This document summarizes Kant's critique of the paralogisms in the Critique of Pure Reason. It discusses four paralogisms that aim to prove claims about the soul through rationalist arguments but commit fallacies of ambiguity. The paralogisms illicitly move from logical concepts like the "I think" to metaphysical conclusions about the soul as a substance, simple, identical over time (a person), and distinct from the external world. Kant argues they rely on an ambiguous use of terms like "I" and "existence" between premises and conclusions.
This document summarizes Kant's critique of the paralogisms in the Critique of Pure Reason. It discusses four paralogisms that aim to prove claims about the soul through rationalist arguments but commit fallacies of ambiguity. The paralogisms illicitly move from logical concepts like the "I think" to metaphysical conclusions about the soul as a substance, simple, identical over time (a person), and distinct from the external world. Kant argues they rely on an ambiguous use of terms like "I" and "existence" between premises and conclusions.
This document summarizes Kant's critique of the paralogisms in the Critique of Pure Reason. It discusses four paralogisms that aim to prove claims about the soul through rationalist arguments but commit fallacies of ambiguity. The paralogisms illicitly move from logical concepts like the "I think" to metaphysical conclusions about the soul as a substance, simple, identical over time (a person), and distinct from the external world. Kant argues they rely on an ambiguous use of terms like "I" and "existence" between premises and conclusions.
Rational Metaphysics • The soul (Paralogisms) • Freedom (Antinomies) • God (Ideal of Pure Reason) Paralogisms • Based on the cogito and extensions thereof. • Uses the TUA as a starting point for various metaphysical results. • Claims knowledge of the self as a thing-in-itself – proceeds from a logical self to the metaphysical self. • Moves from analytic to synthetic judgments. • Illegitimately applies the category of substance to TUA. Four Paralogisms • The soul is a substance • The soul is simple • The soul is conscious of its own identity through time, and therefore a person • The soul is distinct from the external world (dualism) The ‘I Think’ • I think • 1) As subject • 2) As simple subject • 3) As identical subject in every state of my thought • 4) As distinct from the external world Problem with the Paralogisms • Paralogism is a syllogism that is formally invalid. False due to its form. (A341/B399) • Fallacy of ambiguity: sophisma figurae dictionis. Uses a term differently between the major and minor premise. E.g.: • You can always borrow money from a bank with suitable collateral; (Major premise) • Banks are always found beside rivers; (Minor premise) • You can always borrow money beside rivers with suitable collateral. (Conclusion) Paralogism 1: The Soul • What cannot be thought otherwise than as subject does not exist otherwise than as subject, and is therefore substance. (Major premise) • Now a thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be thought otherwise than as subject. (Minor premise) • Therefore it also exists only as such a thing, i.e. as substance. (Conclusion) Paralogism 1 • ‘Cannot be thought otherwise than as subject’ is ambiguous. • Major premise: metaphysical subject. • Minor premise: logical subject. • Corresponding ambiguity in ‘I’. • Minor premise: Logical I • Conclusion: Metaphysical I Paralogism 2: The Soul as Simple • That thing whose action can never be regarded as the concurrence of many acting things is simple. (Major Premise) • ‘I’ is such a thing. (Minor Premise) • ‘I’ is simple. (Conclusion) Paralogism 2 • ‘Whose action can never be regarded as the concurrence of many things’ is ambiguous. • Major premise: substantive entity that must be regarded as singular. • Minor premise: logical entity that must be regarded as singular. • Corresponding ambiguity in ‘I’. • Minor premise: Logical I • Conclusion: Metaphysical I Paralogism 3: The Soul as Person • What is conscious of the numerical identity of itself in different times is to that extent a person. (Major Premise) • Now I, as a thinking being, am conscious of the numerical identity of myself at different times. (Minor Premise) • So I am a person. (Conclusion) Paralogism 3 • ‘Conscious of the identity of itself at different times’ is ambiguous. • Major premise: substantive identity. • Minor premise: logical identity. • Corresponding ambiguity in ‘I’. • Minor premise: Logical I • Conclusion: Metaphysical I Paralogism 4 (Soul as Immaterial) • That whose existence can be inferred only as a cause of given perceptions has only a doubtful existence. (Major Premise) • All outer experiences are of this kind. (Minor Premise) • So existence of all objects of outer sense is doubtful. (Conclusion) Corollary to Paralogism 4 • That whose existence need not be inferred as a cause of given perceptions does not have only a doubtful existence. (Major Premise) • The ‘I’’s existence is of this kind. (Minor Premise) • So the existence of the ‘I’ is not doubtful. (Conclusion) Paralogism 4 • ‘Existence’ is ambiguous. • Major premise: Metaphysical existence. • Minor premise: Logical existence. • Corresponding ambiguity in ‘I’. • Minor premise: Logical I • Conclusion: Metaphysical I