The Median Voter Theorem

Single Peaked Preferences on a Single Dimension

 If everyone's preferences are single peaked on the same single dimension median
voter theorem holds.
 Single dimension, e.g. left-right.
 Single-peaked – each voter has an ideal point and the further away from the ideal
point the lower their utility.

Non single peaked voter

Single peaked “moderate” voter
Single peaked “left” voter
Single peaked “right” voter

Left Right
Single-Peaked Preferences

 Aren't all preferences "single-peaked"?

 No
 Consider as example a wealthy parent.
 If spending on education is high, she sends her kids to public school.
 But otherwise she sends them to private school, and gets no benefit from education
spending. So her preferences would look like this:
 #1 pick: high spending
 #2 pick: low spending
 #3 pick: medium spending
 Medium spending is her worst outcome – she’s paying more for a product she won’t
be (directly) consuming
Two-Party, Winner-Take-All Elections

 Let's take these voters and put them in a hypothetical situation. Suppose we have a
two-party (or two-candidate) election.
 Voters care about and are perfectly informed about party positions on exactly one
issue: liberalism versus conservatism.
 The electoral rule is "winner-takes-all" - whoever gets more votes wins.
 When in doubt, assume ties are resolving by flipping a coin.
 Assumption about party/candidate motivation: They want to win, and care more about that
than everything else put together.
 The two parties compete in exactly one way: By taking a stand on the issue.
 Imagine graphing the distribution of voter ideal points. There are many ways that it
could look, but it is easiest - and pretty realistic - to draw it as a "bell curve."
Two-Party, Winner-Take-All Elections

 Now suppose for a moment that each party's position is randomly assigned. Who
votes for which party?

 The electorate may be divided into three groups: those who definitely vote for the
more liberal party, those who definitely vote for the more conservative party, and
the people in the middle, who pick whichever party is closer to them.
Political Competition and Platform Convergence

 Now put yourself in the shoes of the party that will lose the election if it stays where
it is.

 Question: What will it do to get more votes?

 Answer: Move to the center. They don't lose any of the extreme votes, and get
more of the "swing" votes.

 you get the maximum possible number of votes by moving as close as possible to
the rival party without overlapping.
 But then put yourself in the shoes of the rival party. It won't take this lying down. It
will move towards the center as well. If necessary, it will "leap frog" over you.
 Standard economist's question thus emerges: What is the equilibrium?
Political Competition and Platform Convergence

 You can't have an equilibrium where the parties' platforms are different, because
both parties gain votes by moving closer to each other.

 You can't have an equilibrium where one party gets more than 50% of the
votes. Why? Because you can always win 50% by simply offering exactly the same
platform as your competitor.

 Thus, equilibrium platforms "converge" - both parties offer the same policy.
Political Competition and Platform Convergence

 But what specific policy do they converge to? To answer this, recall that
the median of a distribution is the point with half of the distribution's density above
it and half below it.
 What is the median in this series: {100, 7, 3, 1, 1} ?
 Could the equilibrium platform ever be one where both parties are above the
median of the distribution of voter preferences? No. Why? Because one party
would get more than 50% of the votes by moving a little closer to the median.
 Could the equilibrium platform ever be one where both parties are below the
median of the distribution of voter preferences? No, for the same reason.
 Could the equilibrium platform be the median of the distribution? Yes! If both
parties are at the median, then staying there gets you 50% of the votes, but moving
a little to the left or right gets you fewer than 50%.
Median Voter Theorem

 Thus, we arrive at the famous Median Voter Theorem: Given the preceding
assumptions, both parties move to the exact median of the distribution of voter
preferences. In other words, they both offer platforms identical to the bliss point of
the median voter.

 Note: These results hold up as long as parties prefer winning to losing, all else
equal.
Voter Participation and Franchise Restrictions

 Competing parties thus find themselves under intense pressure to cater to the
median voter.
 But the identity of the median voter typically changes when the electorate changes.
 In a conservative state, for example, the median voter will be more conservative, and both
parties will have to offer conservative policies to win.
 Similarly, if poorer voters are less likely to vote, parties will move to the median of the
distribution of voters, not the distribution of citizens.
 There are many factors that affect participation: age, education, what's on the ballot... even
the weather.
 If proportional amounts of all political persuasions don't vote, the median stays the
same, and so does the electoral outcome.
 But if participation changes in a disproportionate way, this changes the median, and
thereby changes the nature of the winning platform.
Franchise Restrictions

 There are also legal restrictions on voting.

 Non-citizens normally can't vote at all.
 Citizens have to register in advance to vote.
 Non-residents in a state can't vote in that state.
 Convicted felons and children can't vote.

 Similarly, you have to be a Supreme Court justice to vote in the Supreme Court, a
U.S. Senator to vote in the U.S. Senate, etc. As you would expect, measures that
come before these bodies are usually tailored to the median of those who vote on
these measures.
Historical Franchise Restrictions

 The world used to be worse. Democracy is no different.

 In the past, there were often stronger restrictions on voting, also known as
"restrictions of the franchise."
 1. Non-property-holders
 2. Non-whites
 3. Women
 4. 18-21 year-olds

 The motivation is simple: change the median voter to your preferred interests.
Weighted Voting

 Corporations typically have voting, but it is voting proportional to your number of

shares. (Turnout of small share-holders is also typically very low). Thus, the median
corporate voter is usually a large shareholder with a big stake in the company's
financial success.

 In the past, some countries (like Sweden) also had "plural voting," with extra votes
for the aristocracy.
The Effect of Fringe Parties

 In many cases, we see people with extreme preferences deciding not to vote
because "their" candidate is an unprincipled "sell-out."
 This is probably a major force that keeps real-world parties from completely
converging. They have to trade-off extra moderate votes for foregone extremist votes.
 Fringe, "extremist" parties do much the same thing.
For example, if a far-left Green
Party exists, then the Democrats have to worry about two things:
 1. Extremists stay home
 2. Extremists vote Green

 How do fringe parties affect the outcome? They tend to push the median in
the opposite of the direction they favor! If the 5% of most-left-wing Democrats vote
Green, the median of the remaining voters shifts to the right.
Fringe Parties

 So what are fringe parties doing? In many cases, they say they are working for long-
run attitudinal change.

 In the 2000 presidential election, fringe parties wound up making a huge difference
in spite of their small vote shares.

 Will the Libertarian and Green Parties move the 2016 election?
The Median Voter Theorem Doesn’t Always Apply:
Multiple Voting Dimensions

 The Median Voter Theorem only strictly holds if there is a single issue.
 If there are two or more issues that parties take stands on, but only one election,
there is no guarantee that the median voter's preference will win on any issue.
 Moreover, even with single-peaked preferences, multiple voting dimensions make it
possible for voting cycles to arise. Chaos.
 At this point, you might say: "But all real-world elections have multiple issues. So
the Median Voter Theorem is useless."
 Possibly so, but matters are more complicated than that. In particular, we will see that to a
large extent, platforms empirically boil down to a single dimension - in the U.S., position on
the liberal-conservative spectrum.