Britain's Cold War Against FDR'S Grand Design
Britain's Cold War Against FDR'S Grand Design
by Michael O. Billington
4/7/99
Introduction
Part I: Subverting the Atlantic Charter
Part II Recolonization
Sukarno
Burma and Thailand
Vietnam
Part III Cold War
Part IV Spirit of Bandung: A Moment of Hope
Part V Cold War vs. The Spirit of Bandung
Part VI Kennedy and the Non-Aligned Movement
NAM
Kennedy vs. Pugwash Maphilindo
Vietnam Again
Introduction
The British diplomatic archives of the last years of World War II are replete with
whining and hair-pulling about American intentions regarding the Japanese-occupied
European colonies of Asia. The British knew that neither FDR nor U.S. Supreme
Commander in the Pacific Gen. Douglas MacArthur could be trusted to defend
European "property rights" in Asia. The Atlantic Charter, signed by Roosevelt and
Churchill in 1941, pledged to "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of
government under which they will live, and ... to see sovereign rights and self-
government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them." This pledge
meant nothing to Churchill, who claimed with classic British Imperial arrogance that
the Charter simply did not apply to the British Empire. In fact, the British intended to
exempt all the European colonies, not just their own, from the promise of self-
determination in the Atlantic Charter, and in particular those of the Dutch in Indonesia
(the Netherlands East Indies) and the French in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia
(French Indochina).
A British War Department memo of February 1944 captures British sentiment:
"Our main reason for favoring the restoration of Indochina to France is that we see
danger to our own Far Eastern Colonies in President Roosevelt's ideas that
restoration depends upon the UN (or rather the U.S.) satisfying themselves that the
French record in Indochina justifies the restoration of French authority."2
When Gen. MacArthur was appointed commander of the Southwest Pacific
Area in 1942, his command included all of Japanese occupied Southeast Asia. In
1943, at the first Quebec Conference, Churchill succeeded in establishing a British
Southeast Asia Command (SEAC), headquartered in Kandy, Ceylon, with Adm.
Louis Mountbatten in command, which divided up Southeast Asia between
MacArthur's Pacific Command and Mountbatten's SEAC. The British got Burma and
Malaya, their previous colonies, as well as Thailand and Sumatra, the large
northwestern island of Indonesia. But they were not satisfied, and continued to
pressure the U.S. to allow British priority in "liberating" the entire region.
The choice of Mountbatten to command British operations in Asia was critical to
British post-war designs. His appointment was entirely due to his royal pedigree. As
a direct descendant of Britain's Queen Victoria, Mountbatten was related to virtually
every king of Europe, whether of Denmark, Germany, Greece, Russia, Spain, or
Sweden. More particularly, he was a cousin both of Britain's Edward VIII, who
abdicated in 1936 and took the name Duke of Windsor, and of his successor, George
VI. He was maternal uncle and virtual foster-father of Prince Philip (Mountbatten),
Duke of Edinburgh, and he arranged Philip's marriage with the present Queen,
Elizabeth. Lord Mountbatten's military policies were restricted by the demands of his
primary assignment -- the re-establishment of the European colonies in Asia.
The U.S. intention in agreeing to the establishment of SEAC was that the British
would take a larger role in defeating the Japanese in Burma, thus opening up a
Southern route for the resupply of China. The British had other plans. By 1944,
Mountbatten had sabotaged the planned China Road through Burma by stopping the
Ledo Road at Mytkyina, and generally abandoned plans for the recapture of Burma,
turning his eyes toward Malaya and Sumatra. Gen. George Stilwell, Commander of
U.S. forces in China- Burma-India, declared quite bluntly: "The Limies have now
shown their hand. This pusillanimous and double-crossing program amply confirms
our suspicions. They are determined to keep China blocked and powerless."3
Many Americans began to believe that SEAC actually stood for "Save England's
Asian Colonies."
Roosevelt's idea for the former colonies following the defeat of the Japanese
was for "Territorial Trusteeship," whereby an international institution (such as the
proposed United Nations) would oversee a transition to independence and self-
determination over a specified time frame, such as had already been established by
the U.S. in the Philippines during the 1930's. He insisted that all colonization must
end, and that Hong Kong, in particular, must be returned to China. Only a few weeks
before his death, Roosevelt, according to his close friend and advisor Charles
Taussig, said that "there are 1.1 billion brown people. In many Eastern countries they
are ruled by a handful of whites and they regret it. Our goal must be to help them
achieve independence. 1.1 billion potential enemies are dangerous. He said he
included 450 million Chinese in that. He then added, Churchill doesn't understand
this."4
Roosevelt knew that the British were plotting with the other colonial powers to
reassert direct control of Asia after the war. He instructed the U.S. Ambassador in
London to inform the British that no "understanding" among the European powers on
Asia would be valid without U.S. concurrence.
The situation within China during the war exemplified the British role in
subverting the war effort in order to assure the eventual return of their colonial
possessions. The wartime U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), set up by
Roosevelt in 1941, ran U.S.-intelligence operations in China, but was constantly
factionalized between those who supported Roosevelt's policy of U.S. support for a
strong Chinese nation, and the British effort to keep China weak and divided. The
head of British intelligence operations in China was the notorious John Keswick,
chairman of Jardine Matheson, Britain's preeminent "Dope, Inc." corporate structure
in colonial Hong Kong. Keswick and his minions made no secret of their hatred for
Chiang Kai Shek and the Nationalist Party (Guomindang). His energies were divided
between dirty tricks against Chiang Kai Shek and Chiang's intelligence chief, Tai Li,
and efforts to prevent any independent American intelligence capacity within China.
Keswick tried to convince the U.S. that the Nationalists' anti-British sentiments were
actually anti-foreign, and that the white-folk should therefore stick together and
operate within China independently of the Chinese government.
However, in April 1942 Chiang and Tai Li ordered Keswick and his entire
operation out of the country. Keswick argued vigorously for the U.S. to defend him,
but Roosevelt refused. Instead, Admiral Ernest King, head of the U.S. Fleet,
escalated plans for an independent U.S. presence in China, sending U.S. Navel
officer and old China hand Milton (Mary) Miles to work directly with Chiang Kai Shek
and Tai Li. Chiang, on his part, instructed Tai Li to deal exclusively with the
Americans.5 Miles and Tai Li proceeded to establish a highly effective intelligence
capability in prosecuting the war against the Japanese.
Miles also served as head of OSS China in 1942 and 1943, but the OSS
remained drastically compromised by British agents. OSS chief William Donovan,
although generally loyal to Roosevelt, was himself split on the question of the British
role. Exemplary of the problem is the fact that John Keswick, upon being ousted from
China, went directly to New York to meet his friend William Stephenson (Intrepid),
head of British intelligence in the U.S. Stephenson, in turn, arranged for Allen Dulles,
who was head of the OSS office in New York, to hire Keswick for OSS!
Keswick's primary operative within China after his organization was expelled
was C.V. Starr, the newspaper and insurance mogul from Shanghai who founded
American International Underwriters (now called AIG, headed by Kissinger crony
Hank Greenberg). Starr, also a friend of William Stephenson, had transformed his
"company men" across China into an intelligence network for the OSS. But when
Miles insisted that all foreign intelligence within China must be subordinate to the
sovereign government of our Chinese allies, Starr bolted and went to work directly
for the British.
The OSS was also involved in contacts with Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Yen'an in northern China. However, the factional
divisions within the OSS made it nearly impossible for President Roosevelt to know
who was playing the Chinese Communists against the Nationalists (which was the
British policy), and who was seriously trying to bring the two sides together to fight
the Japanese--and to prevent civil war after the defeat of Japan. Roosevelt assigned
a personal emissary to China, Maj. Gen. Patrick Hurley. Hurley met with the CCP in
Yen'an, but later learned that OSS officers were working out a secret deal with the
CCP, behind his back (and therefore behind Roosevelt's back) to provide weapons to
the CCP without first establishing an agreement with the Chinese government.
Hurley reported this to Roosevelt, who ordered an investigation. Both Hurley
and Gen. Abert Wedemeyer, Commander of U.S. forces in China, recognized this as
essentially a British- run operation. Wedemeyer cabled the War Department in
December 1944: "We Americans interpret U.S. policy as requiring a strong unified
China and a China fighting effectively against Japanese. There is considerable
evidence that British policy is not in consonance with U.S. policy. British Ambassador
personally suggested to me that a strong unified China would be dangerous to the
world and certainly would jeopardize the white man's position immediately in Far
East and ultimately throughout the world."6
The British therefore supported all sides, by various means, among the warlord,
communist, and government forces in China, during and after World War II. In the
words of Carton de Wiart, the official liaison between Lord Mountbatten and Chiang
Kai Shek, in a cable to London: "I am not really worried about civil war, which is after
all usual here."7 The actual target of this British policy was revealed in an article in
the London Daily Mail in October 1945, which complained that "anti-British
psychology has not been discouraged by our American ally. U.S. propagandists have
been working from Lanchow, gateway to Tibet, to the Gobi Desert of Mongolia.... A
great plan to dam the Yangtze, known as the 'Yangtze Valley Authority,' will be one of
the greatest engineering contracts of
modern times Their geologists have plodded the old caravan trails
to the fringes of Tibet and the wild western tribal countries."8 In other words, the
British identified the "threat," over fifty years ago, of China establishing itself as a
truly independent nation state through such great projects as the Yangtze dam (now
near completion as the Three Gorges Dam) and the reconstruction of the old Silk
Road (now the center of China's development policy under the name of the Eurasian
Landbridge.9 And, as today, the British were particularly energized to prevent U.S.
collaboration with China on such great projects.
Gen. Hurley flushed out the British plans for Southeast Asia, devised without
informing the U.S.: "The British, French and Dutch in the Far East are bound
together by a vital common interest, namely,
repossession of their colonial empires You may therefore expect
Britain, France and the Netherlands to disregard the Atlantic Charter and all
promises made to other nations by which they obtained support in the earlier stages
of the war.... In the foregoing you have an outline of the reason why the Council of
the Three Empires recently formed at Kandy (SEAC Headquarters) has been built up
without the consent or approval of the U.S."10
Roosevelt stood his ground at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, forcing
British agreement to the Trusteeship principle. Historian Wm. Roger Louis declared:
"The British post-war colonial vision died at Yalta."11 Nonetheless, when FDR sent
Hurley to Moscow and London the following month to get Soviet and British
agreement to his strong-China policy, Churchill told him to his face, "Hong Kong will
be eliminated from the British Empire only over my dead body," and called the
strong-China policy a "great American
illusion."12
The specifics of the Trusteeship policy, however, were left to the founding
conference of the United Nations in San Francisco, which began on April 25, 1945.
Roosevelt, in preparation for that conference, developed a plan to send international
teams of technicians, doctors, economists and others to thoroughly investigate the
conditions and needs in the colonies such that Trusteeship would lead directly to
independence. He had no intention of leaving the development of the former colonial
world to the "free trade" of Adam Smith's "invisible hand," which he knew to be
neither free nor invisible, but a direct tool of colonial oppression.
Unfortunately, Roosevelt died just two weeks before the founding conference of
the United Nations. Even more unfortunately, a leading delegate to that conference
was John Foster Dulles.
John Foster Dulles was one of Roosevelt's most outspoken political enemies,
and the mentor of Roosevelt's 1944 Republican presidential opponent, Thomas
Dewey. Dulles was an isolationist, and an open admirer of Mussolini and Hitler in the
early 1930's, praising both Italian and German fascism as "dynamic," while the rest
of the world was "static." "I dislike isolation," he said in 1939, "but I prefer it to
identification with a senseless repetition of the cyclical struggle between the dynamic
and the static forces of the world."13
In 1943, Dulles published a book called {The Six Pillars of Peace,} calling for a
World Government, to be called the United Nations. Roosevelt recognized the Dulles
version of a United Nations as an apology for the preservation of the European
Empires. Just before his death, Roosevelt tried to prevent Dulles from attending the
San Francisco conference. The President asked his friend Charles Taussig to attend
on his behalf. Taussig later reported sadly to Eleanor Roosevelt "how little influence
the memory of FDR had with (the other U.S. delegates at San Francisco)."14
Dulles, in a manner which would become his stock and trade as the controller of
foreign policy in the Eisenhower administration, "explained" (falsely) to the
Conference that Trusteeship really only meant autonomy for the colonies within the
European Empires. Such "autonomy" was designed to lure would-be nationalist
leaders into accepting a concept of nationalism which was no more than national
leaders ruling over a colonial entity, in which all international political and economic
relations remained under the control of the colonial power. While the native
populations may have some say over local matters, the fundamental conception of
the nature of the individual remained that of the subservient subject to a foreign
imperial power. Dulles's fellow Republican delegate to the San Francisco
Conference, Harold Stassen, made this explicit, showing himself to be a worthy
student of Winston Churchill: "There were some areas which could never govern
themselves and hence could not, for their own welfare, be allowed to determine their
own political
status We did not wish to find ourselves committed to breaking up
the British Empire."15 Churchill, for his part, treated the Yalta agreement as he
had the Atlantic Charter, declaring that Yalta "in no way governs any arrangement
that may be made for the future."16
The British delegate to San Francisco, Colonial Secretary Lord Cranborne, after
the idea for Trusteeship for colonial possessions had been abandoned, gloried in the
"genuine conviction of the U.S. delegation that the unity and strength of colonial
empires (not only the British) is essential to world security." This, he continued, was
"a very healthy development in U.S. opinion."17 The die was cast.
The British were not confident, however, that the U.S. military in Asia, still under
the direction of Gen. MacArthur, would simply turn over the liberated nations of Asia
to their previous colonial masters. With Roosevelt's death, the British pushed the
malleable Truman to transfer post-war responsibility for all of Southeast Asia to the
British SEAC, under Mountbatten. At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, they
achieved their goal. President Truman removed all of the Netherlands East Indies
and most of French Indochina from the command of Gen. MacArthur. Hong Kong
was to be obediently handed back to the British. At the same time, Burma was
removed from the U.S. run China-Burma-India command, very much against the
wishes of Chiang Kai Shek and Gen. Wedemeyer, and placed entirely under SEAC.
The U.S. had already reconquered the Philippines, but the British were to have full
control over the remainder of Southeast Asia, with the single exception of the
northern half of Vietnam, where China would be responsible for accepting the
Japanese surrender.
The supposed justification for transferring responsibility for the liberation of
Southeast Asia from MacArthur to Mountbatten was the need for MacArthur to
prepare for the invasion of Japan. This was a witting fraud. The British knew that no
such invasion would take place. MacArthur's successful blockade of
Japanese shipping routes had already forced the Japanese to seek terms of
surrender, through Vatican channels, which terms were not significantly different from
those ultimately imposed after the war. Even worse, the British had already
persuaded Truman to deploy America's newly-developed nuclear weapons upon
Japanese cities, an act of barbarism which served no military purpose whatsoever,
since Japan was already a defeated nation. As LaRouche has shown 18, the British
wanted the U.S. to display a willingness to use weapons of mass destruction on
civilian populations, in order to terrorize the nations of the world into acceptance of a
post-war world government as the only means of escaping the threat of nuclear
annihilation. With Roosevelt's death, Truman proved to be a willing partner for the
British strategy.
The expansion of Mountbatten's sphere of control, then, had only one purpose:
the re-establishment of European colonial power, and the defeat of all nationalist
resistance to that power -- without U.S. interference.
"[H]ad the Truman administration not swung over to Winston Churchill's anti-
American policies, the proper course of action for the post-World War II U.S.A. would
have been to mobilize and expand the U.S. machine-tool-design sector as a whole,
to supply the nations of Asia, Africa and the Americas the high rates of development
of infrastructure and technology needed to fulfill Roosevelt's vision of a post-war
'American Century'. Instead, we substantially collapsed the levels of production,
rather than capitalizing the accumulated investment in war-production capacity as an
active new industry for development of the world as a whole." 19 The British moved
immediately after the Japanese surrender to occupy Burma, Singapore, Malaya and
Hong Kong, their former colonies, as well as Indonesia, Thailand and South Vietnam.
The shortage of troop transports, mostly American owned, caused some delay. While
the Truman administration made some noises about not using U.S. materiel to
reestablish colonialism, in fact it was U.S. ships and planes which transported the
European colonial armies back to their former possessions.
Sukarno
At one point the British advised the Dutch to deal with Sukarno the same way
the British had dealt with Burma's nationalist leader, Aung San. This could be
interpreted in various ways. Although Mountbatten negotiated Burma's independence
with Aung San, the
British also arranged for Aung San's assassination soon before the scheduled
date for independence. Perhaps not coincidentally, the assassination of Aung San
took place on the day before the "First Dutch Police Action" in Indonesia in July
1947, the first of two rounds of full-scale war against the nationalists.
Burma was not a major source of mineral wealth--its importance was more geo-
political. The mountain country in the north, bordering Thailand, Laos, China and
India, was a desolate but strategic pivot point in Asia which was under nobody's
control. Sparsely populated by various hill tribes, it was the site of some of Britain's
richest opium production. In 1946, Mountbatten decided to grant Burma full
independence while retaining covert control of the hill-tribe country. Aung San, a
nationalist leader who, like Sukarno, had worked with the Japanese occupation
forces (he and his "30 comrades" had been trained militarily and politically during the
1930's in Japan) was the only figure who could conceivably have united the country.
With his assassination, the country predictably fell into civil war immediately following
independence. The hill country became a staging ground for British and U.S. covert
operations in the region for the next fifty years, and a primary source of drugs for
London's Dope,Inc.
Although the British policy toward India's independence is not a subject of this
report, it must be noted that Lord Mountbatten, following his de-facto partition and
instigation of civil war in Burma, proceeded to oversee the British mandated partition
of India into India and Pakistan, assuring instability and bloody communal warfare for
many years to come.
Mountbatten tried to portray himself as the friend of nationalism, both for his role
in decolonizing Burma and India, and as a vocal critic of the Dutch and the French
for their heavy-handed treatment of nationalist forces in their colonies. But in fact,
Mountbatten's crucial role for the Empire was in recognizing that the existing form of
19th Century European colonialism could not survive in a world forever changed by
the U.S. role in World War II, and the threat of a U.S.-led world economic order
based on technologically driven collaboration between sovereign nation states. To
preserve the reality of the British Empire in a new form required granting
independence, but only after fostering multiple points of division. The "weak China"
policy was applied universally.
British policy toward Thailand, situated between British Burma, British Malaya
and French Indochina, was a special case. Thailand was the single Southeast Asian
nation which had never been colonized. In part, this was due to an agreement
between Britain and France to keep Thailand neutral as a buffer between the two
Empires, but it was also due in part to the historical role of the U.S. in Thailand,
through diplomats and missionaries who supported and strengthened the freedom
and sovereignty of the Thai kingdom.22 Nonetheless, the British were the primary
foreign investors and trading partners in Thailand before the war.
During the war, the Thais officially allied with the Japanese occupation force,
and even declared war against the British and the United States. In the year
preceding the Japanese arrival, Phibun Songkhram, one of the two nationalist
leaders of the 1932 peaceful revolution which had established a constitutional
monarchy in Thailand, declared himself "Phu Nam," the Leader, and established
fascist forms of social organization and control. Taking advantage of the British and
French preoccupation with the war in Europe, Phibun seized portions of Burma, Laos
and Cambodia as part of "Greater Thailand." When the Japanese arrived, they
retained Phibun as Prime
Minister, and enforced Phibun's expanded borders, even adding four Malay
States to Greater Thailand.
The second nationalist leader of the 1932 revolution, Pridi Bhanomyong, had
pursued a far more enlightened policy after 1932, including rail and canal
development, rural co-ops, irrigation systems, and the founding of Thammasat
University. But Pridi was pushed out of power after 1938, and when the Japanese
forces moved in, Pridi set up the "Free Thai," creating both rural and urban
resistance networks against the Japanese. The Free Thai established contacts with
the OSS in China, providing intelligence on Japanese activities and carrying out acts
of sabotage with OSS support.
Following the war, Pridi became Prime Minister. He established a new
constitution, returned the captured lands to Thailand's neighbors, and declared the
earlier declaration of war against the Allies to be null and void. The British would
have none of this. While the U.S. had not even acknowledged the war declaration in
the first place, the British demanded that Thailand be treated as a defeated enemy,
and that British military forces be deployed indefinitely to occupy and control the
country. Horrendous conditions were imposed, including: 1) free rice for at least two
years for transfer to British colonies, 2) a huge financial indemnity for war
reparations, 3) an agreement that "no canal linking the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of
Siam shall be cut across Siamese territory without prior concurrence of the
Government of the United Kingdom."
This last condition, banning the so-called Kra Canal, as in the case of Britain's
efforts to sabotage China's great projects, is a classic example of colonial "forced
backwardness." In fact, German, French, Russian and Japanese concerns had
shown interest in Thailand's Kra Canal, but the British preferred retaining the choke-
point at Singapore over all Asian shipping.
However, the U.S., at least in this case, did not buckle under to the British. Pridi
appealed to his OSS friends for help, and the U.S. forced the British to accept an
agreement far short of the virtual colonization they had demanded. There would be
no permanent occupation, rice exports would be paid for, and Thailand was not to be
treated as a defeated nation.
However, only two years later, Truman and the British supported the return to
power of "Phu Nam" Phibun Songkhram--this time as an "anti-communist" friend and
ally of the West!
Vietnam
The peoples of Asia and Africa wield little physical power.... What can we
do? We can do much! We can inject the voice of reason into world affairs. We
can mobilize all the spiritual, all the moral, all the political strength of Asia and
Africa on the side of peace. Yes, we! We the peoples of Asia and Africa,
1,400,000,000 strong, far more than half the human population of the world,
we can mobilize what I have called the Moral Violence of Nations in favor of
peace.
That battle which began 180 years ago is not yet completely won.
at its roots--the free trade
He identified neo-colonialism dogma of the British colonial system:
Colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control,
intellectual control, actual physical
control by a small but alien community within a nation It
behooves us to take particular care to ensure that the principle which is
usually called the 'live and let live principle'--mark, I do not say the principle of
laisser faire, laisser passer, of Liberalism, which is obsolete--is first of all
applied by us most completely within our own Asian and African frontiers.
As with Roosevelt, Sukarno knew that China's Republican hero Sun Yat Sen
would be recognized by his words alone:
Bear in mind the words of one of Asia's greatest sons: To speak is easy.
To act is hard. To understand is hardest. Once one understands, action is
easy.
Sukarno concluded with an appeal to the liberation of the human spirit, applying
his Panca Sila to the universal family of mankind:
The highest purpose of man is the liberation of man from his bonds of
fear, his bonds of human degradation, his bonds of poverty--the liberation of
man from the physical, spiritual and intellectual bonds which have for too long
stunted the development of humanity's majority. And let us remember, Sisters
and Brothers, that for the sake of all that, we Asians and Africans must be
united.
Are we, the countries of Asia and Africa, devoid of any positive position
except being pro-communist or anti-communist?... It is most degrading and
humiliating to any self- respecting people or nation. It is an intolerable thought
to me that the great countries of Asia and Africa should come out of bondage
into freedom only to degrade themselves or humiliate themselves in this way.
The resistance to non-alignment came primarily from the Asian members of the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). SEATO was put together by the British
and John Foster Dulles immediately after the Geneva agreement on Vietnam, as an
anti-communist bloc. It served to place the U.S. in a direct military alliance with the
colonial powers in Asia, Britain and France, along with the Commonwealth countries
Australia and New Zealand. The only Asian members were Thailand, Pakistan and
the Philippines.
The opposition to non-alignment by these three Asian nations was not, however,
merely paying obeisance to their Western allies. Several smaller nations argued that
India was a huge nation, with the capacity to defend itself against powerful enemies,
but that smaller nations could not afford the luxury of non-alignment in the Cold War
environment of the 1950s. Thailand, in particular, was legitimately concerned about
Chinese support for communist insurgency movements in their country and on their
borders. Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia had similar concerns. Prince Wan
Waithayakon, representing Thailand, told the conference that the Vietminh forces
had militarily occupied portions of Laos in 1953 and 1954, and were only a few miles
from the Thai border. They could not be disregarded as a threat, said the Prince, of
either subversion or even direct aggression. He protested the fact that Pridi
Bhanomyong, the former Prime Minister and Free Thai leader, was in exile in China,
and was reported to be organizing Chinese of Thai ethnicity for subversion against
the government of Thailand.
Connected to the fear of Chinese-sponsored subversion across Southeast Asia
was the question of the Chinese diaspora. Millions of ethnic Chinese lived
throughout the region, and, although a minority, they played a disproportionally
significant role in the business activities in each country. Under the Chinese
Nationalist government, both on the mainland before 1949, and later in Taiwan, the
overseas Chinese were recognized as citizens of China, regardless of their place of
birth. This issue of "dual citizenship" posed a serious dilemma to Southeast Asia's
national leaders, who sometimes questioned the patriotism of the Chinese minority.
The potential that that minority might support communist insurgency, supported by
the government in Beijing, was not paranoid or racist speculation. Forming a military
alliance with the Western powers, it was argued, was the only defense available to
small nations against such dangers from China or from "world communism."
At Bandung, Zhou Enlai did not try to deny that such concerns were legitimate.
His critical contribution to the conference was the pursuit of solutions to such
problems based on the common interests of all nations--including the Western
powers. He appealed directly to participants to "facilitate the settlement of disputes
between the U.S. and China by peaceful means," and insisted that "We have no
bamboo curtain." He said that China's "struggle against colonialism lasted more than
100 years," and pledged that China would not do anything for the expansion of
communist activities outside its territory. He quoted Confucius, who said "Do not do
unto others what you yourself do not desire."
Zhou met privately with Prince Sihanouk and Prince Wan, as well as the
delegates from Pakistan, the Philippines and Laos, assuring them that China was
anxious to reach agreements based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.
he invited Prince Wan to visit China, and to inspect the newly established Thai ethnic
autonomous region of Sipsongpanna in Yunnan Province, to confirm that there were
no subversive activities or intentions.
He announced that China was prepared to solve the dual nationality problem,
which he described as "something left behind by Old China." Agreements were set in
motion such that ethnic Chinese born in Southeast Asia would choose one or
another nationality. (Such a choice was also complicated by the pretense of "two
Chinas," since the UN still followed the U.S. policy of recognizing the Nationalist
government in Taiwan as the legitimate representative of
all China.)
Historian Kahin's appraisal at the conclusion of the Bandung Conference was
that Zhou Enlai "had done much to convince previously skeptical delegates that
Nehru's thesis was plausible, and that peaceful coexistence with Communist China
might be possible
after all."
A Moment of Hope
NAM
The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was founded in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in
September 1961, eight months after Kennedy took office. The criteria for
membership included support for national independence and liberation struggles in
the colonial world, peaceful coexistence between sovereign nations, and no
participation in multilateral military alliances, including NATO, SEATO, CETO
(Central Treaty Organization) and the Warsaw Pact. As a result, only 16 of the 29
participating nations at the Bandung Conference were qualified to join NAM. From
Asia, only Indonesia, Cambodia, Burma and India were founding members. Neither
China nor the Soviet Union were invited, although communist Yugoslavia was a
member and the host of the founding conference.
The primary organizers of NAM were Nehru, Nasser, President Tito of
Yugoslavia, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and Sukarno. Cuba was the only Ibero-
American member, but others joined in 1962. They viewed their enemy as the Cold
War itself, which was serving to maintain colonialism in both old and new forms while
preventing the economic and social development of the Third
World.
NAM was inspired by the Spirit of Bandung, but, as with world affairs generally,
the hope of 1955 had been subjected to intense Cold War pressures. Even before
the Bandung Conference, the Communist Parties of Asia had formed an Asian
Solidarity Committee, which expanded into the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity
Organization, including Nasser and other African leaders, after the Suez crisis. It was
not an alliance of nations, but of parties, and was not exactly counter to the Spirit of
Bandung, but was clearly driven by the Soviets and the Chinese, combining
Nasserist anti-colonialism and communist anti-imperialism. The organization grew
through the early 1960's, but disintegrated along with the Sino-Soviet split after
1965.
Within NAM, there were intense debates over the role of the USSR and China.
NAM leaders generally welcomed the East Bloc's support for armed liberation wars
against colonialism, but not their effort to dominate the political and economic
policies of the liberation movements themselves, nor their support for communist
subversion within independent nations.
Another debate within NAM centered on economic policy: should they demand
a New International Economic Order (NIEO) based on the transfer of technology to
the developing nations, or should all offers of assistance or investment from the
North be treated as neo-colonial subterfuge aimed at domination?
This latter view was given a theoretical cover know as "Developmentalism"
associated with Raul Prebish, an Argentine economist who headed the U.N.
Economic Commission for Latin America. Prebish had an extensive resume as a
British asset--he had negotiated a treaty between England and Argentina in the
1930's which tied Argentina to debt payments during the depression, even while
other Latin American countries declared debt moratoria. Then, in the 1950's, after the
overthrown of nationalist Juan Peron, he collaborated with the Bank of England to
scrap Argentina's National Bank in favor of a British-style Central Bank. His
Developmentalism Theory rejected the development of heavy industry in the Third
World in favor of light industries producing consumer goods as "import- substitution,"
thus saving foreign reserves--to assure payment of the foreign debt.
Prebish's Developmentalism locked the Third World into relative backwardness,
while imposing an artificial economic model on the development process which
considered the industrial nations as themselves "dependent" upon exploitation of the
Third World, due supposedly to the nature of capitalist development. This obscured
the distinction between British free-trade economics and the Hamiltonian, American
System policies for nation building.46
A more radical version, called Dependency Theory, was promoted by certain
Marxists and by the British and the French at their training centers for colonial assets
in London and Paris, and at European-run institutions in the Third World, such as
Dar Es Salaam University in Tanzania, which peddled "autonomous socialist
development" through "self-sufficiency" and "self- reliance." These often violently
anti-West and anti-technology ideologies served the colonial powers by undermining
those nationalist forces dedicated to a New International Economic Order based on
technological progress and industrialization. In their most extreme forms, mixed with
the Maoism of the Cultural Revolution, these ideologies produced such horrors as
Cambodia's Khmer Rouge and Peru's Shining Path.
However, the core of NAM member nations were dedicated to the New
International Economic Order, based on peace between East and West as well as
North and South, and global collaboration on the industrialization of the sovereign
nations in the South. John F. Kennedy believed such collaboration was both possible
and necessary.
Kennedy ridiculed Dulles' formulation of neutrality as "immoral." He argued that
neutralism had been "part of our history for over 100 years," and that it was
"inevitable" among the emerging free nations. He wrote:
Our view of the world crisis is that countries are entitled to national
sovereignty and independence.... That is the purpose
of our aid That is a different matter from suggesting that,
in order to be entitled to our assistance... , they must agree with us,
because quite obviously these people are newly independent, they want to
run their own affairs, and would rather not accept assistance if we have that
kind of string
attached."47
Kennedy was worried about communism, but insisted that "those who make
peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable." In words
reminiscent of Sukarno's opening speech at Bandung, Kennedy said:
The great battleground for the defense and expansion of freedom today
is the whole southern half of the globe--Asia, Latin America, Africa and the
Middle East--the lands of the rising peoples. Their revolution is the greatest in
human history. They seek an end to injustice, tyranny and exploitation. More
than an end, they seek a beginning.48
The demise of JFK's vision for the world, marked by his assassination in
November 1963, and the subsequent horror across (especially) Southeast Asia, can
be usefully understood as the result of a showdown between Kennedy and the
Pugwash movement. Pugwash, founded in 1958 by British intelligence networks run
by Bertrand Russell and H.G. Wells, was an alliance of scientists and political
representatives from both the USSR and the West, committed to the British utopian
policy of World Government. The keynote speech at the founding conference was
given by the U.S.- based physicist Leo Szilard. Szilard had become a protege of
H.G. Wells while a student at Oxford, and his Pugwash speech presented Well's
version of nuclear terror as a basis for establishing world government. The policy
became known as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), calling upon the two
superpowers to amass enough nuclear firepower targeted against each other to
assure mutual annihilation in the case of fullscale war--supposedly assuring that
such a global holocaust would never occur. Regional wars, including the use of
tactical nuclear weapons, would let off steam while keeping up the environment of
terror, so that all nations would relinquish their sovereignty to a world government in
order to avoid destruction. The underlying thesis, however, was that in the
thermonuclear age, the constant upgrading of military and industrial technology was
no longer necessary for security purposes, since MAD eliminated the possibility of
global war. Thus, the New Age, post-industrial society paradigm shift, ending the
American System of scientific and technological progress, could be safely ushered in
by its London creators.
The Cuban missile crisis in the fall of 1962 set the process in motion. With
Pugwash creator Bertrand Russell providing guidance and support to Pugwash
supporter Nikita Khrushchev along the way, the world was brought to the brink yet
again--but this time, far closer to the physical and psychological environment of the
American population. Lyndon LaRouche has vividly described the effect of the
Cuban Missile Crisis on the baby-boomer generation in the U.S., and the subsequent
flight into the fantasy world of the counter-culture of the 1960's and 1970's.50
Simultaneous to the Cuban Missile Crisis, China launched an invasion of
Northeast India, in October 1962. Although the territory seized b the Chines army
had long been under contention, the invasion by China was a terrible shock to Prime
Minister Nehru. Both Nehru and Zhou Enlai, who had argued against the invasion
within China, saw their dream of Indian-Chinese collaboration and peace evaporate,
along with the remnants of the Spirit of Bandung.
Nehru appealed to Moscow for assistance, but, despite the escalating Sino-
Soviet split, Khrushchev said no, preoccupied with the Cuban events, and apparently
unwilling to risk a second front against China. The three pillars of FDR's Grand
Design were now at each others throats.
Nehru then turned to the U.S., and Kennedy immediately responded with public
support for India's position and substantial supplies of military equipment. Kennedy
described the Chinese as being "in the Stalinist phase, believing in class war and the
use of force, and seem prepared to sacrifice 300 million people if necessary to
dominate Asia."51 In fact, over the 1960's, China sacrificed many millions of its own
population to famine after the Great Leap Forward, and to political hysteria during
the bloody Cultural Revolution, while the name of "Maoism" was used world wide by
fanatical, terrorist sects, usually created and controlled by London.
Maphilindo
A new effort toward unity, at least in Southeast Asia, emerged in the early
1960s. Sukarno initiated a campaign to forge an alliance between Indonesia, the
Philippines and Malaya, which had gained its independence in 1957. This alliance,
called Maphilindo, went beyond the common ethnic heritage of these three nations
as Malay people, and their closely related languages. Even more important was the
fact that such a union would bridge the divisions imposed by British, Dutch and
Spanish colonialism, while also binding the vast island chains of Indonesia and the
Philippines to the mainland of Asia, making the South China Sea into an "Asian
Lake." Maphalindo represented the seed crystal for unity throughout Southeast
Asia-- a process ultimately realized only in the 1990's with the alliance of all ten
Southeast Asian nations in ASEAN (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations).
Back in 1945, the committee formed to implement Indonesian independence at
the end of the war had voted to include Malaya and British Borneo (Sabah, Brunei
and Sarawak, all on the northern coast of Borneo) as part of
the United States of Indonesia. Sukarno said at that time that the only reason
the Philippines was not included was respect for their national sovereignty, since the
U.S. had already granted independence before the Japanese invasion.
Soon after his inauguration in 1961, Kennedy invited Sukarno to visit the U.S.,
which he did. According to Kennedy aide Roger Hilsman, "Kennedy recognized the
politician and dedicated nationalist in Sukarno, while Sukarno came away with a
growing sense of Kennedy's statesmanship and his empathy for the striving peoples
of the world."52 Kennedy assigned a team of economists to study Indonesia's needs,
which issued an optimistic report, proposing significant development aid. Kennedy
also sent his brother Robert Kennedy, then the Attorney General, on a special
mission to Indonesia and to the Netherlands, where he successfully forced the
Dutch hand on turning over Irian Jaya to Indonesian sovereignty. The President
personally endorsed the idea of Maphilindo.
The British, however, were violently opposed to Maphilindo, as a threat to their
dominance in Malaya, and in Asia generally, especially because of the U.S.
involvement. Working through their favorite compradore in Asia, colonial Singapore's
Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew, the British succeeded in convincing Malaya's Prime
Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman to prepare a merger of Malaya with Singapore, which
was still a British colony, to create Malaysia. In addition to bringing their trusted Lee
Kwan Yew into a position of influence within Malaya, the British intended to use their
banks in Singapore to further control Malaya's economy. They would also preserve
their military basing rights in Singapore.
Later, in 1962, it was agreed to include the three north Borneo colonies in the
Malaysian merger. The bulk of Borneo is a province of Indonesia, Kalimantan, but
the Sukarno government did not at first object to the north Borneo states joining
Malaysia. However, in December 1962 there was an armed revolt against the British
and against the merger by forces connected to the majority political party in Brunei.
The revolt spread to Sarawak, and was only defeated by a full detachment of British
armed forces. Indonesia then took a far greater concern in the fate of the Borneo
colonies. Philippines Prime Minister Diosdado Macapagal joined Sukarno in
objecting to the merger unless it were ascertained whether or not the people of the
Borneo states agreed.
Sukarno announced a policy of "Konfrontasi" in regard to the merger--not
against Malaya, nor even against the planned Malaysia, but against "the neo-
colonialist policy of an outside power which is bent on wrecking Maphalindo. This
divide and rule policy, backed by preponderant military force, can only be checked by
a firm defensive policy of confrontation, lest the national independence and security
of the countries of this region succumb to foreign domination."53
Nonetheless, the three nations of Maphilindo continued their consultations.
Sukarno, Macapagel and the Tunku met in Manila in July 1963. Despite British
efforts to sabotage the meeting, the three leaders signed the Manila Declaration
establishing Maphilindo and set a course for a peaceful solution to the creation of
Malaysia. They called on U.N. Secretary General U Thant to personally oversee a
survey of Sabah, Brunei and Sarawak to determine the sentiment of the population.
It was expected by all that U Thant would find that the majority did wish to join, and
Sukarno agreed to abide by U Thant's findings.
U Thant and President Kennedy had worked closely together around the world.
U Thant's proposal that the 1960's must be a "Development Decade" was
championed by the President. In 1962, U Thant had directed U.S. peacekeeping
forces in the Congo to march against the break-away Katanga Province, much to the
consternation of the British and the Belgians, but with the full backing of JFK. In
response to the Manila Declaration, U Thant, with Kennedy's support, agreed to
carry out the requested north Borneo survey, and announced that it would be
completed by mid- September, 1963.
Then the British pulled the plug. With help from Lee Kwan Yew, British Minister
of Commonwealth Relations Duncan Sandys pressured the Tunku to agree to an
announcement in August that the merger would proceed with or without a
satisfactory result of U Thant's survey. This ploy, serving absolutely no purpose other
than to insult Sukarno, U Thant, and every other party to the Manila Declaration,
succeeded in provoking a virtual declaration of war in Jakarta against the merger,
which the Indonesian government denounced as "British-made Malasia." All hope for
Maphilindo was extinguished.
The U.S. maintained support for Sukarno, but two months later, Kennedy was
killed, and President Johnson immediately cut all aid to Indonesia. Robert Kennedy
travelled to Jakarta in February 1964, in an attempt to bring a peaceful end to the
Konfrontasi. He made some progress, but his report-back was ignored both in the
White House and in the Congress. In March, Sukarno confirmed JFK's warning
concerning "conditions" on assistance to developing nations, telling the U.S.:"To hell
with your aid." Over the next year, Sukarno became increasingly hostile towards the
West generally, and forged ever-closer ties to China. In October 1965, a suspicious
coup-attempt led to Sukarno's downfall and the unleashing of mass hysteria, as
upwards of one half million people were butchered as "communists" by uncontrolled
mobs, tolerated (or instigated) by the authorities.
Vietnam Again
The Spirit of Manila and the Spirit of Bandung were essentially dead. However,
Pugwash and the MAD doctrine required more--surrogate warfare between the
superpowers, a controlled conflict stopping short of full scale strategic confrontation.
The British and their Pugwash-connected allies in the U.S.-- including the circles
around National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy and Under Secretary of State
Averell Harriman within the Kennedy administration-geared up for their desired
bloodbath, with Vietnam the convenient target.
President Kennedy, however, had not gone along with the drive for war in Laos,
and opposed another war in Asia. He agreed to the expansion of the number of U.S.
advisors in Vietnam, including Special Forces, to train the South Vietnamese Army,
but he refused to deploy ground troops or provide large-scale U.S. air cover.
Nonetheless, under the direction of Harriman, Bundy and Secretary of Defense
Robert Strange McNamara, the war was being transformed into a British-colonial
style "population war," including McNamara's infamous accounting tool, the "body
count," to measure the war's progress.
Harriman protege Roger Hilsman, head of the Far Eastern Bureau at the State
Department, and Bundy's aide Michael Forrestal, during several trips together to
Vietnam, allied themselves with the British Colonial Office official Robert K.G.
Thompson, who had designed the Strategic Hamlet program in Malaya. Hilsman and
Forrestal lavished praise on Thompson and his Strategic Hamlet strategy, and
persuaded Kennedy to go along. Hilsman's own glowing description of the model
strategic hamlet could just as easily be describing a U.S. prison:
Areas outside these concentration camps became free fire zones, where
anything that moved was a fair target, while defoliants were used to destroy crops
and forests which might serve as protection for the Vietcong. By the end of 1962,
5500 strategic hamlets were completed or under construction.
Kennedy was not unaware of the pending disaster of this misguided policy. His
friend and economic advisor John Kenneth Galbraith, on his way to assume his post
as Ambassador to India, stopped for an inspection tour of Vietnam at Kennedy's
request. His report back warned the President that the U.S. was becoming wedded
to a certain failure, that a political settlement with Ho Chi Minh was essential, that
India's Nehru could help in that regard, and that in any case the strategic hamlets
and the use of defoliants must end immediately. 55 Several others conveyed similar
messages, and Kennedy took them seriously.
Kennedy decided to disengage from Vietnam. But he did much more--he began
to move directly against the entire Pugwash agenda of world government, balance of
terror and post-industrial society, much to the discomfort of McGeorge Bundy and his
fellow Cold War strategists. As opposed to the arguments from both "left" and "right"
that the age of Mutual Assured Destruction no longer required rapid technological
development, Kennedy insisted that peace were possible only through strength, both
militarily and economically. His most dramatic presentation of this rejection of
Pugwash was planned for Nov. 23, 1963, in Dallas, Texas. Kennedy's prepared text
for that speech ridiculed the post-industrial society advocates, who "assume that
words will suffice without weapons, that vituperation is as good as victory and that
peace is a sign of weakness.... But we can hope that fewer people will listen to
nonsense If we are strong, our strength will speak for itself."56
Kennedy insisted that such strength must include improvements in both nuclear
and conventional forces, expansion of space exploration, education for all
Americans, and a technologically developing economy. He concluded: "That strength
will never be used in pursuit of aggressive ambitions--it will always be used in pursuit
of peace." That speech, of course, was never delivered.
Earlier in the year, Kennedy had announced a pullout of U.S. advisors from
Vietnam, beginning with 1,000 immediately, to be completed by 1965.
Amongst those who were considering an end to the war based on an
agreement with Ho Chi Minh and a neutralist government were the leaders of the
South Vietnamese government itself! Ngo Dhin Diem, the nationalist President, his
brother Ngo Dhin Nhu, and several of the leading generals, were negotiating with the
North in order to achieve a peace agreement. Hilsman complained bitterly that there
were "repeated intelligence reports that Nhu had some notion...that he could
negotiate an end to the war and that he had been attempting to set up a secret
channel of communication with
Hanoi."57
French President DeGaulle, while maintaining his personal contact with
President Kennedy, established diplomatic liaison between Diem and Ho Chi Minh
through a Polish diplomat, Mieczyslaw Maneli, who visited both Hanoi and Saigon
regularly as part of the Geneva agreements from 1954. The last message from the
North Vietnamese before Diem and Nhu were murdered was their agreement to
work towards a peaceful settlement, and a pledge that the North would defend Diem
in the case of a clash with the U.S.58
Harriman's man Hilsman, meanwhile, told Secretary of State Dean Rusk that if
the Diem regime negotiated with Hanoi, the U.S. should "move promptly with a
coup," and should bomb the North if they sent troops to defend President Diem.59
Despite serious reservations from Kennedy, and even more so from his brother
Robert, the Harriman-Bundy faction in the administration pushed events toward full
scale war, including the elimination of anyone who stood in their way. U.S.
Ambassador to Vietnam Frederick E. Nolting and CIA station chief John Richardson
were dumped for being too close to Vietnamese President Diem. Kennedy's choice
to replace Ambassador Nolting was Edmund Gullion, who had been ambassador to
the Congo during the period that Kennedy and U Thant had crushed the insurrection
run by the mineral cartels in Katanga Province. Harriman and Bundy rejected
Gullion, demanding that a "strongman" be appointed "whose character and
reputation," as Hilsman put it, "would permit him to dominate the representatives of
all other departments and agencies."60
Their man was Republican Henry Cabot Lodge. Harriman's intent was for Lodge
to run a coup against the Diem government in order to prevent any neutralist peace
agreement. Kennedy reluctantly consented to Lodge's appointment, believing it
necessary for bipartisan support for his Vietnam policy, but he continued refusing to
endorse a coup.
The events of August 1963, leading to the coup on November 1, as described
by Hilsman and others who were involved, were aimed not only against the Diem
government, but against President Kennedy's policies as well. As Lodge was
travelling to Saigon to begin his mission, Harriman, Bundy and Hilsman drafted a
directive on Vietnam policy, threatening to cut U.S. aid to Vietnam if Diem did not
accept certain demands, including firing his brother, Nhu. The Diem government's
heavy-handed suppression of protests organized by Buddhist monks was cited as
the primary grievance, but this was for public consumption. The architects of the
coup admitted that their actual concern was Diem and Nhu's overtures for peace with
Ho Chi Minh.
The directive on Vietnam was prepared behind Kennedy's back, over a
weekend, while the President was in Massachusetts and other cabinet members
were out of town. Kennedy was read only parts of the directive over the phone, and
was led to believe, falsely, that all the other cabinet members had read and approved
it. Hilsman then leaked the content of the directive to UPI, including "background"
implications that there would be a coup if Diem failed to follow orders. This UPI
report was then played on Voice of America in Vietnam just as Lodge was arriving as
Harriman's "strongman."
Kennedy strongly reprimanded Harriman and Hilsman when he learned what
had happened, and the cabinet meeting broke into a brawl over Harriman's
insistence on Diem's overthrow.61 Almost immediately, however, Lodge began
sending back reports that a coup by certain Vietnamese generals was inevitable,
unstoppable, and that the U.S. would be breaching Vietnam's sovereignty by trying
to prevent it!
Lodge, meanwhile, was both plotting with the military to carry out the coup, and
directly supporting the ongoing Buddhist protests against Diem. The Buddhist faction
running the protests, which included gruesome self-immolations broadcast on
television around the world, were both anti-communist and anti-Diem. Lodge, as his
first act as ambassador, before even visiting President Diem, visited the Buddhist
leaders of the anti-government protests, and invited them to take refuge in the U.S.
Embassy, which became the command center for the continuing protests!
Madame Nhu, the wife of Ngo Dinh Nhu, stated publicly in regard to Lodge:
"they have sent us a pro-consul." Hilsman, reflecting his complete adaptation to the
British colonial worldview, reported proudly: "She was right!"62
Except for an initial meeting with Diem, Ambassador Lodge refused to visit the
President, insisting that Diem must come crawling to him. Within six weeks, Diem
and Nhu were murdered. Three weeks after that, Kennedy was dead, killed by the
same British intelligence apparatus which carried out multiple attempts on the life of
President Charles DeGaulle.63
With Kennedy eliminated, the Pugwash committee within the administration
took charge, with President Lyndon Johnson's acquiescence. While the Vietnam
debacle unfolded, China descended into the nightmare of the Cultural Revolution,
Indonesia burst into bloody hysteria, America's 1960's counter-culture waged war
against the nation's historic commitment to progress, and the world economy began
its slide into post-industrial decay.
It is often heard today that the U.S. won the Cold War when the Soviet Union
dissolved in 1992. This misconception is based on a false premise, of British design,
concerning the nature of the Cold
War itself. The fact is, the Cold War was lost in the 1960's. The U.S.,
Europe, the Soviet Union, China, and the entire Third World were the losers.
Among sovereign nation states, there were no winners.
In April 1999, Cambodia was formally inducted into ASEAN, completing the
unification of the ten Southeast Asian nations for the first time in history. This peace
is closely connected to the emerging strategic and economic alliance between
Russia, China and India, encompassing the majority of the world's population.
President Clinton has committed his administration to strengthening U.S. relations
with these nations of Eurasia, but, as in the Kennedy administration, he is
surrounded by proponents of world government who are promoting regional wars to
disrupt and destroy any impulse toward rebuilding the FDR Grand Design, or the
Spirit of Bandung. The strengthening unity of the Asian nations in the face of global
depression must, this time, be the engine for international peace and development
rather than the cauldron of war.
FOOTNOTES
4. Christopher Thorne, "Allies of a Kind--The U.S., Britain and the War against
Japan 1941-1945," Oxford University Press, New
York, 1978
5. Op. cit., Yu.
6. Ibid.
7. Lanxin Xiang, "Recasting the Imperial Far East; Britain and America
in China, 1945-1950" M. E. Sharpe, New York, 1995.
8. Ibid.
9. "The Eurasian Landbridge" EIR Special Report.
10. Op. cit., Thorne.
11. Wm. Roger Louis, "Imperialism at Bay, 1941-1945--The U.S. and
the Decolonization of the British Empire," Oxford, 1977.
12. Op. cit., Xiang.
13. Leonard Mosley, "Dulles; A Biography of Eleanor, Allen and John
Foster Dulles and their Family Network," Dial Press, NY,
1978.
14. Op. cit., Thorne.
15. Ibid. 60. Op. cit., Hilsman.
16. Op. cit., Louis. 61. Op. cit., Karnow.
17. Op. cit., Thorne. 62. Op. cit., Hilsman.
Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., "How Bertrand Russell 63. Why Brits kill US Presidents,"
New Federalist pamphlet, Became an Evil Man," {Fidelio}, Fall 1994.
December 1944.
LaRouche, "Where Roosevelt was Interrupted."
Peter Dennis, "Troubled Days of
Peace--Mountbatten and the Southeast
Asia Command 1945-46," Manchester
University
Press, 1987.
21. Op. cit., Tanner.
22. Tony Chaitkin, "Report on Dan
Beach Bradley and the American
Missionary Movement," unpublished,
1986.
23. Barbara Tuchman, "The March
of Folly; From Troy to Vietnam," Ballantine
Books, NY, 1984.
24. Stanley Karnow, "Vietnam--A History," Penguin, 1983.
25. Op. cit., Tanner.
26. LaRouche, "Where Roosevelt was Interrupted."
27. Op. cit., Tuchman.
28. Op. cit., Karnow.
29. All the following quotes from the
Asian-African Conference are from:
George M.T. Kahin, "The Asian -African
Conference; Southeast Asia Progress,"
Cornell University, 1955.
30. Nicholas Tarling, "Ah, Ah-- Britain
and the Bandung Conference of 1955,"
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 23, 1
(March 1992).
31. Ibid.
32. Peter Grove, "Gentleman Spy--
The Life of Allen Dulles," Houghton Mifflen,
1994.
33. Ibid.
34. Audrey R. and George M.T.
Kahin, "Subversion as Foreign Policy: The
Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in
Indonesia," New Press, NY, 1994.
35. Ibid.
36. Op. cit., Grove.
37. Op. cit, Kahin, "Subversion."
Much of the material in this section comes
from this book.
38. Ibid.
39. Roger Hilsman, "To Move a
Nation; The Politics of Foreign Policy in
the Administration of John F. Kennedy,"
Doubleday, 1967.
40. Ibid.
41. Theodore C. Sorenson, "Kennedy," Konecky & Konecky,
NY, 1965.
42. Ibid.
43. Op. cit., Hilsman.
44. Op. cit., Sorenson.
45. Ibid.
46. Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., "Operation Juarez,"
47. Op. cit., Sorenson.
48. Ibid.
49. Op. cit., Hilsman.
50. LaRouche, "How Russell Became an Evil Man."
51. Op. cit., Sorenson.
52. Op. cit., Hilsman. 1974.
54. Op. cit., Hilsman.
55. Op. cit., Tuchman.
56. [get ref from Gail - book of Kennedy speeches]
57. Op. cit., Hilsman.
58. Op. cit., Karnow.
59. Ibid.