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UYTENGSU V.

REPUBLIC
FACTS:
Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental on
October 6, 1927, where he also finished his primary and secondary education. He went
to the United States, where, from 1947 to 1950, he was enrolled in the Leland Stanford
Junior University, in California. In April of the same year he returned to the Philippines
for four (4) months vacation. Then, to be exact, on July 15, 1950, his present
application for naturalization was filed. Forthwith, he returned to the United States and
took a postgraduate course, in chemical engineering, in another educational institution.
He finished this course in July 1951; but did not return to the Philippines until October
13, 1951.

Petitioner contends, and the lower court held, that the word “residence”, as used in the
aforesaid provision of the Naturalization Law, is synonymous with domicile, which,
once acquired, is not lost by physical absence, until another domicile is obtained, and
that, from 1946 to 1951, he continued to be domiciled in, and hence a resident of the
Philippines, his purpose in staying in the United States, at that time, being, merely to
study therein.
LAW
SEC. 7 COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 473

CITIZENSHIP; NATURALIZATION; ABSENCE DURING PERIOD


INTERVENING BETWEEN FILING OF APPLICATION AND
HEARING AN OBSTACLE TO PETITIONER'S NATURALIZATION
QUESTION ON THE LAW
Whether or not the application for naturalization may be granted,
notwithstanding the fact that petitioner left the Philippines immediately
after the filing of his petition and did not return until several months after
the first date set for the hearing thereof.
HOW DID SUPREME COURT RULED
NO. Petition denied.

While, generally speaking, domicile and residence mean one and the same thing,
residence combined with intention to remain, constitutes domicile while an established
abode, fixed permanently for a time for business or other purposes, constitutes a
residence, though there may be an intent, existing all the while, to return to the true
domicile.

Where the petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition for
naturalization and did not return until several months after the first date set for the
hearing thereof, notwithstanding his explicit promise, under oath, that he would reside
continuously in the Philippines “from the date of the filing of his petition up to the time
of his admission to Philippine citizenship”, he has not complied with the requirements
of section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, and, consequently, not entitled to a
judgment in his favor.
RULE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
STATUTE CONSTRUED AS WHOLE
It should have one purpose and one intent; Construe its parts and section in
connection with other parts

Optima Statuti Interpretatio est ipsum statutum - the best interpreter of a


statute is the statute itself.

CONSTRUCTION TO AVOID SURPLUSAGE

such requirement refers to actual or physical residence because to construe it


otherwise is to render the clause a surplusage.
An applicant for naturalization must be actually residing in the Philippines from
the filing of the petition for naturalization to its determination by the court

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