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Chapter 2 - Elementary Cryptography
Chapter 2 - Elementary Cryptography
Chapter 2
Elementary Cryptography
Concepts of encryption
Cryptanalysis: how encryption systems are
"broken"
Symmetric (secret key) encryption and the DES
and AES algorithms
Asymmetric (public key) encryption and the RSA
algorithm
Key exchange protocols and certificates
Digital signatures
Cryptographic hash functions
The OT could be cot, dot, got, hot, lot, not, pot, rot, or tot; a likely choice is not.
Unfortunately, q = N does not give any more clues because q appears only once
in this sample.
The word lv is also the end of the word wklv, which probably starts with T.
Likely two-letter words that can also end a longer word include so, is, in, etc.
However, so is unlikely because the form T-SO is not recognizable;
IN is ruled out because of the previous assumption that q is N
A more promising alternative is to substitute IS for lv throughout, and continue to analyze the message
in that way.
By now, you might notice that the ciphertext letters uncovered are just three
positions away from their plaintext counterparts.
Chapter 2
Decryption
key
Plaintext
ciphertext
Overview
combination of two fundamental building blocks of
encryption: substitution and transposition
derives its strength from repeated application of these
two techniques
one on top of the other, for a total of 16 cycles
Hard to trace a single bit through 16 iterations
The algorithm begins by encrypting the plaintext as
blocks of 64 bits
The key is 64 bits long
in fact it is only 56-bit (the other bits are used to check digits)
Overview
Leverages the two techniques Shannon identified to
conceal information: confusion and diffusion
ensuring that the output bits have no obvious relationship to
the input bits and spreading the effect of one plaintext bit to
other bits in the ciphertext
Substitution provides the confusion, and transposition
provides the diffusion
Types of Permutations.
Details of a Cycle.
Two conditions
It must be unforgeable:
If person P signs message M with signature S(P,M), it is
impossible for anyone else to produce the pair [M, S(P,M)]
It must be authentic: If a person R receives the pair
[M, S(P,M)] purportedly from P, R can check that the
signature is really from P
Only P could have created this signature, and the signature is
firmly attached to M