Andal Vs Macaraig
Andal Vs Macaraig
Andal vs. Macaraig GR No. 2474, May 30, 1951 FACTS:t Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Duenas, filed a complaint for the recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land owned by Emiliano Andal and Maria Duenas. Eduvigis Macaraig, herein defendant, donated the land by virtue of donation propter nuptias in favor of Emiliano. The latter was suffering from tuberculosis in January 1941. His brother, Felix, then lived with them to work his house and farm. Emiliano became so weak that he can hardly move and get up from his bed. Sometime in September 1942, the wife eloped with Felix and lived at the house of Marias father until 1943. Emiliano died in January 1, 1943 where the wife did not attend the funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria gave birth to a boy who was, herein petitioner. ISSUE: WON Mariano Andal is a legitimate child of the deceased. HELD: Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943 and Emiliano died on January 1, 1943, the former is presumed to be a legitimate son of the latter because he was born within 300 days following the dissolution of the marriage. The fact that the husband was seriously sick is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 days next preceding the birth of the child. Impossibility of access by husband to wife includes absence during the initial period of conception, impotence which is patent, and incurable; and imprisonment unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations. Marias illicit intercourse with a man other than the husband during the initial period does not preclude cohabitation between husband and wife. Hence, Mariano Andal was considered a legitimate son of the deceased making him the owner of the parcel land.
Benitez-Badua vs CA
Benitez-Badua vs. CA GR No. 105625, January 24, 1994 FACTS:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian were owners of various properties located in Laguna. Isabel died in 1982 while his husband died in 1989. Vicentes sister and nephew filed a complaint for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicentes estate in favor of the nephew, herein private respondent. The petitioner, Marissa Benitez-Badua, was raised and cared by the deceased spouses since childhood, though not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted. The latter to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses submitted documents such as her certificate of live birth where the spouses name were reflected as her parents. She even testified that said spouses continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other hand, the relatives of Vicente declared that said spouses were unable to physically procreate hence the petitioner cannot be the biological child. Trial court decided in favor of the petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses. ISSUE: WON petitioners certificate of live birth will suffice to establish her legitimacy. HELD: The Court dismissed the case for lack of merit. The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption. It does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and her legal rights. Such act amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document. It is worthy to note that Vicente and brother of the deceased wife executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the latter. In the notarized document, they stated that they were the sole heirs of the deceased because she died without descendants and ascendants. In executing such deed, Vicente effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of the petitioner where it appeared thathe was the petitioners father.
Concepcion vs CA
Concepcion vs. CA GR No. 123450, August 31, 2005 FACTS: Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa Almonte, private respondent, were married in December 1989, and begotten a child named Jose Gerardo in December 1990. The husband filed on December 1991, a petition to have his marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy since the wife married a certain Mario Gopiao sometime in December 1980, whom according to the husband was still alive and living in Loyola Heights, QC. Trial court ruled that the son was an illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to the wife while
Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Theresa argued that there was nothing in the law granting visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child. She further wanted to have the surname of the son changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, since an illegitimate child should use his mothers surname. After the requested oral argument, trial court reversed its ruling and held the son to be not the son of Gerardo but of Mario. Hence, the child was a legitimate child of Theresa and Mario. HELD: Considering that Theresas marriage with Gerardo was void ab initio, the latter never became the formers husband and never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of the child. Theresas contention was to have his son be declared as not the legitimate child of her and Mario but her illegitimate child with Gerardo. In this case, the mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. Hence, she is not permitted by law to question the sons legitimacy. Under Article 167 of the Family Code, the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Having the best interest of the child in mind, the presumption of his legitimacy was upheld by the Court. As a legitimate child, the son shall have the right to bear the surnames of Mario and Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of Civil Code on surnames. Gerardo cannot then impose his surname to be used by the child, since in the eyes of the law, the child is not related to him in any way.
Laperal vs Republic
Laperal vs. Republic GR No. 18008, October 30, 1962 FACTS: The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria on March 1939. However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to the spouses. Aside from that, she ceased to live with Enrique. During their marriage, she naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria. She filed this petition to be permitted to resume in using her maiden name Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was claiming that continuing to use her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. ISSUE: Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated from his husband. HELD:
In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. The finding that petitioners continued use of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory provision of Art. 372.
Lukban vs Republic
Lukban vs Republic L-8492, February 29, 1956 FACTS: Lourdes Lukban and Francisco Chuidian got married in 1933 and after a violent quarrel he left Lukban and has not been heard of since then. She diligently looked for him asking the parents and friends but no one knew his whereabouts. She believes that husband is already dead since he was absent for more than 20 years and because she intends to marry again, she desires to have her civil status put in order to be relieved on any liability under the law. ISSUE: Whether Lukban needs to secure declaration of presumptive death before she can remarry. HELD: The court ruled that Lukban does not need to secure declaration of presumptive death of her husband because Civil Code prevails during their marriage in 1933. It provides that for the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that each former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
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