12 International Affairs Review

Hezbollah and Iran:

The new resistance model and
by Omid Townsend
2PLG7RZQVHQG is a graduate student at Georgetown University. He is a cadet in the
ROTC program there and is scheduled to commission in May 2011. He has interned at
the Institute Ior the Study oI War and is a fuent Farsi speaker.
L
ebanese Hezbollah has evolved
into a political and social Iorce
unprecedented in contemporary
Islamism. From its early stages as
a reaction to Israeli occupation,
to its current role as protector oI
southern Lebanon, Hezbollah has
demonstrated an uncanny ability
to learn, transIorm, and adopt
new tactics and strategies that
help its political aims. Hezbollah
has become a local, regional and
religious Iorce that demands the
respect oI even its most bitter
enemies and rivals.
Hezbollah began as a rag-tag group
oI young, disaIIected Shi`ite youth
with Iranian seed money and clerical
guidance. In 1982, a Iew years into
the Iranian revolution, an organized
and diehard group oI youth began
to carry out sophisticated attacks
Georgetown University
Hebzollah has developed Irom an underground militia in Lebanon to an
internationally recognized resistance Iorce. It has used the Iull spectrum oI tools
to accomplish its objectives. Suicide bombers, assassinations, schools and health
clinics put Hezbollah into a unique category among terrorist organizations.
Hezbollah`s profle and capabilities have been helped by its underwriter, the
Islamic Republic oI Iran. This close relationship has regional and international
implications. Iran and Hezbollah have used their rhetoric and strategy in the
Middle East to appeal to a broader group oI potential partners. Resistance to
Israel and justice Ior the Palestinians has now also grown to resistance to all
things Western and justice Ior all oI the 'oppressed. Graduating to this level
requires a dramatically diIIerent approach iI they are to be successIul. Hezbollah
must use its profle to become a partner in peace. Secondly, tactics and language
must conIorm to an internationally recognized standard oI diplomacy. Not until
these basic requirements are met can Hezbollah hope to realize even its most
Iundamental goals.
why it will fail
13 Hezbollah and Iran
on Israeli patrols. The group put
out statements promising revenge
against the Phalangists Ior their
atrocities against civilians and
more oIten than not delivered on
these promises.
Since the 1980s, however,
Hezbollah has been noted Ior both
its social programs and eIIorts
to support resistance to Israel
1
.
Hezbollah remains a conservative
and Islamic organization with
deep ties to its Quranic invocation.
The organization has positioned
itselI as a strong competitor Ior
the sympathies and allegiances oI
the Lebanese people despite the
country`s Iactionalism and ever-
shiIting politics. Despite a diverse
Iollowing composed oI elements
oI poor, wealthy, Sunni and Shi`ite
Lebanese, the organization has
yet to make the transition Irom a
guerrilla resistance to a credible,
internationally recognized political
actor. The United States (U.S.) and
Europe Ior example have diIIerent
positions regarding Hezbollah.
While Europe reIuses to label
Hezbollah as a purely terrorist
organization, the U.S. targets the
organization`s assets, operatives
and blacklists its organization
2
.
An inquiry into the
political and religious reasoning
oI Hezbollah would be
incomplete without reIerence
to the Islamic Republic oI Iran,
which has underwritten and
guided Hezbollah`s theological
and political Iramework since
the organization`s inception.
Unsurprisingly, Iran`s monetary
and material support has attracted
the attention and condemnation oI
the United States and Israel. Iranian
guidance has helped Hezbollah
to evolve and consolidate its
operations to refect strategic and
political ends. Iran has organized
a Iunctioning bureaucracy and
established camps and training
visits to Syria. Despite the
oIfcial designation oI Hezbollah
as a terrorist organization, the
defnition has Iailed to accurately
describe the organization`s Iull
capabilities and actions.
Hezbollah was shadowy
Irom the very beginning and
its Iranian support added to the
mystique. Members were not on
a roster and meetings were never
documented. Key players such
as the young Hassan Nasrullah
and Abbas Mussawi were natural
selections to head up military
operations and propaganda eIIorts.
Hezbollah operated out oI mainly
poor Shi`ite sections oI Lebanon
and in the remote Baalbek Valley,
where people notice outsiders
instantly and are highly suspicious
oI new Iaces, making intelligence
on the group diIfcult iI not
impossible to come by. As the
14 International Affairs Review
Islamic Revolution cemented itselI
in Iran and frmly established its
authority in the Shi`ite world,
Hezbollah began to echo, in
Lebanon, the Revolution`s message
oI anti-Westernism. Hezbollah
called Ior a move back toward
Islamic ideals that could build a
new Islamic identity and culture.
The organization`s aggressive
spirit oI resistance to neo-colonial
practices has quickly rallied
support Irom similar regional
organizations such as Hamas
and the Muslim Brotherhood,
despite diIIering interpretations
oI Islam and political ambitions.
Hezbollah`s initial revolutionary
zeal eventually gave way to a
pragmatic and immediate call to
religious ideals that could appeal
to the broad mass oI Lebanese.
In 1975, Lebanon descended
into a bloody civil war that lasted
more than 25 years during which
time the country was ravaged by
internal struggles and Iactional
murders between Christians,
Druze, Sunni and Shi`ite groups.
The Israeli army invaded in 1982
under the pretext oI liberating
the south oI Lebanon Irom the
Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO), which had fed Jordan
aIter the Black September events
that eIIectively routed the PLO
Irom carrying out more terrorism
in Israel and subversion against
the Jordanians. Israeli Iorces
eventually became an aggressive,
occupying Iorce in Southern
Lebanon, and the involvement
oI the United States (U.S.) and
Frances` military Iorces served only
to exacerbate Lebanon`s troubles.
In the mid-1980s, Hezbollah,
then only a loose and secretive
group oI Iranian-backed youth,
began carrying out guerilla attacks
against Israel DeIense Forces
(IDF). Hezbollah`s military wing
established itselI as a cunning and
adaptable Iorce that only targeted
IDF as a Ioreign enemy, building
domestic support and a perception
that Hezbollah fghters sought
retributive justice Ior the common
Lebanese. This retributive approach
defed the common image oI a
terrorist group engaging in simple
suicide bombings and kidnappings.
Hezbollah never carried out attacks
on the government in Beirut; rather
it Iurther made appeals to shared
Sunni and Shi`ite tenets oI unity
among Muslims, martyrdom and
jihad against an oppressive enemy.
Since the end oI the civil
war in 1990, Hezbollah has taken
conscious steps to ensure its
survival and has sought to carve
out its own unique niche among
conventional concepts oI terror
groups, insurgencies, sub-state
actors and political parties. Notably,
Hezbollah activities have Iallen
15 Hezbollah and Iran
under each oI these labels since its
organization.
Hezbollah`s vision Ior the
Iuture oI Lebanon and Ior itselI has
changed since its early years in the
1980s.
3
Past successes and Iailures
have shown Hezbollah the limits oI
its eIIectiveness and those situations
and endeavors in which its eIIorts
are most or least productive. On
October 13, 2010, Hezbollah
capitalized on its relationship with
Tehran and welcomed Iranian
President Ahmadinejad to Lebanon
in a wave oI support. The oIfcial
visit was meant to show support to
Lebanon and its Iractious political
groups amid political controversy,
but even so the visit was also
intended to underscore Iran`s
infuence and backing oI its proxy;
Hezbollah. Meanwhile, the United
Nations Special Tribunal looking
into the assassination oI Iormer
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafc
Hariri is expected to conclude its
investigation into Hariri`s death
and indict members oI Hezbollah
in the killing oI the late Prime
Minister, by late 2010. Hezbollah
denies any involvement in the
assassination and threatened serious
consequences iI accused.
Despite the current
political cloud hanging over the
organization, in 2008 Hezbollah`s
political muscle contributed to
much-needed reconciliation and
national unity in the compromise
that brought Lebanon`s President
Michel Suleiman to power.
Hezbollah agreed to a power-
sharing agreement that allows it a
veto over key Ioreign and domestic
issues, but did not, however, try to
implement a Sharia-based agenda
or introduce any Shi`ite-inspired
legislation into parliament. This
restraint and understanding oI
the Lebanese landscape gives
credibility to the organization and
aids its trust building. Hezbollah
takes many opportunities to remind
the Lebanese public that it is not
interested in converting anyone to
Shi`ite Islam and is only interested
in building national unity
4
.
Hezbollah`s networks
oI hospitals, schools and cash
assistance programs Ior victims
oI violence and IDF property
demolition has bought it popular
acceptance as a Iorce Ior justice
in Lebanon. Hezbollah`s enemies,
and outside observers, however,
see this as calculated and strategic
maneuvering instigated by the
organization`s Iranian masters
in the hope oI eventually being
a cornerstone Ior an overall
transIormation in the Middle East
in which Islam plays a key role
in domestic and Ioreign policy.
Moreover, Hezbollah would like to
see a Middle East without Israel.
Hezbollah`s advocacy oI
16 International Affairs Review
social programs and equality Ior all
in Lebanon, as well as its popular
appeal, has stood in contrast to what
some observers may have expected
Irom the organization. Hezbollah`s
political support has grown Irom
its Shi`ite base to include popular
Iavor among Lebanese who are
exasperated by the patronage that
dominates the Iragmented political
landscape in Lebanon. Hezbollah
only asks Ior partnerships and
coalitions that could bring true
reIorm to the Lebanese system
5
.
Although these demands are
appealing and Iorward thinking,
Hezbollah`s true intentions and
long-term political goals must not
be Iorgotten. The organization has
promised to never recognize Israel,
even iI every other country does
6
,
even though Hezbollah would be
hard pressed to keep this promise
should its interest become aligned
with partners who do eventually
make that concession.
Lebanon`s political structure
is still based on conIessionalism;
the President must be Christian
Maronite, the Prime Minister a
Sunni Muslim and the Speaker a
Shi`ite. This system is arguably
directly responsible Ior Lebanon`s
checkered political history.
Patronage and regional neglect
has led to a sense oI abandonment
and little confdence in the central
government. Hezbollah`s domestic
agenda seeks to address these
inequalities while simultaneously
not waiting Ior the government to
oIfcially act. Moreover, Hezbollah
has not Iorgotten the civil war and
assigns blame to the Phalangists,
an ultra-nationalist group oI mostly
Maronite Christians, who were
notoriously brutal in the civil war
and took extreme measures against
Shi`ite civilians; one oI Hezbollah`s
original objectives was to counter
this abuse. Today Hezbollah is the
main opposition to the Phalangists
in parliament and takes every
opportunity to articulate its
position IorceIully and to remind
the Lebanese people oI Hezbollah`s
eIIorts during the 1980s to fght the
Israelis and protect the population
Irom internal pogroms.
Hezbollah is and always
has been an Islamic organization
whose actions and policies are
Iounded upon its interpretation
oI Quranic and Sharia sources.
Leadership oI Hezbollah includes
a seventeen-member Maflis-Al
Shura (advisory council)l that
discusses the organization`s
major goals and decisions, and
Iourteen members in parliament
to help implement and advocate
these views. On the surIace, this
organizational structure appears
to be an attempt to democratize
and rectiIy historical economic
disparity among the population.
17 Hezbollah and Iran
However, because oI clear Iranian
backing, many remain suspicious
oI Hezbollah`s approach and intent.
As a power broker and regional
enIorcer in Lebanon, Hezbollah
has eIIectively partitioned both
south Beirut and south Lebanon
into its own domain, and worked
to improve the local economies
and implement its social ideas,
oItentimes at the expense oI long-
time non-Shi`ite residents
7
. During
the Israeli withdrawal, Ior example,
strategic locations in the south
were diverse and mixed. Some
towns represented all oI Lebanon
both politically and ethnically.
Hezbollah`s goal at the time was to
occupy the vacuum that the Israelis
created when they pulled out in
a matter oI hours. Any civilians
Iound to have collaborated would
have had some very diIfcult times
living in the same village with new
Hezbollah supporters.
In an eIIort to remain
relevant to the everyday citizen,
Hezbollah also runs public clinics,
disposal services and educational
Iacilities Ior children and students
oI all ages. Day schools, established
Ior children, Iocus on instilling
morality and values based on
Islam, and put government schools
to shame
8
in terms oI the standard
oI education. Hezbollah`s reason
Ior implementing its own agenda in
these regions is simple; the Shi`ite
psyche, a sense oI being wronged
and oppressed Ior so long, seeks
out a liberator Irom oppression
and Hezbollah flls this role. The
people in regions where Hezbollah
is active do not beneft Irom the
patronage business environment in
other parts oI Lebanon where GulI
money splashes around. On the one
hand, parts oI Beirut and Tripoli
have been inIused with large
cash projects sponsored by Saudi
princes, while on the other hand
South Beirut has suIIered greatly.
A war zone that bore the brunt oI
even the most recent bombing in
2006, the people in the southern
area oI Lebanon`s capital city are
poor, Shi`ites. Hezbollah sees
this population as its base; having
been leIt out oI Lebanon`s good
old boys business culture. Politics
in Lebanon are still sectarian and
elections are predictable, based
on where a candidate is Irom;
those Irom the south are Shi`ite
and candidates Irom the north are
Sunni. What remains to be seen is
how and in what way Hezbollah
will exercise its power in regard to
the rest oI Lebanon and its ethnic
groups, when the country fnds itselI
in yet another crisis, and especially
iI the organization is accused oI a
role in the assassination oI Iormer
Prime Minister Rafc Hariri.
Choosing to take part in
the elections oI 1992 was a major
18 International Affairs Review
step and admittedly a move that
was a natural progression Ior
Hezbollah. In its maniIesto, the
organization advocates democracy
instead oI the proportional
law that dictates which groups
can achieve and hold specifed
positions in the government. These
rules are outdated and help Iuel
the Iactionalism that still haunts
Lebanon today. Although this
system is still in place, the population
demographic has changed and
Hezbollah is vocal in reminding
Lebanon oI this Iact, perhaps
because the Shi`ite population has
grown signifcantly.
P r o n o u n c e m e n t s
condemning Western imperialism
and its policies, which Hezbollah
sees as oppressing the poor and
less Iortunate, have allowed the
organization to steadily cultivate
the support oI other populist
movements. This approach is
identical to the message put out
by the Iranian state propaganda
machine both Ior the Iranian people
and as a guide Ior the country`s
oIfcial position with other nations
9
.
Arguably, Iran has replaced the
Soviets as the voice oI opposition
and conIrontation to the U.S. By
extension, Hezbollah uses this
populous tone and has been seen
as a testing ground Ior translating
these word`s beyond Iran`s
borders. Perhaps this is because
the area Hezbollah has under its
control in Lebanon is war-weary,
more sympathetic and easier to
manage. Lebanon has been through
years oI confict, and Hezbollah`s
and Iran`s dualistic world view--
the oppressed versus the West--is
likely to fnd a receptive audience
in shell-shocked, south Lebanon.
Hezbollah has the potential
to be an agent instead oI an
obstructer oI peace in the eyes oI
the international community, but
there is an obvious double standard
by which Iran operates. While
on the one hand Iran says that it
wants peace and independence, on
the other hand, the country trains
terrorists and hides its nuclear
activity Irom the international
community. Hezbollah, through
Iran, develops ties to countries
such as Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia
and others where a populist and
anti-Western rhetoric prevails.
Where there is a Shi`ite minority,
or in the case oI Iraq, a majority,
Hezbollah naturally sets up shop.
LeItist organizations that oppose
the United States are looked upon
as potential Iriends oI Hezbollah.
The organization`s calls to the
oppressed gives it intellectual
justifcation, according to its own
supporters,
10
however, Hezbollah`s
documented traIfcking in illicit
drugs, arms and people do not help
its rise to legitimacy in the eyes oI
19 Hezbollah and Iran
the international community
11
.
Many groups such as the Irish
Republican Army (IRA), Spain`s
Basque separatists, and in the same
vein the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt, which have used terror as a
tactic, have arguably made eIIorts
to move Irom the violent attacks
Ior which they gained notoriety, to
cease fre, democratic participation
and compromise that allow them
to survive, although the Muslim
Brotherhood is still oIfcially
banned in Egypt. Hezbollah has
made moves in this direction, which
stands in contrast to other violent
Islamist organizations such as Al-
Qaeda, but has not Iully made the
transIormation.
Currently, Hezbollah`s
military wing conducts a wide
variety oI deIensive and oIIensive
operations, mainly against Israel,
which in Hezbollah`s view is
both the instigator oI unrest in
Lebanon and an enemy state. The
organization`s hard-line position
on Israel is however juxtaposed
to Hezbollah`s willingness to be
practical when circumstances
require, even iI independently
acting outside oI Lebanon`s oIfcial
government channels. Most oI these
actions are, however, back channel
and through neutral intermediaries,
and even then only on matters such
as exchanging dead and prisoner
swaps
12
. South Lebanon is the main
theater oI Hezbollah`s military
planning and activities, and Israeli
sentries routinely exchange fre with
Hezbollah border patrols. In 2006,
Imad Mughniyyeh orchestrated
a kidnapping/ambush operation
targeting an Israeli tank patrol that
went awry. The attack led Israel to
invade and bomb southern Lebanon
as Iar north as Beirut, leaving
thousands oI Lebanese dead.
Hezbollah retaliated with guerilla
tactics and Iranian technology.
Hezbollah`s symbolic successes,
such as reports oI an unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) that targeted
an Israeli warship oII Beirut and
inficted Iour causalities, raised the
profle and reputation oI Hezbollah
around the Arab world yet did
little to satisIy the local population
exasperated by the high casualty
rate inficted by superior Israeli
frepower. Hezbollah admitted
that it did not anticipate such a
heavy response
13
Irom Israel. The
Lebanese public expressed anger
at Hezbollah Ior acting on its own
behalI and disregarding its own
statements and promises to not
endanger the Lebanese people.
As oI 2010, Hezbollah is still
rebuilding and emphasizing that its
actions, and not the government`s,
are making things better Ior the
people oI south Lebanon.
Hezbollah`s political
activities mirror those oI many
20 International Affairs Review
popular political groups Iound
worldwide, and it has developed
a public relations organization
that includes a news channel,
newspapers, websites, and
statement mill that operates on
a twenty-Iour hour cycle. The
Hezbollah-run news channel
broadcasts in Hebrew to reach the
ever-close Israeli public, a strategic
audience which Hezbollah knows
listens in
14
. Hezbollah also craIts
its interviews and public gatherings
to construct the best possible
public image. Hezbollah Secretary
General Hassan Nasrullah regularly
incorporates witticisms, employs
perIect Arabic and sprinkles humor
throughout his speeches in an eIIort
to elevate the status oI Hezbollah
public speaking outreach on media
websites such as YouTube, and
reach as many as halI a million
viewers Ior individual clips
15
.
Hezbollah certainly knows how
to project itselI and appeal to a
common decency and justice in the
organization`s eIIort to be perceived
as vindicator and punisher oI what
the region sees as the heavy hand
oI Israel.
With all oI its successes
and newIound political clout,
Hezbollah still has a Iew steps to
take iI it truly seeks to become a
legitimate entity in the eyes oI
the international community. The
United States still lists Hezbollah as
a terrorist organization. Hezbollah`s
involvement in the 1995 bombing oI
an Argentine Jewish cultural center
has not done anything to help the
organization`s cause. Hezbollah and
the Iranian Quds Force routinely
carry out international operations
and assassinations in the Middle
East and Europe,
16
which simply
solidiIy the resolve oI Hezbollah
opponents.
Tactically, Hezbollah`s
operational discipline along with
its organizational structure has
made the military wing a model to
be duplicated in terrorist groups.
The organization has an advanced
counter-intelligence program
17
in
place and its tier-one operators
are trained and provided Iull
cover under Iranian diplomatic
passports
18
. Hezbollah has an
independent Special Forces wing
along with a local voluntary militia
within Lebanon that can be called
on short notice. The command
structure is well-organized and
regionally placed. OIIensive
surveillance operations are carried
out with Hebrew-speaking Arabs
that routinely keep track oI the
positions oI Israeli units and record
their movements to detect patterns
and rotations, and in 2010 IDF
oIfcers were arrested on suspected
ties to Lebanese drug dealers
with connections to Hezbollah
19
.
OIIensive violent activities and
21 Hezbollah and Iran
potential entrapment eIIorts need to
stop iI Hezbollah is to move Irom
a guerilla resistance to a populist
movement that is an internationally
recognized entity.
It is diIfcult to gauge the
workings oI Hezbollah`s inner
circle and its decision making
process. It is a notoriously hard
organization to penetrate Irom an
intelligence standpoint
20
. Perhaps
in an eIIort to open up and show
its true intentions, Hezbollah
should discuss its short- and long-
term goals. II the organization is to
truly transIorm into a progressive
Islamic model, one based on reIorm
and advocacy -- a position which
Hezbollah gives lip service to
21
--
the organization has some diIfcult
decisions to make. In Hezbollah`s
2009 maniIesto, Hassan Nasrullah
states that, 'The Resistance in
Lebanon has evolved Irom a
Lebanese national value to an Arab
and Islamic value and has become
today an international value that`s
taught all over the world
22
. It is
unlikely that Hezbollah doctrine
is taught all over the world, but
Nasrullah may have a point iI he`s
reIerring to a new bloc Iorming
based on countering Western
'hegemony.
With Iran`s increasingly hard-
line, anti-Western stance, a shiIt
away Irom the Iran relationship
would garner Hezbollah signifcant
appreciation Irom both regional
neighbors and enemies. OI course,
the question remains over whether
or not this shiIt is possible, and what
the potential repercussions would be
iI Hezbollah were to 'bite the hand
that Ieeds it, let alone lay down
its weapons and take a position oI
non-violence. The Middle East,
however, has not Iully explored the
benefts oI a non-violent, strategic
resistance model. Tried and tested
by oppressed people throughout
history, the moral high ground is
the only method that has brought
about sweeping change in the last
century--most notably during the
U.S. Civil Rights Movement led
by Martin Luther King Jr. in the
1960s and Mohandas Karamchand
Gandhi`s early twentieth century,
nonviolent resistance movement
in India. Non-violence would
be an about-Iace in broad-scale,
resistance tactics in the Middle
East. Hezbollah would move
Irom a Lebanon-based insurgency
movement to a prime example
oI Islamic teachings guiding a
Iorward-thinking agenda based
on social justice and democratic
principles. Hassan Nasrullah has
advocated Ior and already sees
changes in Hezbollah`s resistance
model taking place, only to
undermine this shiIt by the use oI
Iorce. Moreover, Hezbollah has yet
to Iully persuade a skeptical and
22 International Affairs Review
confict-weary Lebanese population
oI a change in tactics. Even
Lebanon`s own Shi`ite population
Hezbollah`s base oI support in
the country -- has expressed doubt
over the organization`s capacity to
deliver on its promises oI reIorm
and true change
23
.
To truly integrate into a
divided Lebanon, Hezbollah must
carry its message to an international
audience and grow Irom short-
term, cash-based aid to a partner in
peace and constructive dialogue in
the larger Islamic world. Hezbollah
has made clear one oI its main
purposes is to act as a resistance
Iorce to Israel. As much as
Hezbollah demonizes and routinely
places the blame on Israel Ior the
problems oI the Middle East as an
extension oI the Israeli-Palestinian
confict, the organization has
taken Iew steps to oIIer tangible,
practical solutions that could bring
about true peace and prosperity Ior
the region. Hezbollah, by virtue
oI its proximity to Israel and its
homegrown character, is ideal to
fll this niche.
Iran, Hezbollah`s ideal
Iorm oI government, sees itselI
as the sole model in the region oI
a government that stands up to an
international coalition oI countries
that in Iran`s view seeks to keep
Muslims Irom taking their rightIul
place among nation-states. Iran
has downplayed the Iact that it is
Shi`ite and Persian, unlike the Arab
world which is predominantly
Sunni Muslim. In an eIIort to
reach the regional community, Iran
broadcasts numerous TV channels
in Arabic while its leaders seek
to appeal to the broader Middle
East, despite reminders oI Iranian
actions and stances toward Arab
governments supported by the U.S.
As Iran`s proxy, Hezbollah echoes
this reminder when prudent.
Hezbollah lightens its message
in Lebanon to appeal to the in-
country population but there is no
mistake that Hezbollah`s message
Ior the rest oI the world is written
in Tehran.
Iran, and by extension
Hezbollah, needs to realize that
international public opinion is
indeed an important commodity.
Currently, many in the West view
Iran`s mullahs with contempt and
take their vehement statements
against Israel and its allies as an
espousal oI religious violence
that eIIectively seals Iran`s Iate.
Hezbollah puts out this same
message. The organization`s fery
rhetoric regarding Israel serves
only to alienate it Irom the rest oI
the world. Hezbollah would beneft
signifcantly iI it broadcast in
English and took slightly diIIerent
tones in regards to the Israeli-
Palestinian issue, much similar to
23 Hezbollah and Iran
the tones it uses in Lebanon when
appealing Ior partnerships and
national unity.
Any Iair-minded observer
will acknowledge that abuses
have taken place on both sides oI
the Israeli-Palestinian confict Ior
many years. There is no excuse
Ior terrorism, extrajudicial killings
carried out by soldiers or the
blatant destruction oI property.
The Palestinian cause, whether
articulated by Hezbollah, Iran,
Hamas or the Palestinian Authority,
must reach a wider audience. Public
opinion generally sympathizes with
those who are persecuted. However,
the propaganda machine oI Iran
and Hezbollah needs to move
Irom a violent depiction oI Israel
as the demon and instead paint
the problem as a source oI mutual
suIIering. Iran should use its clout
in the Middle East to move away
Irom its infammatory rhetoric to
one oI diplomacy. This suggestion
may sound antithetical to Iran`s
vision and strategy, but any other
course oI action has consequences
that have been exhausted and tested
beIore, with little or no positive
result. Hezbollah has routinely
used rocket attacks against Israel
only to be answered with return
fre. The organization`s collusion
with Iraqi resistance in the south
near NajaI and Karbala, two holy
Shi`ite cities, has been documented
and proven by U.S. and British
intelligence. Despite its military
prowess, Hezbollah has little to
show Ior when Iorce is used. On the
other hand, the organization`s social
programs and public outreach is
where many people fnd sympathy
and gratitude Ior Hezbollah.
There is no ambiguity
in Hezbollah`s support Ior the
Palestinians, and the organization
enjoys support Irom Islamic groups
oI various orientation and ambition
Ior this platIorm; iI not logistically
then defnitely in spirit. In terms oI
actual material support, Hezbollah
is the one that is providing, and it
was recently acknowledged that
Hezbollah sends 'any kind oI
support to Hamas
24
.
II solving the Palestinian
issue is high on Iran`s and
Hezbollah`s agendas, the
organization could use its social
and political capital to reorient its
message toward a more conciliatory
tone. In this regard, Hezbollah has
enjoyed success in Lebanon by
using the Quran to build legitimacy
and authority with the majority oI
the Lebanese public. II the model
is to Iulfll the organization`s
advocacy objectives, Hezbollah
must eventually move toward a
new message oI unity, justice and
rule oI law; all oI which have bases
in the Quran.
Iran would oI course need to change
24 International Affairs Review
1
Silverstein, Ken. 'Augustus Norton on Hezbollah`s Social ServicesBy Ken
Silverstein (Harper`s Magazine). Harper`s Magazine. http://www.harpers.org/
archive/2007/03/sb-augustus-no-1173896326 (accessed October 04, 2010).
2
'Adding Hezbollah to the EU Terrorist List (2007) (testimony oI Alexander
Ritzmann). United States House oI Representatives Committee on Foreign
AIIairs Subcommittee on Europe.
3
'Full Speech oI H. E. Sayyed Nasrallah : Hizbullahs New Political
ManiIesto. 'We Want Lebanon Strong & United. Islamic Resistance In
Lebanon - OIfcial Web Site. http://english.moqawama.org/essaydetails.
php?eid9632&cid214 (accessed October 03, 2010).
4
Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: a Short History. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2009.
5
Ibid.
6
'Al-ManarTV: Hezbollah New ManiIesto: We Want Strong, United
Lebanon, Hezbollah New ManiIesto: We Want Strong, United Lebanon,
accessed October 04, 2010, http://www.almanar.com.lb/newssite/NewsDetails.
aspx?id113379&languageen.
7
Phares, Walid. 'Ten Years Ago, Hezbollah Takes over South Lebanon.
Counterterrorism Blog. Web log entry posted May 23, 2010. http://
counterterrorismblog.org/2010/05/tenyearsagohezbollahtakes.php
(accessed October 4, 2010).
8
Flanigan, Shawn Teresa, and Mounah Abdel-Samad. 'Hezbollah`s Social
Jihad: Nonprofts as Resistance Organizations. Middle East Policy 16, no. 2
(2009).
9
Behnoud, Massoud. 'Propoganda and Reality. Regime Change Iran.
its stance frst. An overtly public
shiIt would be challenging while
a behind the scenes method would
be the most practical approach.
Saudi Arabia currently serves as a
precedent Ior this course oI action.
Hezbollah`s agenda Ior Lebanon and
Iran`s plan Ior the Middle East are
punctuated by similar objectives: a
Palestinian state, independence Irom
Ioreign interIerence and meddling,
and an overall shiIt Irom despotic
governments toward leadership that
refects an Islamic set oI values.
Advocating Ior justice and Islamic
unity needs to go hand in hand with
international relations, and there
could be a basis Ior these objectives
but only iI implemented with tact.
Hezbollah`s statements have laid the
groundwork Ior nonviolent positions
to take shape, and iI the organization
has been practical and politically
savvy up to this point, it is reasonable
to assume that a transIormation into
a credible, internationally recognized
political actor may yet take place.
25 Hezbollah and Iran
Web log entry posted October 11, 2005. http://regimechangeiran.blogspot.
com/2005/10/propaganda-and-reality.html (accessed October 4, 2010).
10
Jaber, Hala. Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1997.
11
Conery, Ben. 'Hezbollah Uses Mexican Drug Routes into U.S. The
Washington Post, March 27, 2009, Online ed.
12
Basma, Ayat, and Avida Landau. 'Hezbollah, Israel Swap Corpses on
Lebanon Border , Reuters. Business & Financial News, Breaking US
& International News , Reuters.com. http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSL16516924.CH.2400 (accessed October 04, 2010).
13
'Asia Times Online-Middle East News-Those Pesky Puppies oI War. Asia
Times Online::Asian News Hub Providing the Latest News and Analysis Irom
Asia. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/MiddleEast/IE22Ak01.html (accessed
October 04, 2010).
14
Abu-Fadil, Magda. 'Al-Manar TV: No Love Ior U.S. but No Help Irom
Taliban. Poynter Online. http://www.poynter.org/dg.lts/id.16466/content.
contentview.htm (accessed October 04, 2010).
15
' . YouTube.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?vISYkBIsB64w (accessed October 04,
2010).
16
Partlow, Joshua. 'Iran`s Elite Force Is Said to Use Hezbollah as Proxy`
in Iraq - Washingtonpost.com. Washingtonpost.com - Nation, World,
Technology and Washington Area News and Headlines. http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/02/AR2007070200174.
html (accessed October 04, 2010).
17
'The Daily Star - Politics - Colonel conIesses` to Spying since 1997.
Lebanon News :: Middle East News :: The Daily Star - Lebanon. http://
www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?editionid1&categid2&article
id102442#axzz11QxjknS2 (accessed October 04, 2010).
18
'Imad Mughniyeh: Hezbollah`s Phantom Killed (Iran Press Service). Iran
Press Service. http://www.iran-press-service.com/ips/articles-2008/Iebruary-
2008/imad-mughniyeh-hezbollahs-phantom-killed.shtml (accessed October
04, 2010).
19
'Israeli OIfcer, Civilians Arrested over Hezbollah Drug Ties - CNN.
Featured Articles From The CNN. http://articles.cnn.com/2010-06-30/world/
israel.drugs1idI-israeli-hezbollah?sPM:WORLD (accessed October 04,
2010).
20
Goldberg, JeIIrey. 'Understanding Hezbollah`s Leadership and Mission :
NPR. NPR : National Public Radio : News & Analysis, World, US, Music &
Arts : NPR. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId5567843
(accessed October 04, 2010).
26 International Affairs Review
21
'Al-ManarTV: Hezbollah New ManiIesto: We Want Strong,
United Lebanon. Hezbollah New ManiIesto: We Want Strong,
United Lebanon. http://www.almanar.com.lb/newssite/NewsDetails.
aspx?id113379&languageen (accessed October 04, 2010).
22
Ibid.
23
Antelava, Natalia. 'Lebanese Sceptical over Unity Talks. BBC News -
Home. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7618480.stm (accessed October 04, 2010).
24
Farah, Douglas. 'Hamas, Hezbollah-And the Muslim Brotherhood?
Counterterrorism Blog. May 14, 2009. Accessed October 13, 2010. http://
counterterrorismblog.org/2009/05/hamashezbollah-andthemuslim.php.