asked for the dismissal of the petition, averring, by way of affirmative and special defenses, that since it was at the instance of petitioner municipality that the Municipality of San Andres was given life with the issuance of Executive Order No. 353, it (petitioner municipality) should be deemed estopped from questioning the creation of the new municipality; 5that because the Municipality of San Andred had been in existence since 1959, its corporate personality could no longer be assailed; and that, considering the petition to be one for quo warranto, petitioner municipality was not the proper party to bring the action, that prerogative being reserved to the State acting through the Solicitor General. 6
On 18 July 1991, after the parties had submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, the trial court resolved to defer action on the motion to dismiss and to deny a judgment on the pleadings.
On 27 November 1991, the Municipality of San Andres filed anew a motion to dismiss alleging that the case had become moot and academic with the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect on 01 January 1991. The movant municipality cited Section 442(d) of the law, reading thusly: Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. - . . .
(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. The motion was opposed by petitioner municipality, contending that the above provision of law was inapplicable to the Municipality of San Andres since the enactment referred to legally existing municipalities and not to those whose mode of creation had been void ab initio. 7 In its Order of 02 December 1991, the lower court 8finally dismissed the petition 9for lack of cause of action on what it felt was a matter that belonged to the State, adding that "whatever defects (were) present in the creation of municipal districts by the President pursuant to presidential issuances and executive orders, (were) cured by the enactment of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as Local Government Code of 1991." In an order, dated 17 January 1992, the same court denied petitioner municipality's motion for reconsideration.
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Hence, this petition "for review on certiorari." Petitioners 10argue that in issuing the orders of 02 December 1991 and 17 January 1992, the lower court has "acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction." Petitioners assert that the existence of a municipality created by a null and void presidential order may be attacked either directly or even collaterally by anyone whose interests or rights are affected, and that an unconstitutional act is not a law, creates no office and is inoperative such as though its has never been passed. 11
Petitioners consider the instant petition to be one for "review on certiorari" under Rules 42 and 45 of the Rules of Court; at the same time, however, they question the orders of the lower court for having been issued with "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction, and that there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law available to petitioners to correct said Orders, to protect their rights and to secure a final and definitive interpretation of the legal issues involved." 12Evidently, then, the petitioners intend to submit their case in this instance under Rule 65. We shall disregard the procedural incongruence.
The special civil action of quo warranto is a "prerogative writ by which the Government can call upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise." 13When the inquiry is focused on the legal existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or any other credit proceeding. 14It must be brought "in the name of the Republic of the Philippines" 15and commenced by the Solicitor General or the fiscal "when directed by the President of the Philippines . . . ." 16Such officers may, under certain circumstances, bring such an action "at the request and upon the relation of another person" with the permission of the court. 17The Rules of Court also allows an individual to commence an action for quo warranto in his own name but this initiative can be done when he claims to be "entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another." 18While the quo warranto proceedings filed below by petitioner municipality has so named only the officials of the Municipality of San Andres as respondents, it is virtually,
however, a denunciation of the authority of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres to exist and to act in that capacity.
At any rate, in the interest of resolving any further doubt on the legal status of the Municipality of San Andres, the Court shall delve into the merits of the petition.
While petitioners would grant that the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160 may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality, they, however, contend that since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner municipality had acquired a vested right to seek the nullification of Executive Order No. 353, and any attempt to apply Section 442 of Republic Act 7160 to the petition would perforce be violative of due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Petitioners' theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been seasonably brought. Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal District, and later the Municipality, of San Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created local government unit. In the same manner that the failure of a public officer to question his ouster or the right of another to hold a position within a one-year period can abrogate an action belatedly filed, 19so also, if not indeed with greatest imperativeness, must a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision be timely raised. 20Public interest demands it.
Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. Section 31 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, constituted as municipal circuits, in the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country, certain municipalities that comprised the municipal circuits organized under Administrative Order No. 33, dated 13 June 1978, issued by this Court pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537. Under this administrative order, the Municipality of San Andres had been covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the province of Quezon.
At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code is proferred. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, 21and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. 22
All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must now be conceded.
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WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ. concur.
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Feliciano, J., is on leave. #
Endnotes:
1 Present at the meeting when the municipal council of San Narciso, Quezon adopted Resolution No. 8 were Municipal Mayor Godofredo M. Tan, ViceMayor Jesus R. Cortez, and Councilors Maximino F. Rivadulla, Eleuterio Aurellana, Juanito Conjares, Dominador Nadres and Felix Aurellana. Councilor Eduardo L. Ausa was absent. The reasons for the adoption of Resolution No. 8 are stated in the following clauses: "WHEREAS, this body has been informed that the chance for the approval of the bill creating the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala, into a regular Municipality is very slim; WHEREAS, the reason behind such disapproval is the patent inability of the proposed Municipality to pay its would-to-be (sic) employees at the rate required in the Minimum Wage Law; WHEREAS, this body in particular, and the great majority of the people of San Andres in general, nowithstanding the provision of the Minimum Wage Law, agitate for the separation or segregation of the abovementioned barrios so as to have a corporate personality in the eyes of the Provincial Board, in the eyes of Congress and in the eyes of the President; WHEREAS, once said barrios acquire a corporate personality in the eyes of the Provincial Board, of Congress and of the President, the development of said barrios and practically the whole southern tip of the Bondoc Peninsula will be hastened. (Rollo, p. 162.)
2 This act has provided for a more autonomous government for municipal districts, amending for the purpose Art. VI, Chapter 64 of the Administrative Code. Sec. 2 thereof states that "any first class municipal district the annual receipts of which shall average more than four thousand pesos for four consecutive fiscal years shall ipso facto be classified as a fifth class municipality and shall thereafter be governed by the provisions of Articles one to five, Chapter 64 of the same Code." 3 Rollo, pp. 77-80.
4 15 SCRA 569, holding that the authority to create municipalities is essentially legislative in nature. 5 Invoked was the Court's ruling in Municipality of Malabang v. Benito 27 SCRA 533. 6 Rollo, pp. 81-83. 7 Rollo, p. 102.
8 Presided by Judge Antonio V. Mendez, Sr. 9 Rollo, pp. 71-74.
10 Named co-petitioners of the Municipality of San Narciso before this Court are its municipal mayor and thirten (13) councilors. 11 Rollo, pp. 183-185.
12 Ibid., pp. 2 & 21; Ibid., p. 50.
13 Moran, COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT, Vol. 3, 1970 ed., p. 208 citing Newman v. U.S., 238 U.S. 537, 545, 56 L.Ed. 513.
14 Only in few exceptions may a private person exercise this function of government, an example of which is when the state law allows a private person to question the regularity of the incorporation of an entity; see E. McQuillin, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, sec. 3.49, p. 592 (3rd ed. 1949).
15 Sec. 1(c), Rule 66, Rules of Court. 16 Sec. 3, ibid. 17 Sec. 4, ibid. 18 Sec. 6, ibid.
19 Tumulak v. Egay, 82 Phil. 828; Tavora v. Ofiana, 83 Phil. 672; Unabia v. City Mayor (99 Phil. 253). In Castro v. Del Rosario (19 SCRA 196), the Court stated that the one-year limitation for filing a quo warranto proceedings is "an expression of policy on the part of the State that persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed should immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a period of one year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by abandonment." 20 Noteworthy is Section 16, Rule 16, of the Rules of Court which sets a five-year limitation for filing a quo warranto action if its purpose is to bring about the "forfeiture of charter" of a corporation, that period to be counted from the time "the act complained of was done or committed." 21 Briad Agro Development Corporation v. De la Serna, supra at p. 534; SSK Parts Corporation v. Camas, 181 SCRA 675.
22 Briad Agro Development Corporation v. De la Serna, 174 SCRA 524, 532 citing Government of P.I. v. Municipality of Binalonan, 32 Phil. 634.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

SO ORDERED. Padilla, Regalado, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.

2 Otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law".

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7 SEE Ilagan v. People, Jan. 29, 1974, 55 SCRA 361.

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9 136 SCRA 27, 40-41.

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12 150 SCRA 144 (1987).

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16 14 Phil. 128, 133-134.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

SO ORDERED. Padilla, Regalado, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.

2 Otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law".

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7 SEE Ilagan v. People, Jan. 29, 1974, 55 SCRA 361.

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9 136 SCRA 27, 40-41.

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12 150 SCRA 144 (1987).

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16 14 Phil. 128, 133-134.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

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(Sgd.) IRENEO DOCALLOS Lupon/Pangkat Secretary

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SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Puno, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

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9 Ibid., id., 12-16. 10 Ibid., id., 6-7.

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11 Ibid., id., 104.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

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Feliciano, J., is on leave. #

chanrobles virtual law library

chanrobles virtual law library

chanrobles virtual law library

chanrobles virtual law library