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JOBS AID PEACE

A Review of the Theory and Practice of the Impact of Employment Programmes on Peace in Fragile and Conflict-affected Countries

Tilman Brück, Neil T. N. Ferguson, Valeria Izzi & Wolfgang Stojetz

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ABSTRACT

The notion that employment can contribute to peace is the explicit backdrop to a large number of labour, training and entrepreneurship programmes and is an implicit one of many more, especially in fragile and conflict-affected states. At the same time, there is a lack of systematic presentation of knowledge on selection into pre-/violent behaviour; on the links between employment programmes and peace; and on which programme designs maximise impact. This research develops the first systematic overview on this topic. This research shows that the theoretical underpinnings of the relationship between employment programmes and peace are well-established but that several layers of empirical support are missing. Firstly, the quantitative support for the theories of change is often weak or absent; secondly, learning on the main relationship between employment and peacebuilding at the programme level is scant; and finally, there are no examples of deeper learning on which programme typologies maximise impact. We conclude that it is imperative that agencies prioritise efforts to close these knowledge gaps. Closing the knowledge gap requires two major commitments. The first – on the demand side - is to support development of new understanding on selection into pre-/violent behaviours and on how such choices can be deterred. The second – on the supply side - is to facilitate and implement a well-defined system of 'enhanced learning' that builds empirical knowledge of programme channels on outcomes and on the variation of these impacts across programme typologies. In combination, these knowledge generation activities will provide a basis for more effective future programming.

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LIST OF MAIN ACRONYMS

FCS	Fragile and Conflict-affected States
ICR	Implementation Completion and Results report
ICRR	Implementation Completion and Results Review
ILO	International Labour Organization
ISR	Implementation Status and Results report
LB	Labour-based interventions
MSMEs	Support to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises
NO INFO	Information not available to the research team
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office
PID	Project Information Document
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VT	Vocational Training
WBG	World Bank Group

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FOREWORD

This report is an important step in our collective efforts to strengthen the peacebuilding impact of our employment programmes in conflict-affected countries. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development includes as goals: the promotion of decent work for all and peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development. In addition, the recently adopted resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council on the review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture recognized that effective peacebuilding must involve the entire United Nations system and requested options for strengthening the United Nations-World Bank collaboration in conflict-affected countries to create an enabling environment for job creation.

While the recent resolutions have underscored the importance of livelihoods in conflict-affected countries, as noted by the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, there is little clarity in either research or practice on re-energizing economies. This Report 'JOBS AID PEACE: A Review of the Theory and Practice of the Impact of Employment Programmes on Peace in Fragile and Conflict-affected Countries' provides for the first time a systematic analysis of available evidence from our four organizations on the peacebuilding impact of our employment programmes since 2005. The research, undertaken by a research team and involvement of global experts, resulted from an analysis of over 400 programmes, a literature review and country case studies. In addition to answering the overarching question on the peacebuilding impact of our employment programmes, the Report also assesses the United Nations-World Bank collaboration in the design and implementation of these programmes.

The Report confirms that there are significant gaps in available evidence on the relationship between employment programmes and their peacebuilding impact. In addition to identifying these gaps, the research provides rich information on good practices and lessons learned across our organizations. Key recommendations to increase the employment programmes' impact on peacebuilding and strengthen the United Nations-World Bank collaboration include: (1) designing employment programmes based on strong conflict analyses and theories of change; (2) setting up monitoring and evaluation mechanisms that measure and report on employment as well as peacebuilding indicators; and (3) maximizing the comparative advantages of each organization while minimizing the potential transaction costs of inter-agency collaboration.

We are convinced that this report will contribute to our continuing efforts in achieving greater impact through evidence-based programming and stronger collaboration. We also hope that the report will be a valuable resource for practitioners in their efforts.



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report provides new understanding on employment programmes in fragile and conflict-affected states as 'inputs' and peacebuilding outcomes in these states as 'outputs', by presenting the first systematic accumulation of knowledge on this relationship. In recent years, substantial (although incomplete) knowledge has been garnered about the impacts of employment programmes on the economic welfare of their participants and about the impact of peacebuilding programmes on attitudes and behaviour. Significantly more rare is the analysis of the cross-pollination of these two ideas - that employment programmes can have peacebuilding outcomes. Despite scant empirical evidence, the idea that peace can be built through employment explicitly permeates a number of programmes and is the implicit backdrop of many more. In this report, we identify over 2,400 employment-related programmes (with implicit or explicit peacebuilding aims) that have been completed since 2005 by the four agencies that commissioned this research.

This research has three purposes. The first is to study the micro-level mechanisms that underpin the relationship between programmes and peacebuilding by collecting evidence on why individuals choose to engage in pre-/violent behaviours associated with conflict and how such selection can be deterred. The second purpose is to provide a snapshot of the status quo, to contextualise the limitations that stem from current knowledge gaps and to provide guidance on the learning opportunities to help close these gaps. The final purpose is to understand how well the four commissioning agencies have worked together, and with other organisations, to maximise the impact of their activities in this domain.

The research was carried out in four main components: (1) a review of the academic literature; (2) a review of the documentation of 432 employment programmes in fragile and conflict-affected states and an in-depth review of 33 of them; (3) field missions in Lebanon, Liberia, and Timor-Leste; and (4) workshops held in Washington DC, Nairobi and Beirut used to define the scope of the study and to 'ground-truth' its findings (see map on page IX). Given the base of this research in individual employment programmes, we focus our research at the micro level rather than at more aggregate levels, which are most likely beyond the impact reach of any single employment programme.

In our review of the academic literature, we find a set of well-defined theories of change, although more often than not supporting empirical evidence is either weak or missing. More so, the externalities and spillovers through which employment programmes can build peace more broadly are almost entirely absent from this literature. Through our assessment, we find that these limitations are present in employment programmes as well. While a significant proportion of programmes reviewed claim a peacebuilding purpose, only a few elaborate on the expected practical connection between employment and peacebuilding. This suggests an absence of explicit theories of change underpinning programmes in a large majority of situations.

Our results also suggest a disconnect between the aim of employment-for-peacebuilding programmes and their proven impact. In our in-depth review of 33 well-documented programmes, we find none where peacebuilding outcomes are linked to an employment component. In turn, it is impossible to draw meaningful inference on the veracity of the link between employment programmes and peacebuilding outcomes, let alone to comment on which programme design features have the most significant impacts. This implies an urgent need for future systematic learning on peacebuilding outcomes that can be linked to various employment programmes. It also calls for some employment programmes in fragile and conflict-affected states to scale back their peacebuilding rhetoric.

Finally, we find that whilst there are a number of good examples of inter-agency collaboration in implementing programmes in fragile and conflict-affected states, these success stories are mostly ad hoc and stem from comparatively rare circumstances where opportunities become obvious or from pressing needs that give agencies little option but to work together. These mixed findings stem from a disconnect between policies and

implementation structures at the headquarter levels and the costs and complexities that affect collaboration at the field office and programme levels, which lack specific advice on how to identify and administer optimal collaborative programming.

In the context of these findings, this report makes seven major (and several minor) recommendations:

1. In the wake of the knowledge gaps uncovered by this research, the agencies should undertake a period of enhanced monitoring and evaluation (M&E) for advanced learning to close the knowledge gaps and develop more effective programmes.
2. All programmes should be based on an explicit, evidence-based and context-specific theory of change.
3. Training on theories of change for peace and related concepts should be conducted with key programme staff.
4. All programmes should explicitly incorporate a 'do no harm' lens through evaluation of programme impacts on non-participants.
5. All evaluations of employment for peacebuilding programmes in FCS should explicitly assess the peacebuilding impacts of the programmes as well as the employment outcomes.
6. Agencies should improve the availability, accessability and quality of programme reports.
7. Agencies should consider the costs and benefits of different forms of collaboration on a case-by-case basis.

The findings of this Report are relevant for the commissioning agencies, bilateral donors, national and local governments in fragile and conflict-affected states, non-governmental organisations operating programmes, and fellow researchers. Even though we could study only a limited number of countries and programmes in depth, we are confident that our insights are relevant for a large number of fragile and conflicted-affected countries. Our research aims to identify common patterns and arguments, which would apply in a variety of contexts. This does not imply that context does not matter, but that employment interventions aiming to build peace are likely to share similar motivations and use similar M&E frameworks. How exactly these common elements should be adjusted to specific contexts (of which there are a bewildering array of possible combinations) is the work that remains to be done in the future.



Location of areas involved in this study

1. INTRODUCTION: CONTEXT

It is a logical theoretical assumption that employment programmes are likely to impact on employment outcomes and that peacebuilding programmes are likely to impact on peacebuilding outcomes. The research introduced in this document, however, seeks to understand a relationship that stretches across these two programme-outcome combinations by looking at the theory and evidence for the peacebuilding impact of employment programmes.

This hypothesised relationship is a backdrop to a wide range of employment programming in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS). Yet to date, little systematic knowledge has been collected on either the theories that underpin the expected relationship or on whether or not employment programmes have successfully delivered peacebuilding outcomes in practice. This document comprises the first effort to provide a composite and structured overview of the status quo, piecing together a strong set of theories of change constructed from strong academic foundations. These theories of change are augmented by a focussed review of the outcomes of over 400 employment and employment-for-peacebuilding programmes.

The International Labour Organization (ILO), the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank Group ('the agencies'[1]) jointly commissioned this study to better understand the anticipated outcomes of their employment-for-peacebuilding programmes and the evidence that supports these relationships.

The purpose of this research, more specifically, is threefold:

The first purpose is to identify the micro-level mechanisms underpinning the impact of employment interventions[2] on peace. We conduct this study at the micro level for two reasons. First, few – if any – employment interventions are large or widespread enough to induce measurable change at the aggregate level. Second, even if and when it is feasible for interventions to have macro-level effects, the theorised mechanisms of such impact rely on changes also occurring at the micro level.

The second purpose is to provide a snapshot of current knowledge on the impacts that employment programmes have had on peacebuilding, to contextualise the limitations that stem from current knowledge gaps and to provide guidance regarding the learning opportunities for agencies to determine what works, what works best and which programmes do and do not deliver on their promises.

The final purpose is to understand the 'complementarity' among the agencies, which we consider to be the extent and success of collaborations between them and between the agencies and other stakeholders, including local governments, government ministries, local NGOs and security service providers.

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1. *In this report, we use the term 'agencies' in a non-technical sense. ILO is a specialized United Nations agency. UNDP is a programme of the United Nations, although it is frequently referred to as the "UN development agency" (see http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/funds-programmes-specialized-agencies-and-others/index.html , accessed 07.08.2016). PBSO is an office within the United Nations Secretariat in New York. The World Bank Group is a specialized agency of the United Nations (as per the 1947 relation agreement), although it has a special status compared to the other agencies and has operational independence.*

2 *The terms 'employment interventions' and 'employment programmes' are used interchangeably throughout this study.*

The research introduced in this Report seeks to understand a relationship that stretches across two programme outcome combinations by looking at the theory and evidence for the peacebuilding impact of employment programmes. This Report advances the policy and research debates on peacebuilding in fragile and conflict-affected states in three ways. First, it describes what we know and what we do not know about employment interventions building peace. What matters here is that there is a common understanding of where we stand and what remains to be done to build the necessary knowledge base for peace to be built routinely by employment interventions.

Second, we find that there are important and valid theoretical reasons to expect that employment interventions can build peace. This is an important insight that in turn justifies future empirical work both by agencies and by researchers to fill the remaining knowledge gaps.

Third, the analysis demonstrates that adopting a micro level lens is an extremely useful, if much neglected, perspective for analysis and programming alike. A society does not move from peace to war without key behavioural and attitudinal changes among its citizens. Rather than trying to predict or prevent violent conflict at the macro level, peaceful behaviour and attitudes can be detected and promoted for the overall benefit of society, for example by strengthening employment. Having said this, this insight also indicates that peace is multi-dimensional and can be built from the positive spillovers and externalities of a range of development programming, rather than just those with explicit peacebuilding aims or design features. Hence what applies to employment promotion could also apply to other development interventions as well. To truly advance peace through development thus requires a mainstreaming of peace as a key outcome variable at the micro level across a range of policy fields far exceeding that of employment. This is perhaps the most challenging of all of our findings: namely, that promoting peace is not only the realm of peace-oriented interventions, or of employment interventions, but ultimately for all interventions in fragile and conflict-affected states.

1.1 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The general aims of this research are fourfold:

1. To conduct an in depth and focussed review of the academic literature with the purpose of understanding the theoretical underpinnings of why and how employment programmes may lead to peacebuilding outcomes.
2. To conduct a wide review of employment programmes that have taken place in fragile and conflict-affected states since 2005 by the four agencies and an in-depth analysis of a shortlist of these programmes that offer the best opportunities for learning. The purpose of this aim is to provide an understanding of what is currently known about the relationship between employment programmes and peace and the knowledge gaps at the programme level.
3. To define current opportunities for the learning to close any knowledge gaps that are discovered as a part of this research process and to provide recommendations on how the agencies can undertake this learning to deepen knowledge.
4. To provide information on how well the agencies have collaborated with each other, with other organisations and with governments to deliver employment for peacebuilding programmes and to provide recommendations on how the outcomes associated with such collaboration can be improved.

1.2 DEFINITIONS

In this report, '**employment**' is defined as work performed for a wage or salary, for profit or for family gain, either in cash or in kind (ILO, 2016a). '**Peace**' is understood to entail the maintenance of the social contract and is defined in an institutional economics sense as a stable commitment to and maintenance of the 'social contract' between the state and its citizens. This in turn entails the legitimate control of the monopoly of violence at state level, the preservation of social cohesion and the dominance of non-violent norms (Justino et al, 2013). Following Galtung (1969), we consider peace both as the absence of pervasive violence ('negative peace') and the presence of effective social systems and norms that allow the non-violent and constructive management of conflict (so-called 'positive peace'). Thus, peace is viewed "not merely as a stage or a condition" but rather as a "dynamic social construct" (Lederach, 1997). In this view, the 'state of peace' in a given country sits somewhere on a continuum that runs from conflict on one side, through negative peace, to positive peace. As shown in Figure 1-1 - The Micro-Macro nexus of conflict, these outcomes interact with individual behaviours and institutions, drawing a link between our micro-level focus on one hand and macro-level outcomes on the other.



Figure 1-1 - The Micro-Macro Nexus of Conflict

'**Peacebuilding**' has multiple definitions, yet there are significant commonalities between the definitions that are used by all of the supporting agencies. In this regard, we view peacebuilding along the lines of these

commonalities, as a process for managing conflict risk, creating peace in the long term and providing the basic opportunity for economic development (United Nations, 2007). Particularly in the wake of more recent work, e.g. that included in 'The Challenge of Sustaining Peace' (United Nations, 2015), it is worth noting that while peacebuilding is typically understood as something that takes place in post-conflict scenarios, it can also occur during any and all phases of the conflict cycle. We conduct our research with these concepts and outcome goals in mind.

We further link this to the United Nations 'Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration', which focuses on peacebuilding programming on three different tracks. The first (Track A) is immediate stabilisation, which seeks to stabilise household income and generate emergency employment; Track B looks towards reintegration; and, finally, Track C aims to develop sustainable employment creation and decent work. It should be noted that, whilst we discuss these three tracks in silos, in fact, programming in all three tracks should take place simultaneously, albeit at different intensities at different periods of the conflict and post-conflict cycle. In combination, this ensures that our research is conducted across a range of fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS), including countries currently experiencing conflict (e.g. Yemen and South Sudan), countries that face threats to peace that have not, in recent times, manifested into conflict (e.g. Lebanon), countries in the early post-conflict phase (e.g. Sri Lanka and Mali); and countries that have experienced much longer post-conflict periods (e.g. Timor-Leste and Liberia).

Due to the focus of this research on employment interventions (which we define as donor-initiated, –funded or –managed activities to expand and strengthen the quantity and/or quality of employment in a country or region), we consider these topics at the micro level. At the micro level, we operationalise measureable conflict outcomes via any form of 'pre-violent and violent behaviour', including collective and organised forms of these phenomena. Following standard approaches in academic and policy writing (e.g. Blattman and Ralston, 2015; Holmes et al., 2013) we use the terms pre-violent and violent behaviour' to capture the full range of activities that threatens peace. This includes all conflict-related acts of violence but also a range of behaviours that we denote 'pre-violent'. These behaviours include, for example, activities that are deliberatly disruptive, such as organised protests or hate speech that signal potential future violence. As short-hand, we use the term 'pre-/violent behaviour' to refer to these behaviours and activities throughout this document.[3]

We denote the theoretical micro-mechanisms underpinning the expected impacts of employment programmes on peace as '**theories of change**' (Brown, 2016; Rogers, 2014). For the purposes of this research, we define theories of change as the entire process that defines the long-term objectives of a programme and then maps backwards to identify what will be done and how this expects to achieve the goals of the programme. In essence, theories of change are the entire motivation for undertaking the programme and the specific purpose of a programme's design. Specifically, the report identifies and advances three broad categories of change: those based on 'contact', 'grievance' and 'opportunity', which in turn are channelled through effects that stem either from the programme itself taking place or through the impacts on jobs of successful programmes. We denote contact, grievance and opportunity as '**transfer mechanisms**' and programme and jobs effects as '**impact channels**'.

Through the research conducted for this study, we conclude that all current micro-level 'transfer mechanisms' link to at least one of the theories of change. Contact, grievance and opportunity represent (micro-)foundations of more well-established aggregate concepts of social capital – both vertical, such as state legitimacy, and horizontal, such as inter-group relations (e.g. Colletta and Cullen, 2000) – and will be carefully defined and discussed in Section 2. The micro-level approach reflects the United Nations credo that, "…clearly, peace needs to emerge organically within society." (United Nations, 2015). The general population of the study, therefore, is

3 . This is also termed 'anti-social' behaviour in the social sciences.

the universe of individuals living in fragile and conflict-affected countries where employment and employment-for-peacebuilding programmes can be – and perhaps are – applied.

We pay special attention to two sub-groups of these populations. First of all, and in line with previous writing on conflict, we consider 'at-risk' groups, such as youth – defined as (young) people who face conditions that may hinder their personal development and threaten their successful integration into society as productive citizens (USAID, 2013). The second are 'high-risk' groups, such as ex-combatants, who are focal points of both the academic literature (e.g. Blattman and Miguel, 2010) and policy interventions (e.g. United Nations, 2014). Once more, although we silo these two groups for expositional ease, we note that it is quite possible for individuals or groups to be both 'at risk' and 'high risk' and that the individuals within these groups are neither exclusively male nor female.



Figure 1-2 - Stages of Learning

This research is carried out with specific reference to the five **stages of learning** depicted in Figure 1-2. In many ways, each step relies on the previous one – it is difficult to meaningfully test theories that are not well-

developed, for example – yet this does not imply that this knowledge can only be generated sequentially, even if it might be optimal to do so.

We call Stage 1 'The Theoretical Base'. The role of this knowledge is twofold. First of all, to postulate on why individuals select into pre-/violent behaviours in the first place and, accordingly, to consider the policy interventions that can tackle such selection. Essentially, this learning component provides the underpinning motivation for engaging in employment for peacebuilding programmes, as it provides the intuition of the transfer mechanisms and impact channels that go into programme design. Stage 2, named 'Evidence on Concepts', seeks to provide empirical support of the information generated in Stage 1. Without this empirical support, learning in Stage 1 remains purely abstract and cannot, therefore, be meaningfully connected to effective programme design. These stages are typically the domain of researchers, although we note that agencies and donors have an important role to play in encouraging the generation of such knowledge, which is a global public good.

'Evidence on Impacts', or Stage 3, requires the collaboration of researchers, agencies and donors to fund and conduct meaningful evaluations of ongoing programmes. This stage of learning connects the theoretical and empirical evidence generated in Stages 1 and 2 with policy interventions. In effect, this stage of learning seeks to understand if programmes have their intended impacts and outcomes. Once this is established, 'Evidence of Implementation' follows as Stage 4, which looks at the differential impacts of various programme design features and provides understanding of which work best, and/or which are appropriate for each situation.

The final stage is 'Evidence for Fine-tuning', which goes deeper into what works, what works best and how this should lead into the design and M&E of the next generation of programmes. The evidence accumulated in Stages 4 and 5 should predominantly come from agencies and implementing organisations with the support of donors. Some of this knowledge may be a private good.

1.3 STUDY METHODOLOGY

This document consists of four separate research components: (1) a focused review of the relevant academic literature; (2) a review of the documentation of over 400 employment and peacebuilding programmes conducted by the commissioning agencies[4]; (3) building on findings from field missions to three specifically selected countries: Lebanon, Liberia and Timor-Leste and; (4) 'ground-truthing' the findings of the first three components at stakeholder workshops in Washington, DC (USA), Nairobi (Kenya), and Beirut (Lebanon), attended altogether by about 90 people. The geographical coverage of our research and our outreach activities is summarised by in the executive summary.

The review covered multiple strands of relevant literature and provides a comprehensive snapshot of the current knowledge, of knowledge gaps and of the application of this knowledge and these gaps to the theoretical relationship between employment programmes and peacebuilding. It extends existing academic reviews of the employment-peacebuilding nexus (Blattman and Ralston, 2015; Brück et al., 2015; Cramer, 2010; Holmes et al., 2013) by linking the findings garnered from this work to what these findings mean at programme level (e.g. Cilliers et al., 2016). Based on the definitions presented above, this review collects existing evidence on the short- and long-term horizons and identifies and advances the micro-mechanisms underpinning the relationship between employment programmes and peace (the so-called 'theories of change'). These theories of change, in essence, document the reasons why agencies might wish to undertake employment-for-peace

4. *For the purposes of this research, we considered projects carried out by the International Development Association (IDA) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) but not the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The methodology in question also results in some discrepancy between the World Bank's list of 'jobs-flagged' projects and our finalised longlist.*

programming. Linked to this, we discuss the role of combined environmental and contextual factors and whether and, if so, how these micro-changes aggregate into impacts measurable at the meso and macro levels.

The bulk of the evidence on existing practice has been collected through an analysis of employment interventions carried out and/or funded by the four commissioning agencies through the adoption of a systematic review protocol. The document review began by looking for all programmes that turned up by a keyword search for employment, peacebuilding or both, in a list of 46 countries defined as being either conflict-affected (in terms of number of battle deaths since 2005), fragile (by appearing in the World Bank's list of fragile scenarios at least once since 2005), or both. This drew up an initial list of in excess of 2,400 programmes, which we scanned for relevance to this project. This scanning reduced this list to 432 programmes in 40 of the 46 scenarios we define as fragile and/or conflict-affected (there were no suitable programmes in the remaining six scenarios). These were in turn assessed on a number of criteria, including the extent and availability of programme documentation and evaluations. This step produced a final list of 33 programmes that were subjected to an in-depth analysis, which provides the 'width' of our evidence. A more in-depth discussion of the methodology of identifying and reducing the number of reviewed programmes can be found in Annex 6. Secondly, it provided the basis of a subset of relevant and well-documented interventions, from which we generate the 'depth' of our evidence, focusing on identification of good practice.

The field visits took place in February (Lebanon), April (Liberia) and April and May (Timor-Leste) 2016 and lasted for a duration of approximately two weeks each. Across the three field visits, nearly 100 semi-structured interviews were conducted with a broad cross-section of relevant stakeholders. This included agency programme staff, academics, staff from other NGOs, staff from civil society groups, the local research and business communities, programme participants and other relevant stakeholders. A full list of interview partners can be found in Annex 2. In addition, a number of on-going programmes were visited, facilitating limited interaction between the research team and programme beneficiaries. The semi-structured nature of these interviews allowed the research team to focus on key themes, which were set out before discussions began, but without the need to disrupt such discussions to ask specific questions.

1.4 SCOPE AND PARAMETERS OF THE RESEARCH

This research was conducted across seven months, from February until September 2016, by a team of four researchers and one research assistant from a mix of qualitative and quantitative backgrounds. This section discusses the scope, parameters and limitations of the four research components.

1.4.1 LITERATURE

The survey was conducted with respect to a wide range of academic literature and policy research documents. As previous reviews have looked at the impacts of employment programmes (e.g. Blattman and Ralston, 2015) and at the relationship between employment and peacebuilding (e.g. Brück et al., 2015), we refocussed our literature review to look specifically at the theoretical relationships between employment programmes and peacebuilding and at the empirical evidence that backs up these 'theories of change' or the steps within them. Given the depth and breadth of this literature review, it is a comprehensive overview of existing theoretical and empirical knowledge on the relationship between employment programmes and peacebuilding.

1.4.2 DOCUMENT REVIEW

The 432 programmes on the longlist reflect a majority of employment programmes in our countries of interest but are unlikely to be the full universe, due to the methodology used to define their relevance (Figure 1-3 - Large Universe of Employment Programmes). In this regard, we believe that strong inference can be taken from the analyses of these 432, but that some errors may arise. This relates not just to potentially excluded programmes, but also to missing programme documentation. Given the duration of the research, the complexity of the task

and the number of unknowns (both for the research team and the agencies involved), as well as a lack of systematised availability of programme documentation, it is possible that we were unable to uncover all of the relevant programme documents and evaluations. As this provided the grounds for generating the shortlist, some potential exists that well-documented or well-evaluated programmes could have been excluded. Despite this concern, it is important to note that the effect of inaccessible documentation/evaluations is the same as their non-existence when considered as learning inhibitors for both external researchers and agency staff.



Figure 1-3 - Large Universe of Employment Programmes

The 432 programmes were evaluated against the criteria discussed in Annex 3 in a manner similar to a systematic review. 69 programmes satisfied these criteria. Again, however, due to the short timeline, only about half of these could be analysed in depth. Although these 33 programmes are likely to be a fairly representative sample of the full list, there is an implicit concern that information could be lost. At the same time, given the uniformity of the information missing and available for these 33 programmes, which we demonstrate throughout this research, it is unlikely that critical or substantial information has been ignored. In turn, as we will demonstrate, it is unlikely that a review of more programmes will influence our conclusions.

1.4.3 FIELD VISITS

A significant proportion of the interviews during the field visits involved programme staff, meaning that their voices are likely to have a stronger weight in the conclusions than stakeholders such as programme beneficiaries and other stakeholders, such as academics or ministerial staff. This problem is exacerbated by the general absence of relevant academic experts in Liberia and Timor-Leste, a lack of access to key government officials and the difficulty in arranging meetings with large numbers of participants. Resulting from the latter weakness is that the experiences that we heard about are not guaranteed to match those of a majority of programme participants. In this regard, we view the outcomes of these field visits more as contextual evidence that supports the more substantial findings, rather than as concrete and stand-alone information. This is particularly the case, as a majority of the participants we did speak to were selected by the agencies, rather than the researchers. As a result, it is also possible that some section biases occurred, both in the potential

selection of the individuals with the best outcomes in the first place and, second, through the willingness of these individuals to submit themselves to interviews.

1.4.4 WORKSHOPS

We held three workshops throughout the research project, in March (Washington DC), June (Nairobi) and July (Beirut), 2016. These workshops provided an important opportunity to both disseminate our initial findings and to ground-truth our conclusions. These workshops, however, were conducted with a relatively small number of participants (approximately 30 at each) and most attendees were from the commissioning agencies, suggesting a potential skew of the views presented. At the same time, the information garnered from these workshops is important in ensuring that our findings have relevance for the staff of the commissioning agencies and other organisations running similar programmes. This is particularly true when considering how the more 'theoretical' aspects of this work (e.g. Section 2; Section 4.1) link to the realities of work in the field. In this regard, we once more use the information garnered at these workshops as contextual evidence throughout the research article, with the knowledge that they may not reflect the full range of views on the matter.

1.5 GENDER CONSIDERATIONS

Gender considerations are mainstreamed through the research, with two principle understandings in mind: first of all, that men and women are likely to experience conflict, and engage with it, in different ways and, thus, that post-conflict needs identification could be different across gender lines. Second, and stemming from this, there are potentially different theories of change at play for women and men in the same programme or that women and men may respond differently to the same underlying theories of change.

While the majority of the academic literature focuses on men as 'perpetrators' in violent conflict and women as 'victims', we carefully conducted the literature review with gender-neutral priors in mind. The field visits were carried out with a focus on ensuring both female and male voices across all key groups were heard during the interviews and reflected in the key takeaways. This included making certain that group discussions were gender-balanced, but also by conducting women-only interviews and specifically seeking women's narratives.

In the review of interventions, our attention to gender was twofold. In the analysis of the longlist of interventions, we coded whether they explicitly identified women as a target group. This allowed us to determine how international agencies conceptualise the relationship between employment and peacebuilding and how men and women are (or are not) targeted based on specific assumptions of risk, vulnerability, and/or peacebuilding potential. This does not imply that specifically identifying women as a target group is a necessary or sufficient condition for gender sensitivity, however. In the in-depth analysis of the short-list, we looked more in detail at how the intervention had attempted to mainstream gender, be it through specific quotas of women in the programme, gender-specific activities or gender-specific indicators. In combination, these approaches ensure that gender is mainstreamed throughout the research and that our conclusions apply to both men and women, as well as our other key groups of interest, such as children, youth and demobilised soldiers.

1.6 INNOVATIONS

This review is innovative in three ways.

First, we focus explicitly on how interventions in one policy domain (employment) can have positive consequences in another domain (peace). Whether or not these impacts are intended, they transcend traditional policy and academic boundaries and cross agencies, ministries and disciplines. This is a challenge for producers and

consumers of this research alike. Yet it also has a significant upside. If employment interventions have positive peace impacts, then this further justifies an expansion of employment programming in FCS.

Second, we adopt a strict micro-level or bottom-up approach. As our interviews commonly demonstrated, peace is often thought of in the aggregate. Countries are either at war or not. This is in sharp contrast to employment interventions which typically focus on the number of jobs created, hence working very clearly at the individual level Our extensive work on how people, households and groups contribute to, experience, and cope with violent conflict shows the benefits of thinking of peace and conflict at the micro as well as macro levels.[5]

Third, we place our analysis in a wider body on institutional learning and capacity. We postulate a model of knowledge building and diffusion, arguing that it takes time and effort for abstract concepts to translate into wide-spread and effective policy prescriptions. In that sense, our analysis goes beyond a typical academic survey paper. We also identify how institutions involved in programming can contribute to widening and deepening the knowledge on how to build peace through employment interventions. As we will show, there is much to be done – but the first evidence suggests that this is a very worthwhile journey to undertake.

The findings of this Report are relevant for the commissioning agencies, bilateral donors, national and local governments in fragile and conflict-affected states, non-governmental organisations operating programmes, and fellow researchers. Even though we could study only a limited number of countries and programmes in depth, we are confident that our insights are relevant for a large number of fragile and conflicted-affected countries. Our research aims to identify common patterns and arguments which would apply in a variety of contexts. This does not imply that context does not matter, but that employment interventions aiming to build peace are likely to share similar motivations and use similar M&E frameworks. How exactly these common elements should be adjusted to specific contexts (of which there are a bewildering array of possible combinations) is the work that remains to be done in the future.

1.7 KEY FINDINGS

1. While the theories of change in question are well-developed, the empirical evidence base is weak, leading to weak confirmation of the hypothesised relationships. The externalities and downstream effects, as well as various spillovers, that could link employment to peacebuilding have only rarely been evaluated explicitly or rigorously. In non-academic terms, not much research has been done on the connection between employment and peacebuilding. This dearth of evidence prevents us from being able to make strong conclusions about whether or not employment programmes build peace, let alone from making meaningful recommendations on which employment programmes have the greatest peacebuilding impact.

2. From the review of programmes, it emerges that while a significant proportion of those examined claim a peacebuilding purpose, only a few of them elaborate on how the employment-peacebuilding connection is supposed to work. In non-academic terms, few even identify theories of change or transfer mechanisms. Furthermore, there is little reflection by programmes on the question of whether the theories of change they do adhere to (implicitly or explicitly) match the specific context and the realities of the programme's implementation. In turn, this apparent lack of evidence is reflected in mixed experiences in the field, where the narratives of some programme participants match the theories of change implied by the programme design closely whilst others diverge significantly.

5. *See chapter 1 in Justino et al, (2013) for an introduction to the micro-level analysis of peace and development. That work in turn is influenced by the collective experience of the Households in Conflict Network which has published over 230 working papers since 2003 (see www.hicn.org).*

3. Our evidence also suggests a disconnect between the aim of the interventions and their proven impact. While impact can never be guaranteed, employment programmes claiming to have peacebuilding objectives can be expected to express how they expect to achieve impact from its specific programming components. Our review demonstrates that, in most cases, this factor is missing. A related finding asks another important question. The notion that peace is a multifaceted phenomenon comprising multiple, although also potentially discrete, factors is implicit in our research. Access to economic opportunity is only one of these factors. Stemming from this, one must ask if an improvement in any one of these indicators, without corresponding improvements in others, is enough to raise the level of peace. In non-academic terms, one must ask if employment programmes alone can build peace (that is, that they are sufficient for peacebuilding) or if peacebuilding programming requires multiple strands tackling various root causes of conflict simultaneously (that is, that employment programmes are necessary but not sufficient components).

4. In discussing how agencies work together in complicated environments to deliver widespread impact, we find surprisingly little awareness of the costs of collaboration, with focus falling only on the supposed benefits of collaboration. These costs include direct costs, such as communication between agencies and staff time spent coordinating, but also indirect costs, such as a lack of innovation in programming, due to collaborative agencies acting as 'cartels', and the costs of identifying opportunities for collaborative programming. More so, very little attention is paid to how such costs can increase dramatically in the FCS that require combined peacebuilding programming. Furthermore, many of the positive impacts we find tend to come from agencies working in silos towards a commonly defined goal (which we denote coordination), rather than from joint agency programming (which we denote cooperation). A subsidiary concern, however, arises about how deliberate coordination really is at the field level – in Lebanon and Liberia, for example, concerns were frequently raised about how deliberate coordination had been. These mixed findings can, in part, be chalked down to a disconnect between, one the one hand, policies and implementation structures in place at HQ level and, on the other, the transaction costs and competition for scarce funding resources at the field level. More specifically, however, there is little explicit guidance on how to ensure collaboration in the field or how to minimise the costs of collaboration in FCS. In turn, this has led to a patchwork complementarity, where agencies work together when a specific opportunity arises to do so and when the costs involved are low. Collaboration in the field, therefore, has tended to be weak and has delivered mixed results. Some collaboration has benefitted from economies of scale and impact efficiencies, whilst others appear to have inhibited progress. In part, this is related to the complexity of the scenarios that require employment for peacebuilding programmes but it is exacerbated by the lack of practical guidance on how to identify and implement collaborative programming.

1.8 RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Despite a lack of previous research on the links between employment programmes and peacebuilding **there is a significant opportunity for learning amongst the agencies**, given the significant amounts of on-going and future programming. This creates space for rigorous and robust empirical evaluations of the links between various employment programmes and peace. This is what we call 'enhanced learning'. Whilst this should include a small proportion of randomised controlled trials (RCTs), it is just as important to measure peace-related outcomes through more typical M&E procedures, when programme roll out is not randomised or where there is no recourse to a control group. This could involve, for example, monitoring individual outcomes and attitudes before, during and at multiple stages after a programme has taken place. We therefore recommend that agencies significantly scale up such M&E in the short term and systematise learning from this. See Figure 1-4 for more information on how this can be achieved.



Figure 1-4 - Expand Scope and Purpose of M&E

2. **Programmes should be based on an explicit, evidence-based and context-specific theory of change.** At the design stage, programmes should clearly articulate how the expected peacebuilding impact is supposed to come about. We find that in most cases, programming documents lack an explicit theory of change – although at times it is implicit. This stands in contrast to the knowledge of programme staff of such theories, which became apparent during the field visits. Agencies should mainstream theories of change in programme documents by considering, first, the desired and anticipated outcome; second, the programme design; and finally, the theoretical links between such a design and such an outcome. For future learning, these links should be explicitly defined within programme documentation and the steps within these theories evaluated along with headline outcomes.

3. **Training on theories of change for peace and related concepts should be conducted with key programme staff.** We found that staff at the agencies do not typically have the capacity to understand some key issues concerning the topic in this field. It is tricky – as we are dealing with an overlap of two very different issues: peacebuilding and employment creation. Hence staff should be offered cross-topic training: on peacebuilding to employment experts – and on employment creation to peacebuilding experts. In addition, methodological training should be offered on how to organise learning for field staff.

4. **Programmes should explicitly incorporate a 'do no harm' lens.** The underlying assumption of using employment programmes for peacebuilding is that the availability, quality and distribution of jobs are a crucial dimension of peace consolidation. By the same token, this means that any intervention dealing with jobs in post-conflict and fragile situations runs a strong risk of doing harm – by, for example, strengthening existing perceptions of favouritism in access to employment, or raising, and then frustrating, hopes for a better future. A key finding of the review of intervention is the virtual absence of any contextualised attention of potentially negative impact of the programme, both at the design and at the evaluation stage.

5. **Evaluations should assess both employment and peacebuilding impacts – rather than assuming that one necessarily follows from the other.** It is a misleading assumption that every positive impact on employment translates automatically into a positive impact on peacebuilding. In fact, it is perfectly possible for a programme to be successful with regard to its immediate employment objectives, while having no impact (or even a negative impact) on peacebuilding.

6. **We encourage agencies to improve the availability and quality of programme reports.** We find that critical evaluations of programmes take place in a small minority of situations, yet other forms of learning (for example, from programme documents and final reports, are often unavailable as well despite their production being mandated by all agencies. That such documentation is unavailable – even when it is extant – is a major barrier to systematic learning, both within agencies and for those who wish to conduct meta-analyses or more in-depth research of programmes.

7. **Agencies should consider the benefits and costs of different forms of collaboration in each specific context.** We encourage agencies to revisit the notion that collaboration between agencies is universally good. To overcome this, we encourage agencies to meaningfully evaluate the anticipated costs and benefits for collaboration on a case-by-case basis. This, in turn, should lead to decisions being made in a systematic way, by considering costs and benefits to various forms of collaboration. Without such a process, it is likely that collaboration will remain ad hoc and suboptimal, as it will remain impossible to draw generalisable lessons from the small number of successful collaborations. Linked to this, we also encourage agencies to develop policies that better consider the reality of collaboration at the field level. At present, such policies appear only applicable at high-levels. This could be improved, for example, by including programme recommendations in 'Post-Conflict Needs Assessments' (PCNAs), rather than asking each agency, independently, to identify the programmes that can satisfy those needs.

1.9 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

The remainder of this document is structured into four sections (see Figure 1-5 - Structure of the Report).

Figure 1-5 - Structure of the Report

Section 2 surveys the theoretical processes that link employment programmes with peacebuilding, with a specific focus at the micro level. The section is split into the following subsections: the basic concepts; theories of change as developed from a review of the academic literature and applied to employment and peacebuilding programming; the contextual factors that affect these theories of change when applied in the field; and the evidence that theories of change are mainstreamed from the document review and field visits.

Section 3 backs up the preceding theoretical section by reviewing the empirical evidence available for the causal link between employment and peacebuilding. This section is divided into the following subsections: (1) a statistical analysis of 432 programmes that took place in 40 countries defined as fragile and/or conflict-affected since 2005; (2) an in-depth analysis of a subset of the 33 most relevant and best-documented programmes from the four agencies supporting this study, selected taking into account relevance and availability of documentation and; (3) supporting contextual evidence from semi-structured interviews with programme participants conducted during the field visits.

Section 4 looks at the concept of 'complementarity', which we consider as both the quality and quantity of collaboration between the agencies who commissioned this research. In this section, we begin with a background theory of the costs and benefits of collaboration and its optimal level, which challenges the notion that agencies working together is inherently universally positive. We follow this theory with a discussion of the current collaboration policies of the United Nations and the World Bank, including a critical reflection on how these policies can be applied. We follow this up with supporting evidence from the document review and from the field visits.

In Section 5, we offer key findings, lessons learned, recommendations and an outlook.

2. RATIONALE: WHY INTERVENE?

In this section, we elucidate two potential channels of impact that link employment interventions with peacebuilding and which, hence, provide a rationale for programmes taking place. The first set – the programme channel - is a direct effect of the programmes themselves, implying that interventions – even those without measured impacts on the labour market – can build peace. The second set – the job channel – relies on the programming successfully stimulating employment and where, as a result, these improvements in employment result in peacebuilding. Within these two main lines, we find the impact in the form of three specific transfer mechanisms: opportunity, grievance and contact. For clarity's sake, we discuss these impact mechanisms in silos.

We find understanding of the theories of change identified in the literature review in all three field visits. Opportunity- and grievance-based theories were most prevalent and could be found in programming in Liberia, Lebanon and Timor-Leste, whilst contact was most prevalent in Lebanon. Despite these findings, however, we find that the inclusion of theories of change in programme documentation is largely absent. This suggests a potential and worrying disconnect between the theories of change that underpin the objectives of programmes and how these programmes are actually designed. The absence of understanding of the impact channels and transfer mechanisms through which a particular programme will work implies that there must be at least a small knowledge gap in programme design features regarding how they are expected to deliver their desired impact. Without knowledge of the impact channels and transfer mechanisms, it then becomes difficult to isolate which particular programme design features are likely to have the largest impact, making suitable M&E more difficult.

We find, principally, that there is a good body of literature on the theories of change but it remains unclear if and how these theories play out in practice. The lack of rigorous evidence in the academic literature is reinforced by a lack of supporting evidence at the programme level. Most evidence available exists at the macro levels, which in turn indicates a lack of knowledge about the microfoundations of employment for peacebuilding. Consequently, we define two levels of missing information: (1) a lack of information on the drivers of individual selection into pre-/violent behaviours and; (2) a lack of information on how such individual choices aggregate into organised, group-based violence and violent conflict.

2.1 CONCEPTS

We distinguish two different channels of impact through which employment programmes can peacebuilding, as well as employment, outcomes.

1. **Job channel:** This channel's effects stem from the intervention's impact on jobs. It is thus the success of the programme to improve or create jobs, and not the programme itself, that delivers positive peacebuilding impacts.

2. **Programme channel:** This channel's effects stem from the existence of a programme, regardless of whether or not the intervention was actually successful in delivering job-related effects.

Whilst considering both the job and programme channels, we further disaggregate into whether impacts are intentional or not. Even unintended effects, such as externalities, spatial spillovers and multipliers, should be detectable by good quality evaluations but, in practice, seldom are. All this posits that employment programmes, for example, could have peacebuilding impacts even if this is not an aim of the intervention. This explains why we include employment programmes without an explicit peacebuilding component in our review of interventions. In addition, interventions could have impacts on non-participants, through the spread of information, creation of (local) jobs and so on. That said, it is also important to note that such unintended outcomes need not always be positive (e.g. Haushofer et al., 2015).

We consider both the 'partial' and 'net' effects of programmes. This means that we allow for the possibility that having a positive (employment or peacebuilding) impact on participants does not necessarily equate to a net positive (employment or peacebuilding) impact in general equilibrium[1]. In non-academic terms, benefits for participants are not necessarily benefits for the whole of society. For example, it is possible that non-participants suffer negatively as a consequence of the intervention, casting shadows over both the true effectiveness of the programme and the 'do no harm' principles.

2.2 CHANNELS OF IMPACT, THEORIES OF CHANGE AND TRANSFER MECHANISMS

The broad definition of employment and the emphasis on state-citizen relations for peace frame the analysis of the specific theories linking both the jobs and programme channels. For these theories of change (see section 1.2), we identify three distinct drivers prevalent in the literature: contact, grievance and opportunity (see Figure 2-1 - Drivers of Adverse Behaviour at the Micro Level). These are defined as follows:

1. **Contact:** a combination of socio-economic circumstances, time and place that influences the interactions between individuals and groups of individuals.

2. **Grievance:** a feeling of resentment over something that is perceived to be unfair.

3. **Opportunity:** a combination of socio-economic circumstances, time and place that influences the (broadly defined) costs and opportunity costs of engaging in pre-/violent behaviours.

1 *This statement is true for both the economic and peacebuilding outcomes of programmes. For example, SME support programmes may lead to the creation of new businesses for programme participants but the consequent destruction of old businesses, as their owners are no longer able to compete, or because the presence of competition drives down prices. In turn, this may lead to positive changes in the attitudes of the programme beneficiaries but corresponding negative changes for the non-participants.*

DRIVERS OF ADVERSE BEHAVIOUR AT THE MICRO LEVEL



LACK OF OPPORTUNITY	EXISTENCE OF GRIEVANCE	LACK OF CONTACT
Definition: A combination of socio-economic opportunities, circumstances and time that influence the costs and opportunity costs of engaging in adverse behaviours. **Example:** Individuals who lack private economic opportunity, such as low incomes, have lower costs and less to lose from engaging in adverse.	**Definition:** A feeling of resentment over something that is, or at least is perceived to be, unfair. **Example:** Individuals who perceive their own group to be unfairly worse off than others bear grievances against the other groups, which can be manifested as adverse behaviours.	**Definition:** A combination of circumstances and time that influence the quality and quantity of interactions between individuals from different groups. **Example:** A lack of contact can breed negative stereotypes or exacerbate negative interactions, increasing tension between groups.

Figure 2-1 - Drivers of Adverse Behaviour at the Micro Level

All three drivers are relevant to both the jobs and programme impact channels. They are at the heart of three specific transfer mechanisms that link employment programmes to peace. We present the underlying logic of each of these mechanisms and review the key evidence supporting these impact channels below.

2.2.1 TRANSFER MECHANISM 1: CONTACT

BOX 2-1 Transfer Mechanism: Contact between groups can contribute to improved relationships and mutual understanding, which in turn mitigate division.

The basic assumptions of grievance-based theories of change are:

1. Adverse beliefs and interactions between social groups can result in tensions between those groups, leading to pre-/violent behaviours
2. Employment programmes can improve relationships between these groups by bringing them together in a productive environment, ensuring quality interactions that break down sources of division and increase trust

1. Theoretical Background

In-group bias is one of the key social issues in conflict and post-conflict societies and may include ethnic groups, combatant-civilian distinctions or many other lines of division (Bauer et al., 2014; Beekman et al., 2014). Bringing members of different groups together in hopes of improving social relations is the essence of many social programmes in conflict-affected regions, such as reconciliation interventions designed in the spirit of 'positive peace'. Systematic evidence, particularly in the developing world, is limited but findings broadly suggest promising effects on social relations between groups as a result of contact (e.g. Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). In the developing world, some evidence supports these general notions. Rydgren et al. (2013), for example, find strong evidence of inter-ethnic contact related to shared working environments in Iraq. By contrast, however, Hjort (2014) finds that multi-ethnic workplaces in Kenya can be bad for business. Furthermore, in conflict-affected settings, inter-group contact may come with additional risks and/or negative externalities. Cilliers et al., 2016, for example, suggest that participating in post-conflict contact workshops has adverse impacts on mental health of participants, even though such participation also had positive peacebuilding outcomes.

Less considered, however, is that bringing people together in economically productive environments may be less intrusive or risky. This implies that the quality or type of contact, in addition to contact taking place at all, is important. The widespread 'Community-Driven Development' (CDD) programmes are actually predicated on the idea that social cohesion emerges from local individuals collaborating under certain institutional arrangements set by the programme (e.g. World Bank 2012a, Avdeenko and Gilligan, 2015; Fearon et al., 2015). Explicit employment interventions of this type are scarce but could be promising. In workplaces, repeated interactions and mutual reliance can build trust and other positive relationships between individuals, whereby reducing adverse perceptions or experiences of out-groups. In Nigeria, for example, a programme exists that sends randomly selected university graduates to different areas of the country. Seven years after the service, students placed in a state where their ethnic group is not the majority show greater national pride, have more knowledge about other ethnic regions and are more willing to move to other ethnic regions (Okunogbe, 2016). From such learning, it is posited that reductions in pre-/violent behaviour will follow.

2. Job Channels

Many workplaces, particularly in large cities and multi-ethnic societies, bring together individuals from multiple socio-economic, religious, tribal and racial backgrounds. More so, important behavioural traits are commonplace in such an environment. For example, through repeated interactions and mutual reliance, cooperation and coordination of activities may be necessary, as is trust between employees. In turn, such interactions between individuals from different groups help to break down ingrained prejudices or stereotypes and, with it, adverse perceptions of out-groups. Consequently, this should lead to reduced tension between these groups and, accordingly, reduced manifestations of pre-/violent behaviours.

3. Programme Channels

In effect, the programme channels are identical to those described above, except that the interactions take place within the programme itself rather than in the workplace. The basis of this effect works on individuals working together during the programme – for example, to complete training or to apply for grants – leading to breaking down differences and prejudices.

2.2.2 TRANSFER MECHANISM 2: GRIEVANCE

BOX 2-2 Transfer Mechanism: Reduced grievances make engagement in pre-/violent behaviours less likely.

The basic assumptions of grievance-based theories of change are:

1. Grievances stemming from real or perceived inequalities foster pre-/violent behaviours
2. Employment programmes can relieve grievances by reducing real or perceived inequalities

1. Theoretical Background

Theories in social and identity economics emphasise how social and political institutions shape attitudes and beliefs that govern behaviour. With respect to pre-/violent behaviours, much importance has been attributed to the 'grievances' individuals hold. These grievances could be targeted towards any of a multitude of well-defined groups, but generally stem from perceptions of unfairness – real or imagined – either between civilians and elites (such as the government) or between in-groups and out-groups. We identify three main sources of grievance that theoretically link to conflict. The first relates to low trust between the populace and its government; the second relates to tensions between socio-demographic groups; the final one relates to adverse social norms that create surrounding violence, which in turn can influence all interpersonal behaviour.

The notion that attitudes toward the government are a key predictor of pre-/violent behaviours is incorporated in many models of collective violence, such as the winning hearts and minds approach to counter-insurgency (e.g. Berman et al., 2011) or Wood's (2003) seminal 'non-material theory' of insurgent collective action. Recent studies such as one by Mercy Corps in Southern Afghanistan confirm that youth perception of corruption among government officials can be a strong predictor of sympathy towards armed opposition groups (Mercy Corps, 2013), which may be followed by active participation.

Another popular argument associates pre-/violent behaviours with perceptions of poverty or 'inequality' (e.g. Sen, 1973; Gurr, 1970). Inequality exists in a number of variables such as opportunity, power, income, health or education, and can be measured at the individual level ('vertical inequality') or at the group level ('horizontal inequality') (Murshed, 2015; Stewart, 2000). While the influential early macro-level studies of conflict by Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) discount the role of inequality, it is widely argued that perceptions of (some form of) inequality or injustice can directly trigger pre-/violent behaviours (e.g. Østby, 2013). While interpersonal (vertical) inequality measures are empirically more advanced, rigorous, causal evidence on the links between vertical inequality and violent conflict is scarce (see: Bircan, Brück and Vothknecht, 2016). At group levels, horizontal inequality is difficult to measure empirically but is often associated with group-based conflict (e.g. Stewart, 2008; Roemer, 1998; Tilly, 1998). In non-academic terms, current thinking in academia suggests that large differences in income or wealth between people within a country do not in themselves start conflict. However, large differences in income or wealth between recognisable groups of people of a given country are likely to lead to violent conflict.

A final source of grievance exists at the level of adverse social norms. Conflict and fragility often bring high levels of uncertainty to the lives of individuals. This uncertainty affects individuals' attitudes and expectations, creating and reinforcing the social norms that characterise violent societies (e.g. Brück et al., 2015). For example, those faced with conflict often have low expectations of the future, which can exacerbate current grievances. While the impacts on social norms and informal institutions more broadly are understudied, existing evidence is markedly mixed (e.g. Blattman and Miguel, 2010). These include negative effects on cooperation (e.g. Bauer et al., 2016) or outlook and expectations (e.g. Bozzoli, Brück and Muhumuza, 2011).

2. Job Channels

The relationship between employment and perceptions of government may not be straightforward, yet there are grounds to believe that employment can directly improve individual trust in formal institutions. Individuals with jobs, for example, may feel more a part of a functioning society, which should be reflected in reduced grievances towards the formal institutions of that society. Such increased buy-in to society, in turn, should reduce individual or group propensity to engage in pre-/violent behaviours. Similarly, access to better jobs or more income can change individuals' perceptions of their own (or their in-group's) position vis-à-vis out-groups, which in turn should mitigate tensions between those groups. The flip side, of course, is that poorly targeted programmes can exacerbate existing tensions or even create new ones by generating new perceptions of inequality. The internal logic of this theory is straightforward, yet the supporting evidence remains thin (see, e.g., Cramer, 2010).

Generating employment can also be an efficient way of changing social norms surrounding conflict. Individuals in employment tend to report higher well-being and better expectations of the future than those who are unemployed (e.g. Dolan et al., 2008; Korpi, 1997; Rainer and Siedler, 2008), certainly in the developed world. Such improvements in expectations at both the individual and aggregate levels lead to increased perceptions of what society can offer, which in turn leads to changes in social norms surrounding violence. This means employment should jointly increase an individual's perception of his or her role in society, whilst also mitigating and changing adverse social norms.

3. Programme Channels

Exposure to an employment programme can directly relieve all three distinct sets of grievance that are linked to pre-/violent behaviours. The implementation of an employment programme may influence the views of participants and non-participants as to the functioning of the state or the economy. In these situations, programmes in effect act as a signal of the state's or economy's capacity. Thus, such programmes – especially those involving visible government participation – should boost trust in formal institutions and reduce pre-/violent behaviours. Similarly, the presence of a programme targeted, at least in part, at a group that perceives itself to be marginalised can lead to direct reductions in those perceptions of marginalisation and its associated impacts on perceptions of vertical and/or horizontal inequalities. However, this mechanism should be taken with the same caveat as the job channels themselves. Finally, the programme can act in much the same way to improve individuals' perceptions of the future and of the society in which they live, leading to the same changes in social norms already described.

2.2.3 TRANSFER MECHANISM 1: OPPORTUNITY

BOX 2.3: Transfer Mechanism: Better circumstances increase the cost of engaging in pre-/violent behaviours

The basic assumptions of opportunity-based theories are:

1. Adverse socio-economic circumstances foster pre-/violent behaviours due to low (opportunity) costs of participation
2. Employment programmes build circumstances less favourable by increasing the (opportunity) costs of pre-/violent behaviours

1. Theoretical Background

The academic workhorse models in the economics of crime are based on the opportunity-cost theories introduced by Becker (1968). In these theories, each person weighs the relative costs and benefits of engaging in criminal activities and does so when the expected gains are greater than the costs (see Draca and Machin (2015) for a review of supporting literature). This logic has been applied to the forms of pre-/violent behaviours relevant to this research, including collective forms of rebellion (e.g. Hirshleifer, 1995; Collier and Hoeffler, 1998). Furthermore, poverty is distressing for many people, which can cause frustrations and anger that leads individuals to engage in pre-/violent behaviours (e.g. Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Rigorous empirical evidence at the individual level, however, is thin, especially from employment programmes in developing parts of the world (e.g. Blattman and Annan, 2015). This leads to a lack of generalisable evidence on the kinds of processes that drive individuals into pre-/violent behaviours in the first place and what can subsequently restore them to productive society.

A related important concept, mentioned by many policy documents, is that of 'idleness'. As an example, youth bulges[2] and the associated issues of un- and under-employment are often theorised to be a ticking time bomb based on arguments including the proverb "the devil makes work for idle hands" (e.g. Huntington, 1996; Goldstone, 2001). While a compelling formal definition is difficult, idleness is closely related to the actual amount of time and opportunity that is available to an individual for engaging in pre-/violent behaviour. Keeping an individual 'occupied' immediately leaves less time and opportunity to commit pre-/violent behaviour, which in the economics of crime literature is called the 'incapacitation effect' (e.g. Jacob and Lefgren 2003). Isolating an incapacitation effect empirically, however, is a daunting task. A few recent studies present convincing evidence for a negative, contemporaneous relationship between school attendance and criminal activity among US youths that is due to incapacitation (Jacob and Lefgren 2003, Luallen 2006, Anderson 2014). Yet, the existing evidence from employment programmes and developing countries in general is extremely weak (e.g. Mercy Corps, 2015).

2. Job Channels

Under the Beckerian opportunity-cost theories, those with low opportunities in the legal labour market are also those most likely to engage in pre-/violent behaviours because they have little to lose from doing so and, proportionally, much more to gain. It logically follows that any programme that successfully raises these opportunity costs, by increasing a person's income or employment status, should reduce the private incentives of that individual to engage in pre-/violent behaviours.

By a similar token, employment productively occupies time and energy of the programme participant in several ways. Via an incapacitation effect, improved performance in the labour market thus results in reduced idleness

2. *While it is important to note the positive role young people can play in economic development and post-conflict transformation, plenty of important work also suggests that 'youth bulges' (where a large proportion of the population is young) is also a conflict risk. This may be particularly so when a large proportion of the population is young men. See the work, for example, of Heinsohn (2003).*

and should reduce the private incentives of that individual to engage in pre-/violent behaviours. Programmes that develop skills can aid individuals in finding what they would define as productive jobs. In this setting, opportunity is not simply an income effect but one that also relates to job quality and a person's associated perceptions of his or her own status. Improvements in such perceptions of status are also likely to be related to individual choices to engage in pre-/violent behaviours or not.

3. Programme Channels

Programme channels function in much the same manner as job channels, except that it is participation in the programme itself that provides the opportunity and the relief from idleness. In the former case, many programmes have strict attendance requirements for participants, which has the same effect of increasing (opportunity) costs of those with incentives to engage in pre-/violent behaviours, as non-attendance foregoes completion of the programme. Similarly, if the incapacitation effects of school attendance on crime in the US discussed above transfer to other settings, then any programme that significantly occupies the time and energy of young people will reduce contemporaneous pre-/violent behaviour. It is worth noting that it is unclear how these mechanisms are supported beyond immediate effects, particularly if the programme itself kept participants busy in a way they did not appreciate or is unsuccessful in improving employment status or prospects.

2.3 CONTEXTUALIZING THE THEORIES OF CHANGE

The objective of designing new employment interventions for peacebuilding purposes is a central concern for policy programming (e.g. ILO, 2003; ILO, 2016b; United Nations, 2014; WDR, 2011; WDR, 2013). Deepening our understanding of the impact of employment programmes on peace and applying these insights to the design of new pro-peace employment interventions is particularly important for at least two reasons. First, the narrative that 'employment is synonymous with peace' is prevalent among practitioners, while the underlying logic often remains unquestioned and untested (International Alert, 2014a; Cramer, 2010; Blattman and Ralston, 2015). Second, inspiring norms, behaviour and institutions that foster and sustain peace directly has generally proven difficult. In particular, a variety of creative community-driven development (CDD) programmes with this purpose have struggled to produce an impact (e.g. King and Samii, 2014; Avdeenko and Gilligan, 2015; King, Samii, and Snilstveit, 2010). This hence raises practical questions such as which theories of change could meaningfully be applicable to research via new interventions and evaluations and where, when, and how they should be applied.

2.3.1 UNPACKING PRE-/VIOLENT BEHAVIOUR

At the heart of the theories of change are processes at the individual level. Why do individuals engage in (some form of) pre-violent or violent behaviour, and how can employment programmes reduce their propensity to engage in such acts? Pre-/violent behaviour includes an extremely diverse set of acts, ranging from petty crime to interpersonal violence and to insurgency. Accordingly, the underlying motivations are likely to vary broadly. While the theories of changes are presented in a general format, it is obviously crucial in practice to identify the type of pre-/violent behaviour the programme seeks to reduce or prevent. A second dimension the general categorisation of pre-/violent behaviour obscures is the role of groups or collectives. Pre-/violent behaviour can be an individual act but is often participation in group behaviour, ranging from small groups of friends to street gangs to mass mobilisation in armed groups. Third, in collective and organised forms of pre-/violent behaviour, the academic literature often simply studies 'participation'.

Surprisingly little attention has been paid to the different roles individuals play in such group activities. Most important here is the distinction between leaders, organisers or mobilisers and those that follow and/or are mobilised (e.g. Bozzoli and Brück, 2011). This insight is reflected in the design of some post-conflict demobilisation programmes that specify 'deals' with the elites of a rebel group. This can be interpreted as a

form of the United Nations 'people-centred' approach, promoting profiling of ex-combatants and targeted responses (United Nations, 2014). Scientifically, such an approach is essentially based on a view of armed groups through a principal-agent lens (e.g. Wood, 2016). Especially in contexts where participation in pre-/violent behaviour is based primarily on non-material incentives, the signalling value of conducting and communicating special labour-market programmes for influential leaders can have high returns. However, we are not aware of systematic interventions and research into this direction.

Taken together, only a careful assessment of these outcomes and priorities facilitates meaningful predictions about the relevance of present theories of change.

2.3.2 GENDER ASPECTS OF THE THEORIES OF CHANGE

Although we discuss the theories of change, impact channels and transfer mechanisms generally, it is important to note that there may be gender dimensions that influence the scale or likelihood of impacts being transferred via a particular route. Justino (2012), for example, notes that women respond differently to conflict than men, which opens up a question about potentially differing 'peace dividends' across genders that depend on women's and men's access to jobs in the aftermath of conflict. Nevertheless, it should be noted that such research considers access to jobs themselves as a part of the 'peace dividend'. At the same time, however, it is important to consider such outcomes more generally and to consider whether employment programmes can have differential impacts on peace, depending on the target group. Given the results of this article, future learning is strongly needed on this front.

2.3.3 THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT

The implementation and realised micro effects of an employment programme are subject to a broad set of structural economic or political factors. In this subsection, we briefly discuss some practical implications of five factors that are particularly important in contexts where peacebuilding is concerned: the local economy, climatic conditions, culture, state capacity and armed conflict itself.

Most obviously, any prediction or analysis of the relevance of a certain theory of change requires an understanding of the local economic environment. The realisation of and returns to employment − as well as programme-based change − directly hinge on a number of structural economic factors, such as the quality of infrastructure, access to credit, existing technologies, sets of skills, information services, and the diversification of the economy.[3]

As the role of climate shocks in fragile contexts is a growing concern, it is also worth noting that there is now robust evidence that economic productivity drops steeply in deviations around annual average temperatures (Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel, 2015a). While economic productivity is only one potential pathway, related studies show that such adverse climatic events also increase the risk of conflict, at both the interpersonal level and the intergroup level (for a review see Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel, 2015b). The climatic conditions may thus interact with the mechanisms linking employment programmes and peace via economic as well as non-economic factors.

How susceptible individuals are to a certain theory of change also depends on the local culture, defined as customary ethnic, religious, and social beliefs and values that are initially acquired through intergenerational transmission (e.g. Greif, 1994; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2006). Culture can thus be thought of as an informal institution, which has been shown to be endogenous to other factors mentioned above (see e.g. Alesina and Giuliano, 2016; Bauer et al., 2016). Any prediction or analysis of the relevance of a certain theory of change thus naturally requires an understanding of the cultural background.

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3. *Economic institutions connecting individuals with the labour market and training opportunities, such as the so-called Information, Counselling and Referral Services (ICRS), may be particularly important but inefficient. Tailored employment programmes may directly alleviate frictions in these processes and create better links between individuals and local markets.*

In fragile contexts, political institutions and 'the state' are often very weak. The potential consequences are twofold. First, even the immediate micro-level impacts of employment programmes are a function of the existing level of state capacity (beyond macro-level issues that we discuss below). A common argument is that creating employment leads to an increase in the tax base (e.g. Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Yet, when the existing level of fiscal state capacity is low, the link between created employment and actual tax revenue will be weak or null, and hence also the overall effect. Second, the very implementation of an employment programme can be significantly more difficult when formal institutional, and specifically infrastructural, capability is moderate.

Finally, in conflict and post-conflict situations, the nature of the conflict and its legacies can also directly interact with the theories of change. First, an emerging micro-level literature documents how the exposure to conflict has a direct effect on some of the behavioural parameters at the heart of the theories of change, including perceptions and preferences. Second, this literature also suggests that conflict can affect the micro constraints governing behaviour (see: Blattman and Miguel, 2010 for a review of both of these concepts). As with state capacity, designing, implementing and evaluating in a conflict-affected context presents serious challenges (Brück et al., 2016; Bozzoli, Brück, and Wald, 2013).

2.3.4 CONFLICT ANALYSES AND THE THEORIES OF CHANGE

At the primary level, we argue that there is no specific hierarchy of the theories of change. Particularly given the lack of empirical evidence at the micro-level, it is impossible to say, in general terms at least, that one theory of change is more important than the others. This should not mask the critical role that context should play in determining which theories of change are the most promising to overcome conflict risk in a given situation. In mono-ethnic situations, for example, contact may be less important than it is in multi-ethnic places. Opportunity , too, could be less important in upper-middle income countries than it is in low income countries and so on. In this regard, it is imperative to ensure that the theories of change at play, which in turn link to programme design features, are grounded on a strong foundation. In turn, such a foundation should then provide a strong opportunity to design programmes around the theories of change most likely to overcome the problems and tensions that are present in that given situation.

One such way is to conduct a **conflict analysis**. Conflict analysis can be defined as the systematic study of the profile, causes, consequences, actors and dynamics of conflict, as well as the actors, conditions and processes promoting resilience and peace (AFPO et al, 2004; PBSO, 2013). Conflict analysis is an essential element of promoting **conflict sensitivity** – i.e. the effort to ensure that development interventions minimise their negative impact on the conflict dynamics ('do no harm') and maximise their positive impact on conflict prevention and peacebuilding (AFPO et al, 2004). See Box 2.X for an overview of the links between theories of change and conflict analyses in our case study countries.

Various tools and methodologies for conflict analysis have been developed by UN agencies (e.g. UNDP, 2003; World Bank, 2005), bilateral donors (e.g. DFID, 2002; SIDA, 2006) and various NGOs and think-tanks (e.g. APFO et al., 2004). These tools share a number of common characteristics:

- Situation analysis (including historical, political, economic, social, security, cultural, demographic and environmental context);
- Analysis of causes (i.e. identification of the root/ structural causes; intermediate/ proximate causes; and triggers);
- Stakeholder analysis (i.e. analysis of those engaged in or being affected by conflict, including their interests, goals, positions, capacities and relationships);

- conflict dynamics analysis (i.e. the resulting interaction between the conflict context, the causes and the actors, including potential scenarios, "connectors and dividers", drivers of change and sources for peacebuilding and resilience). (PBSO, 2013).[4]

Box 2.4: Conflict Analyses and Theories of Change: Examples from the Field

A well-defined conflict analysis is an important step in the development of any kind of peacebuilding programming. These analyses aim to provide systematic knowledge on the nature of a conflict, including understanding of the causes and consequences of the conflict and of the processes that can promote peace. The link between high quality conflict analyses and the *design* of programmes that can meet the various needs in FCS is intuitive and strong. It follows, also, that a careful conflict analysis should precede any *evaluation* of theories of change that are at play in the impacts of programmes impacts. Theories of change that are grounded in the conflict analysis of a given situation are therefore more likely to deliver a programme's goals than those that are not.[5]

In Lebanon, for example, a recent conflict analysis (Fabra-Mata et al., 2015) focuses on the impact of the Syrian crisis in the country and the risks this poses to peace. The report implies five main risks present in Lebanon: job shortages and other economic concerns; feelings of exclusion and marginalisation; strained public services; experiences in Lebanon of displaced Palestinians; and historical confessional-based issues, both within Lebanon and between Lebanon and Syria. Although the three latter issues are likely beyond the scope of programmes where employment is a primary focus, there are strong links to the first two. If this conflict analysis is valid, theories of change relating to increasing opportunity and reducing grievance should play a prominent role in the design of programmes in Lebanon.[6]

A similar analysis in Liberia (Unicef, 2015) suggests up to nine different potential drivers of conflict in the country. Again, like in Lebanon, a number of these (for example, cross-border vulnerabilities, the weak judicial system or weak governance) are likely to be beyond the scope of employment programmes. A number of others, including poverty and unemployment; ethnic tensions; and inadequate access to education, however, are well within the domain of labour-based, vocational training and SME support programmes. If this conflict analysis is valid, all three theories of change are applicable. Opportunity, for example, should alleviate concerns about joblessness, poverty and access to education, whilst grievance and contact could play important roles in alleviating ethnic tensions between groups.

A similar conflict analysis in Timor-Leste from 2009 (GIZ, 2009) even lists fifteen different potential sources of conflict. A couple of these are of immediate importance to employment programmes and related to low levels of human capital and capacity of political institutions. If this conflict analysis is valid, are relevant from a theoretical perspective in Timor-Leste: those based on opportunity and those based on grievances.

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4. *In recent years, tools have looked more at the process of undertaking a conflict analysis (e.g. GPPAC, 2015) as well as trying to integrate conflict analysis with other types of development analysis (e.g. UN Women, 2012).*

5. *It also follows, however, that variations in the quality of conflict analyses will differently influence the probability of success. Weak conflict analyses, for example, are unlikely to deliver applicable theories of change, which in turn is likely to affect the success of any programmes designed with those theories of change in mind.*

6. *Indeed, the mid-term evaluation of the Lebanon project #17 notes that the spillover effects from the Syria crisis are undermining efforts of the project to foster engagement between Palestinian refugees and Lebanese communities. (Moran, 2013: 10-11).*

2.3.5 MICRO- VS. MACRO-LEVEL CONSIDERATIONS

Although the focus of this discussion is on micro-level theories of change, the evidence that supports their constituent parts and the present knowledge gaps in the area, it is also important to consider the potential limitations of this approach. Chief amongst these is that some theories at the macro level may not be measurable through impacts on programme participants, when they have large-scale externalities as in the form of a covariate shock, e.g. affecting everyone in a country. Second, they may not have a meaningful effect when they are not large enough to affect meaningful change at the aggregate level. In non-academic terms, most programmatic interventions are likely to be too small to alter the macro level. An illustration is the previous example of Fearon and Laitin (2003), who argue that macro-level change is the result of interactions between the state and the tax base. In this theory, increased employment diversifies the tax base and allows taxpayers to demand better services from the incumbent government. Provision of these services increases trust in, or attitudes towards, the government, which reduces the likelihood of revolutionary conflict. The nature of this theory, however, relies on changes to the structure of the tax base on a scale that could not be realised even by the largest pro-employment interventions, as well as on top levels of fiscal capacity.

This implies in the first instance that, at the macro level, employment programmes do not necessarily link to all of the theories of change that run from employment to peace, but rather through changes in the incentives and performance of the government. In turn, this provides an important context for the discussion of results, particularly if no significant relationships are found between employment programmes and aggregate-scale indicators of peace. The first possibility is that the positive impact of the employment programme does not exist at all; the second, however, is, that the impact does exist but cannot be measured or understood via traditional impact evaluations at the aggregate level.

Against this background it is very important to consider the microfoundations of both employment interventions and peace. We build on the conceptual framework outlined by Justino et al. (2013) when considering the microfoundations of peace and pre-/violent behaviours threatening peace. We argue that without a proper narrative of the microfoundations of peace, designing, delivering and tracking successful employment interventions for peace is hard.

2.3.6 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR THE LINK BETWEEN EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMMES AND PEACE AT THE MICRO LEVEL

Empirically, it is evident that, in general, the externalities and downstream effects of employment programmes on peace-related outcomes have only rarely been evaluated explicitly and/or rigorously. The existence and relevance of the theories of change hence remain poorly understood, and only recently a few robust microstudies have carefully evaluated the effects of employment programmes on pre-/violent behaviour (e.g. Mercy Corps, 2015; Blattman, Fiala and Martinez, 2014). These are important first attempts, but much more robust empirical evidence is needed to assess the differential impacts of employment programmes and the extent to which they can deliver the peace outcomes anticipated by donors and policymakers (see also Holmes et al., 2013).[7]

7. *"There is a need to move away from an evaluation culture in relation to job creation, which focuses on output indicators such as the number of jobs created, to one which assesses (i) the distribution of employment in terms of targeting and incidence (who gets the jobs which are created) and (ii) outcomes, i.e. the impact of employment on poverty and peacebuilding at micro-, meso- and macro-levels." (p.iv).*

2.3.7 THE EXISTENCE OF JOB CHANNELS

As noted above, the precondition for employment-based effects on peace to exist is that the employment programme successfully impacts the employment status of its participants. Blattman and Ralston (2015) review the existing evidence and lament that despite enormous investments in employment programmes, systematic evaluations of their impact on employment and sustainability is often lacking, and call this "an incredible state of affairs that demands new priorities, new strategies, and new research (p. 38)." This is thus an urgent parallel agenda, where academic and policy communities need to collaborate better, as its benefits for the design of employment-for-peace programmes loom large.

2.3.8 ASSESSING IMPACT

As the use of employment programmes in post-conflict and fragile settings is now an established practice, a natural question to ask is: do they work? There are several challenges in answering this question – primarily, a lack of shared understanding of what it means for an intervention to 'work'.

To guide our analysis, we identify six levels of impact (see Table 2.1 for a summary):

1. **Employment impact on programme participants.** This is the most immediate level of impact, and in many ways the most straightforward to assess. Are participants better off as a result of the programme, in terms of their employment conditions and prospects? Most evaluations, if they took place, worked on this level of impact only.
2. **Employment impact beyond programme participants.** This looks at whether the impact is limited to programme participants, or is broader than that. Does the intervention result in a net employment impact? This requires looking at the possibility of positive and negative interactions between participants and the rest of the population, e.g. deadweight loss effects, substitution effects, or displacement effects.[1] Does the intervention lead to systemic changes in the way in which the economy operates?
3. **Peacebuilding impact on programme participants as a result of employment impact (job channel).** This is conditional on having a positive impact in level 1 above, but not a necessary consequence of level 1. Does the positive impact on programme participants make participants less likely to be involved in violence? The baseline here is, of course, how likely they were to be involved in violence in the first place. This level of impact is what, at first sight, this study is all about. Yet there are further levels of peacebuilding impacts, which are relevant as well.
4. **Peacebuilding impact beyond programme participants as a result of employment impact (job channel).** This can be conditional on level 1 and/or 2, but not a necessary consequence of either. Does the positive employment impact on participants and/or society result in a more peaceful society? Answering this question also requires looking at potential negative impacts of the intervention.
5. **Peacebuilding impact on programme participants as a result of participation in the programme (programme channel).** This involves assessing if participation in the programme itself, as opposed to employment gains, can have resulted in a peacebuilding impact. This can happen, for example, if individuals belonging to opposite factions have an opportunity to meet each other and build mutual trust (contact transfer mechanism) in the context of trainings or internships (a positive impact that could be sustained, in principle, even if these trainings or internships do not result in any actual employment impact).
6. **Peacebuilding impact beyond programme participants as a result of the existence of the programme (programme channel).** This can be a spillover effect from level 5 (peacebuilding impact on programme

1. *Deadweight loss effects happen when results are not different from what would have happened in the absence of the programme. Substitution effects occur when workers hired in a subsidised job are simply substituting for others who would otherwise have been hired. Displacement effects refer to a situation where a firm with subsidised workers increases outputs, but decreases outputs of firms who do not have subsidised workers.*

participants extends to their families and communities), but, in principle, could also be an independent impact. For example, the mere existence of the programme (independently of any actual employment impact) could mitigate a community's grievances and reinforce its trust in the state.

Each level of impact can be assessed in the short and long term. Positive short-term impact is not necessarily sustained in the long term, and can possibly be reversed.

Table 2.1

	On programme participants	**Beyond programme participants**
Employment impact	Are participants better off as a result of the programme, in terms of their employment conditions and prospects?	Does the programme result in a positive impact on the employment situation in general?
Peacebuilding impact as a result of employment impact ('job channel')	Does their enhanced employment status make participants more peaceful?	Does the positive employment impact on participants and/or society result in a more peaceful society?
Peacebuilding impact as a result of participation in the employment components programme ('programme channel')	Does participation in the programme make participants more peaceful?	Does the existence of the programme result in a more peaceful society?

As will be discussed in more depth in Section 3.3, these levels of impact are important both at the design stage (when the expected impact is envisioned) and the evaluation stage (when the actual impact is assessed). As such, they should be integrated in both implementation and monitoring.

It is important to stress that each of these levels of impact can be intended or unintended. It is possible, for example, for employment-only interventions to have an unintended impact on peacebuilding, even though they did not set out to do so. Likewise, impact is not necessarily only positive or neutral, as it is conceivable that the programme may have a negative impact at each of these levels. Many combinations are possible. For example, a programme may have an intended positive impact on one dimension (e.g. improving the employment conditions of participants) while having an unintended negative impact on another (e.g. reinforcing perceptions of marginalisation in non-targeted groups).

In order to make a claim of positive impact, one should also be able to claim, with reasonable confidence, that the programme did not create negative effects that would offset or outweigh any positive effect. This could happen, for example, if the programme created unrealistic hopes for the future that would end up leaving participants disappointed. Or, as another example, it could happen if non-selected young people were to see the selection process as rigged or unjust, and their grievances were therefore to increase as a result of the programme.

BOX 2.5: Impact on employment vs. impact on peacebuilding – a hypothetical 'best case scenario'

Let us assume that a programme aims to contribute to peace through the creation of jobs for youth. Let us assume that it has a target of getting 1,000 young people employed (out of a total youth population of 1,000,000 for the country).

Let us further assume that this programme is a success from the point of view of achieving its objective. 1,000 people are actually trained and enter the job market in decent, well-paid, sustainable jobs. Let us even assume that it can be demonstrated that the positive impact on beneficiaries is a direct result of the programme (through a control group or other type of counterfactual[2]), and that follow-up monitoring (six months/one year after the end of the funding) shows that the positive impact is maintained. The 1,000 young people are still in good jobs, and they are still significantly better off than the overall youth population.

From the point of view of employment impact, this hypothetical programme is a best-case scenario. Can we claim that this had a positive impact on peacebuilding?

Even in this case, the answer is not straightforward. In principle, there are several ways in which the programme may have had such a positive peacebuilding impact. Most obviously, the programme may have diminished the pool of potential recruits for violence by 1,000. It is important, here, to know whether the assumption of the programme is that (a) any young person is a potential recruit for violence, or that (b) there is a minority of young people that, in certain circumstances, may be particularly at risk of violent recruitment. In the former case, one could argue that detracting such a small percentage from the overall pool of potential recruits is ultimately irrelevant. Even if all the programme beneficiaries are discouraged from getting involved in violence, other 999,000 are still at risk. Unless the programme can scale up to achieve a critical mass, its impact will be negligible.

If, however, the underpinning assumption is that there is a subset of young people who is particularly at risk of being recruited, then the success of the intervention will hinge on the ability to identify and reach out to exactly those young people 'at risk'. It will then be important to have criteria and systems for the identification of beneficiaries that allow the programme to reach that potentially violent subset. Given the small number of beneficiaries, it is highly unlikely that this would occur by chance.

Another way in which the programme may have decreased violence is by catalytic effects that go beyond programme participants. In practical terms, it may be that, while the direct job channel effects are limited to direct participants, there are indirect spillover effects on society at large. However, what these expected effects are, and how they are supposed to come about, should be made explicit in programme design, so that it can be monitored and evaluated.

2.3.9 'DO NO HARM' AND NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES

There is now growing awareness among policymakers and academic communities that employment-for-peace interventions may have unintended negative impacts due to programme design and implementation, including risks of favouritism, clientelism and elite capture (Sommers, 2015). As an example, a recent policy report from Nigeria laments "flawed outreach and beneficiary selection processes that are seen to leave opportunities open to manipulation by officials according to political, ethnic or religious affiliations. Such quality challenges directly reduce the contribution of many programs to reducing conflict, and may even cause them to indirectly exacerbate tensions" (International Alert, 2014b).

2. *A counterfactual is defined as 'a comparison between what actually happened and what would have happened in the absence of the intervention' (White 2006: 3).*

However, negative externalities may occur even when selection and implementation is well designed, managed and communicated, and/or positive impacts occur. As an example, Cilliers, Dube, and Siddiqi (2016) find that a reconciliation programme in Sierra Leone successfully strengthened social relationships, yet at the expense of individuals' psychological well-being.

2.3.10 THE ROLE OF THE CONTEXT

Last but certainly not least, the review illustrates the central importance of the context to designing programmes and testing their impact on peace. The context shapes the beliefs and priorities of the targeted population, affects the constraints faced in terms of programme implementation and evaluation and prescribes the specific threats to peace that are to be reduced as well as the role of individuals therein. A deep understanding of the context is therefore required to design new, efficient and successful employment programmes, and to be able to identify and disentangle their positive effects on peace. Specifically, this can, to a certain extent, help reduce risks of unintended negative externalities, which may occur in these contexts even when positive social effects are realised. For pro-peace employment programmes in particular, the returns to a thorough understanding of the political economy of job creation and job disruption in a given fragile environment are potentially very high (e.g. Sommers, 2015).

2.3.11 OVERLAPS IN THE THEORIES OF CHANGE

Although we have siloed off each theory of change for this research, we accept that this may not reflect the physical reality of the world in which programmes are run. Although each of these theories has unique aspects, as we show in Figure 2-2, there are places where the transfer mechanisms of these theories are likely to merge. Thus, whilst it is useful to portion off the theories for discussion and expositional ease, it is also important to note that multiple theories of change could be at play in a single programme, either through the design of that programme or because the transfer mechanism itself belongs to multiple theories of change. In this regard, there are two main areas in which the theories of change merge:

1. The opportunity-grievance overlap
2. The grievance-contact overlap

Based on our research, the connection between the opportunity and contact transfer mechanisms appears to be less relevant.

The opportunity-grievance overlap can occur if there is a tolerable 'threshold' of inequality. In this setting, individuals will only engage in grievance-based pre-/violent behaviours if inequality is too great. The other side of this coin, however, is that the tolerable level of inequality could be related to opportunity. In practical terms, the more opportunities individuals have, the greater (or indeed, less) inequality they may be willing to tolerate. It therefore follows that some programmes that seek to raise absolute opportunity may also help to alleviate grievances by shifting the perceptions of individuals about the extent of inequality, or their willingness to tolerate it.

The grievance-contact overlap occurs when contact between groups can help to breakdown grievances stemming from perceived inequalities. The most obvious example of this occurs when perceptions of inequality are out of kilter with actual levels of inequality between two groups. Contact between the groups, therefore, provides the opportunity to rectify biased perceptions of inequality as the two groups may realise that their own circumstances are not significantly different from those of the other group. In turn, by facilitating an opportunity to re-evaluate the true extent of inequalities, contact-based programmes can also help to alleviate grievances. It follows, therefore, that there may not be a perfect set of metrics that can be used to identify the effects of each theory of change. Rather, some indicators could well measure all of the theories of change. It

is therefore important to consider the different steps within each theory of change, as well as the anticipated outcomes, when designing future M&E.



Figure 2-2 - Drivers of Adverse Behaviour at the Micro Level

2.4 EVIDENCE FOR THE THEORIES OF CHANGE FROM THE REVIEW OF INTERVENTIONS

We reviewed our 'shortlist' of 33 interventions (see section 3.3) with a view to determining whether they included any theory of change, based on the three transfer mechanisms identified in the literature review above, and/or any other (alternative or additional) transfer. In our sample, 14 interventions identify a peacebuilding focus. In practical terms, these are interventions that, by design, are meant to contribute to peacebuilding. For nine of these, we could identify a theory of change, although not always clearly and explicitly articulated.3 For the other four, we could not identify (on the basis of the available documentation) a theory of change underpinning the intervention. Similarly, while several of the reviewed interventions included some degree of situational analysis, none included the systematic analysis of causes, stakeholders, and conflict dynamics that satisfy our definition of a conflict analysis.

3. *It should be noted that other interventions (i.e. programmes in Sudan, South Sudan, and Kosovo) do include a well-articulated theory of change, but this theory of change refers to the impact of the programme on employment, rather than on peacebuilding. Therefore, those are not included in the analysis of this section.*

The theories of change that are present in the programme documentation map to the three transfer mechanisms 'opportunity', 'grievance', and 'contact' identified in Section 2.2. As shown in Table 2.2: Theories of change in reviewed interventions below, the three transfer mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. Similarly, it is also likely that there are points of overlap between the three theories, meaning that one programme theory of change could link to more than one transfer mechanism defined in Section 2.2.

Table 2.2: Theories of change in reviewed interventions

Country	Intervention #	Opportunity	Grievance	Contact
Comoros	#5	✓	✓	
DRC	#7	✓		
DRC	#8	✓		✓
Guinea	#9	✓	✓	
Guinea	#10	✓		
Guinea-Bissau	#11		✓	
Lebanon	#17	✓		✓
Nepal	#22	✓		✓
Timor-Leste	#30		✓	

The theories of change are generally articulated in very generic terms, without giving details on what the evidence is, in that specific context, that a certain factor (e.g. unemployment of women and youth) leads to violence, and therefore how tackling this issue may help build peace. For example, the programme document for intervention #10 in Guinea simply states that:

> *Not having access to employment and revenues and not having the means to realise their aspirations, youth and women [...] are lured by opinion leaders for purposes of committing violence.* (United Nations PBSO/PBF, 2013: 6)[4]

The theory of change is elaborated as follows:

> *If the immediate results of the PBF project are evidenced by employment opportunities for youth and women at risk of conflict, and their equitable access to economic resources is improved, then the risks of their instrumental use for socio-economic aim will be reduced.* (United Nations PBSO/PBF, 2013: 6)[5]

Interestingly, interventions #9 in Guinea and #11 in Guinea-Bissau have a similar focus (short-term job creation in the run-up to elections) and similar target groups (women and youth), but differ in terms of their rationale and expected transfer mechanisms of change. The Guinea programme is based on the underlying assumption that poverty and lack of income put women and youth at risk of being manipulated and recruited for violent means, particularly in the fragile pre-electoral period – thus falls squarely within the opportunity transfer mechanism. The intervention in Guinea-Bissau, instead, is based primarily on the grievance transfer mechanism. While it does refer to 'opportunities', the programme document emphasises the lack of trust in the state, and the fact that youth and women are the ones less likely to have access to patronage networks. The intervention aims at creating a peace dividend, rebuilding confidence in the state and the value of citizenship and civic engagement, and restoring hope (United Nations PBSO/PBF, 2013).

4. *Authors' own translation.*

5. *Authors' own translation.*

One significant aspect is the emphasis on the interventions' 'catalytic' or 'multiplier' effects (as shown by the example of Guinea-Bissau below).[6] In practical terms, the design of the interventions is based on the idea that the impact will not be limited to participants, but will somehow put in motion a virtuous process leading to positive macro-level change. The way in which this multiplier effect is intended to happen is by 'signaling' to communities and society at large (beyond direct beneficiaries) that change is possible, that there are reasons for hope, and, in post-conflict contexts in particular, that peace dividends are forthcoming.

2.4.1 PROGRAMME EXAMPLE: GUINEA-BISSAU

1. The pilot programme 'Labor-intensive employment for youth and women in the lead-up to and immediate post-electoral period in Guinea-Bissau' (#11) was financed by the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund for a total of US$1,885,120 and implemented by UNDP in the period 2013-2014. It provided short-term opportunities for youth and women in the lead-up to and immediate aftermath of the elections, through rehabilitation of high-visibility socio-economic infrastructures (including slaughterhouses, water drainage systems, and an agro-pastoral center). The rehabilitation used labour-intensive approaches was to provide a total of 528 jobs for 4-9 months.

The peacebuilding objective of this intervention is summed up in the programme document as "a pilot initiative to demonstrate the potential peace dividends of stability [...] thus contributing to gradually (re)building public confidence in the social contract between the state and its citizens" (United Nations PBSO/PBF, 2013: 5).

The theory of change, which can be linked to the **grievance** transfer mechanism, is expressed as follows:

> *[i]f at-risk groups like youth and women have immediate access to income opportunities that they perceive as first-hand peace dividends allowing them to cover the basic needs of their families as well [as] the needs of community households on a larger scale, then their confidence in the state will be enhanced, providing a foundation for stronger civic engagement.* (United Nations PBSO/PBF, 2013: 7)

While only a small number of people were to be directly involved, the high visibility of the interventions was meant to have a catalytic effect and expand its peacebuilding benefits beyond direct participants. Thus, while the intervention directly created opportunities for the beneficiaries, the main peacebuilding impact was supposed to operate through the signaling of the programme to the larger population.

2.4.2 PROGRAMME EXAMPLE: LEBANON

The programme 'Empowerment of youth at risk through job creation programme in areas of tensions' (#17), funded through the PBF's Immediate Response Facility for a total of US$2,002,719, was implemented jointly by ILO, UNICEF and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) from 2011 to 2013. It focused specifically on job creation and empowerment of Palestinian youth in Lebanon, to overcome "persistent and pervasive unemployment that pose [sic] an ominous threat to the stability of Lebanon" (MPTF, 2011).

The programme was built on the premise that "the Palestinian camps [in Lebanon] have been identified as areas suffering from chronic instability, with a potential for further deterioration" (United Nations PBF, 2011: 4). The theory of change elaborated in the document is twofold:

1. **Opportunity.** The programme document states that "if young people are left with no alternatives but unemployment and poverty, they are increasingly likely to join an armed group as an alternative way of generating income. [...] Palestine refugees are clearly at risk of political enrollment". (United Nations PBF, 2011: 4-5).

6. *For a discussion of the meaning of 'catalytic effect' for interventions funded by the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, see Scharbatke-Church et al. (2010).*

2. **Contact.** The programme aims to reinforce positive interaction and create common ground between Palestinian and Lebanese communities. A strategic tenet of the programme is expressed as "Employment generation as a way to build trust between the Palestinian and Lebanese communities and consolidate peace" (Zakkar, 2013: 20). As stated in the programme document, "[p]lacement and referral of Palestinian job seekers to training [...] and employment can prove to be a useful tool to build trust between the Lebanese and Palestinian communities. [...] The project will favor an increased interaction between the two communities enabling them to identify common grounds and understand each other's perspectives. Ultimately, it will contribute to reduce the existing animosities between the two groups" (United Nations PBF, 2011: 4)

2.4.3 PROGRAMME EXAMPLE: NEPAL

The Jobs for Peace (J4P) programme for youth employment (#22) was funded by the United Nations Peace Fund for Nepal (UNPFN) for a total of US$ 2,656,000, and implemented by ILO and FAO from 2009 to 2011. The Ministry for Peace and Reconstruction was the focal ministry for implementation. The programme had the overall target of creating 12,500 jobs for young men and women in the two Tarai districts of Parsa and Rautahat. The programme used an integrated approach combining the development of community infrastructure, training-cum-production, entrepreneurship development, access to finance and strengthening of cooperatives as well as two trust funds for youth-led initiatives on youth employment and youth empowerment.

The stated aim was to contribute to national peacebuilding and poverty reduction through youth employment and empowerment in conflict-affected areas. The programme recognised that, even though the active conflict for the country as a whole ended in 2008, localised pockets of tensions had continued and new forms of conflict had started to emerge. In response to this, the project tried to enhance youth access to resources and skills and to create opportunities for productive and decent employment.

The main theory of change underpinning the programme can be linked to the opportunity transfer mechanism. It is summarised as follows in the final report:

> *Unemployed youths who were dependent on their guardians to meet their expenses had lost peace of mind because they had to ask for money from others even though they were themselves grown up and capable to work. The repeated asking of money from the parents created conflicts within the family. Some youths had to discontinue their studies because of the very poor economic conditions of the family. This was also a source of mental tension and conflicts within the family. Many youths were vulnerable to manipulation by vested interest groups and they were easily attracted to take sides in new political and ethnic conflicts even for very nominal amount of monetary benefits.* (UNPFN, 2011: 13)

The programme also aimed to encourage the peaceful gathering of young people through business development and youth-led programmes for youth empowerment. This objective can be linked to the **contact** transfer mechanism, although in this case the focus is not on linking two distinct groups, but rather on facilitating contacts among individuals, thus reinforcing social cohesion.

2.5 EVIDENCE FOR THE THEORIES OF CHANGE FROM THE CASE STUDIES

2.5.1 LEBANON

The field visit to Lebanon took place under a very specific threat to peace, an unprecedentedly nominal and proportional inflow of refugees displaced by the Syrian Crisis. As a result, a vast majority of current programming in Lebanon is designed to meet the needs associated with this situation. Given that status quo, the theories of change prevalent in Lebanon are designed to meet two specific needs: to provide jobs and livelihoods in a tense environment and to increase social cohesion, both within the Lebanese community and between the Lebanese and Syrian communities. Through our interviews, two transfer mechanisms were therefore dominant: opportunity and contact. Through the opportunity transfer mechanism, providing jobs (or access to employment and/or skills and employment/skills programmes) renders direct relief from the threats perceived by the Lebanese people, regarding jobs and wages, stemming from the inflow of Syrians. We are careful to use 'perceived' as a component of our terminology, as there is a long history of Syrians working within the Lebanese economy in large numbers (Chalcraft, 2006; Chalcraft, 2009). This theory builds on the general pressure experienced by Lebanese systems. Initially, perceptions surveys suggested the biggest concerns of the Lebanese – and the greatest sources of tensions – were pressure on infrastructure systems. In particular, these tensions related to water rights, sanitation, hard waste and so on.

As a response to these heightened concerns, an initial wave of programming from all of the agencies we spoke to focused on delivering new and improved infrastructure to all affected communities, both Lebanese and Syrian. As a result of the success of these infrastructure-building programmes, tensions were reduced as people had better access to water, sanitation, etc. However, in more recent waves of the perceptions survey, new sources of tension, particularly related to jobs, emerged (Ashrabati and Nammour, 2015). This process is exacerbated by the high levels of poverty among many in the Lebanese host community, particularly in the north of the country close to the Syrian border. In these regions, normal economic activity, much of which relied on labour, services and products from the other side of the border, was disrupted in multiple dimensions. Accordingly, the new wave of programming was designed to improve the economic conditions of both the Lebanese and Syrian populations, which, in turn, should provide direct relief from this source of tension between the communities. In practical terms, as (lack of) jobs were seen as a key driver of tensions between communities, provision of employment and livelihood opportunities should directly reduce such tensions.

In the contact transfer mechanism, again both the programme and job channels are relevant. The basis of this hypothesis is that communities are forced to interact with each other in a productive environment. In turn, this builds trust and cooperation between people of different nationalities, which breaks down barriers and the tensions associated with those barriers. In this regard, many programmes are specifically designed with this process in mind, e.g. conducting training in multi-nationality and multi-ethnic groups or placing Syrian interns with Lebanese entrepreneurs to develop workplace skills.

The logic of the first transfer mechanism is solid and is reflected in a rather specific current need in Lebanon. The second relies on two sets of strong assumptions: first, that working or training in the same place leads to interaction between Syrians and Lebanese; and second that such interactions are positive and contribute to breaking down barriers. Prima facie and ex ante, it is plausible that such interactions may not be universally positive, or could actually be negative for at least some of the individuals involved (See Box 2.6). More so, it also opens a question as to whether or not employment or training programmes are the optimal, or indeed only, way to ensure contact between communities. Here, notwithstanding the risks highlighted above, we conclude that employment programmes are certainly a good way of ensuring contact for two main reasons: incentives and quality of interaction. The latter of these is relatively self-explanatory – in workplace-style environments, there is often a certain reliance between work roles that, in turn, explicitly builds trust between groups. Such

trust building exercises may be difficult to replicate in other scenarios. The former, however, is also important – without personal gain, individuals showed little desire to engage in other cross-community organisations that were made available to them.

BOX 2.6

> *There were some Syrians in our group but we didn't interact with them. We kept to ourselves and they kept to themselves.* – Lebanese Female Participant in Catering Vocational Training Programme, North Lebanon

> *Facebook has made staying in contact with the Palestinians in our group easy but we've also visited them in their camps. I'd never met a Palestinian before the programme.* – Lebanese Male Participant in Agricultural Vocational Training Programme, South Lebanon

2.5.2 LIBERIA

The context of Liberia, with significant youth disenfranchisement and very low socio-economic opportunities for young people, lends itself to two major sources of tensions. The first is opportunity-based tension - in short, the common perception is that it is very easy to incentivise Liberian youth to engage in pre-/violent behaviour, as other sources of income, or potential sources of income, are so scant. The provision, therefore, of employment - or of the potential employment associated with the training, internships and skills offered by many programmes and the labour-intensive work that provide income for participants during the programme - makes it more expensive, and certainly more difficult, for elites to incentivise programme participants into engaging in pre-/violent behaviour. In turn, programmes are deemed likely to have both direct and indirect effects on peacebuilding, with income-deriving features an inherent part of many interventions.

The second transfer mechanism relates to the grievances this lack of opportunity creates between young people and formal institutions, particularly focused towards the government and other aspects of state apparatus. For the purposes of this section, we define 'government' broadly, rather than simply the incumbent government, as many young people perceive the issue to be systemic, rather than related to a single government body or institution. In turn, these tensions are perceived to lead to faltering trust between youth and the government and weak buy-in from youth into the societies in which they live. This lack of trust, weakened social cohesion and weakened social capital are, in turn, deemed a threat to peace. Programmes can help to bridge these gaps by providing youth with better opportunities, or at least the perception that opportunities will come their way. This, in turn, helps youth both to buy into the communities in which they live and, especially when government involvement in programmes is visible, to increase trust between youth and the state. In many cases, this is perceived to be a direct effect of the programme, that the programmes themselves act as a signal - to both participants and non-participants - that state performance is improving. In turn, this improves buy-in from youth into the societies in which they live and into the formal institutions of the country, whereby reducing potential conflicts.

The logic of the first main transfer mechanism is sound and chimes neatly with findings in Lebanon. If a lack of opportunity is a source of tension, or at least a source of potential pre-/violent behaviour, then provision of current opportunity through programme involvement (and future opportunity through the skills or jobs associated with the programme) should play a role in reducing these tensions. Whether youth can be so easily incentivised to engage in pre-/violent behaviour in the first place, however, and whether they are actually targeted in such a way, is more questionable. Although accepting that our interviews are not representative at even the programme level, let alone regional or national levels, we must be clear that none of our interviewees

who were asked had ever been incentivised to engage in pre-/violent behaviour. Indeed, none had ever been approached to do so, nor knew of anyone who had been (See BOX 2.7)

The strength of the logic of the second transfer mechanism is, in principle, also sound, but is also likely to be underspecified. Most of the youth in Liberia are not unemployed in a traditional sense. Rather, the source of tensions is a lack of access to particular kinds of white collar jobs, with many forms of employment not actually perceived as 'jobs' (e.g. World Bank, 2013). (See BOX 2.8) It is therefore plausible that programmes that do not seek to address these concerns or that are not demand-led may fail to provide the kinds of jobs that will actually increase the buy-in of young people into the societies in which they live. In turn, this theory of change then relies on the strong assumption that income, or potential income, rather than the type of job, can lead to increased buy-in, improved trust and reduced tension. As a result, a failure to provide the correct kinds of jobs may fail to develop the peacebuilding impacts hoped for. At worst, such a failure may actually reinforce the underlying lack of trust, social capital and social cohesion that is deemed a threat.

BOX 2.7

"If I wasn't here today, I might be out there with George Weah dancing in the street and stopping traffic."

"Have you ever been incentivised to do something like that before?"

"No."

"What about people you know? Friends?"

"Never." – Conversation between a researcher and a woman in a vocational business skills training programme in Monrovia.

BOX 2.8

"The police stop us all the time. It's not a real job. I want a real job. One where I get to wear a shirt like yours and drive around in a car like that." – Impromptu conversation between a motorcycle taxi driver and a researcher in Monrovia.

2.5.3 TIMOR-LESTE

The study of post-conflict Timor-Leste is highly relevant for understanding when and how former combatants may mobilise against the state, how unemployed youth may be mobilised against the state, and if and how employment-for-peace programming can help reduce such risks.

Numerous assessments, for example by the g7+ (2016), find that Timor-Leste has now credibly recovered from a crisis of internal violence and political instability, which occurred in 2006 when military elites organised urban unrest and violence that was joined by youth. Largely peaceful democratic elections were held in 2012 and, notably, the g7+ now rates security in Timor-Leste as only one stage away from 'resilience' status. Yet, legal and economic institutions are still considered fragile, just one stage above 'crisis' status (g7+, 2016).

Timor-Leste's domestic economy is characterised by a weak private sector and a high dependence on imports and oil revenues. The government continues to attract large-scale private sector investment by international companies. Yet, such investments are often accompanied by an influx of foreign workers, reducing their linkages with and their impact on the local labour market and economy. Rising oil production and high oil prices after independence initially contributed to strong economic growth, but corruption, patronage and public-sector mismanagement remain important issues, and poverty and wealth inequality remain high.

Middle-income status was achieved in 2011, but in 2016 49.9% of the population still lived below the national poverty line.

Timor-Leste has one of the youngest populations in the world with about 21% aged 15-24, which is comparable to shares in countries as Yemen, Ethiopia and Pakistan. An estimated 15,000-20,000 young people enter the labour market each year, but struggle to secure employment, leaving around 25% of youth (officially) unemployed (LFS 2013). While most young people, especially in urban areas, receive basic and some also higher education, the quality of education is a central theme interview partners lamented. Improving labour market opportunities for youth is recognized as a policy priority (NYP 2007; NYEAP 2009; DWCP 2008) and institutional capacity is being strengthened to deliver (better) programmes to youth, as in the form of the 'Secretary of State for Vocational Training and Employment Policy' (SEPFOPE) and the 'National Labour Force Development Institute' (INDMO). A relatively recent but often mentioned youth-policy scheme involves international cooperations enabling youth to work, study or train abroad. Main partners include the EU, primarily Portugal and Ireland, Australia and South Korea. Much has been achieved, progress is promising and domestically the government receives strong support from agencies as the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Yet, due to the costs involved, the share of the young population benefitting from this strategy will remain low.

A unique and popular form of social organisations by young people are so-called 'martial arts groups'. These resemble large gang-like structures and are a cultural residual of Indonesian rule. While attitudes toward these groups are highly diverse, there is broad agreement that the martial arts groups occasionally engage in inter-gang violence or other rituals, but that they do not have political ideologies, mobilise against the state, control neighbourhoods or engage in organised crime systematically.

Some of Timor-Leste's social protection schemes are very generous, as compared to other developing countries. Following the 2006 political crisis, a direct unconditional cash payment programme commenced, with the largest amount going to veterans of the resistance and their survivors, which, as noted by many of our interview partners, created economic incentives to register as a veteran. Between 2008 and 2012, 37,707 people received some form of veterans' pension or payment. During the 2012 election campaign, it was announced that pensions would be paid to an additional 27,000 veterans. Pensions range from US$276 to US$750 per month.

In the wake of the 2006 crisis, building peace, security and the nation were (still) top priorities for the government. Yet, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) completed its mandate in 2012. Recently, the focus has slightly shifted to sustainable, long-run development. The government's 'Strategic Development Plan' (SDP) for the 2011-2030 period is built around four pillars:

1. Social capital, including health, education and social inclusion;
2. Infrastructure, including transportation, telecommunication, power, and water supply/sanitation;
3. Economic development, which targets three sectors for development – agriculture, tourism and petrochemicals; and
4. Capacity and effectiveness of state institutions.

In practice, the agencies' programming is now putting a lot of emphasis on the physical infrastructure and private sector development to diversify the economy, with objectives of building sustainable development and jobs in the long term.

To summarise in non-academic terms, while the 2006 crisis was resolved relatively quickly and violence has been largely absent since, the social groups associated with instability are still clearly defined. First, veterans are considered a 'high-risk' group. Veterans' role in society and their influence in politics was frequently alluded

to in conversations as some of the old military elites are still occupying influential positions in politics. They are thus widely considered to have the influence and the ability to instigate unrest pro-actively. Second, unemployed (predominantly male) youth, especially in urban areas, are considered an 'at-risk' group, which might be mobilised for behaviour threatening peace as in the 2006 crisis. Given the country's context and background, two sets of theories of change, linking employment programmes to peace, are relevant from a theoretical perspective in Timor-Leste: those based on 'opportunity' and those based on 'grievance'.

BOX 2.9: Aggregate Labour Market Indicators and Conflict

A common stylized fact of conflict research is that unemployed male urban youth are a key risk factor for the outbreak of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). With this argument in mind, many employment programmes in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS) claim that they will have an important peacebuilding impact as well. What, however, if this stylized fact were not true? Are young unemployed urban men really drivers of conflict? A look at some descriptive cross-country statistics paints an interesting and at times surprising picture.

Studying recent cross-country labour market indicators, we do find that some at-risk groups in FCS are indeed more common than in non-FCS (Table 2-3). FCS have younger populations, with an average share of population between the ages 15 to 29 that is three percentage points higher than that of non-FCS. FCS also have, on average, higher shares of male population than non-FCS, by about two to three percentage points.

However, the population of FCS is much less urban than that of non-FCS, by more than twenty percentage points (although the urban population in FCS has been growing faster than that of non-FCS). Compared to other states, FCS seem to have higher employment-to-population ratios and slightly smaller unemployment rates. FCS show, on average, an employment ratio that is almost two percentage points above that of non-FCS in 2014. This seems to be a persistent difference, as that difference was slightly above two percentage points in 2005. Similarly, FCS have an average overall unemployment rate that is below that of non-FCS, by around one percentage point, in both 2005 and 2014.

Furthermore, labour market participation rates of at-risk groups in FCS do not seem to be worse than in non-FCS. For instance, male unemployment rates average, persistently, around one percentage point below that of non-FCS, and both young and young male unemployment rates for FCS average persistently around three to four percentage points below those in non-FCS.

The existence of a large population of young, unemployed urban males might not originate conflict per se, but this should not let us rule out the hypothesis that improving unemployment conditions in countries that are already FCS might help them resolve existing conflicts. Using the proportion of registered battle deaths as a measure of conflict, we find that FCS where unemployment rates increased from 2005 to 2014 are more violent in 2014 than FCS where unemployment rates decreased from 2005 to 2014. This is valid for the overall rate of unemployment, as well as for the male, young or young male unemployment rates (Table 2-4). This could indicate some potential for unemployment to decrease episodes of extreme violence.

Although differences in country averages do not allow us to draw robust conclusions about the relationship between employment and peacebuilding, this first look at the data suggests that more may be at play than merely keeping young, urban males out of unemployment, if one wishes to prevent violent conflict in fragile and conflict-affected countries.

Table 2-3: Key Labour Market Indicators, 2005-2014

		FCS countries		Non-FCS countries		Difference to Non-FCS countries	p – value for Difference
	Year	average	N	average	N		
Employment to population ratio, 15+, total (%)	2005	59.67	40	57.54	135	2.12	0.317
	2014	60.23	40	58.39	135	1.84	0.392
Employment to population ratio, 15+, male (%)	2005	71.81	40	68.27	135	3.54	0.050
	2014	72.09	40	68.13	135	3.96	0.034
Employment to population ratio, ages 15-24, total (%)	2005	42.79	40	39.66	135	3.13	0.243
	2014	42.02	40	38.35	135	3.67	0.180
Employment to population ratio, ages 15-24, male (%)	2005	49.51	40	45.42	135	4.09	0.122
	2014	48.30	40	43.35	135	4.95	0.071
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force)	2005	8.02	40	9.03	135	-1.01	0.382
	2014	7.74	40	8.85	135	-1.11	0.316
Unemployment, male (% of male labor force)	2005	7.20	40	8.12	135	-0.91	0.383
	2014	6.89	40	8.16	135	-1.28	0.217
Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24)	2005	15.07	40	18.23	135	-3.17	0.129
	2014	15.51	40	19.11	135	-3.60	0.111
Unemployment, youth male (% of male labor force ages 15-24)	2005	13.53	40	16.88	135	-3.35	0.079
	2014	13.76	40	18.01	135	-4.24	0.046
Population growth (annual %)	2005	2.04	46	1.36	173	0.68	0.014
	2014	1.93	45	1.12	173	0.81	0.000
Population between 15-29 (% of total)	2005	27.99	42	25.39	153	2.60	0.000
	2014	27.58	42	24.31	153	3.27	0.000
Male population between 15-29 (% of total)	2005	28.13	42	25.83	153	2.29	0.000
	2014	27.77	42	24.86	153	2.91	0.000
Urban population (% of total)	2005	38.25	45	61.15	172	-22.90	0.000
	2014	42.20	44	63.40	172	-21.19	0.000
Urban population growth (annual %)	2005	3.25	45	1.87	172	1.38	0.000
	2014	3.10	44	1.58	172	1.52	0.000
GDP growth (annual %)	2005	4.96	43	5.21	157	-0.25	0.718
	2014	2.83	42	3.23	145	-0.39	0.506
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	2005	2.86	43	3.80	157	-0.94	0.179
	2014	0.88	42	1.97	145	-1.08	0.051
Existence of Battle-related deaths	2005	0.33	46	0.06	173	0.26	0.000
	2014	0.37	46	0.06	173	0.31	0.000
ODA as % of Recipient GNI (Current Prices)	2005	15.04	42	5.22	93	9.82	0.000
	2014	9.41	38	3.46	80	5.95	0.000

Note: unemployment rates and employment ratios are modelled ILO estimates

Sources: World Bank WBI, OECD OECD.Stat

Table 2-4: Unemployment and Conflict

	Proportion of countries with battle deaths in 2014 (FCS where unemployment **increased** from 2005 to 2014)	N	Proportion of countries with battle deaths in 2014 (FCS where unemployment **decreased** from 2005 to 2014)	N	Difference in proportions	p – value for difference
Unemployment, male (% of male labor force)	0.50	14	0.33	24	0.17	0.323
Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24)	0.45	20	0.37	19	0.08	0.616
Unemployment, youth male (% of male labor force ages 15-24)	0.44	18	0.35	20	0.09	0.565
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force)	0.43	14	0.39	23	0.04	0.829

Note: unemployment rates and employment ratios are modelled ILO estimates

Source: World Bank WBI

3. EXPERIENCE: WHAT HAS BEEN DONE?

In this section, we introduce the evidence base for the link between employment and peacebuilding, the bulk of which comes from the analyses of the employment programming carried out by the four agencies. This research generated, in the first instance, a longlist of 432 employment and employment for peacebuilding interventions in 40 of the 46 identified FCS, then whittling this longlist down to a shortlist of 33 countries selected on objective criteria which ranked the quality of the interventions and their documentation. The selection processes of the full universe of programmes and how we selected from these programmes for the long- and shortlists is described in Annex 3 and illustrated in Figure 3-1 - Programme Selection Method. We also include contextual evidence from our semi-structured interviews with programme participants in this section.



Figure 3-1 - Programme Selection Method

With few exceptions, we find very little systematic learning about the impact of employment programmes on peacebuilding. In most cases, this stems from the unavailability of programme documentation. It is unclear whether this documentation is non-existent or not available. Although the recommendations for the future

change, depending on whether the issue is of access or existence, the impact of the outcome on learning remains the same. A lack of accessible documentation acts as a barrier to learning, both within agencies due to a lack of complete records on what has been done and any assessed impacts, but also to external researchers. Meta-analyses, for example, become much more difficult when one cannot access the full universe of available information.

That said, the data we do find is not only insufficient to draw robust conclusions about which programme designs have the greatest impact on peacebuilding, but is also insufficient to draw a causal line between employment and peacebuilding. For example, of the 33 programmes on our shortlist, we did not find any evaluation that specifically assessed the impact of employment on peacebuilding. We found one evaluation (for intervention #8 in the DRC) that specifically looks at peacebuilding impact, but this is limited to the peacebuilding component of the programme and does not include the employment component (Mercier, 2014).

As discussed in 2.4, most programmes lack a clear articulation of a theory of change and some lack any identifiable theory of change altogether. Also for the programmes where a theory of change can be identified or deducted, there is often no articulation of the impact channels or transfer mechanisms of change – but only of a problem (e.g. idle youth being easy prey of manipulation) and a proposed solution (e.g. programmes providing opportunity for youth to counter their idleness). The lack of specificities makes it very challenging to assess what 'worked' at the evaluation stage, as it is not clear how the programme was 'supposed to work'.

3.1 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PROGRAMME LONGLIST

In this section, we discuss the nature of these programmes in greater detail, with a focus on key variables for the whole sample, and for key agency and geographic splits[1]. We split geography by region rather than country due to a lack of a critical mass of programmes in most countries. Indonesia (N=27)[2] received the largest number of programmes in our sample period. The statistical output from which these results are derived can be found in [Annex 2]. We note significant variation on the number of pieces of information available across the 432 programmes and on the availability of programme documents (Figure 3-2). No project has the theoretical maximum number of pieces of information (22) or documentation (9)[3] and, in a large majority of cases, projects are missing half (or more) of all potential pieces of information and documentation. More so, both distributions are normally broadly distributed with a skew at the bottom end (fewer pieces of information/documentation available), suggesting not only a high degree of missing information but also a high extent of randomness in the amount of data points available

1. As the agencies involved in this research have differing definitions of regions, the splits we use may not match those of any single agency. We identify six regions: Sub-Saharan Africa; Asia; Americas; Eurasia; Europe; and Middle-East and North Africa (MENA). The focus countries included in each region can be seen in Annex 1.

2. Given the large proportion of our longlist that look place in Indonesia, we conduct a sensitivity analysis that looks at a restricted sample where we excluded Indonesia. The sensitivity analysis indicates that the results excluding Indonesia are not noticeably different from the main outcomes. A similar finding applies to Guinea as discussed in the methodology in Annex 3.

3. In coding the longlist for analysis, we defined 22 pieces of pertinent information. These are: programme duration; programme budget; programme start date; five possible target groups; three possible programme types; two possible primary focuses; and nine pieces of programme documentation. We refer to this full list of 22 as 'pieces of information'; programme documentation is a sub-set of the information available, which focuses on the availability of programme design and evaluation documents.



Figure 3-2 - The distribution of available programme information (left) and programme documentation (right).

Broadly speaking, programming is proportional to the geographic distribution of FCS – of our 46 countries, approximately half are in Sub-Saharan Africa, a quarter are in Asia and just under 20% are in the MENA region. In regions where fragility is considerably rarer (Europe, Eurasia and the Americas), programmes are also significantly rarer, with these three regions accounting for just over 5% of all programming. When we consider where the agencies work, however, we find significant divergence. Almost all of the PBSO programmes, for example, take place in Africa, with over a half of World Bank and two fifths of UNDP programming also taking place there. ILO is the only agency that has run more programmes in Asia than in Africa, while UNDP has run more programmes in the MENA region than any other. The number of programmes in the other regions (Americas, Eurasia and Europe) are comparatively small and account for about 5% of our sample.

In the rest of this section, we analyse the longlist programmes along a number of key clusters of variables, split into five components: (1) indicators of programme duration[4]; (2) target groups of programmes; (3) intervention type; (4) focus(es) of the programmes; and (5) availability of programme documents. All tables are listed in Annex 4.

Component 1 looks at indicators of programme duration, although passing reference is also made to the availability of budget information[5]; in Component 2, we look at the target groups of programmes; in Component 3 we look at the intervention type; in Component 4 we look at the focus(es) of the programmes; and in Component 5 we look at the availability of programme documents. All tables are listed in Annex 4.

3.1.1 COMPONENT 1: PROGRAMME DURATION

Duration and budget information exists for about 75% of programmes. On average, programmes last just over 2.5 years, although there is a significant amount of variation with durations ranging from as short as three months to over eight years for the longest. Programmes where the World Bank is the principal agency are significantly longer than those of the other agencies, lasting just over four years on average. Programmes where UNDP or ILO is the principal agency tend to last about two and a half years, whereas programmes with

4. *Although the number of programme participants may be a more accurate barometer of programme scale, these data are only rarely available and was not, therefore, collated by the research team. Given the lack of comparability across the budget information available (e.g. sometimes budget is actual and other times it is estimated; sometimes, budget data is for the whole programme, sometimes only for the agency who provides documentation; sometimes data is for a programme with multiple strands, making it difficult to specify the budget apportioned to the employment stands of the project), we avoid taking any direct inference from the budget figures in question.*

5. *Although the number of programme participants may be a more accurate barometer of programme scale, these data are only rarely available and was not, therefore, collated by the research team. Given the lack of comparability across the budget information available (e.g. sometimes budget is actual and other times it is estimated; sometimes, budget data is for the whole programme, sometimes only for the agency who provides documentation; sometimes data is for a programme with multiple strands, making it difficult to specify the budget apportioned to the employment stands of the project), we avoid taking any direct inference from the budget figures in question.*

PBSO as the principal agency last about 18 months on average. We find similar variation in duration data when split by principal agency as we do with the whole sample. All agencies have been involved with some very short programmes and, with the exception of PBSO, also some very long ones (96 or 97 months for ILO, UNDP, and the World Bank and 36 months for PBSO).

Programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa tend to be slightly shorter than those in Asia or the MENA region, lasting an average of 29 months as opposed to 34 months in Asia and 33 months in the MENA region. Again, however, there is significant variation in these data. In Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the MENA region, the shortest programmes are 3, 4 and 3 months respectively; the longest are 91, 72 and 97 months respectively.

3.1.2 COMPONENT 2: TARGETING

In this component, we look at five variables of interest, which describe the target group of the intervention. We split these groups into: youth, women-only, ex-combatants, displaced and formerly displaced people; and others (an amalgamation of other target groups, each of which alone has too few observations). With the exception of women-only programmes, all other target groups comprise both men and women. We are able to find 368 programmes that have a definable target group (although this includes over 150 programmes that demonstrably had no specific target group and were available to anyone). Of those 210 that do have a definable target group, 128 targeted only one of the groups, 46 targeted two of the groups, 15 targeted three of the groups and 7 targeted four of the groups. A much larger proportion of the World Bank and ILO programmes are not demonstrably aimed at particular target groups.

Of those with a definable target, almost 40% targeted youth and 20% targeted women only. Almost 80% of PBSO programmes include youth as a target group, whilst 40% include women; the effect is less pronounced for UNDP, with 43% and 31% of programmes targeting youth and women, respectively. UNDP works with displaced people more commonly than the other agencies, whilst PBSO focusses a large amount of attention on ex-combatants.

3.1.3 COMPONENT 3: PROGRAMME TYPE

In this component, we look at three variables of interest related to the type of programme: (1) labour-based programmes aiming to provide work directly; (2) vocational training programmes that teach skills that can be used in the workplace; (3) and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSME) programmes that aim to stimulate entrepreneurship and job creation. We are able to determine the type(s) of between 360 and 370 programmes, although this includes almost 50 programmes that did not have a definable type. 50% of programmes reviewed consist of a single type; a third of two types; and the remainder (13%) include all three possible strands.

Vocational trainings are by far the most common type of programming, with over two thirds of programmes containing this strand. Over half contain a labour-based strand and just over two fifths an MSME component. All agencies devote more attention to vocational training than to either the labour-based or MSME strands. The regional split appears to match, quite specifically, local needs. In Africa, for example, MSME components are involved in 50% of programming, compared to just over a third in either Asia or the MENA region, where access to credit is typically better. Vocational programmes still remain the most common, however, particularly in Asia where they are a part of three quarters of all programmes.

3.1.4 COMPONENT 4: FOCUS

We are able to ascertain the primary focus of about 370 employment interventions. The remainder in the list still have either a primary employment or primary peacebuilding focus, but it is not possible to ascertain which one, or the combination of the two, is correct in these situations. The primary focus can be split into three broad groups: employment programmes for employment; employment programmes for peacebuilding; and a joint primary focus. This follows the earlier logic that an employment programme, even when peacebuilding is not

a (primary) focus can still (unintentionally) have peacebuilding impacts given the theories of change defined in Section 2. See Figure 3-3 for a graphic representation of how employment programme can intentionally or unintentionally can build peace.



Figure 3-3 - Which Programmes lead to Peace?

We find that about 30% of employment programmes have peacebuilding stated as a main-line goal (either as the only primarily goal or as a joint primary goal with employment), implying that at least in FCS, a significant amount of employment programming explicitly aims to build peace. Furthermore, it is entirely impossible that an even greater number implicitly aim to build peace. ILO, for example, includes peacebuilding as a primary objective in just over 10% of cases. Yet, ILO perceives jobs as crucial for peacebuilding. Programmes with a primary peacebuilding focus are most common in Africa, where 40% of programmes have this aim. This compares to only 13% in FCS in Asia, although peacebuilding focuses are present about a quarter of the time in the MENA region. This difference across fragile scenarios in different locations is perhaps concerning, as it

does not logically follow that FCS in Asia or the MENA region are in less need of peacebuilding than in Africa, despite Africa being home to more FCS than any other region.

3.1.5 COMPONENT 5: EVALUATION

In this component we look at the quality of evaluation and learning as proxied by the ready availability of a series of programme reporting documents. We are careful in the use of the term 'ready availability' as the results discussed here do not imply that the documentation in question does not exist; rather, that it could not be found during the research process. Whether documentation does not exist or is merely inaccessible is equally concerning as it significantly inhibits learning capacity to agencies and external researchers. The discussion in this section is strongly framed by this background. For example, all agencies in question have policies that require programme documents and end reports. Yet these could be found, respectively, in only 54% and 24% of cases, indicating strong barriers to learning.

We look at nine forms of programme documentation: programme documents; end reports; external evaluations; internal evaluations; portfolio evaluations; mid-term evaluations; programme reports; summary documents; and website information. In addition to the unexpectedly low number of programme documents and end reports, we find external evaluations in about 13% of cases and internal evaluations[6] in less than 1.5% of cases. In fact, less than 20% of programmes have any meaningful form of available evaluation documentation. In accepting that many improvements may have taken place since major criticisms in 2010, we repeated the analysis on a subset of programmes that have taken place since then. Despite the expectations of improvement, these data show even fewer meaningful evaluations have taken place, with only 9% of programmes having available external evaluations and less than 1% having internal evaluations.

3.2 EVIDENCE FROM THE IN-DEPTH DOCUMENT REVIEW

33 interventions were selected for in-depth review.[7] Of those, 19 have an exclusive employment focus (we refer to these interventions as 'employment-only'), while 14 have an additional peacebuilding focus (we refer to these as 'employment-peacebuilding' interventions).[8]

The sample includes a cross-section of single-agency interventions and interventions implemented in collaboration by two or more agencies. Not surprisingly, given the different nature and focus of the four organisations that commissioned this study, the distribution of 'employment-only' and 'employment-peacebuilding' interventions is not even: all PBSO interventions have a peacebuilding focus, while only two of the World Bank interventions do.[9]

6. *We note that the World Bank's Implementation Completion and Results Reports are something of a halfway house between an internal evaluations and a final report. For the purposes of this research, however, we include these figures in the 'final reports' columns as, although they often include more information than a final report, they do not satisfy our definition of an evaluation.*

7. *A list of the reviewed interventions is provided is Annex 6. Each intervention has an identifying number, which is used for reference in this section.*

8. *In the case of the EmPLED programme in Nepal (#21), a peacebuilding focus was initially included in the document (and clearly reflected in the title: 'Employment Creation and Peacebuilding based on Local Economic Development'). However, this focus was subsequently dropped in a revised logframe. For the purpose of this analysis, EmPLED has been counted as an 'employment-peacebuilding' programme.*

9. *Intervention #7 in DRC, which has a peacebuilding focus, is an ILO intervention funded by the World Bank.*

3.2.1 EMPLOYMENT INTERVENTIONS

With regard to employment creation, the contents of the interventions do not significantly differ depending on whether they have a peacebuilding focus or not. A variety of approaches are used for employment creation, typically a combination of demand- and supply-side activities within the same programme. On the one hand, increasing job-seekers' employability (mostly through vocational training), and, on the other hand, increasing job opportunities, through direct job creation, partnership with the private sector and/or support to entrepreneurship and self-employment. While the majority of programmes (22) include a vocational training component, only four are exclusively vocational training programmes. The others have vocational training in combination with labour-based (LB) interventions (4), support to entrepreneurships and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) (5), or both (9). Vocational training focused mostly on technical skills for specific sectors (18) as well as on entrepreneurship and business skills (17). In 13 cases, the interventions also offered follow-up support in linking trainees with potential employers.

Most interventions (24 out of 33) included a labour-based component, i.e. a component aimed to either create jobs directly, or to connect participants with some kind of salaried employment. Among those interventions, there is a strong reliance on short-term labour-intensive (LI) approaches as well as cash-for-work, with 17 interventions employing such approaches. Key sectors of focus are infrastructure building, management and repairs (19 interventions), farming (13 interventions), as well as sectors connected with environmental protection, including waste management (12 interventions) and with artisanal trade (12 interventions).

15 interventions focus on entrepreneurial support (either exclusively or in combination with other areas), with nine of these offering some form of microfinance in support to small business.

3.2.2 EMPLOYMENT IMPACT

In the majority of cases, the M&E system is only targeted at assessing the short-term employment impact on programme participants. Frequently used indicators include:

- Number of people employed as a result of the programme (19 cases);
- Number of people trained by the programme (16 cases);
- Number of workdays generated by the programme (12 cases);
- Number of MSMEs and small businesses benefitting from support (6 cases);
- Increase in the income of beneficiaries or households as a result of the programme (3 cases).

In most cases, final reports and evaluations limit themselves at the level of outputs, rather than assessing the impact on employment status and perspectives of participants. For example, they may note the number of participants who graduated from a training programme, but do not attempt to assess whether participants are better off as a result. In the final reports and/or internal evaluations reviewed, we found 15 cases of positive impact on participants (beyond the fact itself of participating in the programme). In external evaluations, this positive impact was found in 10 cases.

Even when an impact on beneficiaries is found, this assessment is generally carried out without recourse to a control group or other type of counterfactual. We found two notable exceptions in this regard: UNDP intervention #15 in Kosovo, and World Bank intervention #26 in Sierra Leone.

The UNDP Kosovo programme (#15)[10] had two external evaluations of the programme's impact for two different periods of the implementation, – one for the year 2007 (Mukkavilli, 2008) and the other for the period 2008-2010 (Kavanagh, 2012). Both evaluations stand out for using an experimental evaluation design, comparing the

10. References to Kosovo shall be understood to be in the context of Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999).

treatment group with a control group (identified at the outset of the programme). Both evaluations conclude that ALM beneficiaries had a significantly higher rate of employment than non-beneficiaries.

The World Bank Sierra Leone (#26) programme 's cash-for-work component was evaluated using a randomised phase-in methodology to establish the causal impact of participation on household outcomes. Communities were randomly divided in control and treatment groups.[11] This allowed the measurement of the short-term impact of the programme by comparing mean outcomes across the two groups. The evaluation found a statistically significant difference among the two groups.

Only few (6) evaluations attempt to assess the employment impact of the programme beyond its own participants. For example, the mid-term external evaluation of programme #32 in Yemen found that the main long-lasting economic benefit of the programme could be a change of 'mind-set' among the youth towards a culture of saving. In addition, they reported spillover effects of new businesses established by youth beneficiaries on producers and traders of raw materials, equipment and tools (Bahnassi, 2014: 40).[12]

In contrast, the final external evaluation of intervention #30 in Timor-Leste finds that no lasting economic impact could be observed:

> *The project has of course resulted in a cash injection in the rural economy [...] but the wage component of this cash injection is to a large extent spent on imported goods (rice, clothes, books, uniforms). [...] The assumption that the project may contribute to a revival of the local economy has proven not to be valid. The project had no or very little lasting impact on the lives of the beneficiaries in terms of the multiplier effect of the income of the project. If multiplier effects are there at all, it is by 'accident' rather than as a built-in mechanism of the project.* (Koekebakker, 2007: 20)

As evaluations are conducted right after the end of the programme, their assessment is naturally limited to the short term. As noted by the internal evaluation of intervention #21 in Nepal: "[s]ince most interventions had been completed only recently or [were] still ongoing, insufficient time had passed for much impact to have been recorded or assessed". Therefore, the evaluation could only assess "early signs of impact". (ILO, 2010: 4).

3.2.3 PEACEBUILDING AIM

The programmes with a peacebuilding focus do not significantly differ from the 'regular' employment programmes in terms of their employment content. What, then, gives them their 'peacebuilding' focus? However, in the design of the programme, peacebuilding is framed as a key aim of the intervention. In practical terms, creating employment is presented as a means to promote peace. Examples of such formulation are:

- Nepal, #22: "To contribute to the achievement of sustainable development and peace consolidation [...] by creating opportunities for decent and productive work for [...] young men and women" (UNPFN, 2009: 1)
- Comoros, #6: "To contribute to the integration of youth and women in socio-economic life in order to reinforce social justice and national peace" (UNPBF, 2012: 2)[13]

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11. Treatment communities received the programme in Phase I, while control communities did not (they received the programme in subsequent phases. (World Bank, 2015c).

12. To quote the evaluation report: "The number of youth beneficiaries out of the total youth population was very small, but the activity has contributed in making a mind-set change in enhancing the culture of saving among youth, which the project has managed to publically promote very well to the youth. The importance of the activity interventions to the local economy is somewhat limited, as many have viewed it as social work that can be done by youth volunteers and argued that there is no direct economic value generated for the local economies. But this intervention has a significant indirect impact on the local economy as follows: skills gained by the youth, as many youth reported that they found temporary jobs based on the skills gained from school rehabilitation in Sana'a, and the traders and producers of the items as raw materials, equipment and tools purchased by those working on the project, who are expected to have benefited indirectly". (Bahnassi, 2014: 40).

13. Authors' own translation.

- Central African Republic, #4: "[t]o effectively contribute to the change of conditions for youth, by offering them the possibility to access employment, to create better life conditions for themselves and to become agents of peacebuilding" [14] (UNDP, 2009: 4).

3.2.4 TARGETING OF PARTICIPANTS

Another way in which programmes incorporate a peacebuilding focus is by targeting specific participants, either because they are 'high risk' (we found 6 programmes that make this claim explicitly[15]) or because they have a potential to contribute to peacebuilding (we found 4 such cases[16]).

Employment programmes with a peacebuilding focus are much more likely to target youth (although the definition of youth varies considerably – see [17]:), compared to programmes that only focus on employment[18]. Youth unemployment is frequently referred to as a 'security problem'. For example, intervention #26 in Sierra Leone is based on the premise that ""The lack of productive employment for youth [is] considered not only an economic problem, but also a major political and security risk." (World Bank, 2015c: 1).

Table 3.3

Country	Intervention code	Youth age definition
Comoros	#6	15-35
Guinea-Bissau	#11	18-35
Lebanon	#17	15-24
Nepal	#22	15-29
Sierra Leone	#26	15-35
Sudan	#29	15-25
Timor-Leste	#30	16-29
Yemen	#32	18-30

This confirms a strong connection, in the thinking and practice of international agencies, between youth unemployment and conflict, as well as a strongly held assumption that providing employment for young people is instrumental in turning them from a conflict risk to a factor of peace consolidation. As stated in the programme in Central African Republic (#4), for example:

> *The main challenge of today is to transform youth [...] into a lever of local development and enablers of peace consolidation. This transformation has to be carried out by means of employment promotion initiatives [...]*[19] (UNDP, 2009: 2).

14. Authors' own translation.

15. These are: DRC (#7); Guinea (#9 and #10), Guinea-Bissau (#11), Lebanon (#17) and Timor-Leste (#30).

16. These are Burundi (#2), Central African Republic (#4), Guinea (#10) and Guinea-Bissau (#11).

17. For the programmes not listed in this table, we could not find an age definition for the youth target group.

18. This finding is consistent in the shortlist and longlist of interventions.

19. Authors' own translation.

The Lebanon programme document (#17) explicitly references the youth bulge theory:

> *It is often argued that the high proportion of young people in the total population – usually referred to as "youth bulges" - leads to increasing insecurity and makes fragile states especially prone to conflict […]. The threshold for youth bulges is generally set at 20% of young people in the overall population. When a fragile state is already overwhelmed by social, economic, environmental and policy strains –as Lebanon currently is – the chances of degeneration into conflict and civil unrest are even greater.* (UNRWA/ILO/UNICEF, 2011: 5)

However, as noted in section 2.2 above, empirical evidence to support the youth bulge theory is weak.

Seven programmes refer to women as a social group to be specifically targeted.[1] The two programmes in Guinea (#9 and #10) explicitly identify women as group particularly at risk of violent mobilisation. This statement appears surprising, as most research on vulnerability for mobilisation focuses on men. It would have been intriguing to learn what led to this particular conclusion in the case of Guinea.

3.2.5 PEACEBUILDING ACTIVITIES

Some programmes (six in our sample) also include specific peacebuilding activities, alongside employment promotion activities. Peacebuilding activities fall into two broad categories: (1) activities aimed at raising individuals' awareness, understanding and skills on peace and conflict resolution; and (2) activities aimed at bringing people together and improving intra- and inter-group trust and cooperation. The two categories are not mutually exclusive, and they can often be found in combination within the same intervention.
Peacebuilding activities mentioned in programme documents are:

- Awareness-raising, training sessions and debates on citizenship, non-violence and other peace-related themes (DRC #8, Guinea #9, Guinea #10, Haiti #12 and Lebanon #17);
- Use of community radios to promote messages of peace and non-violence (DRC #8 and Guinea #10);
- Youth exchanges (DRC #8);
- Establishment of 'peace centres' - community centres focused on peace (Guinea #10);
- Trust fund for youth-led empowerment programmes (Nepal #22);
- Youth socialisation activities (e.g. theatre plays, movie screenings, sports tournaments) (Guinea #9).

The activities listed above do not have a direct employment relevance, although they may (depending on the programme) target the same participants that were also targeted through employment-activities.

3.2.6 PEACEBUILDING IMPACT

As discussed earlier, a fundamental difficulty in answering the question whether an intervention 'works' is a lack of shared understanding of what it means for an intervention to work. We have identified three possible levels of impact, each of which can be further divided in 'impact on participants' and 'impact beyond participants' (see Table 2.1 in 2.3.7).

1. Employment impact (on participants / beyond participants);
2. Peacebuilding impact through job channel (on participants /beyond participants);
3. Peacebuilding impact through programme channel (on participants/ beyond participants).

1. These are: Burundi (#2), Comoros (#6), Guinea (#9,10), Guinea-Bissau (#11), Sierra Leone (#25), South Sudan (#27) and Yemen (#32). This list does not consider interventions that call for a quota for women's participation (see below).

We use this framework for a meta-review of available evaluations. However, we find that, in many cases, it is difficult or impossible to deduce how the intervention had a certain impact – particularly whether this was through jobs or programme channels - from the content and phrasing of final reports and evaluations.

Peacebuilding impact is not a focus of the evaluations we reviewed. Three evaluation reports include some sort of disclaimer about not being in a position to assess the peacebuilding impact. For example, the evaluation of intervention #21 in Nepal (where a peacebuilding focus was initially in the programme document but then dropped in a revised logframe), states that:

> *[the] question to what extent an impact on peace building can be demonstrated or expected […] has not been assessed by the project and of course the [Evaluation Team] was not in a position to do so itself.* (ILO, 2010: 48)

The evaluation of programme #30 in Timor-Leste included a similar statement, claiming a problem of attribution:

> *[i]t is not possible to establish whether or to what extent the project managed to meet the wider objective of reducing the potential for conflict and destabilisation in Timor-Leste. This is a matter of methodology (attribution factor) rather than of project outcome. The situation in Timor-Leste has been relatively stable since the implementation of the project. This outcome cannot be directly attributed to the project.* (Koekebakker, 2007: 11)

In a similar vein, the midterm evaluation of intervention # 17 in Lebanon concludes that:

> *[t]he impact on those individuals most likely to be the first to engage in violent activity is unclear. There is evidence to suggest that instability resulting from spill-over effects from the Syrian conflict is undermining efforts in this project to foster improved engagement between the Palestine refugee community and their Lebanese neighbours.* (Moran, 2013: 10-11)

We found claims of some positive peacebuilding impact in eight internal assessments[2] and five external evaluations.[3] As these claims are often phrased in very generic terms, it is therefore difficult to discern whether positive peacebuilding impact is seen as a direct result of employment creation (job channel) or of participation in the programme itself (programme channel).

Job Channel

Evaluation of programme #30 in Timor-Leste makes a limited claim of positive peacebuilding impact through the job channel:

> *The project successfully managed to provide short term opportunities to groups which have played or could potentially play a destabilising role, in particular the youth […]As far as the impact of the project on conflict reduction is concerned, it is fair to conclude that the project managed to contribute to political stability and a peaceful environment to the extent possible.* (Koekebakker, 2007: 11)

The evaluation of intervention #22 in Nepal also reports some positive peacebuilding impact through a job channel:

> *Many specific examples were reported for ways in which the Programme activities had contributed to peace. […] wage employment created by the Programme during the construction of roads, irrigation canals,*

2. These are DRC (#8), Guinea (#9, #10), Haiti (#12), Iraq (#14), Nepal (#21 and #22) and Sudan (#29).

3. These are Lebanon (#17), Nepal (#22), DRC (#7, #8) and Haiti (#12).

> *vegetable collection center and marketing shed engaged the youths on constructive activities.* (Kumar-Range, S.K. & Acharya, H., 2011: 22)

In an attempt to identify a peacebuilding impact for the programme, evaluations have noted the limited scale of interventions vis-à-vis the magnitude of the problem – making it unrealistic to expect a significant impact through a job channel. For example, the mid-term evaluation of intervention #17 in Lebanon concludes that:

> *[i]t is difficult to determine the stabilisation impact of this project, as this project is small in scale relative to the size of the problem it is seeking to address, and so the impact must also be relatively small.* (Moran, 2013: 56)

Similarly, the PBF Portfolio Evaluation for Comoros concludes, with reference to intervention #6:

> *The project […] had a very limited scope as it addresses the provision of employment of very few individuals (a few hundred out of a total 'potential universe' of 400,000 youngsters and women) […] The project will make a modest contribution on employment creation for youth and women and therefore its impact on peacebuilding in the context of Comoros will be very limited.* (Larrabure & Ouledi, 2011: 17)

In fact, the Comoros evaluation raises doubts regarding the fact that the programme can be considered as a peacebuilding intervention at all. Employment creation in general (as opposed, for example, to employment creation for ex-combatants) is seen as a 'development objective' rather than a peacebuilding objective (UNPBF, 2012: 1). As the evaluation mission did not consider the project a peacebuilding initiative, it could not identify any catalytic effect. The evaluation of the overall portfolio of the Peace Building Fund (PBF) in Comoros reaches a similar conclusion:

> *The project will make a modest contribution to employment creation for youth and women and therefore its impact on peacebuilding in the context of Comoros will be very limited. If maximizing youth and women's employment is the objective, then, in the opinion of the evaluation mission, it would have been better to use the funds on consolidating a functional and "demand driven" national vocational training programme.* (Larrabure & Ouledi, 2011: 18)

The lack of clarity on how the employment impact on peacebuilding is supposed to work (in other words, the absence of a theory of change) has been noted in the PBF portfolio evaluation for Burundi, which states, with regard to intervention #2:

> *The link between the small enterprise project and peacebuilding was always unclear and, in the end, it was not able to identify a market for its beneficiaries' goods, which was a primary strategy for the success of these small businesses.* (Campbell et al., 2014: 16)

We thus note a discrepancy between the strong connection between employment creation and peacebuilding, which is postulated ex ante in programme documents, and the available evidence of the impact of employment interventions on peacebuilding that emerges from ex post documentation.

Programme Channel

The evaluation of intervention #22 in Nepal finds (in addition to the job channel detailed above) also a programme channel leading to a positive peacebuilding impact:

> *The leadership roles they took on in the committee enhanced their skills and experience in managing construction activities and working together for a common cause despite the differences in their ethnicity, economic status and political ideology. This has generated a sense of unity for a common cause among the youths from various backgrounds. Community members and youth reported that a new and positive selfex-image for youth was created, transforming them from idle vagrants into contributing community*

> *members, [whose] capabilities for bringing development Programmes and resources to their villages had been enhanced.* (Kumar-Range, S.K. & Acharya, H., 2011: 22)

The final internal evaluation of intervention #21 in Nepal also mentions some signs of positive peacebuilding impact, although these are hypothesised rather than stated as a firm finding:

> *In discussions with stakeholders and beneficiaries, the following indications were found that a contribution to peace building may be being made:*
>
> *• The inclusive approach and economic impact among the poorest and marginalized is likely to have a positive effect on the roots of the conflict.*
>
> *• The project worked in strongly conflict-affected areas.*
>
> *• The LED approach appears to have reduced conflict over allocation of resources.* (ILO, 2010: 48)

There is no further detail as to how the intervention may have reached this positive impact.

We found one interesting example where the evaluation does not find a peacebuilding impact on participants, but finds a probable positive impact beyond participants. The mid-term evaluation of intervention #17 in Lebanon concludes that, while (because of selection criteria) the programme is unlikely to have reached young people at risk of becoming radicalised, because of the close-knit family structure, "project activities offer hope to all family members, including those most at risk of radicalisation" (Moran, 2013: 57).

In practical terms, the evidence that employment programmes, by virtue of their existence, contribute to peacebuilding remains weak, and even when claims are made, the transfer mechanisms remain unclear.

While in itself valuable, this impact would not be directly relevant for our purposes, as these activities could, in principle, have been carried out in the context of a non-employment programme as well. This means that a positive impact of these activities does not, in itself, support the case for employment interventions in peacebuilding.

3.2.7 UNINTENDED IMPACT

Unintended (positive or negative) impacts are not generally assessed. One small exception in this regard is intervention #29 in Sudan, whose final report concludes that "the programme has provided indirect platforms of dialogues on issues affecting livelihoods of beneficiaries in security conscious environment". (MDGF, 2013: 9).

A (very limited) unintended impact on social cohesion is also noted for World Bank intervention #14 in Iraq (which did not have a peacebuilding focus by design). The Implementation Completion and Results report noted, in particular, the "strong demonstration effect" of the programme:

> *The decentralized approach together with local collaboration and shared ownership of completed works demonstrated and supported community building and the development of social cohesion and trust [...] At the local level, through the rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure and ensured irrigation water, there was an improvement of community cohesion [...] the use of community-based mechanism helped to avoid violence.* (World Bank, 2014a: 19-20)

The lack of systematic consideration of unintended negative effects represents a key finding of the research. If one moves from the assumption that access to jobs is crucial for peacebuilding, it follows that programmes that aim to create jobs also have a strong potential for 'doing harm'. Such unintended negative impacts can easily be overlooked in evaluations, unless such awareness is explicitly incorporated in M&E design.

3.3 EVALUATING THEORIES OF CHANGE

In section 2.4, we have singled out three examples of programmes for which clear theories of change could be identified. We now refer to the same examples again, to examine to what extent the theories of change were taken into account, and found valid, by the final evaluations of those programmes. Only two of the three programmes had available evaluations, discussed further below.

3.3.1 PROGRAMME EXAMPLE: GUINEA-BISSAU

The theory of change of the programme 'Labor-intensive employment for youth and women in the lead-up to and immediate post-electoral period in Guinea-Bissau' (#11) can be linked to the **grievance** transfer mechanism and stresses the importance of providing 'peace dividends' to 'at-risk groups' such as youth and women, thus enhancing their confidence in the state and providing a foundation for civic engagement. The programme document particularly stresses the importance of setting off a catalytic effect to 'show' the results of the programme beyond immediate beneficiaries, thus signalling peace dividends to the broader population.

There was no evaluation available for this programme. The final report of the programme does not address the issue as to whether the intervention succeeded in having this 'demonstrative' catalytic effect. Two perceptions surveys are mentioned as means of verification, but (based on what the report says) they were limited to assessing respondents' satisfaction with the outcome of the programme.

3.3.2 PROGRAMME EXAMPLE: LEBANON

The theory of change elaborated in the programme 'Empowerment of youth at risk through job creation programme in areas of tensions' (#17) is twofold: it is linked to (1) opportunity, providing young people to ways of generating income as an alternative to joining an armed group, and (2) contact, reinforcing positive interactions and creating common ground between the Palestinian and the Lebanese communities.
With regard to the **opportunity** transfer mechanism, the midterm evaluation found that the programme involved only a relatively small number of beneficiaries – and, in all likelihood, not those who were most at risk of recruitment for violent purposes. Therefore, even if the programme did succeed in creating employment, the evidence that it 'worked' is scant.

> *The majority of the participant beneficiaries in the activities in this project are probably unlikely to be those who are most likely to be the first to take part in violence [...]This project does not appear to actively identify and recruit these individuals into training and offers little direct incentive to divert those most at risk of being radicalised from that path, to participate in project activities.* (Moran, 2013: 56-57)

Interestingly, however, the evaluation does find an indirect impact on the community more at large, which was not included in the original design:

> *However this project does have the effect of offering hope to the community at large that there continues to be initiatives aimed at improving their situation, that they have not been forgotten and there is a chance that at least one family member could improve their life chances. Because of the close knit family structures prevalent in the Palestine refugee community, project activities offer hope to all family members, including those most at risk of radicalisation.* (Moran, 2013: 57)

In practical terms, the evaluation hints at a possible 'multiplier' effect that – by happenstance rather than by design – may reach young people that are at risk of being recruited into violence.

The midterm evaluation also suggests that, in order to reduce the appeal of radicalisation, emphasis should be given to the way in which young people spend their free-time as well as to the situation of constant stress they live in. It notes that violent online video games are one of the few distractions available to young men.

Therefore, focusing on recreational facilities and activities that would "allow [young people] to take their minds off their problems and the problems of their community"(Moran, 2013: 68) would be as important as providing training or job opportunities.

The mid-term evaluation does not find evidence for the **contact** transfer mechanism. In fact, it notes that there has been little interaction between the Lebanese and Palestinian communities:

> *The activities supported under this activity provided for little direct interaction or integration with local Lebanese people, apart from those participating in Apprenticeships engaging with mostly Lebanese employers and Lebanese fellow workers. […] However given the very difficult political and security situation in NLA, it was not possible to ascertain if these activities will have any impact on improved relationships or reduce tensions between the communities. The high drop-out rate of Apprentices who received on-the-job training placements outside Palestine refugee camps suggests that there has not been much improvement.* (Moran, 2013: 58)

Furthermore, the evaluations (both midterm and final) suggest that, rather than a lack of interaction, the crucial problem was the disadvantaged position of Palestinian job-seekers vis-à-vis Lebanese employers, including frequent cases of exploitation:

> *The Jobseekers who attended the focus group identified that one of the main reasons for engaging with [the programme] is the perception that […] they would be somewhat better protected against exploitation by Lebanese employers. Several identified how on previous occasions they had not received payment for previous work done or had been abused in one way or another. The reality that some Lebanese employers appear to be exploiting Palestinians is clearly a source of tension between the two communities which should be addressed in order to promote PBF objectives of engendering better relations between them.* (Moran, 2013: 58-59)

A key finding of the final evaluation was that:

> *The project assumed that the placement and referral of Palestinian job seekers in training and employment would automatically contribute to conflict resolution and dialogue between Palestinian refugees and the Lebanese community. There was not enough emphasis on decent working conditions and social inclusion.* (Zakkar, 2013: 8)

In non-academic terms, the programme adopted the view that 'giving more jobs to Palestinians' and 'giving them more exposure to Lebanese' would build peace. This did not consider that the Palestinians already had experience with Lebanese through exploitative working conditions, which left beneficiaries in a condition of vulnerability, and did not "create the conditions which would deter youth from eventually becoming […] engaged in violence". (Zakkar, 2013: 22).

3.3.3 PROGRAMME EXAMPLE: NEPAL

The 'Jobs for Peace' (J4P) programme (#22) was primarily underpinned by an opportunity-based theory of change, according to which lack of cash in hand made young people vulnerable to manipulation by vested interest groups. The programme also aimed to encourage the peaceful gathering of young people through business development and youth-led programmes for youth empowerment (contact transfer mechanism). There was a programme self-evaluation and independent final evaluation.

The programme self-evaluation claims to confirm the validity of the programme design and the relevance of the opportunity transfer mechanism. It also stressed the link between unemployment, idleness and violence:

> *The project is relevant to the target groups in the target districts because of high levels of youth un/underemployment with the inherent risk of idle and poor youth engaging in criminal activities thereby*

> *undermining the fragile Nepali peace process. There is a clear rationale and justification for the project [...] Idle youth are easy prey for recruitment by armed criminal groups across the Tarai.* (McCarthy, 2010: 7)

The independent final evaluation states, with regard to the validity of the opportunity transfer mechanism:

> *Wage employment created by the Programme during the construction of roads, irrigation canals, vegetable collection center and marketing shed engaged the youths on constructive activities.* (Kumar-Range & Acharia, 2011: 22)

The concept of employment as an antidote to idleness is again stressed:

> *Community members and youth reported that a new and positive self-image for youth was created, transforming them from idle vagrants into contributing community members, [whose] capabilities for bringing development Programmes and resources to their villages had been enhanced.* (Kumar-Range & Acharia, 2011: 22)

The evaluation also confirms the programme channel effect of the intervention on social cohesion, beyond direct employment generation:

> *The leadership roles [the youth] took on in the committee enhanced their skills and experience in managing construction activities and working together for a common cause despite the differences in their ethnicity, economic status and political ideology. This has generated a sense of unity for a common cause among the youths from various backgrounds.* (Kumar-Range & Acharia, 2011: 22)

In sum, the evaluations confirm the validity of programme design with regard to its Theory of Change, with regard to both the opportunity and the contact transfer mechanism.

3.4 KEY TRENDS AND CONSIDERATIONS

Our meta-review of evaluations has highlighted a number of common themes discussed in these project documents and evaluations, which can provide initial food for thought in the design and planning of future interventions. In this subsection, we summarise these common themes across the programmes of the shortlist. These do not represent, as such, recommendations from the authors, although we take these into account to develop our conclusions and recommendations in Section 5.

1. Evaluations call for a proper understanding of individuals' motivation and incentives to participate in employment interventions.

This is a key lesson learned from the UNDP 'Active Labour Market' (ALM) intervention in Kosovo (#15). The final report notes that the programme was generally successful at taking into account participants' incentives and motivations, but that it failed to do so in some cases. For example, the programme did not manage to attract the desired number of social assistance beneficiaries or mothers, who found the scheme's financial incentives to be insufficient to cover the loss of benefits or the cost of child care respectively (UNDP, 2014: 23).

Related to this is an interesting finding of the evaluation of intervention #17 in Lebanon, which points to a possible trade-off between targeting participants that are mostly 'at risk' and/or 'in need', and those that have the greatest motivation and potential for success:

> *The majority of the participant beneficiaries in the activities in this project are probably unlikely to be those who are most likely to be the first to take part in violence [...]. [P]articipation in activities supported by this project mostly requires the beneficiary voluntarily making an application to participate, which takes effort and initiative on the part of the individual concerned. Similarly the activities themselves require significant effort on the part of beneficiaries if they are to participate in and benefit from them.[...]*
>
> *Intuitively therefore someone who persists in pursuing education and training despite the security, transport, cultural, financial and many other challenges hindering their progress on a daily basis, is still engaged with the systems which support the Palestine refugee community and still hopeful for the future. [...] Those most at risk of engaging in violent activities are logically those who have given up hope in conventional systems to improve their lot, who feel they have nothing to lose by participating in radicalised movements [...]* (Moran, 2013: 56)

An important point made in the midterm evaluation for intervention #32 in Yemen is that not all the young people who start an entrepreneurial programme actually possess entrepreneurial spirit, skills and motivation. For those who do not, the programme should offer alternatives within the same programme, both in vocational training and job placement:

> *Taking no actions for this category of youth is considered to be inefficient for two main reasons: first, loss of funds invested in targeting, selecting, and training; and second, the discontinuation will result in the youth becoming at risk again.* (Bahnassi, 2014: 15)

In practical terms, it is thus important to be aware that the participants that the programme may appeal to are not necessarily the same participants that the programme wants to reach. This means that, if the effort is to reach those most 'vulnerable' and/or 'at high risk', this is not simply going to happen automatically. Therefore, targeted outreach efforts need to be factored into programme design and planning to minimise the disconnect between the target group identified for the intervention and the motivations and incentives of those targeted to participate.

2. Evaluations recommend clear, transparent and consistent criteria for the identification of programme participants.

By their own nature, programmatic interventions can only reach a limited subset of the overall population. The identification of programme participants can be thought of as a two-step process:

1. The definition of the participants' category(-ies), e.g. 'youth'.

2. The identification of criteria for matching concrete individuals with those categories, as well as criteria for ranking of applicants in the likely event that eligible individuals outnumber available spots.

The review of interventions shows that categories of eligible participants are generally defined in terms that are both extremely broad and quite ambiguous (e.g. 'at risk youth'). This makes the second step (identification and ranking of actual participants) not only challenging but also prone to fraud and manipulation. For example, the programme document for intervention #32 in Yemen provides no details, only stating that participants will be selected on the basis of criteria to be developed, and a selection process to be agreed upon by the partners.

The midterm evaluation for this same programme raises strong concerns regarding the criteria for the identification of beneficiaries:

> *The terms "jobless", "entrepreneurial spirit", "the poorest" and finally "vulnerable" were emphasized during the selection process […]. [H]owever, it was found that there was no unified definition common to [all partners]. Additionally, the terms were not clarified and disaggregated into certain weighted score dimensions that could be effectively scored and matched among the candidates […]In practice, the project did not have sufficient previous information about whether those youth met the criteria because this information is usually difficult and costly to collect, analyse and apply in a timely fashion. For instance, some types of vulnerabilities are also time-specific; sudden misfortune may reduce a comparatively well-off person to poverty from one year to the next. Some error of inclusion, identifying non-poor persons as poor and therefore admitting them to the project, or of exclusion, identifying poor persons as not poor and thus denying them access to the project, is therefore inevitable.* (Bahnassi, 2014: 35-37)

One notable example of a programme that has established clear and transparent criteria is the UNDP ALM programme in Kosovo (which, however, did not have a peacebuilding focus). While most other programmes limit themselves to generic statements of need, vulnerability or risk, ALM had eligibility criteria explicitly designed around the determinants of labour market disadvantage in Kosovo, such as age group (young people in the age group of 15 to 29 years), length of unemployment (registered as unemployed for at least six months), educational attainment (priority was granted to those who had not completed primary and secondary education), gender (the programme reserved 50% of places to young women), work experience (the programme primarily targeted first-time jobseekers) and household characteristics (priority was granted to those belonging to households receiving social assistance). The programme eased some pre-conditions for minority job seekers, such as being registered as unemployed for at least six months before becoming eligible, and raising the age range to 15-35 years instead of 15-29. (UNDP, 2014).

World Bank intervention #24 in Pakistan also contains more details than average with regard to the identification of beneficiaries, specifying three target groups (laid-off workers from formal and informal sections; poor and vulnerable youth; and return migrants) as well as a number of sub-groups. In particular, the generic category of 'poor and vulnerable youth' is broken down into three more specific sub-categories: beneficiaries of the Benazir Income Support Program (BISP), a national cash transfer programme that targets the ultra-poor in the country; youth from the 5 poorest districts of Sindh and; youth from the worst floor affected districts of Sindh (World Bank, 2014b).

The evaluation for the 'Work for Peace' programme in Timor-Leste finds that, while the programme document identifies youth as the main target group, this has not been followed through in implementation:

> *The project focused on youth 16-29 (70% at least). This project evaluation found, in at random interviews, that about one third of the beneficiaries were above the target age group. Workers were often much older than the target groups: several beneficiaries were in their fifties, sixties, and seventies.[…] It is considered a just choice to not exclude people in the age groups above 29. In the communities all people badly need cash income. The burden of supporting family life often depends completely on women in the older age groups. Also, excluding older people would not be culturally acceptable.* (Koekebakker, 2007: 16)

This points to a gap between programme design and implementation that, while understandable, makes it extremely hard to monitor and evaluate the programme and to learn from it.

3. Evaluations recognise that the process of participant selection inevitably generates 'winners' and 'losers' and can potentially increase tensions.

Involvement of community groups in the targeting process is a frequently used approach in international development, as part of a broader commitment to participation. For example, the programme document for intervention #11 in Guinea-Bissau states that, "community groups, including women and youth networks, will be consulted in the selection of beneficiaries" (United Nations PBSO/PBF, 2013b: 7).

Likewise, the final report for intervention #12 in Haiti (quoting the final evaluation) concludes that:

> *The engagement of community organization has been instrumental during the beneficiary's [sic] selection process, which has proved to be extremely beneficial to promote dialogue in the communities and minimize the tension in the zones of intervention. By doing so, the project has empowered these local organizations enabling the communities to develop their potential and take active part in the decision making processes.* (UNDP, 2012: 7)

However, the mid-term evaluation of intervention #32 in Yemen raises concerns about community-based selection of participants, as it could easily lead to "personal interests, tribal or political reasons […] as community members may have other incentives beside good targeting" (Bahnassi, 2014: 17).

Ultimately, it is important to be aware that this process can potentially 'do harm', particularly in situations where exclusion from employment is already a source of grievance.

4. Evaluations identify problems with indicators, which often do not allow for assessment of impact on employment and/or peacebuilding.

Problems with indicators are remarked on by several evaluations. These include:

- Excessive emphasis on quantitative indicators with a limited focus on qualitative ones (Zimbabwe #33[1], Nepal #21 and Lebanon #16[2]);
- Many programmes lacking baselines and targets (Yemen #32), which makes it unclear what success should be measured against (Bahnassi, 2014: 8);
- Absence of timeframes, i.e. lack of clarity of when the target should be achieved;

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1. The evaluation of intervention #33 in Zimbabwe notes that the programme has probably "achieved more than has been documented". This lack of documentation is partly due to the fact that the monitoring system, which was provided by the government's structures, "mainly focused on quantitative information and laid a limited focus on quality, sustainability and impact". (Karuga & Zimbisi, 2013: 3-4).

2. The evaluation of intervention #16 in Lebanon concludes that "[a]nalytical qualitative reporting is as important (perhaps more important) than quantitative reporting": "We also noticed a trend to communicate cumulative data which highlights quantitative achievements but lacks minimum alignment with more qualitative parameters, which leads us to question the ability to draw conclusions from this data and suggest corrections/improvements as the project was unfolding." (Moussa, 2011: 17).

- Indicators too concrete, formulated at the activity level, and difficult to link to outcomes (e.g. Nepal #21, South Sudan #27[3]), or, at the opposite, too abstract and difficult to link to programme interventions (Nepal #21);
- Use of words that are difficult to measure and are ambiguous, e.g. number of youth trained 'effectively', number of youth enterprises 'sustainably' established. It is not clear what value would count for success (Yemen #32)[4];
- Difficulty observing a difference during the lifespan of the programme (Nepal #21).

The final internal evaluation intervention #21 in Nepal concludes that:

> *Taken together, these weaknesses do not much facilitate an assessment of the extent to which the project has progressed towards its immediate objectives, though it can be assessed whether a planned fish pond was actually constructed and a training programme was completed by the planned number of people. […] The means of verification foreseen are largely appropriate, but have weaknesses that relate to those of the indicators. That is, it is difficult to identify reliable means of verification for indicators that are difficult to assess.* ILO (2010: 24)

Monitoring is essential for institutional learning. To quote again from the evaluation of intervention #16 in Lebanon:

> *The absence of a clear Monitoring and Evaluation strategy linked to indicators and assumptions makes it very difficult to measure the progress towards the attainment of the planned development objectives, and most importantly the capitalization on the institutional learning and the lessons from the field as the project unfolds […]Systematic monitoring based on empirical evidence should be hence embedded in the modus operandi of EESC in order to establish a body of knowledge and re-design and/or improve performance based on the analysis of the gathered data..* (Moussa, 2011: 15)

While data are normally disaggregated by sex, further disaggregation would be useful to fully understand the impact of the intervention (including, potentially, its peacebuilding impact):

> *Disaggregation of data is limited to gender, while other variables such as […] age […], their education level, their current employment situation, their work in formal or informal economy, […] would have been very useful in understanding the context […] and would have triggered a wealth of additional insights for this evaluation.* (Moussa, 2011: 17)

In practical terms, the meta-review of evaluations points to considerable room for improvement in the way in which indicators are designed and used. Designing micro-level indicators that are appropriate to the context, relevant to the purpose of the programme, and measurable within the programme's resources and timescale is certainly a challenge, but one that is worth tackling as a matter of priority. This will most certainly also require a corresponding effort in terms of training programme staff within the institutions.

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3. "The JP lacked an effective M&E plan with appropriate indicators for measuring and reporting on results. Consequently, most (if not all) of the intermediate reports generated by the JP provided information on the status of activity implementation as opposed to reporting on the effect of the interventions on the situation of target groups" (Chiwara, 2012: 20-21).

4. "the absence of base indicators and targets since the beginning of the project, and in some cases time frames, does not enable the real measurement of progress. In the absence of target indicators, it is not clear what success should be measured against. Neither is it clear what magnitude of youth trained "effectively" and "efficiently", or what number of enterprises "sustainably" established by youth, or what value of growth of existing enterprises, or of financial or in-kind contributions to the project by partners, should be considered successes. Furthermore, in the absence of timeframes in some cases, the project never made explicit when some of these objectives were to be met". (Bahnassi, n.d.: 29).

5. Evaluations identify flexibility of implementation as a key factor for the success of interventions.

The importance of flexibility in implementation is an issue that came up repeatedly in the evaluations. This is particularly important in post-conflict and fragile contexts, characterised by rapidly changing circumstances and a lack of predictability. As stated by the evaluation of intervention #29 in Sudan:

> *In post conflict areas, recurrence of instabilities should be an anticipated risk in the design, and mitigating measures should be identified in advance.* (Carravilla, n.d.: 38)[5]

The possibility of piloting activities before scaling them up is found to be a key element of success for the ALM programme in Kosovo (#15):

> *The [ALM] project evolved continuously in response to needs identified during implementation and to unexpected barriers or opportunities. Proper initial design of such projects in order to allow measuring of the impact as well as cost effectiveness is very important.[…] This approach of having the project on "permanent monitoring and review" enabled the project to introduce necessary changes in the operational procedures; to test and scale up some schemes while phasing out others; to understand and respond to the capacity building needs of local institutions; to better understand the interventions that were necessary to ensure the long-term sustainability of ALMPs once donor support is phased out. In more practical terms, it was this flexibility that allowed reaching output targets by, for example, softening eligibility criteria to increase participation of minorities or by increasing number of beneficiaries in one scheme when another became less popular.* (UNDP, 2014: 23)

In a similar vein, the evaluation of intervention #21 in Nepal notes that:

> *The project document provided a good deal of flexibility, including in the provision that the logical framework could be revised. This gave the project team and stakeholders the freedom to respond to identified needs and opportunities.* (ILO, 2010: 8)

A case for the importance of flexibility is also made by the Implementation Completion and Results report for World Bank intervention #26 in Sierra Leone, which had to deal with the Ebola outbreak during the implementation period:

> *The project proved valuable in the Ebola outbreak context – it was flexible, provided resources to improve communication to beneficiaries, taught ways to avoid Ebola, etc. The project is a proof that design can be forward looking, with readiness to respond to shocks.* World Bank (2015c: 18)

Fragile post-conflict environments need a contingency plan to be in place from the outset, as noted by the final report for intervention #29 in Sudan. A sound monitoring system, put in place from the very beginning, allows for early warning signs to be acted upon quickly. The failure to do so was noted as a problem in the completion report for intervention #1 in Afghanistan.

6. Evaluations recognise that partnership with the private sector is crucial, but should be based on clear and transparent criteria.

Several programmes rely on partnerships with business firms and other private sector actors for job placements or internships. The mid-term evaluation of intervention #32 in Yemen notes both the importance of partnership for job placement, but also the challenge of having private firms complete the related labour market survey (Bahnassi, 2014: 11).

Intervention #15 in Kosovo is the only example where the potential risks of this partnership were considered and systems were put in place to reduce and manage those risks. The programme had clear a priori eligibility

5. Similar conclusions are reached by the 'Implementation Completion and Results Reports' of the World Bank programmes in Afghanistan (World Bank, 2015a) and Sri Lanka (World Bank, 2015b).

criteria for private sector partners. These revolved around the economic sector (priority access was given to private manufacturing enterprises and agriculture enterprises) and workforce composition (the enterprise was required not to displace its employees or reduce their working hours and to put an experienced worker to supervise the individual beneficiaries). One of the immediate risks with the wage subsidies scheme that were identified at the beginning of the programme was the potential for abuse by beneficiary businesses. Through its monitoring system, the programme found out that some applicant firms were registering their existing employees as unemployed, in order to 'hire' them through the scheme and claim benefits. These firms were rejected (UNDP, 2014: 11).

Intervention #24 in Pakistan required that contracted training providers, as a condition for funding, committed to a minimum level of job placements of trainees. A minimum performance criterion of an initial 25% job placement and/or continuing education and training was included in all contracts with providers, with incentives for meeting targets. The Implementation Completion and Results report finds that "[t]he employment rate of the program increased substantially as a result of the introduction of this performance clause in the contract" (World Bank, 2014b: 12).

Combined, these considerations point to the crucial role of private sector partnerships for employment programmes, but also to the importance of grounding these partnerships on clear criteria and conditions.

7. Evaluations recognise that employment interventions can be a powerful way to promote gender equality. Most of the reviewed interventions include targets for the involvement of women, in absolute or percentage terms. These targets are often exceeded. Data about participation are systematically disaggregated by sex.

A minority of interventions specifically aimed at increasing gender equality and women's empowerment (e.g. Nepal #22). Intervention #17 in Lebanon explicitly sets itself the objective of improving gender equality, alongside its peacebuilding objective:

> *In the Palestine refugee community there is an unequal decision-making power between women and men. Besides culturally bound gender discriminations, Palestinian women's lack of control over financial resources affects their participation in decision making in the household.* (Moran, 2013: 31)
>
> *The opportunities for young women, irrespective of their educational attainment, are frequently constrained by their parents, community elders and older male siblings.* (Moran, 2013: 52)

In response to this, the strategy of the programme is to use successful placement of young women as a way to:

> *Generate income, which hopefully will result in a positive spill-over effect of changing the perception in the Palestinian community of women as economic agents. This it is hoped will position women to become more influential within the community, with a potential to lead by example and affect the decisions of the household and of the youth within the family. Another intended product of the project is the improved access to information for both women and men on their rights with regards to the labor market, which will also empower women (increased access to information on legal rights.)* (Moran, 2013: 32)

Even when gender equality is not an intended objective, several evaluations found a positive impact in this regard.

Women were employed in cash-for-work projects, including in roles and sectors they were not traditionally active in. The ILO/UNDP programme document for Sierra Leone (#25) refers to a labour availability survey that was conducted before the start of the programme. The survey revealed that:

> *There were no religious or cultural inhibitions that prevent men and women from working together nor was there any problem with women working on a construction site or earning the same wages as men.* (Sierra Leone MDTF, 2011)

A consistent finding is that progress in improving gender equity can be made even in situations where there are significant cultural barriers (World Bank, 2015a: 10) and that employment programmes can serve to challenge existing stereotypes of what jobs are 'appropriate' for women. For example, the midterm evaluation of intervention #32 in Yemen finds that:

> *The impact of the Cash-for-Work (CFW) program on young women can go beyond employment and income. While the project was not aiming to radically change the formation of gender relations and the gender division of labour in Yemen, the CFW programs implemented have proved the positive potent for promoting gender equality. The project has enabled young women to engage in school rehabilitation (painting) work for wages for the first time in Yemen and to perform jobs and skills previously considered to be men's exclusive domain, as well as gaining the same rate of pay. New areas for employment and income-generation have opened up for women.* (Bahnassi, 2014: 41)

A well-documented positive effect on gender equality can be found in the Implementation Completion and Results report for World Bank intervention #26 in Sierra Leone:

> *The program appeared to have had positive impacts on inter-personal dynamics and female autonomy at household level. There were positive impacts on family trust and cohesion and women's power to make decision on the use of own earnings and contraceptives. Remarkably, reported incidence of domestic violence among female respondents in the treatment group was significantly lower relative to the control group. Compared to the treatment group, female respondents in the treatment group were also more likely to report that they themselves were the most influential decision-maker on the use of contraceptives and on how to use their own earnings.* (World Bank, 2015c: 49)

While a positive impact on gender equality can be, and often is, unintentional, it is important to explicitly incorporate a gender lens to maximize such impact, e.g. through an initial gender assessment (Carravilla, n.d.), the use of gender-specific indicators (World Bank, 2015c) and/or more stringent guidelines for ensuring a female quota of beneficiaries (Bahnassi, 2014). In two cases (Kosovo #15 and Zimbabwe # 33), an emerging lesson was the need to take child-care needs into consideration.[6]

8. Evaluations find a problem with lack of follow-up with programme participants.

The establishment of mechanisms for the follow-up of participants has been identified as a priority by two of the reviewed evaluations. For example, the final evaluation for intervention #17 in Lebanon concludes that:

> *In terms of employment, no monitoring sheets were provided to the evaluator allowing verification of the numbers of adolescents enrolled in short training courses who subsequently found employment. Feedback from meetings with beneficiaries during the field visits indicates that there may be a high employment rate among the graduates.* (Zakkar, 2013: 10)

One of the recommendations from that evaluation is to "set up [...] a holistic database allowing tracking of each individual beneficiary of the project." (Zakkar, 2013: 6). The same recommendation is also made by the midterm external evaluation of intervention #32 in Yemen:

> *[...] develop a database of youth candidates: youth who were targeted should be registered in a database based on their selection criteria and background information. The database should help the project maintain a large pool of candidates that can gradually and incrementally be fed into the project as youth entering the program. The database also would be used to monitor and track records of the youths' journey during the implementation and after the enterprises 'development.* (Bahnassi, 2014: 17)

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6. The Zimbabwe evaluation recommends setting up baby day care facilities (crèche) to enhance women's effective participation in vocational training (ILO, 2013: 4).

This points to the importance of establishing tracking systems to monitor participants after the end of the programme, as a key factor to ensure sustainability of the intervention, to assess impact in the longer term and to promote organisational learning.

3.5 SUPPORTING EVIDENCE FROM THE CASE STUDIES

3.5.1 LEBANON

It is clear that donor institutions and the wide array of implementing agencies operating in Lebanon typically judge success only in terms of the numbers involved in programmes. In this regard, the peacebuilding aspects of programmes are entirely assumed at best. At worst, these positive externalities are simply hoped for. To our knowledge, no agency in Lebanon has actively measured or sought to measure the impact of their programmes on peace and certainly none has linked their analyses to the theories of change they posit. A common explanation for this is that donors judge employment programmes only in terms of numbers of beneficiaries and are unwilling to fund extensive impact evaluations. Particularly in Lebanon, where competition for resources is high, this results in low priority being given to evaluations, as this may reduce the success probability of a programme proposal. In turn, donors themselves face political pressure from their parliaments to deliver higher numbers, rather than more robust evaluations, exacerbating the evidence gap.

In the absence of meaningful evaluations, we rely instead on contextual evidence from semi-structured interviews with programme participants, which are based on meetings with small groups of programme participants. Evidence supporting either theory of change stemming from these meetings is mixed at best, with a number of competing narratives established. Participants of a UNDP intervention, who were involved in a programme available only to Lebanese people, for example, largely delineated their perceptions of Syrians along their post-programme outcomes. Those with the best outcomes displayed a palpably more favourable opinion of Syrians than those at the other end of the outcome spectrum. This evidence is tempered, however, by the experiences of the participants of an ILO programme, none of whom displayed particularly favourable perceptions of Syrians despite having access to new sources of income. (See BOX 3.1).

This ILO group undertook their training in a mixed group that included 20 Lebanese and seven Syrians yet reported that groups quickly divided along national lines, with little meaningful inter-group contact established. In contrast, a group of young men involved in another multi-nationality ILO programme reported initial tensions between different nationalities. As the programme progressed, these tensions were broken down and friendships established that last until the present day. In the case of the women's group, therefore, it appears that neither step in the contact-based theory of change hypothesis was realised. The mixed group had not encouraged contact between the different national groups. In turn, this precluded the second outcome of the theory being realised in this particular case. In contrast, the young men experienced more positive outcomes, with meaningful contact between the groups being established and barriers being broken down.

Although only anecdotal, these mixed experiences across different programmes suggest that there is no guarantee that programmes will actually realise impacts on peace, or even realise their own theories of change. In this regard, the requirement for more meaningful impact evaluations becomes much more apparent. Even when theories of change are well established, there is no guarantee that programmes can, or do, bring about such changes.

BOX 3.1: The Job Channel in Lebanon

Six young people who have gone through a vocational training course in North Lebanon sit in a room. In this group, one can easily delineate the post-programme outcomes into three broad groups: success, stagnation and failure. At the very top of success is a young man who has a stable job at a restaurant in Beirut. This young man not only has a stable income and a guaranteed job for the future but has undergone significant on-the-job training. He will, in the near future, become a trainer himself and will travel throughout the region with this job. In the middle, there is a group whose lives have not changed much. They may now run businesses but see both opportunities and threats in the current climate. These include a woman who has started a print and copy shop and a young man who has started a mobile phone repair shop. Both have new customers as a result of the arrival of refugees from Syria but have also faced pressures, including increased rents. The final group, consisting of two young men, have failed to start businesses, blaming these same increased rents. However, they have also struggled to return to the informal work they used to do, as they perceive themselves to have been priced out of the market.

The same broad lines of differentiation in outcome can easily be used to delineate the perceptions of Syrians in Lebanon held by these six young people. The first young man sympathises with their plight and suggests they should be helped more. Those in the middle both appreciate the additional customer base whilst remaining neutral on the presence of Syrians in their community. Those with the worst outcomes also express the worst attitudes towards Syrians, perceiving them only as a threat to themselves and their communities.

All of these young people undertook different strands of the same training course, yet demonstrate significantly different perceptions about Syrians in Lebanon. With some, the tension is palpable in how they speak and in their body language. In this case, the evidence for the programme channel effect appears to be minimal. The support of the job channel hypothesis, however, remains strong.

3.5.2 LIBERIA

A number of donors operating in Liberia have been able to undertake robust and rigorous evaluations of their programmes, which in turn provides plenty of strong background evidence. This goes back to the work of Chris Blattman and Jeannie Annan (2010), who looked at the impact of an ex-combatant reintegration programme. This research, however, focused only on the economic impacts of the programme, showing that ex-combatants from the treatment group were better off than those from the control group. A pilot of the World Bank's Youth, Employment, Skills (YES) programme was also rigorously evaluated using an experimental design, showing strong economic effects (World Bank, 2012b). On-going analyses of the YES programme include non-economic indicators linked to peacebuilding but focuses only on intertemporal changes in indicators for the treatment group, rather than for both treatment and control groups. Furthermore, results in these non-economic domains are mixed, with only a small number of a large number of indicators proving statistically significant. Whilst feeding into more general concerns about how to measure peacebuilding aspects of employment for peacebuilding interventions, an associated statistical concern arises. Given the low proportion of indicators that are statistically significant and the large number of indicators, it is possible that some of the indicators that are significant are so-called 'false positives', i.e. statistical effects that are due to random chance rather than a genuine causal effect.

Less controversial is an impact evaluation of the 'Economic Empowerment of Adolescent Girls and Young Women' (EPAG) programme, which used a randomised pipeline research design of the project's pilot that compared the outcomes of a treatment group entering training in the first round of training sessions in March 2010 - February 2011 to a control group of those participating between July 2011 and June 2012. This programme was shown to have significantly boosted young women's economic well-being in terms of

employment, income and propensity towards saving. The programme is also reported to have had small but significant effects on women's empowerment. The link between women's empowerment and peacebuilding via improved social cohesion, however, is only hypothesised. Like a number of programmes in Liberia, however, these results cannot be generalised. The most vulnerable young women (e.g. those who are functionally illiterate) are explicitly prevented from participating in the programme. It is unclear what impacts, if any, such programmes would have on more vulnerable people. In non-academic terms, there is strong evidence of the employment boosting effects of a number of programmes in Liberia, but evidence on their impact on peacebuilding remains thin.

A more pointed criticism of this research, general to all of the impact evaluations, however, is the tendency for it to ignore the underpinning theories of change linking employment and peacebuilding. Rather, this research seems to follow an input-outcome model that treats the transfer mechanisms as something of a black box. In such a situation, it is impossible to understand the routes through which programmes can, or at least are expected, to have an impact. In turn, this shows that, whilst there is some evidence available, certainly for the impact of pro-employment programmes on economic indicators, there is none that can directly support the theories of change at play. It is also apparent that agencies in Liberia are well aware of the trade-offs involved between preferred programme design and evaluation capacity. A meeting with an implementing and evaluation officer of one agency, for example, revealed understanding that allowing demand-driven self-selection into treatment aims had an effect on the quality of the impact evaluation but that, to provide maximal impact, such an approach was preferable and worth the associated evaluation risks.

Perhaps a more concerning source of evidence comes from the 'Innovations for Poverty Action' impact evaluation of a programme that includes both a psychosocial aspect and an economic one, comprising both cash transfers and cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT). Participants who received only the cash grant were found to be no better off than the control group. However, those who received CBT were significantly better off, and those who received both the grant and CBT were better off than both the control group and the group of those who received only CBT (See Box 3.10). This, in turn, suggests that a focus only on employment may not be sufficient to build peace, but that these improvements are either merely a sufficient condition or simply an enhancer of the effects of other methods for building peace.

A final major consideration is the anecdotal evidence uncovered relating to the externalities stemming from employment interventions. Although some of these externalities could be positive – for example, one female participant of a programme reported creating a larger business with her mother than a competing smaller business – these examples were not universal. Indeed, a number of programmes may have caused negative externalities. The most common example of such externalities involved new businesses set up by programme participants competing with and crowding out established businesses. Immediately, this suggests that even successful programmes do not necessarily create more jobs or entrepreneurs. More concerning, however, is the impact such crowding out could have, particularly when viewed in terms of grievance theories of change. Established firms going out of business could easily create tensions by itself, as the owners of those firms lose income and security. Especially if programmes are perceived to have unfairly targeted one demographic or social grouping, this could further be exacerbated by perceptions of unfairness. Such potential externalities are clearly an area that needs more research, not least on the peacebuilding connotations for job displacement, as well as job creation.

In combination, this suggests that many programmes in Liberia have succeeded in developing employment, whilst evidence on non-economic indicators is mixed if available at all. It is hard to criticise the agencies' dedication to rigorous impact evaluation but the requirement to focus more strongly on peacebuilding aspects remains apparent, as does the need to link such evaluations to the theories of change that underpin programmes. Even when theories of change are well established and incorporated into programmes, evaluations tend not to look at the steps involved. In this context, there is no guarantee that programmes can,

or do, bring about the changes they are hypothesised to. Indeed, as one interviewee stated, "We know the programmes work because we have strong theories of change." Without better analysis of the steps involved in each of these impact transfer mechanisms, however, such a statement will remain strong and laden with big assumptions.

Another source of missing information in Liberia pertains to weak and missing analyses of spillovers – positive and negative – from programmes taking place. Important narratives were established in Liberia about negative spillovers, for example, that have not been rigorously analysed. One of the most common issues is that new businesses started by individuals involved in programmes had begun to crowd out previous businesses in the same communities (See BOX 3.2). In these particular cases, demand appears fixed but that competition, temporarily at least, drives down prices forcing some businesses to close. Not only does this imply that the programmes in question are only partially successful and do not necessarily produce net benefits, but it also opens up the potential for new tensions between programme participants and existing entrepreneurs (see BOX 3.3). Such tensions could be further exacerbated if there is perception of unfairness or nepotism, for example, in the selection of programme participants.

BOX 3.2

> *"I started the same kind of business as my mother because that's what I knew. Then she wasn't doing so good so we had to go into business together."* - Female Interviewee involved in Skills Training Programme near Monrovia, Liberia.

BOX 3.3

> *"When I went back to my community after the training and started my business it was fine but then the owners of other businesses started to get angry. Eventually, one of them closed."* Female Interviewee involved in Skills Training Programme in Bensonville, Liberia.

BOX 3.4: Cognitive Behavioural Therapy in Liberia

At the very core of much of the research included in this article is a question about whether economic opportunity, alone, is a sufficient condition to build peace or if it is merely a necessary one. The nature of this question makes it very hard to disentangle, given the relatively small number of evaluations of employment for peacebuilding programmes, let alone evaluations of those with both employment and non-employment components.

One of the few programmes that has gone some of the way to attempting to answer this question is a programme run in Liberia with almost 1,000 young men, most of whom were engaged in theft, drug dealing and who often had violent confrontations with each other. One part of this programme offered cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) through the Sustainable Transformation of Youth in Liberia (STYL) programme; the other was an unconditional cash grant of US$200 - approximately three month's wages in Liberia. Both strands of the programme were assigned by a lottery, meaning that some applications received neither the CBT nor the US$200; some received only CBT; some received only the cash grant; and some received both. In this regard, the programme offers not just the opportunity to understand the impact of an economic opportunity programme (the cash grant) or just a peacebuilding programme (the CBT strand), but also the missing information on how these interact with and complement each other. Unlike most other programmes reviewed during this research, this one also focuses on peace-related outcome variables, rather than just the usual employment or economic ones. These include both (self-reported) individual participation in pre-/violent behaviours and individual acceptance of such activities. Furthermore, it follows up with individuals in the short term (2-5 weeks after the programme) and in the long term (12-13 months after the programme), allowing the results to demonstrate a potentially rich tapestry of effects.

This rich tapestry throws up a number of relevant outcomes for our research. If, for example, those who received only the cash grant demonstrate reduced engagement in pre-/violent behaviours in the short and long term, then one may be able to deduce - at least in this situation - that improved economic opportunity (at least at the individual level) is enough to build peace. On the other hand, however, if those who only received therapy show improvements just as large as the group that received both the therapy and the cash grant, one may infer that - for at-risk men in Liberia - economic opportunity may not even be a necessary condition to build peace. Of course, if the final outcome is that it takes both the therapy and the cash grant to cause improvements in attitudes towards and engagement in pre-/violent behaviours, then one may conclude that, in this situation, economic opportunity is a necessary but not sufficient condition to build peace.

In fact, what the evaluation shows is that there is no impact, short- or long-term, on many key indicators of pre-/violent behaviour for the group who received only the cash grant relative to the control group. Those who received only the therapy, on the other hand, demonstrate improved attitudes towards and engagement in pre-/violent behaviours but only in the short run. Within one year, this effect appears to have disappeared. Finally, those who received both the cash grant and the therapy demonstrate improvements in both the short and longer terms. This suggests, primarily, that in this particular setting, economic opportunity alone is not sufficient to build peace. However, certainly when considering things in the long term, it is a necessary condition.

This is, of course, only one programme, targeted only at one particular group, in one part of one country. Yet, it provides important opportunities for learning for future programming. First and foremost, it shows that it is possible to evaluate programmes with economic opportunity components against peacebuilding- and pre-/violent behaviour-related outcomes. Indeed, through a mix of qualitative and quantitative data collection, it may provide a strong model that can be used in other situations - particularly as the qualitative data collection, which included 'shadowing' participants in their day-to-day life, was used to verify self-reported engagement in pre-/violent behaviours. In future, such 'shadowing' may not always be necessary. However, it also provides a good model for how attribution can be assessed in programmes with multiple components. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, it shows that the strong assumptions made in many programmes do not always hold. Had this programme included only an economic opportunity component, it is not clear that positive effects would have emerged on the most important indicators of pre-/violent behaviour.

3.5.3 TIMOR-LESTE

As in many other contexts, the donors operating in Timor-Leste have to judge success of an employment programme primarily based on the number of beneficiaries involved in programmes, but also put a particular emphasis on understanding the direct and indirect effects on economic development. Many programmes in Timor-Leste (including those that are not directly employment interventions), as for example ILO's 'Roads for Development' (R4D) programme, have been monitored closely and evaluated extremely well, including thorough external midterm reviews and internal evaluations of the economic impact of this public investment programme. These impact evaluations often consider multiple dimensions, externalities and spillover effects, such as impacts on markets, access to markets and access to services at the community, road and individual levels, including beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries (e.g. R4D, 2015a; R4D, 2015b). Reports based on survey data collected by the agencies as well as our own interviews with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries at programme sites suggest that the economic impact is often significant. Most programmes are much appreciated by involved communities and achieve their primary objectives of creating short-term work opportunities - where via rotations mechanisms many persons participate - and improving access to services and markets. For the prioritised road projects, there appears to be surprisingly little conflict over where exactly a road is built, and road construction was described by representatives of several treated communities as a "blessing from god."

From a labour perspective, the majority of these recent interventions are public works programmes with short-term employment components, with only few training components for ordinary individuals.[1] In addition, the agencies in Timor-Leste have so far only rarely explicitly measured, or sought to measure, any impact of their programme on peace and long-run development, i.e. including impacts on employment beyond the end of the programme. Particularly over the past five years, outcomes have strongly focused on building capacity, including infrastructure and training of local contractors. These are implemented by the programmes locally, with the assistance of the agencies. In combination with strong investments in institutional capacity and the private sector, this raises great expectations for sustainable employment in the long run. Yet, whether these expectations can be fulfilled and opportunities delivered still remains to be seen (and tested). Notably, quantifying the sustained impact on employment is consistently referred to by interview partners as "the next stage," while that on peace is neglected and discounted.

Taken together, there is a striking discrepancy between the extensive evaluation of job channel effects and the near absence of evidence on the peacebuilding impact of employment interventions. We hence rely on indirect and/or anecdotal evidence to assess the relevance of theories of change in programming and whether impacts were realised in practice, be it intentionally or not.

Many interview partners believe that veterans have the influence and ability to organise unrest in the future, and equally many view youths as the most likely followers. Yet, meaningfully designed and evaluated employment programmes addressing these risks are rare. Despite the absence of impact evaluations, the general narrative revealed in all qualitative stakeholder interviews is that job creation is essential for peace. This narrative is predicated on contextualized versions of two common and distinct assumptions. The first one is: Unemployment is a risk for peace. In Timor-Leste, this assumption is most commonly expressed by through the ubiquitous usage of the term 'ticking bomb' to refer to unemployed youth. The second one is: Employment is synonymous with peace (see also above). This assumption is sometimes derived from the first assumption. The underlying mechanisms are usually assumed and not questioned or addressed rigorously, but accounts by stakeholders reveal that these are associated with opportunity-based theories of change for both the high-risk and the at-risk groups. By contrast, the role of grievance-based transfer mechanisms is discounted consistently and only rarely considered.

Many agency and government officials emphasise that it is necessary to keep 'idle youth' 'off the street' or 'busy'. There is substantial disagreement as to how easily youth might actually be mobilised (now), but most interview partners discount the role of economic, political or ideological incentives. As one of the interview partners who believes that idle youth could be mobilised easily put it: "A T-shirt is enough to mobilise youth here. It does not matter who you are, as long as it's exciting." A related central theme that emerged in interviews is that many idle youth join the so-called 'martial arts groups' described above. While a social capital view directly implies that being organised in these groups might catalyse mobilisation for collective pre-/violent behaviour, there is broad agreement that the martial arts groups themselves are very unlikely to instigate violence or upheaval against the state, given their nature. While especially civic society actors and local NGOs lament incidents of street fighting and gang behaviour, these groups are often even dismissed as 'folkloristic'. Beyond idle youth, the main concern many stakeholders raise is that that 'veterans' are potentially the biggest threat to stability as they have the ability to 'cause trouble', if they chose to do so. Due to this belief, many informants are divided about the social value of the very generous pensions that veterans receive. Providing veterans with a stable income is by many considered as an instrument to 'buy peace' rather than an efficient way to combat poverty. While the evidence is only indirect and does not derive from the agencies' employment programmes directly, these accounts are consistent with the theory that cash-transfers can deter 'mobilisers' from instigating unrest. While this refers to the rarely made distinction between 'leaders' and 'followers' in civil unrest (see section 3.4 above), there is actually neither rigorous evidence from Timor-Leste on the validity of this distinction nor on

1. Training components often focus on so-called local contractors, whose business skills are to be built (see below).

the detailed mechanisms of how veterans may be bought off in such a way. Beyond the economic opportunity-cost arguments, it is conceivable that stable payments also induce gratitude among veterans.

Compared to the opportunity-based theories, the role of grievances for at-risk youth is downplayed by many stakeholders in Timor-Leste. These views are consistent with evidence from informal interviews with young unemployed youth in Dili, many of whom display very forgiving views of the government and who seem to have a low level of resentment concerning their position in society. This observation is also confirmed by nationally representative survey data on perceptions from 2013, which show that levels of both perceptions of security and trust in formal institutions are higher than expected, and have even slightly increased since 2008 (Asia Foundation 2013, Asia Foundation 2014).[2] From a theoretical point of view, however, this presents a puzzle. Why are the young unemployed not more upset, given the challenging economic and political situation?[3]
From our interviews with youth, agencies, NGOs and government officials, four sets of explanations emerged, all of which emphasise the role of the local context and inform lessons for future programmes in Timor-Leste (see more details see BOX 3.5).

BOX 3.5: Why are the young and unemployed in Timor-Leste not more upset?

First, economic grievances are relieved due to an extraordinary level of social capital. Upon graduation from or when leaving high school, young people can and do return to their families, which provide an economic and social safety net, often based on a single breadwinner. While the determinants of social capital are complex, this observation is consistent with a growing number of academic studies from various countries that find strong correlations between intense conflict violence on the one hand and post-conflict cooperation and socially beneficial behaviour on the other (Bauer et al 2016). In addition, there is strong evidence for carefully engineered and successful efforts by the agencies and other actors to promote social inclusion, while protecting against elite capture in the challenging early stages following independence in 2002 (see e.g. World Bank 2006).

Yet, this raises the question of how the existing safety net is funded and for how long such a mechanism can be sustained. What if, for example, the single breadwinner lost his or her job? At the moment, much income is earned in the public sector, in the oil industry and by social transfers (veteran pensions), all of which are likely to decline in the future. There are efforts to shrink the public sector as the main employer, oil revenues are plummeting and veteran pensions are a contentious topic as well as a burden on public finances.

Second, grievances against the state and public authorities are (still) mitigated by the public awareness that Timor-Leste is a very young nation that 'needs to be built' together. This narrative was promoted by various influential participatory programmes before 2012, such as 'Build the Nation' and 'Serve the Nation'. Yet again, having contributed to reducing fragility and increasing social cohesion, patience is likely a limited good. As with economic grievances, grievances against the state are hence likely to rise, should patience dry up or development dividends cease to materialise.

Third, the level of (latent) social conflict seems comparably low. While Timor-Leste is a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual society, tensions between ethnic groups appear low in comparison to contexts such as Lebanon and Liberia. In addition, despite its violent history, Timor-Leste never had a (protracted) civil conflict. Rather, for a very long time the Timorese always had a 'common enemy' that had seized their territory during the occupations by Portugal and Indonesia. The few NGOs engaged in direct conflict resolution and social inclusion emphasise gender-based and domestic violence as their focal areas in social conflict, while other forms of violent crime are not viewed as a priority issue.

2. This is consistent with the positive macro-level security assessments, as by the g7+.

3. Obviously, the puzzle also gives rise to the concern that these structural factors may eventually lead to a rise in discontent and insecurity.

Fourth, it appears that cultural beliefs and attitudes tend to reject hostility and promote patience. While it is difficult to measure or prove this statement, it would be another factor supporting a peaceful society. Interviews with the aforementioned NGOs reveal concerns that these cultural 'norms' are gradually becoming weaker among young people. However, the NGOs report that their main target with youth violence is to help manage impulsive reactions to stress, i.e. to train youth to be able to cope with situations non-violently when they are under pressure or feel threatened.

BOX 3.6: Current Programming, Context and the Future – A Synecdoche from Timor-Leste

During our field visits, we found that rigorous impact evaluations conducted by donor agencies were rare across all locations. The reasons for this, however, are specific to each context. In Lebanon, the unprecedented extent of the Syrian crisis and its impacts on Lebanese society led to an action first model. In Liberia, as discussed elsewhere in this report, a number of experimental impact evaluations have taken place, yet these are still small in number and remain entirely engulfed by the extent of on-going programming in the country, particularly in the post-Ebola phase. In Timor-Leste, the absence of impact evaluations stems from a shift of government priorities and associated donor strategies in 2012. The shift in priorities in Timor-Leste from short-term stabilisation to longer-term development goals is an opportunity as well for impact evaluations, however, as it acts as a source of exogenous variation in the data and provides an opportunity to understand the interaction of context and evaluation outcomes.

In Timor-Leste before 2012, there was a strong employment-for-peace programming component (e.g. ILO's 'Work for Peace' programme) emphasised in official documentation and in the narratives of local stakeholders. The initiatives associated with this successfully and deliberately delivered short-term employment to vulnerable groups. While carefully designed and effectively implemented, these programmes often relied on the assumption that employment automatically builds peace, whilst the underlying logic of the connection was neither specifically evaluated nor specified. Since 2012, however, peacebuilding is no longer a mainstreamed goal in Timor-Leste – without such a priority area, for example, PBSO is no longer active in the country. As a result, programmes of any sort that aim to build peace are scattered, small-scale and typically carried out by NGOs that focus on non-violent conflict resolution at the community level.

In the absence of recent rigorous evaluations of the impacts of programmes of any sort – including employment programmes – on peace, it is difficult to estimate the peace outcomes such interventions could have had. At the same time, however, two discrepancies arise with respect to the theories of change defined in Section 2. First of all, young people in Timor-Leste considered 'at risk' are mostly concentrated in urban areas, yet a significant proportion of programming that targets this group take place in rural areas.[4] This includes, for example, the large-scale 'Road Climate Resilience' project from the World Bank and the public investment programme 'R4D' from ILO. Second, many programmes that work through the opportunity transfer mechanism focus on direct remuneration, rather than employment generations (e.g. the government's social welfare payment to veterans), which raises moral hazard issues as payments need to be sustained to transmit the effect in question.

This suggests that in every FCS, there will be a number of neglected forms of impact evaluation that are particularly pertinent. Such needs should be defined by the agencies and lead to new information. In Timor-Leste, we define two that are of particular importance:

1. Employment programmes that target youth should differentiate 'productive' versus short-term measures that merely keep youth 'busy'.

4. There are some important exceptions, such as the "Training and Employment Support Programme" (TSEP), but our experience in the field suggested that such programmes were the exception rather than the rule.

2. Employment programmes that target veterans should differentiate between making them 'productive' members of society versus directly incentivising their actions[5].

Similar considerations should be given to both the long-term picture and the transitional phases that foreshadow such long-term picture in all contexts. Timor-Leste, once more, straddles these phases, with suggestion that the next 5-10 years will usher significant structural and attitudinal change. Decreasing oil prices, for example, are likely to require significant growth of the private sector, fundamentally changing the tax base of the economy. In turn, this switches the focus from the micro-level theories of change espoused here to the more macro-level ones. At the same time, however, such changes in the economy are also likely – particularly in the short-term – to alter the developmental landscape. Any clamour at the individual level to benefit from the dividends of anticipated development that is not realised, in turn, could pose a new threat to peace. In such a situation, aggrieved but currently-pacified youth may be more easily incentivised to engage in pre-/violent behaviours. In this situation, it is not clear that programme channels that simply keep people busy will be enough to sustain peace.

Specifically, this points at the need for sustainable, peace-oriented programming in Timor-Leste. More generally, however, it also points to the need to understand not only current threats to peace but how such threats could be manifested in the future. Programming, in turn, should not target only current deficits but also those that could arise in the future and, more pertinently, that could arise as a by-product of prior programming. Planning for the future, and understanding how current interventions may influence those plans, therefore, remains imperative. This points to a general need to monitor behaviour and attitudes towards peace for both programme beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries and to consider whether money, or busyness, alone are enough to keep peace - or if decent jobs and sustainable livelihoods are the key for peace instead.

5. We note that any proposal that would actually cut benefits to veterans in Timor-Leste is sensitive and should be treated with significant caution.

4. COMPLEMENTARITY: HOW HAVE AGENCIES WORKED TOGETHER?

The scenarios that require 'employment-for-peacebuilding' style programming are some of the most complicated that development agencies face. On the one hand, there is an immediate need to end, prevent or mitigate conflict and to prevent slippage back into violence. On the other hand, a set of urgent and acute developmental needs exists. Implementing programmes, or a series of programmes, that match all of the needs of these highly complex scenarios, is therefore likely well beyond the scope or even mandate of a single agency or NGO, let alone a single department or group within an agency. It logically follows that any comprehensive policy in these scenarios could - and does - require multiple agencies to work together and to leverage their comparative advantages to deliver the maximum possible impact. The flip side, however, is that working together is unlikely to be costless, both creating the possibility of waste and challenging the assertion that inter-agency complementarity is universally positive. Such costs are likely to be even higher in FCS. Travel and communication costs, for example, are likely to be higher.

We find that agencies currently lack a set decision-making processes to determine the costs and benefits of collaboration. Consequently, agencies should implement such processes on a case-by-case basis, rather than seeking to cooperate in all potential situations. This stems, at least in part, from a gap between how headquarter views and administers collaboration and the reality of what programme and country staff face in the field. We find many good examples of collaboration but also cases of collaboration hampering programmes. In addition, there are cases where nothing happened, although programmes could have taken place and brought about additional benefits. It is more concerning that the theoretical base for collaboration appears to be weaker than that for the link between employment programmes and peacebuilding.[1]

What is clear is that the notion that complementarity of actions is inherently a good thing is accepted wisdom within all agencies, and that all agencies have taken major steps to formalise its importance in a series of current and historical policies. At the same time, whilst these policies note the benefits of working together, they provide very little practical guidance on how to do so at the programme level, or even at the country level. In turn, this appears to have created a very real disconnect between notions of complementarity in the upper echelons of agencies and how this can feasibly be implemented in the field, not least given the funding pressures that each agency faces. This disconnect is important and requires immediate addressing by all agencies. Whilst there is much information on the benefits of working together, it appears that little thought has been given to how this can be achieved, given the day-to-day pressure country offices and implementation groups face.

Another consideration relates to flexibility, as discussed in Section 3.3. Such flexibility is an important component of programming responsive to the complex environment and needs of fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS). Flexibility allows some components of a programme to be discontinued, as time progresses and other parts of them – particularly those that appear to have the most pronounced effects – to be scaled up as needs require. Such flexibility clearly interacts with various forms of inter-agency collaboration. On the one

1. We also note that there is likely to be a significant amount of intra-agency collaboration as well, which also comes with costs and benefits. It may be worth agencies' time and effort to consider whether or not such intra-agency collaboration can act as a baseline model for how inter-agency collaboration can function better.

hand, it implies a potential need to discontinue the operations of at least one agency in a cooperative situation, whilst on the other potentially scaling up the role of others, which poses obvious challenges and creates additional complexity for joint programmes. Conflict is therefore likely to arise between the private incentives of a given agency and the provision of joint programming. Similarly, it also implies additional complexity in coordinative programming, where agencies work alone but leverage their comparative advantages against those of other agencies. Flexibility implies that agencies' sphere of influence, their needs and, in turn, the comparative advantages that they have, are likely to change over time. Such a requirement suggests that, in FCS, the potential costs and complexities of collaboration increase drastically.

In turn, this implies a requirement for more formal policies that provide information on three major strands of complementarity: how agencies can go about developing joint programming as a first stop, rather than as one that presents itself through opportunity or good fortune; how agencies can accurately and meaningfully consider the costs that act as barriers to complementarity as well as the benefits that stem from it and; how agencies can coordinate their individual activities and overcome the costs mentioned in point two in order to ensure that they deliver on the defined needs, without leaving gaps or having unnecessary overlaps in programming (probably the most important issue). At present, the underlying processes that would facilitate this are not as well defined as other parts of the complementarity strategy. In non-academic terms, deeper thought must be given not just to how agencies can work together to identify needs, but also to how they can work together to satisfy those needs and how they can overcome the costs of doing so. This should be a necessary part of all future 'Post-Conflict Needs Assessments' (PCNAs). To achieve this, however, the processes that govern how agencies can and do work together must first be defined and formalised.

4.1 THEORY OF COMPLEMENTARITY

Although it may prima facie seem logical that complementarity is a good thing, this notion requires in-depth consideration. On the one hand, collaboration can deliver a multitude of material benefits. This includes, for example, the ability to leverage a much wider range of comparative and absolute advantages, to draw on a much wider information and knowledge base and to design and implement larger programmes that benefit from significant economies of scale. Such phenomena not only potentially contribute to improved programming, they also provide benefits of focus, which allow agencies to do what they are best at rather than wasting time, energy and other scarce resources in competition over funds.

This, however, should be tempered by other important economic features that compromise the net benefits of complementarity. For example, although competition among donors may cause agencies to spend resources chasing funding for new programming, the competition that this instils can also breed innovation. In the first instance, it implies that agencies will receive a premium for new or more effective forms of programming; in the other, the competitive environment itself may lead agencies to devoting more energy to improving their own programmes. Particularly in the long term, such innovations could lead to significant improvements in the way programmes are designed, managed, implemented and evaluated. This stands in contrast to the potential for cooperative cartels to breed corruption and to block such innovation.

A universal view that complementarity is a good thing also ignores other important phenomena. For example, it may not be costless for agencies to work together, particularly at the country and programme levels. These costs could be organisational, practical, operational or all of these, and include, for example: posting staff to act as focal points for coordination; barriers to complementarity stemming from agencies working with different government ministries; differences in mandates, approaches, monitoring, evaluation techniques and documentation. All of this is not to mention that each agency – and even different groups or departments within an agency – will undertake different approaches, even if their goals are largely similar, further adding

to these costs. Given this interaction of costs and benefits, the notion of 'optimal' complementarity arises (see Figure 4-1).



Figure 4-1 - Knowing When to Stop

How much collaboration is not enough? How much is too much? And what is just right? In practical terms, a requirement exists to decide – in each scenario – whether the benefits that could arise from complementarity exceed the implicit costs. It should be understood that in certain situations, it is optimal for agencies not to work together. Calculating such expected costs and benefits, however, is no small task. Agencies must, therefore, formalise methods for measuring both the expected costs and expected benefits from working together.

In section 3.3, we have seen that flexibility is widely seen as a key element of success when implementing employment programmes in conflict and post-conflict settings. This includes the possibility of discontinuing some elements of the programme while scaling up others. It is reasonable to ask whether this element of adaptive management - which has been identified as a key factor of success for single-agency programmes such as UNDP's ALM in Kosovo (#15) and ILO's EmPLED in Nepal (#21) would be more difficult to achieve in multi-agency programmes (where discontinuing a component may mean, in essence, 'eliminating' an agency from the programme).

In situations where agencies believe that the benefits of complementarity outweigh the costs, a second decision on the form of such collaboration must be taken. We define two forms of complementarity - 'cooperation' and 'coordination' – each with its own costs and benefits. Cooperation is self-explanatory and focuses on multiple agencies working together to deliver programmes jointly with other agencies. This process relies on joined-up thinking and decision-making from within agencies from a programme's inception phase. Coordination, on the other hand, looks at how agencies' individual actions sum up to meet all of the defined needs of a particular

scenario and the extent to which these actions are deliberate. In practical terms, this means that agencies in principle do their own thing but work pro-actively with other agencies when situations come up that require it. Whilst the costs of cooperation are obvious, e.g. the combined actions of multiple partners, difficulties in defining each agency's comparative advantage within a programme, other concerns arise. In particular, these relate to working out how many agencies it is desirable to have. On the one hand, increasing the number of agencies is likely to bring new skills, ideas and advantages to the table. On the other hand, each new agency added significantly increases the costs of cooperation. Coordination, on the other hand, is likely to suffer fewer direct costs, as it relies on agencies working on their own, thus reducing the additional oversight and management costs. The flip side of this argument is that the mapping of complex environments needed to facilitate coordinated action is costly and time-consuming, as is coordinating individual actions to ensure that both overlaps and gaps in what is provided are minimised. It thus follows that complementarity may not be a desirable, let alone achievable, goal in all situations. Agencies should make decisions sequentially and rationally, based on the expected costs and benefits at each decision node.

Thus, whilst inter-agency complementarity is often held up to be a universally desirable objective, agencies must be clear about both the costs and the benefits of such approaches, about the needs they satisfy and about whether complementarity adds significant benefits to programming capacity and impact. This not only requires agencies to consider the costs and benefits of complementarity, but also the optimal form of complementarity for a given situation. Furthermore, once agencies have made decisions to collaborate, a series of subsequent decisions must be made on the form of such collaboration. This includes how many agencies should be involved in cooperative programming and which agencies should have which comparative advantages in coordinative situations. Each of these decisions should be made on a case-by-case basis.

4.2 COMPLEMENTARITY POLICIES

The potential requirement to work together in complex environments is well known across the wider United Nations system. In response to these needs, the individual organisations have developed a series of policies designed, specifically, to bring agencies together to define system-wide needs. Within the World Bank, for example, the 'Conflict Analysis Framework' (CAF) initially defined the importance of development and security agencies working together. This was superseded by the more recent 'Political Economy of Conflict' (PEC) approach, which took these ideas but added the importance of looking at sub-national regions, as well as nations. In turn, this policy advocates a horizontal overview that integrates impact across programmes, rather than vertical and siloed programming. In practical terms, this policy hints at the importance of programmes fitting together, even if they have different motivations, rather than each set of programmes taking place in isolation from the rest of the system in which it is implemented.

By a similar token, the United Nations has well defined policies in such challenging circumstances. This organisation espouses the notion that employment and income generation are fundamental elements of post-conflict peacebuilding but that delivering successful employment and income programmes would be challenging even in the best of circumstances. To overcome this, they suggest a significant need to build partnerships, both across United Nations agencies and with non-United Nations agencies. This approach is highlighted in the United Nations 'Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration' and its associated Operational Guidance Note (OGN). This policy proposes a three track approach: stabilising income generation and provision of emergency employment; promoting opportunities at the local level and; supporting sustainable employment creation and decent work.

Given the need to undertake programming in all three tracks at once, although with varying densities over time, a system-wide approach is often required to deliver on this policy. Such an approach relies on United Nations agencies, international finance institutions (IFI) and other stakeholders to apply coordinated and

comprehensive approaches to tackle the issues at hand. This means that this approach requires collaboration between a multitude of agencies, donors and other stakeholders that builds on the comparative advantages of each. In turn, this policy also provides guidance on the kinds of programmes that can go into each of the three tracks and how they sum up to the overall goals of the programming.

These overall goals are typically defined by 'Post-Conflict Needs Assessment' (PCNA), which are most commonly jointly developed by the World Bank and the United Nations. Each PCNA is designed to deliver a comprehensive and objective estimate of need. In turn, this should provide consensus on the priorities in each scenario, in turn aiming to minimise programme overlap and ensuring more coherence amongst donors. However, whilst the PCNA is designed to estimate and define the needs of each scenario, it does not provide specific programme proposals. Given the scope of the work, there is a need for significant collaboration amongst agencies to put together a PCNA, requiring joined-up thinking at the HQ and country levels. The main issue with PCNAs, and with all of the policies discussed more generally, is that, whilst it is feasible to believe that they create an overall image of the needs of the country and even of the programming required to deliver these needs, they do not provide instruction on the practicalities of how agencies can, or should, work together in the field or how they can identify opportunities for doing so.

Despite the explicit understanding in each policy that agencies need to work together and that they need to maintain focus at the system as well as the programme level, there is very little guidance in these policies on how to do this at a practical level. PCNAs, for example, define well how agencies should collaborate to put together the assessment, including defining leadership roles at the HQ and country level, but do not provide information on how agencies can best leverage their comparative advantages to actually implement the programmes in question. In turn, this opens up the potential that, whilst much has been done to overcome the barriers to effective collaboration at the highest levels within agencies, practical gaps prevent these ideas from being realised. This is reinforced by a relative lack of guidance on how agencies can identify opportunities to collaborate.

In non-academic terms, it is generally accepted that agencies realise the importance and benefits of working together but that, especially at the implementation level, there is a lack of guidance on how to go about implementing it and benefitting from it. In particular, there is little critical reflection on the costs of complementarity and, accordingly, on its desirability in each set of circumstances. There is significant guidance, for example, on the rules all agencies should follow in designing their programming, but very little on how they can join together to ensure they are following a comprehensive approach. In effect, this implies that while the sphere of needs is often well defined, there is a lack of clarity on how agencies can work together to satisfy this entire universe of needs. In turn, it would appear that both overlaps and gaps in satisfying all of the needs of a particular context are almost inevitable.

In practical terms, this implies that there exists a potential disconnect between HQ and the field. This extends both to the desirability of complementary programming in a given situation and to how the benefits of complementarity can be reaped without incurring the multitude of associated costs. In turn, this risks a lack of joined-up thinking at the programme or situational level, leading to a lack of coherence in complementarity. As a result, this seems likely to provide isolated examples of agencies working well together but, potentially, without the prerequisite structure to allow this to become the rule.

4.3 FINDINGS FROM THE REVIEW OF INTERVENTIONS

Of the 33 interventions selected for in-depth review, 13 were implemented in collaboration by two or more agencies. Of these, four are a collaboration of two agencies, three are a collaboration of three agencies, and six are a collaboration of four or more agencies.

The reviewed evaluations do not dwell at length on the value added of collaboration to enhance the peacebuilding impact of employment interventions. Furthermore, they do not explicitly address the issue of value added by collaboration, nor (with few exceptions) do they tackle the costs incurred by collaboration. Most comments regard 'positive collaboration'.

Reflections and lessons emerging from the document review are:

1. **Collaboration can be effective in increasing efficiency and effectiveness in managing limited resources.**

This point is made by the final report of intervention #2 in Burundi, with regard to the collaboration between UNDP and the United Nations Integrated Office In Burundi (BINUB).

> *Positive collaboration experiences are often down to good teamwork. For example, the final report for the intervention in Sudan (#29) noted that collaboration among the agencies was positive, with periodic meetings to resolve issues and to chart the best way forward: "[g]ood teamwork was established among focal points, and this had definitely contributed to collaborative efforts to achieve project results.* (MDGF, 2013: 6)

2. **It is possible to have 'too much of a good thing', with an excessive number of agencies involved in planning and implementation.**

Evaluations for joint programmes2 in Sudan (#29) and South Sudan (#27)3 both find that the number of international agencies involved (11 for each programme4) was excessive.

The mid-term evaluation also noted that the high number of United Nations organisations involved created problems that possibly offset the benefits:

> *Joint Programming, when performed in a balanced manner in terms of the number of agencies involved depending on their area of expertise can bring valuable benefits, but when the number of agencies is as high as in the case of YEM some unwanted effects may occur that can compromise the Programme efficiency: (1) Extreme difficulty to coordinate actions, (2) activities overlap and (3) an increase in running costs that could have been possibly avoided. It would be recommendable for future interventions to look carefully at the balance between the number of agencies involved with respect to the development needs to be addressed.* (Carravilla, n.d.: 9-10)

Transactions costs are particularly high when decision-making is not decentralised and agencies have to 'check' with their headquarters in order to make any significant programming decision.[5]

3. **Agency participation should be clearly informed by the areas of expertise and comparative advantage.**

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2. *Joint Programming is one modality for United Nations agencies to work together. A joint programme is a set of activities contained in a joint work plan and related common budgetary framework, involving two or more United Nations organisations. The work plan and budgetary framework form part of a Joint Programme document (UNDG, 2014).*

3. *The Joint Programme on Creating Opportunity for Youth Employment started in 2009, covering both Sudan and South Sudan. It was funded by Spain through the MDG Fund, with the goal to improve job prospects for youth (particularly returnees and demobilised soldiers) through skills development, the creation of employment opportunities and ensuring that job creation is integrated in national development policies. In July 2011, the programme was separated into two country programmes: United Nations Joint Programme for Creating Opportunities for Youth Employment in Sudan, and UN/RSS Joint Programme for Creating Opportunities for Youth Employment in South Sudan. The budget was divided almost with US$4,517,291 to the South and US$4,482,708 to the North. The contents of each programme were partly revised following the split.*

4. *Both programmes included a very high number of partners. The Sudan programme included nine United Nations organisations (FAO, ILO, UNDP, UNAIDS, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNIDO and UNV), plus the Resident Coordinator's Support Office (RSCO) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). For the South Sudan programme, international partners were FAO, ILO, IOM, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNOPS and UNV.*

5. *For example: "[t]he different procurement procedures of some participating agencies delay implementation and obstruct desired synergy" (Carravilla, n.d.: 10).*

In Sudan (#29), the mid-term evaluation finds that some agencies were involved in areas outside of their areas of expertise, for example:

> *(a) UNFPA, UNICEF and UNAIDS are delivering training related to reproductive health. (b) UNDP has been working on a labour market survey, a highly technical work out of its areas of speciality and which is one of the specialities of ILO. (c) UNESCO and FAO are implementing food processing activities.* (Carravilla, n.d.: 30)

The evaluations for the programme in South Sudan arrive to similar conclusions regarding the mismatch between the agencies' specific expertise and their role in the programme:

> *The roles of UN agencies did not reflect their comparative advantages. For example, ILO would have been better placed to handle Labour Market Surveys instead of UNDP; and UNICEF was allocated funds for livelihood training instead of ILO and UNIDO. In addition, given that ILO and UNIDO had similar areas of work in the South and North respectively, it would have been more efficient for them to swap activities when the programme was divided into two.* (Chiwara 2012: iv)

In practical terms:

> *The extensive number of partnering UN agencies does not necessarily imply better inter-agency collaboration nor effective implementation. [...] The UN should undertake a comprehensive gap analysis; and only then identify and match relevant UN agency technical expertise based on their comparative advantages to address the gaps.* (Chiwara, 2012: iv-v)

4. The type and degree of collaboration is influenced by the 'level' of joint implementation (outcomes or outputs).

The final evaluation for the South Sudan JP remarks that the 'jointness' of the programme was in fact limited, as it was articulated at the outcome level (with each agency being responsible for one or more specific outputs) rather than at the output level (with agencies contributing towards, and sharing responsibility for, each output):

> *The programme was not designed as a joint programme, strictly speaking. By definition, a joint programme should enable joint attribution of results by two or more UN agencies. This means that UN agencies must work together through a common work plan to achieve attributable results – outputs. Where UN agencies are only contributing to a common result – outcomes – this cannot be defined as a joint programme. This provides the basis and mechanisms for UN agency collaboration in the context of their different programming and operational regulations, reporting models and timeframes. Due to the lack of joint planning and implementation, the JP missed some opportunities for building synergy between different UN agency outputs. For example, youth to whom skills training had been given through the JP activities were not necessarily engaged by the other UN agencies that were undertaken [sic] construction and renovation of youth facilities and infrastructure.* (Chiwara, 2012: iv)

5. Inter-agency collaboration should reinforce national ownership.

The final external evaluation for intervention #17 in Lebanon found a "very weak and almost non-existent" level of national ownership and government's involvement:

> *The project was planned through coordination between UNRWA, UNICEF and ILO. The Lebanese government was not involved in the planning and design process. [...] The project was marked more by UN ownership than by national ownership.* (Zakkar, 2013: 8, 20)

On a related point, evaluations of interventions in Sudan (#29) and South Sudan (#27) highlight, as a key lesson learned, participation of different agencies in joint or collaborative programmes should move to a context-specific analysis of what kind of expertise is needed in that particular situation and for the particular objectives of the intervention. This knowledge gap analysis should guide the identification of the partner agencies, rather than the other way around.

6. It is important to have well-functioning coordination systems at the local level.

The final evaluation for intervention #17 in Lebanon found that the agencies worked well together at the central level, but that coordination was "entirely vertical" (Zakkar, 2013: 9). At the local level, coordination and collaboration were much weaker:

> *The field visits of the final evaluation mission were organized with each agency separately, to take place on separate days in the same area. It was revealing that while visiting the Beddawi camp with UNICEF, a community center was visited that was different from the community center in the same camp that had been visited with UNRWA the day before. Furthermore, while interviewing beneficiaries of UNICEF literacy classes and life skills sessions, it seemed that they were unaware of the existence of a center of employment and access to coaching and job placement services provided by UNRWA nearby. At the same time, when interviewing beneficiaries from the apprenticeship component implemented by UNRWA, it was revealing to meet with some apprentices who are in real need of psychosocial support, and who had never been referred to the [psychosocial] services that are provided by UNICEF as part of the same project. It was also revealing to meet a participant in the short training course who [...] is still illiterate but has not benefited from the UNICEF literacy support courses that are available in the same area.* (Zakkar, 2013: 25)

The evaluation analyses the current structure which has the three agencies, UNRWA, ILO and UNICEF, all represented in the inter-agency committee, while each essentially does its own bit with separate partners (Figure 4-2: Comparison of Coordination Systems). This leads to different problems, including the lack of a functioning referral system for trainees. As a result, an alternative is proposed for coordination closer to the local level, allowing for a deeper integration of various programme components (Figure 4-2: Comparison of Coordination Systems) (Zakkar, 2013: 25-26).

Current coordination system



Proposed coordination system



Figure 4-2: Comparison of Coordination Systems in Lebanon (intervention #17).

Source: Zakkar, 2013: 25-26.

7. For Joint Programmes, it is important that the coordinating agency has sufficient authority over the other partners.

In the cases of Sudan (#29), the final report finds that designation of ILO as Lead Coordinating Agency (rather than Lead Implementing Agency) left it with the challenge of "coordination by persuasion":

> *As it was, [ILO] had to exert extra efforts in getting all agencies involved, worked [sic] cohesively and cooperate in submission of required inputs.* (MDGFa, 2013: 13)

This finding was reaffirmed by the mid-term evaluation:

> *The leading agency is responsible for coordinating the whole implementation but doesn't have the authority over other UN agencies to do so.* (Carravilla, n.d.: 50)

BOX 4.1: Inter-programme Collaboration

In addition to inter-agency collaboration, it is important to consider the benefits of collaboration among different programmes, particularly in terms of exchange of information and expertise and striving for complementarity. For example, the final internal evaluation of programme #21 in Nepal concludes that there was little collaboration with other programmes, although this would have been beneficial:

> *Well-intentioned declarations about collaboration with other projects and agencies are not sufficient to make it happen. There need to be good reasons for staff to make collaboration effective. Embedding collaboration in the logframe, better coordination at the country management level and allocating funds to joint work can create such reasons.* (ILO, 2010: 8)

The evaluation sees this as a missed opportunity, particularly as programme staff had an open and positive approach to collaboration. This, the evaluation continues, is not unusual: ("[u]nfortunately, a lack of collaboration [among projects] is the rule rather than the exception" – ILO, 2010: 63). Reasons include the fact that collaboration is not included in the logical framework's outputs, indicators or targets (and therefore cannot be easily assessed). In addition, staff are not assessed on their successes in establishing collaboration and are generally under great time pressure to deliver and management support for collaboration is usually inadequate (ILO, 2010: 63).

4.4 FINDINGS AND REFLECTIONS FROM THE CASE STUDIES

4.4.1 LEBANON

In Lebanon, we heard two strong examples of inter-agency collaboration. Perhaps the single greatest success story was the development of the Local Economic Development Association for North Lebanon (LEDA North), an agency set up as a part of a UNDP programme that is now integral to the successful implementation of most programmes in northern Lebanon. (See BOX 4.2). Both programmes we visited in North Lebanon, for example, operated through LEDA North. The second example involves UNRWA continuing an Employment Services Centres programme started by ILO. In this case, the collaboration ensured that the programme did not only have a short-term presence but, rather, became sustainable.

These success stories, however, are notable because they appear to be the exception, rather than the rule. They occurred only because a specific opportunity arose that allowed agencies to benefit from the work done by others. In providing an illustration of the benefits of inter-agency collaboration, these isolated examples also draw attention to a more general failing. There is much to gain, yet the underlying structures to maximise such gains appear not to be in place. Indeed, in Lebanon, quite the opposite appears to be true with agencies competing with each other for access to scarce resources, rather than collaborating. Although in the long-term this may lead to innovation, it may also hamper attempts to provide suitably broad programming in an unprecedented context. The absence of such structures, formal or informal, is alarming. Not only does it lead to competition that may not be productive, particularly in the short term, it may also preclude better identification of joint opportunities in Lebanon.

In turn, this has led to a perception, particularly amongst stakeholders directly linked to ILO, PBSO, UNDP and the World Bank, that agencies in Lebanon do not best leverage their capacities. Such a lack of coordination was noted to have two potentially damaging effects. First, it means that international agencies may crowd out local NGOs, who could deliver better programmes more cost-effectively or who have greater local knowledge but cannot otherwise compete with large organisations. Second, it means that agencies fail to leverage their comparative advantages as well as they could, when focusing, for example, on programme details rather than convening power or access to government. Given the short time horizons on which each agency has been forced to operate in Lebanon and the tensions this creates, especially for staffing contracts as old programmes end, such a lack of collaboration is understandable. In turn, this implies an urgent need to change the thinking of donor agencies and their funders in order to ensure that longer time horizons can be considered and, as part of that, that agencies have the opportunity to better work together. It also, however, implies a role for agencies themselves to identify their relative strengths and to seek opportunities to use those in collaboration with others.

Where there is more success is in the coordination of each agency's programmes into a multi-layer approach, where they complement each other at the micro, meso and macro levels. In combination, these programmes have aggregated up to a comprehensive strategy with apparent success stories at every level in the economy. Alarmingly, however, whilst there is evidence to show that this has occurred, it is less clear how deliberate or well-designed this process is. In turn, this implies that an element of luck is present, particularly in the absence of an overarching government strategy to deliver multi-layer programming. To paraphrase the director of an NGO working on multiple agricultural value chain programmes in Lebanon: "Somehow, the micro, meso and macro programmes have complimented each other well, but I would say that this is entirely down to good fortune and luck."

On the other hand, however, each agency has contributed to a successful, or at a comprehensive, set of programmes without any deliberate attempt to do so by acting in isolation. In turn, this may challenge the fundamental notion that coordination between agencies is universally good. In Lebanon, where agencies have competed rather than collaborated on a large amount of programming, the outcomes do not appear to be worse than anywhere else.

BOX 4.2: North LEDA

North LEDA, or the North Lebanon Local Economic Development Agency to give it its proper name, was established in March 2011 with the support of the UNDP ART Gold programme. North LEDA was established to "provide technical assistance to MSMEs and cooperatives, to help optimise their marketing efforts and increase revenue". Part of these activities have involved working with international agencies to develop and deliver programmes. Whilst this has included continuing work with UNDP, a number of other agencies and governments have worked through the agency. This currently includes, for example, ILO projects on olive oil value chains, an Italian government-funded programme on milk value chains and agricultural guidance for fruit-tree farmers, conducted with UNDP. The benefits of such an agency appear self-evident, given that multiple agencies and donors continue to work through it. That it was established in the first place is positive from aprogrammatic perspective. That multiple agencies not involved in its founding continue to work through it, however, also shows an important level of collaboration between the agencies. In this case, multiple agencies have now benefited from the initial actions of one. The role that North LEDA continues to play provides an interesting example of how one agency can benefit from the actions of another. At the same time, despite having such an apparently positive impact on the programming of multiple agencies, North LEDA is a part of an ILS LEDA network that operates in only 36 locations in 16 countries, of which only one other country (Sri Lanka) appears in our list of fragile or conflict-affected states. It follows that whilst a success story in Lebanon, the fact that this success has not been replicated elsewhere shows not just the current limitations of inter-agency collaboration but also a potential failure to have learned from prior success.

4.4.2 LIBERIA

In many ways, complementarity in Liberia follows a very similar model to that in Lebanon. There are a few strong examples of inter-agency cooperation and a deep understanding of its benefits, whilst at the same time little evidence of systemised or structured coordination of activities. For example, we directly asked one interviewee if he could provide examples of inter-agency collaboration. His response was an un-contextualized "Yes", followed up by no further information. In practical terms, complementarity is viewed positively and is certainly present when agencies have private incentives to collaborate, but this does not ensure that such collaboration is structured or formalised. For example, all three of our study's implementing agencies (ILO, UNDP and the World Bank), along with a number of other United Nations agencies and multiple Liberian ministries, were involved in the 'United Nations Joint Programme for Employment and Empowerment of Young Women and Men in Liberia' (See BOX 4.3). Similar success stories are reported, particularly when agencies were directly instructed to work together, such as during the Ebola crisis. Such large, unified programmes apparently delivered their goals very successfully, yet ties built during them were not formalised into on-going activities.

Unlike Lebanon, however, there are established places, particularly in ministries, that are designed to ensure that agencies can and do work together. Given the context of major examples of complementarity in very large programmes and of the availability of spaces to aid in joint action, the lack of structured complementarity is more alarming than it was in Lebanon, where the nature of the situation appeared to contribute to a lack of opportunity to collaborate. There are, however, some mitigating factors that may complicate complementarity in Liberia. First, different agencies are mandated to work with different ministries. Thus, even when ministries do attempt to establish spaces to ensure collaboration, it may be complicated for agencies to do so meaningfully with ministries with which they are not mandated to work. Second, even the establishment of such spaces may give a strong overarching picture, but it does not necessarily provide a guide as to how each agency can best leverage its capacities, which in turn does not guarantee that these spaces can really instigate collaboration amongst the agencies.

As in Lebanon, this potential failure to best leverage capacities may have two further damaging effects. The first is that large agencies can crowd out the activities of some smaller local NGOs, who may be able to deliver programmes better or more cost-effectively, given their strong local knowledge and capacities. Second, once again, attention was paid to the apparent blurring of boundaries between agencies, leading to (apparently) fruitless competition for funding sources. Once more, this therefore provides an image that cooperation and coordination are possible, and, when done effectively, can have significant positive impacts. Yet, it does not occur as a matter or process.

BOX 4.3: United Nations Joint Programme on Youth Employment and Empowerment of Young Women and Men in Liberia

The United Nations Joint Programme on Youth Employment and Empowerment of Young Women and Men (JPYEE) ran in Liberia from 2009 to 2011 with the aim of empowering Liberia's young people by providing them with the necessary life skills, training and employment support services to become productive citizens. It consisted of five interrelated components, spanning the ground from humanitarian provision to development. These included a review of youth policies and provision of institutional support to the government and civil society groups in Liberia; skills training for employment for young people; work to facilitate the transition of young people into productive employment; empowerment and social cohesion schemes for young people; and promoting decent work in the informal economy and agriculture.

Perhaps more importantly, however, the programme jointly involved three of the agencies who commissioned this research (ILO, UNDP and the World Bank), as well as four Liberian government ministries (the Ministry

of Youth and Sports, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Gender and Development). In this regard, the programme provides a potential model, not only for how agencies can work together but how they can also work with various strands of the government. Indeed, one of the major successes of the programme was reported to be the increase in coordination across the four government ministries involved. This, in turn, led the government to declare its intention to maintain the initiatives of the programme to achieve coordination and coherence in tackling youth unemployment. The reasons for such success stemmed both from the government's ownership of the programme and from the pooling of the resources of multiple United Nations agencies to address what has become a national priority in Liberia. The impact of the programme on future government action, organisation and capacity is a clear success and shows what can be achieved through inter-agency collaboration mechanisms.

At the same time, deeper reflection on such outcomes is currently missing. It is not clear if the programme would have been equally successful without the collaboration between the agencies, for example, or if it could have been achieved through single-agency programming. Similarly, there is little reflection on the costs - real and opportunity - of this level of collaboration. At the same time, however, the programme also provides some understanding of what can be achieved through agencies collaborating with each other. Coupled with better consideration of the costs and benefits of collaboration, this can provide a suitable model for future programming and future inter-agency and agency-government collaboration.

4.4.3 TIMOR-LESTE

In the years following independence, the agencies were instrumental in overseeing and leading the country's reconstruction, building and keeping peace, developing Timorese state capacity and promoting economic development, among many other issues. This involved many strong examples of inter-agency cooperation and coordination, but assessment reports and anecdotal evidence from interview partners highlights that, not surprisingly under the extreme challenges of post-independence Timor-Leste, "coordination among activities of numerous donors continued to be a challenge" (World Bank, 2006; IOM, 2002).

For the post-crisis period from 2007 until 2012, there is consistent evidence for strong inter-agency complementarity, particularly in terms of coordination. The agencies which commissioned this study conducted complementary programmes that, according to internal evaluation reports and qualitative evidence from interviews with 'outsiders', including civilians and political actors, were well-designed, effective, distinct in nature and informed each other in a meaningful way. Good examples are ILO's 'Youth Employment Promotion' (YEP) programme and the World Bank's 'Youth Development Project' (YDP), which tackled youth marginalisation from different angles. Their results were perceived to be very useful complements and contrasts to one another: YDP focused on direct youth empowerment and social inclusion. while YEP focused on skills and training. While YDP did not have a specific employment component and YEP was a capacity programme, this was deemed a very successful and productive approach to engaging and empowering youth in a fragile environment.

Since 2012, the only programmes with an explicit peacebuilding focus are scattered and small-scale initiatives by NGOs. Yet, not only did government and donor priorities shift from peace and stabilisation to economic development, but inter-agency complementarity in employment programming also changed. Cooperation and coordination in Timor-Leste now is in many ways very similar to that in Lebanon and Liberia: mutually high appreciation of the work done by each agency and its benefits to all other agencies, contrasted by very few examples of direct cooperation and little evidence of systemised coordination of activities.

Specific to Timor-Leste is that the strong focus of agency engagements related to employment is now on technical assistance in bilateral partnerships with the government, which leads and funds most initiatives. Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) in Timor-Leste has dropped substantially in recent years and represented only about 5% of the gross national income in 2012. Several agency interview partners opine that,

due to the new make-up of donor-government configurations, agency programmes are now more narrow and are reducing scope for collaboration 'by construction'.

The entire sample of interviewed stakeholders from either side emphasised their satisfaction with the relationships and work between the government and the agencies, such as in the 'embedded approach' promoted by ILO. The dominant success stories reported focus on building roads, as in the R4D programme (with ILO) and the 'Road Climate Resilience' project (with the World Bank), and fostering institutional capacity, as in the form of the 'Secretary of State for Vocational Training and Employment Policy' (SEPFOPE) and the 'National Labour Force Development Institute' (INDMO), or the development of the 'Serviço de Registo e Verificação Empresarial', a one-stop shop for registering businesses (led by the IFC).

Generally speaking, the bilateral programmes by different agencies with the government are often similar. A number of stakeholders expressed the desire to harmonise and to cross-pollinate programmes (better). Yet, direct agency collaboration or even structured exchanges for coordination are relatively rare, programme-driven or restricted to a few (active) thematic working groups. While the high-quality bilateral programmes by the different agencies with the government have had an impressive impact, there seems much to gain from more coordination. However, the underlying structures to maximise such gains appear not to be in place. In fact, several stakeholders note that the government-funded nature of most programmes and engagement in similar types of programmes by the agencies naturally creates some form of competition. The absence of stronger inter-agency coordination mechanisms, formal or informal, is thus suboptimal and feeds perceptions, particularly among NGOs and civil society organisations, that agencies in Timor-Leste may not best leverage their capacities and comparative advantages.

Due to the particularly close partnerships between the government and the agencies in Timor-Leste, the agencies are often 'directly associated with the government' among the local population. As explained by several interview partners, this was the reason for incidences where stones were thrown at agency vehicles during the crisis. Strengthening coordination mechanisms in Timor-Leste may thus, as in Lebanon, not only reduce inefficient competition among agencies and foster better identification of joint opportunities but, more speculatively, even mitigate grievances among risk groups via trust in and perceptions of institutions.

4.4.4 DISCUSSION

Findings on inter-agency cooperation are mixed across the locations. In all three, there is evidence of positive results from agencies working together, yet only in Timor-Leste does this appear to be standardised and formalised. In both Lebanon and Liberia, there is a general lack of formal engagement between agencies despite differing levels of government involvement in developing such collaborations. It appears that the Ebola crisis forced coordination in Liberia for a while, but this was the result of extraordinary circumstances. Even then, concerns were raised about whether or not this particular collaboration was explicitly successful. The collaborations that remained, therefore, were ad hoc and based on case-by-case opportunities arising to collaborate.

Such patterns are unlikely to be specific to the theme of employment and peacebuilding. Collaboration costs are high everywhere, missions and agency cultures and regulations are vastly different, mutual mistrust between some agencies is deep-seated and modes of finance and of operation differ (most notably between the World Bank awarding loans and the United Nations spending donor funds or simply shepherding political processes at little financial cost). Consequently, each agency has different entry points and different roles in a country, depending very strongly on the context and the challenges faced. This is particularly true of the emergency-development continuum, where some United Nations agencies are much better at relief and emergency work, while the World Bank and the regional banks are much better at longer-term development work. The narrative will strongly differ for countries like CAR or Haiti versus countries like Ethiopia or Nigeria. Common interests are either imposed by extreme events (like Ebola in Liberia) or are based on the aligned agendas of the respective leaders of the organisations, who each individually stand more to gain from working with their counterparts than do most employees of the respective organisations.

Having said this, there are strong winds pushing these organisations to work increasingly closer together in exactly the types of countries where employment and peacebuilding interventions matter most. Increasingly, poorer and more vulnerable households are based in conflict-affected or fragile countries, while extreme poverty and economic isolation in some world regions are hypothesised to drive insecurity and destabilisation. Hence, the two large themes of economics and politics are increasingly overlapping for organisations that are committed to spreading shared prosperity and human security.

Furthermore, the concept of building peace by strengthening the economy requires an intellectual synergy of competencies typically spread across multiple and disconnected agencies. There are hence genuine synergies to be created from sharing country-level analysis and best practices for intervention design (in the spirit of this report). In any case, it would appear to be a good practice to utilise the maximum available information and to share such information widely within shared countries of operation (even if national governments at times are also adept at divide and rule). The need to improve performance in both poverty alleviation and peacebuilding in conflict-affected and fragile states is hence the biggest incentive for various agencies to expand their early experiments of cooperation strategically, intellectually and operationally. Clearly incentivising and recognising individual and institutional benefits to cooperation is likely to yield more of that than mere appeals to inter-institutional charity.

Bilateral donors also have a key role to play in how they allocate money, share information and practice their interventions. Part of the story with bilateral donors is the extent to which each country has a consistent strategy across the World Bank (where policy is often decided in finance or development ministries) and the United Nations (where policies are often decided by foreign offices). If trust funds, for example, clearly require some degree of coordination where such action would be genuinely useful, conditionality to that effect may help achieve a better outcome than standard operation procedures of each of the possible collaborators would. At the same time, it seems important to keep things simple and not to overload programmes with various objectives. Perhaps some programmes can share some common (security) infrastructures, while others will only share common analyses, but each subsequently goes its own way in its own region or sector.

To improve joint efficiency in the area of employment and peacebuilding, there is a need to re-think the incentive structures of donor agencies and their funders in order to ensure that longer time horizons can be considered and, as part of that, that agencies can and must better work together. This could include separated areas of engagement for agencies themselves to identify their relative strengths and to seek opportunities to use them in cooperation with others. At the same time, measures to reduce competition for (especially bilateral) donor funds and to avoid crowding out of more cost-effective local partners and organisations, would be invaluable. It may also be that collaboration will vary by the level of disaggregation. As argued above, the United Nations Secretary-General and the World Bank President may have strong incentives to collaborate. At the regional level, these incentives may be much lower. At the country level, it may depend on the severity of the situation, the scale of the operation and the character of the staff. At the programme level, collaboration may already be very advanced in some cases, with some configurations of programmes already regularly combining expertise and services from different agencies.

Perhaps in the future, some small number of countries with suitable conditions could be used as a trial for enhanced forms of collaboration, assessing the costs and benefits of such policies in the spirit of the rigorous evidence called for elsewhere in this report. Apart from the anecdotal evidence presented here, the evidence base is, once more, weak. More systematic evidence on the drivers and effects of collaboration are urgently required.

5. CONCLUSIONS: WHAT NOW?

This research was predicated on four main objectives:

1. To conduct an in depth and focussed review of the academic literature.
2. To conduct a wide review of employment programmes that have taken place in fragile and conflict-affected states since 2005 by the four agencies.
3. To define current opportunities for the learning to close any knowledge gaps that are discovered as a part of this research process.
4. To provide information on how well the agencies have collaborated with each other, with other organisations and with governments

This research was conducted in four separate components. The first was a targeted review of existing academic and grey literature. The second was an analysis of the documentation and evaluation of all of the employment programmes of the four participating agencies in 46 FCS since 2005, with a more in-depth focus on a shortlist of the best documented programmes. These two strands of desk research were supported, contextualised and augmented by three field visits to Lebanon, Liberia and Timor-Leste. The fourth component consisted of three stakeholder workshops held in Washington DC, Nairobi and Beirut.

Although we find a large number of interventions (almost 450 in all) that match the 'employment-for-peacebuilding' requirements either explicitly (by having peacebuilding components or explicit peacebuilding aims) or implicitly (by taking place in a fragile or conflict-affected environments), we find that those with meaningful evaluations are in the minority. Of these programmes, we were able to access any form of internal or external for just over 10%. Within the shortlist of 33 programmes, we find little robust analysis of job channels, particularly in the long run. More disturbingly, we find no attempt to meaningfully evaluate the impact employment programmes have on peace in any programme.

This stands in contrast to convincing theories of change, which are strongly developed in the academic literature and of which there is a broad knowledge amongst the programme staff we encountered. That said, another worrying disconnect is present in programme documentation. Despite the strength and knowledge of the theories of change, they are very seldom present in programme documents and these theories of change made explicit even less. Finally, we also find little difference between the employment aspects of explicit and implicit employment for peacebuilding programmes. In combination, this implies that the peacebuilding impacts of employment programmes in fragile and conflict-affected places are mostly simply assumed. Consequently, there is an apparent lack of current knowledge on the link between employment programmes and peace, which in turn inhibits meaningful learning about what works and what does not.

We further expand on these findings in the remainder of this section, the rest of which is split into three sub-components. The first provides a snapshot of the main findings of this research project. The second discusses the implications of these findings for aims and objectives set out in Section 1.1. The final section presents recommendations on how to close existing knowledge gaps and to improve the performance of programmes.

5.1 KEY FINDINGS

We split this research into three key components. The first consists of identifying the motivations for undertaking employment for peacebuilding programming ("why intervene?"). These motivations can be thought of as 'theories of change', or, in non-academic terms, the anticipated mechanisms through which employment programming – either directly or through its impact on employment levels – is expected to boost peace as well as employment. The second section focusses on the empirical evidence supporting these theoretical links from programmes already undertaken ("what has been done?"). The aim in compiling this evidence was twofold: firstly, to generate information on the causal relationship between employment programmes and peacebuilding, if any; and secondly, to draw lessons from these programmes about which aspects of design and implementation had the greatest impacts. Finally, we look at the ways in which agencies can, have and have not worked together to achieve these goals ("how have agencies worked together?"). The rest of this section deals with the key findings from each of these aspects of our research.

5.1.1 MOTIVATIONS

In general, we find that there are strong theoretical foundations to believe that employment programmes can lead to peacebuilding. First of all, we find two headline routes through which employment programmes can build peace. The first is the programme channel, which stems simply from the programme taking place. The second is the job channel, which requires the intermediate step of the programme itself having a definable employment impact. We note that these routes are not mutually exclusive – it is possible for a programme to have both a direct and an indirect impact on peace. Within these headline routes, we find three transfer mechanisms that apply equally to both the programme and job channels: opportunity, grievance and contact.

First, 'opportunity' hinges on the assumption that increasing individual opportunity (e.g. income, access to jobs and potential success in the labour market) increases the costs and opportunity costs of engaging in pre-/violent behaviours. A livelihoods programme, for example, should boost individual participation in the labour market, leading to increased personal and household income. As this income increases, the costs of engaging in pre-/violent behaviours go up (e.g. individuals may lose a day's income from missing work or lose their job altogether). By a similar token, the costs for so-called 'spoilers' to incentivise others to commit pre-/violent behaviour also increase, making such activities less likely.

Second, 'grievance' hinges on the assumption that various forms of inequality, real or perceived, are drivers of conflict. Thus, employment programmes that reduce such inequalities, or perceived inequalities, can also build peace. We again take the example of a livelihoods programme. If a livelihoods programme targets a marginalised group (e.g. young people), it may not only stimulate employment and opportunity among that group, but also reduce the grievance or feelings of exclusion that young people are often assumed to feel. In turn, this programme boosts the sense of belonging of the target group, reducing grievances and the conflict risk associated with the group.

Finally, 'contact' hinges on the assumption that adverse stereotypes or interactions between definable groups can build tensions and potential conflict between those groups. By bringing them together, programmes create an opportunity not only to overcome poor interactions or to break down these adverse stereotypes, but also to replace them with positive ones. In the workplace, factors such as mutual reliance, trust and collaboration are key forces to success. When these things are built between workers from different groups, they act as mitigating factors to conflict. Once more, we take the example of the livelihoods programme. An intervention that brings young people from different ethnicities together in the workplace may not only increase opportunity and reduce grievance, but also break down socio-cultural barriers between these groups. As stated before, we note that these transfer mechanisms are not mutually exclusive – indeed, whilst it is useful to silo them into three separate descriptions, a single programme design can work through multiple theories of change. For example, a livelihoods programme that targets a marginalised group can improve peace through both the

opportunity and grievance routes. That said, we believe that any employment for peacebuilding programme can be matched to at least one of these theories of change.

5.1.2 SUPPORTING EVIDENCE

At the very highest level, there is very little direct evidence for the link between employment programmes and peacebuilding. Of the very small number of examples in the literature that explicitly aim to connect the two, none strongly paints the picture of a link. More so, it is entirely impossible to generalise these findings to other scenarios, so thin is the evidence base. To our knowledge, only three studies have meaningfully attempted to connect the two phenomena but none has yet found a causal link.

This stands in contrast to the significant amount of programming that is predicated on the assumption that employment leads to peacebuilding. In our first round of analysis, we found in excess of 2,415 programmes, which were seemingly relevant, of which we could meaningfully define 432 as 'employment-for-peacebuilding' programmes. These programmes were either explicitly employment-for-peacebuilding programmes (by containing a defined peacebuilding motivation or peacebuilding aspects) or implicit (by taking place in a fragile or conflict-affected scenario). Despite the large number of programmes (almost 50 per year) undertaken, however, we find a general lack of systematic learning from what has been done. Only 12% of these programmes have any kind of evaluation at all, whilst analysis of the impacts of employment programmes on peacebuilding is entirely absent.

On our shortlist of 33 programmes, for example, only one programme meaningfully examines any impact at all on peace. At the same time, this evaluation only looked at the impact of a separate peacebuilding component on peace and employment was deliberately excluded from this analysis. In non-academic terms, we find no evidence from the programme documentations themselves that links actual employment programmes to peacebuilding.

5.1.3 COLLABORATION

We found a common operating assumption amongst agencies – particularly at HQ level – that collaboration between agencies, either through joint programmes or coordination of action – is universally good. Despite this assumption, however, experience at the field level does not necessarily match this. At the field level, (both real and opportunity) costs and other barriers to collaboration suggest that, whilst there are very real benefits to collaboration, these benefits cannot be realised costlessly. Perhaps more pertinently, it also implies that the costs of collaboration are greater than the potential benefits in a number of situations. In those situations, it logically follows that agencies should not seek to collaborate. Overall, there must be an optimal level of collaboration in each setting and period, which stands in contrast to a near-universal aspiration at some levels within each agency that there should be more collaboration.

We find two distinct types of collaboration, which we define as: 'cooperation' and 'coordination'. Cooperation relies on agencies directly working together to deliver, for example, different strands of a single large programme. Cooperation realised multiple benefits, including wider talent pools and opportunities for agencies to leverage comparative advantages. At the same time, however, it also imposes significant costs. These can include suboptimal distribution of funds, communication costs and competition for resources. Coordination, on the other hand, relies on agencies working separately to deliver a basket of programming aimed at filling in the entire sphere of needs. Again, whilst the benefits of this approach are obvious – particularly relating to minimising both overlaps and gaps in provision – costs remain as well. This includes competition between agencies for donor funds, which in turn suggests that each agency may not leverage its comparative advantages optimally.

We find a gap between policies at HQ level and the reality of collaboration at the field level. This is most apparent in the gaps between these policies, which acknowledge the benefits of collaboration but not its costs,

and thereby fail to identify locally suitable optimal degrees and forms of collaboration. In turn, there is little practical guidance on how to minimise the costs of collaboration, leading to greater net benefits. Perhaps the strongest example of this concern is with so-called post-conflict needs assessments, which rely on agencies jointly defining the scope of needs for countries in post-conflict settings. Whilst these documents aim to understand the full array of needs, and thus the kinds of programming that are needed, they do not provide specific programme guidance. This leaves agencies to define how best to provide those needs themselves, thus increasing the costs of collaboration without necessarily having a definable impact on the benefits.

Generally, we find that programme and field staff are, at least de facto, aware of these costs as well as the benefits. This leads to what we could call a 'patchwork' collaboration between agencies, which relies on the identification of opportunities to work together, rather than optimal collaboration being the primary aim. In turn, however, this implies three things: first of all, agencies may still collaborate in situations where there is no net benefit to do so; secondly, that they do not always collaborate in situations where net benefits could be realised from doing so; and thirdly, that there are currently no meaningful ways of finding out if the collaboration that does happen was actually beneficial. Consequently, this implies that the degree of collaboration between agencies is often less or more than the optimum.

5.2 LESSONS LEARNED

5.2.1 THEORIES OF CHANGE

During our field visits, we found strong knowledge and understanding of the theories of change amongst all key stakeholders, including programme staff in all of the agencies we worked with. Despite this knowledge, however, we find that only a small number of programmes have a definable theory of change included within their documentation and that of those, even fewer make the theory of change explicit. For example, for only nine of the interventions that we reviewed in detail we could identify any mention to a Theory of Change[1]. In most cases, reference are very brief and phrased in very generic terms. This creates a disconnect between the strength of the underpinning theories and the application and analysis of these theories in reality.

In practice, the theoretical links between employment programmes and peace have been given significant attention and a number of plausible and complex mechanisms have been defined. At the same time, however, empirical support for these theories is often thin or missing entirely. These knowledge gaps are not just found in the individual steps involved in each of the theories of change, however, but also in the main underpinning logic. This is most stark when one considers the drivers of individual selection into the pre-/violent behaviours we consider in this research. There is little direct evidence on why individuals choose to engage in such acts, for example. It logically follows, therefore, that there is even less evidence on what can deter them from doing so. This reinforces a more general longstanding need to more deeply analyse peace and conflict at the micro level (see: Bozzoli, Brück and Wald, 2013). In these settings, without the microfoundations in place, it is difficult to understand the interaction between individual actions and peace. It follows that in such a setting, it remains difficult to understand how changes at the individual level, including those resulting from participation in an employment programme, can contribute to building peace.

Two subsequent shortcomings reinforce this concern. The first is that there are few robust theories, let alone much empirical evidence, that link impact at the programme level with that at the more aggregated levels also needed to build peace. These spillovers are seldom considered in the literature or in programme designs, yet are essential for programmes to meaningfully build peace rather than simply changing the attitudes of participants. The second is that there is a lack of consideration, let alone evidence, on whether employment is sufficient to build peace. Given that many definitions of peace focus on multiple strands, it is unclear if

1. We mean here the concept of theory of change. It does not mean that the documents necessarily use this terminology.

peace can be built by improvements in any single indicator, or if it requires a balanced and simultaneous improvement across all indicators.

BOX 5.1: Using 'theories of change' in Practice

The importance of elaborating a sound theory of change as part of programme design cannot be overstated. As seen above, most interventions reviewed for this study do not include a theory of change, and when they do, they phrase it in very abstract and context-unspecific terms. While 'theory of change' has become a trendy concept in international development and has raised scepticism for being just another development buzzword (Stern & Valters, 2012; Vogel, 2012), what it means, in very simple terms, is to unpack the beliefs, assumptions and hypotheses that underpin every programme about how change is expected to happen in that specific context.

The theory of change should be context-specific and evidence-based.

Any theory of change is only as good as the evidence it is based on. It should therefore be informed by context analysis. For example, the two programmes in Guinea (#9 and #10) state that women are particularly at risk of violent mobilisation if unemployed. What is relevant is to explain why this statement is made. Have adult women been mobilised more in the past compared to adult men? Are some women more easily mobilised that others? The question is not whether this is a universally valid statement, but whether it holds true in the specific case of Guinea, and how confident we can be (based on the evidence available to us) that this statement holds true.

A theory of change is essential to measure impact on peacebuilding.

Several evaluations state that impact on peacebuilding is hard, or even impossible, to assess. This stands in stark contrast with the claims made in programme documents about the intended impact of the programme. The difficulty to assess impact stems, in large part, from the lack of clarity about the impact channels and transfer mechanisms of change. In non-academic terms, it is not clear what is supposed to happen 'in the best-case scenario'.

A theory of change helps to promote learning.

As we have seen, some of the interventions reviewed for this report have been found – by internal or external evaluations – to have had a positive impact on peacebuilding. However, this positive impact is phrased in very general terms. There are no details about how the evaluation reached such conclusions, and which transfer mechanisms led to the claimed peacebuilding impact, or through which impact channel it was transmitted. It is therefore extremely hard to learn about what worked, what did not work, what was specific about that context and what can possibly be replicated, or adapted to other contexts. Having a theory of change would help to make this learning more clearly identifiable and communicable.

The possibility of unintended impact should be considered in programme design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

The absence of consideration of potential unintended consequences is a striking finding from the review of evaluation. Any development intervention can potentially 'do harm'. If, as repeatedly stated in policies and programming, development interventions have a particular strong potential for promoting peace, then it also follows that they have a strong potential for unintended negative impacts. Unintended negative impact on peacebuilding can be a function of poorly designed and/or executed employment programmes, e.g. if

trained participants have their hopes crushed because they are not referred to potential employers or do not receive the promised starter-kits for their business. However, even a 'best-case scenario' from an employment perspective can have an unintended negative impact on peacebuilding, and this negative impact is likely to go unnoticed unless indicators and systems are put in place to detect it. Having a theory of change helps to assess the potential negative unintended impact. For example, if the programme is informed by the idea that violence is fuelled by feelings of injustice and exclusion (according to the grievance transfer mechanism), then the positive effects on the 1,000 selected participants can be easily outweighed by reinforced negative perceptions by the non-selected majority. In fact, it also seems possible that at least some in the non-selected majority could perceive unfairness in their personal, or group's, exclusion from the programme, creating grievances where there previously were none. Being aware of this potential negative impact is the first step towards addressing the risk.

5.2.2 SUPPORTING EVIDENCE

The long and short of our findings is that the evidence for the relationship between employment programmes and peace is significantly thinner than the relative commonality of employment programmes in FCS. We find that a small minority of programmes have any kind of evaluation at all. Of those, even fewer have robust or meaningful evaluations conducted with respect to any form of control group, and of those, none focus on the relationship between the employment programme and peacebuilding. For example, of the 33 interventions that we studied in detail, we found only two were evaluated using a control group, and in both cases this counterfactual referred to the employment impact rather than the peacebuilding impact.

In general, peacebuilding impact is not a focus of the evaluations we reviewed. Three of them explicitly state that peacebuilding impact was unclear and/or impossible to assess in the context of the evaluation. We found claims of some positive peacebuilding impact in eight internal assessments and five external evaluations. However, the impact claimed is generally very limited (and in two cases, unintended). Furthermore, little or no evidence is provided to support the claim, nor there is any detail about the process and methodology to reach those conclusions. It is not clear, in particular, whether the claimed positive impact is due to job channels, programme channels, or programme activities that are not related to employment.

In turn, it becomes impossible to draw generalisable lessons about the relationship between employment programmes and peacebuilding, let alone about the specific aspects of programming that had the strongest peacebuilding impact. In turn, we remain uncommitted on the nature of the empirical relationship between employment interventions and peacebuilding. At present, there simply is not enough evidence from impact evaluations or from M&E to reach a satisfactory conclusion.

We are neutral on whether or not our analysis implies that such M&E does not exist or was simply impossible to access during the research process. At the same time, however, whether through non-existence or inaccessibility, the apparent lack of programme documents and evaluations has the same inhibiting impact on learning. In turn, this acts as a barrier to agencies learning from their own programmes and to external researchers seeking to analyse or meta-analyse these programmes. More generally, however, this is a symptom of a lack of systematic learning, which stands in contrast to the number of programmes that have been undertaken under the auspices of employment for peacebuilding.

In turn, this lack of systematic learning is reflected in our findings in the field: in some instances, programmes appeared to have their desired impacts. Throughout our semi-structured interviews, we uncovered a number of positive stories relating to both the jobs and programme impact channels. At the same time, these outcomes were not universal for all programme participants, with some even reporting worsened impressions of out-groups as a result of participation. Without a solid base of systematic learning, however, it is impossible to

deduce what it was about some programmes that led to positive outcomes and why others failed to replicate such outcomes.

5.2.3 COLLABORATION

Both the extent and success of collaboration is decidedly mixed. We uncover some strong examples of inter-agency collaboration in the field, yet they tend to be isolated examples that have stemmed from unique opportunities for one agency to benefit from the work of another. These benefits, however, are off-set by a number of costs – particularly that collaboration appears to have hampered success rather than bolstered it on some occasions. The reasons for this patchwork of quality and quantity of successful collaboration appear to be threefold.

First of all, even optimal collaboration is not costless, yet these costs are seldom, if ever, directly considered in agencies' policies. In turn, there is a distinct lack of processes (formal or informal) within each agency to estimate the costs in any given potential collaborative scenario. It follows that, when costs are, ex ante, not well or accurately measured, such a lack of information can lead to too much collaboration, not enough collaboration, collaboration in the wrong places or the wrong sort of collaboration, either through over- or under-estimation of costs or through the costs not being fully considered.

Second of all, there is often a disconnect between collaboration as viewed from the HQ level and the reality of those implementing it in the field. For example, when agencies generate funds for joint programmes, there remains complexity in administering these funds, particularly as each agency seeks to maximise its own share. This is reinforced by a lack of specific concern being given to the difficulties faced in collaborating at the field level in agencies' policies.

Finally, there is insufficient specific programme guidance in the 'needs assessments' documents that agencies develop in FCS, which results in a disconnect between a country's defined needs and knowledge of who is best placed to provide which aspects of the solution to those needs. In combination, this creates significant barriers to optimal collaboration amongst agencies.

This lead to a final consideration, which is the assumption of the universal benefits stemming from collaboration. Whilst many of these benefits are self-evident, this can act to mask some of the drawbacks. Inter-agency competition is most prominent amongst these. Whilst competition for resources has its own drawbacks and costs, a lack of such competition could lead to reductions in innovative programming, for example. In turn, such a lack of innovation could further reduce opportunities for learning, not least because of insufficient variation in programme design, targeting or type.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

That more evidence and learning – and the training associated with it - is needed is a common and often unsatisfactory refrain of much research and of many researchers. At the same time, this is a key recommendation that comes from our research. To date, a large number of theories of change have been developed and a large number of programmes undertaken, yet systematic knowledge development on both fronts remains largely absent. We discuss, in more detail, specific recommendations in the three subsections below.

5.3.1 THEORIES OF CHANGE

1. Further evidence and learning is needed on the microfoundations of individual selection into the pre-/violent behaviours leading to violent conflict that underpin this research. This will allow a more detailed understanding of what motivates individuals to engage in group-based violence and of more accurate understanding of what can deter them from doing so. Agencies have an important role to play in stimulating this learning, not least because it could and should directly influence programme design.
2. One specific example of an urgent need for better knowledge is the role of youth in violent, group-based conflict. There remains a need to explore the expected and the actual role of youth for peacebuilding. It is often assumed that youth represent a group at risk of conflict behaviour, though this is a largely untested hypothesis that may be locally inappropriate. In the absence of reliable evidence, it may pay to challenge conventional wisdom if initial evidence suggests to do so.
3. Theories of change should be mainstreamed in all programme documents and programme planning. This process should begin with a strong definition of the outcome aims of the programme at the micro level. Once a programme has been designed, specific information should be provided on the anticipated links between design of that programme and the desired micro-level outcome. These processes should be mapped to at least one of the headline transfer mechanisms: opportunity, grievance or contact. Figure 5-1 gives some simple examples of how this can be achieved.
4. Agencies should also make explicit whether the expected peacebuilding effects could and should come through the job channel, programme channel or both through a similar process as described in Recommendation 3.
5. Agencies should aim to explicitly assess whether or not the theory of change holds in a specific setting, rather than simply analysing the relationship between the input (the programme) and its outcomes. In some situations, this can be done through careful selection of impact indicators, although some indicators are likely to measure multiple theories of change given the relationships between them. In these scenarios, analysis of the steps involved in the theories of change should also be encouraged.
6. While programme staff have a high level of awareness of possible theories of change in general, there is a strong need for training to familiarise agencies' programme staff with the key terms and concepts and their use in programme planning, monitoring and evaluation.



Figure 5-1 - Drivers of Adverse Behaviour at the Micro Level

5.3.2 SUPPORTING EVIDENCE

1. There is an urgent need to generate systematic learning about the actual impact of employment programmes on peace. This is a critical but largely untested assumption for many employment programmes that aim to build peace. Furthermore, beyond understanding if a programme had an impact, it is critical to understand why and how such (lack of an) impact was obtained, that is to understand the actual, context-specific mechanisms of the broad theories of change. This process should be done in multiple ways, ranging from rigorous, research-based methods to less formal methods of institutional learning. This includes a small number of randomised controlled trials (RCTs) and (external) evaluations, where follow-ups are conducted with individuals who did and who did

not have the chance to participate in the programmes. These latter analyses should be conducted to specifically test for the presence of spillovers and externalities. More generally, however, agencies should monitor the development of individuals involved in programmes from the outset, as well as carry out shorter-term monitoring of participation. Even if conducted without recourse to a control group or counterfactual, many benefits accrue to the less rigorous approaches, including the provision of systematic learning across various programme locations, types and focuses. Such an approach is essential in moving through the stages of knowledge that facilitate improved and enhanced programming.

2. Agencies should note the large potential learning and knowledge gains from a relatively large increase in the number of evaluations in the near future. Although there are large gains from even the relatively modest proposed increase in evaluations, these are massively outweighed by a more significant up-scaling of systematic learning. Although this may come with costs in the short run, these costs will be significantly outweighed by the benefits from more accurate and better designed programming in the future.
3. Furthermore, agencies should strengthen the organisation, availability and accessibility of all project documents. More ready access to the large amounts of existing and future information will better facilitate within-agency learning as well as facilitating better learning for researchers undertaking meta-analyses.
4. Agencies should consider how the impact of the programme may differ across groups (programme heterogeneity) and what effects this may have on peace.
5. Agencies should specify at the design stage how unintended negative effects will be avoided. In particular, they should beware of elite capture of the benefits of employment interventions due to the roll-out mechanism used. In a peacebuilding setting where grievances are an issue, such capture of benefits could further entrench perceptions of inequality.
6. Agencies should check for unintended negative or positive effects by careful and selective analysis of individuals and groups who did not participate in a programme. Spillovers can be analysed through collecting data from individuals who live in a programme region but who did not personally participate, and from individuals who live in regions where programmes did not take place. Comparison of both groups provides understanding of the local effects of a programme. Externalities can be analysed through considering the theoretical linkages between a programme and phenomena that programme is not specifically designed to change, and measuring the outcomes of programme participants on these domains. Spillovers and externalities could be jointly analysed by applying both recommendations above.
7. Agencies should attempt to meaningfully analyse the peacebuilding aspects of employment programmes through the processes described above. At present, even the best evaluations of employment programmes assume peacebuilding outcomes but do not explicitly analyse them. They should beware of simply stating peacebuilding impacts of an intervention where none are expected or intended. Donors and agencies are likely to be increasingly sceptical of assumed or claimed impacts when they are not backed up by specific programming and M&E activities. This, logically, also implies that agencies should differentiate between employment interventions in FCS that do and those that do not have additional peacebuilding objectives (see Figure 3-2 - Which Programmes lead to Peace? above). Given the current state of empirical knowledge, it seems valid to have a clear differentiation between these two types of programmes. It may be better to have a good employment programme with no explicit peacebuilding focus in some instances than to assume a peacebuilding impact where there possibly is none.

5.3.3 COLLABORATION

1. A need remains to clarify the role of inter-agency collaboration, cooperation and coordination, including knowledge sharing. Agencies should designate, jointly with other agencies, donors and national stakeholders a few priority countries for enhanced collaboration. Outcomes in these countries should be checked against others with 'normal' collaboration to ensure that collaboration has moved closer to its optimum and that it has its desired effects. More so, agencies should (either formally or informally) implement a case-by-case decision-making process that estimates the costs and benefits of collaboration, with a specific focus on why these costs may be higher in FCS.
2. Agencies should design guidelines on the processes that identify specific opportunities for inter-agency collaboration, or collaboration with national governments or other stakeholders. These guidelines should be confirmed with upstream and downstream partners. Agencies should also consider adding specific programme recommendations to PCNAs, which would allow agencies to 'select' the programmes they are best-placed to implement.
3. Agencies should encourage that a case-by-case decision-making process be followed by their field offices to estimate both the costs and benefits of potential forms of collaboration, and hence the locally optimal degree of collaboration. In turn, collaboration should only go ahead if the expected benefits from doing so exceed the costs involved.
4. Agencies should consider developing specific programme recommendations along with their needs assessments. This will provide a stronger benchmark for how agencies, either alone or through cooperating with others, can provide programming that matches a country's needs. More so, it provides an objective basis against which they can evaluate and define their own comparative advantages. This will significantly reduce the costs of coordinating action in the field, as agencies do not waste time and other resources competing for funds.
5. Agencies should assess the comparative advantage of various national and international actors in managing and/or implementing a planned programme. This should include an honest assessment of one's own comparative advantage. They should integrate other agencies where they have a comparative advantage (for example accessing insecure environments or designing sector-specific interventions).
6. Agencies should discuss with national stakeholders how aligned national priorities and the conflict assessment are. Do all analyses suggest the same actions? In practical terms, are peacebuilding elements requested and/or required by the national government, whatever the perceived needs and planned responses may be? In answering these questions, agencies provide a better outline of the needs that are present and how, individually and collectively, they can act to meet those needs.
7. Agencies should pay particular attention to national ownership of collaborative programmes. Although such national ownership is an important goal in all projects, this should be given special attention in collaborative situations as it can help to span internal differences between government departments, as well as within the agencies. This, in turn, can help to develop more coherent programming at both the agency and government levels.

5.4 OUTLOOK

In Section 1 of this report, we defined five stages of learning that, taken together, provide the opportunity for agencies to optimally design and implement employment programmes. Although these stages of learning are broadly generic to any kind of intervention, the information that needs to be generated within each varies drastically across programme objectives and modalities. The extent of required learning is likely to be much greater in situations such as employment for peacebuilding, where programmes have multiple intended

outcomes (in this case, both creating employment and building peace), particularly when at least one of the intended outcomes requires cross-pollination of two separate ideas. In this section, we discuss these stages of learning in the context of employment-for-stability programmes, where our research findings imply the 'knowledge gaps' that result and the activities (which we denote in Figure 5-2 the 'action gap') that can be undertaken to close the knowledge gap.



Figure 5-2 - Closing the Knowledge Gap

5.4.1 RECOGNISING THE KNOWLEDGE GAP

As shown in Figure 5-2, we conclude that the extent and development of current knowledge lags behind the large number of programmes we have discussed throughout our research. We note the strong and important work done on the theoretical base of the relationship between employment programmes and peacebuilding. Although we stop short of saying work on these theories is definitively complete, the present theories are well-

developed and the available concepts provide a strong rationale for believing that employment programmes could have impacts on peacebuilding.

However, we find that whilst there is empirical support for the constituent parts of these theories, two key empirical support pillars are missing. First of all, there is a general absence of information on individual selection into pre-/violent behaviours, whether in the developed or developing world. Second, specifically in FCS, empirical support of how these individual incentives aggregate into collective action is incredibly thin.

This reflection is not new in itself (see, for example, Blattman and Ralston (2015) who make an almost identical point). We also accept that it is not a point that should be made glibly. It is important to note the general empirical complexity of studying individual selection into pre-/violent behaviours due to an absence of appropriate or bespoke data, as well as the additional complexity of studying this topic in FCS.

At the same time, we find worrying evidence of the consequences of these knowledge gaps, which show the importance of this study. Throughout our field visits, for example, we heard many strong assumptions about who selects into pre-/violent behaviours and why. At the same time, as we discuss throughout this document, it is also possible to challenge many of these assumptions even when, prima facie, they seem intuitive (as with the assumption that unemployed urban young men are more likely to become actors of violent conflicts; or where unemployed young people can be easily incentivised by so-called 'spoilers' to engage in disrupting activities). Given this lack of knowledge, it is often difficult to accurately predict the routes through which an employment programme can build peace, let alone understand the extent of its impact. Whilst some first work has been done to develop evidence on concepts, significant and limiting gaps remain in this knowledge. We therefore conclude that the field is currently positioned at the start of Stage 2 (as illustrated in Figure 5-2).

On the headline relationship between employment programmes and peacebuilding outcomes, we find little strong evidence. To our knowledge, only two attempts have been made to bridge this gap in academic research and neither produces particularly strong findings. At the agency level, we find similar knowledge gaps. Of our 33 shortlisted programmes, for example, we find no evidence that peacebuilding outcomes have been evaluated, despite peace playing an important motivating role in most of them. From this, it is difficult to make more general assumptions about the headline link, let alone about the programmatic learning that comes in Stages 4 and 5. Without good evidence or empirical knowledge generated in Stages 2 and 3, it is neither possible to provide information on the precise contextual or programme factors that generate the most success, nor on how to optimise the next wave of programmes. This absence of evidence on either concepts or impacts we call the 'knowledge gap' (as shown in Figure 5-2).

5.4.2 CLOSING THE ACTION GAP

That such a knowledge gap exists is, in many ways, understandable. Even simply putting together the various domains discussed in this research document (3 focus areas; at least 46 FCS; 6 combinations of theories of change; 5 target combinations and; 7 programme combinations) generates about 30,000 feasible and unique scenarios in which programmes take place (see Figure 5-3). Learning which focus, targeting combination and programme typologies have the greatest impact in which scenarios, is therefore an enormous undertaking. This is before sub-national regions, the phases of the conflict cycle, or the changing fragility spectrum are even considered.



Figure 5-3 - Complex Programme Contexts result in a large number of Scenarios

At the same time, however, we find that there is so little evidence for the peacebuilding impacts of employment programmes that it is a source of significant and immediate concern. Whilst it is infeasible and undesirable, let alone unnecessary, to conduct M&E for enhanced learning in every possible scenario, it is important to close the major knowledge gap that remains. Even relatively modest increases in M&E for enhanced learning, in this case, will generate significant returns, especially if the knowledge created is also shared effectively.

Although M&E for enhanced learning must include the most robust and rigorous academic approaches, e.g. randomised controlled trials (RCTs), these studies should be much broader and more numerous than expensive and time-consuming RCTs will allow. Agencies should therefore seek to stimulate quasi-experimental evaluations and ex post evaluations, and in many more cases be willing to provide baseline as well as midline and endline information on programme participants. In combination, this would provide a much more complete picture of what works and what does not. The insights will then need to be communicated across and within agencies, highlighting the role of capacity development and training.

Agencies have an important role to play in stimulating the research needed to complete Stages 3 and 3, that is to reach the so-called 'outcome point' (Figure 5-2). This role includes engaging with research funding agencies and foundations. The generation of such knowledge is an important global public good and can be stimulated by demand for this knowledge from agencies and donors as well as from the usual academic incentives. From the demand-side, however, agencies can also play an important role in developing the missing knowledge in Stage 2.

Agencies should be willing to fund M&E for enhanced learning and to significantly scale up these forms of M&E. Although this will impose costs in the short term (see Box 5.2), the long-term impact of the newly accumulated knowledge will provide significant future gains from streamlined and optimised programmes. Without these two sources of action, the key knowledge gap defined in this document will remain and will act as a barrier to more effective programming. At the same time, in the long term, the opportunity costs of taking action now will be much greater than those involved in stimulating the learning that can close the knowledge gap.

BOX 5.2: How Much Does Enhanced Learning Cost?

Costs for standard monitoring and evaluation (M&E) as well as costs for more rigorous forms of evaluations (like impact evaluations) vary greatly. Indeed, there is no consensus in the literature on how much either M&E or impact evaluations cost on average per programme. In this box, we will discuss some preliminary evidence on this topic and suggest a practical way forward for budgeting enhanced learning on the peacebuilding impact of employment interventions.

Costs of Core M&E

In our review of interventions, we find little evaluation costs in the shortlist review. The only evaluation-related costs frequently found in budgets are M&E data, and these are often not restricted to single programmes. For two interventions, we found budgets for ex post evaluations that focus more on programme outcomes than programme impact (Table 5-1). These two ex post evaluation budgets represent 0.84% and 0.90% of their respective programme budgets.

Rieger (2011) assesses the costs of (mostly ex post) evaluations for Switzerland in a survey article and compares his findings with other studies. He finds that costs differ significantly, partly in line with the scale of the underlying programme. Ex post evaluations cost between US$10,000 for smaller evaluations and budgets of US$100,000 or more for larger evaluations. What is clear is that more complex evaluations, e.g. those tracking people over time and those with comparison groups, can easily cost several hundreds of thousands of dollars. As a share of programme costs, these budgets can be as low as 0.01% for a large programme or as high as 10% for a small programme. Furthermore, the type of programme also matters. Standardised, mature programmes are less costly to evaluate than novel, experimental programmes.

Costs of Enhanced M&E

This suggests that a new wave of enhanced learning for employment programmes aiming to build peace will require above-average M&E and learning budgets in the short term. Enhanced learning are those activities that go beyond core M&E activities which are typically part of every development intervention. Enhanced learning may include extra efforts to establish a counterfactual or to hold special training events, e.g. to teach programme staff about theories of change relevant for peacebuilding. Enhanced learning may hence include impact evaluations (such as randomised controlled trials or RCTs), but the term captures much more than just impact evaluations. Having said that, impact evaluations are among the most complex and costly learning exercises, implying that the figures we discuss are an upper boundary of what enhanced learning may cost. For example, some forms of ex post evaluation using secondary data cost little more than research time.

Impact evaluations are more demanding in terms of data collection and staff needs than core M&E activities. To conduct an impact evaluation, novel data needs to be collected, including data on beneficiaries and a control group. Data collection time may also be extended beyond the lifetime of the programme in order to measure longer-term effects. Impact evaluations may require hiring more specialised staff or consultants (Baker, 2000).

The World Bank is a particularly useful information source on the cost of impact evaluations, because it is the largest producer of impact evaluations among development institutions, using mostly experimental methods. It has made data available on a large number of impact evaluations. In this sample in Table 5-2, the average cost of an impact evaluation is about US$500,000, or about 0.5% of the total programme cost. In a direct comparison with M&E costs for the same sample of programmes, the World Bank reports expenditures of US$0.2 to US$0.6 million for programme preparation and US$0.1 - US$0.15 million per year for programme

supervision, which place the cost of a rigorous impact evaluation at a similar order of magnitude as overall M&E activities. While some baseline or endline data collection activities can be integrated in M&E activities, there are no mentions of possible synergies between these two activities. For that reason, we cannot assume synergies that would lower evaluation costs, but we find little evidence that evaluations are substantially more expensive in FCS (IEG, 2012).

A cost breakdown by expense type shows, most notably, that data collection alone accounts for two thirds of total impact evaluation costs (Table 5-2; Gertler et al., 2011). While it is harder to derive from this cost structure what the price for a non-experimental impact evaluation would be, given the nature of the costs, we could expect most of these costs to be variable and thus that evaluation costs scale down significantly for lower-dimension programmes.

A United Nations report on impact evaluations conducted within the United Nations system (including ILO), where not all impact evaluations are required to have an experimental or quasi-experimental design, finds evaluation budgets to be highly variable within the US$25,000 to US$220,000 range, with the bulk of evaluations clustered around the US$25,000 to US$30,000 range (UNEG, 2003). This later range yields evaluation costs as a percentage of the average ILO programme total cost in the range between 1.3% and 1.5%. As can be seen from average budgets of peacebuilding interventions (Table 5-3), United Nations agencies have much smaller average budgets than World Bank programmes. In particular ILO and PBSO, when they are the only agency in the programme, have relatively small programme budgets and are thus unlikely to have impact evaluation cost shares of programme cost similar to higher budget programmes.

How much would it cost to fund enhanced learning for 100 'pioneer programmes'?

Reviewing this evidence, we make conservative assumptions about likely evaluation costs for core M&E, for enhanced M&E (excluding impact evaluations) and for impact evaluations. We assume that strictly proportional core M&E costs around 0.5% and enhanced M&E 1% of programme budgets for all budget sizes. Furthermore, we assume that impact evaluations cost 1.5% of overall programme budgets for smaller programmes (average budgets of around US$1.5 million to US$2 million; and of around 0.5% for larger budget programmes, such as those from the World Bank, of close to US$100 million (Table 5-4, panel A).

Finally, we calculate these enhanced evaluation costs for 100 additional 'Pioneer Programmes' over a period of five years, moving us from the decision point to the outcome point (see Figure 5-2). In other words, in our scenario the four agencies would conduct on average 25 such programmes over five years, 16 with enhanced, non-impact evaluation methodologies and 9 with impact evaluation methodologies. This is equivalent, on average, to each agency running three impact evaluations per theory of change over five years, which is a very low estimate given the complex programme contexts these interventions operate in (see also Figure 5-3). The calculation of this scenario indicates that 100 'pioneer programmes' across the agencies would have a core M&E budget of US$13 million in total. Upgrading this to an enhanced M&E framework including one third impact evaluations would cost an additional US$10.6 in total (as a conservative lower bound). The cost of closing the knowledge gap may hence be at least an additional US$10 million for a period of five years (Panel B in Table 5-4 and Figure 5-2).

Table 5-1: Evaluation Costs in Peacebuilding Programmes

Agency	Peacebuilding Focus	FCS country	Country	Name	Programme budget	Evaluation budget	Evaluation type	% of programme	Source
UNDP	Yes	Yes	DRC	Projet de consolidation de la paix dans les zones minières artisanales de la province du Nord Kivu (programme Rubaya)	6546774	55000	external final	0.84%	(a)
UNDP	Yes	Yes	Sudan	Early Recovery in Darfur	1200000	10743	external final	0.90%	(b)

Sources: (a) Nienta et al. (2014) (b) Fadul (2015).

Table 5-2: Budget Estimates and Budget Shares for World Bank Impact Evaluations

Agency	**Number of interventions**	**Type**	**Source**			
World Bank	102	Experimental and non-experimental	Word Bank Group Impact Evaluations – Relevance and Effectiveness	Average cost of IE	Median cost of IE	
					as % of intervention	as % of programme
				$0.5 million	1.4	0.5
World Bank	14	Experimental	Impact Evaluation in Practice	Average cost by IE		
				Total Cost ($)	744646	100%
				Travel	71621	10%
				World Bank staff	66031	9%
				Consultants (national and international)	115975	16%
				Data collection (including filed staff)	482290	65%
				Other (dissemination & workshops)	30686	4%

Sources: IEG (2012) and Gertler et al. (2011).

Table 5-3: Average Budgets by Agency (in USD)

	Agency is present	Only agency in the programme
ILO	10 209 507	1 902 454
PBSO	2 967 193	1 536 209
UNDP	17 193 408	21 662 582
WB	73 896 429	78 588 462

Note: Programme budget or actual budget if programme budget is unknown, peacebuilding focus interventions.

Source: Authors' own calculations based on the longlist.

Table 5-4: Simulation of Enhanced Learning Costs for 100 Pioneer Programmes

Panel A: Unit Evaluation Costs in USD	**Simulation: "100 Pioneer Programmes"**		
	Core M&E 0.5%	**Enhanced M&E 1%**	**Impact Evaluations 0.5-1.5%**
ILO	9 512	19 025	28 537
PBSO	7 681	15 362	23 043
UNDP	108 313	216 626	324 939
WB	392 942	785 885	392 942

Panel B: Total Evaluation Costs in USD	**Simulation: "100 Pioneer Programmes"**			
	Core M&E 0.5%	**Enhanced M&E 1%**	**Impact Evaluations 0.5-1.5%**	**Total**
ILO	237 807	304 393	256 831	561 224
PBSO	192 026	245 793	207 388	453 182
UNDP	2 707 823	3 466 013	2 924 449	6 390 462
WB	9 823 558	12 574 154	3 536 481	16 110 635
Total	12 961 213	16 590 353	6 925 149	23 515 502

Note: The total is the sum of Enhanced M&E and Impact Evaluations.

Source: Authors' own calculations based on the Longlist.

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ANNEX 1: FOCUS COUNTRIES AND REGIONS OF THE REVIEW OF INTERVENTIONS

ASIA AND OCEANIA

Afghanistan	Indonesia	Kiribati
Marshall Islands	Micronesia (Federated States of)	Myanmar
Nepal	Pakistan	Philippines
Solomon Islands	Sri Lanka	Timor-Leste
Tuvalu		

AMERICAS

Haiti

EURASIA

Georgia

EUROPE

Kosovo[1]	Ukraine

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Iraq	Iran	Lebanon
Libya	Palestine	Syria
Yemen		

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Burundi	Central African Republic (CAR)	Chad
Comoros	Côte d'Ivoire	Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
Eritrea	Ethiopia	Guinea
Guinea-Bissau	Liberia	Madagascar
Mali	Nigeria	Rwanda
Sierra Leone	Somalia	South Sudan
Sudan	Togo	Uganda
Zimbabwe		

ANNEX 2: INTERVIEW PARTNERS, WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS AND KEY RESOURCE PERSONS

Name	Organisation	Country
Abdul Rahman Lamin	UNESCO Regional Office for Eastern Africa	Kenya
Abimbola A. Adubi	World Bank	Liberia
Aida Mota	Ministry of Social Protection and Solidarity	Timor-Leste
Alain Waked	DFID	Lebanon
Alan Bobbett	Building Markets	Liberia
Alasdair Fraser	IGC	Liberia
Ali Dehaq	ILO	
Alia Farhat	Al Majmoua	Lebanon
Amanda McLoughlin	DFID	
Andre Filipe Bongestabs	Ministry of Social Protection and Solidarity	Timor-Leste
Annabella Skof	ILO	Lebanon
Anne Juepner	UNDP	Kenya
Antonio Indart Jr.	ILO	Timor-Leste
Asha Sawyer	FAO	Kenya
Awa Dabo	UNDP	Tanzania
Ayham Al-Maleh	PBSO	United States
Bas Athmer	ILO	Timor-Leste
Basel Kaghadou	ESCWA	Lebanon
Bastien Revel	UNDP	Lebanon
Betty Oloo	UNFPA Somalia	Somalia
Bolormaa Angaabazar	World Bank	Timor-Leste
Bruno Maltoni	UN IOM	Timor-Leste
Camelia Dureng	UNMIL	Liberia
Carole Alsharabati	St Joseph University Beirut	Lebanon
Charu Bist	UNDP	United States
Chinyere Emeka-Anuna	ILO	Liberia
Christopher Fayia	Center Songhai	Liberia
Christopher Wakube	SaferWorld	Kenya
Christopher Wleh Toe	National Civil Society Council	Liberia
Cleophas Torori	UNDP	Liberia
Cristiana Solomon	UNMIL	Liberia

Cyprine Birgen	IOM	Somalia
Dala Korkoyah Jr.	GOL Ministry of Gender and Development / EPAG	Liberia
Daniel Boakye	World Bank	Liberia
Daniela Henrike Klau-Panhans	World Bank	Kenya
Dave Lowe	Chamber of Commerce and Industry	Timor-Leste
David Robalino	World Bank	United States
Diana Bernardo	UNDP	Timor-Leste
Diego Garrido Martin	World Bank	Kenya
Dominic Massaquoi	GOL Ministry of Gender and Development / EPAG	Liberia
Donato Kiniger-Passigli	ILO	Switserland
Emilia Pires		Timor-Leste
Erica Kuhlik	IPA	Liberia
Fadi Abilmona	UNDP	Lebanon
Fatima Elsheikh	UNDP	Timor-Leste
Federico Negro	ILO	Switserland
Fernando Cantu	ESCWA	Lebanon
Fernando de Encarnacao	ILO	Timor-Leste
Frances Ainley	DFID	Lebanon
Francis Dennis	Liberia Chamber of Commerce	Liberia
Frank Hagemann	ILO	
Frederick Wakhisi	Universal Peace Federation	Kenya
Frieda M'Cormack	UNMIL	Liberia
George Antoun	Mercy Corps	
George Gachara	HEVA Fund	Kenya
Greg Kitt	Parley	Liberia
Habib Ur Rehman Mayar	g7+	Timor-Leste
Helder da Costa	g7+	Timor-Leste
Henk-Jan Brinkman	PBSO	United States
Hernani Soares	Institute for Business Support	Timor-Leste
Hovig Wannis	UNDP	Lebanon
Hussein Hoteit	ICU	Lebanon
Hyewon Jung	UNDP	Jordan
Ilias Dirie	ILO	Somalia
Isabel de Lima	National Labour Force Development Institute	Timor-Leste
James Atema	American Friends Service Committee	Kenya

Jamil Kanaan	UNRWA	Lebanon
Jan von der Goltz	World Bank	United States
Jason Pronyk	UNDP	
Jemell Kiazolu	ILO	Liberia
Jens Tranun Kristensen	UNMIL	Liberia
Joanna Nassar	UNDP	Lebanon
Johannes Schreuder	PBSO	United States
John Pile	UNFPA	Timor-Leste
John Skelton	Mercy Corps	Liberia
John Zay Zay	IRC	Liberia
Jonathan Brooks	UNDP	Somalia
José M.C. Soares	WEBACA	Timor-Leste
José Ramos-Horta		Timor-Leste
José Ricardo Silva	World Bank	Timor-Leste
Julie Agum	UNMIL	Liberia
Kamal Hamdan	Consultation and Research Institute Lebanon (CRI)	Lebanon
Ken Chamuva Shawa	ILO	Ethiopia
Kennedy Akolo	American Friends Service Committee	Kenya
Knut Ostby	UN	Timor-Leste
Kristoffer Tangri	UNDP	United States
Lars Johansen	ILO	Lebanon
Lars Siefert	UN Department of Safety and Security	Timor-Leste
Leon Chammah	UNDP	Lebanon
Letigia Jesus	Ba Futuro	Timor-Leste
Liam Perret	UNRCO - Somalia	Somalia
Lina Shamsadin	PBSO	Yemen
Luca Renda	UNDP	Lebanon
Lucy Richardson	UNDP	United States
Mack Capehart Mulbah	World Bank	Liberia
Maha Ali	Mercy Corps	Lebanon
Maha Kattaa	ILO	Lebanon
Manal Founi	UNDP	Syria
Marcello Mori	European Union External Action Service	Lebanon
Mario Patino	International Rescue Committee	Lebanon
Mark Gordon	WFP Somalia	Somalia
Marta Pedrajas	UNDP	United States
Mattias Lundberg	World Bank	United States

Melanie Oey	SPARK Liberia	Liberia
Michelle Bouchebel	Search for Common Ground	Lebanon
Michelle Krogh	UNDP	Lebanon
Michelle Rebosio	World Bank	Liberia
Milica Turnic	UN Women	Liberia
Minako Manome	UNDP	Jordan
Mirvat Haddad	World Bank	Lebanon
Mohamed Chamsin	Municipality of Sidon	Lebanon
Mr Alexandrinda	Secretariat of State for Vocational Training Policy and Employment	Timor-Leste
Mr Cancio	Secretariat of State for Vocational Training Policy and Employment	Timor-Leste
Mr Eli	North LEDA (Programme Officer)	Lebanon
Mr Felisberto	Secretariat of State for Vocational Training Policy and Employment	Timor-Leste
Mr James	Green Cities Recycling Innovation Center	Liberia
Mr Lucio	Secretariat of State for Vocational Training Policy and Employment	Timor-Leste
Mr Mark	World Bank	Liberia
Nadia Alawamleh	UNDP	Jordan
Nadia Piffaretti	World Bank	United States
Nancy Ezzedine	Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS)	Lebanon
Nancy Maroun	Mercy Corps	Lebanon
Nasser Yassin	American University Beirut	Lebanon
Nathalie Bavitch	ILO	Lebanon
Nirina Kiplagat	UNDP	Tanzania
Nuha Mohammad	UNRWA	Lebanon
Nuno de Rosario Trinidade	Chamber of Commerce and Industry	Timor-Leste
Nyawira Kimondo	IOM	Somalia
Osama Tageldin	UNDP	Sudan
Osman Siddiqi	IPA	Liberia
Palmira Pires	East Timor Development Agency	Timor-Leste
Pamela Dale	UNICEF Somalia Support Center	Kenya
Par Skold	UNMIL	Liberia
Patrick Daru	ILO	Lebanon
Paulo Alves	Secretariat of State for Vocational Training Policy and Employment	Timor-Leste
Pedro Conceicao	UNDP	United States
Pierre Bengono	PBF	Niger

President	North LEDA	Lebanon
Rachael Eicholz	Oxfam	Lebanon
Raed Harb	Mercy Corps	Lebanon
Ramon Garway	UN Women	Liberia
Ramses Kumbuyah	Ministry for Youth and Sport	Liberia
Rania Bikhazi	ILO	
Rebecca Littman		United States
Richard van Hoolwerff	SPARK Liberia	Liberia
Roberto Pes	ILO	Kenya
Rubio Dias Ximenes	East Timor Development Agency	Timor-Leste
Saah N'tow	GOL Liberia Ministry for Youth and Sport	Liberia
Salif Massaly	ILO	Liberia
Sami Atallah	Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS)	Lebanon
Sanna Kaskeala	UNWOMEN	United States
Sarah Douglas	PBSO	United States
Sean Borrell	Consultant	Timor-Leste
Shaza Al-Jundi	ILO	Lebanon
Sheeraz	UNDP	Lebanon
Sierra James	Ba Futuro	Timor-Leste
Simon Done	ILO	Timor-Leste
Sofia Palli		Lebanon
Stanley Kamara	UNDP	Liberia
Stephen Lavalah	Youth Exploring Solutions	Liberia
Sunita Caminha	UN Women	Timor-Leste
Susan J. Brownell		Liberia
Susan Marx	The Asia Foundation	Timor-Leste
Tammy Smith	PBSO	United States
Terje Tessem	ILO	Switzerland
Timothy Lawther	ILO	Timor-Leste
Tom Thorogood	UNDP	Lebanon
Tomas Stenstrom	ILO	Timor-Leste
Torge Matthiesen	Germany Federal Foreign Office	Lebanon
Tracy Wama	HEVA, The Presidency, Kenya	Kenya
Valentina Calderon	ESCWA	Lebanon
Valeria Moro	UNRWA	Lebanon
Vidal Campos Magno	Ba Futuro	Timor-Leste
Viola Dub	DFID	Lebanon

Wambui Kabogo	IOM	Kenya
William Dennis	BSC Monrovia	Liberia
Witness Simbanegavi	African Economic Research Consortium (AERC)	Kenya
Yun Jae Chun	PBSO	United States
Zubair Ezzat	UNDP	Somalia

ANNEX 3: METHODOLOGY OF THE REVIEW OF INTERVENTIONS

To achieve the aims of the research in a consistent and replicable manner, we adopt a 'systematic review' protocol[1] concerning our empirical analysis of interventions, consisting of:

1. Clear inclusion criteria for choosing interventions to be analysed;
2. An explicit and replicable search strategy to find potential interventions to be included;
3. Systematic coding and analysis of included interventions.

INCLUSION CRITERIA

The decision on the inclusion or exclusion of interventions is based on four criteria as follows.

First, we consider interventions where at least one of the commissioning organisations is involved in a funding[2] and/or implementing role.

Second, we only include interventions falling into one or more of the following categories of intervention:

1. Labour-based interventions (LB): this includes any type of intervention that aims at providing participants with salaried job. This includes programmes that create jobs directly (for example, through cash-for-work schemes or public works) as well as programmes that facilitate connections between participants and employers. Internship schemes (even if unpaid) qualify under this category as well.
2. Vocational training interventions (VT): this includes all types of training that is aimed at increasing participants' employability (be it in salaried employment or self-employment). We also include here training follow-up support such as job placement services for trainees.
3. Interventions in support of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs): this includes interventions aimed at supporting participants to set up their own businesses, as well as interventions aimed at directly supporting existing MSMEs.

It should be noted that, according to our inclusion criteria, there are types of employment-related intervention that do not qualify, e.g. support for policy development, institutional capacity development or interventions aimed at creating a favourable macroeconomic environment for employment. This is in line with our focus on the microfoundations of peace.

Third, we selected interventions taking place in an agreed list of 46 focus countries (see Annex). For the purposes of the systematic review, it was important to have a list that was generated exogenously to the research team to minimise biases. Therefore, we identified as focus countries all those countries that are listed on the World Bank's Harmonised List of Fragile Contexts FY15 (IDA and blend countries; see World Bank, 2015d) and/or (2) have an average 50+ battle-related deaths since 2005 according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP, 2015). This generated a list of 45 countries.

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1. For a definition of systematic review, see Campbell Collaboration: http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/what_is_a_systematic_review/.http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/what_is_a_systematic_review/.

2. In the case of the PBSO, this refers to programmes funded by the UN Peacebuilding Fund.

An additional country, Guinea, was added upon request from one of the agencies, bringing the final number to 46 countries. The inclusion of Guinea resulted in an additional inclusion of 12 programmes, which were, broadly speaking, poorly documented. The results of the analysis have not been affected substantially by the inclusion of Guinea. If anything, it worsened the mean indicators for the availability of information.

Fourth, we considered interventions with a start date in the period 2005 to 2015.[3]

The review of interventions was then conducted in three stages, with a view to balancing the 'width' and the 'depth' of analysis.

STAGE 1 – MAPPING

In Stage 1, we mapped the universe of all relevant interventions for the focus countries in the period 2005-2015, creating a de facto census of all relevant interventions. While we recognise that this list may not be exhaustive, priority is given to making the sample as complete as possible without any known biases, thereby generating a list that is a representative sample of all existing interventions and that is large enough to allow for meaningful quantitative analysis. In addition, we aimed to make the search for relevant interventions replicable, to maximise transparency and hence trust in the results.

The list was generated using the agencies' web portals. Given the differences in functionality, some adaptation across agencies was needed (see Table A3.1: Data Sources and Retrieval Methods below).

Table A3.1: Data Sources and Retrieval Methods

Agency	Database/ Portal	Process
ILO	http://www.ilo.org/global/regions/lang--en/index.htm	Search by country, then filter by keyword(s).
PBSO	http://mptf.undp.org/document/search	Select Fund (PBF), then select country, then screen manually.
UNDP	http://open.undp.org/	Search by country, then screen manually.[2]
World Bank	http://www.worldbank.org/projects	Search by keyword(s), then filter by country.

Note: All links valid as of 31 August 2016.

For all countries except Francophone countries, the keywords empl* OR job* OR work* OR skill* were used for the online searches. For Francophone countries, we also searched for trava* OR competence*. These searches were conducted by the research team with some support from PBSO in the case of their web portal.

3. In the case of the World Bank, documents generally include the date of Board approval (AD) rather than the start date (SD) of the intervention. In this case, the date of board approval is considered a good predictor for the start date (we considered SD = AD + 1).

At the start of the research, each organisation also provided the research team with a list of interventions that they considered particularly relevant. These lists were included in the initial mapping, alongside the keywords search.

With regard to the selection of World Bank interventions, the research team was aware of the existence of the WBG Jobs Group's analysis of the 'job-flagged' portfolio, i.e. a database of projects with an explicit and substantive focus on jobs.[4] A list of job-flagged interventions for fragile countries was shared with the team during the research period. However, there was no complete overlap between the countries in the job-flagged list and the list of focus countries for the study. The decision to use a database search was ultimately motivated by the effort to have as much consistency as possible among the search criteria for the various agencies, as well as the strive for replicability in the intervention list. An ex post comparison of the two lists showed an overlap of 57 interventions (i.e. 57 interventions were both on our list and on the World Bank job-flagged list).

This part of the work yielded a list with **2415 candidate interventions** for consideration.

These interventions were then reviewed (using summaries where available) against our criteria of inclusion (see above). Only interventions qualifying according to these criteria were retained. This yielded a list of **432 interventions**.[5] This longlist is included in this Report as Annex 5.

STAGE 2 – CODING

The aim of this stage was to create a database of key information on all qualifying interventions. We hence coded all qualifying interventions according to a number of basic variables. Coding variables relate to dates, budget, type of intervention (LB, VT or MSMEs), target beneficiaries, employment focus (primary or secondary) as well as peacebuilding focus (or lack thereof).

The data generated in this stage permitted us to undertake a basic quantitative analysis to enhance our understanding of the 'big picture' concerning the prevailing trends on the nature and the distribution of relevant interventions across all focus countries. This analysis can be found in Section 3.1. It is representative of the work of the four agencies in the field of employment interventions for peacebuilding in FCS in the period 2005-2015 – and probably indicative of similar programming by similar agencies or donors.

STAGE 3 – SELECTION OF SUBSET OF RELEVANT AND WELL-DOCUMENTED INTERVENTIONS

In stage 3, we aimed to analyse the most relevant and best-documented subset of interventions in more depth (the top of the pack, so to speak). The motivation was that we were keen to learn from the best interventions which had useful information. We selected a sample of relevant interventions and coded these in some more detail. The resulting data revealed in some detail (but with less external validity than the analysis of stage 2) if programmes reached their intended impact and which theories of change helped to explain such impacts.

Given our learning objective, the shortlist of interventions is not a random sample. Interventions were selected based on relevance and availability of documentation. **Essential criteria** for inclusions were:

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4. The analysis of the 'jobs-flagged' portfolio was based on a review of Project Appraisal Documents and Implementation Completion and Results Reports for interventions approved through FY15. The list is available to teams seeking to conduct analysis of jobs-relevant projects.

5. This figure includes 64 interventions for which we could not find any documentation to determine their precise focus.

1. Availability of at least a final report, internal evaluation or external evaluation (this meant, logically, eliminating all the programmes that had not yet been completed);
2. Employment as a primary focus of the intervention (thus eliminating all the interventions where employment was secondary to other objectives).

Specifically, the **process of selection** was as follows.

Out of the longlist of 432 interventions, we then selected only the programmes that were already completed (i.e. with an end date of 2015 or earlier). This left us with a list of **271** interventions.

Next, we only kept the completed interventions for which we could access at least a final report, mid-term or final external evaluation or internal final evaluation. This left us with a list of **126** interventions.

Out of this list of 111 interventions, we only kept those that had a primary employment focus. This gave us a list of **69** qualifying interventions.

A shortlist of **33 interventions** was selected for in-depth analysis. The final selection took into account a mix of qualitative and quantitative criteria:

1. Priority was given to interventions with a peacebuilding focus.
2. Both the quality and quantity of documentation were taken into account.
3. All other things being equal, for the same agency the most recent intervention was selected.

The final selection also has to ensure that no agency was under- or over-represented. A primary reliance on peacebuilding focus would have led to an over-representation of PBSO interventions vis-à-vis the other agencies (particularly the World Bank).

We ensured geographical balance by (1) not having more than two programmes per country and (2) having at least one programme for each region.
Given our interest in inter-agency collaboration, we also ensured a balance between single-agency and collaborative interventions. The resulting shortlist of 33 interventions studied is included in this Report as Annex 6.

CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS

A challenge for the research team was to map interventions in a consistent and replicable way, given the differences in database access and functionality across the participating agencies discussed above. The ease of access to programme documentation varied significantly, as discussed at the start of Section 3. In the end, we decided to document each of our steps and decisions clearly, thereby making the findings as transparent, replicable and externally valid as possible.

A key limitation concerned the difficulty in accessing documents, particularly external evaluations. The type and quantity of available documentation varied by agency. We do not claim that this documentation does not exist, but it was not available to the research team during the period of the research. It is conceivable that some additional information is available in the open domain but that despite our persistent and best efforts we failed to locate it. However, from the point of view of institutional learning, hard-to-access project documentation is equivalent to non-existent project documentation, as we argue in detail in this report. The research team spent more time identifying suitable information than a typical programme officer could be expected to have available while designing a new intervention.

The type of documentation available also varied across agencies. For example, for World Bank interventions, we did not have access to external evaluations, but we had fairly large access to Implementation Completion and Results (ICR) Reports and/or Implementation Completion and Results Reviews (ICRRs).[6] For 41 interventions we had access to a ICR and/or ICRR (corresponding to 53% of all the completed World Bank interventions examined).

For ILO interventions, some form of external evaluation (mid-term and/or final) was available for 39% of the completed interventions, but these were mostly only available in summary form (typically 4 pages summarising the methodology, main findings and recommendations of the evaluations). For UNDP interventions, final reports were available to us for 28% of the completed interventions, while some form of evaluation was available for 26% of the completed interventions.

For PBSO interventions, final reports were generally available and easily accessible on the website (86% of the PBSO interventions had a final report available). Final programme evaluations were available only in 6 cases (16%). This is due to the fact that (with the exception of IRF/emergency projects) PBF projects are not generally evaluated individually, but rather as part of the overall PBF portfolio for a given country. Portfolio evaluations were taken into account when available (18 cases, or 49%).

In the case of joint interventions, documentation produced by one agency is counted against all the participating agencies. These figures do not differentiate between the documents that are publicly available and those that have been shared with the research team by the four organisations.
As a result of the limited availability and heterogeneous nature of the documentation, data availability also varied. The research team did not conduct targeted searches to obtain particular variables for projects. Rather, our search strategy relied on finding relevant documentation and extracting information from these documents.

6. *The World Bank considers ICRs as the primary documents to be used for the purpose of analysing World Bank project performance. ICRs are typically available six months after the closing date and contain as much detailed information as possible to support the performance ratings. The ICR Review (ICRR), conducted by IEG, is an independent, desk-based, critical review of the evidence, results, and ratings of the ICR in relation to the operation's design documents. Based on the evidence provided in the ICR and an interview with the last task team leader, IEG arrives at its own ratings for the project, based on the same evaluation criteria of the Bank. IEG reviews all ICRs of completed operations to validate the Bank's self-evaluation and ratings. Combined with the ICR report, this validation serves as an independent evaluation of the project based on collecting evidence outside of the Bank's own process. This process serves the dual functions of informing learning and ensuring accountability. These assessments are archived and made available on IEG's external website. Final ratings used are based on the independent review. The ICRRs were considered when available in the World Bank project database.*

ANNEX 4: STATISTICAL TABLES FOR LONGLIST ANALYSIS

Table A4.1: Programme Frequency by Primary Agency

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Agency	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative
ILO	167	38.66	38.66
PBSO	36	8.33	46.99
UNDP	117	27.08	74.07
World Bank	112	25.93	100.00

Table A4.2: Programme Frequency by Region

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Agency	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative
Americas	11	2.55	2.55
Asia	114	26.39	28.94
Eurasia	6	1.39	30.33
Europe	9	2.08	32.41
MENA	86	19.91	42.31
SSA	206	47.69	100.00

Table A4.3: Programme Frequency by Principle Agency and Region

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Agency	ILO	PBSO	UNDP	World Bank	Total
Americas	4	1	3	3	11
Asia	71	1	19	23	114
Eurasia	1	0	4	1	6
Europe	1	0	7	1	9
MENA	26	1	37	37	86
SSA	64	33	47	62	206
Total	167	36	117	112	432

Table A4.4: Comparative Statistics on Mean Programme Duration

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Duration	325	31.69	19.12	3	97
Duration_ILO	144	29.63	16.82	3	89
Duration_PBSO	36	17.97	6.57	8	36
Duration_UNDP	100	31.13	17.97	4	96
Duration_WB	45	50.47	21.95	3	97
Duration_Asia	101	34.36	18.00	4	72
Duration_MENA	73	33.82	21.27	3	97
Duration_SSA	131	28.61	17.90	3	91

Note: Table showing mean duration of programmes (in month), split by: the full sample; those where ILO is the primary agency; those where PBSO is the primary agency; those where UNDP is the primary agency; those where the World Bank is the primary agency; those that took place in Asia; those that took place in the MENA region and those that took place in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Table A4.5: Comparative Statistics on Programme Types

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Labour	364	0.51	0.50	0	1
Vocational	369	0.68	0.47	0	1
SME	363	0.44	0.50	0	1

Table A4.6: Comparative Statistics on Programme Types by Agency

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLE (Mean)	ILO	PBSO	UNDP	World Bank
Labour	0.51	0.33	0.55	0.52
Vocational	0.74	0.94	0.61	0.60
SME	0.41	0.53	0.59	0.29

Table A4.7: Comparative Statistics on Programme Types by Region

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLE (Mean)	Asia	MENA	SSA
Labour	0.40	0.53	0.54
Vocational	0.67	0.55	0.76
SME	0.36	0.38	0.51

Table A4.8: Comparative Statistics on Programme Types

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Youth	372	0.40	0.49	0	1
Women	369	0.20	0.40	0	1
Displaced	368	0.10	0.30	0	1
Ex-Combatants	368	0.07	0.26	0	1
Other	368	0.05	0.22	0	1

Table A4.9: Comparative Statistics on Programme Types by Agency

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLE (Mean)	ILO	PBSO	UNDP	World Bank
Youth	0.37	0.78	0.44	0.25
Women	0.14	0.39	0.31	0.07
Displaced	0.09	0.06	0.19	0.03
Ex-Combatants	0.02	0.25	0.11	0.04
Other	0.08	0.03	0.05	0.04

Table A4.10: Comparative Statistics on Programme Target by Region

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLE (Mean)	Asia	MENA	SSA
Youth	0.35	0.23	0.52
Women	0.11	0.94	0.10
Displaced	0.08	0.16	0.07
Ex-Combatants	0.00	0.01	0.14
Other	0.08	0.04	0.05

Table A4.11: Comparative Statistics on Primary Programme Focus

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Employment	373	0.61	0.49	0	1
Peacebuilding	367	0.29	0.47	0	1

Table A4.12: Comparative Statistics on Primary Programme Focus by Agency

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLE (Mean)	ILO	PBSO	UNDP	World Bank
Employment	0.72	0.61	0.57	0.53
Peacebuilding	0.11	0.97	0.41	0.13

Table A4.13: Comparative Statistics on Primary Programme Focus by Region

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLE (Mean)	Asia	MENA	SSA
Employment	0.53	0.68	0.62
Peacebuilding	0.13	0.26	0.40

ANNEX 5: LIST OF ALL REVIEWED INTERVENTIONS ('LONGLIST')

Country	Programme title	Agency(ies)	Other UN partners	Dates	Status	Type of Intervention	Primary employment focus	Peacebuilding focus	Reason for inclusion	Available documentation
Afghanistan	Road to Jobs: Bringing decent work to rural households of the Northern Provinces in Afghanistan	ILO		2014 - 2018	Ongoing	LB	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work, job; On ILO's list	Prodoc, Summary, Website
Afghanistan	Local economic development and employment project in Herat	ILO		2007	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment	
Afghanistan	Expansion of Employment Service Centres to Nine Provinces in Afghanistan, 3rd phase	ILO		2006 - 2007	Completed	LB	Yes	No	KW search: employment	External Final evaluation
Afghanistan	Employment Services Centre for Returned Refugees and IDPs in Kabul	ILO	UNHCR	2005 - 2006	Completed	LB	Yes	No	KW search: employment	
Afghanistan	Capacity building for return, reintegration and temporary migration of Afghan workers and their protection	ILO	UNHCR	2006 - 2008	Completed	LB	Yes	No	KW search: work	
Afghanistan	Studies on Afghan Competitiveness for Job Creation - Agricultural Value Chains	ILO		2013 - 2015	Completed	VT, MSMEs	No	No	KW search: job; On ILO's list	
Afghanistan	Local Dev .through infrastructure & jobs (Afghanistan)	ILO		2008 - 2010	Completed	LB	Yes	No	KW search: job	
Afghanistan	Strengthening Skill Assessment & Certification Systems in Afghanistan	ILO		2013 - 2017	Ongoing	VT	Yes	No	KW search: skill	Summary, Website
Afghanistan	Afghanistan Access to Finance	WB		2013 - 2018	Ongoing	MSMEs	No	No	KW search: employment	PAD PID ISRRs
Afghanistan	Afghanistan - Second Skills Development Project	WB		2014 - 2018	Ongoing	VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment, job, skill	PID

Afghanistan	Afghanistan New Market Development	WB		2012 - 2016	Ongoing	MSMEs	No	No	KW search: employment, work	PID ISRs
Afghanistan	Strengthening Higher Education Additional Financing	WB		2006 - 2013	Completed	VT	No	No	KW search: employment, work, job; On WB's list	PID ISRs ICR
Afghanistan	AF Rural Enterprise Development Program	WB		2011 - 2016	Ongoing	VT, MSMEs	No	No	KW search: employment, work, skill	PID ISRs
Afghanistan	Afghanistan Skills Development Project	WB		2009 - 2014	Completed	VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment, skill; On WB's list	PID ISCs ICRR ICR
Afghanistan	Non-Formal Approach to Training Education and Jobs in Afghanistan Project	WB		2015 - 2018	Ongoing	VT	Yes	No	KW search: job	ISCs
Afghanistan	Afghanistan - Education Quality Improvement Project	WB		2005 - 2009	Completed	VT	No	No	On WB's list	PID ICR
Afghanistan	Afghanistan Peace & Reintegration Programme	UNDP		2010 -	Unknown	LB, VT	Yes	Yes	On UNDP's list	Prodoc, Progress reports, Summary
Afghanistan	Strengthening the Resilience of Rural Livelihood Options	UNDP		2014 - 2019	Ongoing	VT, MSMEs	No	No		Prodoc, Summary
Afghanistan	Gender Equality Project (Gep - II)	UNDP		2013 - 2015	Completed	VT	No	No		Prodoc, External Final evaluation, Mid-term evaluation, Progress reports, Summary
Afghanistan	Local Economic Develoment for Afg - Initiation Phase	UNDP		2015	Completed	VT	No	No		Summary
Tajikistan-Afghanistan	Project for Livelihood Improvement in Tajik-Afghan Cross-border Areas (LITACA)	UNDP		2014 - 2017	Ongoing	VT, MSMEs	No	No	On UNDP's list	
Burundi	Programme de développement des filières au Burundi (PRODEFI) - Composante Emploi des Jeunes Ruraux	ILO	IFAD	2013 - 2016	Ongoing	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	No	KW search: employment	Summary, Website
Burundi	Support employment creation & reintegration	ILO		2010 - 2013	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment	

Burundi	Public Works and Urban Management Project	WB		2010 - 2015	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work, job	PAD PID ISRs ICR
Burundi	Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project	WB		2010 - 2013	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	No	Yes	KW search: employment	PID, ISRs ICR
Burundi	Burundi Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Program	WB		2005 - 2008	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	No	Yes	KW search: employment	PAD PID ICR
Burundi	Burundi Road Sector Development	WB		2005 - 2015	Completed	LB	No	No	KW search: work	PAD PID ISRs ICR
Burundi	Reintegration Communautaire Et Villages Ruraux Integres	UNDP			Unknown	VT, MSMEs	No	Yes		Prodoc
Burundi	Appui a La Consolidation De La Paix Et La Réintégration	UNDP		2015 - 2016	Ongoing	VT, MSMEs	No	Yes		Prodoc
Burundi	Opportunités Economiques Par La Promotion De L'artisanat	UNDP		2014 - 2016	Ongoing	VT, MSMEs	Yes	No		Prodoc
Burundi	Reintegration socio-economique des rapatries du Camp de Mtabila	UNDP		2013 - 2014	Completed	LB	No	Yes	On UNDP's list	Progress reports
Burundi	Youth participation in social cohesion at community level (Participation des jeunes a la cohesion sociale au niveau communautaire)	PBSO	UNFPA	2007 - 2008	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, Portfolio evaluation, Progress reports, Summary
Burundi	Promotion du rôle des petites et micro-entreprises dans la consolidation de la paix	PBSO, UNDP	BINUP	2008 - 2009	Completed	VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, Portfolio evaluation, Progress reports, Summary
Burundi	Appui à la réintégration socio économique des populations affectées par les crises et au relèvement communautaire	PBSO, UNDP		2009 - 2010	Completed	LB, VT	No	Yes	On PBSO's list	Final report, Portfolio evaluation, Internal evaluation, Progress reports, Summary

Burundi	Consolidation de la Paix à travers l'appui à la réintégration socio-économique durable en faveur des personnes affectées par le conflit	PBSO, ILO , UNDP	UNFPA, FAO, UNWOMEN, UNHCR	2011 - 2014	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	No	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, Portfolio evaluation, Progress reports, Summary
CAR	CAR - Emergency Urban Infrastructure Rehabilitation & Maintenance	WB		2008 - 2016	Ongoing	LB	No	No	KW search: employment, work	ISR
CAR	Projet D'appui Au Redéploiement De L'administration	UNDP		2015 - 2017	Ongoing	LB	No	Yes		Prodoc, Summary
CAR	Appui Institutionnel Pour La Transition	UNDP		2014 - 2016		LB, VT, MSMEs	No	Yes		Prodoc, Final report, Summary
CAR	Appui à la formation par l'apprentissage et à l'insertion des jeunes déscolarisés et désœuvrés des régions affectées par les conflits, comme facteur de consolidation de la paix	PBSO, UNDP		2009 - 2010	Completed	LB, VT	Yes	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, Progress reports, Summary
CAR	Redynamisation des Centres de formation professionnelle de Bozoum, Bossangoa et Bria	PBSO	UNESCO	2009 -	Completed	VT	Yes	Yes	On PBSO's list	Final report, Progress reports, Summary
CAR	Formation socioprofessionnelle et réintégration des jeunes grâces l'emploi (Youth Education Pack - YEP)	PBSO	UNHCR	2009 -	Completed	VT	Yes	Yes	On PBSO's list	Final report, Progress reports, Summary
CAR	Rural communities' access to local financial services	PBSO, UNDP	UNCDF	2010 -	Completed	VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, Progress reports, Summary
CAR	Appui à l'insertion de la Jeunesse Pionnière Nationale (JPN) dans les zones d'accueil et à l'efficacité du centre d'apprentissage et de réinsertion économique de Bossembélé.	PBSO	FAO	2010 -	Completed	VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, Progress reports, Summary

CAR	Support for the implementation of income generating activities and self-employment in the agricultural sector in conflict zones	PBSO	FAO	2010 -	Completed	VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, Progress reports, Summary
CAR	Prevention of recruitment, demobilisation and socio-economic reintegration of children associated with armed groups and other vulnerable children and women in the conflict zones	PBSO	UNICEF, UNFPA, WFP	2010 -	Completed	VT	No	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, Progress reports, Summary
CAR	Appui à la Réinsertion/ Réintégration des ex-combattants démobilisés et au Relèvement communautaire en République Centrafricaine	PBSO, UNDP	BINUCA	2012 -	Unknown	VT, MSMEs	No	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Progress reports, Summary
Chad	Promotion de la micro et petite entreprise rurale	ILO		2006 - 2012	Completed	MSMEs	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work, job	Summary, Website
Chad	Value Chain Support Project	WB		2014 - 2019	Ongoing	VT, MSMEs	No	No	KW search: employment	PAD, ISRs
Chad	Urban Development Project	WB		2008 - 2015	Completed	LB	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work, job, skill	PAD, ISRs, PID
Chad	Développement Des Opportunités économiques Des Femmes	UNDP		2005 - 2008	Completed	MSMEs	Yes	No		Prodoc
Comoros	Creation of 500 youth and women employment in agricultural field in Comoros	ILO		2012 - 2013	Completed	VT, MSMEs	Yes	No	KW search: employment; On ILO's list	Prodoc
Comoros	Comoros - Emergency Crises Response Project	WB		2011 - 2015	Completed	LB	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work, job	ICRR, ICR, ISRs, PID
Comoros	Emergency Food Security and Unemployment Support Through Cash-for-Work	WB		2010 - 2014	Completed	LB	Yes	No	KW search: work	ISRs
Comoros	Comoros - Economic Governance Reform Support Grant	WB		2010 - 2011	Completed	VT	No	No	On WB's list	ISRs, Prodoc, PID
Comoros	Réforme Sécuritaire en Union Des Comores	UNDP		2013 - 2015	Completed	LB	No	Yes		Final report

Comoros	Projet Agriculture Mohéli	UNDP		2009 -	Unknown	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	No		Prodoc, Summary
Comoros	Support to sustainable peace through the promotion of youth and women employment in the Comoros (Appui à la pérennisation de la paix par la promotion de l'emploi des jeunes et des femmes aux Comores (APROJEC)	PBSO, ILO, UNDP	UNIDO, FAO	2010 - 2012	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, external Final evaluation, internal evaluation, Progress reports
Comoros	Appui à l'intégration socio économique des femmes et filles associées au conflit dans le cadre du DDR	PBSO	UNFPA	2010 - 2011	Completed	VT, MSMEs	No	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, external Final evaluation, Portfolio evaluation, Progress reports
Comoros	Promotion des conditions économiques et sociales des jeunes et femmes dans l'île de Mohéli au travers l'appui à l'agriculture	PBSO, UNDP	UNIDO	2009 - 2011	Completed	VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, external Final evaluation, Portfolio evaluation, Progress reports, Summary
Comoros	Appui à la pérennisation de la paix par la promotion de l'emploi des jeunes et de l'éducation civique aux Comores	PBSO, ILO		2013 - 2015	Completed	VT	Yes	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, Progress reports
Côte d'Ivoire	Engaging multinational enterprises on job creation for young women and men in Cote d'Ivoire	ILO			Unknown	LB, MSMEs	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work, job, skill	Summary, Website
Côte d'Ivoire	Emergency Youth Employment and Skills Development Project	WB		2012 - 2019	Ongoing	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	KW search: employment, work, job, skill	ISRs, PID
Côte d'Ivoire	Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance Project	WB		2008 - 2013	Completed	VT	No	Yes	KW search: employment, work, job	ISRs, PID
Côte d'Ivoire	Youth Employment Pilot	WB		2008 - 2010	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment, work, job	
Côte d'Ivoire	Support for Young Entrepreneurs and Urban Job Creation	WB		2009 - 2013	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: job	
Côte d'Ivoire	Programme Conjoint Pauvreté	UNDP	UNICEF, FAO, UNFPA	2015 - 2016	Ongoing	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	No		Progress reports, Summary

Côte d'Ivoire	1,000 micro-projects for socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants and youth at risk in Côte d'Ivoire	PBSO, UNDP	ONUCI	2008 - 2009	Completed	LB, VT	No	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, Portfolio evaluation, Progress reports, Summary
DRC	Programme d'activités pour l'emploi des jeunes dans la province du Katanga (PAEJK)	ILO		2012 - 2015	Completed	VT, MSMEs	Yes	No	KW search: employment	Prodoc, external Final evaluation, Summary, Website
DRC	Youth Employment	ILO		2008 - 2010	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment	
DRC	Programme d'appui à l'emploi des jeunes	ILO		2007 - 2008	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment	
DRC	Améliorer la gouvernance dans les mines du Katanga par la promotion du travail décent	ILO		2007 - 2009	Completed	VT	No	No	KW search: work, job; On ILO's list	Prodoc, External Final evaluation
DRC	Projet d'Appui à la Réinsertion Economique Durable des Démobilisés en République Démocratique du Congo (ARED II)	ILO, WB		2009 - 2012	Completed	VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	On ILO's list	External final evaluation, Summary
DRC	DRC: Financial Infrastructure and Markets	WB		2015 - 2020	Ongoing	MSMEs	No	No	KW search: employment, work	PAD PID ISRs
DRC	DRC Eastern Recovery Project	WB		2015 - 2020	Ongoing	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work, job	PAD PID ISRs
DRC	Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project	WB		2005 - 2011	Completed	LB	No	Yes	KW search: employment; On WB's list	PID ISRs ICR
DRC	DRC Labor Intensive Works in the Katanga Province - State and Peace-Building Fund	WB		2011	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: work	
DRC	Joint Project for Community Reintegration of Ex Child Soldiers	UNDP	UNICEF, WFP, UNWOMEN	2015 - 2016	Ongoing	LB, VT	No	Yes		Prodoc, Summary
DRC	Projet de consolidation de la paix dans les zones minières artisanales de la province du Nord Kivu (project Rubaya)	UNDP	UNICEF, FAO	2012 - 2014	Completed	LB	Yes	Yes	On UNDP's list	Prodoc, Final report, External final evaluation
DRC	Projet de Relèvement et de Relance Economique dans la Province du Maniema	UNDP	FAO		Unknown	VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes		Prodoc
DRC	Community recovery and peacebuilding in North Kivu	UNDP		2011 -	Unknown	VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	On UNDP's list	Prodoc, Summary

DRC	Project to support the stabilization of South Kivu	UNDP	UNICEF, FAO	2012 - 2014	Completed	LB	No	Yes	On UNDP's list	Prodoc
Eritrea	Youth Employment and Skills Development	UNDP, ILO	UNIDO, IOM	2014 - 2016		VT, MSMEs	Yes	No		Prodoc
Eritrea	Joint Programme on Gender Equity in Eritrea	UNDP, ILO	WHO, UNICEF, UNIFEM, UNFPA	2007	Completed	VT, MSMEs	No	No		Prodoc
Eritrea	Support to promotion of sustainable livelihoods, enhanced community solidarity, and resilience in Eritrea	UNDP		2014 - 2016	Ongoing	LB	No	No		Prodoc, Progress reports
Ethiopia	Promoting Rights and Opportunities for People with Disabilities through legislation	ILO			Completed	VT	No	No	KW search: employment, skill	External final evaluation
Ethiopia	Organization for Women in Self Employment (WISE)	ILO		2012	Completed	VT, MSMEs	Yes	No	KW search: employment, job, skill; On ILO's list	Prodoc, Summary, Website
Ethiopia	Poverty Reduction through Decent Employment Creation in Ethiopia	ILO		2007 - 2010	Completed	VT, MSMEs	Yes	No	KW search: employment; On ILO's list	Prodoc, External final evaluation
Ethiopia	Promoting access to micro-insurance for financial inclusion and decent work – Phase II	ILO		2007 -	Completed	MSMEs	No	No	KW search: work	External final evaluation
Ethiopia	Reducing decent work deficit in the informal economy	ILO			Unknown	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: work	
Ethiopia	Mekelle Prison Project - Creating sustainable livelihood opportunities for women and youth	ILO			Unknown	VT, MSMEs	No	No	KW search: skill; On ILO's list	Prodoc, Summary
Ethiopia	Edible Oil Value Chain Enhancement	ILO	UNIDO, FAO	2009 - 2012	Completed	VT, MSMEs	No	No	On ILO's list	Prodoc, External final evaluation, Mid-term evaluation
Ethiopia	Women Entrepreneurship Development Project	WB		2012 - 2017	Ongoing	VT, MSMEs	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work, skill	PAD, PID, ISRs
Ethiopia	ET Competitiveness and Job Creation Project	WB		2015 - 2020	Ongoing	MSMEs	No	No	KW search: work	PAD, PID, ISRs
Ethiopia	Entrepreneurship Development Programme	UNDP		2012 - 2016		VT, MSMEs	Yes	No		Summary

Georgia	Support Involvement Employers' Org. in implementing reintegration policies for returnees and endorsement of Trade Unions Migration Policy	ILO		2013	Completed	LB	Yes	No	KW search: employment	
Georgia	Youth Development and Inclusion	WB		2008 - 2012	Completed	LB, VT	Yes	Yes	KW search: skill	ISRs, PID
Georgia	Skills for Employment Program	UNDP		2013 - 2016	Ongoing	MSMEs	Yes	No		Prodoc, Mid-term evaluation, Summary
Georgia	Abkhazia Agriculture	UNDP		2014 - 2016	Ongoing	VT	No	No		Prodoc, Summary
Georgia	Vocational Skills Eu	UNDP			Unknown	VT	Yes	No		Prodoc, Summary
Georgia	UN Joint Programme to Enhance Gender Equality in Georgia	UNDP		2011 - 2014	Completed	VT, MSMEs	No	No		Prodoc, Summary
Guinea	Stepping Up Skills Project	WB		2014 - 2020	Ongoing	LB, VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work, job, skill	PAD, PID, ISRs
Guinea	Guinea - MSME Development Project	WB		2013 - 2017	Ongoing	VT	No	No	KW search: employment, skill	PAD, PID, ISRs
Guinea	Productive Social Safety Net Project	WB		2012 - 2017	Ongoing	LB, VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work, job, skill	PAD, PID, ISRs
Guinea	Labor Intensive Public Works - Additional Financing for Third Urban Development Project Phase II	WB		2008 - 2011	Completed	LB	Yes	No	KW search: work	
Guinea	National Rural Infrastructure Project	WB		2005 - 2013	Completed	LB	No	No	KW search: work	PID, ISRs, ICR
Guinea	Programme De Prévention Des Conflits&consolidation Paix	UNDP	UNIDO, WFP, UNFPA	2014 - 2015	Completed	VT	Yes	Yes		Prodoc
Guinea	Promotion Du Genre en République De Guinée	UNDP, ILO	FAO, WFP, UNIDO	2013 - 2017	Ongoing	VT, MSMEs	Yes	No		
Guinea	Joint project to support the youth movement and some groups of young poorest	PBSO	UNICEF, UNIDO	2010 - 2011	Completed	VT, MSMEs	No	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, Portfolio evaluation, Progress reports, Summary

Guinea	Socio-economic reintegration of children recruited in an irregular manner in the armed forces of Guinea	PBSO	WFP, UNICEF	2011 - 2012	Completed	VT	No	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, Portfolio evaluation, Progress reports, Summary
Guinea	Projet d'appui a l'insertion économique des jeunes et des femmes	PBSO, UNDP	UNFPA, WFP, UNIDO	2011 - 2012	Completed	LB, VT	Yes	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, Portfolio evaluation, Progress reports, Summary
Guinea	Réintégration des jeunes associes avec les forces armées et les jeunes vulnérables – phase 2	PBSO	UNICEF	2013	Completed	VT	Yes	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, Progress reports, Summary
Guinea	Programme nationale d'emploi specifique pour les jeunes (filles et garcons) a risque de conflit	PBSO, UNDP	UNFPA, UNIDO, WFO	2014 - 2015	Completed	LB, VT	Yes	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, Progress reports, Summary
Guinea-Bissau	Private Sector Rehabilitation & Agribusiness Development	WB		2014 - 2019	Ongoing	VT, MSMEs	No	No	KW search: employment, work	PAD, PID, ISRs
Guinea-Bissau	Youth Professional Training and Employment	PBSO, UNDP		2008 - 2010	Completed	VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, Portfolio evaluation, Progress reports
Guinea-Bissau	Appui à la création d'emplois et de revenus en Guinée Bissau	PBSO, UNDP , ILO	FAO, UNICEF	2011 - 2013	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Portfolio evaluation, Progress reports
Guinea-Bissau	Quick and Multilevel Impact for Women's Economic Empowerment and Improvement of Working Conditions in Guinea-Bissau	PBSO	UNWOMEN, FAO, UNICEF	2012 - 2015	Completed	VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Progress reports
Guinea-Bissau	LB-intensive employment for youth and women in the lead-up to and immediate post-electoral period in Guinea-Bissau	PBSO, UNDP		2013 - 2014	Completed	LB	Yes	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, Progress reports
Haiti	Programme de prévention des désastres naturels par la réhabilitation de l'environnement à travers la création d'emplois	ILO		2007 - 2009	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment	

Haiti	Promote the socio-economic integration of vulnerable children and youth through a multi-faceted approach and mutually reinforcing interventions as professional training, job placement, entrepreneurship and citizenship development.	ILO, UNDP		2015 - 2017	Ongoing	LB, VT	No	No	KW search: job	Summary, Website
Haiti	La gestion de debris en appui au retour au foyer des populations affectées par le tremblement de terre dans des quartiers de Port-au-Prince (phase I et II)	ILO		2011 - 2013	Completed	VT, MSMEs	No	No	On ILO's list	external Final evaluation, Mid-term evaluation, Summary
Haiti	Réhabilitation de 16 quartiers et retour volontaire des familles de 6 camps associés/ Réhabilitation de la zone du Champ de Mars	ILO		2011 - 2015	Completed	VT, MSMEs	No	No	On ILO's list	Prodoc, Final report, Progress reports, Summary
Haiti	Port-au-Prince Area Community Driven Development Pilot Project (PCF) / PRODEPAP	WB		2007 - 2009	Completed	LB	No	No	KW search: employment	
Haiti	Haiti Community Driven Development (CDD) Project / PRODEP	WB		2007 - 2013	Completed	LB	No	No	KW search: employment	PAD, PID ISRs ICR
Haiti	JSDF Grant for Emergency Community Cash for Work Project	WB		2010 - 2012	Completed	LB	Yes	No	KW search: work	PID ISRs
Haiti	Creation D'emplois Inclusifs	UNDP		2012	Completed	LB	Yes	No		Prodoc, Progress reports, Summary
Haiti	Post Earthquake Recovery & Livelihood	UNDP		2010 - 2014	Completed	LB	Yes	No		Prodoc, Progress reports, Summary
Haiti	Programme De Relèvement Immédiat	UNDP			Unknown	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	No		Progress reports, Summary
Haiti	Recovery through Employment Generation, Environmental Rehabilitation and Disaster Mitigation	PBSO, UNDP, ILO		2010 - 2011	Completed	LB	Yes	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, Progress reports, Summary

Indonesia	Promote decent work for food security and sustainable rural development in the Nusa Tenggara Timur province	ILO	FAO	2014 - 2016		NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment, work	Summary, Website
Indonesia	Indonesian Green Entrepreneurship Program (IGEP)	ILO		2012 - 2014	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment	Summary, Website
Indonesia	Education and Skills Training for Youth Employment in Indonesia (EAST)	ILO		2006 - 2010	Completed	LB, VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment	Mid-term evaluation, Summary, Website
Indonesia	Employment-intensive Growth for Indonesia: Job Opportunities for Young Women and Men (JOY)	ILO		2006 - 2010	Completed	LB	Yes	No	KW search: employment, job	External final evaluation, Mid-term evaluation, Summary
Indonesia	Entrepreneurship culture and business creation for youth employment in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, Indonesia	ILO		2005 - 2008	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment	
Indonesia	Further developing employment services and VT in Aceh and North Sumatra	ILO		2006 - 2007	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment	
Indonesia	Local Economic Recovery: Rebuilding Livelihoods and Employment Opportunities	ILO		2005 - 2007	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	No	KW search: employment	Mid-term evaluation
Indonesia	Employment-intensive Infrastructure for Aceh	ILO, UNDP		2005 - 2006	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment	
Indonesia	Aceh Employment and Livelihoods Training Support	ILO		2005 - 2006	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment	
Indonesia	Employment Creation for Poverty Creation and Livelihood Recovery	ILO, UNDP	FAO, UN-HABITAT, UNORC, OCHA	2005 - 2008	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	No	KW search: employment	Summary, Website
Indonesia	Emergency Employment and Livelihoods Support Network	ILO		2005 - 2006	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment	
Indonesia	Decent Work for food security and sustainable rural development in Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT), INDONESIA	ILO		2013 - 2016		NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: work	
Indonesia	ASEAN Small Business Competitiveness Program	ILO		2013 - 2015	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: work	Summary, Website

Indonesia	Green Entrepreneurship	ILO		2012	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: work, job	Summary, Website
Indonesia	Creating jobs: capacity building for local resource-based road works in selected districts of Aceh and Nias (Phase III)	ILO		2011 - 2012	Completed	LB, VT	Yes	No	KW search: work, job	Summary, Website
Indonesia	Green Jobs in Asia - Indonesia	ILO		2010 - 2012	Completed	VT	Yes	No	KW search: work, job	Summary, Website
Indonesia	Capacity building for local resource-based road works in selected districts in NAD and NIAS	ILO, UNDP		2006 - 2011	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: work	
Indonesia	Emergency Employment and Livelihoods Support Network	ILO		2005 - 2006	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: work	
Indonesia	Promoting Micro and Small Enterprises through Improved Entrepreneurs' Access to Financial Services (PROMISE IMPACTS)	ILO		2015 - 2018	Ongoing	MSMEs	No	No	KW search: job	Summary, Website
Indonesia	Local development through infrastructure and jobs (Indonesia)	ILO		2008 - 2010	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: job	Summary
Indonesia	Entrepreneurship skills development primarily for indigenous people	ILO		2009 - 2010	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: skill	
Indonesia	Provision of skills training and recovery of livelihoods in Central Java	ILO		2006 - 2007	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: skill	
Indonesia	The ICFTU-APRO project for skills development and VT in Indonesia	ILO		2005 - 2006	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: skill	
Indonesia	Livelihood Recovery for DI Yogyakarta and Central Java	WB		2008 - 2010	Completed	MSMEs	No	No	KW search: employment, work, skill	PAD PID ISRs
Indonesia	Access to Finance and Capacity Building of Earthquake-Affected MSEs in Yogyakarta and Central Java	WB	IOM	2008 - 2010	Completed	MSMEs	No	No	KW search: employment, skill	PAD PID ISRs ICR
Indonesia	National Program for Community Empowerment in Urban Areas (PNPM UPP)	WB		2008 - 2011	Completed	VT, MSMEs	No	No	KW search: work	PAD PID ISRs ICR ICRR

Indonesia	Peace Through Development in Disadvantaged Areas (Ptdda)	UNDP		2012 - 2016	Ongoing	MSMEs	No	Yes	On UNDP's list	Prodoc, Summary
Iraq	Expansion of the KAB programme in Kurdistan targeting students enrolled in vocational education institutes and unemployed youth graduates of TVET	ILO	UNESCO	2012 - 2013	Completed	VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work	Summary, Website
Iraq	Skills development to support employment generation in Iraq	ILO	UNOPS	2007 - 2008	Completed	VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment, skill; On ILO's list	Prodoc, External final evaluation, Mid-term evaluation, Website
Iraq	Private sector development programme for Iraq	ILO, UNDP	UNIFEM, UNOPS, UNIDO, FAO, UNHABITAT	2009 - 2012	Completed	MSMEs	No	No	KW search: work; On ILO's list	Prodoc, Summary, Website
Iraq	Local Area Development Programme (LADP)	ILO	UNOPS	2007 - 2010	Completed	VT	Yes	No	On ILO's list	External final evaluation, Progress reports, Summary
Iraq	Improving quality and relevance of Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) in Iraq	ILO	UNESCO, UNHABITAT	2007 - 2011	Completed	VT	Yes	No	On ILO's list	Prodoc, External final evaluation
Iraq	Iraq Emergency Community Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project	WB		2005 - 2013	Completed	LB	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work	PID ISRs ICR ICRR
Iraq	IQ-Youth Livelihoods Development in Southern Iraq	WB		2011 - 2015	Completed	LB, VT	Yes	No	KW search: work, skill	PID ISRs
Iraq	Funding Facility for Stabilization	UNDP		2015 - 2017	Ongoing	LB, MSMEs	No	No		Prodoc, Progress reports, Summary
Iraq/Kurdistan	Icrrp	UNDP		2014 -	Unknown	LB, MSMEs	No	No	On UNDP's list	Prodoc, Summary
Iraq	VT Msme Capacity Development in Basra	UNDP		2014 - 2015	Completed	VT, MSMEs	No	No		Prodoc, Progress reports, Summary
Iraq	Resilience Support for Syrian Refugees	UNDP		2014 - 2015	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	No	Yes		Prodoc, Progress reports, Summary
Iraq	P1-Is-03 Rehab for Mine Victims	UNDP		2014	Completed	LB, VT	Yes	No		Prodoc, Progress reports, Summary
Iraq	Improvement of Basic Infrastructure for Idps	UNDP		2014 - 2016		LB, VT, MSMEs	No	Yes		Prodoc, Progress reports, Summary
Kiribati	Support improved decent employment opportunities for youth in Kiribati	ILO		2012 - 2013	Completed	VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment	

Kiribati	Promotion of Youth Employment in Kiribati	ILO		2009 - 2011	Completed	VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment	
Kiribati	Sub-regional Programme on Education, Employability and Decent Work for Youth in the Pacific Island Countries	ILO		2006 - 2010	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	No	KW search: work	External final evaluation
Kosovo	Active LB Market 2	UNDP		2014 - 2017	Ongoing	LB, VT	Yes	No		Prodoc, Summary
Kosovo	Local level response for employment generation and integrated territorial development	UNDP		2014 - 2017	Ongoing	VT, MSMEs	Yes	No		Prodoc
Kosovo	Skills Development in Kosovo	UNDP		2015 - 2016	Ongoing	VT	Yes	No		Prodoc, Summary
Kosovo	Active LB Markets Programme for Youth	UNDP		2005 - 2014	Completed	VT, MSMEs	Yes	No	On UNDP's list	Prodoc, Final report, External final evaluation, Mid-term evaluation, Progress reports
Lebanon	Employment Services For Palestinian Refugees in South Lebanon	ILO, UNDP	UNRWA	2011 - 2013	Completed	VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment	Prodoc
Lebanon	Support to Public Employment Services	ILO		2008 - 2013	Completed	LB	Yes	No	KW search: employment	Prodoc, Mid-term evaluation, Progress reports, Website
Lebanon	Skills development, employment services and local economic recovery for the construction sector	ILO		2008 - 2013	Completed	VT, MSMEs	Yes	No	KW search: employment, job, skill; On ILO's list	External final evaluation, Progress reports, Website
Lebanon	Enhancing Local Employment, Skills and Enterprises in Nahr el Bared, Lebanon	ILO		2008 - 2010	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	KW search: employment, skill; On ILO's list	Final report, External final evaluation, Progress reports, Website
Lebanon	Emergency employment and skills in the Nahr El Bared Palestinian Camp in North Lebanon	ILO, UNDP		2008	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment, skill	
Lebanon	Enabling Job Resilience and Protecting Decent Work Conditions in Rural Communities Affected by the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Northern Lebanon	ILO		2013 - 2016		LB, VT	Yes	No	KW search: work, job	Prodoc, Website

Lebanon	Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in North Lebanon	ILO		2009 - 2012	Completed	VT, MSMEs	No	Yes	On ILO's list	Prodoc, Final report, External final evaluation, evaluation
Lebanon	Local socio-economic recovery in war-affected areas of South Lebanon (II)	ILO		2009 - 2011	Completed	VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	On ILO's list	Prodoc, Progress reports
Lebanon	Local Socio-economic Recovery in war-affected areas of South Lebanon (I)	ILO	FAO, UNIDO, ESCWA	2007 - 2008	Completed	VT, MSMEs	Yes	No	On ILO's list	External final evaluation
Lebanon	Engagement Facility - Lebanon Crisis Response Plan	UNDP		2014 - 2015	Completed	LB	Yes	Yes		Prodoc, Summary
Lebanon	Support to the Economic and Social Fund for Development	UNDP		2011 - 2014	Completed	MSMEs	Yes	No		Prodoc, Summary
Lebanon	Support to Economic Recovery, Community Security and Social Cohesion in Lebanese Communities Affected by the Syrian Crisis (aka Lebanese Host Communities Support Project)	UNDP		2012 - 2017	Ongoing	LB	No	No	On UNDP's list	
Lebanon	Setting integrated plans and services for welfare and heath in 8 municipalities	UNDP		2014 -	Unknown	VT	No	No	On UNDP's list	
Lebanon	Support to employability, MSMEs, value chains and regional and national development strategies and policies	UNDP		2015 -	Unknown	MSMEs	No	No	On UNDP's list	
Lebanon	Empowerment of youth at risk through job creation programme in areas of tensions	PBSO, ILO	UNRWA, UNICEF	2011 - 2013	Completed	VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, External final evaluation, Mid-term evaluation, Progress reports
Liberia	UN joint programme for employment and empowerment of young women and men in Liberia	ILO, UNDP	UNESCO, UNICEF, WB, UNFPA	2009 - 2011	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	KW search: employment; On ILO's list	Prodoc
Liberia	Poverty Reduction through Decent Employment Creation in Liberia	ILO		2007 - 2010	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	No	KW search: employment, job; On ILO's list	External final evaluation, Mid-term evaluation
Liberia	Youth Employment Liberia	ILO		2008 - 2010	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment	

Liberia	Gender and employment generation: Contributing to lasting peace	ILO	UNIFEM	2007 - 2008	Completed	VT, MSMEs	Yes	No	KW search: employment; On ILO's list	Prodoc
Liberia	LB-based public works	ILO		- 2014	Completed	LB	Yes	No	KW search: work; On ILO's list	Prodoc, External final evaluation
Liberia	Agricultural Sector Rehabilitation Project	ILO		- 2015	Completed	MSMEs	No	No	On ILO's list	Prodoc
Liberia	Agriculture and infrastructure development project (AIDP)	ILO, WB		- 2015	Completed	LB	No	No	On ILO's list	Prodoc, Final report, Progress reports, Summary, Website
Liberia	LR: Youth, Employment, Skills Project	WB		2011 - 2016	Completed	LB, VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work, job, skill	PAD, PID, ISRs
Liberia	Promoting Private Sector and Natural Resource Governance	UNDP		2013 - 2018	Ongoing	MSMEs	No	Yes		Summary
Liberia	Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme	PBSO, UNDP		2008 - 2010	Completed	VT	No	No	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, Portfolio evaluation, Progress reports, Summary
Liberia	Women's Economic Empowerment: Building Peace, Promoting Prosperity	PBSO	UN Women	2013 - 2015	Completed	VT	No	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, Portfolio evaluation, Progress reports, Summary
Liberia	National Youth Service Programme for Peace and Development	PBSO	UNICEF	2013 - 2015	Completed	VT	No	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, Portfolio evaluation, Progress reports, Summary
Madagascar	Contribution à la réduction de la pauvreté par la promotion de l'emploi des jeunes - Phase 2 - CREPEJ 2	ILO, UNDP		2015 - 2016	Ongoing	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment	
Madagascar	Contribution à la réduction de la pauvreté par la promotion de l'emploi des jeunes à Madagascar, CREPEJ	ILO, UNDP		2014	Completed	VT, MSMEs	Yes	No	KW search: employment	Prodoc, Summary
Madagascar	Vers l'autonomisation des femmes et jeunes filles vulnérables à travers l'emploi décent (II)	ILO, UNDP		2013 - 2014	Completed	LB, VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work	Prodoc
Madagascar	Vers l'autonomisation des femmes et jeunes filles vulnérables à travers l'emploi décent: Madagascar (I)	ILO, UNDP		2011 - 2013	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment	

Madagascar	Promotion de l'emploi et des revenus dans la région Vatovay -Fitovinay	ILO, UNDP		2008 - 2010	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment	
Madagascar	Promotion de l'emploi et des revenus dans la région d'Atsimo Andrefana	ILO, UNDP		2008 - 2009	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment	
Madagascar	Promotion de l'emploi et des revenus	ILO, UNDP		2006 - 2007	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment	
Madagascar	Support vulnerable groups of workers in their transition from informal economy to formalization	ILO		2014 - 2016		NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: work	
Madagascar	Construction des Ecole Primaires en Madagascar, basee sur l'utilisation des ressources locales	ILO		2014	Completed	LB	No	No	On ILO's list	Prodoc
Madagascar	HIMO Batiments	ILO		2005 - 2007	Completed	LB	No	No	On ILO's list	Prodoc
Madagascar	Madagascar Emergency Food Security and Social Protection Project	WB	FAO, UNICEF	2014 - 2018	Ongoing	LB	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work	PAD, PID, ISRs
Madagascar	Emergency Infrastructure Preservation & Vulnerability Reduction Project	WB		2013 - 2017	Ongoing	LB	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work, job	PID, ISRs
Madagascar	Madagascar - Emergency Food Security and Reconstruction Project	WB		2008 - 2013	Completed	LB	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work, job	PID, ISRs, ICR
Madagascar	Integrated Growth Poles Additional Financing Credit	WB	UNEP, WHO	2009 - 2012	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	No	KW search: employment, job	Project paper
Madagascar	Resilience Communautaire	UNDP, ILO	UNCDF, FAO, UNIDO, UNESCO, UNHABITAT, WPF	2015 - 2016		VT	Yes	No		Prodoc, Summary
Madagascar	Développement Accéléré De L'économie Rural	UNDP		2015 - 2017	Ongoing	LB, VT	Yes	No		Prodoc, Summary
Mali	Projet d'insertion des jeunes dans la vie professionnelle a travers les investissements a haute intensite de main d'oeuvre en milieu urbain et en milieu rural (PEJIMO)	ILO		2007 - 2010	Completed	LB, VT	Yes	No	On ILO's list	Prodoc, External final evaluation, Progress reports
Mali	Skills Development and Youth Employment Project	WB		2014 - 2020	Ongoing	VT, MSMEs	Yes	No	KW search: employment, skill	PAD, PID, ISRs

Mali	Education Sector Investment Program II	WB		2006 - 2009	Completed	VT	No	No	KW search: employment, work, job	PAD, PID, ISRs
Mali	Growth Support Project	WB		2005 - 2012	Completed	MSMEs	No	No	KW search: skill; On WB's list	PAD, PID, ISRs, ICR
Mali	Development Learning Center Project	WB		2005 - 2011	Completed	LB, VT	No	No	On WB's list	PAD, PID, ISRs, ICR
Mali	Projet Conjoint Jeunesse Et Résilience	UNDP, ILO	FAO, UNFPA	2013 - 2015	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes		Prodoc
Mali	Appui au Renforcement des capacités de résilience aux conflits des femmes et des jeunes dans la région de Gao et Tombouctou	UNDP, PBSO		2015 - 2016	Ongoing	LB, VT, MSMEs	No	Yes		Prodoc, Summary
Myanmar	Shan State: Peace, reconciliation and development through community empowerment	ILO		2014 - 2019	Ongoing	LB, VT	No	Yes	KW search: work	Summary, Website
Myanmar	Promotion of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work as Tools for Peace in Myanmar	ILO		2014 - 2016	Ongoing	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: work	Website
Myanmar	STED Asia: Skills for Trade and Economic Diversification	ILO		2014 - 2017	Ongoing	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: job, skill	Website
Myanmar	Start and Improve your Business in Myanmar : Building stronger SME support for job creation	ILO		2013	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: job	
Myanmar	Infrastructure and Jobs - Emergency Livelihood Project in Response to Cyclone Nargis in Mawlamyinegyun Region in Myanmar (Burma)	ILO		2008 - 2009	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: job	
Myanmar	Entrepreneurship Development and SME support in Myanmar	ILO		2013 - 2017	Ongoing	VT, MSMEs	No	No	KW search: skill	Summary, Website
Myanmar	Livelihood Support for Social Cohesion	UNDP	UNCDF	2013 - 2015	Completed	VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	On UNDP's list	Prodoc, Internal evaluation, Progress reports, Summary
Myanmar	Integrated Community Development Project-Icdp	UNDP		2008 - 2010	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	No	No		Prodoc, Summary
Nepal	Skills for Productivity and Employment	ILO		2014 - 2017	Ongoing	VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work, skill	Summary, Website

Nepal	Emergency employment response to Nepal earthquake-affected areas: Provision of OSH equipment for debris and landslide clearance workers	ILO		2015	Completed	LB	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work	Summary, Website
Nepal	Skills Enhancement for Employment	ILO	IFAD	2008 - 2011	Completed	LB, VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment, skill	Summary, Website
Nepal	Employment Creation and Peace Building based on Local Economic Development (EmPLED)	ILO		2006 - 2010	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	KW search: employment, job; On ILO's list	Prodoc, External final evaluation, Internal evaluation, Mid-term evaluation, Progress reports, Website
Nepal	ILO ACT/EMP Norway and Netherlands Projects in Nepal	ILO		2009	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment, work	Website
Nepal	Employment creation for people living with HIV and AIDS (PLHA)	ILO	UNAIDS	2008 - 2009	Completed	LB, VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment, job	Summary, Website
Nepal	Strengthening the National Rural Transport Program (SNRTP)- Nepal	ILO	IDA WB	2014 - 2019	Ongoing	LB	Yes	No	KW search: work	Website
Nepal	Local development through infrastructure & jobs	ILO		2008 - 2010	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: job	
Nepal	Adolescent Girls Employment Initiative II	WB		2015 - 2014	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment	
Nepal	Enhanced Vocational Education and Training	WB		2011 - 2015	Completed	VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment, skill	PAD, PID, ISRs
Nepal	Nepal: Adolescent Girls Employment Initiative (AGEI)	WB		2011 - 2012	Completed	LB, VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment, job, skill	PID, ISRs
Nepal	Nepal Poverty Alleviation Fund II Supplemental	WB		2007 -	Unknown	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment, work	PID
Nepal	Making markets work for the conflict affected in Nepal	WB		2013 - 2017	Ongoing	VT	No	No	KW search: work	PID, ISRs
Nepal	Micro-Enterprise Development Programme (Medep) IV	UNDP		2013 - 2018	Ongoing	VT, MSMEs	Yes	No		Prodoc, Progress reports, Summary
Nepal	Renewable Energy for Rural Livelihoods (Rerl)	UNDP		2014 - 2019	Ongoing	MSMEs	No	No		Prodoc, Summary

Nepal	Livelihood Recovery for Peace Project	UNDP		2009 - 2014	Completed	MSMEs	No	Yes	On UNDP's list	Prodoc, Mid-term evaluation, Progress reports, Summary
Nepal	Building Back Better in Nepal	UNDP	WFP, WHO, UNICEF, IOM	2015 - 2018	Ongoing	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	No		Prodoc, Summary
Nepal	Support to Knowledge and Lifelong Learning Skills-Skills	UNDP		2015 - 2017	Ongoing	VT	Yes	No		Prodoc, Progress reports, Summary
Nepal	Jobs for Peace - 12,500 Youth Employed and Empowered through an Integrated Approach	PBSO, ILO	FAO	2009 - 2011	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, External final evaluation, Portfolio evaluation, internal evaluation, Progress reports, Summary, Website
Nigeria	Development Finance Project	WB		2015 - 2021	Ongoing	VT, MSMEs	No	No	KW search: employment	PAD, PID, ISRs
Nigeria	State Employment and Expenditure for Results Project	WB		2013 - 2017	Ongoing	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	KW search: employment	PAD, PID, ISRs, Website
Nigeria	State Education Program Investment Project	WB		2014 - 2017	Ongoing	VT	No	No	KW search: employment, skill	PAD, PID, ISRs
Nigeria	Nigeria Youth Employment & Social Support Operation	WB		2014 - 2020	Ongoing	LB, VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work, job, skill	PAD, PID, ISRs
Nigeria	Nigeria - Growth & Employment	WB		2012 - 2018	Ongoing	VT	No	No	KW search: employment, work	PAD, PID, ISRs
Palestine	Abraham Path: Economic Development across Fragile Communities	WB		2014 - 2017	Ongoing	VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment, job	PAD, PID, ISRs
Palestine	Emergency Municipal Services (Rehab. II)	WB		2006 - 2011	Completed	LB	Yes	No	KW search: employment, job; On WB's list	PID, ISRs, ICR
Palestine	WBG: Tertiary Education Project	WB		2005 - 2012	Completed	VT	No	No	KW search: job; On WB's list	PAD, PID, ISRs, ICR
Palestine	Construction of Sewage Treatment Plant in Khan Younis	UNDP		2005 - 2007	Completed	LB	Yes	No		Prodoc, Final report, Progress reports, Summary
Palestine	Emergency Employment Generation in Gaza Strip through immediate support to solid waste management and safeguarding the environment.	UNDP		2010	Completed	LB	Yes	No		Prodoc, Progress reports, Summary

Palestine	Communitry Resilience & Dev. Prog. for Area C & Ejrm	UNDP		2012 - 2015	Completed	MSMEs	Yes	Yes		Prodoc, Summary
Palestine	Right to Education in the Gaza Strip	UNDP			Unknown	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO		
Palestine	Jerusalem Development - Islamic Development Bank	UNDP		2011 - 2013	Completed	LB	Yes	No		Prodoc, Progress reports, Summary
Palestine	Poverty Oriented Infrastructure through EPGs - Kfw v-VII	UNDP		2006 - 2008	Completed	LB	Yes	No		Prodoc, Summary
Palestine	P1 - Construction of the Jericho Agro-Industrial Park	UNDP			Unknown	LB	Yes	Yes		Prodoc, Summary
Palestine	Support to Employment Generation	UNDP		2015 - 2016	Ongoing	LB	Yes	Yes		Prodoc, Summary
Palestine	Safeguarding of Cultural Heritage in the Old City	UNDP			Unknown	LB	No	No		Summary
Palestine	Engineering Services – UN Programmes/agencies	UNDP		2008 - 2010	Completed	LB	No	No		Prodoc, Summary
Palestine	Export Development in the West Bank Project – Canadian I	UNDP		2010 - 2013	Completed	MSMEs	Yes	No		Prodoc, Summary
Palestine	Employment Generation through Emergency Response to Solid Waste Management (Gaza Strip)	UNDP		2009 -	Unknown	LB	Yes	No	On UNDP's list	Summary
Pakistan	Livelihood Restoration & Protection and Sustainable Empowerment of Vulnerable Peasant Communities in Sindh Province	ILO	FAO, UNWOMEN	2013 - 2016	Ongoing	VT	No	No	KW search: employment, work, skill	Mid-term evaluation, Summary, Website
Pakistan	Empowerment of vulnerable groups through employment, education and training	ILO		2010 - 2013	Completed	VT	No	No	KW search: employment, work	External final evaluation, Website
Pakistan	Promotion of productive employment in Pakistan	ILO		2010 - 2013	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment	
Pakistan	Skills Development and Employment Information Centres (CBLRP)	ILO		2009 - 2011	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment, skill	
Pakistan	Women's Employment Concerns and Working Conditions in Pakistan (WEK-PK)	ILO		2005 - 2009	Completed	LB, VT	No	No	KW search: employment, work	external Final evaluation, Mid-term evaluation

Pakistan	Support to Pakistan Carpet Manufacturers & Exporters Association (PCMEA) for Establishing a Carpet Weaving Training Institute in Punjab	ILO		2014 - 2016	Ongoing	VT	No	No	KW search: work, skill	Summary, Website
Pakistan	Cash for Work for Floods-Affected Areas in Pakistan 2010	ILO	OCHA	2010 - 2011	Completed	LB	Yes	No	KW search: work	
Pakistan	Employable Skills Development for Improved Livelihoods of North Waziristan IDPs	ILO		2014 - 2015	Completed	VT	Yes	No	KW search: skill	Website
Pakistan	ILO/Regional Skills Programme/Japan Skills Development in Asia and the Pacific 2012	ILO		2012 - 2013	Completed	VT	Yes	No	KW search: skill	Website
Pakistan	Vocational and skills training	ILO, UNDP		2005 - 2006	Completed	VT	Yes	No	KW search: skill	
Pakistan	Sindh Skills Development Project	WB		2011 - 2016	Ongoing	VT	No	No	KW search: employment, skill	PAD, PID, ISRs
Pakistan	Emergency Job Training for Vulnerable Youth	WB		2011 - 2013	Completed	VT	Yes	No	KW search: job	ISRs, ICR, summary
Pakistan	Community Resilience in Malakand	UNDP		2011 -	Completed	LB	No	Yes	On UNDP's list	Prodoc, external Final evaluation, Summary
Pakistan	Youth and Social Cohesion Project	UNDP	UNDP	2015 - 2016	Ongoing	VT	No	Yes	On UNDP's list	Progress reports, Summary
Pakistan	Promoting Employment & Productivity in Garment Industry	UNDP		2012 - 2017	Ongoing	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	No		Prodoc, Progress reports, Summary
Pakistan	Refugee Affected & Hosting Areas Programme	UNDP, ILO	WHO, UNHCR, FAO, WFP, UNESCO, UNIFEM	2009 - 2013	Completed	MSMEs	No	Yes	On UNDP's list	Prodoc, Progress reports, Summary
Rwanda	Skills Development Project	WB		2011 - 2019	Ongoing	VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work, skill	PAD, PID, ISRs
Rwanda	Rwanda Transport Sector Development Project	WB		2007 - 2012	Completed	LB, VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work, job	PAD, PID, ISRs, ICR, ICRR
Rwanda	Promoting Economic Empowerment of Adolescent Girls and Young Women	WB		2012 -	Unknown	VT, MSMEs	Yes	No	KW search: work, job	PID

Rwanda	Seventh Poverty Reduction Support Grant	WB		2012 -	Completed	VT	No	No	KW search: work, job, skill	PAD, PID, ISRs, ICR, ICRR
Rwanda	Sixth Poverty Reduction Support Grant	WB		2011 -	Completed	VT	No	No	KW search: work	PAD, PID, ISRs, ICR
Rwanda	Building an Inclusive Financial Sector in Rwanda (Bifsir	UNDP		2009 - 2012	Completed	MSMEs	No	No		Prodoc, Progress reports, Summary
Rwanda	Joint Youth Employment Programme	UNDP, ILO		2014 - 2018	Ongoing	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	No		Prodoc, Summary
Sierra Leone	Greater employment opportunities to secure decent youth employment Sierra Leone	ILO			Unknown	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment	
Sierra Leone	Youth enterprise development component of the Youth Employment Scheme (YES)	ILO			Unknown	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment	
Sierra Leone	Quick Impact Job Creation for Youth through LB Based Public Works	ILO, UNDP		2011 - 2012	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	No	KW search: work, job	Prodoc, external Final evaluation
Sierra Leone	Training of contractors and unskilled workers in contract management and LB-based methods for feeder/ community roads	ILO			Unknown	VT	Yes	No	KW search: work, skill	
Sierra Leone	Youth Employment Support	WB		2011 - 2015	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	KW search: employment, work, job, skill	PID, ISRs, ICR, ICRR
Sierra Leone	Additional Financing to NSAP - Food Crisis Response	WB		2009 - 2010	Completed	LB	No	No	KW search: employment, work, job	PID
Sierra Leone	SIERRA LEONE IDP Transport Additional Financing	WB		2009 -	Unknown	LB	No	No	KW search: employment, work	PID
Sierra Leone	Promoting Sustainable Youth Employment through Capacity Building	WB		2008 - 2010	Completed	VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	KW search: employment	Summary
Sierra Leone	Promoting Sustainable Youth Employment through Youth Entrepreneurship	WB		2008 - 2010	Completed	VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	KW search: employment	
Sierra Leone	Skills Training and Career Development Project for Disadvantaged and Disabled Youths	WB		2008 - 2011	Completed	VT	Yes	No	KW search: skill	
Sierra Leone	Reintegration of Sl Red Cross Volunteers Burial Teams	UNDP		2015 - 2016	Ongoing	VT	No	No		Prodoc

Sierra Leone	Youth Employment and Empowerment Programme (YEEP)	UNDP		2011 - 2012	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes		Prodoc, Summary
Sierra Leone	Youth Enterprise Development	PBSO, UNDP		2007 -	Completed	VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, Portfolio evaluation, Progress reports
Syria	Improving Employability of Marginalized Youth JSDF	WB		2010 - 2014	Completed	VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment	ISRs
Syria	Strengthen Resilience in Syria	UNDP		2015 - 2017	Ongoing	LB, VT, MSMEs	No	Yes		Prodoc, Summary
Syria	Emergency Assistance for the Restoration /Rehabilitation of Livelihoods for People Affected by the Crisis in Syria	UNDP		2013 - 2014	Completed	LB	Yes	Yes	On UNDP's list	Prodoc, Final report, Summary
Syria	EU Support to Affected Communities in Syria	UNDP			Unknown	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes		Prodoc, Summary
Solomon Islands	Rapid Employment Project	WB		2010 - 2015	Completed	LB, VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work, job, skill	PID, ISRs
Solomon Islands	Human Security Initiative for "Tensions" Reduction	UNDP, ILO	UNICEF	2012 - 2014	Completed	VT	No	Yes		Prodoc, Summary
Somalia	Federal Government of Somalia and United Nations joint programme on youth employment	ILO, UNDP		2015 - 2018	Ongoing	LB, VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment	Prodoc
Somalia	Technical assistance through employment intensive investment projects	ILO		2010 - 2012	Completed	LB	Yes	No	KW search: employment	
Somalia	Sustainable employment and economic development programme (SEED)	ILO, WB	FAO	2011 - 2012	Completed	LB, VT	Yes	Yes	KW search: employment	Prodoc
Somalia	Employment generation for early recovery in South Central Somalia	ILO, UNDP		2010 - 2012	Completed	LB, VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment	Prodoc
Somalia	Employment for Peace and Development in South and Central Somalia	ILO		2008 - 2010	Completed	LB, VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment	Prodoc
Somalia	Employment for Peace: Promoting Gender Equity	ILO		2008 - 2010	Completed	LB	Yes	No	KW search: employment	Prodoc
Somalia	Somali Employment, Enterprise & Livelihoods (EEL) Programme 2006-08	ILO			Unknown	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	No	KW search: employment	Prodoc, Progress reports

Somalia	Employment-Intensive Programme in Support of Peace, Mogadishu, South and Central Somalia	ILO			Unknown	LB, VT	Yes	Yes	KW search: employment	Progress reports
Somalia	Creating Opportunities for Productive and Decent Work for Out of School Young People	ILO	UNCF	2009 - 2010	Completed	LB, VT	Yes	No	KW search: work	Prodoc
Somalia	Durable solutions for Somali refugee returnees through repatriation assistance and promoting sustainable livelihoods	ILO		2014 - 2015	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	No	Yes	On ILO's list	Prodoc
Somalia	Improvement of livelihoods of vulnerable households in peri-urban araes of Galkayo	ILO	FAO, TS	- 2014	Completed	VT, MSMEs	No	No	On ILO's list	Final report, External final evaluation
Somalia	Youth for Change: Promoting community security through engagement with youth-at-risk in Somali regions	ILO, UNDP	UNICEF	2012 - 2013	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	KW search: job; On ILO's list	Prodoc, Summary, Website
Somalia	Community Employment Intensive Infrastructural Programme	ILO			Unknown	LB, VT	Yes	Yes	On ILO's list	Prodoc
Somalia	Drought Management and Livelihood Protection	WB		2012 - 2013	Completed	LB	No	No	KW search: work	PID, ISR
Somalia	Alternative Livelihoods to Piracy	UNDP		2014 - 2015	Completed	VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	On UNDP's list	Prodoc, Progress reports
Somalia	Poverty Reduction and Environment Protection (Prep)	UNDP		2010 - 2015	Completed	LB, VT	Yes	No		Prodoc, Progress reports
Somalia	Local Economic Development Somalia	UNDP		2015 -	Unknown	LB, VT	Yes	No		Progress reports
Somalia	Rule of Law and Security Programme	UNDP		2012 - 2015	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	No	Yes		Prodoc
Somalia	Mogadishu clean up support project	UNDP		2014 - 2015	Completed	LB	No	No	On UNDP's list	Progress reports
Sri Lanka	LED programs implemented in selected provinces & districts to improve the local business environment and employment creation	ILO		2014 - 2015	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment	
Sri Lanka	Local Empowerment through Economic Development Projects in Sri Lanka	ILO		2011 - 2012	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment, job	

Sri Lanka	Youth Employment Project (ILO/ Japan)	ILO		2008 - 2010	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment, work	
Sri Lanka	Micro & Small Enterprise Development Project for Pro-poor Growth in Sri Lanka (Enter-Growth Project)	ILO		2005 - 2009	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment	
Sri Lanka	Employment generation road project	ILO		2005 - 2006	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment	
Sri Lanka	Promotion of Decent Work for Youth in Sri Lanka (aka the ILO/Japan Youth Employment Project)	ILO		2008 - 2010	Completed	VT	Yes	No	KW search: work	external Final evaluation
Sri Lanka	Local Empowerment through Economic Development (LEED) Project	ILO		2010 - 2014	Completed	VT, MSMEs	No	No	KW search: job; On ILO's list	Progress reports, Summary, Website
Sri Lanka	Support to ACI 2: Jobs and skills for youth - Sri Lanka	ILO		2014 - 2015	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: job, skill	
Sri Lanka	Enhanced access to more and better jobs in Sri Lanka	ILO		2010 - 2012	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: job	
Sri Lanka	Skills development for economic empowerment and the creation of livelihoods	ILO		2005 - 2008	Completed	VT	Yes	No	KW search: skill	external Final evaluation, Summary, Website
Sri Lanka	Children affected by war: upgrading of vocational skills training centres in tsunami-affected districts	ILO	UNCF	2006 - 2008	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: skill	
Sri Lanka	Enhancement of employment possibilities in Sri Lanka's Sabaragamuwa Province and its two Districts of Ratnapura and Kegalle, Sri Lanka	ILO		2008 -	Unknown	VT, MSMEs	Yes	No	On ILO's list	Prodoc
Sri Lanka	Skills Development Project	WB		2014 - 2019	Ongoing	VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment, job, skill	PAD, PID, ISRs
Sri Lanka	Small and Medium Enterprise Development Facility	WB		2010 - 2015	Completed	MSMEs	No	No	KW search: employment	PAD, PID, ISRs, ICR

Sri Lanka	Higher Education for the Twenty First Century Project	WB		2010 - 2016	Ongoing	VT	No	No	KW search: employment	PAD, PID, ISRs
Sri Lanka	Emergency Northern Recovery Project	WB		2009 - 2012	Completed	LB	No	No	KW search: employment	PID, ISRs, ICR, ICRR
Sri Lanka	Second Community Development and Livelihood Improvement Project	WB		2009 - 2014	Completed	LB, VT	No	No	KW search: employment	PAD, PID, ISRs, ICR, ICRR
Sri Lanka	North East Housing Reconstruction Program	WB		2005 - 2009	Completed	VT	No	No	KW search: employment	PID, ISRs, ICR
Sri Lanka	Governance for Local Economic Development (Gled) - Dim	UNDP	FAO	2013 - 2017	Ongoing	VT, MSMEs	No	No		Prodoc, Progress reports, Summary
Sri Lanka	Governance for Local Economic Development (Gled)-Nim	UNDP		2013 - 2017	Ongoing	VT	No	No		Prodoc, Summary
Sri Lanka	Northern Livelihoods Development Programme (3 Phases)	UNDP		2012 -	Unknown	MSMEs	No	No	On UNDP's list	Progress reports, Summary
South Sudan	Safety Net and Skills Development	WB		2013 - 2017	Ongoing	LB, VT	Yes	Yes	KW search: employment, work, skill	PAD, PID, ISRs
South Sudan	South Sudan Private Sector Development Project	WB		2013 - 2016	Ongoing	MSMEs	Yes	No	KW search: employment	PID, ISRs
South Sudan	Capacity Building Institutional and Human Resource Development Project	WB		2006 - 2011	Completed	VT	No	No	On WB's list	PID, ICR
South Sudan	Support to Inclusive Growth and Trade Capacity	UNDP		2012 - 2016	Unknown	LB, VT, MSMEs	No	Yes		Prodoc, Progress reports, Summary
South Sudan	Skills and Employment for Peace in South Sudan	PBSO, ILO, UNDP	UNIDO	2013 - 2015	Completed	VT	Yes	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Progress reports, Summary, Website
South Sudan	Joint programme: Creating opportunities for youth employment in South Sudan	ILO, UNDP	FAO, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNFPA, UNOPS, UNESCO	2009 - 2012	Completed	VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes		Final report, External final evaluation, Mid-term evaluation
Sudan	Joint Programme: Creating opportunities for Youth Employment in Sudan	ILO, UNDP	UNV, FAO, UNICEF, IOM, UNIDO, UNFPA, UNAIDS, UNOPS	2009 - 2012	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	No	KW search: employment; On ILO's list	Prodoc, Final report, External final evaluation, Mid-term evaluation, Summary
Sudan	LB Intensive Flood Protection River Gash, Kassala State	ILO		2008 -	Unknown	LB, VT	No	No	On ILO's list	Prodoc

Sudan	Sudan Stablization & Reintegration Programme	UNDP		2015 - 2017	Ongoing	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes		Prodoc, Website
Sudan	Early Recovery in Darfur	UNDP	UNHCT, IOM		Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes		Prodoc, Final report, Summary
Sudan	Creation of job opportunities for youth in Sudan through LB-intensive work opportunities	UNDP		2014 - 2016	Unknown	LB, VT	Yes	No	On UNDP's list	Prodoc, Progress reports, Summary
Sudan	Darfur Community Based Reintegration and Csac	UNDP	UNAMID, UNFPA, UNEP, UNWOMEN	2014 - 2016	Ongoing	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes		Prodoc, Summary
Sudan	Emergency Assistance for the Restoration/Stabilization of Livelihoods	UNDP		2014 -	Unknown	LB	No	No	On UNDP's list	
Sudan	Empowering Women for Peace & Recovery in East Sudan	PBSO, ILO	UNWOMEN	2012 - 2013	Completed	VT, MSMEs	No	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, Progress reports, Summary
Timor-Leste	Business Opportunities and Support Services (BOSS) NZAID	ILO		2013 - 2016	Unknown	MSMEs	No	No	KW search: employment; On ILO's list	Prodoc, Mid-term evaluation, Summary, Website
Timor-Leste	Support to constituents on research and training on skills and employment	ILO		2014 - 2015	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment, skill	
Timor-Leste	Training and Employment Support Programme (TESP)	ILO		2013 - 2014	Completed	VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work	Summary, Website
Timor-Leste	Youth Employment Promotion Programme (Timor-Leste)	ILO		2008 - 2012	Completed	LB, VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work	Mid-term evaluation, Summary, Website
Timor-Leste	Investment Budget Execution Support for Rural Infrastructure Development and Employment Generation (TIM Works) Project (Timor-Leste)	ILO		2010 - 2012	Completed	LB	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work, job	External final evaluation, Summary, Website
Timor-Leste	Community mobilization for poverty alleviation and social inclusion in service delivery (COMPASIS)	ILO, UNDP	FAO, UNICEF, UNFPA, WFP	2010 - 2013	Completed	VT, MSMEs	No	No	KW search: employment	Summary, Website
Timor-Leste	Local development through infrastructure & jobs	ILO		2008 - 2010	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment, job	
Timor-Leste	Women in self employment project (WISE)	ILO		2008 - 2009	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment	
Timor-Leste	Youth Employment Promotion Initiative (YEPIP)	ILO		2007 - 2009	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment	

Timor-Leste	Work for Peace- Serbisu ba Dame	ILO, UNDP		2007	Completed	LB	Yes	Yes	KW search: employment, work	External final evaluation, Summary
Timor-Leste	Roads for Development	ILO		2012 - 2016	Unknown	LB	Yes	No	KW search: work; On ILO's list	Prodoc, Summary, Website
Timor-Leste	Fourth Rural Development (RDP IV). Component II: Rural Roads Rehabilitation and Maintenance (RRRM)	ILO		2011 - 2016	Completed	LB, VT	Yes	No	KW search: work; On ILO's list	External final evaluation, Mid-term evaluation, Summary, Website
Timor-Leste	Second Chance Education Project	WB		2010 - 2016	Ongoing	VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment, job; On WB's list	PAD, PID, ISRs
Timor-Leste	Education Sector Support	WB		2007 - 2013	Completed	VT	No	No	KW search: employment, job, skill	PID, PAD, ISRs, ICR
Timor-Leste	Third Transition Support Program	WB		2005	Completed	LB	Yes	No	KW search: employment	PID, ICR
Timor-Leste	Consolidation Support Program Policy Grant	WB		2006	Completed	LB	Yes	Yes	KW search: job; On WB's list	PID, ICR
Timor-Leste	TP-Private & Fi0cial Sector Assessment	WB			Unknown	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	On WB's list	
Timor-Leste	TP-SP & labourlabourlabour market	WB			Unknown	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	On WB's list	
Timor-Leste	TP-Youth Sector support	WB		2009 - 2012	Completed	VT, MSMEs	No	No	On WB's list	PAD, PID, ISRs, ICR
Timor-Leste	Support to Oe-Cusse Sar and Zeesm Programme	UNDP		2015 - 2017	Ongoing	VT, MSMEs	No	No		Prodoc, Summary
Timor-Leste	Mobilize Social Business to Accelerate Achievement of Timor Leste MDGs	UNDP, ILO	UNCDF, UNIDO, USAID	2012 - 2015	Completed	MSMEs	Yes	No	On UNDP's list	Prodoc, External final evaluation, Summary
Timor-Leste	Local Governance Support Programme	UNDP	UNCDF	2014 - 2018	Ongoing	LB	No	No		Prodoc, Mid-term evaluation, Progress reports, Summary
Timor-Leste	Inclusive Finance for Underserved Economy	UNDP	UNCDF	2008 - 2012	Completed	VT	Yes	No		Prodoc, Summary
Togo	Extension de la protection sociale en lien avec les politiques de l'emploi par la mise en œuvre d'un socle de protection sociale	ILO		2011 - 2014	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment, work, job	
Togo	Community Development and Safety Nets Project	WB	UNICEFF	2012 - 2016	Ongoing	LB	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work, job	PID, PAD, ISRs

Togo	Community Dev. Project ERL	WB		2009 - 2013	Completed	LB	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work, job	PID, ISRs, ICR
Togo	Création Emplois & Revenus	UNDP, ILO	FAO, IFAD, UNIDO	2014 - 2018	Ongoing	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	No		Progress reports, Summary
Ukraine	Social Inclusion of People with Disabilities through Access to Employment	ILO, UNDP		2008 - 2011	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment	Summary
Ukraine	Access to Financial Services Project	WB		2006 - 2010	Completed	MSMEs	No	No	KW search: employment, work	PID, PAD, ICR
Ukraine	Early Recovery Programme	UNDP	UNICEF	2014 - 2015	Completed	LB	No	No	On UNDP's list	Prodoc, Summary
Ukraine	Response to Idps Issues	UNDP		2015 - 2016		LB, MSMEs	Yes	No	On UNDP's list	Prodoc, Summary
Ukraine	Economic and Social Recovery of Donbas Region	UNDP		2015 - 2016		VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	On UNDP's list	Prodoc
Uganda	Joint UN Programme on Gender Equality for Uganda	ILO		2010 - 2015	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: employment	Summary
Uganda	Better delivery services to youth-led entreprises to provide an avenue for job creation for young people	ILO		2014 - 2015	Completed	NO INFO	NO INFO	NO INFO	KW search: job	
Uganda	Albertine Region Sustainable Development Project	WB		2014 - 2019	Ongoing	LB, VT	No	No	KW search: employment, skill	PAD, PID, ISRs
Uganda	Second Northern Uganda Social Action Fund Project (NUSAF2)	WB		2010 - 2016		LB	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work, skill	PAD, PID, ISRs
Uganda	Private Sector Competitiveness II	WB		2005 - 2013	Completed	VT, MSMEs	No	No	KW search: employment	PAD, PID, ISRs, ICR, ICRR
Uganda	Local Development and Social Cohesion in Northern Uganda	UNDP		2013 - 2014	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	No	On UNDP's list	Prodoc, Progress reports, Summary
Uganda	Support for Development of Inclusive Markets in Tourism	UNDP		2011 - 2014	Completed	MSMEs	No	No		Prodoc, Progress reports, Summary
Uganda	Livelihoods and local economic recovery	PBSO, UNDP	IOM, UNCDF, WFP, FAO	2010 - 2012	Completed	VT, MSMEs	No	Yes	On PBSO's list	Prodoc, Final report, e External final evaluation, Portfolio evaluation, Progress reports
Yemen	Women Entrepreneurship Development Programme in Yemen	ILO		2010 - 2016	Ongoing	VT	No	No	KW search: employment	Website

Yemen	Entrepreneurship education - Know about business	ILO		2008 - 2015	Completed	VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment	Summary, Website
Yemen	Integrated support for young women and men in Yemen to access decent work	ILO		2012 - 2016		VT	No	No	KW search: work, skill	Website
Yemen	Support buiding of capacity of skills training providers and business development service providers to improve the employability of young women and men in Yemen	ILO		2012 - 2013	Completed	VT	Yes	No	KW search: work, skill	
Yemen	Labor Intensive Public Works	WB		2014 - 2017	Ongoing	LB	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work, job	PID
Yemen	SME Revitalization and Employment Pilot Project	WB		2013 - 2015	Completed	LB	Yes	No	KW search: employment	PAD, PID, ISRs
Yemen	Social Fund for Development IV	WB		2014 - 2016	Ongoing	LB	No	No	KW search: employment, work, skill	PAD, PID, ISRs
Yemen	Yemen Employment for At-Risk and Marginalized Youth	WB		2009 - 2013	Completed	LB	Yes	No	KW search: employment	ISRs
Yemen	Second VT Project	WB		2007 - 2013	Completed	VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment, job, skill	PAD, PID, ISRs
Yemen	Corridor Highway Project	WB		2014 - 2019	Ongoing	LB	Yes	Yes	KW search: work	PAD, PID, ISRs
Yemen	Road Asset Management Project	WB		2013 - 2018	Ongoing	LB	Yes	No	KW search: work	PAD, PID, ISRs
Yemen	Emergency Social Safety Net Enhancement (EC Food Facility Grant) Project	WB		2009 - 2012	Completed	LB	No	No	On WB's list	PID, ISRs, ICR
Yemen	Community Driven Early Recovery in Sa'ada	UNDP		2011 -	Unknown	LB, MSMEs	No	Yes	On UNDP's list	Prodoc, Progress reports, Summary
Yemen	Integrated Early Recovery for Abyan Governorate	UNDP		2013 - 2015	Completed	LB, MSMEs	No	No	On UNDP's list	Prodoc, Progress reports, Summary
Yemen	Emergency Assistance Project for Livelihoods Restoration	UNDP		2011 - 2012	Completed	LB, VT	Yes	Yes		Prodoc, Summary
Yemen	Livelihood & Economic Recovery Coordination – PBf	UNDP, ILO	FAO, WFP, IOM, UNHCR	2014 - 2015	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes		Prodoc, Summary
Yemen	Youth Economic Empowerment Programme (YEEP) Phase I	UNDP		2012 - 2013	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	On UNDP's list	Prodoc, Mid-term evaluation, Summary
Yemen	Youth Economic Empowerment Project in Yemen – Phase II	UNDP		2014 - 2015	Completed	LB, VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	On UNDP's list	Prodoc, Summary

Zimbabwe	The Youth Employment Support (YES) Jobs for the Unemployed and Marginalized young People (JUMP)	ILO		2010 - 2011	Completed	VT, MSMEs	Yes	No	KW search: employment, work, job	Summary, Website
Zimbabwe	Skills for Youth Employment and Rural Development in Zimbabwe	ILO		2010 - 2015	Completed	LB, VT	Yes	No	KW search: employment, skill	External final evaluation, Summary, Website
Zimbabwe	Kenya-Zimbabwe: Green jobs for the young marginalized	ILO		2009 - 2012	Completed	VT, MSMEs	Yes	No	KW search: employment, job	External final evaluation, Summary, Website
Zimbabwe	Productive Safety Net - Pilot Public Works Program	WB		2013 -	Unknown	LB	Yes	No	KW search: work	PID, PAD
Zimbabwe	Support to Peacebuilding and Increased Access to Sustainable Livelihoods in Zimbabwe: 2012-2014 (PBIASL)	UNDP		2012 - 2014	Completed	VT, MSMEs	No	Yes	On UNDP's list	Progress reports
Zimbabwe	Support to Peacebuilding, Disaster Risk Management and Increased Access to Sustainable Livelihoods for Resilience Building and Social Cohesion	UNDP		2014 - 2015	Completed	VT, MSMEs	Yes	Yes	On UNDP's list	Prodoc, Progress reports, Summary

ANNEX 6: LIST OF INTERVENTIONS FOR IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS ('SHORTLIST')

#	Country	Agency(-ies)	Period	Title	Peacebuilding focus
1	Afghanistan	World Bank	2009-2014	Skills Development Project	No
2	Burundi	PBSO, UNDP, BINUP	2008-2009	Promotion du rôle des petites et micro-entreprises dans la consolidation de la paix	Yes
3	Burundi	World Bank	2010-2015	Public Works and Urban Management Project	No
4	Central African Republic (CAR)	PBSO, UNDP,	2008-2010	Appui à la formation par l'apprentissage et à l'insertion des jeunes déscolarisés et désœuvrés des régions affectées par les conflits, comme facteur de consolidation de la paix	Yes
5	Comoros	World Bank	2011-2015	Emergency Crises Response Project	No
6	Comoros	PBSO, ILO, UNDP, UNIDO, FAO	2010-2012	Appui à la pérennisation de la paix par la promotion de l'emploi des jeunes et des femmes aux Comores (APROJEC)	Yes
7	DR Congo	ILO, World Bank	2009-2012	Projet d'Appui à la Réinsertion Economique Durable des Démobilisés en République Démocratique du Congo (ARED II)	Yes
8	Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	UNDP, UNICEF, FAO	2012-2014	Projet de consolidation de la paix dans les zones minières artisanales de la province du Nord Kivu (project Rubaya)	Yes
9	Guinea	PBSO, UNDP, UNFPA, WFP, UNIDO	2011-2012	Projet d'appui a l'insertion économique des jeunes et des femmes	Yes
10	Guinea	PBSO, UNDP, UNFPA, UNIDO, WFP	2014-2015	Programme nationale d'emploi specifique pour les jeunes (filles et garcons) a risque de conflit	Yes
11	Guinea-Bissau	PBSO, UNDP	2013-2014	Labour-intensive employment for youth and women in the lead-up to and immediate post-electoral period in Guinea-Bissau	Yes

12	Haiti	PBSO, UNDP, ILO, WFP, FAO, UNIFEM, MINUSTAH	2010-2012	Recovery through Employment Generation, Environmental Rehabilitation and Disaster Mitigation	Yes
13	Iraq	ILO, UNOPS	2007-2008	Skills development to support employment generation in Iraq	No
14	Iraq	World Bank	2005-2013	Emergency Community Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project	No
15	Kosovo	UNDP	2005-2013	Active Labour Markets Programme for Youth	No
16	Lebanon	ILO	2008-2010	Enhancing Local Employment, Skills and Enterprises in Nahr el Bared, Lebanon	No
17	Lebanon	PBSO, ILO, UNRWA, UNICEF	2011-2013	Empowerment of youth at risk through job creation programme in areas of tensions	Yes
18	Liberia	ILO	2007-2010	Poverty Reduction through Decent Employment Creation in Liberia	No
19	Liberia	ILO	2007-2014	Labour-based public works	No
20	Madagascar	World Bank	2009-2013	Emergency Food Security and Reconstruction Project	No
21	Nepal	ILO	2006-2010	Employment Creation and Peace Building based on Local Economic Development (EmPLED)	Yes[3]
22	Nepal	PBSO, ILO, FAO	2009-2011	Jobs for Peace - 12,500 Youth Employed and Empowered through an Integrated Approach	Yes
23	Palestine	World Bank	2007-2011	Emergency Municipal Services (Rehab. II)	No
24	Pakistan	World Bank	2011-2013	Pakistan: Emergency Job Training for Vulnerable Youth	No
25	Sierra Leone	ILO, UNDP	2011-2012	Quick Impact Job Creation for Youth through Labour Based Public Works	No
26	Sierra Leone	World Bank	2011-2015	Youth Employment Support	Yes
27	South Sudan	ILO, UNDP, FAO, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNFPA, UNOPS, UNESCO	2009-2012	Joint Programme: Creating opportunities for youth employment in South Sudan	No

28	Sri Lanka	ILO	2006-2008	Skills development for economic empowerment and the creation of livelihoods	No
29	Sudan	ILO, UNDP, UNV, FAO, UNICEF, IOM, UNIDO, UNFPA, UNAIDS, UNOPS	2009-2012	Joint Programme: Creating opportunities for Youth Employment in Sudan	No
30	Timor-Leste	ILO, UNDP	2007	Work for Peace- Serbisu ba Dame	Yes
31	Togo	World Bank	2009-2013	Community Development Project ERL	No
32	Yemen	UNDP	2012-2013	Youth Economic Empowerment Programme (YEEP) – Phase I	No
33	Zimbabwe	ILO	2010-2015	Skills for Youth Employment and Rural Development in Zimbabwe	No

Notes: References to Kosovo shall be understood to be in the context of Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999).

The functionality of the UNDP database does not allow for simultaneous country and keyword search.

PB focus in original design; subsequently dropped in log frame revision.