C.G. - Greenbury Committee
C.G. - Greenbury Committee
Introduction:
1. The purpose of the code is to set out best practice in determining and accounting for Directors remuneration. 2. Detailed provisions have been prepared with large companies mainly in mind, but the principles apply equally to smaller companies. 3. All listed companies in the UK should comply with the code to the fullest extent practicable and include a statement about their compliance in the annual report to the shareholders by their remuneration Committees or elsewhere in their annual reports or accounts. Any areas of non compliance should be explained and justified
Introduction (cont.):
4. The London Stock Exchange should introduce the following continuing obligations for listed companies. a. An obligation to include in their annual remuneration committee reports to shareholders or their annual reports a general statement about their compliance with Section A of the Code which should also explain and justify any area of non compliance.
b. A specific obligation to comply with the provisions in Section B of the Code which are not already covered by existing obligations and with provision C 10 of the Code, subject to any changes of working which may be desirable for legal or technical reasons. 5. Within Section B, provision B-3 requires remuneration committees to confirm that full consideration has been given to Section C and D of the Code.
The Code
A. The Remuneration Committee:
1. To avoid potential conflict of interest, Board of Directors should set up remuneration Committees of non-executive directors to determine on their behalf and on behalf of shareholder within agreed terms of reference the companys policy on executive remuneration and specific remuneration packages for each of the Executive directors including pension rights and any compensation payments. 2. Remuneration Committee Chairman should account directly to the shareholders through the means specified in this code for the decisions their committees reach. 3. Where necessary, Companys Articles of Association should be amended to enable remuneration committees to discharge these functions on behalf of the Board.
C. Remuneration Policy:
1. Remuneration committees must provide the packages need to attract, retain and motivate Directors of the quality required but should avoid paying more than is necessary for the purpose. 2. Remuneration committees should judge where to position their Company relative to other companies. They should be aware what other comparable Companys are paying and should take account of relative performance. 3. Remuneration Committees should be sensitive to the wider scene, including pay and employment conditions elsewhere in the Company, specially when determining annual salary increases. 4. The performance related elements of remuneration should be designed to align the interests of Directors and shareholders and to give Directors keen incentives to perform at the highest levels.
C. Remuneration Policy:
5. Remuneration committees should consider whether their Directors should be eligible for annual bonuses. If so, performance conditions should be relevant, stretching and designed to enhance the business. Upper limits should always be considered. There may be a case for part payment in shares to be held for a significant period. 6. Remuneration committees should consider whether their Directors should be eligible for benefits under long term incentive schemes. Traditional shares options schemes should be weighed against other kinds of long term incentives schemes. In normal circumstances shares granted should not vest and option should not be exercisable, in under three years. Directors should be encouraged to hold their shares for a further period after vesting or exercise subject to the need to finance any costs of acquisitions and associated tax liability.
C. Remuneration Policy:
7. Any long term incentive schemes which are proposed should preferably replace existing schemes or at least form part of a well considered overall plan, incorporating existing schemes, which should be approved as a whole by shareholders. The total rewards potentially available should not be excessive (B12). 8. Grants under incentive schemes, including new grants under existing share option schemes should be subject to challenging performance criteria reflecting the companys objectives. Consideration should be given to criteria, which reflect the companys performance relative to a group of comparator companies in some key variables such as total shareholder return
C. Remuneration Policy:
9. Grants under executive share options and other long term incentive schemes should normally be phased rather than awarded in one large block (B6). 10. Executive share options should never be issued at a discount. 11. Remuneration Committees should consider the pension consequences and associated costs to the company of basic salary increases, especially for Directors close to retirement. 12. In general, neither annual bonuses nor benefits in kind should be pensionable (B8).