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![US Navy SEALs operating with Virginia-class attack submarine USS New Mexico. All Virginia class boats are equipped to deploy SEAL frogmen while submerged](/https/www.telegraph.co.uk/content/dam/news/2024/02/22/TELEMMGLPICT000284985726_17086070301670_trans_NvBQzQNjv4BqGhFGD3OcMvc3EVqNhTDH_0R8YSybYNWDTYrGStsI8ko.jpeg?imwidth=680)
On 15 December 2021, a trilateral security and technology transfer agreement between Australia, the UK and the US was announced. Called Aukus, it has military and security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific at its heart, out of which comes the requirement to deliver nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. The UK and US do not have enough nuclear shipbuilding infrastructure even for their own needs, so in the longer run Australia will need to build its own boats.
The announcement came as quite a surprise, particularly to the French, and has been hotly debated ever since.
At a strategic level it makes perfect sense. To project power and influence across inescapably vast swaths of ocean, Australia needs nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs – not to be confused with their nuclear-ballistic-missile-armed siblings, SSBNs). You really only need to look at a globe to understand why. But SSNs are some of the most complex and expensive warships there are, so sharing the effort with two countries who have been doing it for a while is a good idea.
Aukus is more than ‘just’ the submarines though. It also aims to enhance the development of advanced military capabilities such as cyber warfare, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and undersea capabilities. Information sharing is already commonplace through the ‘Five Eyes’ arrangement (Aukus countries plus New Zealand and Canada) but this plans to take it beyond ‘just’ information and into the realms of sensitive technology sharing. It includes plans for more joint military exercises, cooperation on defence innovation, and sharing of defence capabilities. Aukus will strengthen military ties between the three countries and improve their collective security posture in the Indo-Pacific region. So far so good.
Although it’s not explicitly stated in the announcement, a significant motivation behind Aukus is to counter China’s growing military capabilities and assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific. Of course, this means it hasn’t been universally welcomed, and some are even calling it a new arms race, but on the whole, the strategic level messaging and cooperation has been well received.
However, as with anything Naval, broad strategic conversations are quickly forgotten in the rush to zoom in on hull numbers and money, and this is no exception.
In outline, the plan is for Australia to buy three to five US-built Virginia class SSNs with the first due in 2032 and then one more every three years. So this isn’t happening soon and if you’re of a particularly negative disposition, are one of the more extremist China hawks, or have a short planning horizon, it can already be written off as ‘too late to bother’.
That viewpoint does rather ignore the fact that right now China is totally dependent on Australia for iron ore, vitally necessary for its huge industrial and construction sectors. Finding other sources of supply will take time, and is something that China almost certainly needs to have sorted out before making any move that would force Canberra to react.
So there is probably time, at least for the first Virginias to arrive. After that the plans to build the new Aukus submarine will be matured in time for their delivery to start around 2040. Those boats could be five or six in number depending on how many Virginias the Australians get. The first could be built here in the UK and then the remainder in the Osborne Naval Shipyard in Adelaide. The UK and Australian yards will carry out much of the building but the boats will have US nuclear and command system technology at their core.
This is where Aukus starts getting messy. None of the three countries have anything close to a good track record of delivering complex maritime projects on time and to budget. Internal criticism has been common and now, insults are increasingly being thrown at the other countries.
Only yesterday, Hugh White, a leading thinker in Australian defence, wrote an article in Australian Foreign Affairs called ‘Dead in the water, The Aukus delusion’ titled ‘Fatal Shores: Aukus is a grave mistake’ in which he suggests that “UK submarine building and maintenance isn’t up to scratch for their requirements, why would it be for ours?” I’ll put him down as a ‘maybe’ for now but he is not alone.
Accusations of strained UK submarine infrastructure, and there are many, can equally be levelled at the US. The Americans want to build two Virginias a year but are currently only managing 1.3. This actually needs to be 2.33 for Aukus sales to not erode their own numbers.
So even the simple bit – selling a tried and tested submarine type – is causing capacity issues. Extrapolate this to the part where all three countries have to build a largely new boat in yards that are not ready and you can see why people are nervous. International cooperation of this sort is littered with examples of delay and overspend. The Eurofighter Typhoon programme started in 1983 but didn’t go operational with the RAF until 2007. Granted that was across four countries but still, it took 24 years and Typhoons are far less complex pieces of equipment.
Then, with Typhoon there was at least no doubt that the partner nations needed fighter jets. There is no such certainty in Australia with plenty who think that the whole thing is a waste of money, or could even make them less safe. Arguments for non-nuclear powered submarines instead are now popping up.
On this subject, it is hard to exaggerate just how much less capable a non-nuclear submarine is than a nuclear powered one. The suggestion that conventional boats are quieter are always oversimplified and often out of date. The idea that they can operate in shallower water is typically exaggerated or irrelevant.
The key thing to remember is that a conventional submarine cannot run its diesels when fully submerged. This means that it can’t travel long distances and can cross moderate distances only at a battery-saving crawl. It will struggle to get into weapons range of any moderately fast moving surface ship, and will have even worse problems in getting away after making an attack. Worst of all, it cannot move quickly and undetectably across large distances as a nuclear boat can. This capability, delivered by the Aukus plan, changes the entire naval picture in the western Pacific. Conventional boats simply don’t.
Yes, a conventional boat can put up its “snort” air-intake mast above the surface, allowing it to run diesels and recharge batteries without fully emerging. But a snort mast is nearly as obvious as simply surfacing, and restricts the sub’s speed nearly as badly as running on batteries.
Yes, there are various “air independent” power options available which can improve a conventional boat’s submerged performance somewhat – though still nowhere near to equalling a nuclear vessel. But air-independent systems require complicated and dangerous topping off with dangerous semi-explosive fuels after use: it’s notable that all such designs still have diesels for practical utility. There’s a good reason that air-independent subs didn’t come into use until decades after nuclear ones did, and they remain rare.
Nuclear is what you want if you are serious about submarine warfare, and it is hard to imagine a clearer geographical case for nuclear-powered boats than Australia with the vast Pacific waters it needs to dominate – waters which might well be overflown by hostile patrol planes, or patrolled by hostile warships. But you do have to be able to afford nuclear, and that is a big ‘if’.
On cost, Virginias currently come in at about 4.3 billion US dollars per boat (3.41 billion pounds at today’s rates) – that is significantly more than a QE class aircraft carrier. If you order three of them and then five of the ones that come along after (which may well cost more as they will require new infrastructure), you do need to be certain that this is what you want.
On the plus side, the long-awaited/much delayed review into the Australian surface fleet was published this week – it shows strategic clarity and ambition. It talks about pace, and this will be key; infra, people and decisions need to all move fast if any of this is to work. Beauty pageants over prospective ship types and political delays need to be eradicated.
Money has been allocated, immediately raising questions as to whether it’s enough, but it’s a start and arguably puts the Australian plans on a stronger footing than the UK’s ambitious but unfunded Integrated Review and supporting Defence Command Paper. Overall, the intent and ambition in this breaking paper, in my view, gives Aukus a boost.
There are pros and cons for each country.
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For Australia, Aukus has the ability to answer the strategic need for long-range power projection. It brings the US and the UK closer and makes their theatre of operations directly relevant to both countries. But the gap between now and delivery needs to be filled with rapid industrial upscaling, engagement and activity. The RN’s carrier strike deployment to the Indo-Pacific in 2025 will be a key stepping stone. Australia will need to learn how to become a partner rather than a customer – the constant tinkering with the design of their version of the Type 26 frigate, the Hunter-class, is a case study in how to ensure your value for money can be eroded over time. Later this decade, if the US is ready to deliver the Virginia class but Australia isn’t ready to receive, guess what happens next.
The US will be delighted with anything that helps share their burden in the Pacific and also gets a new operating base there. The downside for them is anything that could prevent them maintaining their own sub numbers. Then, Trump issue lurks ever closer with every indication that he could derail the whole thing by promising more Virginias. A huge advantage of Aukus is that it boosts the Western world’s sub-building capacity. It seems incredible to write that a potential next President may not want that, but here we are.
For the UK, the real prize is a larger fleet of SSNs, some of which could then be used in the North Atlantic on UK essential tasks. We are woefully understrength here in terms of numbers and availability. Anything that has even the slightest promise of reversing this trend should be embraced. Increased access to US technology is never a bad thing either.
But our nuclear enterprise is in shocking condition. Docking and build periods are too long and our people, the most precious part of all, are suffering from both and are voting with their feet. If not managed, this will get worse as nuclear engineers and designers based in Barrow are seduced by the bright lights of Adelaide, as a steady stream of their seagoing counterparts have been for years now. If we allow a ‘nuclear brain drain’, our own infra, already thin, quickly becomes unsustainable.
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Aukus also needs to be considered a whole-country endeavour. The 2015 defence review determined that the MOD should cover the cost of the new nuclear armed deterrent submarines where the previous two classes had received extra funding from the Treasury. The Defence budget has never really recovered from this jolting shift, which has effectively wiped out recent increases in defence spending, and the mindset that caused it is the opposite of what is now required.
The MOD can’t do this one on its own. Contracts need to be crafted between the Cabinet Office and Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S), an area that has so often gone awry in the past. The Department of Education should be involved in determining and establishing skills in future crews, the Home Office for developing Aukus visas so people can travel freely between countries, and so on. For so long, the MOD has been expected to do other departments’ work, in particular by having its budget sidetracked into job creation schemes: now it is time for some payback.
Better collaboration between government (policy and money) and industry (build and deliver) is required. The US and the UK have been doing this on elements of our submarines for 60 years now. That level of performance is now required with a third country in the circle of trust. This will not be easy: “you can’t surge trust” is a military cliché for a reason.
Aukus remains an exciting strategic opportunity to bolster our and key allies’ defences with a weapon system that dominates in delivering soft and hard effects. But peer below the strategic positives and a picture of fragility emerges at all levels.
For it to work, for these fragilities to be reversed, all three countries need to make it a domestic and international ‘whole-ship evolution’ on a collaborative scale perhaps not seen before in peacetime. If anyone wobbles either strategically, financially or contractually then it will collapse. Recruitment and retention in all three countries needs to improve or the whole thing becomes moot.
From a UK perspective, it is an invaluable opportunity to reverse our nuclear decline and so to generate more boats for our own use in the North Atlantic and elsewhere. Sadly, learned helplessness in defence means that many are predicting failure already. Its initial ‘far away’ location is not helping with those for whom our foreign and naval policies start and stop at the English Channel.
But if we want more nuclear submarines and to revive the industries and jobs that support them, then this is the best option we have on the table today.
Australia has shown vision with this initiative and, as of today, it seems that they will back it financially. We now need to do the same and get our ‘pre-war’ chequebook out accordingly.
Tom Sharpe is a former Royal Navy officer with command experience operating against Russian submarines
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