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Safety Moment

Jan 2010

Algerian Gas Plant Failure - Background

A gas treatment plant was in the final stages of commissioning.

Train 1 had been flowing gas for a couple of weeks then Train 2 was
brought on stream

Within a matter of hours of start-up of Train 2 problems with the CO2


plant resulted in gas being diverted to flare.

During the start-up of Train 1, it had been noted that the flare system
seemed excessively noisy and vibration in some of the pipe work
resulted in bolts holding pipe clamps becoming loose.

Background (Continued)

As Train 2 started to send gas to flare the situation became worse.

Within hours the 6" line taking gas off the top of the glycol contactor
to the flare header failed catastrophically at the header.

The plant then went into automatic emergency shutdown resulting


in a large proportion of the gas inventory (approx. 80 tonnes)
venting through the hole left by the failed 6 pipe in the flare header.

Luckily the wind was blowing away from the plant and the gas did
not ignite.

Schematic

Photos

Initial Investigation Findings

The 6" dia line connecting the glycol contactor to the


flare header was under designed. The under-design
caused sonic velocities resulting in excessive vibration
and rapid turbulence induced fatigue failure.

A complete engineering check of the entire blowdown


system revealed numerous instances where gas
velocities exceeded code levels.

Root Cause Findings


Root Cause Findings of the Engineering Authority Investigation
Multiple breakdowns of the Project systems including:

Failure to appreciate the importance of the blowdown system to the safety of


operations

Failure to apply what should have been a good Quality System.

The Contractor QC system required independent checks of critical safety


systems. These checks were not carried out for this line.

Failure to follow through on HAZOP findings. The HAZOP commented on


the unusual configuration of pipe work entering the header. These
comments were not followed up

Failure of the commissioning team to adequately respond to excessive noise


and vibration in the blow-down system. Bolts that fell out of pipe clamps
were replaced and re-torqued without reference back to the designer.

Lessons from Incident

Ensure personnel competencies are specified and applied at all


levels

Demonstrate compliance with codes, standards and procedures,


verify and retain calculations and documents

Ensure special attention is given to piping systems handling slugs,


2-phase fluids and turbulent flow.

Demonstrate closure of all design reviews and HAZOP actions

Train operators and commissioning personnel to understand


significance of unusual situations and to respond correctly during
commissioning and start up.

THOUGHTS

SHORT DISCUSSION MOMENT Best Practice

Maximum velocities

WP EMS Process Design specifies 0.5 Mach Max at Vent/Flare Discharge

Others ?
Specify flow regimes in line lists?
More attention to flow induced vibration in process
systems as a result of debottlenecking?

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