WINNING THE HEARTS AND MINDS

OF THE PEOPLE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM IN

AFRICA
 Outline of the Presentation
1. INTRODUCTION 5. WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS
1.1. Definition of terrorism 5.1. Military - Community
1.2. Why focus on the hearts and Outreach
minds? 5.2. Tolerating ordinary Citizens
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 5.3. Using Intelligence to weaken
2.1. Rethinking Civil–Military Relations terrorists
2.2. Historical evolution of terrorism 5.4. Using IT Facilities for
2.2.1. Postmodern terrorism surveillance
3. TERRORISTS’ DEMOGRAPHICS 5.5. Fighting terrorism with de-
3.1. Terrorists’ Educational and family radicalization
Backgrounds 5.5. The need for participatory
3.2. Age and Gender of Terrorists governance.
4. EXTERNAL FACTORS THAT FUEL 5.6. Adopting a holistic approach
TERRORISM
SECTION ONE - INTRODUCTION
1.1. Definition of terrorism

1.2. Why focus on the hearts

and minds?
 1.1. Definition of terrorism
In Gregory (2005), terrorism is defined as:

The illegitimate, premeditated use of

politically motivated violence or the
threat of violence by a person or group
against persons or property with the
intent to coerce a government by
instilling fear amongst the populace.
 1.1. Definition of terrorism -- 1
• The insurgents generally belong to small and often
unconnected groups.
• They hide their identities and surface only briefly to
carry out terrorist attacks.
• The problem with fighting terrorism is finding the
enemy on a battlefield that has no boundaries.
• The terrorists are in the business of creating and
spreading fear.
• They want people and nations to feel helpless.
• They are happy when people fear that attacks come
randomly and without warning.
 1.2. Why focus on the hearts and minds?
• Terrorists celebrate when people adopt defeatism as a
philosophy.
• Terrorism will fall of its own weight when enough hearts
and minds are won.
• Terrorism is weakened when its leaders lose popular
support, and people actively oppose them.
• The social media are the strongest tool terrorists use to
recruit members and raise funds.
• It is noted elsewhere that the terrorist group, ISIS, has put
out over 100 million tweets.
• They have succeeded in winning many hearts and minds,
through social media.
1.2. Why focus on the hearts and minds? --1
• Terrorism is asymmetric warfare, involving the use
of random/unpredictable violence.
• Terrorists capitalize on social media propaganda and
surprise attacks.
• Fighting terrorists is similar to waging a war against
an indescribable enemy.
• The most effective counterterrorism strategy will
involve:
– discrediting the insurgents by every possible
means, and
– attacks based on discreet superior intelligence.
1.2. Why focus on the hearts and minds? --2
• Ordinary people can be influenced easily by peers
or cultural in-groups.
• Civil society groups can effectively counter the
media campaigns of the terrorists.
• Winning the hearts and minds of ordinary citizens
will reduce violent strikes and counterstrikes.
• The war on insurgency has to be put in its proper
context as an ideological war.
• It will be won in the hearts and minds of the people
• By subduing the adversary’s ideology and methods.
 SECTION TWO - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Rethinking Civil–Military

Relations
2.2. Historical evolution of
terrorism
2.2.1. Postmodern terrorism
 2.1. Rethinking Civil–Military Relations
• Civil–military relation (CMR) describes the
relationship between the civil authority and the
military.
• The classical thinking is that the civil authority and
the military are fundamentally different from each
other.
• The focus is to professionalize the military through
sound technical training.
• The military was meant to remain in the specialized
arena as experts in the use of force.
• Huntington believes the civilian government should
maintain objective control over their armed forces.
2.1. Rethinking Civil–Military Relations -- 1
• The objective control is indicated by the following
factors:
– the military adopts its ethos and discipline, and
recognizes the boundaries of professional roles;
– Civilian leadership formulates strategic military policies;
– Civilian leaders recognize the military’s political
neutrality and professional autonomy.
• For Huntington the relationship between the two
institutions should be managed.
• There is a tendency for a country to be
conservationist with military threat and liberal in
peace times.
2.1. Rethinking Civil–Military Relations -- 2
• Janowitz argues that the orientation of both
institutions can converge with time.
• There will either be a civilianization of the military
or militarization of society;
– or both institutions will shift to converge at a point.
• Huntington sought to control the difference, but
Janowitz believes the difference will diminish.
• Charles Moskos goes further to developed the
institutional/occupational (I/O) hypothesis.
• The I/O hypothesis is used to explain the post Cold
War civil-military relations.
2.1. Rethinking Civil–Military Relations -- 3
• For the I/O hypothesis, the military has become less
institutional and more occupational in nature.
• An institutional military is divergent, while an
occupational military is more convergent.
• The agency theorists argue that the military should
remain the "masters of the profession of arms."
• The agency theory reinforces Huntington's view of
strengthening military professionalism.
• The concordance theory by Rebecca L. Schiff calls
for collaborative civil-military relations.
2.1. Rethinking Civil–Military Relations -- 4
• Schiff believes that the military, political elites, and
the civil society should agree on four key issues:
– Social composition of the officer corps
– The political decision-making process
– The method of recruiting military personnel
– The style of the military
• Agreement of the three partners on the issues can
check domestic military intervention.
• Schiff applies her theory of concordance to explain
a number of civil –military conflicts.
2.1. Rethinking Civil–Military Relations -- 5
• The extant literature on CMR is pre-occupied with
managing civil authority-military conflicts.
• Neither Huntington, Janowitz, Moskos nor Schiff
focused on CMR for the war on terrorism.
– An asymmetric war that cannot be won with the
barrel of the gun alone.
• Winning the war without frontlines calls for a
paradigm shift in CMR.
• The current focus should be how both institutions
should collaborate to win hearts and minds.
2.1. Rethinking Civil–Military Relations -- 6
• Both parties need to bridge the information and
cultural gap existing between them.
• As Schiff rightly noted the military, political elites,
and the civil society should work together.
• This will lead to greater connectivity (contact and
understanding) among the key stakeholders.
• All sides should strive for cooperation, dignity for
the human person, and respect for the rule of law.
• Dismantling the mental and social structures that
support terrorism is not negotiable.
 2.2. Historical evolution of terrorism
The present postmodern terrorism is distinguished by:
- determination to reverse civilizations and change
human history.
- Destroy the perceived enemy by every means, and
takeover whole territories.
Modern terrorism sought to press home a point, often
using indirect approaches.
Classical terrorism aimed at specific targets with few
casualties (e.g., assassinations) or wreaks havoc on “non-
significant” facilities.
- The damage was fairly low because the terrorist aimed
to achieve a specific political objective.
 2.2.1. Postmodern terrorism
Attributable to “clash of civilizations” - primarily the
clash of Americanization with traditional religious
cultures.
• It is a clash of ideals and ideologies, for example;
– USA seeks to globalize Western values,
– Islamism desires to replace sovereign states with over-
arching caliphates.
• The Islamists or radical fundamentals attack
churches and mosques alike.
• They consider themselves accountable only to God,
and take responsibility for their acts of destruction.
• They desire to de-modernize the world!
 2.2.1. Postmodern terrorism -- 1
• They are opposed any type of negotiation; they do
not want to seat at the table:
– instead, they seek to destroy the table and those sitting
around it.
• A difference needs to be made between Islamic and
Islamist:
– Islamic means “Muslim- related,” a religion that believes
in peace.
– Islamist is an extreme version of radical fundamentalism
associated with terrorism.
– A majority of Muslims condemn radical fundamentalism
 2.2.1. Postmodern terrorism -- 2
• Terrorist groups operate in small cells that are ultra-
flexibly networked.
• Less hierarchical organizations connected by means of
modern IT infrastructure.
• Hydra-headed – can scatter, regroup, and adjust easily
in different directions.
• Oliver Roy notes that terrorists may lack the resources
to realize their stated goals;
– But to dismiss them as insignificant extremists would be a
grave mistake because they can and will create disorder, on a
vast scale.
– Their strategy is to win the fight against nation states by
exhausting their individual and collective military power in
multiple theaters.
 SECTION THREE - TERRORISTS’ DEMOGRAPHICS

3.1. Terrorists’ Educational and

family Backgrounds

3.2. Age and Gender of

Terrorists
3.1. Terrorists’ Educational and family Backgrounds
• Many terrorists come from mainstream educational
and family backgrounds.
• More belong to middle class families, with a large
percentage being engineers and physicians.
• Many have been exposed to Western culture and
lifestyle. For instance:
– Mohammed Atta came from a middle-class Egyptian
background.
– He was a well-respected academic in Germany.,
– He was a suspected mastermind of the September 11, 2001
attacks.
– He was flying the plane that crashed into the North Tower.
• Osama bin Laden came from a family with exceptional
wealth in Saudi Arabia.
3.1. Terrorists’ Educational and family Backgrounds
• Sageman (2004) notes that most jihadists married
and had children.
• Terrorism is not necessarily a result of personal
poverty or deprivation.
• Sageman found also that many jihadists’ wives
shared or adopted the beliefs their husbands.
• Marriage provided a supporting environment for
jihadist views, and not a restraining influence, in a
number of cases.
 3.2. Age and Gender of Terrorists
• Mahan and Griset (2007) note that terrorists are
typically male aged 17 to 23.
• Pape (2005) found that the average age of suicide
bombers ranged from 21.1 to 29.8 years.
• Majority of women have been intellectual drivers
and followers.
• Harmon (2000) notes that about 30% of
international terrorists are women, and
• females participate actively in nearly all
insurgencies.
4. EXTERNAL FACTORS
THAT FUEL TERRORISM
4. External Factors that fuel Terrorism
• Globally, the proliferation of arms favors violence as
the principal means for resolving disputes.
• Continued tension in the Middle East and other war
theaters will popularize further terrorism.
• A growing number of failed and fragile states pose a
significant threat to international security.
• The globalization of information technology will
continue to make it easy to export cultures.
• The clash of ideas and ideologies will continue to be
a source of tension.
 5. WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS
5.1. Military - Community Outreach
5.2. Tolerating ordinary Citizens
5.3. Using Intelligence to weaken terrorists
5.4. Using IT Facilities for surveillance
5.5. Fighting terrorism with de-
radicalization
5.5. The need for participatory governance.
5.6. Adopting a holistic approach
 5.1. Military - Community Outreach
• Security agencies can build public trust and gather
intelligence, through community outreach
programs.
• But the citizens should not see the programs as a
means for gathering intelligence.
• Outreach efforts can support counter-radicalization
operation.
• Outreach can give marginalized groups an
opportunity to speak out.
• The military has all professions – doctors, nurses,
teachers, engineers, pilots and so on.
 5.1. Military - Community Outreach -- 1
• In China many roads, rail lines, houses etc. are built
by the military.
• A good percentage of “Made in China” goods are
produced by military corporations.
• Nothing stops the navies of African countries from
transporting citizens by ships and boats.
• Why should the military of African countries not
have corps for road building, rail construction, mass
transportation, and manufacturing?
• The air force can run commercial air transport and
monitor the airspace at the same time.
 5.1. Military - Community Outreach -- 2
• The military can deploy its discipline and expertise
productively in the public sphere.
• This can win hearts and minds.
• A stronger citizens - military bonding makes intelligence
gathering easier.
• Military outreach programs will enhance communities'
roles in “affecting positive change”:
– through reporting crimes
– seeking protection and intervention from the police,
– volunteer community policing and providing vital
intelligence.
•
 5.2. Tolerating ordinary Citizens
• Some years ago, Al Jazeera aired a news item
showing Israeli soldiers forcefully ejecting Israelis
who illegally occupied Palestinian land.
• The citizens fought their armed soldiers; they
shouted, threw stones, and held their uniforms.
• The soldiers successfully evacuated them without
hitting anyone.
• A few days after Israeli soldiers shot and killed a
stone-throwing Palestinian.
• They tolerated their compatriots but dealt
ruthlessly with the “enemy”.
 5.2. Tolerating ordinary Citizens –1
• It will be pleasing to see the African military make
such distinction between citizens and the enemy.
• Treating entire communities as potential criminals
distances the people from security operatives.
• Terrorists are not conventional criminals - it is more
effective to pre-empt and prevent attacks .
• Gathering and using intelligence effectively can
successfully weakening the insurgents.
• And ordinary citizens can be the best source of
intelligence when treated appropriately.
 5.3. Using Intelligence to weaken terrorists
• Intelligence is needed to pre-empt and disrupt
terrorist activity.
• The 4 Ps of Intelligence:
– Prevention: addressing underlying causes of terrorism
and protecting the citizens.
– Pursuit: disrupting and apprehending the terrorists.
– Protection: ensuring that reasonable security
precautions are taken.
– Preparedness: putting resources in place to respond
effectively to a terrorist attack.
• Ensuring adequate information sharing.
5.3 Using Intelligence to weaken terrorists --1
• Hunting for information should be the most important part
of the war on terrorism.
• A key aspect of intelligence gathering is to identify and
track terrorism financing .
• Several financial transactions in Africa occur in the informal
sector where banks are unable to track.
• Foreign exchange is bought principally from the black
market, despite the growing number of banks.
• Terrorism finances can also come through such informal
channels.
• The solution is not to criminalize and clamp down the
informal operators, but to encourage them to formalize.
5.3. Using Intelligence to weaken terrorists --2
• 50 percent of the war on insurgents will be won if
the hearts and minds of non-bank financial
operators are won.
• Counterterrorism effort need the active support of
influential indigenous opinion shapers, community
leaders, and NGOs.
• A single article or TV appearance by such persons
can have a more profound impact than a year's
government public enlightenment effort.
5.4. Using IT Facilities for surveillance
• Insurgency cannot be resolved by treating the
entire population as suspects.
• Terrorists are comparatively rare, often well-
disguised, and difficult to distinguish from other
persons.
• Using modern digital technologies effectively help
avoid mass labeling of whole communities as
terrorists.
• IT systems can be used to track individuals that
people have cause to suspect.
 5.4. Using IT Facilities for surveillance --1
• Mohanty et al (2015) proposes Citizens’
Intelligence Gathering & Intelligence Information
Interlinking (CIGIII) system for India.
• CIGIII has two components -
– Citizen’s Intelligence Gathering System (CIGS) and
– Intelligence Information Interlinking (III).
• CIGS deploys IT to create channels for collecting and
verifying intelligence from citizens.
• III system links the different users of information to
the source.
 5.4. Using IT Facilities for surveillance –2
• CIGS gathers intelligence from the population on
terrorist suspects and operations.
• Civil society groups are deployed to verify the
information.
• In many African countries, intelligence networks
often fail to penetrate sections of the society.
• Similarly, the intelligence network is weakened by
in-house corruption.
• Many officers disclose confidential national security
information across the line of control.
 5.4. Using IT Facilities for surveillance –3
• Terrorist operation may spread over several areas
and security operatives are thinly stretched on the
ground.
• More terrorist gangs find safe havens in remote
rural areas where security networks are weakest.
– It is there that the major terrorist plans are
contemplated and executed in towns.
• Accordingly involving citizens and citizens’ based
groups for intelligence gathering is very essential.
• Mohanty et al (2015) proposes that toll free phone
lines be provided to citizens.
 5.4. Using IT Facilities for surveillance --4
• Many persons may not want to expose their
identification.
• A special module can be incorporated in the system
to identify each informant.
• Informants who gave useful information should be
identified and rewarded.
• Their identity should not be exposed publicly.
• Potential informants keep back vital intelligence for
fear of being exposed.
• Others fear that they will not be rewarded.
 5.5. Fighting terrorism with de-radicalization
• Some marginal terrorists may want to opt out if their
safety is guaranteed.
• The security community must make efforts to
penetrate the ranks of terrorist gangs.
• High-level intelligence about a criminal gang usually
requires insider knowledge.
• In fighting insurgency, troop “numbers” is important,
but troop “type” is more essential.
• Africa’s military should be well versed in intelligence
engineering and psychological warfare.
• It should be possible to identify the terrorists by
working through key informants.
 5.5. Fighting terrorism with de-radicalization --1
• Security operatives would need to appeal to the
consciences of “moderate” militants;
– many of whom joined extremist groups for financial
considerations.
• The goal is to turn the insurgents against their
leaders and win some to the side of government.
• This approach will certainly not require thousands
of additional troops;
– but compact units of shrewd intelligence operatives.
• However troops will need to be deployed for
containment.
 5.6. The need for participatory governance
• The fight against terrorism requires team work and
widespread collaboration.
• Security agencies, the financial sector, the diplomatic
service and health organizations have roles to play.
• The key to success is organization, cooperation and
coordination.
• Good governance is central to the effective conduct of
the war against terror.
• The rule of law should be maintained and defended.
• Development of strong civil society movements is very
essential.
• Terrorism is fuelled by public dissatisfaction and
ignorance.
5.7. The need for participatory governance -1
• A sustained strategy for educating the local
population is important.
• Out-of-school youths should be positively
socialized, trained and empowered.
• Platforms should exist for the relevant state and
non-state stakeholders to share ideas.
• Such interactions can result in small but highly
significant successes, and future collaborations.
• Good governance will make fighting terrorism
much easier and more successful.
 5.8. Adopting a holistic approach
• The underlying factors that give birth to VEOs should be
addressed.
• Deploying the military may tackle the symptoms; but
the root causes should be addressed.
• Since terrorism has become a regional issues, an
African-led solution is required.
• African governments must deal effectively with
economic mismanagement.
• It is high time we outgrow the nostalgias our different
colonial pasts.
• Close cooperation between Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad,
and Niger will bring a quick end to Boko Haram.
 5.8. Adopting a holistic approach --- 1
• A strategic vision for fixing the needs of Africa’s growing
youthful population should be in place.
• Unmet aspirations for education and employment are
the manure for the growth of VEO.
• Communities suspected of harboring terrorists should
not be punished collectively.
• Doing so encourages further radicalization and hiding
away of vital intelligence information.
• Terrorism, like other global social problems, has to be
dealt with.
• There are no easy solutions. Indeed, short-term,
reactive responses are dangerous.
• Counter-radicalization may take years to bear fruits.
 THE END

THANK YOU
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