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The Paralogisms (PH 3261)

Dr. Qu Hsueh Ming ([email protected])


Rational Metaphysics
• The soul (Paralogisms)
• Freedom (Antinomies)
• God (Ideal of Pure Reason)
Paralogisms
• Based on the cogito and extensions thereof.
• Uses the TUA as a starting point for various metaphysical results.
• Claims knowledge of the self as a thing-in-itself – proceeds from a
logical self to the metaphysical self.
• Moves from analytic to synthetic judgments.
• Illegitimately applies the category of substance to TUA.
Four Paralogisms
• The soul is a substance
• The soul is simple
• The soul is conscious of its own identity through time, and therefore a
person
• The soul is distinct from the external world (dualism)
The ‘I Think’
• I think
• 1) As subject
• 2) As simple subject
• 3) As identical subject in every state of my thought
• 4) As distinct from the external world
Problem with the Paralogisms
• Paralogism is a syllogism that is formally invalid. False due to its form.
(A341/B399)
• Fallacy of ambiguity: sophisma figurae dictionis. Uses a term
differently between the major and minor premise. E.g.:
• You can always borrow money from a bank with suitable collateral; (Major
premise)
• Banks are always found beside rivers; (Minor premise)
• You can always borrow money beside rivers with suitable collateral.
(Conclusion)
Paralogism 1: The Soul
• What cannot be thought otherwise than as subject does not exist
otherwise than as subject, and is therefore substance. (Major
premise)
• Now a thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be thought
otherwise than as subject. (Minor premise)
• Therefore it also exists only as such a thing, i.e. as substance.
(Conclusion)
Paralogism 1
• ‘Cannot be thought otherwise than as subject’ is ambiguous.
• Major premise: metaphysical subject.
• Minor premise: logical subject.
• Corresponding ambiguity in ‘I’.
• Minor premise: Logical I
• Conclusion: Metaphysical I
Paralogism 2: The Soul as Simple
• That thing whose action can never be regarded as the concurrence of
many acting things is simple. (Major Premise)
• ‘I’ is such a thing. (Minor Premise)
• ‘I’ is simple. (Conclusion)
Paralogism 2
• ‘Whose action can never be regarded as the concurrence of many
things’ is ambiguous.
• Major premise: substantive entity that must be regarded as singular.
• Minor premise: logical entity that must be regarded as singular.
• Corresponding ambiguity in ‘I’.
• Minor premise: Logical I
• Conclusion: Metaphysical I
Paralogism 3: The Soul as Person
• What is conscious of the numerical identity of itself in different times
is to that extent a person. (Major Premise)
• Now I, as a thinking being, am conscious of the numerical identity of
myself at different times. (Minor Premise)
• So I am a person. (Conclusion)
Paralogism 3
• ‘Conscious of the identity of itself at different times’ is ambiguous.
• Major premise: substantive identity.
• Minor premise: logical identity.
• Corresponding ambiguity in ‘I’.
• Minor premise: Logical I
• Conclusion: Metaphysical I
Paralogism 4 (Soul as Immaterial)
• That whose existence can be inferred only as a cause of given
perceptions has only a doubtful existence. (Major Premise)
• All outer experiences are of this kind. (Minor Premise)
• So existence of all objects of outer sense is doubtful. (Conclusion)
Corollary to Paralogism 4
• That whose existence need not be inferred as a cause of given
perceptions does not have only a doubtful existence. (Major Premise)
• The ‘I’’s existence is of this kind. (Minor Premise)
• So the existence of the ‘I’ is not doubtful. (Conclusion)
Paralogism 4
• ‘Existence’ is ambiguous.
• Major premise: Metaphysical existence.
• Minor premise: Logical existence.
• Corresponding ambiguity in ‘I’.
• Minor premise: Logical I
• Conclusion: Metaphysical I

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