PeaceNexus Foundation

For

United Nations Peacebuilding Fund

Catalytic Programming and the Peacebuilding Fund

A Concept Note for the UNPBF Advisory Group: Final Draft

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0. ACRONYMS

BINUCA	Bureau intégré des Nations Unies pour la consolidation de la paix en République centrafricaine
CAR	Central African Republic
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
IDP	Internationally Displaced Persons
JSC	Joint Steering Committee
LACC	Liberian Anti-Corruption Commission
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
PBC	United Nations Peacebuilding Commission
PBF	United Nations Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UN	United Nations

1. INTRODUCTION

On behalf of the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), this project explored the term 'catalytic' as it applies to peacebuilding and specifically the work of the PBF in Central African Republic (CAR) and Liberia.

The PBF was established in 2006 with a mandate that requires it to be catalytic, strategic and address gaps in the peacebuilding arena. Not all the work that the PBF engages in needs to be catalytic yet it is one of the key elements in the PBF's mandate. To date it has been largely undefined which has inhibited clear communication. As a result there have been differing interpretations of the mandate between various actors and in some cases this element of the mandate has been omitted from serious consideration on the ground.

In an attempt to rectify the situation, the PBF Advisory Group, in its March 2010 meeting, asked the PBF to put forth a concept note for the Advisory Group's autumn meeting. The PBF, in turn, secured an arrangement with PeaceNexus to put together a team of consultants with expertise in peacebuilding and experience with the PBF.   (Biographies of the team members are found in Annex E).

The project was designed in two phases; with the first phase defining catalytic for the PBF and grounding this definition in the realities of CAR and Liberia. The second phase will translate the Advisory Group's conclusions on the meaning of catalytic into operational recommendations on how the PBF can more effectively support catalytic programming. This would include reviewing policies, structures and guidance to tailor it to better support catalytic programming as well as consideration on how the PBF should assess the effectiveness of this form of its work.

This concept note marks the culmination of the first phase. It is the result of an extensive literature review, wide ranging telephone interviews and two field missions: CAR and Liberia. The literature review included UN and PBF documentation as well an exploration of the use of the term catalytic in the literature of other fields. Over thirty interviews, predominately by telephone, were conducted with a range of actors related to the PBF including former and current PBF/PBSO staff, staff from throughout the UN system, member state representatives, peacebuilding donors and NGOs, and knowledgeable people external to the UN system. This was followed by two short field missions to CAR and Liberia to draw on the experience of those who have been directly involved in the PBF's work. (A full list of documents reviewed and experts interviewed can be found in the annexes).

The report starts by reviewing the origins and mandate of the PBF with a particular focus on the use and meaning of catalytic to date. From there it offers a short exploration of the term catalytic from other fields. As peacebuilding entered the review, a series of challenges arose in terms of defining catalytic. The key challenges are described as an introduction to providing a proposed definition and set of criteria for catalytic programming for the Peacebuilding Fund.   This section is the bulk of the paper; offering further explanation to each criteria along with examples.[1] From there the comparative advantage of the PBF and its implications on the PBF's ability to be catalytic are briefly considered. This is followed by a section that identifies issues that constrain the PBF's ability to be catalytic.

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[1] Though examples are given throughout the concept note, it is important to remember that the team was not able to verify the catalytic effectiveness of these examples.

2. THE MANDATE OF THE PEACEBUILDING FUND

Following a request from the General Assembly (Resolution A/60/180) and the Security Council (Resolution S/RES/1645-2005), the UN Secretary General established the PBF in October 2006. The scope of the PBF was to "support interventions of direct and immediate relevance to the peacebuilding process and contribute towards addressing critical gaps in that process, in particular areas for which no other funding mechanism is available. Use of fund resources is meant to have a catalytic effect in helping to bring about other, more sustained support mechanisms, such as longer term engagements by development agencies and bilateral donors." (A/60/984, p 4)

Though the establishment of the Fund marked the culmination of significant efforts during the previous year, interviews suggest that it was a late addition in the process of creating the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). It was reported that the original thinking behind the PBC had not included a funding component, but that was revised upon the receipt of an offer of resources.[2]

In 2008, after two years of PBF operations, a General Assembly mandated review led to a revision of the PBF's Terms of Reference. The revision was guided by the desire to "enhance the Fund's capacity to serve as a flexible, responsive and focused resource for peacebuilding support" and to "maximize the synergy between the Peacebuilding Commission and Fund." (A/63/818, p2) The revised Terms of Reference, finalized in October 2009, states the "mandate [is] to provide immediate and direct support to post-conflict countries…guided by the following principles: transparency, flexibility, operational speed, accountability, catalytic effect, effectiveness, needs-based allocations and national ownership." (A/63/818, p4)

2.1 CATALYTIC AND THE PBF

The notion that the PBF should be catalytic can be traced to the original reference in the "In Larger Freedom" Annex, where it states, "where gaps commonly occur, in the financing of early development activities and the recurrent costs of public administration, a Standing Fund for Peacebuilding could play a targeted and catalytic role." (2005, pg 3) References to a catalytic role, catalytic effect and catalytic impact continue throughout the PBF documentation, but with limited expansion on the idea.

In an attempt to understand the impetus for the use of the term, the interviews sought to determine the original intentions; these discussions showed vastly different interpretations of the term "catalytic". Many felt that the use of the term had no strategic or defined meaning, but was a useful, diplomatic expression that did not offend any of the primary players in the discussion. Others linked it to the relatively small size of the PBF, stating that with so little money one needs to be realistic about what one can achieve. While a few felt that catalytic was an overarching criterion, meaning it applied to all work of the PBF, most felt that it was one of many things that the PBF should strive towards.

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[2] This late addition is supported by the trail of documents. Though many of the core elements of the PBC are mentioned as early as 2000 in the Brahimi Report, the first mention in official UN documents of a funding mechanism for peacebuilding was in an annex to the September 2005 Secretary General's report "In Larger Freedom." This became more formalized in the October 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, which made a formal request to the Secretary General to establish a multi-year standing Peacebuilding Fund. (A/RES/60/1)

The 2009 Application Guidelines offers the first expansion on catalytic through the descriptions of the review criteria for each funding facility. The Immediate Response Facility uses "catalytic impact," while the Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility uses "catalytic effect" as review criteria. Despite the different names, they have the same definition: "the project must demonstrate its potential catalytic effect on the engagement of other stakeholders in the peacebuilding process. In addition, it must identify how its achievements will be sustained or built upon once the project is completed. The project must include a plan for securing financial commitments for the next phase of activities and/or an exit strategy." (Guidelines, p6)

Despite the provision of this expanded understanding, conversations with current stakeholders in-country and at a global level showed that there is still significant confusion regarding the term. For most, it is a term used easily, but without significant consideration of the meaning or implications. The most common impressions of the meaning of "catalytic" included:

- Raising more money to continue projects that have already been started
- Getting something started on the ground
- Ensuring sustainability of the projects
- Creating a platform or conditions for progress

Though clear differences of opinion do exist, these could not be classified as competing camps, as most people were responding 'off the cuff,' rather than with well thought through rationales.

Each of the meanings noted in interviews and the explanation provided in the Application Guidelines have operational ramifications for each stage in the PBF process: from eligibility review to project evaluation. Though the operational implications are beyond the scope of this study and may be tackled in a second phase, they should be kept in mind as reflection on the meaning of "catalytic" continues.

3. EXPLORATION OF "CATALYTIC"

This section reviews the use of the term "catalytic" in other fields. It offers a basic, non-field specific definition, as well as notions about how to bring about catalytic changes. These findings informed the overall conclusions regarding the application of the term to the Peacebuilding Fund.

3.1 USE OF THE TERM CATALYTIC IN OTHER FIELDS

The term "catalytic" has few substantive references in the peacebuilding literature, as it is not a term of art in the peacebuilding field. There are, however, interesting and relevant usages of the concept in other fields. Starting with chemistry, where the word originates, catalytic means a substance, usually used in small amounts relative to the reactants, that modifies and increases the rate of a reaction without being consumed in the process.

The review also explored the use of the term "catalytic" in the fields of catalytic finance, catalytic philanthropy, social entrepreneurs and catalytic change, catalytic community development, catalytic leadership, catalytic mechanisms in business, and catalytic roles in energy conservation and emissions reduction. Despite the different realms that these fields work within, there was little variation in how catalysis is defined.

Based on this review, a generic definition of catalysis emerged, as follows:

> ***Catalysis refers to a process where an agent is introduced into a system in order to enable, provoke, facilitate, or accelerate shifts in the interaction of the***

> ***parts—which allows something new to emerge among the elements of the system***.

This definition emphasizes the *conditions for a significant change*, rather than the change itself. In other words, the effort is to enable the system itself to address challenges over time, rather than solving the presenting problems of the moment.

Whether any given action, or intervention is catalytic, then, depends on the underlying **rationale** for that action. If the stated purpose is to trigger, accelerate, enable, or leverage resources *so that follow-on actions are likely to occur*, then it is appropriate to describe this intervention as catalytic. Therefore, those wishing to design a catalytic intervention must ask: What is the missing factor or capacity that, if created or strengthened, will increase the possibility of things working more efficiently and effectively?

> **Example**: In an anti-AIDS campaign, all of the medical facilities and resources were in place (clinics, screening processes, drugs, medical personnel), but only a trickle of people were taking advantage of the program. Organizers realized that they needed a strong awareness campaign coupled with an incentive program. These missing elements finally brought people into the program, so that it was able to attain its goals—the existing resources began to function more effectively.

Further exploration of the term in other fields revealed a number of ways that catalytic programming can be undertaken. Not every field included each of these ways to be catalytic, nor did every field utilize the same language to represent concepts. The listing below represents a synthesis of the ideas and builds upon the basic definition presented above.

Building capacity for critical change within a system. As suggested by the discussion above, catalytic efforts must leave behind some enhanced capacity to address later problems or issues. This capacity must reside in systems and institutions—not simply in individuals. Thus free-floating training programs would rarely be catalytic in themselves, unless associated with effective institutional development.

Creating a shift in thinking that reframes the problem. Catalytic efforts can generate deeper or more sophisticated understanding regarding issues, allowing for more thorough change.

Making new connections that increase effectiveness within a system. At times, the elements (actors, institutions, initiatives) of a solution are present, but they are not currently linked in effective ways. Catalytic action can promote new connections that make the system operate more effectively.

Creating a demonstration effect. Some catalytic actions demonstrate a novel way of addressing a problem—which then catches on and is replicated widely.

Mobilizing/leveraging resources that enables the next level of change in a system. Actions that mobilize new actors or attract additional resources can be considered catalytic.

Respond to immediate windows of opportunity that accelerate change in a system. Catalytic actions may take advantage of "windows of opportunity," seizing these moments to accelerate or consolidate the impact of change processes.

This list expands the generic definition of catalytic. It represents broad categories that, in order to be made actionable, need to be applied to specific contexts. General as they are, they do not provide sufficient guidance to differentiate catalytic from other programming. The next step then is to refine the concepts and contextualize them to peacebuilding and post-conflict environments.

3.2 CHALLENGES TO DEFINING CATALYTIC FOR THE PBF

Though there is some received wisdom around the meaning of catalytic in other fields, the review found that there were challenges to defining the term for the PBF. Three were particularly noteworthy as they lie at the heart of the task of defining "catalytic" for the PBF.

Inadequate definition of peacebuilding

Within the peacebuilding field there is no commonly accepted definition for peacebuilding. This inadequacy is mirrored within the UN family, where one finds multiple definitions of the term; all of which offer broad and often poorly defined concepts.[3] The review found that much of the vagueness about the term "catalytic" was, at its source, confusion about the concept of peacebuilding itself.

"Catalytic" is not a stand-alone idea. An intervention seeks to catalyze something—and, in this case, the focus is on catalytic peacebuilding. Thus, to understand the notion of "catalytic" for the PBF, one must have a clear sense of what is and is not peacebuilding. Efforts that fail to meet a fundamental "peacebuilding test" cannot aspire to be *catalytic* peacebuilding. Potential peacebuilding actors, including UN agencies, government partners and NGOs are universally unclear about what is *in* or *out* of peacebuilding, in terms of sectors of intervention, regarding their specific global, regional or local context, as well as what is particular about peacebuilding program design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

Confusion with other PBF criteria and concepts

Throughout the interviews, both at the global level and in the field in Liberia and Central African Republic (CAR), the team found that many people conflated "catalytic" with other important elements of the PBF mandate such as filling funding gaps, peace dividends, and sustainability. Everything the PBF is supposed to do was lumped under this single word (i.e., catalytic). Phrases were used synonymously or there was no differentiation or recognition of relationships among the PBF's core concepts.

Confusion between the means (how one does it) and the ends (the results)

The PBF 2009 Application Guidelines speak of "catalytic effects" and "catalytic impacts," which suggests an emphasis on the results of catalytic actions. This focus on results did not appear clearly in the interviews, where means and ends were often conflated, or the distinction between the two not understood. Some described catalytic in terms of the work one would do (means), while others referenced solely the results or changes that catalytic work would produce (ends), and some mixed the two.

4. CATALYTIC PROGRAMMING FOR THE PEACEBUILDING FUND

In this section, the team has applied the general definition of catalytic to the work of the PBF. This is based on discussions with key stakeholders in Liberia, CAR and at the global level, a review of the comparative advantage of the fund, in-depth discussions with the PBSO and consideration of the challenges of defining catalytic previously articulated. The discussion starts with a definition of catalytic for the PBF, outlines four criteria for catalytic programming and then expands upon key elements of that definition.

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[3] A request to the PBF for their definition of peacebuilding was answered with a list of the different definitions that exist in official UN documentation.

4.1 WHAT IS CATALYTIC PROGRAMMING FOR THE PEACEBUILDING FUND?

The review builds from the concepts identified in the generic review of catalytic and imposes the filter of peacebuilding to develop a definition specific to PBF. The Peacebuilding Fund considers a program to be catalytic if it **enables** a peace process to become unblocked or creates a larger or longer-term peacebuilding change to occur.

> *"[Catalytic is] work that forms a platform upon which something else which is necessary can happen. It is the yeast – [it] will it go into the dough and make it do certain things. Does the work end there or does it create a means against which other things can happen?"*

> *Interviewee in Liberia*

> *"If I think of catalytic then I think of salt. Salt stimulates interactions and reactions. On its own it is not good…but, when used with other ingredients, it creates a special taste or it preserves things… As good as salt is for cooking and preserving, it is not the description of success."*

> *Interviewee in Liberia*

Catalytic programming does not transform a conflict root cause or defuse a trigger; instead it sets up the conditions for the root-cause to be transformed or the trigger resolved. These intermediate conditions (or enabling factors) still represent changes in the context,[4] but they are not the ultimate peacebuilding changes desired. Therefore, like yeast and salt, enabling factors (conditions) should not be viewed in isolation of the larger or longer-term effect desired.

To be considered catalytic, programming for the Peacebuilding Fund should fulfill <u>all of</u> the following four criteria:

- Kick start a new longer-term peacebuilding effort, or accelerate an existing blocked peacebuilding effort;

- Ensure that the necessary ownership, capacity and willingness exist to increase the likelihood of catalyzing larger, or longer-term peacebuilding change;

- Provide an immediate response to factors that are urgent and relevant to peacebuilding;

- Fill a critical gap not covered by other donors.

Criteria 1: Kick start a new longer-term or larger peacebuilding effort, or accelerate an existing blocked peacebuilding effort

While all peacebuilding programming aims to create change in individuals, organizations, institutions, and/or cultures, so that they are more likely to sustain just peace, programming intending to be *catalytic* focuses specifically on ways to kick start or accelerate these changes that other actors and institutions will then carry forward.

1. *Kick start a new longer-term or larger peacebuilding effort that promotes a deeper level of change:* In post-conflict situations there are numerous large-scale, significant efforts necessary to bring about positive peace; yet for many reasons it is not always possible to start immediately on these processes or develop a comprehensive response. Catalytic programming kick starts these processes by stimulating follow-on activities that promote

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[4] This is a critical point when one reflects on the issue of evaluation or assessment of results. The key to ensuring that work can be evaluated is to base it on clearly articulated changes.

deeper levels of change.[5]

Example: A PBF-funded program in CAR had the explicit goal of providing basic agricultural means of production (tools and seeds) to returnee populations (refugees and IDPs). If essential economic life could be restarted, this could allow a whole series of additional effects to take place, including a draw for other populations to return home, revival of local markets and cross-border trade, and a return to a sense of security and normalcy in communities.

Example: In CAR, UN and NGO PBF recipient organizations started the DDR process with a smaller effort focused on child soldiers. The implementing agencies asserted that the successful completion of this effort would draw in other actors in support of the broader DDR initiative.

2. *Accelerate an existing peacebuilding effort that is blocked or stalled*: Peacebuilding progress can be blocked or stalled in situations where the elements of a solution are present, but are not able to get started or, after starting, momentum has stopped. This stalling can be intentional, due to spoilers, or unintentional, due to the realities of the situation, such as lack of resources. A catalytic program can enable the process to be restarted or enable the removal of the blockage.

    Example: In Sierra Leone, in the lead up to the 2007 elections, the government stopped paying election officials as a way to block the elections from proceeding. By providing funds to pay the salaries of election officials, the electoral process was restarted, which in turn avoided the potential of violence erupting in response to the spoiled election process.

    Example: In Liberia, the government created the Liberian Anti-Corruption Commission (LACC); however, it did not have sufficient funding to equip an office or to do outreach within the counties. The PBF filled this funding gap, which enabled the LACC to establish a physical base of operations and reach beyond Monrovia.

As outlined in the previous section on generic meanings of catalytic, various ways of kick starting or accelerating peacebuilding change include: building capacity, creating shifts in thinking, making new connections, creating demonstration effects, mobilizing/leveraging resources, and responding to immediate windows of opportunities amongst others.

Criteria 2: Ensure that the necessary ownership, capacity and willingness exist to increase the likelihood that the desired larger or longer-term peacebuilding result will be catalyzed

There are three main ways to increase the probability that the investment made by the PBF will catalyze the desired larger or longer-term peacebuilding change: gaining country-level ownership, building capacity and attracting additional actors to peacebuilding. The specific context will determine how each of these can best be accomplished. Ownership, capacity building, and attracting additional peacebuilding actors are enabling factors in catalytic programming as well as principles that should guide the design and implementation of catalytic programming (see below).[6]

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[5] In discussions this was commonly referred to as 'sustainability.' However, in catalytic programming it has its own meaning. It is not that the program continues, but rather that the process evolves or advances to the next level in pursuit of the critical peacebuilding change.

[6] The importance of national ownership and capacity is also stressed in recently released Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, pp 11-12 by Anderson, Heller, Snagqu (2010).

- *Gains Country-Level Ownership of Peacebuilding*: Support from national stakeholders (government, civil society, communities) is developed to continue actions that are essential to the peace consolidation process. This is achieved through the development of a deeper understanding of the causes and dynamics of conflict and the potential for local responses as well as a vision for what is possible for the country. The achievement of country-level ownership of peacebuilding will enable additional activities relevant to peacebuilding to occur. If country-level ownership of a PBF intervention or critical peacebuilding priority does not exist at the outset of the intervention, then the intervention must include significant efforts to build this ownership, which may require the direct involvement of UN political leadership.

  Interventions that build on pre-existing national ownership have a greater likelihood of sustaining that ownership during the implementation process and encouraging larger or longer-term peacebuilding interventions that capitalize on the results of the PBF intervention. However this should not be the sole criteria as that could lead to missing key politically-sensitive issues that need ownership generated within national stakeholders.

  Example: The Mid-term evaluation in Burundi found that all but one of the projects that made an important contribution to peace consolidation built on an idea and/or policy that originated within the Government Ministry or organization that co-managed the project. In other words, national ownership was present from the beginning of each project. In the one case where national ownership was not present from the beginning of the project (i.e., the Cadre de Dialogue), the Executive Representative of the Secretary General spent a considerable amount of his own time and political capital to help to create this ownership prior to the start of the project and throughout the implementation process. In fact, the entire project was designed to reinforce national ownership and capacity.

- *Builds Capacity for Peacebuilding:* Catalytic programming creates capacities within the context to enable continued peacebuilding work. In most cases the key required capacities include institutional mechanisms, policies or group behaviors.   To build these capacities, targeted individual, group, or organizational capacity building are also often required. The key is that there is a clear link between the individual, group, or organizational capacity and broader systemic capacity for change. For instance, only training mediators to resolve land disputes without establishing the necessary institutional mechanism or policies for land dispute resolution would not be catalytic. *See Annex B: On Capacity Building for a more detailed description of the various ways that capacity can be understood.*

  Example: In Liberia, the PBF supported the building of a new prison facility in Nimba County. The previous structure, a converted warehouse, had a capacity of twenty-five, yet was holding up to one hundred people with only three guards. In addition to the human rights violations of such overcrowding, escapes were commonplace, and the communities who had reported crimes were being threatened by the escapees. This was undermining the broader attempts at buttressing the rule of law in Nimba and generating a strong incentive for bypassing the formal justice system and using individual or informal processes (i.e., revenge). Given that Nimba County was where the war started, this was becoming a significant security issue. The new prison provided a crucial capacity that allowed improvements in the functioning of the other elements of the justice system.

- *Attracts Peacebuilding Actors:* Programming that will enable larger or longer-term peacebuilding change almost always requires actors and resources to support the next phase of the effort. This can be in the form of financial contributions or new implementing actors drawn to the work. To be catalytic it is important that the new

actors and/or resources are engaged at a new level, not simply in continuation or extension of the same work.

Example: In Burundi, the PBF supported a project that rehabilitated military barracks, which enabled the newly-integrated and larger army to live together in barracks. The PBF took the risk of funding this initiative, which no other donor was initially willing to fund. Once donors saw that the project was successful, several of them contributed significant funds to rehabilitating other military barracks (that the PBF had not been able to cover).

Criteria 3: Provide an immediate response to factors that are urgent and relevant to peacebuilding

The third criteria for a PBF program to be catalytic is that it provides immediate support for factors that are directly relevant to peacebuilding. The PBF is mandated to fund initiatives that have "immediate relevance to the peacebuilding process." [7] Therefore all work that is catalytic must also have immediate relevance. This has a time implication and area of focus consideration.

Catalytic peacebuilding should insert itself quickly and precisely into an ongoing dynamic, with the intention of achieving quick results in a 'short' timeframe (but with potential larger or long-term impact). The specifics of what constitutes 'short' will be dependent on the issue, project and context.

Catalytic programming should also focus on those issues directly relevant to *essential* work to promote peace and stopping violence from re-emerging within the PBF's four thematic areas. [8] It is important that a portion of the work within each area focuses on addressing the 'untouchable' conflict issues pertinent to the priority area. These issues usually lie at the heart of the conflict, are politically sensitive and possibly considered high-risk interventions. The PBF is uniquely placed to respond, as it capitalizes on the PBF's comparative advantage of being able to take political risks, which is discussed in greater detail later in the report.

Criteria 4: Fill a critical gap not covered by other donors

By definition, catalytic programming does not need to fill a critical funding gap. However, given their mandate, a fourth requirement for the PBF is that work *does* fill a critical gap. This is particularly true where funding gaps arise due to political sensitivities or the inability of other donors to support work due to the constraints on ODA allocations.

Conversely, work that fills a critical gap is not always catalytic. There are instances where filling a funding gap is an important initiative in its own right. Take, for example, providing the final 5 million dollars to the budget of an electoral commission in support of an election process. This clearly fills a necessary funding gap, but it does not necessarily create an enabling factor that will

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[7] The PBF is "designed as a rapid and flexible mechanism for addressing critical peacebuilding gaps in the immediate needs of countries emerging from, or at risk of relapsing into, violent conflict. The Fund focuses on interventions that demonstrate direct and immediate relevance to peacebuilding, and that have a catalyzing impact including on the sustained support and engagement of other key stakeholders. Guidelines for Applying to the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF): Part I, United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, New York: United Nations, October 2009, p. 3. Emphasis added.

[8] The four areas are: 1) Activities designed to respond to imminent threats to the peace process, support for the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue; 2)Activities undertaken to build and/or strengthen national capacities to promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict and to carry out peacebuilding activities; 3) Activities undertaken in support of efforts to revitalize the economy and generate immediate peace dividends for the population at large; and 4) Establishment or re-establishment of essential administrative services and related human and technical capacities.

lead to larger, longer-term or unblocked peacebuilding change.[9]

Putting it all together with a catalytic rationale

Quality catalytic programming must bring the above elements together and explain how they will interact effectively. Key to do this is remembering that catalytic programming involves two levels of change: 1) the factors which are the intermediary level of change that the catalytic program directly affects; and 2) the longer-term or larger level of change that the catalytic program hopes that its intervention will unblock, jump start, or accelerate.

The "catalytic rationale" explains how these are related. It should ultimately describe how the peacebuilding change (box 4) is immediately relevant to the peacebuilding process as determined by a conflict analysis (box 1) and specifically to the factor being addressed. Finally, it must describe how the activities proposed (box 2) will result in the achievement of the enabling factor (box 3). [10] The graphic below describes this catalytic rationale in greater detail.

Box 1: Based on a set of analyses, programming makes some assumptions about specific conditions or factors (X factor) that, if addressed, carry the potential to catalyze movement forward in a specific process (Y Process) that is deemed critical to the consolidation of peace. Examples of the kinds of factors on which catalytic programming might focus include:

- Current ways of thinking, inadequate mindsets, fragmented or silo thinking
- Insufficient levels of awareness
- Lack of specific skills or competencies in individuals
- Weak institutional capacities

- Lack of clear mechanisms, systems, procedures
- Inadequate platforms for stakeholder engagement
- Dysfunctional relationships and patterns of interaction

Box 2: Programming allocates resources and supports strategies that focus on addressing these identified factors in order to catalyze the broader change process.

Box 3: Evaluation asks if programming has been successful in addressing these specific factors assumed to carry catalytic potential. Indicators are developed to test whether the desired shifts in these factors has been achieved.

Box 4: If programming has effectively addressed these factors, evaluation then asks whether these factors have also unblocked, jump-started, or accelerated movement forward in the larger change process. A separate set of indicators are developed to test assumptions made about the extent to which these factors have contributed in a catalytic way. It is possible that this evaluation will need to occur at a later time than the evaluation in Box 3.

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[9] In this example there is a further question as to whether this qualifies as a peacebuilding intervention which is an issue raised in other parts of the report.
[10] A clearly articulated "catalytic rationale" will also provide the basis for an evaluation of the extent to which an effort was, in fact, catalytic.

Consider two examples: a PBF-supported project might kick start a new process in response to an issue that was deemed high risk and thus not previously supported, yet vital to peace consolidation. For example, an urgent dialogue regarding the role of the army in relation to the general population (in the face of long-term and frequent abuses) would constitute such a high-risk effort. If this work was designed to rapidly deliver results, it could demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach and the potential for engaging constructively in high risk activities. This demonstration effect could be used to attract new actors to support this work and/or to build ownership amongst country-level actors in support of this initiative. This ownership or the additional actors would then enable a larger or longer-term peacebuilding change to occur.

Alternatively consider programming that brought together a new combination of actors into a coalition dedicated to advancing work on a politically sensitive conflict issue that was not being currently addressed. A typical example would be groups brought together to combat corruption. Such a coalition could raise awareness of the needed change regarding this conflict issue among important stakeholders. This in turn could attract funds or involvement in the issue by new actors or donors. These monies or actions would enable a larger or longer-term peacebuilding change.

Further examples, organized according to the four PBF priorities and articulations of the catalytic rationale may be found in the table in Annex A: Examples of Catalytic Programming and Their Rationale.

4.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR CATALYTIC PROGRAMMING

The four catalytic criteria have implications on design and implementation of programming. Some of the implications are simply good peacebuilding practices that catalytic programming also needs, while others have a unique catalytic programming slant.

Catalytic programming should be based on a thorough conflict analysis and catalytic assessment.

In each context, peacebuilding priorities need to be determined based on a conflict analysis including an assessment of the potential for catalytic programming.   Though it is likely not feasible for all of the enabling factors to be identified in this assessment, a sense of which peacebuilding priorities are better suited to catalytic programming should be provided. As not all PBF programming needs to be catalytic, not all peacebuilding priorities should be addressed through catalytic programming.

The assessment should also consider whether there is a need to focus catalytic programming on the peacebuilding architecture related to that country (in-country or at headquarter level) in addition to focusing on the conflict dynamics (drivers or triggers of the conflict).   The PBF has the potential to support an overarching strategy for consolidation of peace, influence how implementing agencies view their own roles in peacebuilding or build capacity of recipient organizations.

Example: In Liberia and Burundi as they went through the PBF process, UN agencies became aware of the need to enhance their own capacities for peacebuilding (PBF Priority Area 2). As a result, the UN agencies devoted more time and attention to strengthening peacebuilding capacities within their own agencies and national partners as part of their ongoing programming. This is an example of a focus on the peacebuilding system itself—quite apart from the changes promoted in the conflict dynamics in the country through funded programs.

The conflict analysis – with catalytic assessment - should be the basis of the application for eligibility and the initial Priority Plan, as these are crucial to developing work that is directly relevant to the peacebuilding process; a key component of catalytic programming.   As filling a

gap is a criteria for being catalytic, the Priority Plan needs to also reflect the identified peacebuilding funding gaps, responding to the question: *Who is funding what activities related to peacebuilding, and what important initiatives are missing?*

In addition to the analysis, eligibility and priority plan development, it is at this early phase that the PBF and JSC have an opportunity to engage in catalytic programming itself. The way in which the PBF and JSC engage with a UN country team and national government can build their peacebuilding capacity, generate ownership or attract new agencies (donors or implementing partners) that previously had not been involved in peacebuilding but may have a key role to play. This in turns lays the foundation for more catalytic programming by the recipient agencies.

Once the eligibility has been granted and Priority Plan accepted project developers must base their work in the conflict analysis and possibly an additional sectoral analysis that goes deeper into the issue.   For programming that is to be catalytic they also need to answer the question: *What is the missing factor (capacity, ownership, agency, resources) that if created or strengthened will increase the potential of the system working more efficiently and effectively to achieve a specific peacebuilding priority as stated in the Priority Plan?*

Catalytic programming should include as core elements of the program design – ownership, capacity-building, and the advocacy with peacebuilding actors who can build on the work started by the PBF program.

Project design should lay the foundation for catalytic programming. Particularly for projects that aim to enable a larger or longer-term peacebuilding change, as opposed to unblocking a process, it is essential to develop overt strategies related to generating ownership, attracting actors and capacity building of the people who will be charged with taking responsibility for the work beyond the initial catalytic phase.

These strategies should include clear, feasible objectives stated in the language of change. Having programs with clear changes represented in goals and objectives are the foundation for effective monitoring and evaluation.

Like any good peacebuilding programming, catalytic programming should be flexible and include a detailed monitoring and evaluation strategy to enable it to adjust to changing circumstances, question its underlying assumptions, and increase the likelihood that it will catalyze the desired larger or longer-term peacebuilding change or enable an unblocking.

All peacebuilding takes place in an uncertain highly complex environment where the outcome of the peacebuilding programming is far from certain. To adjust the catalytic program in response to a changing context, it is important that procedures and systems remain flexible and that results are closely monitored, analyzed, and clearly reported. Monitoring should be done by those implementing catalytic programming; tracking progress towards creating or strengthening the enabling factors (capacities, attracting, ownership) as well as regular context reviews.

In terms of evaluation, the ultimate aim of catalytic programming is to contribute to larger or longer-term change. This requires that catalytic programming is assessed at two levels:

1) its contribution to the intermediary level of change (the factors) that it hopes will contribute to broader or longer-term change; and
2) the actual contribution of the intermediary level of change to the larger or longer-term change.

Pragmatically the latter – the larger or longer-term change – would not be able to be truly assessed until sometime after the completion of the catalytic programming. That said, indications of success in this regard should be looked for in any evaluation occurring at the end of a project.

Also, importantly because this level of change depends on numerous other contextual factors, the catalytic program should not be held directly accountable for its achievement.

In addition, because there is much to learn regarding catalytic programming for the PBF, it is important to record the lessons learned from each intervention in order to build a knowledge-base on catalytic programming to improve future work.

In terms of the PBF portfolio of work in-country, further consideration will need to be given to how one assesses overall impact given the inclusion of a commitment to catalytic programming. It is likely that a classic results framework approach at the portfolio level is not applicable from an evaluation perspective, though further work would need to be done to determine an appropriate alternative approach.

5. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE OF THE PBF AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CATALYTIC PROGRAMMING

This section explores how the comparative advantage of the PBF influences its ability to be catalytic. Seven advantages were identified through the interviews and literature review where the PBF is viewed to have a comparative advantage in relation to other donors/funds. While these seven advantages could be debated, they have been taken as "given" as it was not the mandate of the team to assess their veracity.

The seven advantages are:

- Rapid disbursement of funds and rapid implementation of projects is possible through PBF.
- National ownership of a peacebuilding agenda and priorities can be gained through two-tiered decision making processes (JSC and PBSO) of PBF.
- PBF use of the MDTF mechanism provides a relatively easy way for donors to channel funds.
- PBF provides a means to support non-ODA programming.
- The PBF focuses explicitly on peacebuilding, unlike other funds that have multiple purposes or which have related purposes that peacebuilding then has to argue itself into.
- PBF is able to take political risks in favor of consolidating peace.
- PBF has the potential leverage to generate strategic coherence amongst the UN agencies in-country on peacebuilding which can affect the aid system.

The Fund's ability to capitalize on these advantages has varied from country to country. Overall, it appears that there is room for improvement that would enable the Fund to fully realize these advantages.

Despite the wide range of issues represented in the list above, their relation to the Fund's ability to support catalytic programming is the same. When capitalized on they can support the Fund's ability to provide immediate support for factors critical to peacebuilding; a key criteria for catalytic programming. For instance, the Fund's ability to support non-ODA programming enables it to engage in politically sensitive, high-risk areas that would not qualify as ODA.

When these advantages are not capitalized upon, they can diminish the PBF's ability to support catalytic programming. For instance if the two-tier decision making process does not generate ownership of a legitimate peacebuilding agenda but is rather fueled by an interest in allocating funds to important development priorities, then PBF supported projects will not be immediately

relevant to the peace process and thus not catalytic peacebuilding.

6. CHALLENGES AND CONSTRAINTS THAT LIMIT THE PBF'S ABILITY TO BE CATALYTIC

Given this definition of catalytic and the associated four criteria, the review identified a number of issues that constitute constraints on the ability of the PBF to undertake catalytic programming.

Weak Peacebuilding Capacity in the Receiving UN Organizations

As was widely heard from staff involved in PBF projects throughout this review, their capacity to design, implement and monitor a peacebuilding project is still being developed.[11] Nevertheless, these agencies are the only official channel for PBF funds in eligible countries. To date, the PBF has had limited capacity to provide the necessary training and technical support to field offices.

There are a number of operational ways where this peacebuilding capacity gap appears throughout the UN system. For instance, in most cases, conflict analysis is incomplete or not shared.[12] Without a good analysis of the root causes, triggers and dynamics of the conflict it is difficult to determine the relevance of proposed projects to the peacebuilding process, which is a precondition for catalytic programming.[13]

Further, many projects submitted for JSC approval are poorly designed and lack focus from a peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity perspective. In most cases, the core problem is that program designers do not sufficiently define the changes the program will seek to achieve, nor how the work proposed would lead to the intended result . Since peacebuilding—and catalytic peacebuilding—requires a focus on change and an ability to provide a rationale for why the project will work, this constrains the ability of PBF-funded projects to be catalytic.

Further, many projects lack overt strategies for generating the ownership, building capacity or attracting actors. Successfully generating these factors requires a concerted and strategic effort built into the project design, so that time and resources will be dedicated to this role.

Difficulty in Obtaining Information regarding Funding Levels and Focus

The PBF is supposed to address important funding gaps as one important aspect of being catalytic. However, it is extremely difficult to obtain accurate and up-to-date information about what donors are funding, or intend to fund, in any specific country. OECD data, for instance, is often 18 months or two years old.

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[11] This finding is supported by the PBF Burundi midterm evaluation see Susanna Campbell with Leonard Kayobera and Justine Nkurunziza (2010), Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi (Bujumbura: United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi), pp. 7-11. As well as from the peacebuilding capacity support efforts made in 2008 and 2009 for the PBF in Liberia by Cheyanne Church: see Cheyanne Church (2008) Peacebuilding Expert Consultancy Report for the Peacebuilding Fund in Liberia, pp 4-6.

[12] Sometimes conflict analysis is developed, but too late to influence the priority plan or the JSC decisions regarding allocations. In CAR, for instance, the Integrated Strategic Framework, which contains a thorough conflict analysis, is still in draft form in mid-2010, and is too late to inform the $30 million PBF funds already allocated.

[13] Many project proposals submitted for PBF and JSC consideration to date are not directly relevant to the immediate peacebuilding priorities, but rather business-as-usual for UN agencies. In other words, they are development projects. Therefore they do not pass a key requirement of catalytic programming: relevance to peacebuilding priorities.

Where information does exist, it often fails to provide the level of analysis necessary to determine gaps and overlaps. For instance, in Liberia numerous donors currently provide financial support to the police. However the police have a wide variety of needs, within which there might be politically sensitive areas not funded, but data is not available at the degree of specificity to identify a critical gap in funding within a specific area.

Ability to Attract Actors or Resources

The team identified several challenges related to attracting actors to continue the next phase of peacebuilding programming, either operationally or by providing additional resources.

The first is related to the short timeframe of PBF-funded projects: 18 months. The sentiment from the field was clear: this does not provide enough time to generate ownership or capacity amongst other actors necessary to enable them to continue the work at the next level. In Liberia, although there was significant discussion at the project allocation stage regarding the need for government ministries to commit to continuing the projects after the initial PBF funding, many implementing partners report that the timeframe was inadequate both to ensure that the necessary capacity was present and that the necessary funding would appear as a line-item in the ministry's budget.[14]

The 18-month timeframe also raises challenges in terms of leveraging additional resources. If the programming does not already align to a donor's existing priorities for a country, then the donor simply cannot react fast enough to support a worthwhile effort, even if it wants to. Even if the programming does align to existing donor priorities, donors can remain unable to support it if the project arrives at the end of their funding cycle.

In some cases, the ways that donors operate actually rules out additional funding. An organization that received substantial PBF funding in Liberia made a strong effort to obtain follow-on funding from other donors. Donors told them that they could not give them a grant, as that would constitute "double dipping," as they already gave money to the PBF.

In terms of generating 'new' resources for a country from bilateral donors following on a PBF allocation, structural difficulties were also identified. Foreign ministries and development agencies operate according to different priorities and procedures. Therefore a diplomat responsible for liaising with the PBSO may support a PBF allocation, but that does not mean the development agency in the diplomat's country will allocate greater resources or increased priority to aid in carrying on the programming initially supported by the PBF. If the PBF-supported country is not already on the development agency's list of priority countries, then it would be very difficult for additional monies to be granted through the development agency.

Given that some interviewees viewed the catalytic role of the PBF only in terms of its ability to leverage greater financial support, these structural issues suggest that this narrow interpretation will be difficult to achieve.

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[14] According to the March 2010 midterm evaluation of the PBF in Liberia a few projects reported that they were able to attract additional actors to their work. For instance the TRC supported work which will be carried on by civil society who, funded by UNDP, will disseminate TRC findings throughout the country. However a number of these findings were still tentative as of March 2010 and further research would need to be done to determine how many were actually carried on.

7. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

A program deemed to be catalytic by the PBF enables larger or longer-term changes relevant to peacebuilding or unblocks the process. Essential to this definition is the **enabling of changes** critical to peacebuilding that are not being financially supported by others. By extension, the enabling factors themselves, though necessary, are not sufficient to be deemed effective peacebuilding.

This raises an important cautionary point in the consideration of catalytic peacebuilding: what happens when the catalysis does not work? Examples were given from both Liberia and Sierra Leone, in which expectations of communities or stakeholders had been raised due to the emphasis on things happening after the catalytic project was completed. However the processes undertaken did not create the necessary enabling factors. Therefore, there were no next steps that could lead to larger or longer-term peacebuilding change, causing disgruntlement and frustration amongst those participating in the projects.

7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS THAT MIGHT INCREASE THE CATALYTIC EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PBF EFFORTS

Recommendations have been devised based on the proposed definition and criteria for catalytic programming coupled with the challenges inherent in defining the concept and the constraints outlined above. The list starts with recommendations for the PBF as a whole and is followed by specific recommendations for Liberia and CAR.

1. The PBF New York

To support catalytic programming the PBF should:

- Develop a *context-specific practical definition of peacebuilding for the PBF* (or the skills and processes to do so), as a necessary prerequisite for catalytic programming that will help UN agencies and JSC members to distinguish PBF peacebuilding programming from longer-term peacebuilding programming, development efforts and humanitarian responses.

- In conjunction with other parts of the UN as appropriate, develop *guidance on conflict analysis and peacebuilding programming* that honors the 'light footprint' commitment of the PBF as stressed in the 2010 Peacebuilding Architecture Review, while highlighting the key issues pertinent to catalytic programming. Such guidance should permit relatively rapid analysis during the eligibility and Priority Plan process, and periodic updating as well as supporting quality design and implementation.

- Provide *guidance on Priority Plans* so that they identify the key peacebuilding **changes** necessary and the opportunities for catalytic programming.

- Develop effective *working relationships between PBC and PBF*, so that the PBF's ability to work on high risk or politically sensitive issues—one of their comparative advantages—can be optimized.[15]

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[15] The importance of coordination and coherence between the PBC and the UN peacebuilding missions is also stressed in the recently released Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, pp 13 by Anderson, Heller, Snagqu (2010).

- Provide the *option of an extended timeframe* for implementation for catalytic programming, based on a clear catalytic rationale that includes a sense of the time needed to accomplish specific enabling factors.

- Develop a strategy to *engage with the bilateral and multilateral donor community*, to determine if there are ways to align processes and priorities and obtain more real-time nuanced data on funding and, in particular, on gaps (in terms of policy and funding) that can be filled by the PBF.

In time the PBF should:

- Alter the proposal template structure to reflect the *different design needs of a catalytic* peacebuilding program.

- Develop an *on-line training module* that articulates the difference between peacebuilding and catalytic peacebuilding with a clear focus on the pragmatic implications of this distinction. For instance, what additional elements should appear in a catalytic program design?

- Develop *prototypes of priority plans and well designed catalytic programs* as illustrative examples to reinforce the concepts.

2. The PBF in Liberia:

The PBF in Liberia would benefit from all of the general PBF recommendations presented above to increase catalytic effectiveness. In addition:

- Ask the JSC to define peacebuilding in the new Priority Plan as it pertains to Liberia at this time. Use this definition as a filter in reviewing proposals.

- Map out peacebuilding capacities across the government and UN implementing agencies and develop a strategy to address weaknesses.

- Review the TRC report recommendations dealing with human rights abuses and impunity to identify where the PBF could have a catalytic effect on politically sensitive issues.

3. The PBF in CAR:

As in Liberia, the PBF process in CAR would benefit from the general recommendations. In addition:

- In the mid-term evaluation process, ensure that the evaluation team examines several projects that claim catalytic effects, to determine to what extent those expectations have been met or not.

- Review the multiple recommendations signed and committed in the 2008 peace accords—and determine whether any of those, if implemented, might have a catalytic effect. For instance, the accords call for the establishment of a permanent inclusive

political dialogue mechanism that has never been implemented. Coordinate with the PBC special configuration in this effort.

- Examine the Integrated Strategic Framework (currently in draft), to see how PBF-funded projects align with the conflict analysis and issues identified. Work with BINUCA and the PBC special configuration to focus efforts on those issues, as possible.

- CAR suffers from a range of spillover effects—from conflicts in Sudan, Chad, DRC and Uganda, among others. Explore how the PBF and PBC might together promote more effective regional approaches by the UN and regional entities that would help consolidate peace in CAR.

7.2 RECOMMENDED NEXT STEPS IN THE CATALYTIC REVIEW PROCESS

Two issues repeatedly came up in the process of this review and thus present themselves as critical next steps:

- First, the need to provide concise and simple operational guidance for catalytic programming applicable to each stage in the PBF process: application for eligibility, priority plan, project review criteria, and means of evaluation.
- Second, engaging in the difficult but essential issue of developing an operational and contextual definition of peacebuilding for the PBF.

The catalytic review team sees these as high priority next steps that will enable the PBF to promote catalytic change in fragile political environments.

For further illustration of the notion of catalytic programming, the table that follows provides examples of catalytic programming identified in the course of this study. As Burundi, CAR and Liberia received the primary attention through field studies and a portfolio-level evaluation, they dominate the table. Clearly more examples exist in other PBF-supported locations as well.

The examples have been arranged according to the four PBF Priority Areas. In addition to a short description of the programming, the table also identifies what makes each example catalytic, applying the distinctions already described. One word of caution: the catalytic review team's scope was to identify examples of potentially catalytic programming supported by the PBF. It was not in a position to gather evidence of effectiveness or prove that these examples did indeed lead to a larger, longer-term or unblocked peacebuilding change. That would require focused evaluation efforts at a detailed program level.

Concrete Case Study Example	Why This Effort Is Catalytic (The catalytic rationale)
PBF Priority Area 1: Activities designed to respond to imminent threats to the peace process, support for the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue, in particular in relation to strengthening of national institutions and processes set up under those agreements.	
Burundi: The construction of army barracks enabled the army to be removed from living amongst the general population where there had been a history of human rights abuse against communities. The provision of dedicated housing reduced human rights abuses of the population by the army and allowed greater cohesion to be developed among the recently integrated military. This project claimed that there were no other funding possibilities at the time that the PBF funded the project.	This project addressed a funding gap while providing a physical structure, an example of building capacity. The provision of this capacity kick started the longer-term changes of cohesion and diminished some human rights abuses.

Concrete Case Study Example	Why This Effort Is Catalytic (The catalytic rationale)
Liberia: Multiple peacebuilding programmes in support of rule of law such as support to public defenders and police were being hampered by the lack of good corrections facilities in Nimba county. Nimba plays a significant role in Liberia's conflict history and is perceived to be a possible trigger to renewed conflict. The prison was so inadequate that detainees were frequently escaping which undermined the community's trust in the rule of law system. This in turn encouraged vigilantism, which due to the delicate nature of peace in Nimba has the potential to rekindle violent conflict. The building of the prison stopped the pattern of escape which enabled the rest of the system to function more effectively.	The building of the prison is an example of strengthening capacity on an issue that if not addressed could erupt in renewed violence. (relevance) Further this project enabled a larger peacebuilding change to occur – that of trust in the rule of law.
PBF Priority Area 2: Activities undertaken **to build and/or strengthen national capacities** to promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict and to carry out peacebuilding activities	
Burundi: The PBF supported a community-level dialogue process to discuss the role and function of the TRC. This built broad-based support for the TRC process and satisfied their desire to move the process forward.	This work kick started the reconciliation process. Through engagement with the people, ownership of the reconciliation agenda was strengthened as was the individual knowledge and acceptance of the process (capacity). This in turn sets up conditions for a longer-term reconciliation process, if the political will to start this process is present.
Liberia: Grand corruption played a central role in the lead up and continuation of the war in Liberia. The ongoing perception that grand corruption continues within the elected elite has the potential to reignite the war. The government created the Liberia Anticorruption Commission (LACC) but did not have enough funds for it to become fully operational. The PBF supported the establishment of an office and a county based anti-corruption awareness program.	The LACC is a required institution (capacity) to tackle a key conflict driver – predatory and exclusionary government. By providing financial support, the creation of the institution as an operational entity was accelerated which could lead to longer-term peacebuilding changes such as breaking the spirit of impunity and raising awareness of options of recourse. If concrete results are realized, there is further potential to attract other actors to financially support the LACC through a demonstration effect.
Central African Republic: The creation of a DDR Steering Committee that had representatives from government and most of the rebel factions modeled a process of inclusive political dialogue and building consensus. This challenged the dominant political culture of exclusion and control.	The steering committee is an example of bringing together existing actors in a new way to form a locally-owned mechanism (capacity) to kick start a larger process. The example highlights an issue that is politically sensitive yet vital to peacebuilding.

Concrete Case Study Example	Why This Effort Is Catalytic (The catalytic rationale)
PBF Priority Area 3: Activities undertaken in support of efforts **to revitalize the economy** and generate immediate peace dividends for the population at large	
Central African Republic: The PBF supported a "seeds and tools" project aimed at restarting base-level economic activities among IDPs and others devastated by war. The provision of this basic agricultural kit enabled reestablishment of basic economic life which led to restarting markets, encouraged returns and cross-border trade which is a start towards a return to secure and normal life.	This project kick started a process that attracted other actors and built capacity which in turn precipitated a larger economic recovery.
PBF Priority Area 4: Establishment or reestablishment of essential administrative services and related human and technical capacities	
Liberia: Public defenders (and their transportation) were established in each of the 15 counties through a PBF-supported project. County public defenders enable trials to take place as both sides of a case can be represented and witnesses can be found and brought forth. In turn this decreases pre-trial time. Post-trial it enables convicted criminals to avail of rehabilitation services. Given that a large portion of those convicted are ex-combatants their rehabilitation has wider security implications.	Public defenders are not a high priority funding item and thus there was a distinct funding gap on this issue. The links between perpetrators of crime and ex-combatants makes it more than a simple rule of law issue (relevance). The provision of public defenders with mobility is a key capacity that unblocked the rest of the rule of law system.

The focus on capacity building in catalytic programming is based on the assumption that any given system may be dysfunctional or ineffective if there are weak or missing capacities.   In a national peace process, one of the goals of catalytic programming would be to ensure that the necessary capacities are strengthened and installed so that national actors are able to own and effectively address their own challenges. Capacity building is not limited to training individuals but can be viewed in four distinct dimensions. Using these dimensions can help identify more precisely important leverage points where capacities are weak or missing.

Consider the following graphic that along the vertical axis distinguishes between a focus on the capacities of an individual and the capacities of a social system and along the horizontal axis distinguishes between those changes that are internal to the individual or system versus those that are external – as in observable and generally more tangible.

Building Capacities: A Four-Quadrant Perspective

	Interior - Less Visible	Exterior - Visible
Focus on Capacities of Individuals	**Individual Thinking & Values** *Problem/barrier:* • Level of awareness • Current mindsets, ways of thinking • Values & attitudes • Motivation & incentives	**Individual Skills, Actions & Behaviors** *Problem/barrier:* • Insufficient skills • Dysfunctional behaviors, actions
	1	**2**
Focus on Capacities of Social Systems	**4** **Culture & Relationships** *Problem/barrier:* • Mistrust, Polarization • Unquestioned "norms" or "rules" • Dysfunctional relationships • Dysfunctional collective patterns or habits of exclusion, marginalization, distorted information/communication	**3** **Systems, Structures & Procedures** *Problem/barrier:* • Inadequate structures or mechanisms • Inadequate systems or procedures (decision-making, resource allocation, IT, etc.) • Insufficient resources • Inadequate policies, laws

In most cases, capacity building requires focusing attention on a combination of factors across the different quadrants. For simplicity, consider four different scenarios as a way of highlighting the perspectives of each of these quadrants separately.

Quadrant 1:   A potential block to movement forward in an important process might be that key individuals lack sufficient awareness to act, or their current ways of thinking limit their effectiveness. They may lack the necessary motivation or incentives to act differently.   This, however, doesn't necessarily imply a lack of skill (quadrant 2).   In this situation, capacity building would focus on raising awareness, increasing knowledge, shifting ways of thinking, promoting different values.

Quadrant 2: In a given context, it may be that individuals are sufficiently motivated and have the necessary knowledge and awareness, but the lack of specific skills is impeding movement forward in a process.   In this case, capacity building would focus on training programs to build the required skills.

Quadrant 3: In a given context, it may be that individuals have the necessary knowledge, attitudes, motivation and competencies indicated in the upper quadrants, but the necessary structures or mechanisms are missing or inadequate, in which case capacity building would focus on strengthening institutional capacities (policies, laws, procedures, decision-making systems, resource allocation systems, IT systems, etc.)

Quadrant 4: In a given context, it maybe that the barrier to a process moving forward is not located in specific individuals (upper quadrants) nor in existing structures (quadrant 3), but is situated in quadrant 4 where relationships between sectors and stakeholders are so polarized and dysfunctional; power imbalances and patterns of exclusion and marginalization prevent important stakeholders from working together. In this case, catalytic programming will focus on building the right kind of relationships and interactions between actors and sectors through political dialogue, reconciliation processes, etc.

	Name		**Title**	**Organization**	**Country**
1.	Adam	Segolene	Post Conflict Transition	Swiss Foreign Ministry	Switzerland
2.	Aklilu	Bisrat	Head of Office	MDTF Office	UN staff
3.	Andrews	Jonathon	Chief of Staff	BCPR, UNDP	USA
4.	Bahncke	Anja	Policy Speacialist	DOCO	USA
5.	Ball	Nicole	Senior Fellow	Center for International Policy	USA
6.	Candela	Isabel	Senior Recovery Adviser	UNICEF	USA
7.	Fitzgerald	Réachbha	Advisor	Irish Mission to the UN	Ireland
8.	Gilmore	Scott	Executive Director	Peace Dividend Trust	Canada
9.	Jones	Bruce	Director	Center for International Cooperation, NYU	USA
10.	Levine	Neil	CMM Head	USAID	USA
11.	Lotz	Christian	Peacebuilding Specialist	BCPR, UNDP	USA
12.	McAskie	Carolyn	Former ASG of PBSO	UN PBSO	Canada
13.	Meurs	Doug	Delegate	US Mission to the UN/Dept of State	USA
14.	Morrice	Adrian	Political Affairs Office PB Focal Point	Policy Planning Unit, UN DPA	USA
15.	Odonell	Madalene	Policy, Evaluation & Training Division	DPKO	USA
16.	Onestini	Cesare	First Counselor, EU Delegation to the UN	EU	USA
17.	Patel	Ana	Executive Director	Outward Bound Center for Peacebuilding	USA
18.	Schreiber	Dan	Attaché	Belgian Mission to the UN	Belgium
19.	Segerström	Lotta	Attaché	Permanent Mission of Sweden to the UN	USA
20.	Serre	Julien		UNPBF	USA
21.	Slotin	Jenna	Research Officer	PBSO	USA
22.	Smith	Dan	Secretary-General	International Alert	UK
23.	Sonner	Heather	Analyst for UN research	International Crisis Group	USA
24.	Stiefel	Matthias	Vice President	Interpeace	Switzerland
25.	Sylla	Djeidi	PDA	UNDP Guinea	Guinea
26.	Tchirgi	Necla	-------	Independent Consultant	USA
27.	Tomlinson	Andrew	Director & Representative	Quaker United Nations Office	USA
28.	Travers	Patrick	Policy Advisor	Canada Mission to the UN	Canada
29.	Van den Bulcke	Filip	First Secretary	Belgian Mission to the UN	Belgium
30.	Vikram	Parekh	Policy Planning/Assessment Officer	PPAB	USA
31.	Wee	Asbjorn	Administrator	International Network on Conflict & Fragility (INCAF), OECD	Norway
32.	Williams	Brian	Head of PBF	UNPBF	USA

PEOPLE INTERVIEWED IN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Members of Steering Committee

Sahle Work-Zewde with staff member	Special Representative of the Secretary General, Co-Chair of Steering Committee	BINUCA (Integrated Office of the United Nations in Central African Republic)
Bernadette Sayo-Nzalé and staff members	Minister	Ministry of Social Affairs, the Family and National Cohesion
Laurent Ngonbaba and staff members	Minister	Ministry of Justice
Francis Bozizé	Minster (Delegated)	Ministry of Defense

Other Donors (also on SC)

David Tchuinou	Principal Economist	World Bank
Meike van Ginneken	Sr. Water & Sanitation Specialist	
Nicole Malpas	Chargé de Programme, Governance Sector/Civil Society	European Commission
Jean-Pierre Vidon	Ambassador	French Embassy
Jean-Phillippe Deschamps	Educational Cooperation Attaché	
[name unknown]	Commissioner	CEMAC (Central African Monetary & Econ. Community)

UN Agencies

Erasme Tchetchou	Program Assistant	UNESCO
David Bozoumma	Program Assistant	
Abdou Ningha	Program Assistant	
Th. Jocelyn Kolenga	Assistant Program Officer	UNHCR
Chantal Gavania	Program Officer	
Mahamat Ahmad Alhabo	Chef Antenne	
Olusegun Olubowale	Sr. Admin. Program Officer	
Donatien Pandikuziku	Chargé de Programme	World Food Programme
Willy Zihaliwra	Child Protection Specialist,	UNICEF
Anne-Marie Cluckers	Country Director	UNDP
Marcel Kabundi	Program Officer	Human Rights Section/BINUCA
Rokhaya Daba Fall and Chargé de Programme	Resident Representative	FAO
Gaston Bushayija	Strategic Planning Advisor	UNDP

NGOs/Implementing Partners

Pascal Koyamene	Vice President	Committee for Monitoring of the Recommendations of the Permanent Inclusive Dialogue
Leland Montell	Country Director	International Rescue Committee
Gilles Ponserre	National Director	Danish Refugee Council
Davide Stefanini	Chargé de Programmes	
Abbé André Singa	National Executive Secretary	CARITAS
Modeste Gonaa	Chargé de Programme	
Sebastien Ningando	Assistant for Administration	
Gen. Xavier Sylvestre Yangongo with staff members	General/Director	Jeunnesse Pionière Nationale (Young Pioneers)
Marie Blondine Songuelema-Yakondji	President	AFJC (Association of Women Jurists)
Natasha Guinet	Program Officer/Trainer	
Lydie Kamot	President	CIFAD (International Center for Women in Development)
Lucienne Maka-Gbossokoto	Vice President	
John Hanson	Chief of Mission	Mercy Corps

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Sekenane Achimene	Vice President	UFDR
General Gabriel Ngaindiro	Coordinator of SSR	Armed Forces CAR
Antony Caille-Lahoutou	Member of committee	?
Steven Siqueira	Chief of Staff	BINUCA

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Members of Steering Committee

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Wilfred Gray-Johnson	Head of Office	PBO/PBF Secretariat
Moustapha Soumare	DSRSG & Co-Chair JSC	UNMIL
Viama J. Blama	Trial Lawyer	Ministry of Education
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Carolyne (Teddy) Bryan	Deputy Mission Director	USAID
David Belgrove	OBE/Chargé d'Affaires	British Political Office
UN Agencies		
Samuel Toe	Peacebuilding Fund Focal Point	UNMIL
James Shilue		UNOPS/InterPeace
Baffour Agyeman-Duah	Governance Advisor	UNMIL
Mamadou Dian Balde	Senior Protection Officer	UNHCR
Tomoko Semmyo	Associate Protection Officer	UNHCR
Rory Keane	SSR Advisor	UNMIL
Names unknown, except one		UNCT
		UNICEF
		UNESCO
		UN-Habitat
Esperance Fundira	Resident Representative	UNFPA
Napoleon Abdulla		UNDP (Justice & Security Trust Fund)
Maria Threase Keating	Deputy Representative	UNDP
Henrietta Mensa-Bonsu	DSRSG for Rule of Law	UNMIL
NGOs		
Aaron Sleh	National Coordinator	Civic Initiative
Jerome J. Verdier, Sr.	Senior Counsel/CEO	Verdier & Associates, Inc.
Lindora Howard-Diawara	Interim Executive Director	WANEP-L
James Yarsieh	Head	Rights & Rice Foundation
Aaron Weah		ICTJ
Jackson W. Speare, II	Acting Head of Office	International Alert
Korto R. Williams	Country Representative	Action-Aid Liberia
Other		
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Saye Guanue	Professor	University of Cuttington
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Cheyanne Scharbatke-Church (Team Lead) is a practitioner-scholar who has worked on issues of accountability and power for the past decade. As a Principal at Besa Consulting she has conducted evaluations predominately 'in' and 'on' conflict issues as well as advising agencies on how to establish appropriate policies and systems to support quality design, monitoring and evaluation that strengthens programming. She has worked for a wide range of organizations such as the ICRC, CARE International, the Peacebuilding Fund in Liberia and ICTJ. Cheyanne teaches classes on evaluation of peacebuilding and corruption at the Fletcher School, Tufts and has specific geographic expertise in West Africa, the Balkans and Northern Ireland. She has held positions with the Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP), Search for Common Ground and INCORE. She has published on evaluation and peacebuilding, corruption in humanitarian aid, single identity work and research impact on conflict policy. Cheyanne has her MSc in International Relations from the London School of Economics.

Susanna Campbell is specialist in peacebuilding, conflict prevention, state-building, organizational learning, and research methods. She has over fourteen years of experience examining the relationship between intervention effectiveness and the routines and systems of intervening organizations, including as a staff person with: the Center for Preventive Action of the Council on Foreign Relations; the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER); UNICEF Burundi; and as an independent researcher or evaluator for the International Crisis Group, International Alert, The World Bank Post-Conflict Fund, the National Defense University, Catholic Relief Services, UK Department for International Development (DfID), the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the World Bank Fragile and Conflict-Affected States Group, and the Integrated UN Office in Burundi (BINUB). A list of her numerous publications in this area can be found at: http://www.graduateinstitute.ch/ccdp/campbell-susanna.html. She is currently a Research Fellow at the Centre on Conflict, Development, and Peacebuilding at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, and is completing her PhD at The Fletcher School, Tufts University.

Julia Doehrn recently graduated from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy where she devoted her graduate studies to post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. Driven by a strong personal interest in Central Asia and the Middle East, Julia's research culminated in her Master's Thesis in which she assessed the influence of the Afghan opium economy and opium-related corruption on post-conflict state stability in the country. Her area of expertise lies in issues concerning conflict and post-conflict management combined with profound knowledge in project design, monitoring and evaluation. Most of Julia's professional experience is rooted in journalism and public relations. During a three year long journalist traineeship she worked for one of the two German public broadcast stations both in their domestic news studio as well as their studio overseas in Washington D.C., and as a freelancer for two local newspapers. Besides, Julia worked in political communications for the German Parliament and the Hessian State Chancellery.

Philip Thomas has over twenty years of accumulated experience working in the fields of conflict prevention, transformation and peacebuilding. His work has involved supporting the OAS and UNDP, as well as Government and Civil Society Organizations in the design and implementation of processes on issues as varied as land, labor, inter-ethnic relations, and reparations in a number of countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region. He recently co-authored with Bettye Pruitt *Democratic Dialogue: A Handbook for Practitioners*, a joint publication of the UNDP, OAS, CIDA and International IDEA. Philip now resides in the United States and, as a Principal at D$_3$ Associates, continues to work as an international consultant in Latin America, Asia and Africa. He holds two Masters Degrees and is a Doctoral candidate in Human and Organizational Systems at the Fielding Graduate Institute in Santa Barbara, CA and teaches courses at Goshen College, a Mennonite college in Goshen Indiana.

Peter Woodrow, MPA, is Co-Director of the Reflecting on Peace Practice Project (RPP), based at the CDA Collaborative Learning Projects in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The RPP is an experience-based learning process that involves agencies whose programs attempt to prevent or mitigate violent conflict. Its goal is to improve the effectiveness of international efforts in peacebuilding. Peter is an experienced mediator, facilitator, trainer, and consultant. He has also developed and implemented international programs in consensus building, problem solving, decision making and inter-ethnic conflict resolution in Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe. He has worked with the Peacebuilding Fund process in Liberia, the UN Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery and the UN Framework Team for Conflict Prevention. Mr. Woodrow is also a Partner at CDR Associates in Boulder, Colorado, USA, where he is on leave to work with the RPP project. He holds a Master's in Public Administration from the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and a B.A. in Government from Oberlin College.

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