Legitimate Expectations, Judicial Review and Tribunals
Legitimate Expectations, Judicial Review and Tribunals
“56. What is still the subject of some controversy is the court’s role
when a member of the public, as a result of a promise or other
conduct, has a legitimate expectation that he will be treated in one
way and the public body wishes to treat him or her in a different way.
Here the starting point has to be to ask what in the circumstances the
member of the public could legitimately expect. In the words of Lord
Scarman in Re Findlay [1985] 1AC 318 at p338, “But what was
their legitimate expectation?” Where there is a dispute as to this, the
dispute has to be determined by the court, as happened in Findlay.
This can involve a detailed examination of the precise terms of the
promise or representation made, the circumstances in which the
promise was made and the nature of the statutory or other discretion.
57. There are at least three possible outcomes.
(a) The court may decide that the public
authority is only required to bear in mind its
previous policy or other representation, giving it
the weight it thinks right, but no more, before
deciding whether to change course. Here the
court is confined to reviewing the decision
on Wednesbury grounds.
(b) On the other hand the court may decide that
the promise or practice induces a legitimate
expectation of, for example, being consulted before
a particular decision is taken. Here it is
uncontentious that the court itself will require the
opportunity for consultation to be given unless
there is an overriding reason to resile from it in
which case the court will itself judge the adequacy
of the reason advanced for the change of policy,
taking into account what fairness requires.
(c) Where the court considers that a lawful promise
or practice has induced a legitimate expectation of
a benefit which is substantive , not simply
procedural, authority now establishes that here too
the court will in a proper case decide whether to
frustrate the expectation is so unfair that to take a
new and different course will amount to an abuse
of power. Here, once the legitimacy of the
expectation is established, the court will have the
task of weighing the requirements of fairness
against any overriding interest relied upon for the
change of policy.
58. The court having decided which of the categories is
appropriate, the court’s role in the case of the second and
third categories is different from that in the first. In the
case of the first, the court is restricted to reviewing the
decision on conventional grounds. The test will be
rationality and whether the public body has given proper
weight to the implications of not fulfilling the promise. In
the case of the second category the court’s task is the
conventional one of determining whether the decision
was procedurally fair. In the case of the third, the court
has when necessary to determine whether there is a
sufficient overriding interest to justify a departure from
what has been previously promised. ”
Development in India
• First reference in State of Kerala v K.G. Madhavan Pillai—
The Govt. had issued a sanction to the respondents to open
a new unaided school and to upgrade the existing ones.
However after 15 days a direction was issued to keep the
sanction in abeyance. This order was challenged on the
ground of violation of principles of natural justice.
Facts of the case: There were special leave petitions, civil appeals and writ
petitions which formed a batch of matters, brought before the Supreme Court
in this case, owing their origin to separate decisions of different High-Courts
and several provisions in different enactments-- thereby raising several
distinct questions of law, which were grouped together in this case for the
purpose of adjudication upon them. These matters were broadly pertaining
to- the constitutional validity of sub-clause (d) of clause (2) of Article 323-A
and sub-clause (d) of clause (3) of Article 323-B of the Constitution of India,
1950; and also in regards to the constitutional validity of the Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985; moreover what was also the subject of challenge was
whether the Tribunals constituted under Part XIV- A of the Constitution of
India can be effective substitutes for the High-Courts in discharging the power
of judicial review.
ISSUES
1. Whether the power conferred upon Parliament or State Legislatures, as the case
may be, by sub-clause (d) of clause (2) of Article 323-A or by sub-clause (d) of clause
(3) of Article 323-B of the Constitution, totally exclude the jurisdiction of all courts,
except that of the Supreme Court under Article 136, in respect of disputes and
complaints referred to in clause (1) of Article 323-A or with regard to all or any of the
matters specified in clause (2) of Article 323-B, runs counter to the power of judicial
review conferred on the High-Courts under Articles 226/227 and on the Supreme
Court under Article 32 of the Constitution?
2. Whether the Tribunals, constituted either under Article 323-A, or under Article 323-
B of the Constitution, possess the competence to test the constitutional validity of a
statutory provision/rule?
2. For securing independence of judiciary, the judges of superior courts have been
entrusted with the power of judicial review. Though the Parliament is empowered to
amend the Constitution, the power of amendment cannot be exercised so as to
damage the essential feature of the Constitution or to destroy its basic structure.
3. The High Courts and the Supreme Court have been entrusted with the task of
upholding the Constitution (i.e. furthering the ends of the Constitution) and with a
view to achieving that end, they have to interpret the Constitution.
Court held…
1. The Court held that Clause 2(d) of Article 323-A and Clause 3(d) of Article 323-B, to
the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High-Courts and the Supreme Court
under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional.
2. Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 excluded the power of judicial
review exercised by the High-Courts in service matters under Articles 226 and 227;
however it did not exclude the judicial review entirely in as much as the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution was kept intact. The Court
held that Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and the “exclusion of
jurisdiction” clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of Articles 323-A
and 323-B would, to the extent that they exclude the jurisdiction of the High-Courts
(under Articles 226 and 227) and the Supreme Court (under Article 32) would be ultra-
vires the Constitution.
3. The Court said that the jurisdiction conferred upon the High-Courts
under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32
of the Constitution is part of the inviolable basic structure of our
Constitution.
4. The Court held that there was no Constitutional prohibition against
administrative tribunals in performing a supplemental as opposed to a
substitutional role; that is in exercising their powers such tribunals
cannot act as substitutes for High-Courts and the Supreme Court. Their
decisions will be subject to scrutiny by a Division Bench of the
respective High-Courts i.e. all decisions of these tribunals (tribunals
created under Articles 323-A and 323-B of the Constitution of India)
will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court
within whose jurisdiction the concerned tribunal falls.
Judicial Review
• Judicial Review has been described as judicial
power in action