# FRAGILITY AND RESILIENCE IN THE MANO RIVER UNION SUBREGION:
CONSOLIDATING PEACE DIVIDENDS AMID PERSISTENT CHALLENGES

Fragility and Resilience in the Mano River Union Subregion: Consolidating Peace Dividends Amid Persistent Challenges

authors

Prof. Brian Ganson
Head, Centre on Conflict & Collaboration, Stellenbosch Business School

Abou Bakarr Kamara (lead on economic issues)
Country Economist, International Growth Centre

Ibrahim Al-bakri Nyei (lead on polity issues)
Ducor Institute for Social and Economic Research

Tidiane Traore (lead on regional issues)

Aïssatou Cissé Yao-Yao (lead on societal issues)

in memoriam

Herbert M'cleod (1948-2022)
Country Director, Liberia and Sierra Leone Programme, International Growth Centre

The views represented in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the African Development Bank, Mano River Union Secretariat, or United Nations.

Cover design: Sara Lopez Domenech
Cover picture: NGOs and cultural organizations bid farewell to UNMIL, UN Photo/Albert Gonzalez Farran

FRAGILITY AND RESILIENCE IN THE MANO RIVER UNION SUBREGION: CONSOLIDATING PEACE DIVIDENDS AMID PERSISTENT CHALLENGES

Executive Summary

This Outcome Document ("Report") is the result of a joint effort by the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Mano River Union Secretariat (MRU-S), and the United Nations (UN) to assess the state of fragility and resilience in the Manu River Union subregion, with the intent to support MRU countries individually and jointly, informing policy and programme reforms for national governments and their development partners.

The Report builds on the earlier work that emerged from this effort that comprehensively surveyed the symptoms of fragility and evidence of resilience in the subregion. As underlined by recent events in the region – including the coup in Guinea, deadly street protests and police responses to them in Sierra Leone, post-election violence in Côte d'Ivoire, and strikes and protests in Liberia – the persistence of fragility is profoundly experienced across the subregion.

Indeed, any number of expert analysts reach the conclusion that the contemporary situation increasingly mirrors the situations leading up to the civil wars in the subregion; and that the window may be closing on the opportunity to stop the downward spiral and to build the society that citizens want and deserve.

Experts note that, for decades now, questions of the economy, human development, social cohesion, state building, management of border areas, and other issues have been studied, plans have been developed, and initiatives have been undertaken by governments, development partners, and civil society. Their consensus supported by the data and evidence is that these efforts have not and will not as currently conceptualised and implemented add up to a reliable pathway out of fragility.

This Report therefore interrogates why positive efforts to address fragility fall short, why negative dynamics persist, and what might be done about it.

The Report draws on the earlier research and findings; additional secondary research into the contemporary literature related to the persistence of fragility; and four expert group consultations, organised around the themes of the capable and inclusive economy, polity, society, and subregion, from which examples for this Report are drawn. Additionally, feedback was iteratively solicited from AfDB, MRU-S, the UN, and national governments, who were active participants in the consultation process.

Diagnoses for the persistence of fragility

The Report concludes that, for an exit from fragility to occur, positive dynamics of social cohesion, coherence of effort, and institutionalization must be fed, while negative dynamics

of fragility must be starved. Yet, positive examples of these dynamics are isolated and small scale, with the broad evidence indicating that negative examples dominate across the subregion.

The research and expert analysis underline that the dynamics of fragility continue to be fed by the policies and practices of governments, international institutions, and development partners:

- Intentional actions (as well as decisions not to act) result in unconstrained corruption across public and private sectors that is pursued with nearly complete impunity, undermining social cohesion, and destabilising already fragile institutions.

- International and national economic and political interests are pursued despite their evident negative impacts on fragility, frequently ignoring local voices and their imperatives for greater direct benefit to the historically impoverished and marginalised at scale.

- There is an erosion of traditional sources of resilience and social cohesion, with local governance policies, party politics, and development programme implementation introducing new forms of inter-group competition and enmity that are not historically rooted.

At the same time, the evidence shows how the dynamics of social cohesion and resilience are being starved through inter-related dynamics:

- There is insufficient implementation of "post-conflict" frameworks and processes, with little attempt to achieve sufficient consensus – particularly across historic conflict fault lines – on the inclusive vision for each country and the subregion or how to achieve it.

- There are failures to invest in effective institutionalization, with little attention to the widely shared stakeholder values, attitudes, beliefs, and commitments about the way in which decisions should be made and implemented and which are required for institutions to function.

- There is an absence of policy and programme coherence, with positive change efforts across different agencies of government, governments in the subregion, development partners, and civil society neither sufficient nor mutually and positively reinforcing.

These endogenous and exogenous factors combine to create downward cycles of poverty, exclusion, intergroup animosity, and destructive political contestation, which further reinforce fragility.

The diagnostic analysis highlights that the actions and inactions that feed the dynamics of fragility and starve the dynamics of social cohesion and resilience emerge from entrenched systems and institutions that serve the priorities and interests of only a limited number of powerful stakeholders who effectively exercise complete control over them.

Prescriptions for an exit from fragility

The Report's prescriptive analysis concludes that profound shifts in power relationships and institutional arrangements – with respect to the political economy, and in local, national, and subregional governance – are required to unlock the forces for peaceful development.

It is, therefore, insufficient to continue to point out bad policies and suggest that the opposite course of action be pursued. Nor will it be a plausible approach to address fragility by identifying discrete gaps and developing yet more plans or programmes to address them.

Rather, the Report concludes that an exit from fragility will require governments and development partners to nurture a fundamentally more balanced system of voice and influence across the many stakeholders for positive societal change. Only once the goals of political inclusion and power sharing are advanced at scale will it be reasonable to assume that sound policies and practices can or will be implemented by powerful political and economic actors.

The research and expert review point to a variety of implications from this conclusion:

- Clearer redlines and more robust governance processes must be established by international partners and national governments. These must prevent and address the exacerbation of fragility through public or private policies and practices that: contribute to multidimensional poverty; exclude the already vulnerable or marginalised; make life more difficult for those who make their livelihoods in the informal sector; exacerbate historical fault lines; and circumvent inclusive, consensus-based planning processes that are consistent with agreed international frameworks and peacebuilding and development good practice.

- Pro-poor development policies and programmes that represent a meaningful departure from pre-conflict forms of production and distribution are required. Systemic improvements to informal sector ecosystems can benefit the greatest number of people the most rapidly. Effective decentralisation of prioritisation, planning, governance, implementation, and monitoring may be required, as will be capacitation of women, youth, and marginalised populations, as well as professional bodies and other civil society actors, to play meaningful roles in planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and conflict resolution.

- Progress may be easier to unlock at a subregional level, recognising the very real inclusive economic development opportunities. Additionally, regional approaches can help to address entrenched, negatively reinforcing political systems at national levels, for example, by building and strengthening professional networks on a subregional basis, and by the convening and empowering of other communities across the subregion, including women's and youth groups, human rights and environmental advocates, and other constituencies that often have trouble having their voices heard and their ideas realised.

Analysts underlined the importance in all these efforts of directly addressing questions of values within and between networks of actors, inclusive of development partners, national governments, and those in the private sector.

The diagnostic and prescriptive analyses provide the foundations for the Report's specific recommendations.

Recommendations for international partners

These recommendations speak to the AfDB, UN, and MRU-S who commissioned this Report, but also directly to the variety of other governments and multinational organizations and institutions that engage across the MRU subregion on questions of development, security, and the economy.

1. ***Conduct comprehensive fragility impact reviews*** that respect UN evaluation norms and standards. Reviews should identify how policies and programmes directly or indirectly impact social cohesion, coherence of effort, and institutionalisation. Governance structures should be created and/or enhanced to ensure that remedial action with respect to negative impacts on fragility is taken, with a risk register for actual and potential negative impacts on fragility maintained and made public.

2. ***Establish a fragility observatory for the subregion*** to monitor the sufficiency, coherence, and cumulative impact of efforts to address the political economy of fragility. The professionally and independently managed Observatory should, through inclusive, participatory, and transparent processes, make public key social, political, and economic outcomes data, with particular attention to historical conflict divides. In doing so, it should be a catalyst for networking and positive action, based on sound values, across actors, countries, and sectors.

3. ***Prioritise a subregional perspective in planning and action***. Development partners should drive coherence and cumulative impact of effort through the adoption of specific policies for the preferential use of the subregion as the unit of analysis for studies, policy development, programme design, and budgeting. This may require them to align their own organisational structures, budgets, staffing models, and engagement patterns to facilitate the coordination and implementation of subregional solutions.

Recommendations for national governments

These recommendations speak to the member state governments of the MRU, as well as to other actors who seek to constructively support and influence them.

1. ***Prioritise peace settlements, particularly on matters of the economy***. Governments should pursue social cohesion as a national priority, as premature abandonment of peacemaking and peacebuilding processes has undermined an exit from fragility. They should articulate how they intend to hold their own officials and affiliated politicians to account for overcoming "winner take all" politics, with particular attention to historic conflict fault lines and to unaddressed dimensions of peace processes, such as truth and reconciliation processes.

2. ***Mandate the meaningful voice and participation of stakeholders***. Effective processes of public participation should be mandated in law for policy, programme, and project

planning and decision making. Where private action has substantial public impact, public participation should also be mandated with impartial moderation to ensure inclusive analysis and planning; rights compatible, interest-based outcomes; and prompt and effective conflict resolution and redress of grievances.

3. ***Prioritise a subregional perspective in planning and action***. Subregional interchange should be fostered at the technical and professional level across departments and agencies of government, inclusive of relevant professional bodies and civil society actors. Challenges and opportunities for more effective regionalization that delivers maximum value to the poorest and most marginalised should be prioritised. Interchange should be leveraged to incorporate subregional assets and opportunities in national policies, plans, and their implementation.

Recommendations for other actors

These recommendations speak to actors in civil society and the private sector, as well as those that seek to support and to influence them.

1. ***Develop subregional networks***. Civil society actors should develop cross-country networks for information exchange, strategy development, and coordination of action, including the networking of CSO and other local actors between each other. They should consider subregional assets and opportunities in their strategy-setting, policy development and programme design; and should actively participate in efforts to ensure the sufficiency, coherence, and cumulative impact of efforts to address fragility in the subregion.

2. ***Emphasise the capacity to change systems as a core element of strategy***. Civil society and other development actors, their partners, and funders should take into account the systemic dimensions of the problems that they seek to address, including social incohesion, incoherence of efforts, and insufficient institutionalisation. They should include in development programmes and advocacy initiatives capacity building for stakeholders that result in their effective participation in policy, programme, and project decision making.

3. ***Take greater initiative in the private sector***. Operating companies as well as those who finance or support them should engage in policymaking, legal or regulatory reform efforts, dealmaking with public entities, or community engagement only as part of independently moderated, transparent, broadly inclusive, and rights compatible processes. They should enhance their governance structures with respect to negative impacts on fragility, and subject themselves to accessible, binding dispute resolution and redress mechanisms.

The Report concludes that if such actions are not taken, there is scant reason to hope for exits from fragility in the subregion. However, with disciplined, coordinated action, substantial and steady progress towards greater social cohesion, coherence of effort, and institutionalization, inclusive and peaceful development can yet be achieved.

FRAGILITY AND RESILIENCE IN THE MANO RIVER UNION SUBREGION: CONSOLIDATING PEACE DIVIDENDS AMID PERSISTENT CHALLENGES

Outcome Document

Background to and remit for this Outcome Document

The African Development Bank (AfDB), the Mano River Union Secretariat (MRU-S), and the United Nations (UN) undertook a joint effort to assess the state of fragility and resilience in the Mano River Union subregion. The intent was to support MRU countries individually and jointly, informing policy and programme reforms for national governments and their development partners.

> Economic growth and GDP per capita in the MRU member states has been consistently low, with pervasive high poverty and unemployment rates as well as "deplorable" macroeconomic indicators overall. Positive gains are registered during boom periods; but, in most cases, these are short-lived and easily reversed due to shocks, with what expert analysts describe as debilitating implications.
> —WORKSHOP REPORT ON THE INCLUSIVE AND CAPABLE ECONOMY

An earlier desk review report that emerged from this effort comprehensively surveyed the symptoms of fragility and evidence of resilience in the subregion. It documents how consequentially fragility is experienced by the populations of the MRU countries.

This Outcome Document ("the Report") therefore does list the variety of conditions and dynamics that all experts agree must be addressed if the subregion is to achieve peaceful development: whether from old threats such as elite capture of the economy and failures to deliver peace dividends to the younger generation, new ones such as climate change, or their combination in ways that create openings for even greater instability, for example, from violent extremism.

This Report rather analyses the reasons why fragility persists. For decades now, questions of the economy, human development, social cohesion, state building, management of border areas, and other issues *ad infinitum* have been studied, plans have been developed, and initiatives have been undertaken by governments, development partners, and civil society. However, the expert consensus is that these have not added up to a reliable pathway out of fragility. This Report therefore interrogates why positive efforts fall short, why negative dynamics persist, and what might be done about it.

> In the Mano River region countries, experts note that the impact of COVID-19 was seen less in the rate of deaths and infections than in economic decline, political instability, and social unrest as a result of mismanagement of the health crisis. These manifested in various ways: a military coup, street protests, runaway inflation, and increased unemployment.
> —WORKSHOP REPORT ON THE INCLUSIVE AND CAPABLE POLITY

This Report draws on the earlier research and findings; additional secondary research into the contemporary literature related to the persistence of fragility; and four expert group consultations, organised around the themes of the capable and inclusive economy, polity,

society, and subregion, and each resulting in a workshop report, and from which examples for this Report are drawn. Additionally, feedback was iteratively solicited from AfDB, MRU-S, the UN, and national governments. This Report characterises the broad consensus of views that emerged from this process that were found to be equally well-grounded in the supporting research and literature.

Overview: The persistence of fragility in the MRU subregion

Across the MRU subregion, fragility is perhaps most apparent from iconic events, such as the 2021 coup in Guinea; deadly street protests and police responses to them in Sierra Leone; post-election violence in Côte d'Ivoire; and strikes and protests in Liberia.

But the evidence and expert commentary underline that these singular events are underpinned by troubling, chronic dynamics. These include: continued arbitrary killings

> Experts conclude that the extent of poverty has considerably deteriorated the capital of trust between populations and States.
> —WORKSHOP REPORT ON THE INCLUSIVE AND CAPABLE SOCIETY

as well as cruel and degrading treatment by security services; an inability of government to widely deliver basic services or achieve a reliable path out of multidimensional poverty, even with substantial foreign aid; patterns of private sector development that exacerbate rather than ameliorate inequality; and persistent narratives of grievance and exclusion. These realities implicate questions of development and state building more broadly construed.

Although intertwined with these broader frameworks, the fundamental question from the application of a fragility lens is distinctive. It explores whether society has the capacity to sustain positive momentum and resist shocks with respect to such substantial challenges. In this Report, a fragility analysis delves into the root causes of what experts characterise as a collective failure to make necessary progress on the issues identified in the earlier research, even though they are of such broad concern and have such obvious and profound negative impacts on sustainable, peaceful development. Thus, the endpoints that this Report explores are socio-political:

- Social cohesion   Is there sufficient consensus – particularly across historic conflict fault lines – on the inclusive vision for each country and the subregion, and on the pathways for moving there?

- Coherence of effort   Are sufficient positive change efforts across different agencies of government, governments in the subregion, development partners, and civil society mutually and positively reinforcing?

- Institutionalization   Does the functioning of institutions reflect widely shared stakeholder values, attitudes, beliefs, and commitments about the way in which decisions should be made and implemented?

As explored below, the evidence and expert commentary underline that any evidence-based answer to these questions for the subregion must be in the aggregate broadly negative. Some positive examples and trends are visible. However, these are not at scale. On the other hand,

negative trends appear to be both widespread and accelerating. Indeed, any number of analysts reach the conclusion that the contemporary situation increasingly mirrors the situations leading up to the civil wars in the subregion; and that the window seems to be closing on the opportunity to stop the downward spiral and to build the society that citizens want and deserve.

> The African Development Bank has noted, in published work, that while the most serious crises of the 20th century reflected geopolitical oppositions, contemporary crises are mainly of socio-political origin—including dynamics of political and social exclusion and poor governance—and therefore difficult to resolve without action at the root of these weaknesses.
> —WORKSHOP REPORT ON THE INCLUSIVE AND CAPABLE SOCIETY

Furthermore, and as explored in detail in Part I of the Report that follows, the weight of evidence is that fragility primarily persists in the MRU subregion not as a result of extrinsic factors, but as a function of domestic political choices in which international partners are often enough implicated. Simply put, the policies and practices of powerful political and economic actors continue to feed the dynamics of fragility – undermining social cohesion, coherence of effort, and true institutionalization – while starving the dynamics of resilience and social cohesion. As in the pre-war periods of the MRU countries that descended into armed conflict, the evidence points to a conclusion that this is predominantly driven by parochial, political economy considerations.

For a variety of reasons, actors across sectors, constituent parts of national governments, and internationally are not taking consequential enough action to counter these negatively reinforcing dynamics. Yet, in the absence of substantial course corrections, experts conclude that fragility in the MRU states should be anticipated to deteriorate further in the medium term.

Thus, the essential task is to build new pathways that turn the political tide towards the effective starving of the dynamics of fragility and the feeding of the dynamics of resilience and social cohesion at scale. Part II of the Report explores these possibilities, finding that they will require shifts in power relations and institutional arrangements to create a more balanced system of political voice and influence – with respect to the political economy, and in local, national, and subregional governance – across stakeholders for positive societal change. Only once these goals are advanced do experts believe that it will be reasonable to assume that sound policies and practices for state building and development can or will be implemented by powerful political and economic actors, both national and international.

Part III of the Report applies the insights emerging from Part I and Part II analyses to develop specific recommendations for development partners, national governments, and other actors. It concludes that if such actions are not taken, there is scant reason to hope for exits from fragility in the subregion; but that, with disciplined, coordinated action, substantial and steady progress towards greater social cohesion, coherence of effort, and institutionalization, inclusive and peaceful development can yet be achieved.

Part I: Diagnosing the persistence of fragility in the MRU subregion

For an exit from fragility to occur, positive dynamics of social cohesion, coherence of effort, and institutionalization must be fed, while negative dynamics of fragility must be starved. Yet, as explored below, the broad evidence is that the opposite is happening across the MRU subregion.

The research and expert opinion underline that the dynamics of fragility continue to be fed by the policies and practices of governments, international institutions, and development partners. Intentional actions (as well as decisions not to act) result in unconstrained corruption; international and national economic and political interests that are pursued despite their evident negative impacts on fragility; and the erosion of traditional sources of resilience and social cohesion.

At the same time, the evidence shows how the dynamics of social cohesion and resilience are being starved. This is found to be the result of an insufficient implementation of "post-conflict" frameworks and processes; failures to invest in effective institutionalization; and failures of policy and programme coherence.

Together, and in addition to cross-border dynamics, these factors result in downward cycles of poverty, exclusion, and destructive political contestation, which tend to feed the dynamics of fragility and starve the dynamics of social cohesion and resilience.

It would be impossible to present here all of the data that emerged in the research and consultations. Therefore, Part I analysis that follows should be understood as a summary of the key driving factors of the persistence of fragility, providing only indicative examples of dynamics that were found to be well-grounded in the expert consultations as well as in the supporting research. The four workshop reports as well as the secondary sources on which they draw provide the fuller picture.

A. Feeding the dynamics of fragility: Unconstrained corruption

Corruption was the most prevalent dynamic of fragility identified in the consultations for this Report. This is supported in the accompanying research, with persistent scandals across the subregion, and weak rankings for the member countries in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index. Corruption is reportedly pervasive, from low level officers at border posts to the highest levels of government in national capitals. Furthermore, the subregion is characterised by a fundamental corruption of the institutions of government. Broad evidence points to elite misappropriation of funds and opportunity both for personal benefit, and to maintain control over the decisions of government through patronage politics. Analysts note that, as in the pre-war periods across the subregion, they do so with nearly complete impunity.

> Experts suggested that the pervasiveness of corruption in the public bureaucracy has made it impossible for citizens to freely navigate the bureaucracy or to attain needed services, and even to access justice in the court system. Electoral processes have become fiercely contested and difficult to organize due to lack of trust among politicians and in the electoral management bodies that mostly favour incumbents. Concerns around the prevalence of corruption in the region have also been highlighted in many development indices.
> —WORKSHOP REPORT ON THE INCLUSIVE AND CAPABLE POLITY

It is underlined that corruption is equally a private sector phenomenon. Bribery is used to secure access to natural resources and government contracts. Corrupt partnerships between government officials and business leaders allow taxes to be avoided, with the Brookings Institute estimating that illicit financial flows represent 54% of trade value in Sierra Leone, and 18% in Guinea. These same corrupt partnerships lead to widespread disregard for environmental and social standards. Illegal and unregulated mining are common in the subregion, both artisanal and large scale. Protected forests are heavily degraded, with levels of deforestation at 75% or more, and driven by forestry and agricultural development. Community rights are commonly ignored in mining and infrastructure development, with many cases of the violence of state security forces deployed to protect narrow private interests.

It is not believed that these dynamics, and even the specific organisations and individuals behind them, are unknown to the senior leadership of national institutions and international partners. It was noted that the UN, AfDB, bilateral donors, and others have a long history of engagement; a strong presence on the ground; innumerable well-grounded reports from national institutions and civil society actors; and access to a broad network of key informants. Thus, many analysts conclude that many international partners have chosen to not see what is in front of them, and to not act on what they do see – a stance which, where true, would render them complicit in wrongdoing by government officials as well as private sector actors. Any such acquiescence in what is acknowledged as rampant corruption feeds the dynamics of fragility. It directly as well as indirectly undermines social cohesion, contributes to incoherence of efforts, and destabilises already fragile institutions.

> A worrying trend is the politicization of the private sector. Given the level of development in most of the MRU member states, the government remains a major consumer of the services provided by the private sector, and the largest source of lucrative contracts. An observation confirmed during the consultations is that whenever there is a change in administration, a new set of private sector operators emerges with little or no experience but who "win" public contracts because of connections, notwithstanding their lack of experience for the services they are supposed to provide. This practice stultifies growth and maturity of firms, condones high costs and inefficient production and stifles growth of enterprises, all of which fuel the persistence of fragility and instability as well as starved the dynamics of resilience.
> —WORKSHOP REPORT ON THE INCLUSIVE AND CAPABLE ECONOMY

B. Feeding the dynamics of fragility: Conflicting political objectives

Experts note that the subregion is characterised by policy goals in stark conflict with one another, undermining efforts to address fragility. For example, it is broadly acknowledged that an exit from fragility requires an inclusive economy. This requires a thickening of the subregional economy, in terms of local value creation and capture; in terms of direct benefit to the historically impoverished and marginalised at scale; and in terms of the subregional networks comprising value chains. Yet, structural reforms are imposed by the IMF that

undermine service delivery and feed the grievances underlying fragility. Business environment reforms focus on the subsidy and protection of international capital, without commensurate protection and support for local stakeholders most affected by their operations. Similarly, the UN OHCHR Special Rapporteur on the right to food has found that "trade policy has primarily focused on economic frameworks and has either ignored or marginalized people's human rights concerns". Northern financing – primarily for outflows of primary commodities to the North – results in trade and investment flows that mimic colonial patterns, at the same time heightening the risk of external shocks. Meanwhile, subregional trade is mainly informal, vulnerable to exploitation, and small in scale, representing less than 10% of external trade.

> Tax strategies seem to focus largely on increasing revenue generation rather than supporting a balanced development agenda. A case a point is in Sierra Leone where the 2022 Finance Act reduced the threshold for goods and services tax (GST) from Le350 million to Le100 million. This has led to an increase in the tax burden for small and medium scale enterprises with the potential effect of constricting the expansion of small businesses—the key source of private sector expansion.
> —WORKSHOP REPORT ON THE INCLUSIVE AND CAPABLE ECONOMY

Not only does the pursuit of such policy objectives feed fragility; it was found that the way they are pursued does so as well. For example, flagship international initiatives in the agricultural sector with footprints in the subregion, such as the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) and the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Africa (NAFSN) are widely condemned for undermining local voice and inclusion; smallholders are marginalised with respect to issues as diverse as food security and nutrition, seed systems, markets for land rights, regulation of contract farming, and women's rights. At the national level, policies carefully constructed to achieve broad local consensus, such on the post-Ebola recovery plan in Sierra Leone, as well as between Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia, are described as having been ignored by development partners who leverage their funding to direct governments towards their own preferred policy and programmatic solutions. It was noted that these dynamics are particularly acute in the periphery, with notable failures to move beyond partnerships solely with national governments to engage and empower decentralized and local sources of authority and legitimacy.

> Unlike East and Southern Africa, a regional approach to the development of agricultural value chains was described as non-existent in the MRU counties. Therefore, the subregion is not capitalizing on its agricultural potential and fails to see the mutual benefits in terms of job creation, market development, and food security—despite these being highlighted as critical in needs assessments and development plans. Rather, development partners and national governments prioritize commodity exports that mimic patterns of colonial trade.
> —WORKSHOP REPORT ON THE INCLUSIVE AND CAPABLE REGION

The evidence shows that committed individuals in the national and international sphere are clearly engaged around questions of fragility and attempt to develop policies and initiatives for addressing it. However, the evidence is that, on balance, the goal of addressing the drivers of fragility is at best a subsidiary one at both national and international levels. It goes missing in policy debates and programming decisions in the face of shorter-term and more parochial interests, whether an international institution advancing its preferred programmes to meet its internal goals; bilateral donors shaping aid and trade policies to serve their domestic constituencies; or national actors directing resources to punish opponents and reward supporters. The political objectives of national and international actors therefore often enough conflict with the building of resilient economies, polities, and societies, and thereby further feed the dynamics of fragility.

C. Feeding the dynamics of fragility: Erosion of traditional sources of resilience and social cohesion

Historically, the ability of communities in the subregion to survive in the face of war, economic shocks, and epidemics has come from their relative local autonomy and economic self-sufficiency. This creates a tension, as the failure of the formal state to integrate the periphery – from the colonial period to the present – is a source of fragility; but it has left in place economic and social ties that are vital sources of resilience.

> Lack of trust in the political process has created a crisis of legitimacy for incumbent governments, and by extension the authority of the state in some areas; and in most rural areas, where the state has a tenuous presence, its legitimacy is similarly thin among the people. Growing distrust for the state due to its failure to deliver has led to intermittent civil protests in the last two years in Liberia as was seen during the mass demonstration against an increase in rape crimes in August 2021. In the worst case, distrust in the state has led to the overthrow of governments by unconstitutional means as the military did in Guinea in September 2021. According to experts, fear of similar unconstitutional change is experienced by some in Côte d'Ivoire.
> —WORKSHOP REPORT ON THE INCLUSIVE AND CAPABLE POLITY

The evidence is that this tension is often poorly managed, with government policies and programmes – supported by international partners – undermining local assets far faster than they are built through national frameworks and initiatives.

These dynamics are visible in economic policy. Experts report an over-emphasis on formalisation of the economy that ignores the vast majority of economic actors in the informal sector, as well as the many ways in which they could be supported more directly. They note prioritisation of investment that shifts farmers from smallholder production to plantation employment, ignoring the impact on food security and nutrition, while increasing vulnerability to commodity shocks. And they see inhibitions of subregional trade that undermine traditional value chains. The conclusion is that the periphery is being denied the traditional bases on which it relied, without being provided sufficient alternative resources with which to succeed.

> In Sierra Leone, land in the provinces/regions (where most large-scale mining and plantations are undertaken) belongs to the traditional authorities and landowning families. In most cases, when land is appropriated for commercial development, landowners are not paid a fair price for surface rents and crop compensation. Although traditional authorities are expected to protect the interests of local communities, it is alleged that they often collude with officers within central government to negotiate prices and compensation far below the market price. This has resulted in several uprisings in mining and rural communities, with increases in tensions, destruction of property, and in some cases, loss of lives in rural communities.
> —WORKSHOP REPORT ON THE INCLUSIVE AND CAPABLE ECONOMY

Additionally, the evidence shows how social and political structures that have historically been sources of consensus building, conflict resolution, and crisis management are being undermined, sometimes intentionally. Decentralization policies are pursued as deployment of authorities from the centre, creating tensions with local governments and traditional authorities. Meanwhile, traditional leaders are being co-opted into party politics, causing local social ruptures. Political affiliation is closely linked to ethnic and regional identity, leading some politicians to highlight or play up ethnic tensions. This introduces new forms of inter-group competition and enmity that experts underline are not historically rooted, feeding fragility.

To say that actors or institutions are sources of resilience and social cohesion is to recognise that they have capabilities and legitimacy to achieve positive results despite the

many negative dynamics around them. They are the bright spots in a political landscape that is otherwise often enough bleak. However, the broad evidence is that these are not acknowledged by national or international actors as assets to be leveraged in nation building. Avenues of economic resilience for the many are rather ignored or even undermined in pursuit of elite deals; sources of social and political resilience that have provided balance in periods of crisis are co-opted or destabilised by those who may consider them sources of opposition. These actions that have the effect of making it difficult for more positive action to take root – for whatever motive they are undertaken – further feed the dynamics of fragility.

D. Starving the dynamics of resilience and social cohesion: Insufficient implementation of "post-conflict" frameworks

One of the strongest messages that emerged from the post-war analyses across the subregion was the need for fundamental economic reform. Required were the end of State predation, extractive production, colonial patterns of trade, and fragility entrepreneurship, in which the very business model is premised on corruption and lax enforcement of regulation. All of these were understood as forms of structural violence and key drivers of human rights abuses. As noted in the 2004 UN Secretary-General's Report on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, justice and reconciliation require accountability mechanisms that end and remedy such large-scale human rights abuses. In the same vein, the African Union's Transitional Justice Policy (AUTJP) prioritises "fighting impunity" and "bringing an end to any ongoing violence and removing the threats of further violence impacting the affected population" by "addressing the legacies of the past violence and oppression", including the structural violence of the colonial and post-colonial economy.

Yet, experts note that any serious efforts to restructure the economy were quickly abandoned, with only the rhetoric of post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding remaining in place. Mining became "mining for peace", while the possibilities to use mining for local beneficiation and broader economic empowerment were broadly ignored. Trade became "trade for peace", with little attempt to achieve prosperity through subregional development planning and implementation. Subsidies for foreign capital became "finance for peace", without sufficient protection for human rights, the environment, or community concerns. The consensus conclusion is that, in the aggregate, development and growth policies and programmes across the subregion are

not particularly pro-poor; nor are they a meaningful departure from pre-conflict forms of production and distribution.

Another critical message of post-war analyses was to take seriously the need to address historical conflict divides, and to put in place mechanisms that could identify and engage tensions in society before they escalated into unmanageable conflict. In the public sphere, architectures emerged that brought together state security actors with local leaders to discuss and address issues. Within civil society, organisations built from their wartime credibility to build local capacity for conflict resolution within sophisticated networks of support. These efforts provided important balance in a system characterised by high concentrations of power and fraught relationships between the centre and the periphery, between formal and traditional government authorities, and between different political identity groups.

A few of these initiatives persist, continuing to prove their value. However, such peacebuilding structures and organisations have largely been de-funded by international partners. In general, there are a lack of visible or adequately resourced social cohesion efforts within countries and across the subregion, and experts note a notable absence of important social actors (e.g., religious leaders) from contemporary peacebuilding and social cohesion efforts.

> In Liberia and Sierra Leone, groups such as the Mano River Women's Network for Peace and WIPNET, the Women's Network for Peacebuilding, played a vital role at the height of the violence. They ensured that the warring factions could come to the negotiating table and that the agreements reached reflected the needs of the populations. Despite this history, as well as Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) recognizing the active role of women in conflict resolution, an ongoing role for women as key actors and agents of change in peace has often not been recognized.
> —WORKSHOP REPORT ON THE INCLUSIVE AND CAPABLE SOCIETY

Experts conclude that these dynamics suggest a dangerous failure to learn from the lessons of the past. The root causes of conflict, as well as the brutal consequences of the failure to address them, have been authoritatively documented across the subregion. The measures required to emerge from a difficult past have been set out in, among other places, national instruments such as the reports of truth and reconciliation commissions. For a time, it appeared that economic reform and transitional justice measures were being taken seriously and supported at a meaningful level by national and international actors.

However, interest in, and funding for, these important initiatives were abandoned well before any meaningful economic, social, or political endpoints had been reached. The result of a premature return to "business as usual" is that many positive change efforts withered before they could sufficiently take root. The Report finds that this failure to follow through on meaningful economic and social reforms starves the dynamics of resilience and social cohesion across the subregion.

E. Starving the dynamics of resilience and social cohesion: Failures to invest in effective institutionalization

> Political institutions are said not to be capable enough to manage effectively the natural social conflict that occurs among the people (from many ethnic and cultural groups) in the various countries. There is thus limited social cohesion and political stability among the people.
> —WORKSHOP REPORT ON THE INCLUSIVE AND CAPABLE POLITY

Government agencies and departments across the subregion have been provided an enormous amount of technical and financial support over the past decades, for example, for drafting laws, renovating buildings, and funding staff and programmes. However, experts note that little attention has been paid to how they would or could function in societies often enough characterised by deep social and political divisions. They note that structures and processes are imposed from above, rather than from processes that build broad belief in their importance to society and result in commitments to mutual accountability. There is little recognition of, or attempts to build from or integrate, indigenous models or local initiatives.

> Across the subregion, post-conflict recovery and statebuilding were approached largely as a bureaucratic, technical process focusing on providing 'adequate' human and material resources to improve the efficiency of state institutions. They to a greater extent ignored aspects of nation-building which involves building a shared sense of identity and destiny. The lack of effective nation-building in the Mano River region can be seen in the sporadic communal conflicts that erupts in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire around land ownership and the visible ethno-regional division that marks party political affiliation in Sierra Leone.
> —WORKSHOP REPORT ON THE INCLUSIVE AND CAPABLE POLITY

There is a virtual absence of investment in the tools and structures of effective public participation; and also, underinvestment in the capacity of civil society, labour, and traditional authorities to constructively engage in policy making, planning, or accountability measures. Positive values, such as social responsibility for the members of a community, are not promoted.

Thus, the MRU countries have visible institutions of government that provide the trappings of a modern and functional state apparatus; yet these are not socially or politically embedded in ways that would render them effective. Cases are related where officials are provided with training, but they are not incentivized to change their ways of doing business; operating budgets are provided for various offices, but there are no mechanisms for effective oversight or governance; public purposes are declared, but there is little constructive engagement with the public or their representatives in labour, civil society, and traditional structures in ways that could build effective partnerships; and negative values, such as a willingness to take illegal action based on "orders from above", go unaddressed. Thus, the institutions of government remain prone to capture and misuse by those in power. Perversely, investments in these institutions reinforce rather than ameliorate power imbalances in society, rendering institutions sources of conflict and grievance rather than moderators of their resolution.

> Personalization of power and strongman rule have grave implications for constitutional order and stability. The indefinite suspension of Sierra Leone's revered auditor general by the President in November 2021 and the alleged role of Liberia's ruling party in the removal of a supreme court judge in 2019—a move largely criticized as unconstitutional—are seen as manifestations of strongman rule in the region. As experts observe, these are all evident that 'state institutions in the region have been personalized and as a result, the systems do not drive themselves, but are driven by elites'.
> —WORKSHOP REPORT ON THE INCLUSIVE AND CAPABLE POLITY

> The MRU Secretariat established the Joint Peace and Security Confidence Building Units at the borders to play the role of policy coordination and implementation. Joint Border Units should open up the space for tackling instability and insecurity issues directly; they are expected to concentrate their respective activities in the same geographic areas. However, it has been noted that most of these units are now ineffective because of inadequate resources and support.
> —WORKSHOP REPORT ON THE INCLUSIVE AND CAPABLE REGION

This analysis suggests the fundamental ineffectiveness of national government and development partner strategies to build institutions in the subregion without commensurate investments in their "institutionalization" – "the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability" (Huntington, 1968:12). National and international actors have invested in the visible "hardware" of government. The expert conclusion is that they have grossly underinvested in, for example, political settlements across conflict divides on institutional goals and functions; broad-enough social consensus on the mechanisms of mutual accountability in their operations; or capacity building for effective public participation that helps to balance political power and influence in the system – the "software" that institutionalises new and more positive ways of thinking and acting. Thus, the conclusion reached is that the subregion has not achieved the institutionalization of government functions vis-à-vis the welfare of the people or the nation, as measured by institutional "adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence" (Ibid.). This government-centric view of, and lopsided support for, institutions is found to starve the dynamics of resilience and social cohesion across the subregion.

F. Starving the dynamics of resilience and social cohesion: Failures of policy and programme coherence

Numerous examples emerged in the consultations and research of potentially impactful policies and initiatives that are languishing or appear forgotten. For example, at the subregional level, the previous strategic plan of the MRU-S included the establishment of Growth

> Civil society struggles to become strong enough to exert substantial pressure on political choices. Consequently, the aspirations of the populations are not sufficiently taken into account and their powers of control over political institutions are reduced. These dynamics are further exacerbated by government efforts to suppress protest.
> —WORKSHOP REPORT ON THE INCLUSIVE AND CAPABLE SOCIETY

Triangles; yet experts see no apparent attempt made to incorporate these into the national plans of member states. The African Continental Free Trade Area is already in force; yet there have been overall little attempts made to revisit finance, trade, and investment strategies in member states to capitalise on new opportunities. Similarly, there has been a failure to harmonise mining policies, a necessary forerunner to joint or collaborative minerals exploitation. Analogous failures of policy follow-through were also noted at the national level. For example, Sierra Leone shipping laws require 40% of all exports to go through the national shipping lines; yet no plans are in the works for developing the indigenous shipping industry required. Obviously, no positive results can be recorded from such inchoate policies.

Additionally, many policies and programmes across the subregion are pursued with what was described as tunnel vision, limiting their potential effectiveness. Massive investments are promoted in primary production of minerals and agriculture; yet these are pursued as discrete islands of investment that experts underline ignore larger sectoral and subregional opportunities, whether the promotion of industrialisation or the leveraging of infrastructure for other enterprises. Business environment reform is often associated with formalisation efforts that focus on the obligations of even small operators; yet experts see few commensurate efforts to make needed improvements in the ecosystems of the informal economy in which the vast majority in the subregion live. These narrow approaches to policy development and programmatic implementation deprive member states and their citizens of greater leverage and optimal gains from investments. Additionally, as broader impact is not delivered, they tend to increase inequality and power imbalances. They thus become additional sources of contention in society, particularly with respect to historically marginalised groups and those in the informal economy.

The broad evidence is that, in fragile and conflict affected environments, positive change is already more challenging. This makes coordination and coherence of effort all the more important. These principles have been broadly acknowledged by international partners, for example, in the OECD DAC framework for peacebuilding effectiveness. National actors as well have also committed to coherent and coordinated action in national and subregional frameworks. Yet, experts find the analyses, processes, and governance required – such that enough rowers are pulling the right boat in the agreed direction – almost nowhere to be found. Even policies and programmes that are sound in terms of their potential positive impact on fragility are therefore rendered ineffective. They lack an enabling environment for their success, are not at a sufficient scale, or are rendered ineffectual by other policies and programmes that work at cross purposes. The Report finds that these failures starve the dynamics of resilience and social cohesion across the subregion.

G. Conclusion: The compounding effects of a downward cycle of poverty and exclusion

What should be clear from this analysis is that fragility is not a phenomenon that can be easily compartmentalised. Rather, the evidence from research and expert consultations is that fragility emerges from, and is sustained by, a host of political decisions across sectors and actors at national and international levels that – intentionally or not – feed the dynamics of fragility and starve the dynamics of resilience and social cohesion. Furthermore, these discrete political decisions and their outcomes feed one another, leading to a downward spiral.

Negative cycles of citizen-government engagement are one manifestation. Political action and inaction also lead to food insecurity and other elements of persistent, high levels of multi-dimensional poverty across the subregion. The experience of most citizens is that their concerns on these and other pressing matters are ignored. Protests erupt, only to be met with state violence and other forms of oppression. These in turn become additional grounds for grievance, mistrust, and calls for escalation of conflict, whether in the form of violence or of non-democratic political transitions. These are dynamics with which the subregion is far too familiar.

However, even as economic and political exclusion raise tensions that make countervailing measures more important, they make it harder for people under stress to engage in positive change efforts. The survival imperative impedes civic engagement. This is particularly true as people have high levels of dependency on politically directed resources, and party politics increasingly permeate all dimensions of government decision-making and civic life. There are evident implications for transparency, accountability, and development results.

These intertwined dynamics of conflict escalation and inability to form positive change coalitions feed the downward spiral that to many observers appears increasingly entrenched. This in turn feeds growing hopelessness and despair. One sign is the noted increase in drug addiction, involving increasingly debilitating drugs. There are also reports of increasing openness to violent extremism in the subregion, underlining that even international dimensions of fragility have deep domestic roots.

> A participant argued that 'fragility occurs in a vicious circle. Its outcomes, like corruption, weak institutions, and lack of services, are also the root causes'. Indeed, the drivers and outcomes of fragility are usually interconnected and mutually reinforcing, expressing themselves through chains of events that take place over a period of time. The pre- and post-war eras of the Mano River Union subregion are revealing of how the chain of events from the conception of the various states (colonial impositions) to faulty state formation processes, military dictatorships and elite domination led to violent conflicts; and how stark inequality, poverty and weak institutions in the post-war era continue to deepen fragility in the various countries.
> —WORKSHOP REPORT ON THE INCLUSIVE AND CAPABLE POLITY

> The migration of youth to urban areas where they hope to access opportunities that are barely available is also driving lack of productivity in the agriculture sector which continues to suffer labor shortage induced by rural-urban migration. One consequence of this trend is the rapid increase in food prices and general inflation over the years. With limited opportunities in the major urban centers, cities like Abidjan, Conakry, Freetown, and Monrovia have seen a rise in crime rates and increase in political violence as unemployed young people in those cities have become readily available for violence during electoral periods. Indeed, over the last ten years, no election has taken place in the four countries of the MRU without major incidents.
> —WORKSHOP REPORT ON THE INCLUSIVE AND CAPABLE POLITY

Experts underline that the breadth of drivers of fragility as well as their intertwined nature means that fragility will not be addressed through discrete "anti-fragility" or "pro-resilience" measures. An approach that assumes that every effort somehow "contributes" to fragility reduction ignores that isolated efforts are easily undermined or overwhelmed by deeply entrenched systems dynamics and the opposing interests that drive them.

Consistent with the hard-won lessons of peacebuilding effectiveness, efforts must be comprehensive enough, fast enough, and geared towards systems change to turn the tide consequentially. Part II, below, explores the possibilities for redirecting collective efforts in these directions.

Part II: Prescriptions for an exit from fragility across the MRU subregion

The Part I analysis highlights that it would be wrong to consider fragility in the MRU subregion to be the result of the *absence* of systems and institutions. Rather, the evidence points strongly to entrenched systems and institutions that serve the priorities and interests of only a limited number of powerful stakeholders who effectively exercise complete control over them for their own purposes. This may be for nefarious reasons: for example, subverting the rule of law to capture corrupt rents. It may be for more benign reasons: For example, development finance institutions or bilateral donors may hold the sincere belief that the advancement of their programme goals or preferred solutions, and that pursuing them through their relationships with a small elite, is for the good of the countries in question. However, experts find that the result is often the same: ways of working that feed the dynamics of fragility, and that starve the dynamics of social cohesion and resilience.

This analysis is consistent with the broad evidence that, because fragile and conflict affected places are characterized by status quo systems and institutions that "are functioning to achieve some purpose – protecting the power and authority of a particular elite, for example – they are highly resistant to change" (Ganson & Wennmann, 2016:192). Required, therefore, are profound shifts in power relationships and institutional arrangements that unlock the forces for peaceful development: with respect to the political economy, and in local, national, and subregional governance. Furthermore, resistance from those who benefit from current arrangements must be anticipated and accounted for.

Building from the research and expert consultations, Part II finds that this will require governments and development partners to nurture a fundamentally more balanced system of voice and influence across the many stakeholders for positive societal change. A broader range of significantly more empowered actors must be brought into systems and processes that analyse the status quo, assess opportunities, develop policies, plan programmes, monitor

their implementation, and resolve conflicts. This means that it is insufficient – and perhaps even pointless, as it has been tried so many times before – to simply point out bad policies (including those examples in Part I, above) and suggest that the opposite course of action be pursued. The broad consensus is that only once the goals of political inclusion and power sharing are advanced at scale will it be reasonable to assume that sound policies and practices can or will be implemented by powerful political and economic actors.

> In Sierra Leone, 2021 mid-term census provisional numbers are raising concerns. The outcomes have become highly politicized because of their potential to entrench the power balance of Parliament for some years to come. Experts worry that this conflict has the potential to undermine the legitimacy not only of Statistics-Sierra Leone, but also of the decisions of Parliament that would be made under any new allocation of seats. Additionally, if the census numbers are in fact inaccurate, experts worry that they will make impossible rational planning for service delivery, and thus increase marginalization, grievance, and division.

As explored in the analysis below, these conclusions have implications for the processes of policy and programme development, and for policy monitoring and evaluation, particularly at international levels. They have implications for the focus and prioritization of programmatic efforts as well. And finally, they have implications for institutional reforms that may be possible to implement, despite current fragility and its entrenched political economy underpinnings. Here the Report explores these at the level of principles; in Part III the Report provides specific recommendations.

A. New pathways despite fragility: More rigorous policy, programme, and project decision-making to address fragility

The picture that emerged from the earlier desk review on the state of fragility and resilience in the subregion is of a patient that is in an admittedly fragile state. Yet, as set out in the Part I analysis of this Report, some national and international actors continue to make decisions that pummel the already injured, often in the name of providing assistance. At the same time this renders fragility worse, it undermines positive efforts. A clear imperative that emerged from the consultations and research is to reverse these dynamics. To do so, the conclusion reached is that substantially more robust decision-making structures and governance processes are called for.

First, analysts emphasise that clearer redlines must be established to prevent the exacerbation of fragility. Policies and practices must be evaluated for their potential, for example, to contribute to multidimensional poverty; to exclude the already vulnerable or marginalised; to make life more difficult for those who make their livelihoods in the informal sector; or to exacerbate historical fault lines. If there is any substantial risk that they

> MRU countries have a relatively young population—about 70% of the population is of working age. Yet, programmes have largely not addressed the aspirations of young people. Initiatives have remained at the pilot stage and have not been scaled up to induce a significant change in the poverty, lack of training, unemployment, and lack of opportunities of young people. Consequently, young people find refuge in illegal activities (drug sales, clandestine gold panning, arms trafficking, etc.) and have often expressed their discontent through acts of violence and extremism (destruction of public property). They remain subject to manipulation by the political class and extremist groups.
> —WORKSHOP REPORT ON THE INCLUSIVE AND CAPABLE SOCIETY

must do so, they must be revisited and revised. Similarly, policies and practices must be

evaluated for their potential to increase inequities between identity groups, or to further concentrate power and resources in elites, dynamics known to increase conflict risk and reduce collaborative potential. Also needed is enhanced action to evaluate potential complicity in, or even indirect support for, corruption. Adherence to the findings that emerge from such analyses requires enhanced governance structures, particularly for development partners and private sector actors whose focus on narrow goals or technical implementation may leave them blind or indifferent to these dynamics.

Furthermore, systems analysis reminds us that, to change deeply entrenched patterns and practices within a system, impetus may need to come from outside of that system. Overly-directive aid provision has been rightly criticized when it undermines local voice, participation, and initiative. However, aid conditionality can be effectively deployed in partnership with local civil society actors, for example, to avoid complicity of international partners in political malfeasance, or to protect human rights defenders and community advocates in government as well as in civil society from being silenced or punished. Similarly, development partners together with private sector actors who provide investment, finance, insurance, guarantees, or other support for private sector development can play a more prominent role in constraining destructive action by companies. Financing, investment, or subsidies can be made contingent, for example, on the willingness of a company to subject itself to fair and independent mechanisms for addressing complaints and providing redress, together with performance bonds that accrue to the benefit of affected communities. These may require incorporation of binding international mechanisms of accountability.

International development aid in the MRU countries has, over the years, lacked local ownership and the support needed to ensure sustainability. This is largely because development organizations mostly implement projects they consider suitable based on templatized theories of change, and not those desired by the people and appropriate to the local contexts. This has created a culture of dependency in governments that now look to development aid and foreign partners to perform basic and routine functions of the state. Additionally, co-optation of civil society and local traditional leaders as "agents" or "partners" of the state have left voids in local institutions. As a result, there is a deficit in local communities of local leaders with the moral authority and influence to organize the communities around common causes and address issues of service delivery, security, and justice.

—WORKSHOP REPORT ON THE INCLUSIVE AND CAPABLE POLITY

Experts note that these protective measures can be balanced with support for more positive engagement. Actors who direct or provide resources can and should insist on inclusive, consensus-based processes for policy, programme, and investment development, consistent with agreed international frameworks and peacebuilding and development good practice. Private sector actors can be required – both through national frameworks and through conditionality of international assistance in the form of guarantees, subsidies, insurance, or investment protection – to improve key processes in which stakeholders need be included, such as context and conflict assessments, ESG and other risk assessments, risk mitigation plans, benefit sharing agreements, and ESG monitoring and evaluation. Within these processes, power imbalances can be in part addressed, and more trusting relations developed, through independently moderated and more fundamentally consensus-driven processes. At the same time, companies who are unwilling to engage openly, transparently, and fairly can be weeded out as potential fragility entrepreneurs.

B. New pathways despite fragility: Better focused policy and programme design

As set out in the Part I analysis, development and growth policies and programmes across the subregion are not particularly pro-poor; nor are they a meaningful departure from pre-conflict forms of production and distribution. There is scant evidence to suggest that, if these pathways are continued, more than a small proportion of the subregion's citizens will reap meaningful benefits within the next generation.

> Decentralization of power and services is linked to stability and resilience. A 2014 World Bank study on various forms of decentralization and closeness of government services to the people found that the MRU countries were, on the contrary, among the most centralized, with most public services inaccessible to the majority of the people. In Liberia, the most centralized, where the president appoints all local officials, the index for political decentralization is 0 and the overall index for decentralization is 0.01. The overall decentralization index for the remaining countries are: Sierra Leone 0.01, Guinea, 0.02, and Côte d'Ivoire 0.06.
> —WORKSHOP REPORT ON THE INCLUSIVE AND CAPABLE POLITY

Therefore, a substantial refocusing of efforts is required for a dependable exit from fragility. There is apparent need to focus on opportunities at scale for the informal sector, including subsistence farmers, as economic development is currently badly skewed away from any direct benefits to the vast majority of the subregion's citizens. Systemic improvements to informal sector ecosystems can benefit the greatest number of people the most rapidly. Direct benefits to marginalized populations can also minimise the risks of overly complicated results chains, in which rents must flow, for example, from a mining enterprise to the central government before being allocated to the benefit of the periphery and then delivered. Additionally, the patronage economy currently traps many citizens in dependency. As more direct economic opportunity is fostered for more people, space for their civic and political engagement opens.

> The desk review of this project identified the mineral sector, among others, as one with the potential to enhance economic resilience in all member states. Yet the sector's contribution to growth and development has been minimal. While accounting for between 60% and 80% of export earnings, the sector's contribution to GDP ranges between 5% and 15%. Additionally, the sector remains largely unintegrated with the rest of the economy. Thus, member states cannot fully benefit from the potential of the sector. For example, in 2010-11, when Sierra Leone's national electricity grid could only generate about 10MW nationwide and the capital city (Freetown) was described as one of the darkest in the world, one of the mining companies had excess generation capacity. On the whole, and although minerals resource exploitation started since the colonial era, very little positive has been achieved, and resources have rather fueled conflict and instability.
> —WORKSHOP REPORT ON THE INCLUSIVE AND CAPABLE ECONOMY

To achieve these ends, the consultations and research suggest that decentralisation of prioritisation, planning, governance, implementation, and monitoring may be required. At a subnational or local level, it may be easier to address questions of social cohesion, sufficiency and coherence of efforts, and institutionalisation of new approaches through engagement of the breadth of stakeholders in more productive political configurations. This should lead to programmes that have a more specific and explicit outcomes focus: for example, the development of reciprocal national or subregional supply-demand opportunities, or the improvement on a cross-border basis of healthcare delivery in a specific borderland area.

However, such efforts will require capacitation of actors if broader populations are to meaningfully and effectively participate in policy making and programme design and implementation. In particular, this will need to include women, youth, and marginalised populations, but also professional bodies and others outside of formal government. Also needed are well-developed civic institutions that can legitimately play public diplomacy roles.

> Countries focus on national development plans at the expense of regional planning, where they could be more leverage. For example, for COVID-19, no regional plan was adopted. The only regional plan that MRU has produced so far is the Post Ebola Recovery Plan—which failed due to lack of funding.
> —WORKSHOP REPORT ON THE INCLUSIVE AND CAPABLE REGION

> Experts believe that the growing number of civil society and non-governmental organizations in the region offers opportunity for collaborative and concerted approaches in dealing with issues of fragility. In all of the MRU countries, local organizations are engaged in efforts to solve poverty challenges, promote democracy and good governance, and advance human rights. The rise of these organizations means there are now multiple actors exercising public authority along with the state, and at the same time providing crucial services in remote areas. They demonstrated their relevance during the Ebola epidemic and also during the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic, supporting communities with information on public health regulations, relief items, and even working with government to enforce regulations. Their role was indispensable to crucial to breaking the transmission chain. Similarly, CSOs are working to add greater credibility and legitimacy to democratic processes and holding government institutions accountable. Electoral processes are now observed by civil society and NGO coalitions in all MRU countries whose role during electoral periods held to engender citizens' participation and promote the credibility of the process.
> —WORKSHOP REPORT ON THE INCLUSIVE AND CAPABLE POLITY

It was noted that the policy environment is in substantial flux. There are major new initiatives planned under the rubrics, for example, of post-COVID-19 development, the Sustainable Development Goals, or Agenda 2063. At the same time, more private sector resources are being pushed into fragile environments, even as Europe reconsiders its stance towards corporate impunity for human rights violations, and development finance institutions explore new avenues for peace positive private sector development. These and other policy review and development processes pose risks, as poorly conceptualised or implemented, they may replicate and exacerbate the shortcomings of current policy and practice as set out in Part I of this Report. However,

skilfully and responsibly managed, they hold out the opportunity for shifting policy and programme design relevant to the subregion towards the starving of the dynamics of fragility and the feeding of the dynamics of resilience and social cohesion.

C. New pathways despite fragility: Subregional institutionalisation of reform efforts

As noted in the Part I analysis, institutionalisation of new ways of addressing fragility – including as described in (II.A) and (II.B), above – requires changes not only in institutions, but in people. Analysts note that reforms will often be frustrated without widely shared stakeholder values, attitudes, beliefs, and commitments about the way in which decisions should be made and implemented. In the fragile and conflict-prone environment of the subregion, building these common normative frameworks will in turn require assurance that

there is sufficient consensus – particularly across historic conflict fault lines – on an inclusive vision for peaceful development.

Several analysts drew from promising experience to posit that, given current conditions, progress on these fronts may be easier to unlock at a subregional level. A subregional focus is seen as much more than a recognition of the very real inclusive economic development opportunities verified in the consultations and supporting research. It is an additional avenue for addressing entrenched, negatively reinforcing political systems at national levels.

> In early 2000, traveling to Guinea from Sierra Leone by road was challenging from the Sierra Leone end and relatively easier thereafter. Today, it's the reverse, and the story is the same on the Liberia end. There is little or no effort to coordinate with a view to ensuring that infrastructural development in member states complement each other. This has severe effect on cross border trade, particularly for SMEs that constitute a significant percentage of economic activities in the subregion. It partly explains why trade between and among member states remains very low.
> —WORKSHOP REPORT ON THE INCLUSIVE AND CAPABLE ECONOMY

For example, there are currently few efforts to build or strengthen professional networks on a subregional basis. However, accountants, civil engineers, rural development specialists, attorneys, health professionals, and others can usefully share perspectives on challenges faced and on possible solutions. This will help to define and to shape subregional dimensions of opportunities. At the same time, their analyses, evaluations, and advocacy for better paths forward in their domestic contexts may be perceived as less political and more professional if coming from a subregional rather than a national perspective.

> The MARWOPNET is a network of women for peace with chapters in the four MRU countries. It was established during the conflict period in Liberia and Sierra Leone, when it was instrumental in bringing peace. However, support faded away. This is indicative of a broader lack of an integrated approach to social guarantors. It was noted that social guarantors in communities—including civil society organizations but also traditional and religious leaders—are left out of the structures of conflict prevention and resolution. Experts believe that such guarantors can play a greater role in social cohesion. and that they can be better integrated within infrastructures for peace and development.
> —WORKSHOP REPORT ON THE INCLUSIVE AND CAPABLE REGION

Experts anticipate similar benefits from the convening and empowering of other communities across the subregion, including women's and youth groups, human rights and environmental advocates, and other constituencies that often have trouble having their voices heard and their ideas realised. Among other benefits, these people-to-people connections can be instrumental in shaping the subregional identity necessary to the realisation of MRU goals.

Analysts reflect that these networking efforts may usefully be part of an observatory or clearinghouse for the analysis of fragility as well as efforts to address it across the subregion. Affiliated with the MRU-S or otherwise established in the subregion, such a facility could be a focal point for identifying negatively reinforcing dynamics; assessing the coherence and cumulative impact of efforts to address them; identifying successful approaches for further investment; capacitating actors in tools of public participation and public diplomacy; and increasing the accountability of international policy makers, development partners, and national and subregional actors, including those in the private sector.

Analysts underlined the importance in all of these efforts of directly addressing questions of values. It is noted that the subregion has many reservoirs of positive values. Despite the subregion's many challenges, the incidence of interpersonal violence is lower than in other parts of Africa or the developing world. In many communities, individual responsibility for the common welfare is fundamental; and still, "when the thief is caught, the village is ashamed". All networks of actors – inclusive of development partners, national governments, and those in the private sector – are perceived to need to engage in dialogue and reflection around the roots of these values; the ways in which they have been maintained and continued to be made real; the threats to their continued currency; and ways of recognising, celebrating, nurturing, and enforcing the normative frameworks which they represent.

Part III: Recommendations in light of the persistence of fragility

The fundamental conclusion of the Part I analysis is that the persistent fragility that describes the status quo is the result of deeply imbedded patterns that serve the needs of a small elite of actors: in governments, in international institutions, and in the private sector. While sound policies and robust programmes are indeed required, parochial interests block, undermine or subvert even solutions that are straightforward from a policy perspective. The stark reality that emerges from the research and expert consultations is that fragility persists, rebuffing decades of effort to address it.

The fundamental conclusion of the Part II analysis is therefore that, to break the negatively reinforcing dynamics that have resulted in endemic cycles of fragility, the focus must be on the networking and empowerment of a wide range of actors to achieve a balanced system of political influence, sufficient consensus for positive change, and effective institutionalization. To the extent that the economic and political dynamics of fragility are enabled and protected by the current, closed configurations of power relations and institutional arrangements, these must be opened.

> One opportunity is in the social cohesiveness of some borderland communities, even though they may be across different sovereign boundaries. With common language and cultural groups, efforts at facilitating greater engagements between these communities—such as facilitating free movement—are likely to boost cooperation on trade, promote regional unity and solidarity on common issues affecting the communities. Cross border trade is already high among these communities. Greater policy reforms on free movements and access to capital are likely to scale up economic activities along the borders which will provide incentives for greater cooperation and cohesion, reduce the likelihood of violence, and perhaps minimize support to transnational criminal activities in the borderland communities of the MRU.
> —WORKSHOP REPORT ON THE INCLUSIVE AND CAPABLE POLITY

The Part III recommendations for national governments, development partners, and other actors follow from these conclusions. They are premised on the general findings from Part I and Part II that, if development partners and national actors do not stop feeding the dynamics of fragility, progress will likely be difficult to impossible. If development partners and national actors do not stop starving the dynamics of social cohesion, progress will likely be slow and uncertain. And if development partners and national actors do not focus on subregional assets, opportunities will be squandered, and progress will be notably more difficult.

Recommendations emphasize three key priority areas for each set of actors. This underlines the conclusion that, if key driving factors of the persistence of fragility are not addressed, ancillary efforts cannot be expected to have meaningful impact.

A. Three priority recommendations for international partners

These recommendations speak to the AfDB, UN, and MRU-S who commissioned this Report, but also directly to the variety of other governments and multinational organizations and institutions that engage across the MRU subregion on questions of development, security, and the economy. They emphasize stopping negative actions; enhancing the coordination and impact of positive action; and opening new opportunities through a subregional perspective.

1. Conduct comprehensive fragility impact reviews

All of the MRU subregion development partners have – through their adoption of, or adherence to, a variety of national and international policies – committed to "do no harm" in their interventions in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. There is little evidence that this is consequentially put into practice in their dealings across the MRU subregion countries. The Report finds that societies and polities that are already in a critical state of fragility are thereby further battered by the actions and inactions of international partners purporting to do good but far too often achieving the opposite results. Therefore:

a. A top-to-bottom fragility review should be conducted into policies and programmes, and the processes by which these are developed.

b. The focus of the review should be the ways in which policies and programmes directly or indirectly impact social cohesion (with specific reference to historic conflict divides); coherence of effort (both within governments and institutions and with other actors); and institutionalisation within national polities (with particular reference to the social embeddedness of values, attitudes, and beliefs, and the enforceability of commitments, with respect to good governance and inclusive development).

c. Within scope of the review should be both direct interventions – those intended to have development, security, political, and economic within the subregion – and policies and programmes which may have indirect impacts, such as those related to finance and trade.

d. To ensure its fairness and legitimacy, the review should respect UN evaluation norms, including that it be independently facilitated; transparent and inclusive; and that the results be published and subject to public scrutiny.

e. Governance structures should be created and/or enhanced to ensure that remedial action with respect to negative impacts on fragility is taken, and that the dynamics of fragility are not being fed or the dynamics of resilience being starved going forward. A risk register for actual and potential negative impacts on fragility should be maintained and made public.

2. Establish a fragility observatory for the subregion

All of the MRU subregion development partners also have – again through their adoption of, or adherence to, a variety of national and international policies – committed to coordination

of efforts with other development partners and with affected stakeholders. The reality, however, is that planning, policies, programmes, and stakeholder engagement still largely unfold within country, government agency, beneficiary group, or thematic area silos. The Report finds that, after decades of state building, development, anti-fragility, and pro-resilience efforts, even potentially positive action by development partners is therefore not adding up to positive change sufficient to turn the tide of endemic fragility. Therefore:

a. Development partners should, collectively, establish a Fragility Observatory for the MRU subregion to ensure the sufficiency, coherence, and cumulative impact of efforts.

b. The Observatory should be a focal point and centre of excellence for analysis of the political economy of fragility, both at societal levels and for policy and programme reviews.

c. The independence, professionalisation, and guaranteed resources of the Observatory must be above reproach to ensure its legitimacy.

d. The Observatory should curate, develop (where necessary), integrate, and make public key social, political, and economic outcomes data at subregional, national, and sub-national levels, with particular attention to historical conflict divides.

e. The Observatory should be a model in the subregion for inclusive, participatory analysis and for transparency of findings; and in doing so, be a catalyst for networking and positive action across actors, countries, and sectors.

f. Consistent with recommendation (A.1.b), an explicit goal of the Observatory should be to support efforts to instil and uphold values; to increase the accountability of all actors; and to ensure that the moral guarantor role is effectively played by development partners.

g. Development partners should condition policy, programme, and budget support for governments, international institutions, private sector actors, and civil society on their honest and engaged participation in the Observatory's efforts.

3. Prioritise a subregional perspective in planning and action

The founding Declaration of the MRU recognised that accelerating the "economic growth, social progress and cultural advancement" "can best be accomplished by active collaboration and mutual assistance in matters of common interest in economic, social, technical, scientific and administrative fields". However, some development partners are often enough blind or indifferent to subregional dimensions of their work. This Report finds that this undermines progress as envisaged by MRU member states, and fails to capitalise on important social, political, and economic opportunities. Therefore:

a. Development partners should drive coherence and cumulative impact of effort through the adoption of specific policies for the preferential use of the subregion as the unit of analysis for studies, policy development, programme design, and budgeting.

b. Development partners should align their own organisational structures, budgets, and staffing models to facilitate the coordination and implementation of subregional solutions.

c. Consistent with recommendation (A.1), development partners should review and revise policies and practices that tend to undermine or inhibit subregional solutions, with particular attention to those that tend to replicate colonial-era patterns of investment, trade, and aid.

d. Consistent with recommendation (A.2), development partners should subject their individual and collective efforts to participatory monitoring and evaluation to assess their impact on regionalisation and progress towards its opportunities.

e. Where networking has a thematic (e.g., health, infrastructure, or investment) or beneficiary (e.g., women, youth, security sector actors, or forensic accounts) focus, development partners should prioritise the nurturing of networks across the MRU subregion with the explicit goals of professionalising coordination efforts and empowering civil society and local actors, consistent with recommendation (C.1)

B. Three priority recommendations for national governments

These recommendations speak to the member state governments of the MRU, as well as to other actors who seek to constructively support and influence them. They emphasize re-establishment of a peacemaking framework in national relations; mandating the meaningful voice and participation of affected stakeholders in government policies and decision making, as well as in cases where private sector actions have substantial public impact; and adopting a subregional perspective in the formulation and implementation of national policies and plans.

1. Prioritise peace settlements, particularly on matters of the economy

It has become common currency to speak of the MRU member countries as being in a post-conflict phase, and for efforts of governments to be framed in terms of consolidating peace. While all are grateful that the risk of organised armed violence has been greatly reduced, such a narrow focus masks the reality that deep fissures persist across historic conflict divides; and that government policies and decisions are often perceived as legitimate only by members of one faction or political party. This Report finds that the premature abandonment of commitments to peacemaking has undermined an exit from fragility and the development of resilient economies, polities, and societies; and that it has rather contributed to the persistence of highly conflictual, "winner take all" politics. Therefore:

a. Governments should pursue social cohesion as a national priority, articulating how they intend to hold their own officials and affiliated politicians to account for pursuing it.

b. Governments should launch national reviews with the purpose of exploring, prioritising, and building broad consensus on approaches to addressing the issues that are most corrosive to social cohesion and to the institutionalisation of more just and inclusive governance.

c. These reviews should be conducted with particular attention to historic conflict fault lines and to unaddressed dimensions of peace processes, such as truth and reconciliation processes.

d. These reviews should be conducted with particular attention to the mechanisms that have proven successful in bringing people together in society, during peace processes or otherwise, and to how these can best be deployed, nurtured, and expanded going forward.

e. These reviews should be conducted with particular attention to the values required to make the implementation of recommendations effective, and to how these can best be inculcated and made real.

f. These reviews should be inclusive; should be moderated by persons of outstanding character and broad legitimacy; and should be protected from partisan influence.

2. Mandate the meaningful voice and participation of affected stakeholders

The constructs of voice, empowerment, and inclusion are frequently invoked across the MRU member countries with respect to development planning and implementation, including economic development. These values and principles are rather more frequently honoured in their breach. Decisions in the public and private sectors with wide-ranging implications are made by narrow elites; and there are examples of carefully constructed inclusive processes that were undermined by backroom dealings. This Report finds that these practices breed suspicion, foment grievance, undermine the legitimacy of decisions made, and make negative outcomes more likely from even well-intentioned decisions. Therefore:

a. Effective processes of public participation should be mandated in law for policy, programme, and project planning and decision making.

b. Where private action has substantial public impact, for example, on land use or access to water, public participation should be mandated, for example, in the development of ESG analyses, risk mitigation plans, benefit sharing agreements, conflict resolution processes, and their monitoring and evaluation, and it should be mandated that these be impartially moderated with the goal of reaching rights compatible, interest-based solutions.

c. Processes of public participation should have adequate resources, including access to independent professional and technical advice to all parties.

d. Awareness of, and capacities for, public diplomacy and public dispute resolution should be increased across government, civil society, and the private sector.

e. To prevent the escalation of grievance or the undermining of important rights and interests, the failure of a responsible party to engage in effective public participation should already be grounds for an affected party to seek redress.

3. Prioritise a subregional perspective in planning and action

In the Consolidated Fourth Protocol to The Mano River Declaration, member states agree "to implement a common policy of cooperation and development in all areas of economic activity … as well as in the area of social and cultural affairs". While there are a variety of examples of cross border initiatives and support for MRU structures, a subregional perspective seems largely absent from day-to-day government decision making and programme design and implementation. The Report finds that this substantially hinders progress as envisaged in the MRU declaration and protocols, reinforcing the structures of fragility, and inhibiting the emergence of potential subregional sources of resilience. Therefore:

a. Subregional interchange should be fostered at the technical and professional level across departments and agencies of government, inclusive of relevant professional bodies and civil society actors, with the intent to prioritise challenges and opportunities for more effective regionalization.

b. An outcome of this interchange should be the preferential use of the subregion as the unit of analysis for studies, policy development, programme design, and budgeting, with national actors incorporating subregional assets and opportunities in the formulation and implementation of national policies and plans.

c. Consistent with recommendation (A.1), national governments should review and revise policies and practices that tend to undermine or inhibit subregional solutions, with particular attention to those that tend to replicate colonial-era patterns of investment, trade, and aid.

d. Consistent with recommendation (A.2), national governments should subject their individual and collective efforts to participatory monitoring and evaluation to assess their impact on regionalisation and progress towards its opportunities.

e. Particular attention should be given to the opening of opportunities for traders and producers in the informal sector; to health; and to other thematic areas where national borders have as a matter of history or practice held less meaning.

f. Particular attention should be given value chains and sectors where a subregional approach is an essential element of unlocking opportunity, such as in, for example, beneficiation policies or industrial investments, or health service delivery.

C. Three priority recommendations for other actors

These recommendations speak to other actors in civil society and the private sector, as well as those that seek to support and to influence them. They emphasize the development of subregional networks; capacity development for systems change as a core element of strategy; and greater initiative required by private sector actors and their allies.

1. Develop subregional civil society networks

The deeply imbedded patterns that limit power to, and subvert institutions to the interests of, a small elite are strongest at the national level where they have been honed for

generations. While coordinated action by civil society to counter these dynamics has at times been impressive within countries, it has been less consistently so on the subregional level. This Report finds further potential for networking and mutual support at the subregional level to help to break the negatively reinforcing dynamics of exclusion that are at the heart of fragility, and to open the currently closed systems of power relations and institutional arrangements in important ways. Therefore:

a. Civil society actors should develop cross-country networks for information exchange, strategy development, and coordination of action, including the networking of CSO and other local actors between each other.

b. Consistent with recommendations (A.3) and (B.3), civil society actors should consider subregional assets and opportunities in their strategy-setting, policy development and programme design.

c. Consistent with recommendation (A.2), civil society actors should actively participate in efforts to monitor and evaluate, and to ensure the sufficiency, coherence, and cumulative impact of, efforts to address fragility in the subregion.

d. Civil society actors should, in their relationships with donors and partners, review and revise policies, practices, and programming that tend to undermine or inhibit subregional approaches and solutions, with particular attention to those that tend to replicate colonial-era patterns of investment and aid.

2. Emphasise the capacity to change systems as a core element of strategy

Status quo decision making systems and institutions in the subregion have proven resistant to the engaged participation of community actors, civil society organisations, and traditional institutions. While recommendations (1) and (2) speak to the imperative for national actors and international partners to open these spaces, greater capacity on the part of civil society actors to meaningfully participate is also required. However, programming (often enough driven by "results for money" thinking) may deprioritise the development of the human capital required to seek better technical, social, and political solutions for vexing societal problems. The report finds that these dynamics miss opportunities to build capacity that would help to challenge dysfunctional systems and to help to construct more functional institutions. Therefore, civil society and other development actors, their partners, and funders should:

a. Take into account the systemic dimensions of the problems that they seek to address, including social incohesion, incoherence of efforts, and insufficient institutionalisation.

b. Include in development programmes and advocacy initiatives capacity building for stakeholders and effected communities on the substantive and technical dimensions of the work, including its systemic and subregional dimensions.

c. Include in development programmes and advocacy initiatives capacity building for stakeholders and effected communities on citizen rights and responsibilities, including the common values required for societal progress across the subregion.

d. Include in development programmes and advocacy initiatives capacity building for stakeholders and effected communities on effective pathways for their voice and inclusion in assessments, strategy setting, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and resolution of disputes related to policies, programmes, and projects.

3. Take greater initiative in the private sector

The UN, development finance institutions including the AfDB, the AU, the OECD, and others have for decades underlined in their policy documents and advocacy for international norms and binding standards the dangers of private sector investment and operations insensitive to the dynamics of fragile environments. There is little evidence of respect for these imperatives across the subregion. Far more common in the private sector are fragility entrepreneurs who take advantage of elite capture, weak institutional arrangements, and social incohesion to capture rents. This Report finds the current pathway of private sector development to be a leading driver of the persistence of fragility in the subregion, endangering society and the natural environment, and undermining the ability of others to take action for positive change. Therefore, private sector actors, including operating companies as well as those who provide investment, finance, insurance, guarantees, or other support, should:

a. Refrain from engagement in policymaking, legal or regulatory reform efforts, or dealmaking with public entities that is not embedded in transparent, broadly inclusive, and rights compatible processes, consistent with recommendation (B.2).

b. Ensure that all key processes in which stakeholders need be included, such as context and conflict assessments, ESG and other risk assessments, risk mitigation plans, benefit sharing agreements, and ESG monitoring and evaluation be independently moderated and consensus driven, consistent with recommendation (B.2).

c. Create and/or enhance governance structures to ensure that remedial action with respect to negative impacts on fragility is taken, and that dynamics of fragility are not being fed or the dynamics of resilience being starved going forward. A risk register for actual and potential negative impacts on fragility should be maintained and made public.

d. Subject themselves to accessible, binding dispute resolution processes and redress mechanisms that have been designed and implemented together with affected stakeholders, respectful of all national and international obligations and commitments.

e. Provide material support to, and actively participate in, efforts to ensure the sufficiency, coherence, and cumulative impact of fragility reduction efforts, consistent with recommendation (A.2), in particular (A.2.g). In doing so, they should seek to incorporate subregional assets and opportunities in their own strategy-setting, policy development and planning.

f. Ensure that the capacity building described in (C.2.b-d) be sufficiently funded and supported in all stakeholder engagement processes, consistent with recommendations (B.2) and (C.2).

References

Abdullah, I. (2004), Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War. Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa.

Abdullah, I. and Maponga, O. (2012), "From Fragility to Sustainable Peace and Development in Sierra Leone." In Fragile States and Development in West Africa. Nairobi: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.

Acemoglu, D., Chaves, I.N., Osafo-Kwaako, P. and Robinson, J.A. (2016), "Indirect Rule and State Weakness in Africa: Sierra Leone in Comparative Perspective." African Successes, Volume IV: Sustainable Growth, edited by S. Edwards, S. Johnson, and D.N. Weil. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Adele, A. (2018), "How Selective Justice Is Eroding Peace in Côte d'Ivoire." News. The New Humanitarian, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/2018/02/28/how-selective-justice-eroding-peace-cote-d-ivoire.

African Development Bank (2022), The Bank Group's strategy for addressing fragility and building resilience in Africa (2022-2026), https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/bank-groups-strategy-addressing-fragility-and-building-resilience-africa-2022-2026.

Allouche, J., Benson, M. and M'Cormack, F (2016). "Beyond Borders: The End of the Mano River War(s)?" Evidence Report. Addressing and Mitigating Violence. England: Institute of Development Studies.

Amnesty International (2018). "Amnesty International Report 2017/18: The State of the World's Human Rights." London: Amnesty International, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/6700/2018/en/.

Amundsen, I. (2014). "Drowning in Oil: Angola's Institutions and the 'Resource Curse". Comparative Politics 46 (2): 169–89.

Anderson, M.B. (1999). Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace or War. London: Lynne Rienner.

Anderson, M., Brown, D. and Jean, I. (2012), Time to listen: Hearing people on the receiving end of international aid, Cambridge, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects.

Anderson, M. B., and Olson, L. (2003), Confronting war: Critical lessons for peace practitioners – reflecting on Peace Practice Project. Cambridge, MA: Collaborative for Development Action.

Anderson, M. B., and Wallace, M. (2013), Opting out of war: Strategies to prevent violent conflict. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder.

Asal, V., Findley, M., Piazza, J. A., and Walsh, J. I. (2016), Political exclusion, oil, and ethnic armed conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 60: 1343–1367.

Assangna, C. (2017). "An examination of the Sierra Leone War." African Journal of Political Science and International Relations 11 (5): 103–11. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5897/AJPSIR2017.0994.

Austin, J and Wennmann, A. (2017), Business engagement in violence prevention and peace-building: the case of Kenya. Conflict, Security & Development, 17(6): 451–472. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2017.1401840.

Bagwitz, D., Becker, S., Elges, R., Grossman, H., Kruk, G. and Mierke, A. (2008) Private Sector Development in Post- Conflict Situations. Berlin: GTZ.

Bah, A.B. (2011) "State Decay and Civil War: A Discourse on Power in Sierra Leone." Critical Sociology 37 (2): 199–216.

Ballentine, K., and Nitzschke, H. (2006). "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Policy lessons from studies in the political economy of armed conflict." Security and Development: Investing in Peace and Prosperity, edited by R. Picciotto and R. Weaving. New York: Routledge.

Barbara J. (2006), Nation building and the role of the private sector as a political peace-builder', Conflict, Security & Development, 6, 4, 2006, 581–94.

Baumol, W. (1990), Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive. Journal of Political Economy, 98(5): 893–921. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/261712.

Besley, T., Collier, P. and Khan, A. (2018), Escaping the Fragility Trap, Commission on Fragility, Growth and Development, https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Escaping-the-fragility-trap_Oct-2020.pdf.

Besley, T. and Persson, T. (2009): The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics, American Economic Review Vol. 99 No. 4 September 2009, https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.99.4.1218.

Bojicic-Dzelilovic, V., Kostovicova, D. and Rampton, D. (2014). "State-Building, Nation-Building and Reconstruction." In The Handbook of Global Security Policy, 265–81. MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Boyce, J.K. and Forman, S. (2010), "Financing Peace: International and National Resources for Post conflict countries and Fragile States", World Development Report 2011, Background Paper.

Brown, T., Fanthorpe, R., Gardener, J., Gberie, L. and Sesay, M.G. (2005). "Sierra Leone Drivers of Change". Bristol, United Kingdom: IDL Group.

Campos, N.F. and Nugent, J. B. (2000), "Who is Afraid of Political Instability?", Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 67.

Campos, N. F., Nugent, J. B. and Robinson, J. (1999), "Can Political Instability be good for Growth?", University of Southern California.

Canelas, C., & Gisselquist, R. M. (2018) Horizontal inequality as an outcome. Oxford Development Studies, 46: 305–324.

Chapman, J. (2004), System Failure: Why Governments Must Learn to Think Differently. London: Demos.

Chigas, D., Church, M. and Corlazzoli, V. (2014), Evaluating Impacts of Peacebuilding Interventions: Approaches and Methods, Challenges and Considerations. CCVRI Guidance Product. London: DFID.

Clapham, C. (2003), "Sierra Leone: The Political Economy of Internal Conflict." Working Paper 20. The Hague: Clingendael Institute.

Cockayne, J. (2010), Crime, corruption and violent economies. Adelphi Series (Ending Wars, Consolidating Peace: Economic Perspectives), 50(412–413): 189–218, https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/tadl20/50/412-413.

Coleman, J. S. (1988), Social capital in the creation of human capital. American Journal of Sociology, 94: S95–S120.

Colletta, N. J., and Cullen, M. L. (2000), The nexus between violent conflict, social capital and social cohesion: Case studies from Cambodia and Rwanda. Washing- ton, D.C.: World Bank.

Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2002), 'On the incidence of civil war in Africa', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46, 1, 2002.

Collier, P. and Sambanis, N. (2002), Understanding Civil War: A New Agenda, Journal of Conflict Resolution 46:1, 3–12. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002702046001001.

Conteh-Morgan, E. (2010), "Peacebuilding and Human Security in Postwar Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis." In Sierra Leone beyond the Lomé Peace Accord, edited by M. Mustapha and J.J. Bangura. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Cramer, C. (2006), Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing: Accounting for Violence in Developing Countries. London: C. Hurst & Co.

Crane, A., and Ruebottom, T. (2011), Stakeholder theory and social identity: Rethinking stakeholder identification. Journal of Business Ethics, 102: 77–87.

Dahlberg, R. (2015), Resilience and Complexity: Conjoining the Discourses of Two Contested Concepts. Culture Unbound: Journal of Current Cultural Research 7:3, 541–557. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3384/cu.2000.1525.1573.

Davies, V. (2002). "War, Poverty and Growth in Africa Lessons from Sierra Leone." Paper prepared for Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) 5th Annual Conference Understanding Poverty and Growth in Africa. Oxford: St Catherine's College, Oxford University.

de Carvalho Griebeler, M. and Hillbrecht, R.O. (2015), Producers, parasites and poverty traps. EconomiA, 16(3): 310–320. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econ.2015.07.002.

de Coning, C. (2016), From Peacebuilding to Sustaining Peace: Implications of Complexity for Resilience and Sustainability. Resilience, 4: 166-181. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/21693293.2016.1153773.

Englebert, P. and Portelance, G. (2015), The Growth-governance Paradox in Africa. Africaplus, https://africaplus.wordpress.com/2015/01/06/the-growth-governance-paradox-in-africa/.

Fairhead, J. and Wilkinson, A. (2017), "Comparison of social resistance to Ebola response in Sierra Leone and Guinea suggests explanations lie in political configurations not culture." Critical Public Health 27 (1): 14–27.

Fanthorpe, R. (2005), "On the Limits of Liberal Peace: Chiefs and Democratic Decentralization in Post-war Sierra Leone." African Affairs 105 (418): 27–49.

----- (2003), "Humanitarian Aid in post-war Sierra Leone: the Politics of Moral Economy." In Power, Livelihoods and Conflict: Case Studies in Political Economy Analysis for Humanitarian Action, Report 13, edited by S. Collinson. London: Overseas Development Institute Humanitarian Policy Group.

Fayemi, K. (2004), "Governing Insecurity in Post-Conflict States: The Case of Sierra Leone and Liberia." In Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector, edited by A. Bryden and H. Hanggi. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Firchow, P. (2018), Reclaiming everyday peace: Local voices in measurement and evaluation after war. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108236140.

Fisher, J. (2015), "'Does it Work?'–Work for Whom? Britain and Political Conditionality since the Cold War". World Development 75: 13–25. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.12.005.

Freedom House (2009), Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/Freedom_in_the_World_2009_complete_book.pdf.

Fort, T. L. and Schipani,C. (2004), "The Role of Business in Fostering Peaceful Societies", https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/role-of-business-in-fostering-peaceful-societies/39F381F211120B66293F33812A88C717.

Ganson, B. (2021), Private sector development in fragile states: A peacebuilding approach. Institute for Security Studies (2021).

----------(2019), Business (not) for peace: Incentives and disincentives for corporate engagement on good governance and peaceful development in the African context, South African Journal of International Affairs (2019, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1-24).

Ganson, B. Luiz, J. and Wennmann, A. (2019), Business Environment Reforms in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: From a Transactions towards a Systems Approach, Journal of International Business Policy (2019, Vol 2, No. 3, pp. 217-236).

Ganson, B. and M'cleod, H.P. (2019), Private sector development and the persistence of fragility in Sierra Leone, in Business and Politics (2019, Vol 21, No. 4, 602-631).

--------- (2018), The underlying causes of fragility and instability in Sierra Leone. London: Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development (2018).

Ganson, B. and Wennmann, A. (2016), Business and Conflict in Fragile States: The Case for Pragmatic Solutions, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016).

---------- (2016), Business and Institutional Reform in Hybrid Political Orders, in Institutional Reforms and Peace Building (London: Routledge, 2016, N. Ansorg & S. Kurtenbach, eds.).

Gaspar, V., Janamillo, L. Wingender, P. (2016), Political Institutions, State Building, and Tax Capacity: Crossing the Tipping Point, January 2016, IMF Working Papers 16(233):1 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781475558142.001.

Gates, S., Hegre, H. Nygård, H.M. and Strand, H. (2012), "Development Consequences of Armed Conflict." World Development 40 (9): 1713–22.

Gberie, L. (2005), A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone. Bloomington, Indiana University Press.

Geneva Peacebuilding Platform (2015), White Paper on Peacebuilding. Geneva: Geneva Peacebuilding Platform (GPP).

Government of Liberia, Truth and Reconciliation (2009), Report, https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/liberias-trc presents-final-report.

Government of Sierra Leone, Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2004), Final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, Freetown https://www.sierraleonetrc.org/index.php/view-the-final-report/download-table-of-contents.

---------- National AGOA Response Strategy 2019 to 2025, https://www.theigc.org/project/developing-sierra-leones-agoa-response-strategy/.

Gubler, J. R., and Selway, J. S. (2012), Horizontal inequality, crosscutting cleavages, and civil war. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56: 206–232.

Guimond, M. (2007), Structural Adjustment and Peacebuilding Road to Conflict or Peace? IDRC Working Paper. Ottawa: IDRC.

Gündüz, C., and Klein, D. (2008), Conflict-sensitive Approaches to Value-chain Development. Micro REPORT #101. Washington, DC: USAID.

Gurr, T. R. (1993), Why minorities rebel: A global analysis of communal mobilization and conflict since 1945. International Political Science Review, 14: 161–201.

Halevy, N., Halali, E., and Zlatev, J. J. (2019), Brokerage and brokering: An integrative review and organizing framework for third-party influence. Academy of Management Annals, 13: 215–239.

Hillesund, S., Bahgat, K., Barrett, G., Dupuy, K., Gates, S., Nygård, H. M., Rustad, S. A., Strand, H., Urdal, H., and Østby, G. (2018), Horizontal inequality and armed conflict: A comprehensive literature review. Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 39: 463–480.

Humphreys, M. (2005), Natural resources, conflict, and conflict resolution: Uncovering the mechanisms. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49: 508–537.

Humphreys, M., and Weinstein, J. M. (2008), Who fights? The determinants of participation in civil war. American Journal of Political Science, 52: 436–455.

Hunziker, P., and Cederman, L.E. (2017), No extraction with- out representation: The ethno-regional oil curse and secessionist conflict. Journal of Peace Research, 54: 365–381.

International Alert (2015), Peace Through Prosperity: Integrating Peacebuilding into Economic Development, https://www.international-alert.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Economy-Peace-Through-Prosperity-EN-2015.pdf.

Ivanyna, M. and Shah, A. (2014), "How Close Is Your Government to Its People? Worldwide Indicators on Localization and Decentralization." Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 8, no. 2014–3 (2014): 1–61.

Jackson, P. (2005), "Chiefs, Money and Politicians: Rebuilding Local Government in Post-War Sierra Leone." Public Administration and Development 25 (1): 49–58.

Joint Mano River Union Fragility and Resilience Assessment (2021), unpublished desk review report, commissioned, by the United Nations, the African Development Bank, and the Mano River Union Secretariat.

Justino, P., Brück, T. and Verwimp, P. (2014), A Micro-Level Perspective on the Dynamics of Conflict, Violence, and Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199664597.001.0001.

Keen, D. (2005). Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone. Oxford: James Currey.

Kelman, H. C. (2004), Reconciliation as identity change: A social-psychological perspective. Y. Bar-Siman- Tov (Ed.), From conflict resolution to reconciliation: 111–124. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.

Kobayashi, K. and M'cleod, H.P. (2021), Rethinking business reforms in post-conflict settings: the case of Sierra Leone, Conflict, Security & Development, 21:1, 43-61.

Kolk, A., & Lenfant, F. (2016), Hybrid business models for peace and reconciliation. Business Horizons, 59: 503–524.

-----(2015), "Partnerships for Peace and Development in Fragile States: Identifying Missing Links." Academy of Management Perspectives 29 (4): 422–37. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5465/amp.2013.0122.

Kpundeh, S. (1994), "Limiting Administrative Corruption in Sierra Leone." The Journal of Modern African Studies 32 (1): 139–57.

Kumar, C. and De la Haye, J. (2011), Hybrid Peacemaking: Building National 'Infrastructures for Peace'. Global Governance 18:1, 13–20.

Laplante, L. J. and Spears, S. A. (2008), Out of the Conflict Zone: The Case for Community Consent Processes in the Extractive Sector, Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 11:1, 69–116.

Lau, D. C., and Murnighan, J. K. (2005), Interactions within groups and subgroups: The effects of demographic faultlines. Academy of Management Journal, 48: 645–659.

Loode, S. (2011), Peacebuilding in complex social systems. Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development, 18: 68–82.

Manuel, C. (2015), "Is there a Causal Link between Investment Climate and Growth? A Review of the Evidence." DFID Legal Assistance for Economic Reform Programme, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/591b040aed915d20f800000c/laser-evidence-paper-the-link-between-ic-reform-a.pdf.

Mason, S. J. (2009), Insider mediators: Exploring their key role in informal peace processes. Berlin, Germany: Berghof Foundation for Peace Support, https://berghof-foundation.org/library/insider-mediators-exploring-their-key-role-in-informal-peace-processes.

McCoy, J., Rahman, T., and Somer, M. (2018), Polarization and the global crisis of democracy: Common patterns, dynamics, and pernicious consequences for democratic polities. American Behavioral Scientist, 62: 16–42.

McIntosh, K., and Buckley, J. (2015), "Economic development in fragile and conflict affected states." Birmingham: GSDRC, https://gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Econdevfragilestates1.pdf.

Mehlum, H., Moene, K. and Torvik, R. (2006), Parasites, in Bowles, S, Durlauf, S and Hoff, K (eds), Poverty Traps, 79–94. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

-----(2003), Predator or Prey: Parasite Enterprises in Economic Development, European Economic Review, 47(2): 275–294. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00194-5

-----(2002), Plunder & Protection Inc., Journal of Peace Research, 39(4): 447–459. DOI: https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/plunder-protection-inc.

---- (2000), Predator or Prey: Parasite Enterprises in Economic Development, Department of Economics Memorandum 27/2000. University of Oslo.

Moncada, E. (2019), Resisting protection: Rackets, resistance, and state building. Comparative Politics, 51(3): 321–339. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5129/001041519X15647434969948.

Mustapha, M. (2010), "Global Inequalities and Peace in Postwar Sierra Leone." In Sierra Leone beyond the Lomé Peace Accord, edited by M. Mustapha and J.J. Bangura. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Naudé, W. (2007), Peace, Prosperity and Pro-growth Entrepreneurship. Discussion Paper No. 2007/02. Helsinki: WIDER, https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/84657/1/546168884.pdf.

Ncube, M. and Jones, B. (2013), "Drivers and Dynamics of Fragility in Africa." Africa Economic Brief, 2013.

Nyei, I. A. (2016), "Beyond the Disease: How the Ebola Epidemic Affected the Politics and Stability of the Mano River Basin." Conflict Trends, 2016, https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/beyond-the-disease/.

Obenland, W. (2014), Corporate Influence Through the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Africa. Aachen/Berlin/Bonn/New York, https://www.globalpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Corporate_Influence_through_the_G8NA.pdf.

Odendaal, A. (2013), A Crucial Link: Local Peace Committees and National Peacebuilding. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

OECD (2016), "States of Fragility 2016: Understanding Violence." Paris: OECD Publishing. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264267213-en.

-----(2015), "A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States." International Dialogue on Peace Building and State Building, https://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer_public/07/69/07692de0-3557-494e-918e-18df00e9ef73/the_new_deal.pdf.

----- (2012), Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility – Improving Learning for Results. Paris: OECD, 2012.

------ (2008), OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Paris: OECD.

Oetzel, J., Westermann-Behaylo, M., Koerber, C., Fort, T. L., and Rivera, J. (2009), Business and Peace: Sketching the Terrain, Journal of Business Ethics, 89, pages 351–373, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10551-010-0411-7.

Ogunmola, D. (2009), "Socio-Economic Injustice and Cronyism: Warlordism and Tayloryism in the Sierra Leone Civil War." Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, Working Paper No. 3.

OHCHR (2008), Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights. Document no. A/HRC/8/5, April 7.

Østby, G. (2013), Inequality and political violence: A review of the literature. International Area Studies Review, 16: 206–231.

Paczynska, A. (2016), Liberia rising? Foreign direct investment, persistent inequalities and political tensions. Peacebuilding, 4: 297–316.

Provost, C., Ford, L. and Tran, M. (2014), G8 Alliance Condemned as New Wave of Colonialism in Africa. Guardian (February 18).

Reno, W. (2009), Illicit markets, violence, warlords, and governance: West African cases. Crime, law and social change, 52(3): 313–322. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-009-9199-8.

Retal, M. (2012), Governance for Peace: Security the Social Contract. New York: UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, 2012.

Richards, P. (2003), "The Political Economy of Internal Conflict in Sierra Leone." Working Paper 21. The Hague: Clingendael Institute.

Robinson, J. (2008), "Governance and Political Economy Constraints to World Bank CAS Priorities in Sierra Leone." Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, https://scholar.harvard.edu/jrobinson/files/jr_wb_sierraleone.pdf.

Sierra Leone Telegraph (2021), "Why Has President Bio Suspended Auditor General Lara Taylor-Pearce?" News. Sierra Leone Telegraph, November 13, 2021, https://www.thesierraleonetelegraph.com/why-has-president-bio-suspended-auditor-general-lara-taylor-pearce/.

Stabilization Unit (2008a), Stabilisation through Economic Initiatives and Private Sector Development (PSD). Draft April. London: UK Cabinet Office Stabilization Unit.

Stewart, F. (2011), Inequality in political power: A fundamental (and overlooked) dimension of inequality. European Journal of Development Research, 23: 541–545.

------(2008), Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multi- ethnic Societies. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

------ (2002), "Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development." Studies in Development Economics and Policy. London: Palgrave Macmillan, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230501850_5.

----- (2000), Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities. Oxford: Queen Elizabeth House.

Thomson, B. (2007), "Sierra Leone: Reform or Relapse? Conflict and Governance Reform." London: Chatham House.

UNDPA and UNEP (2015), Natural Resources and Conflict: A Guidance for Mediation Practitioners. New York and Nairobi.

UN Global Compact and Principles for Responsible Investment (2010), Guidance on Responsible Business in Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas. New York: UNGC & PRI, 2010.

UN News (2021), 'Time for Action' to Support Most Fragile States: Guterres." UN News, October 21, 2021, https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/10/1102752.

UNHCR (2020), "Ivorians Flee to Neighbouring Countries Fearing Post-Electoral Violence." UNHCR Briefing Notes, November 3, 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2020/11/5fa118a44/ivorians-flee-neighbouring-countries-fearing-post-electoral-violence.html.

USAID (2007), Poverty Reduction in Conflict and Fragile States: Perspectives from the Household Level, Summary of Proceedings from a Conference Held November 8–9, 2006. Washington DC: U.S. Agency for International Development.

-----(2009), A Guide to Economic Growth in Post-Conflict Countries. Washington DC: USAID, https://gsdrc.org/document-library/a-guide-to-economic-growth-in-post-conflict-countries/.

Vallings, C. and Moreno-Torres, M. (2005), "Drivers of Fragility: What Makes States Fragile"?. Working Paper No. 7, DOI: https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.12824.

Vervisch, T. (2011), The solidarity chain: Post-conflict reconstruction and social capital building on three Burundian hillsides. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 5: 24–41.

Vorrath, J. (2014), "From war to illicit economies: organized crime and state-building in Liberia and Sierra Leone." SWP Research Paper, 13/2014. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/From-war-to-illicit-economies%3A-organized-crime-and-Vorrath/1e48704cb58a143fc659083087b08a69c9b866c7.

Wennmann, A. (2011), The Role of Business in Armed Violence Reduction and Prevention. International Review of the Red Cross 94:887, 919–940.

Wimmer, A. (2008), The making and unmaking of ethnic boundaries: A multilevel process theory. American Journal of Sociology, 113: 970–1022.

Woodrow, P. and Chigas, D. (2009), A Distinction with a Difference: Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding. Reflecting on Peace Practice Project. Cambridge, MA, https://www.cdacollaborative.org/publication/a-distinction-with-a-difference-conflict-sensitivity-and-peacebuilding/.

World Bank (2018), Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict. Washington, DC: World Bank.

-------(2011), World Development Report 2011: Conflict, security, and development. Washington, DC: World Bank, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/4389.

World Bank, DataBank: World Development Indicators, https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators.

Zack-Williams, A.B. (1999), "Sierra Leone: The Political Economy of Civil War, 1991–1998." Third World Quarterly 20 (1): 143–62.