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DANILO E.

PARAS, 
petitioner
vs.
COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, 
respondent

G.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996


FACTS OF THE CASE:

Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay


of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay
election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was
filed by the registered voters of the barangay.
Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition,
scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall
election on November 13, 1995.
At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well
above the 25% requirement provided by law.
The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of
petitioner's opposition. On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set
anew the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995.
After conducting a summary hearing, the court dismissed the
petition and lifted the restraining order.
In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the
third time, re-scheduled the recall election an January 13, 1996.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
The petitioner argues that in accordance to Section 74 (b) of
Republic Act No. 7160, (Local Government Code), which states that
"no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the
official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding
a regular local election“.
Petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall
election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election
was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996.
In support thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v.
Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the
SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as
the SK election is a regular local election, hence no recall election
can be had for barely four months separate the SK election from the
recall election.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the recall election in question is in violation to the
provisions of Section 74b of the Local Government Code.
RULING:
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute
must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part
of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and
kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local
official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph
(b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the
period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall
election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus,
subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local
election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the
novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of
removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end
of his term.
And if the SK election which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be held
every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the
purview of the phrase "regular local election", as erroneously
insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted
rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.
It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute
should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution.
Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government
Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict
with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the
Constitution to "enact a local government code which shall provide
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanism of recall, initiative, and referendum . . . ."
Moreover, petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to
absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court
made the following admonition:

“We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as


this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and
defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is
usually found not in "the letter that killeth but in the spirit
that vivifieth". . .
The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its
construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according
to its spirit and intent.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having
become moot and academic. The temporary restraining order issued
by the Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall election
should be as it is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Reported by: ABENOJA, Raven Joie G.

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