ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW
PSDA
Vipulbhai Mansinhbhai Chaudhary V. State of Gujarat and
anothers

(2017) 13 SCC 51

Rakhi
16117703817
IV – C
BA LLB
 Principle Of Natural Justice
Natural justice implies fairness, equity and equality. In a welfare state like India, the role and jurisdiction of
administrative agencies is increasing at a rapid pace. The concept of Rule of Law would loose its validity if the
instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging these functions in a fair and just
manner. So Principle Of Natural Justice needs to be developed and followed.

Three Principles of natural Justice

Nemo judex in causa sua
• No one ought to be a judge in his own particular reason.
• Justice ought not exclusively be done yet clearly and without a doubt be believed to be finished.
Audi Alterum Partem
The principle of audi alteram partem is the basic concept of principle of natural justice. The expression audi
alteram partem implies that a person must be given opportunity to defend himself. This principle is sine qua
non of every civilized society. This rule covers various stages through which administrative adjudication
pasees starting from notice to final determination. Right to fair hearing thus includes:-
• Right to notice
• Right to rebut adverse evidence (i) Right to cross examination (ii) Right to legal representation
• Disclosure of evidence to party and present the case.
• Report of enquiry to be shown to the other party.
Reasoned Decision
The necessity of expressing the reasons can't be under accentuated as its fills the accompanying need: -
• It guarantees that the authoritative specialist will apply its brain and impartially take a gander at the actualities
and confirmation of the case.
• It guarantees that all the applicable components have been considered and that the unessential elements have
been forgotten.
• It fulfills the bothered party as in his view focuses have been analyzed and considered preceding achieving an
end.
• The re-appraising experts and courts are in a superior position to think about the interests on the topic of law.

Right to NOTICE
The term ‘notice’ originates from the Latin word ‘notitia’ which means ‘being known’. Notice is the starting of any
hearing. Unless a person knows the formulation of subject and issues involved in the case, he cannot defend himself.
A notice must be adequate and contain:
• Time, place and nature of hearing,
• Legal authority under which hearing is to be held,
• Statement of specific charges (or grounds) and proposed action (or grounds) which the person has to meet.

The test of adequacy of notice will be whether it gives sufficient information and material so as to enable the person
concerned to put up an effective defence.
However, the requirement of notice will not be insisted upon as a mere technical formality, when the concerned party
clearly knows the case against him, and is not thereby prejudiced in any manner in putting up an effective defence
 Brief facts of the case
The appellant was the chairman of the Mehsana District Co-operative Milk
producers’ union. He was elected as the chairman for three years, but he continued
beyond three years by virtue of section 74C(2) of Gujarat co-operative society Act,
1961. The registrar of the society issued a show cause notice on 12/1/15 asking
Chaudhary to show cause, that why he shouldn’t be removed for various reasons.
Chaudhary challenged the notice by writ petition, which was dismissed by Gujarat
High Court as premature. The dismissal was confirmed by division bench in Letters
Patent Appeal. Aggrieved by the same Chaudhary filed a Special Leave Petition on
12/5/15.
During the pendency of the appeal, Registrar passed an order on 10/3/15 , he
removed Chaudhary as a chairman under section 76B(1) of The Act and also
disqualified him from elections for period of three years under section 76B(2) of The
Act, Court disposed off the SLP on 20/3/15, directing status quo regarding the order
or Registrar to be maintained till 30/3/15 to enable chaudhary to approach a
appropriate forum for challenging the order.
Chaudhary filed the statutory revision before the state government, government confirmed
the registrar’s order. Aggrieved by the same, he filed a writ petition in which the judge of
high court upheld the order of Registrar as regards the removal and set aside the order
regarding disqualification. The Court held the proceedings under section 76B(2)can only be
inituated afer an order under section 76B(1) . So, the disqualification made by section 76B(2)
couldnot be sustained.
As the part of the order went against appellant, he referred the cae for Letters Patent Appeal
which was dismissed. Then he approached the supreme court filing SLP
Meanwhile, Registrar issued a fresh show cause notice calling upon chaudhary as to why he
should not be disqualified. Again aggrieved by the same Chaudhary challenged the notice,
unsuccesfully. He carried the matter to Letters Patent Appeal. The notice was quashed being
beyond the ambit of section 76B.
Aggrieved by such order state of Gujarat filed special leave petition.Supreme Court by an
order permitted Chaudhary to reply. He even filed a reply. Then the Registrar passed an order
disqualifying Chaudhary for six years.
Chaudhary filed writ petition challenging the above order. The Court quashed the notice but
to an extent. He was disqualified for three years. Chaudhary carried the matter to Letters
Patent Appeal, in which the High Court declined to interfere.
 ISSUES INVOLVED

• Whether a combined notice issued to Chaudhary complied with the

Principles of Natural Justice ?
• Whether power conferred by a statute on body other than a judicial
body: (i) could be exercised repeatedly or (ii) are there any legal
limitations thereon (iii) if limitation, what are they ?
• Whether the period of disqualification of six years is consistent with
law ?
 Judgement
1. Whether combined notice issued to Chaudhary complied with the Principles of Natural Justice?

The Court held that, There is no concept of issuing notice in advance. If such notice in advance is issued for the
proposed action to follow the event to happen, it could be said that the action proposed is prejudged, predetermined
and as a result of bias attitude. In fact, reading the language of sub- sections (1) and (2) of Section 76B of the Act
independently, one would find that the legislature intended to pass two different and distinct orders at two different
stages. In both the sub-sections, the words “by order” are used. Therefore, removal of an officer is contemplated by
order to be passed at first in point of time and then by separate order, the Registrar may direct that the officer “so
removed” shall be disqualified to hold or to contest election for any office in his own society or in any other society
for a period which may be fixed by the Registrar within the ceiling limit and for such order to be separately passed,
principles of natural justice, as stated above, are to be followed.” The learned Single Judge, therefore, concluded that
a combined notice under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 76B is untenable.

2. Whether power confered by a statute on a body other than a judicial body (i) could be
exercised repeatedly or (ii) are there any legal limitation or (iii) if limitations what are they?

The Court held that where an order passed in exercise of a power conferred by a statute is set aside on the
ground that such an order was passed in breach of the principles of natural justice, the power could once again
be exercised by complying with the principles of natural justice.
 The court refered to A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in 
Thimmasamudram Tobacco Co. v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Nellore Division, Nellore, AIR 1961 AP
324, held that, in a case where the flaw in the order appealed against consists of in the non-observance of certain
procedure or in not giving effect to the maxim ‘audi alteram partem’, it is open to the officer concerned to start the
procedure once again with a view to follow the rules of procedure and the principles of natural justice.” The said
principle laid down by the Andhra Pradesh High Court was approved by this Court in 
Superintendent (Tech.I) Central Excise I.D.D. Jabalpur & Others v. Pratap Rai, (1978) 3 SCC 113.
Division bench of high court quashed the order saying that second proceedings cannot be initiated On the same facts.
The saud conclusion is clearly untenable and was set aside.
3. Whether the period of disqualification of six years is consistent with law?
Originally the Section provided for disqualification only for four years. But the “four years” period was substituted
by “six years” period by the Gujarat Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 2015 (Act No.12 of 2015).
A logical corollary is that, no right or liability can be created by a repealing enactment, which is inconsistent with
the rights and obligations conferred under the repealed Act unless the repealing enactment makes an express
declaration to that effect or adopts some other technique known to law to achieve that purpose. Giving retrospective
effect to the repealing enactment is one of the techniques by which the legislature seeks to achieve that purpose.
There is nothing in Act No.12 of 2015 which warrants an interpretation that the legislature intended to create a
disqualification which would run for a maximum period of six years with retrospective effect. In the circumstances,
the disqualification of six years upon Chaudhary is not tenable and at best Chaudhary could be disqualified for a
maximum period of four years. So disqualifying Chaudhary for three years would meet the end of justice
Thankyou