

THIRD PORTFOLIO EVALUATION OF THE UN PEACEBUILDING FUND (PBF)

Support to Burundi
(2014 – 2020)*

Final Report



United Nations
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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AU	African Union
ACHPR	African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
BINUB	United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
BLTP	Burundi Leadership Training Program
BNUB	Bureau des Nations Unies au Burundi – United Nations Office in Burundi
CNDD-FDD	Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie–Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie – National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy
CNDI	National Commission for the Inter-Burundian Dialogue
CNIDH	National Independent Commission on Human Rights
CNL	National Congress for Freedom
CNTB	National Land Commission
CSLP	Cadre Stratégique de Croissance et de Lutte contre la Pauvreté – Strategic Framework for Growth and Poverty Control
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
EAC	East African Community
ERSG	Executive Representative of the Secretary-General
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FNL	Forces Nationales de Libération – National Liberation Forces
FOCODE	Forum pour la Conscience et le Développement
GCP	Groupe de coordination des partenaires – Partner Coordination Group
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GYPI	Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-governmental Organizations
IRF	Immediate Response Facility
JSC	Joint Steering Committee
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NDP	National Development Plan
NNGO	National Non-governmental Organizations
NUNO	Non-UN Organization
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OSASG	Office of the Special Advisor of the Secretary-General
OSESG-B	Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office
PDA	Peace and Development Advisor
PPP	Priority Peacebuilding Plan
RC	Resident Coordinator
RUNO	Recipient United Nations Organization
SFCG	Search for Common Ground

SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SNR	Service national de renseignement – National Intelligence Service
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UPRONA	Union pour le Progrès national – Union for National Progress

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

i. This portfolio evaluation assesses the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) support to Burundi from 2014 to 2020. It also reflects on the broader lessons learned from PBF support to Burundi from 2007 to 2014 as well as the implications of this support for PBF engagement in other countries and future engagement in Burundi. Burundi is a unique case for the PBF because it was one of the first two recipients of PBF funding and, thus, benefitted from the presence of a Burundi configuration within the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC).¹ Between 2007 and 2020, the PBF gave over \$86 million dollars to support peacebuilding in Burundi, second only to its contributions to the Central African Republic. Between 2007 and 2020, the context surrounding peacebuilding in Burundi also changed from one where the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), Western donors, and regional heads of state hailed Burundi for achieving a successful peace process and post-conflict elections to one where international and regional actors sanctioned Burundi for “ongoing human rights violations,” “arbitrary arrests and detentions,” and the “suspension and closure of some civil society organizations and the media.”² Moreover, tensions between the Burundian Government and the UN increased, illustrated by the forced departure of at least four high-level UN officials from the country, impeding collaboration between the UN and the Burundian Government particularly in relation to the political crisis that began in 2015.³ The effects of PBF’s support to Burundi were, of course, highly affected by this changing political context, offering an important opportunity to examine the contexts in which the PBF is fit for purpose.

ii. The PBF began providing support to Burundi in its immediate post-conflict period, following the 2005 elections. Burundian parties signed the Arusha Agreement in 2000; began implementing the agreement in 2001; integrated the Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie–Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) into the peace process with the signature of the Pretoria Protocol peace agreement in 2003; and organized their first post-conflict elections in 2005, leading to the election of Pierre Nkurunziza, of the CNDD-FDD, as Burundi’s first post-war president. The PBF’s initial tranche to Burundi (2007-2010) aimed to help the Integrated UN Office in Burundi (BINUB) and the Burundian Government 1) support the implementation of key reforms outlined in the Arusha Agreement for which funding was not immediately available—including, the integration of the former rebel groups into the Burundian National Defense Force and the professionalization of the Burundian National Police; 2) support continued dialogue among political parties to break logjams in Burundi’s increasingly contested Parliamentary debates; and 3) provide socio-economic peace dividends for women, youth, and Burundian entrepreneurs.⁴

iii. The PBF allocated its second tranche (2011-2013) in the aftermath of Burundi’s contested 2010 elections and the related political violence carried out, in part, by youth militia allied with the

¹ Over this period, the Burundi configuration was led by Norway, Sweden, and then Switzerland.

² Final communiqué: Fact-finding Mission of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to Burundi, African Union. December 12, 2015, [https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/fact-finding-mission-of-the-african-commission-on-human-and-peoples-rights-to-burundi]; C. Bryson Hull, “UN-led peace body shuts, heralding Burundi success,” Reuters, August 22, 2005, [https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/un-led-peace-body-shuts-heralding-burundi-success].

³ Burundi orders U.N. security adviser out after violence warning, Reuters, April 17, 2014, [https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-burundi-un-idUKBREA3G1EM20140417]; Burundi : le gouvernement déclare persona non grata trois experts des Nations Unies, Jeune Afrique, October 11, 2016. [https://www.jeuneafrique.com/364586/politique/burundi-gouvernement-declare-persona-non-grata-trois-experts-nations-unies/]. “Reduced cooperation with the United Nations system, including the imposition of restrictions on operations throughout the country, has further undermined efforts to find a peaceful solution to the [2015] crisis.” Report of the Secretary-General on Burundi, February 27, 2017, [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2017_165.pdf].

⁴ Susanna P. Campbell, Leonard Kayobera, and Justine Nkurunziza, “Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi,” New York: United Nations, March 2010, [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CABFEA3AB9A416D34925779C000EAE96-Full_Report.pdf].

government.⁵ The second PBF tranche to Burundi did not aim to address the increasingly contested political space in Bujumbura; instead, it focused on community-level peace dividends and reintegration in the three provinces worst affected by the civil war: Cibitoke, Bubanza, and Bujumbura Rural.

iv. The third phase of PBF support for Burundi (2014-2020) was originally intended to support national reconciliation, democratic governance, land management, and youth employment creation, but was redesigned after the 2015 political crisis.⁶ In response to the 2015 attempted coup—and related increased political violence, closing political space, increased human rights abuses, restrictions on civil society and media, and flight of Burundians to neighboring countries—the PBF funded twenty-one projects in the following areas:⁷ human rights monitoring, political dialogue efforts, increased social cohesion among youth, community-level mediation by women, support for the reintegration of the thousands of Burundians who had fled the country, and coordination.

v. **During this third phase, the projects supported by the PBF were largely relevant to the opportunities and constraints posed by Burundi's post-2015 political crisis,**⁸ including the Burundian Government's policy that aid to Burundi should focus on development not peacebuilding.⁹ The PBF's support for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and AU human rights monitors enabled these inter-governmental organizations to monitor and report on allegations of human rights abuses in an environment where few other actors could do so.¹⁰ The support for the East African Community's Inter-Burundian dialogue process also responded to a crucial need—addressing growing political violence and inter-party tension at all levels of society; nonetheless, these dialogue efforts ended after the Burundian Government refused to continue participating in meetings held outside of the country.¹¹ The PBF's substantial support for youth social cohesion efforts also addressed one of the most pressing issues facing Burundian communities: large numbers of unemployed youth who were participating in political militias or other types of community-level violence. The support for women's mediation efforts was less urgent but still addressed the longer-term needs for community-level conflict resolution capacity and for the empowerment of women in society. Finally, the cross-border project aimed to provide targeted support for the return, if not the reintegration, of over 100,000 Burundians who had fled the country after 2015. The focus on community-level socio-economic support for youth, women, and returnees also responded to the Burundian Government's requirement that the UN and international donors focus on development and socio-economic support, not peacebuilding, as indicated by multiple

⁵ Susanna P. Campbell, Tracy Dexter, Michael Findley, Stephanie Hofmann, Josiah Marineau, and Daniel Walker, "Independent External Evaluation: UN Peacebuilding Fund Project Portfolio in Burundi." New York: UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), February 1, 2014 [<https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/293211?ln=en>].

⁶ Plan Prioritaire de Consolidation de la Paix: Burundi (2014-2016).

⁷ As the UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs noted, "Burundi was in a deep political crisis, facing a rapid escalation of violence." Alarmed at Escalating Crisis, Brimming Tensions in Burundi, Top Officials Brief Security Council, Suggesting Interventions to Prevent Spiraling Violence. November 9, 2015, [<https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12112.doc.htm>].

⁸ According to the Report of the Secretary-General on Burundi from 23 February 2017, "Nearly two years have passed since the beginning of the political crisis in Burundi, which was sparked by the decision of the ruling party, Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie — Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD), to support President Pierre Nkurunziza's candidacy for a third term." United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on Burundi*, S/2017/165, New York: United Nations, paragraph 2.

⁹ Republic of Burundi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation, "Participation of H.E. The President of the Republic in the 75th Session of the United Nations General Assembly," 29 September 2020, [<https://www.mae.gov.bi/en/2020/10/23/participation-of-h-e-the-president-of-the-republic-in-the-75th-session-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly/>].

¹⁰ "Burundi: UN rights chief deplores suspension of human rights groups, warns of 'civil war,'" United Nations News, November 25, 2015, [<https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/11/516502-burundi-un-rights-chief-deplores-suspension-human-rights-groups-warns-civil-war>].

¹¹ In a 2017 communique, the Burundian Government stated that: "Henceforth with the results of the 4th session, which is the last held abroad, [the] Dialogue [would] continue and complete that which brought together the Burundians of the interior." Statement following the 4th session of Inter-Burundi Dialogue held in Arusha, Dec 17, 2017, [<https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/statement-following-4th-session-inter-burundi-dialogue-held-arusha>].

individuals interviewed for this evaluation and as outlined by President Evariste Ndayishimiye during his UN General Assembly address in September 2020 (according to a summary of his statement).

“Regarding the presence of Burundi on the United Nation Security Council, His Excellency Evarist Ndayishimiye reiterated the legitimate call for Burundi’s immediate withdrawal from this agenda and to use this precious time to deal with the social-economic development issues in order to support national efforts in the implementation of the National Development Plan of Burundi 2018-2027 and the sustainable development objectives of the 2030 agenda.”¹²

vi. Although all the PBF projects during this period were generally relevant to the political and security context, their ability to contribute to their intended aims (i.e. their effectiveness) varied significantly. This variation was due to the closing political space in Burundi, the short-term nature of projects, the fact that the projects did not seek to address broader political or systemic issues, and the lack of coordinated implementation by project partners. The human rights projects supported transparent human rights reporting until the UN Human Rights Office in Burundi was closed “at the insistence of the Government.”¹³ As mentioned above, the Inter-Burundian dialogue project resulted in several meetings but not in a fully-fledged dialogue process. Most of the projects were focused on youth and women. These projects were generally well-implemented and seemed to improve relationships between youth of different political parties and provide women mediation and leadership opportunities that they may not have had otherwise; nonetheless, these projects did not take place at the scale (neither geographic nor temporal) necessary to achieve their ambitious aims nor did they seek to change the policies that created problems for youth and women in the first place. Instead, these projects sought to operate within the political space available to them. The cross-border project contributed to its aim of facilitating the return of refugees but the efforts of the different implementing agencies were uncoordinated and did not address the longer-term issues inhibiting returnee reintegration.

vii. In addition to the project-level effects of the PBF-supported projects, the PBF support to Burundi had an aggregate effect that is not visible when focusing on project-level outcomes. The PBF projects are overseen by the Joint Steering Committee (JSC), which was composed primarily of UN staff and Burundian Government officials. In addition, the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), and the related Burundi configuration, provided a forum for high-level UN member state consultations about the evolving context in Burundi. The PBF projects provided an opportunity for this range of Burundian Government, UN, and UN member state officials to discuss political and security issues by focusing on the details of the specific projects and the challenges and opportunities that they were facing. The PBF, thus, enabled these key actors to sustain and maintain continuous engagement in an environment where dialogue among the Burundian Government and its traditional European development partners was increasingly constrained.

viii. It is impossible to assess the effect of this sustained engagement, but many interviewees argued that the most important effect of the PBF support to Burundi was the opportunity for dialogue that it afforded. Some argued that this engagement set the stage for the current improved relations between the Burundian Government and European donors, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund

¹²Republic of Burundi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation, “Participation of HE The President of the Republic in the 75th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” 29 September 2020, [https://www.mae.gov.bi/en/2020/10/23/participation-of-h-e-the-president-of-the-republic-in-the-75th-session-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly/].

¹³ UN Human Rights Office in Burundi closes, March 5, 2019, [https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24254].

(IMF), and the UN; nonetheless, given the number of other factors that could have contributed to the thawing of relations, it is impossible to attribute this outcome to the PBF. Furthermore, given the continued restrictions in the political and civic space in Burundi, it is unclear if increased dialogue focused primarily on development cooperation and economic liberalization will also lead to improved human rights, inclusive political institutions, and opening civic space. The countries in the broader sub-region have increasingly prioritized economic liberalization and curtailed political freedoms, providing a model that Burundi may seek to follow.

ix. **Other than sustained dialogue between the UN and the Burundian Government, there were several moderate catalytic effects of the PBF support to Burundi during this period.** First, the women’s mediation project built on existing structures and relationships to augment the leadership and conflict-resolution skills of women and to create a network of women mediators that would reinforce these skills. The creation of network structure seems to have been a catalytic effect because it survived beyond the life of the project and continued to support the capacity of the women trained by the project. Our interviewees indicated that these trainings empowered them to mediate conflicts within their communities, although it is not clear if they were able to transfer these skills to other women who were not trained by the project. Second, the PBF support for human rights also had clear catalytic effects, particularly in spurring actions by the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council and in signaling that the protection of human rights was still a priority for the UN and the AU in Burundi. The ability of the youth projects to have clear catalytic effects was limited by their short-term nature and the difficulty that implementing partners faced in finding additional funding to support follow-on projects.

x. **Because of the broader political and funding context, it was very difficult for PBF projects during this period (2014-2020) to catalyze additional funding.** Several of the PBF projects—the support to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and African Union (AU) observers, the cross-border project—were co-funded by other donors, such as the European Union, but these donors were not aware that the PBF was also financing these projects. Rather than catalyzing new funding, the PBF seemed to supplement simultaneous grants from other donors. The first tranche of PBF support to Burundi (2007-2010) was able to catalyze additional funding *and* catalyze momentum in Burundi’s peace process because it was allocated in a context where both the Burundian Government and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) donors were enthusiastic about engaging in the types of peacebuilding activities that the PBF wanted to support. In other words, the first phase of PBF support to Burundi operated in a context where OECD donors and the Burundian Government were open to being catalyzed. By contrast, the third period of PBF support to Burundi (2014-2020), operated in a context where the communication between the government and most OECD donors had broken down and few donors or Burundian Government officials were interested in supporting the types of peacebuilding projects that the PBF was funding.

Lessons Learned and Lost

xi. As indicated above, this assessment of the PBF support to Burundi provides important opportunities to learn broader lessons about the conditions for effective PBF support to a recipient country. Our overall assessment is that over the past fourteen years, there have been important lessons learned; but there have also been important lessons lost. The major lesson learned is that the PBSO should focus on supporting innovative peacebuilding projects that reinforce existing capacity and have the support of key stakeholders within the host government. But, this lesson learned has a downside:

the pressure for RUNOs and NUNOs to always generate new, innovative projects seemed to prevent them from reinforcing and sustaining the results from existing innovative PBF projects.

xii. The case of PBF support to Burundi also demonstrates that in spite of lessons learned, there are many lessons that have been lost along the way. First, we will discuss the lessons lost in relation to the management, support, and oversight of PBF projects. Then, we discuss the particular implications for how the PBF engages with different political contexts, which are represented by Burundi's transition between 2007 and 2020 from a post-conflict country implementing wide-ranging power-sharing reforms to a country with closing political space, widespread restrictions on civil society and media, allegations of continuing human rights abuses, and most opposition politicians living in exile.

xiii. One of the most important lessons lost by the PBF is that **RUNOs often lack the capacity to design and implement peacebuilding projects.** The UNCT is composed of UN entities whose mandate prioritizes development or humanitarian outcomes, not peacebuilding outcomes. With the exception of UNICEF, UN agencies, funds, departments, and programs have not invested in building significant staff capacity to design and implement peacebuilding projects. Furthermore, UN actors do not train their implementing partners, and instead rely on their partners' existing capacity. As a result, even if a RUNO has the capacity to design a peacebuilding project, there is no guarantee that its implementing partner will have the capacity to implement this project in a conflict-sensitive way. The generally poor peacebuilding programming capacity of RUNOs was raised in the two prior portfolio evaluations and again, in this portfolio review, by a wide range of interviewees as a significant factor impeding the effectiveness of PBF-supported projects.¹⁴

xiv. A second important lesson lost is that **the PBF Secretariat does not have the programmatic or monitoring capacity to supplement inadequate RUNO capacity.** The PBF Secretariat in Burundi functioned as an administrative agent that was responsible for ensuring that all concept notes, proposals, and reports followed PBF guidelines; coordinating the JSC; and providing monitoring and evaluation frameworks to all RUNOs and NUNOs. The PBF Secretariat did not have the technical or strategic capacity to identify strategic areas for PBF engagement, help RUNOs or NUNOs design projects, or monitor the projects that the PBF decided to fund. The PBSO was unable to significantly supplement the PBF Secretariat's capacity. It provided important technical feedback on RUNO and NUNO project design, but was only able to allocate limited time to each project proposal.

xv. A third lesson lost is that over the entire portfolio of PBF support to Burundi, **the most successful projects were those that were designed and implemented by Burundian Government officials, national NGOs, and/or UN staff with significant peacebuilding capacity and strong networks across Burundian society.** In other words, the PBF's most successful projects worked largely because they supported Burundian actors who had done the hard work of building the peacebuilding networks and capacity necessary to implement successful peacebuilding projects, all of which they did prior to receiving PBF's short-term funding. Rather than funding one-off projects, the PBF should consider providing consistent core and project funding to domestic actors who are likely to implement high-quality peacebuilding activities, particularly in contexts where the political and civic space for these actors to operate is closing. When doing so, the

¹⁴ See Susanna P. Campbell, Leonard Kayobera, and Justine Nkurunziza, "Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi," New York: United Nations, March 2010, [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CABFEA3AB9A416D34925779C000EAE96-Full_Report.pdf]; Susanna P. Campbell, Tracy Dexter, Michael Findley, Stephanie Hofmann, Josiah Marineau, and Daniel Walker, "Independent External Evaluation: UN Peacebuilding Fund Project Portfolio in Burundi." New York: UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), February 1, 2014[<https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/293211?ln=en>].

PBF should also account for one potential risk: the UN may not be able to defend these domestic actors in contexts of increasing intimidation or other constraints on their operations.¹⁵

xvi. **A fourth lesson lost is the importance of integrated political and programmatic capacity to support the strategy, design, and implementation of PBF projects.** As indicated in the two previous PBF Burundi portfolio reviews, the PBF was instrumental in enabling BINUB to implement sensitive, high-risk activities that advanced Burundi's peace process. Because of the high-risk and political nature of these PBF projects, they require the buy-in and, often, the continuous support of the head of the UN in the country, whether the Resident Coordinator (RC), Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) or, in the case of BINUB, the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General (ERSG). This type of high-level in-country support is necessary because peacebuilding requires the integration of political strategy with programmatic capacity. Without the political strategy, PBF projects are likely to be designed and implemented as if they were normal RUNO projects with a peacebuilding "Band-Aid." Without the programmatic capacity, the UN's political strategy cannot be translated into concrete reforms or activities that lead to peacebuilding outcomes.

xvii. The integration of political strategy and programmatic capacity is likely to require that the office of the RC or the SRSG has the following characteristics: 1) an SRSG or RC that has strong political/diplomatic skills *and* strong programmatic knowledge and skills; 2) political officers or a Peace and Development Advisor (PDA) who engages in regular political analysis at the strategic level; 3) a PBF Secretariat that administers the PBF projects and ensures reporting requirements are followed; and 4) technical project design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) capacity to support RUNOs or NUNOs who do not already have this capacity. During the period under review in this portfolio evaluation, these four characteristics were either not present at all or were not present at the same time. Even though there was both a UN Special Envoy and an RC, these two offices did not coordinate with each other or ensure that the UN's political strategy and programmatic capacity were well-integrated. Even though there was a PDA for a period, this position replaced the PBF Coordinator. At no point in time was there a PDA and a PBF Coordinator at the same time. There was also a high turnover of RCs over this period, with four different people occupying this post, and two periods that were occupied by interim RCs. This high turnover in UN leadership inhibited the maintenance of relationships between the UN and key actors in the Burundian Government and civil society and undermined an integrated and coherent UN strategy. As multiple interviewees commented, Burundi was well-known as a difficult context in which to work, making it difficult to find personnel who could and would occupy key posts.

xviii. **A fifth lesson lost is that short-term, catalytic funding is only appropriate in contexts where there is something to catalyze.** In other words, in the absence of other donors who are interested in funding peacebuilding, PBF-funded projects are unlikely to catalyze additional funding. In the absence of a broader peacebuilding strategy that key domestic stakeholders support, PBF-funded projects are unlikely to catalyze momentum in the country's war-to-peace transition. In the first tranche of PBF support to Burundi, the PBF Secretariat and the office of the ERSG spent a great deal of time networking with and coordinating the broader donor community and ensured that donors

¹⁵ Jason Beaubien, "Why Burundi Is Kicking Out Aid Groups," National Public Radio, January 23, 2019, [<https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2019/01/23/687400070/why-burundi-is-kicking-out-aid-groups>].

"Burundi: UN experts raise alarm at growing repression of NGOs and human rights defenders," Geneva: United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 6 Feb 2017, [<https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21145&LangID=E>]; Stef Vandeginste, "Ethnic Quotas and Foreign NGOs in Burundi: Shrinking Civic Space Framed as Affirmative Action," *Africa Spectrum* 54.3 (2019): 181-200.

were actively engaged in the JSC and the sector-specific technical working groups. Furthermore, most of the PBF projects were grounded in a strong political analysis and strategy that was co-developed between the Burundian Government and the UN. For the first tranche, the PBF funding was, thus, inserted within a broader peacebuilding strategy and funding environment that enabled the PBF projects to catalyze additional funding and create momentum in Burundi's post-conflict transition.

xix. Catalytic outcomes require: 1) coordination with donors, government, and civil society organizations that can support follow-on peacebuilding initiatives; 2) a broader political strategy in which the PBF's short-term projects can be situated; and 3) a country environment with the political and civil space necessary for peacebuilding to occur. During the period under review in this portfolio evaluation (2014-2020), none of these factors were present, leading to numerous complaints from RUNOs, NUNOs, and beneficiaries that the PBF projects functioned more like short-term humanitarian projects than strategic peacebuilding projects. Interviewees felt that without follow-on funding or activities that build on the successes of PBF projects, their impact was likely to dissipate quickly. As indicated in the second portfolio evaluation (2011-2013), a peace dividend can easily become a peace disappointment if there are no efforts to build on its successes.¹⁶

PBF engagement with post-conflict vs. closing democratic contexts

xx. The three phases of PBF support to Burundi coincided with three different phases in the Burundian Government's state consolidation process. The first phase coincided with the immediate aftermath of Burundi's first post-conflict elections when the government, UN, civil society, and donors were all engaged in implementing the reforms outlined in Burundi's peace agreements. Although, even in this stage the CNDD questioned particular provisions of the Arusha Agreement and argued that they were consolidating, not building, peace and the FNL rebel group remained militarily active.¹⁷ The second phase coincided with closing democratic space in Burundi that was marked by the withdrawal of the majority of the opposition parties from the 2010 elections, "alleging massive fraud and irregularities," and "opposition and civil society activists" warnings "about diminishing political space," "frequent prohibition or interruption of opposition party meetings" and new laws affecting "the status of the opposition, the media and civil society."¹⁸ The third PBF phase of support to Burundi coincided with rapidly closing political space "through repression" and "tense" government "relations with key bilateral partners."¹⁹ The fact that the PBF supported Burundi in both

¹⁶ Susanna P. Campbell, Tracy Dexter, Michael Findley, Stephanie Hofmann, Josiah Marineau, and Daniel Walker, "Independent External Evaluation: UN Peacebuilding Fund Project Portfolio in Burundi." New York: UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), February 1, 2014[<https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/293211?ln=en>].

¹⁷ "First report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi," S/2007/287, New York: United Nations Security Council, May 17, 2007; "Second report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi," S/2007/682, New York: United Nations Security Council, November 23, 2007; "Third report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi," S/2008/330, New York: United Nations Security Council, May 15, 2008; "Fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi," S/2008/745, New York: United Nations Security Council, November 28, 2008; "Fifth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi," S/2009/270, New York: United Nations Security Council, May 22, 2009; "Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi," S/2009/611, New York: United Nations Security Council, November 30, 2009; International Crisis Group, "Elections in Burundi: A Radical Shake-up of the Political Landscape," Africa Briefing 31, August 25, 2005.

¹⁸ "Seventh report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi," S/2010/608, New York: United Nations Security Council, November 30, 2010, para 7; "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi," S/2011/751, New York: United Nations Security Council, November 30, 2011; "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi," S/2013/36, New York: United Nations Security Council, January 18, 2013; "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi," S/2014/36, New York: United Nations Security Council, January 20, 2014, para. 59; "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi," S/2014/550, New York: United Nations Security Council, July 31, 2014; International Crisis Group, "Burundi: From Electoral Boycott to Political Impasse," Africa Report 169, February 7, 2011; International Crisis Group, "Burundi: Bye-bye Arusha?" Africa Report 192, October 25, 2012.

¹⁹ "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi," S/2015/36, New York: United Nations Security Council, January 19, 2015; "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi," S/2015/510, New York: United Nations Security Council, July 7, 2015; "Report of the Secretary-General on Burundi," S/2017/165, New York: United Nations Security Council, February 27, 2017; "Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Burundi," S/2018/89, New York: United Nations Security Council, January 25, 2018; "The situation in Burundi:

a post-conflict context and a context of closing democratic space allows us to draw important lessons about the effectiveness of the PBF's approach in each context, which we outline below.

xxi. **First, government ownership of PBF projects is a condition for PBF support to a host country.** The government's approval is required for PBF projects to proceed, except in those unique cases where projects are approved only by the UN Secretariat. A crucial innovation of the PBF is the JSC, which is co-chaired by the UN and the Government and includes members of the donor community and civil society. During the first phase of PBF support to Burundi, the JSC, and accompanying Technical Follow-up Groups, provided a unique space for the UN, donors, and civil society groups to discuss Burundi's peace and security context. There was no other equivalent forum where these different stakeholders were able to discuss peace and security issues. Furthermore, during the first phase of PBF support to Burundi, many of the PBF projects were co-directed by the Burundian Government and the UN, enabling government buy-in to the policy, strategy, and operationalization of the PBF projects and contributing to the effectiveness and catalytic nature of these projects. **The PBF's dual aims of sustaining inclusive peace and supporting government ownership seem to be most achievable in post-conflict and other contexts of opening political space where the host government and the UN can collaborate on the design, oversight, and implementation of PBF projects.**

xxii. Government ownership was significantly more difficult to achieve and navigate during the second and third phases of PBF support to Burundi. During the second phase, the PBF projects largely focused on the community level. The central government had little direct engagement in their design and implementation, although it did follow their implementation through regular reports to the JSC. The UN and international donors did not prioritize peacebuilding and, instead, focused on supporting the Burundian Government's development policy.²⁰ This may have been the period in which conflict prevention activities could have been most appropriate, but the UN lacked the necessary government consent for these initiatives. Furthermore, the UN did not have country-level leadership that was willing and able to engage in this type of highly-political conflict prevention work, in spite of several attempts by the UN at high-level dialogue.²¹ Conflict prevention that seeks to influence the behavior of the government (rather than just non-state actors) requires challenging the existing policies and approaches of the government, which the UN was unable or unwilling to do during this period.

xxiii. The effectiveness of the PBF in different political contexts is, of course, shaped by the incentive structure of the UNCT and RC. The RC and UNCT are incentivized to maintain strong relationships with the host government, which is responsible not only for approving PBF projects, if there are any, but also for approving their country programs and collaborating on the majority of their activities within the country. Furthermore, if it wishes to do so, the host government can request that the RC or any member of the UNCT stop working on its territory. From this perspective, there are few incentives for the UNCT or RC to directly challenge the policies of the host government. This is in contrast, of course, to the OHCHR or a political or peacekeeping mission, which are mandated explicitly to advance political, security, and human rights priorities within the host country, in line with the human rights treaties signed by the host government and mandates of the UN Security

Report of the Secretary-General," S/2018/1028, New York: United Nations Security Council, November 15, 2018; "The situation in Burundi: Report of the Secretary-General," S/2019/837, New York: United Nations Security Council, October 24, 2019.

²⁰ Ivy Mungcal, "Burundi donors' conference ends on a high note," DEVEX, October 31, 2012, [<https://www.devex.com/news/burundi-donors-conference-ends-on-a-high-note-79608>]

²¹ "Letter dated 27 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council," S/2017/174, New York: United Nations Security Council, March 2, 2017.

Council. The implication is that the UNCT and RC are unlikely to have the incentive to support or implement potentially controversial peacebuilding activities in contexts with closing democratic space, such as during the second and third phases of PBF support to Burundi.

xxiv. During the third phase of PBF support to Burundi, the JSC met infrequently and the government only cooperated in the implementation of projects that had specific socio-economic benefits for the population, such as the women’s community-level mediation program and youth-focused projects.²² Our interviewees reported that Burundian Government officials expressed support for the PBF when it delivered direct livelihood benefits to the population in line with the Government’s National Development Plan, and were less concerned with the PBF’s contributions to community-level reconciliation or resilience. Nonetheless, the main argument for PBF support and engagement to Burundi during this period was, as articulated above, that it enabled and supported higher-level political conversations that may not have otherwise taken place. In other words, the PBF enabled some dialogue and discussion about inclusive politics, political violence, civil society, and media in a context where the democratic space was narrowing, particularly in the 2015 pre-electoral period. While this is a valid theory of change for PBF engagement, it does not align with the PBF’s broader commitment to governmental ownership in the design of the PBF, or even the PBF’s focus on supporting projects that catalyze additional follow-on funding or spur peaceful change.²³ If the PBF wants to continue to engage in contexts of narrowing democratic space, then it needs to reexamine whether its leadership and oversight mechanisms support peacebuilding in these contexts; otherwise, it is likely to support projects that may purport to build peace but lack the political and civic space to do so.

xxv. **Second, in contexts of closing democratic space, there is a tendency of many OECD donors and the UN to fund international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and national non-governmental organizations (NNGOs) to carry out peacebuilding projects on which the government is not willing or able to directly cooperate.** In Burundi, the UN’s and OECD donors’ reliance on INGOs and NNGOs has led the Burundian Government to place significant restrictions on INGO and NNGOs, attempting to control the types of activities they implement, who benefits from these activities, and who these organizations hire.²⁴ In Burundi, this has led many international and national NGOs to leave the country and a degree of politicization of the existing NGO sector.²⁵ If the PBF wants to support truly independent INGOs and NNGOs in contexts of closing democratic space, it should consider whether it is capable of protecting them from threats, intimidation, and potential cooptation by the government.²⁶ If the PBF is not able to provide

²² The Burundian Government has prioritized donor engagement that directly supported “national efforts in the implementation of the National Development Plan.” Republic of Burundi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation, “Participation of H.E The President of the Republic in the 75th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” 29 September 2020, [<https://www.mae.gov.bi/en/2020/10/23/participation-of-h-e-the-president-of-the-republic-in-the-75th-session-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly/>].

²³ “Catalytic programming does not transform a conflict root cause or defuse a trigger; instead it sets up the conditions for the root-cause to be transformed or the trigger resolved. These intermediate conditions (or enabling factors) still represent changes in the context, but they are not the ultimate peacebuilding changes desired. Therefore, like yeast and salt, enabling factors (conditions) should not be viewed in isolation of the larger or longer-term effect desired.” Scharbatke-Church, Cheyanne, Susanna Campbell, Julia Doehrn, Philip Thomas, and Peter Woodrow. *Catalytic Programming and the Peacebuilding Fund*. (PeaceNexus Foundation, 2010) 9.

²⁴ “Burundi: UN experts raise alarm at growing repression of NGOs and human rights defenders,” Geneva: United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 6 Feb 2017, [<https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21145&LangID=E>]; Stef Vandeginste, “Ethnic Quotas and Foreign NGOs in Burundi: Shrinking Civic Space Framed as Affirmative Action,” *Africa Spectrum* 54.3 (2019): 181-200.

²⁵ Jason Beaubien, “Why Burundi Is Kicking Out Aid Groups,” National Public Radio, January 23, 2019, [<https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2019/01/23/687400070/why-burundi-is-kicking-out-aid-groups>].

²⁶ Reuters Staff, “Burundi suspends some NGOs for violating new law,” *Reuters*, September 28, 2018, [<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-rights/burundi-suspends-some-ngos-for-violating-new-law-idUSKCN1M81A1>]; US Department of State, “2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Burundi,” Washington, DC: US Department of State, [<https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/burundi/>].

this support, then it should not expect INGOs or NNGOs to implement high-risk peacebuilding projects that the UN is unwilling or unable to undertake itself. Recent history in Burundi has shown that the UNCT and RC are likely to lack the capacity and incentives to offer this type of protection.

xxvi. **Third, project-focused short-term funding may be best suited for post-conflict contexts when there is political and civic space, and related donor engagement, on which to capitalize. More flexible funding to support ongoing political processes is likely to be needed in contexts of closing democratic space.** In contexts of closing democratic space, short-term project-focused funding that requires high-levels of government support is likely to be ill-suited to support conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives. These contexts require alternative funding models. One alternative funding model focuses on flexible, longer-term funding for uncertain political processes. Conflict prevention efforts may seek to support unpredictable high-level negotiation processes. Like the EAC dialogue process funded by the PBF after the 2015 attempted coup d'état, these processes do not align with standard logical frameworks or project proposal templates. A more flexible and longer-term financing modality may be better suited to support these unpredictable and highly sensitive political processes. Another alternative funding model focuses on repeated core and programmatic investment in domestic organizations with strong peacebuilding capacity. In contexts of closing democratic space, projects like the youth social cohesion and women's mediation projects that aim to address the root causes of conflict are likely to benefit from longer-term and sustained engagement that enables the recipient communities to build and sustain social cohesion and conflict resolution capacities, particularly within a broader political context that may seek to undermine these efforts. Furthermore, as mentioned above, if the PBF aims to support INGO and NNGO peacebuilding efforts in these contexts, then the PBF should consider how it can provide sustained engagement, including funding for core costs, and protection for these organizations.

Recommendations

xxvii. The summary of the lessons learned and lost from Burundi sought to synthesize the main points that the PBF and PBSO should learn from its years of support to Burundi. In addition to applying the lessons above, we have three overarching recommendations, outlined below.

xxviii. Recommendation 1: **The PBF and its management, support, and oversight mechanisms were designed primarily for post-conflict contexts where the host government and broader donor community are committed to peacebuilding** (Quadrant 1 in Typology below). In contexts of closing democratic space and increasing human rights violations, the PBF's current short-term project focus that requires high-levels of host-government involvement is not fit for purpose. These contexts of closing democratic space are likely to require longer-term engagement with more flexible funding arrangements for the reasons that we outline above. These considerations lead to a descriptive typology depicted in Figure 1.

xxix. The PBF currently argues that it can support innovative and catalytic peacebuilding initiatives in all types of contexts, including those represented by Quadrant 1 (High levels of host government commitment to peacebuilding reforms + High levels of civil society strength); Quadrant 2 (Low levels of host government commitment to peacebuilding reforms + High levels of civil society strength); Quadrant 3 (High levels of host government commitment to peacebuilding reforms + Low levels of civil society strength); and Quadrant 4 (Low levels of host government commitment to peacebuilding reforms + Low levels of civil society strength). The case of PBF support to Burundi between 2007 and 2020 demonstrates that only contexts that have the characteristics of Quadrant 1 (High levels of

host government commitment to peacebuilding reforms + High levels of civil society strength) are likely to provide an environment where the PBF can effectively support short-term, innovative, and catalytic peacebuilding projects. Quadrants 2 and 3 are likely to require a more strategic approach and longer-term funding, while it is unclear if there is space for PBF project-focused engagement in Quadrant 4, which is likely to require higher-level, flexible funding for inclusive political processes rather than short-term PBF projects as well as broader, higher-level political support of the PBC.

Figure 1: Typology of Country Contexts and ideal PBF support to different contexts

		Host Government Commitment to Peacebuilding Reforms	
		High	Low
Strength of Civil Society	High	1 PBF to support innovative and catalytic peacebuilding initiatives	2 PBF to focus on strengthening and protecting civil society; advocating with government to open political space
	Low	3 PBF to support civil society's peacebuilding capacity in collaboration with government	4 Space only for flexible support for political processes, not short-term, inflexible PBF project support

xxx. For contexts such as those represented by Quadrant 2 and 3, the PBSO should focus on strengthening the core capacity of civil society organizations and NNGOs by providing funding for core budget expenses and longer-term funding for peacebuilding activities. In addition, in Quadrant 2, the UN Secretariat should support efforts aimed at engaging the host government and advocating for more open political space. If peacebuilding funding is scarce, which is likely to be the case in all contexts but immediate post-conflict environments, the PBSO cannot rely on the RC, RUNOs, or UN member states to provide the necessary catalytic funding to support follow-on peacebuilding initiatives. The PBF should provide supplementary and longer-term funding itself as part of a sustained strategy to support peacebuilding capacities. Our evaluation of Burundi also demonstrates that in contexts that resemble Quadrant 4 (Low levels of host government commitment to peacebuilding reforms + Low levels of civil society strength), the PBF will be unable to achieve its dual aims of national ownership and political inclusion and, thus, is unlikely to benefit from prioritizing project-support to these contexts. Instead, these contexts are likely to require higher-level political support from the UN Secretariat and associated flexible funding to support ongoing political dialogue. The PBSO should develop a different funding and disbursement strategy for each of the four contexts outlined in Figure 1.

xxxi. Recommendation 2: **The PBSO needs to ensure that the RUNOs, NUNOs, RC (and his/her office), and the PBF Secretariat are equipped** with the programmatic capacity, political analysis, and monitoring and evaluation capacity necessary to support the design and implementation of high-quality peacebuilding activities. The existence of these capacities cannot be taken for granted. At the moment, these capacities are not assessed as part of the criteria for their qualification as a

RUNO, NUNO, or RC operating in a PBF recipient country. The PBSO needs to ensure that the RC's Office, the PBF Secretariat, and RUNOs have the capacity necessary to support and implement high-quality peacebuilding activities. NUNOs are subject to more stringent approval and selection criteria but their peacebuilding programmatic capacity should also be addressed in these assessments.

xxxvii. Recommendation 3: Given that strong peacebuilding capacity often resides within national or international NGOs, rather than RUNOs, it is a positive development that the PBF is directly funding NGOs through the Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative (GYPI) and indirectly funding them as implementing partners of RUNOs. **Support for NGOs, however, raises three broader issues that the PBF should address.**

- First, greater transparency and communication is needed around PBF calls for proposals, indicating clearly who can apply and what types of partnerships are necessary for the application. Furthermore, if the PBF seeks to ensure that it reaches a broad range of national and international NGOs, it should broaden its outreach efforts beyond the usual NGOs that already have strong ties to the UN.
- Second, INGOs and NNGOs, because they are subject to domestic laws, are more vulnerable to threats, attacks, and manipulation by the host government. In cases where the PBF chooses to directly or indirectly support INGOs and NNGOs, it should ensure that it also protects and supports these organizations, including through longer-term engagement.
- Third, the PBF's GYPI approach is not linked to an overall peacebuilding strategy for the host country. This may lead the PBF to fund NGO peacebuilding initiatives, but it may not lead the PBF to fund the right and most strategic NGO peacebuilding initiatives that align with the UN's broader strategic approach. The PBSO should consider how GYPI calls for proposals align with its overall strategic priorities in the host country and reinforce the broader coherence and aggregate effect of PBF support to this country.

xxxviii. In addition to the recommendations outlined above, the majority of people whom we interviewed asked about the future support that the PBF would provide to Burundi. While we are not in a position to recommend specific types of activities, we **outline two potential visions of continued PBF support to Burundi.**

xxxix. One vision for the potential added value of the PBF in Burundi was that it could capitalize on the recent thawing of relations between European donors and the Burundian Government and focus on support for conflict prevention activities in Burundi. As with the 2014 to 2020 PBF support to Burundi, the most important effect of the PBF may not be the individual projects implemented, but rather the broader environment that the JSC and the PBC create for dialogue among the UN, the Burundian Government, other bilateral cooperation partners (including the Chinese), and civil society organizations (depending on the political context). There was widespread agreement among interviewees that this type of constructive dialogue and consultation was badly needed and that the PBF and JSC may be well suited to provide it, particularly under the leadership of a new RC. There was less clarity among interviewees regarding which projects the PBF should support, although more dialogue initiatives at the national level and support for mechanisms that address land conflicts would be obvious choices.

xxxv. Another vision emerged: if the Burundian Government does not want the PBF to engage in peacebuilding in its country, then the PBF should not engage in peacebuilding there. In this case, Burundi resembles Quadrant 4 in Figure 1, above. If the PBF seeks to support peacebuilding efforts that are disconnected from the national-level political process, such as the women's and youth projects it supported during the phase under review, then it may give the impression that peacebuilding and political openness are occurring when they are not. Furthermore, the PBF requires a high level of national ownership, which, in contexts that resemble Quadrant 4, is at odds with the PBF's goal of supporting political inclusion.

1. INTRODUCTION

1. The Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) is the United Nations' "financial instrument of first resort to sustain peace in countries or situations at risk or affected by violent conflict."²⁷ This independent portfolio evaluation, conducted between January and August 2021, assesses the third Peacebuilding Priority Plan (2014-2018) and the period immediately after its expiration (2018-2020). In addition, it compares this third phase of PBF support to the prior two phases of support (2007-2010 and 2011-2013), deriving broader lessons learned from the PBF's long engagement with Burundi. Specifically, the purpose of this portfolio evaluation is to assess: 1) the extent to which the PBF's support from 2014 to 2020 achieved real and sustained positive results in consolidating peace in Burundi, either through direct action or through catalytic effects; 2) the timing of PBF's support and strategic decision-making during the third Peacebuilding Priority Plan (PPP) (2014-2018) and its subsequent extensions; 3) the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and catalytic nature of the third PPP and the PBF's subsequent engagement; and 4) the extent to which the lessons from the first and second portfolio evaluations were integrated into the third phase of PBF support and served to improve its effectiveness, efficiency, and catalytic effects.²⁸

2. In the paragraphs below, we begin by briefly synthesizing the PBF's involvement in Burundi. We then discuss our evaluation criteria, research design, and methodology and the challenges of conducting the evaluation during the COVID-19 pandemic. We close by providing a roadmap for the rest of the report.

1.1 Synthesis of PBF's involvement in Burundi

3. Burundi is a particularly important case for the PBF. It was one of the first two recipients of PBF support and is the second-largest recipient, with a total approved budget of \$86,171,480 between 2006 and 2021.²⁹ The Burundian Government requested that Burundi be placed on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in 2006, and it has since remained on the PBC's agenda. The UN subsequently declared the country eligible to receive support from the PBF. The financial envelope provided by the PBF to Burundi was \$35 million from 2007 to 2010; \$9.2 million from 2011 to 2013; and \$15.8 million from 2014 to 2018. In 2018, the PBF entered a fourth phase of engagement with a funding envelope of \$11.8 million. In 2019, one additional project was approved under the Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative (GYPI) appeal for \$1.5 million. The PBF also provided support for urgent projects using the Immediate Response Facility (IRF).

4. The primary scope of this evaluation is the third Peacebuilding Priority Plan (PPP), which encompasses a portfolio of 21 projects spanning three main priorities: 1) Democratic exercise of human rights; 2) Youth participation in political, social, and reconciliation initiatives; and 3) National dialogue and social cohesion (see Figure 2). The three main priorities are further broken down into project sectors as illustrated in Figure 2. The average project duration is two years, and the median budget is US\$ 1.37 million. Projects are distributed across sectors as follows: Youth (10), Human Rights (4), Women (4), Coordination (1), Dialogue and Cross-border (1 each) (see Appendix C).

²⁷ United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, *The Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund 2020-2024 Strategy*. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3zh2W17> (Last accessed on June 10, 2021).

²⁸ See Appendix A for the Terms of Reference.

²⁹ Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, *The Peacebuilding Fund: Fact Sheet*, [<http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/PB000>].

Figure 2: Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2014 - 2017



1.2 Evaluation Criteria, Research Design, and Methodology

5. A team of five researchers and three research associates conducted this portfolio evaluation between January and August 2021. Unlike project-level evaluations, this portfolio evaluation was not mandated to evaluate individual projects, but rather to provide an assessment of the portfolio as a whole. As noted in previous PBF portfolio evaluations, the primary difference between peacebuilding evaluations and other types of evaluations is that peacebuilding evaluations do not *only* assess whether or not the project or program achieved its stated aims, objectives, and indicators.³⁰ Peacebuilding evaluations also assess the relevance of these aims to the potential drivers of conflict and peace, both during the project design and implementation phases. Below, we briefly discuss the evaluation criteria that we employed in this portfolio evaluation, the constraints facing this type of evaluation during a global pandemic, and the research design and methodology that we employed.

1.2.1 Evaluation Criteria and Constraints

6. This evaluation assessed the PBF portfolio in Burundi from 2014 to 2020. The evaluation team analyzed the potential contribution of the 21 PBF projects, and the broader PBF management and oversight infrastructure, to the PBF's implicit or explicit sectoral-level theories of change and the broader dynamics of peace consolidation in Burundi over this time period (see Appendix E). The evaluation team used the following criteria: Relevance, Effectiveness and Catalytic Effects, Coherence, National Ownership, Gender and Conflict Sensitivity, and Management and Oversight (including risk management).³¹ In Appendix B, we provide a clear definition of each of these

³⁰ See Susanna P. Campbell, Leonard Kayobera, and Justine Nkurunziza, "Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi," New York: United Nations, March 2010, [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CABFEA3AB9A416D34925779C000EAE96-Full_Report.pdf]; Susanna P. Campbell, Tracy Dexter, Michael Findley, Stephanie Hofmann, Josiah Marineau, and Daniel Walker, "Independent External Evaluation: UN Peacebuilding Fund Project Portfolio in Burundi." New York: UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), February 1, 2014 [<https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/293211?ln=en>].

³¹ See Appendix A for the Terms of Reference.

evaluation criteria. While gathering data on this range of factors is a challenge for all portfolio evaluations—which aim to examine the aggregate and catalytic effects of such a wide range of projects implemented over different time periods and geographic locations—a portfolio evaluation of the PBF in Burundi at this point in time is particularly challenging for three reasons.

7. First, because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the capacity of the evaluation team to gather primary data was greatly limited. The three international evaluators were not able to travel to Burundi to do the research. Additionally, the travel and accessibility of the two Burundian evaluators, each of whom was hired for only three weeks of fieldwork, were limited because of health and safety concerns related to the ongoing pandemic. For comparison, the prior two portfolio evaluations were based on over a month of fieldwork by larger teams, each member of which was able to travel to Burundi.

8. Second, the political, security, and institutional context in Burundi is much less conducive to open and transparent data collection about peacebuilding projects and conflict dynamics than it was during the prior two portfolio evaluations. The scope and scale of the UN presence in Burundi has greatly declined over the past seven years, transitioning from a large integrated UN mission to a small UN Country Team with a small PBF Secretariat and the departure of the Office of the UN Special Envoy to Burundi on May 31, 2021. As a result, we observed a decline in both the capacity of UN staff to engage with and support the evaluators. Furthermore, the political and security context in Burundi has become increasingly restrictive and uncertain since 2014, reducing the pool of interlocutors available to discuss peace and conflict dynamics and the political and civic space for peacebuilding interventions. Both of these factors limited the evaluation team's ability to collect accurate data about the PBF interventions and their contribution to evolving dynamics in Burundi.

9. Third, the evaluation was hindered by delays resulting from UNDP Burundi procurement delays and miscommunication. Once the evaluation team was hired, UNDP Burundi delayed the payment of two of the evaluators for over five weeks after the payment requests were submitted. This required the consultants to finance the fieldwork with their own funds, including establishing contracts for transportation and lodging. Again, while waiting for the reimbursement, the evaluation team received numerous contradictory and erroneous messages from UNDP Burundi, which required repeated interventions from UNHQ in New York to ensure that the evaluators were paid. The management of these delays also required a high degree of problem-solving from the entire evaluation team, further increasing the evaluation team's workload. These delays jeopardized the data collection for this evaluation and the good will of the evaluators, both of which were essential to the success of the evaluation. If this is an indication of the type of bureaucratic delays that Recipient United Nations Organizations (RUNOs) and Non-UN Organizations (NUNOs) have had to manage, as multiple interviewees mentioned, then the administration of UNDP Burundi was not only an impediment to the success of this evaluation but is likely also to have been an impediment to the efficiency and effectiveness of PBF support to Burundi. This was an issue raised frequently during the first two portfolio evaluations and seems to have remained a significant impediment during this third period of PBF support to Burundi.

1.2.2 Research Design and Methodology

10. The evaluation employed, to the greatest extent possible, a participatory approach whereby discussions with and surveys of key stakeholders provide and verify the substance of the findings. It builds on the findings and lessons from the first and second portfolio evaluations, also led by Dr. Campbell, exploring how the PBF adapted to changes in the Burundian context and learned lessons

from one phase to the next. The evaluation relies on a multi-method approach to maximize the validity and reliability of research findings. The overall findings are based on the integration of content analysis of official United Nations documents and other gray literature from partners, a survey experiment, and semi-structured interviews conducted virtually and in person.³²

11. The evaluation team implemented this data collection approach between May 4, 2021 and June 21, 2021. Primary data for the evaluation included semi-structured interviews and a survey. When preparing the evaluation exercise, the evaluation team considered in detail the security, health, and logistical restrictions that may affect their efforts to collect data, and how to mitigate these ethical risks. Given the global travel restrictions resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, many of the in-country and international interviews were conducted remotely.

12. The research team conducted interviews with a broad range of stakeholders using a purposive sampling strategy to select participants who fall within these five categories of respondents: 1) advisory group members; 2) management; 3) personnel; 4) partners (key partners in design and implementation) and 5) observers (people who witnessed the PBF projects but did not participate directly in their design, implementation, or evaluation). The semi-structured interview protocol for UN staff, in French and English, is included in Appendix H. The questions were adapted for various groups in order to assess the relevance, effectiveness, national ownership, coherence, evolution, and processes of the PBF portfolio in Burundi.

13. To ensure the security and confidentiality of the data, the evaluation team anonymized all interview notes and transcripts, stored them in an encrypted folder, and entered them into Nvivo (a qualitative data analysis computer software package) for analysis. The evaluation team analyzed key patterns across stakeholders to identify emergent themes. The evaluation team also fielded a survey to assess perceptions of the PBF more broadly. In total, the evaluation team interviewed more than 200 people, which represent the following division among the purposive sampling categories listed below. All of these interviews were conducted on a confidential basis, per American University's Institutional Review Board (IRB) conditions permitting us to conduct this research (See Appendix K). As such, when discussing the interview data in this report, we refer generally to feedback from interviewees but do not identify specific interviewees or their organization, position, or location.³³

1. HQ/Advisory Group (16 interviewed; 30 contacted)
2. Implementing Partners (24 interviewed; 31 contacted)
3. Management (23 interviewed; 25 contacted)
4. Project Personnel (23 interviewed; 41 contacted)
5. External Observers (7 interviewed; 12 contacted)
6. Beneficiaries (105 interviewed)
7. Other individuals recommended (10 interviewed; 15 contacted)

14. To identify the geographic scope of the various PBF projects, the evaluation team summarized where all the PBF projects were implemented. Table 1 shows the distribution of the PBF projects by commune and province. In Appendix G, we provide two additional tables providing details on where each of the projects occurred. We provide this information at both the province and commune level (see Location Tables in Appendix G).

³² Appendix D synthesizes the results for each project contained in UN reports and project-level external evaluations.

³³ Susanna P. Campbell, "Ethics of research in conflict environments," *Journal of Global Security Studies* 2.1 (2017): 89-101.

15. We found that four provinces had the highest density of PBF projects: Bujumbura Mairie (11 projects), Bujumbura Rural (12), Makamba (11), and Kirundo (12). At the commune level, three different projects were implemented in Kayogoro commune in Makamba province. Nine other communes (see Table 1 below) also had a high density of projects, with two projects per commune. Figure 3 provides a map of Burundi’s provinces and communes with the locations of PBF projects circled in red.

Table 1: PBF Projects by Commune and Province

Commune	Province	Number of PBF projects
Busoni	Kirundo	2
Gihanda	Bubanza	2
Gisuru	Ruyigi	2
Isare	Bujumbura Rural	2
Kayogoro	Makamba	3
Kirundo	Kirundo	2
Mabanda	Makamba	2
Mukike	Bujumbura Rural	2
Mutimbuzi	Bujumbura Rural	2
Ntega	Kirundo	2

16. With the exception of Gihanga and Gisuru communes, the other high-density communes are located in the high-density provinces identified in the previous paragraph: three in Bujumbura Rural Province, three in Kirundo province, and two in Makamba province (see Appendix G). In addition to conducting virtual interviews with a range of in-country and international respondents, our purposive sampling strategy aimed to ensure the maximum possible coverage of respondents with experience with the PBF projects in these high-density communes.

1.3 Structure of the Evaluation Report

17. The remainder of the report proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the evolving Burundian context and the PBF and donor response to this context. Specifically, we highlight the evolving peace and security landscape following the 2015 crisis, the international and regional responses to the crisis, and its implications for the PBF work in Burundi. In Section 3, we provide our assessment of the PBF support to Burundi between 2014 and 2020 in line with each of our evaluation criteria. In Section 4, we discuss the lessons learned and lessons lost during the full period of PBF support to Burundi (2007-2021) and outline related recommendations for the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO).

Figure 3: Map of PBF Project Locations in Burundi



2 BURUNDI AND PBF CONTEXT

2.1 The evolution of the peace and security context international response³⁴

18. During the period under review, Burundi experienced several significant shifts in the political and security context to which the PBF sought to respond and influence. These shifts included the 2015 protests and failed coup, the 2018 referendum, the 2020 elections, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the untimely passing of President Pierre Nkurunziza. These political, security, and health events led to increased population displacement, human rights violations, expulsion of and crackdown on national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the broad closure of civic space, economic downturns, and the election of a new president and shuffling of key ministerial posts. This was a period of rapid and frequent changes in Burundi's peacebuilding landscape that put pressure on Burundi's diplomatic relations, financing mechanisms, and institutional capacity.

19. Burundi gained its independence from Belgium in 1962. Already rocked by the assassination of newly elected Prime Minister Louis Rwagasore a few months earlier, Burundi was soon faced with instability due to increasingly exclusionary politics. A series of military coups (July and November 1966, 1976, 1987) and episodes of ethnic violence have repeatedly impeded economic growth and increased poverty levels. For example, during the 1972 rebellion, between 200 and 300,000 Hutus were killed, 150,000 fled the country, and the country's GDP shrank by 6.4%.³⁵ In 1987, during the first coup by former President Buyoya, 20,000 Burundians were killed and over 60,000 fled to Rwanda. In 1993, the first Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, was assassinated, leading to the massacre of 100,000 Burundians and the flight of 500,000 Burundians outside of the country. The civil war that started that same year led to over 300,000 deaths and over a million displaced. Following on the signature of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in 2000, the war officially ended with the election of Burundi's first post-conflict president, Pierre Nkurunziza, five years later, even though

³⁴ The analysis in this section draws on a wide range of official documents and research reports, including the Reports of the UN Secretary-General on Burundi; reports from independent analysts, such as the International Crisis Group and the Institute for Security Studies; research reports from academic journals; reports from the World Bank and the African Union; reports from the Burundian Government; Burundian, African, and International news media; and the two prior independent external evaluations of the PBF support to Burundi. See specific citations throughout this analysis as well as the reports cited here. "First report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi," S/2007/287, New York: United Nations Security Council, May 17, 2007; "Second report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi," S/2007/682, New York: United Nations Security Council, November 23, 2007; "Third report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi," S/2008/330, New York: United Nations Security Council, May 15, 2008; "Fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi," S/2008/745, New York: United Nations Security Council, November 28, 2008; "Fifth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi," S/2009/270, New York: United Nations Security Council, May 22, 2009; "Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi," S/2009/611, New York: United Nations Security Council, November 30, 2009; International Crisis Group, "Elections in Burundi: A Radical Shake-up of the Political Landscape," Africa Briefing 31, August 25, 2005; "Seventh report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi," S/2010/608, New York: United Nations Security Council, November 30, 2010, para 7; "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi," S/2011/751, New York: United Nations Security Council, November 30, 2011; "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi," S/2013/36, New York: United Nations Security Council, January 18, 2013; "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi," S/2014/36, New York: United Nations Security Council, January 20, 2014, para. 59; "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi," S/2014/550, New York: United Nations Security Council, July 31, 2014; International Crisis Group, "Burundi: From Electoral Boycott to Political Impasse," Africa Report 169, February 7, 2011; International Crisis Group, "Burundi: Bye-bye Arusha?" Africa Report 192, October 25, 2012; "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi," S/2015/36, New York: United Nations Security Council, January 19, 2015; "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi," S/2015/510, New York: United Nations Security Council, July 7, 2015; "Report of the Secretary-General on Burundi," S/2017/165, New York: United Nations Security Council, February 27, 2017; "Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Burundi," S/2018/89, New York: United Nations Security Council, January 25, 2018; "The situation in Burundi: Report of the Secretary-General," S/2018/1028, New York: United Nations Security Council, November 15, 2018; "The situation in Burundi: Report of the Secretary-General," S/2019/837, New York: United Nations Security Council, October 24, 2019.

³⁵ René Lemarchand (2002), "Le Genocide de 1972 au Burundi," *Cahier d'Études Africaines*, 167:551-568 [<http://etudesafriques.revues.org/document156.html>]; Janvier Nkurunziza (2017), *Growth in Fragile States in Africa: Conflict and Post-conflict Capital Accumulation, Review of Development Economics*, 23(3):1202-1219.

the government continued to fight with the National Liberation Forces (FNL) rebel group until just prior to the 2010 elections.³⁶

20. In 2005, Burundi entered a new era of participatory and inclusive politics: many of the security sector reforms outlined in the Arusha Agreement were implemented and largely effective and Burundians held a constitutional referendum and organized peaceful general elections. This democratic opening, and donors' positive response, helped to create a certain degree of stability and robust economic growth. In spite of this important progress, the period from 2005 to 2010 also presented an emerging pattern of closing political space, human rights violations, and repression of the political opposition, press, and civil society organizations (CSOs).

21. In 2010, Burundi held its next round of elections. While these polls were intended to mark the end of the immediate post-conflict period and the consolidation of democratic governance after decades of war and crisis, the results were contested by the majority of the opposition parties. Following these controversial elections, which had already been tainted by violent confrontations during the electoral campaign, the country experienced two years of instability and violence that was primarily attributed to the National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy's (CNDD-FDD) youth wing (*imbonerakure*), the intelligence services, and the police. Most opposition leaders fled the country, leaving a political vacuum.

22. While the violence had subsided by the end of 2012, paving the way for the return of opposition leaders in 2013 under negotiated security guarantees brokered by the United Nations, there was widespread uncertainty as to whether this stability would remain in the lead-up to the 2015 elections. Indeed, political and legislative developments—the passing of a new and restrictive media law, a controversial new framework for the national land commission (CNTB), the disputed review of the constitution by the ruling party, and the rift between the CNDD-FDD and its government partner, the Union for National Progress (UPRONA)—created a tense political environment.

23. In 2015, President Nkurunziza's decision to run for a widely-disputed third term, and his subsequent re-election in 2015, triggered a widespread political crisis.³⁷ What started as peaceful protests against President Nkurunziza's third term turned to violent confrontations between law enforcement officials, protestors, and armed groups. The failed coup attempt of May 13, 2015 became the real turning point.³⁸ Following the coup attempt, foiled by troops loyal to the president, “political tensions increased” and “the offices and equipment of private radio and television stations RPA, Radio Bonesha FM and Radio Isanganiro [were] destroyed and the stations” stopped broadcasting.³⁹ The

³⁶ “First report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi,” S/2007/287, New York: United Nations Security Council, May 17, 2007; “Second report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi,” S/2007/682, New York: United Nations Security Council, November 23, 2007; “Third report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi,” S/2008/330, New York: United Nations Security Council, May 15, 2008; “Fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi,” S/2008/745, New York: United Nations Security Council, November 28, 2008; “Fifth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi,” S/2009/270, New York: United Nations Security Council, May 22, 2009; “Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi,” S/2009/611, New York: United Nations Security Council, November 30, 2009; International Crisis Group, “Elections in Burundi: A Radical Shake-up of the Political Landscape,” Africa Briefing 31, August 25, 2005; International Crisis Group, “Burundi: To Integrate the FNL Successfully,” Africa Briefing 63, International Crisis Group, July 30, 2009.

³⁷ “The African union reiterates the imperative need for dialogue and consensus for a lasting solution to the crisis in Burundi and announces that it will not observe the elections scheduled for 29 June 2015,” Addis Ababa: African Union, June 28, 2015, [<http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-african-union-reiterates-the-imperative-need-for-dialogue-and-consensus-for-a-lasting-solution-to-the-crisis-in-burundi-and-announces-that-it-will-not-observe-the-elections-scheduled-for-29-june-2015>].


³⁸ Esdras Ndikumana and Aymeric Vincenot, “Burundi protests turn violent as poll delayed,” Mail & Guardian, May 20, 2015, [<https://mg.co.za/article/2015-05-20-burundi-protests-turn-violent-as-poll-delayed/>].

³⁹ “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi,” S/2015/510, New York: United Nations Security Council, July 7, 2015.

political instability and violence that ensued led to large-scale displacement of Burundians, both domestically and in neighboring countries.⁴⁰ The political crisis worsened tensions in a country already afflicted with severe poverty, little access to education, and limited employment opportunities.⁴¹

24. International and regional actors varied in their responses to the crisis.⁴² At the continental level, the African Union (AU) promptly condemned the violence but was not able to decisively deescalate the situation.⁴³ The AU's engagement entailed three types of interventions: mediation efforts, human rights monitoring, and attempts to deploy security forces to maintain the peace in the country. In each area, the AU faced important obstacles that hindered its ability to have a meaningful impact on the crisis. The mediation component consisted in the delegation of the negotiation efforts to the East African Community (EAC) based on the principle of subsidiarity between the AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs). The EAC's mediation efforts were largely paralyzed by its members' different domestic and foreign policy imperatives, which enabled the Burundian Government to ignore these attempts to find a political solution. Indeed, tensions between Rwanda and Tanzania over previous security issues in the Democratic Republic of Congo made cooperation between the two countries difficult. Moreover, President Museveni's own electoral ambitions in Uganda made him unable to negotiate a settlement between the government and the opposition. As such, the Burundian Government capitalized on competition among members of the EAC to maintain the status quo.

Figure 4: Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) in Burundi, 1975-2020.



Notes: This figure shows changes in levels of electoral democracy index (EDI) in Burundi from 1975 to 2020. The EDI ranges from low (0) to high (1). Data are from the *Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)*. The blue line shows the mean EDI per year with 95% confidence intervals. Source: *Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)*

⁴⁰ US Department of State, "Burundi: Displacement Since April 2015," Washington DC: US Department of State Humanitarian Information Unit, January 8, 2016, [https://reliefweb.int/map/burundi/burundi-displacement-april-2015]

⁴¹ Government of Burundi and UN Development Program, *Vision Burundi 2025*, Bujumbura: Ministry of Planning and Communal Development and UNDP in Burundi, June 2011, [https://www.undp.org/content/dam/burundi/docs/publications/UNDP-bi-vision-burundi-2025_complete_EN.pdf].

⁴² Nina Wilén and Paul D. Williams. "The African Union and coercive diplomacy: the case of Burundi." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 56.4 (2018): 673-696.

⁴³ "African Union will not observe elections in Burundi," Al-Jazeera, June 28, 2015, [https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/6/28/african-union-will-not-observe-elections-in-burundi].


25. European and North American countries struggled to maintain their influence in Burundi. In early 2016, the European Union (EU), one of Burundi’s most important development partners, imposed sanctions as a result of unsatisfactory consultations based on Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement. Article 96 calls for a re-evaluation of assistance for the EU and EU member states if partner-states fail to respect essential elements of human rights, democratic principles, and the rule of law. The partial suspension of financial support from the EU and its member-states dealt a blow to the country’s deteriorating economy: inflation increased, the currency devalued, and the GDP shrunk by 3.9 percent.

26. Other political actors maintained strong relationships with the Burundian Government. As a result of the void created by the retreat of European donors, there was increasing alignment between the Burundian Government, China, and Russia, both politically in NY and in their cooperation relationships in Burundi. South Africa, which had been a guarantor of Burundi’s peace process and is an important power broker in the region, openly supported the CNDD-FDD-led government.

27. Following the 2015 elections, the government forged ahead with its political agenda and enacted a series of restrictive political laws despite having lost the bilateral financial backing of most of its international development partners. While a sense of normalcy returned to Burundi, the political climate remained tense and the political space closed. The democratic gains achieved in 2005 had been largely eroded. Repression and exclusion, instead, became more prominent features of the Burundian political landscape. Figure 4 depicts the evolution of democratic space in Burundi from 1975 to 2020.

28. Violence and intimidation by state agents and the *imbonerakure* intensified ahead of the 2018 constitutional referendum that aimed to further consolidate political power. Figure 5 shows the violent incidents against civilians. There was a spike in abuses and threats against those in the “No Camp,” which opposed the constitutional amendments proposed by the Burundian Government. Efforts by the opposition to educate the population about the referendum were curtailed by the Burundian Government. While the government sponsored a “neutral” information campaign from December to April, it limited official YES and NO campaigns to only a few weeks before the referendum, offering an advantage to the government’s position.

Figure 5: Violent incidents in Burundi from January 2017 to April 2018



29. More broadly, since the announcement of the constitutional review at the end of 2017, the political climate further deteriorated, with the government using violence and threats against its opponents. The CNDD-FDD warned potential dissenters against attempting to thwart upcoming efforts of the ruling elite to promote the constitutional referendum. During a press conference in February 2018, the police spokesperson warned that people caught campaigning against the referendum would be arrested.⁴⁴ In fact, in 2018, many people suspected of campaigning against the constitutional reform, or simply people known to have opposed the changes, were arrested or intimidated by local and national authorities.⁴⁵

30. Following tense elections in May 2020, a new government was installed in August 2020. The unexpected passing of then President Pierre Nkurunziza in June of that year, prior to the inauguration of President-elect Ndayishimiye, raised concerns about the stability of the country. But the transfer of power to the new president took place without violence. In his inauguration speech, President Ndayishimiye highlighted “national unity and cohesion of the Burundian people, peace and social justice” as top priorities, marking positive prospects for the improvement of relations between the Government and its international partners.⁴⁶ UN investigators argued that significant changes in human rights policies were also needed to alter Burundi’s trajectory.⁴⁷ In July 2020, the International Organization of the Francophonie announced it would resume cooperation with the Burundian Government for the first time since it had suspended its programs in 2016.⁴⁸ In June 2021, the EU, which had suspended direct budgetary support to Burundi since 2015, announced that it was preparing to lift sanctions and resume budgetary aid to Burundi.⁴⁹

2.2 The evolution of the Burundian context in the PBF sectoral areas

31. In this section, we discuss the evolution of the context in each of the five sectoral areas on which the PBF-supported projects focused: human rights, dialogue, youth, women, and cross-border reintegration. Subsequently, we evaluate the PBF-supported projects in relation to these contexts.

2.2.1 Human Rights

32. The human rights situation in Burundi remained challenging between 2015 and 2020. The 2015 crisis spurred an increase in extrajudicial killings, arrests, torture, intimidation, and targeting of human rights defenders. Figure 6 shows how political liberties and protection of human rights from physical integrity violations varied throughout the periods of PBF engagement in Burundi.

33. While significantly improved since the end of the war, the human rights situation in Burundi tends to worsen around electoral periods. During the 2006-08 pacification campaign, the electoral crisis of 2009-2011, and the events of 2015-2016, the government relied on a number of state security institutions, notably the national intelligence service (SNR) and the police, who have committed

⁴⁴ “Burundi police threaten opposition to constitution change,” AfricaNews, February 12, 2018, [<https://www.africanews.com/2018/02/14/burundi-police-threaten-opposition-to-constitution-change/>]

⁴⁵ “Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi,” A/HRC/39/63, New York: United Nations Human Rights Council, August 8, 2018.

⁴⁶ “Ndayishimiye sworn in as Burundi’s new president,” Aljazeera, June 18, 2020, [<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/6/18/ndayishimiye-sworn-in-as-burundis-new-president>].


⁴⁷ “Burundi needs more than a new President to break the cycle of violence, say UN investigators,” Geneva: United Nations Human Rights Council, July 14, 2020, [<https://ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=26086&LangID=E>].

⁴⁸ “Burundi welcome back in Francophonie family as sanctions are lifted,” *The East African*, November 10, 2020, [<https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/burundi-welcome-back-in-francophonie-family-as-sanctions-are-lifted-3017094>].

⁴⁹ Andrew Rettman, “EU preparing to lift Burundi sanctions, despite warning,” *EUobserver*, June 23, 2021, [<https://euobserver.com/world/152231>].

significant human rights violations.⁵⁰ One underlying problem is that Burundi's security sector reform is incomplete. While the government has been lauded for integrating the former rebels and military into a new Burundian National Defense Force, attempts to reform the SNR and the police have faced more government resistance. During the period under review, the SNR, the police, and the youth wing of the CNDD-FDD reportedly engaged in a variety of human rights violations including, restrictions on political meetings, intimidation of CSOs, unlawful arrests, torture, and extrajudicial killings against political opponents of the CNDD-FDD.⁵¹ In both its structure and violation of human rights, "organs of the State are often indistinguishable from organs of the ruling party."⁵² Moreover, in 2015, the Minister of Public Safety created an anti-riot brigade to control contestation in protest neighborhoods in Bujumbura.⁵³ This brigade was accused of serious human rights violations.⁵⁴

Figure 6: Physical violence index and Political liberties index in Burundi, 1975-2020.



Notes: This figure shows changes in physical violence and political liberties in Burundi from 1975 to 2020. The red line reflects estimates of the physical violence index and the blue line reflects estimates of the political liberties index with 95% confidence intervals reported. The physical violence index captures if citizens are safe from political killings and torture by the government or government agents. Ranging from zero to one, higher index values represent a higher level of physical integrity. The political liberties index captures the extent to which political liberties are respected. Source: Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem).

⁵⁰ Stephanie Nebehay, "U.N. investigators say Burundian forces still torturing, killing opponents," *Reuters*, June 15, 2017, [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-violence/u-n-investigators-say-burundian-forces-still-torturing-killing-opponents-idUSKBN19617S].

⁵¹ "Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi," A/HRC/39/63, New York: United Nations Human Rights Council, August 8, 2018.

⁵² "Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi," A/HRC/39/63, New York: United Nations Human Rights Council, August 8, 2018.

⁵³ Cabinet of the Minister of Public Security, "Ordonnance No. 215 /1182 du 07/09/2015 Portant Creation, Organisation, Composition, Missions et Fonctionnement de la Brigade Anti-Emeute," Bujumbura: Government of Burundi, [http://www.securitepublique.gov.bi/IMG/pdf/bae-2.pdf].

⁵⁴ Interactive Dialogue on Burundi, "Oral Briefing of the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi," Geneva: Human Rights Council, September 23, 2020, [https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26283&LangID=E].

34. Particularly since 2008, the *imbonerakure* have emerged as the youth wing of the ruling party.⁵⁵ The group started to make its presence known shortly before the 2010 elections and has been accused by the opposition and human rights observers of being armed and of intimidating the opposition.⁵⁶ Sections of the *imbonerakure* who are spread out across countless hills in the country are believed to be operating more or less independently with limited to no instruction from the center. They derive revenue from their ability to exert power over the rural population to seize property and tax unhindered.⁵⁷

35. During this period, various actors were tasked with monitoring the evolving human rights situation in Burundi. The most significant actor was, of course, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). In addition to monitoring, the OHCHR also helped to establish Burundi's National Independent Human Rights Commission (CNIDH) in 2011 with funding from a prior tranche of PBF support. In recent years, the CNIDH has deviated from its initial mandate and focused on promoting the government's official narrative on human rights.⁵⁸ As such, in February 2018, the Sub-Committee on Accreditation of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions, downgraded CNIDH from status "A" to "B" for a lack of independence.⁵⁹

36. The AU also deployed initiatives to monitor human rights in Burundi. In December 2015 an African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) fact-finding mission visited the country to investigate human rights violations and other abuses. While the ACHPR briefed the AU Commission chairperson during the summit, the report was not published until May 2016, limiting its visibility and impact. While the ACHPR report acknowledged the negative impact of armed groups in the country, it argued that the Burundian government was responsible for most of the violence.⁶⁰

37. The AU also deployed a delegation of human rights observers and military advisors later in 2016, with support from the PBF as well as other donors, to report on possible human rights violations in the country and to verify the disarmament of militias and armed groups. While the Burundian Government accepted the deployment, these observers and advisors faced many hurdles in the performance of their duties because the AU was never able to secure a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) from the government. Without the MoU, the observers were very limited in the work they could accomplish. While their visibility in the country was minimal, they accompanied OHCHR observers around Bujumbura until the OHCHR office closed in February 2019.⁶¹ The closure of the OHCHR office in Burundi, at the request of the Burundian Government, illustrated long-standing tensions between the two entities. The AU human rights observer mission closed at the end of May 2021.⁶²

⁵⁵ "Who are the Imbonerakure and is Burundi unravelling?" The New Humanitarian, April 28, 2015,

[<https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2015/04/28/who-are-imbonerakure-and-burundi-unravelling>].

⁵⁶ "Burundi: the UN Commission of Inquiry raises red flags at the serious human rights violations committed in the pre-electoral climate," Geneva: United Nations Human Rights Council, September 4, 2019,

[<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=24941&LangID=EJ>].

⁵⁷ Status and dynamics of the political situation in Burundi, July 21, 2014, Institute for Security Studies

⁵⁸ "Burundi: CNIDH loses its grade A independence status," *International Federation for Human Rights*, March 14, 2018,

[<https://www.fidh.org/en/impacts/burundi-cnidh-loses-its-grade-a-independence-status>].

⁵⁹ "World Report 2019: Burundi," Human Rights Watch, 2019, [<https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/burundi#>].

⁶⁰ "Report of the Delegation of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights on its Fact-Finding Mission to Burundi, 7-13 December 2015," Banjul: African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, May 17, 2016, [<https://www.achpr.org/news/viewdetail?id=198>].

⁶¹ "UN Human Rights Office in Burundi closes," Geneva: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, March 5, 2019, [<https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24254>].

⁶² "Communique of the 993rd meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council on the African Union Human Rights Observers and Military Experts Mission in Burundi, 27 April 2021," Addis Ababa: African Union, May 7, 2021, [<http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-993rd-meeting-of-the-african-union-peace-and-security-council-on-the-african-union-human-rights-observers-and-military-experts-mission-in-burundi-27-april-2021>].

2.2.2 Dialogue

38. Between 2014 and 2020, the PBF was involved in supporting the main dialogue efforts underway in Burundi: 1) the efforts by the Secretary-General's Special Advisor and Special Envoy, and 2) the related EAC-led Inter-Burundian Dialogue process. In November 2015, Jamal Benomar was appointed as the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General for Conflict Prevention (including Burundi) and mandated to respond to the violence, displacement, and civilian deaths that followed the May 2015 attempted coup.⁶³ Benomar left this position in 2017, at the request of the Burundian government.⁶⁴ Subsequently, the UN established the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General in Burundi (OESG-B) and appointed several consecutive UN Special Envoys to Burundi, all of whom were charged with facilitating the EAC's support for the Inter-Burundian dialogue and broader political dialogue in Burundi.⁶⁵ The events of 2015—President Nkurunziza's candidacy, the protests, the coup attempt, the elections, and the escalating violence—had changed the nature and focus of the ongoing international and regional dialogue efforts in Burundi. The international community and regional actors had, at first, tried to promote dialogue across the sides of the political divide by deploying a number of seasoned diplomats to mediate.⁶⁶ When this failed, the AU announced that the EAC would lead an Inter-Burundian dialogue first led by President Yoweri Museveni, and later facilitated by former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa.⁶⁷

39. The EAC mediation efforts failed to gain momentum as the government refused to fully participate in the process and divides among EAC member states sent mixed messages to the Burundian parties.⁶⁸ The EAC convened a five summits with the government, the opposition—part of which was, once again, in exile—other Burundian stakeholders, and international partners; but none of these summits yielded a pathway toward an inclusive political solution.⁶⁹ The Government of Burundi initiated its own “national Inter-Burundian dialogue” process under the auspices of the Government-established National Commission for the Inter-Burundian Dialogue (CNDI),” although observers raised “serious concerns about the inclusiveness and legitimacy of the process.”⁷⁰ As the CNDD-FDD consolidated its post-election authority, and refused to participate in further Inter-Burundian dialogue summits outside of the country, it became clear that the EAC-led dialogue would not yield the outcome the international community had hoped for.⁷¹ In 2019, Mkapa officially completed his tenure as dialogue facilitator, leaving the dialogue to an uncertain future.⁷²

⁶³ “UN chief sends envoy to Burundi after ‘chilling’ violence,” *The East African*, December 17, 2015, [https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/un-chief-sends-envoy-to-burundi-after-chilling-violence-1344096].

⁶⁴ “Burundi: le président demande le départ du représentant de l'ONU,” *RFI*, November 15, 2016, [https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20161115-burundi-onu-nkurunziza-demande-depart-representant-jamal-benomar].

⁶⁵ “Special Envoy in Burundi,” New York: Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, [https://dppa.un.org/en/mission/special-envoy-burundi].

⁶⁶ “The African Union and the Burundi Crisis: Ambition versus Reality,” Crisis Group Africa Briefing No 122, Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, September 28, 2016, [https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/burundi/african-union-and-burundi-crisis-ambition-versus-reality].

⁶⁷ “Running Out of Options in Burundi,” Africa Report No. 278, Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, June 20, 2019, [https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/burundi/278-running-out-options-burundi].

⁶⁸ “The situation in Burundi: Report of the Secretary-General,” S/2019/837, New York: United Nations Security Council, October 24, 2019; In a 2017 communique, the Burundian Government stated that: “Henceforth with the results of the 4th session, which is the last held abroad, [the] Dialogue [would] continue and complete that which brought together the Burundians of the interior.” Statement following the 4th session of Inter-Burundi Dialogue held in Arusha, Dec 17, 2017, [https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/statement-following-4th-session-inter-burundi-dialogue-held-arusha].

⁶⁹ “Running Out of Options in Burundi,” Africa Report No. 278, Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, June 20, 2019, [https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/burundi/278-running-out-options-burundi].

⁷⁰ “Report of the Secretary-General on Burundi,” S/2017/165, New York: United Nations Security Council, February 27, 2017.

⁷¹ In a 2017 communique, the Burundian Government stated that: “Henceforth with the results of the 4th session, which is the last held abroad, [the] Dialogue [would] continue and complete that which brought together the Burundians of the interior.” Statement following the 4th session of Inter-Burundi Dialogue held in Arusha, Dec 17, 2017, [https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/statement-following-4th-session-inter-burundi-dialogue-held-arusha].

⁷² “The situation in Burundi: Report of the Secretary-General,” S/2019/837, New York: United Nations Security Council, October 24, 2019.

2.2.3 Youth

40. Burundian youth find themselves at the heart of the Gordian knot of the country's peace, security, and development nexus. They are economically and politically marginalized and can easily become prey to political manipulation and instrumentalization. Young people constitute the majority of the population in Burundi, and yet, their autonomy in the political landscape remains limited. Political parties routinely use youth groups to energize their base and swell their numbers. Parties have used their youth wings for resistance and mobilization in various settings.⁷³ However, when looking at the leadership and the structure of political parties, there is not often space for youth to contribute to platform-building or important decisions about the party.

41. While youth remain underrepresented in most party programs, the relationship between youth and their parties varies greatly. Indeed, most political party leadership is detached from the reality of young people today and are keen to maintain their position of leadership, leaving little room for the new generation. Moreover, by their very nature, political parties in Burundi, like in many other nascent democracies or conflict-affected states, struggle to formulate clear political platforms and policies. As such, until recently, Burundian political parties have not articulated the specific strategies to deal with critical issues facing youth: youth unemployment, a struggling labor force, and weak education system.

42. One way in which young people have been visible in the political landscape is in political actors' instrumentalization of them for political violence. The ability to wield violence through various mechanisms is part of Burundi's political legacy, and youth have long been part of the calculation. Burundi is not unique in its prevalence of political youth groups; nonetheless, some have argued that these groups became politicized and violence-prone very early in post-independence Burundi.⁷⁴ As early as 1962, the urban-based youth wing of the ruling party engaged in numerous acts of ethnic violence against Hutu at the behest of Tutsi elites, even at a time when the ruling party—Union pour le Progrès national (UPRONA)—was still ethnically mixed. During the 1970s, the members of the urban-based youth wing were known as the foot soldiers of UPRONA and were often deployed to guard frontiers and inspect travelers' documents on the edge of towns, acting as political proxies of the state even when orders were not specifically given from the top.⁷⁵

43. The normalization of youth violence took root even before the multiparty era and spilled right into the war. Before Ndadaye's 1993 assassination, youth gangs, including criminal groups, had emerged in the capital and many of them were multiethnic in nature. Ndadaye's death and the ethnic violence that engulfed Bujumbura forced the youth to seek safety on their own. The group Sans-défaite (without defeat), for example, was once multi-ethnic, but as Tutsi and Hutu members turned on each other, Hutu youth broke away from the group. As Tutsi groups like Sans-échec (without fail) and Sans-défaite controlled neighborhoods like Musaga, Nyakabika, and Ngarara, Hutu youth formed self-defense groups to fight back and retreated towards Kamenge and armed themselves.⁷⁶ Fierce and often-violent confrontations took place between the youth in various neighborhoods. The Burundian army often offered logistical and financial support to Sans-échec and Sans-defaite, and later, recruited

⁷³ Angzoorokuu Paalo, Sebastien. 2017. "Political party youth wings and political violence in sub-Saharan Africa: A case of Ghana." *International Journal of Peace and Development Studies*. 8(1):1-14.

⁷⁴ Lemarchand 1996. *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide*, New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, p. 71.

⁷⁵ Russell, Aidan. 2015. "Rebel and Rule in Burundi." *International Journal of Africa Historical Studies* 48 (1):73-97, p. 89; Dudouet, Véronique. 2015. *Violent mobilization of youth gangs by political parties in understanding a new generation of non-state armed groups*. New York: United Nations, p. 22.

⁷⁶ Ceppi, Jean-Philippe. January 19, 1995 "Dans un maqui Hutu du Burundi." *Liberation*, [https://www.liberation.fr/planete/1995/01/19/dans-un-maquis-hutu-du-burundi_117765/]; "Burundi: Struggle for survival: Immediate action vital to stop killings," AFR/16/07/1995, London: Amnesty International, [<https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ac6a9e1c.html>].

members of Sans-défaite. Meanwhile, Hutu youth groups ended up forming a significant portion of the Hutu rebellion. During the 2015 crisis, many political actors turned to them to achieve their political objectives.

44. Youth are also particularly vulnerable to the pervasive poverty in Burundi. They suffer disproportionately from the lack of employment and economic opportunities. This is particularly true in urban settings. As young people leave their rural homes for the chance of a more prosperous city life, they are too often confronted with the harsh realities of hunger and destitution in the capital.⁷⁷ As such, young people may easily fall prey to economic manipulation by political actors who offer them financial rewards, food, and drinks in exchange for their engagement in violence. As electoral seasons intensify, young people are asked to engage in specific acts in exchange for money, such as disrupting meetings and intimidation.⁷⁸ This helps explain the concentration of violent youth groups in Bujumbura. However, the ruling party, which has political reach across the country's territory, can easily mobilize youth in the countryside as well. Many of the violent members⁷⁹ of the *imbonerakure* are financially vulnerable, unemployed, or are former combatants, some of whom were never fully demobilized and never received their demobilization benefits.⁸⁰

2.2.4 Women

45. Since 2005, the Burundian constitution and electoral codes have stipulated that women should constitute 30 percent of elected public decision-making positions at all levels.⁸¹ Burundi ranks 7th in Africa in terms of women's representation in parliament. Today women represent 38 percent of members of parliament, compared to 34 percent in 2010 and 14 percent in 2000. In the provinces, however, closer to most women's realities and challenges, women account for only 19 percent of elected representatives.⁸² While Burundi has made important strides in increasing the descriptive representation of women, women are rarely in substantive decision-making positions in the government or political parties, instead primarily occupying technical posts.⁸³ When they hold ministerial positions (33 percent at the moment), they often disproportionately occupy posts in lower-prestige departments.⁸⁴ The military, the police, and the Ministry of Interior are almost entirely under male control.⁸⁵ Like in many other countries, the militarized and patriarchal nature of politics in Burundi has an impact on the space women are permitted to occupy.

46. The history of violence has also impacted the leadership composition of the parties that emerged from the rebellion: the National Congress for Freedom (CNL) (formerly the National Liberation Forces (FNL)) and the CNDD-FDD. During the war, the military wings of these organizations took control of their trajectory and leadership, determining who was in charge. Very few women participated as combatants during the rebellion, and those who participated were among the rank-and-file, not the military command. While the CNDD-FDD welcomed civilians into its political ranks, the

⁷⁷ Sommers, Marc. 2013. *Adolescents and Violence: Lessons from Burundi*. IOB Discussion Paper.

⁷⁸ Buchanan, Elsa. 2015. Burundi: "Who are the feared Imbonerakure youth?" *International Business Times*, June 3; Action on Armed Violence. *Rapport d'Enquête sur la Manipulation Economique des Jeunes par les Partis Politiques en Période Electorale*.

⁷⁹ Not all members of the Imbonerakure are active or participate in violence.

⁸⁰ "Burundi: Who are the Feared Imbonerakure," June 3, 2015. *International Business Times* [<https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/burundi-who-are-feared-imbonerakure-youth-1504301>]

⁸¹ Fikiri Nzoyisenga, "15 Years of Gender Quotas in Burundi: What's the Impact?" Washington, DC: Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, August 26, 2020, [<https://giwps.georgetown.edu/15-years-of-gender-quotas-in-burundi-whats-the-impact/>].

⁸² "Women's Political Participation: African Barometer 2021," International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, [<https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/womens-political-participation-africa-barometer-2021.pdf>].

⁸³ Nanourou and Wilson. 2014. *Analysis of the Status of Women in Burundi's Political and Electoral Processes*. IFES, p 6.

⁸⁴ de Roeck et al. 2016. *Special Data Feature: Institutions in Burundi and Rwanda: A 20-year data overview (1995-2016)*. *Annuaire des Grands Lacs 2015-2016*; IFES. 2014. *Analysis of the Status of Women in Burundi's Political and Electoral Processes*.

⁸⁵ de Roeck et al. 2016, 48.

increased militarization of the party leadership largely excluded women from decision-making positions. Similarly, despite the CNL's strenuous attempts for civilian input at the local and national level, it has vacillated between remobilization and political participation and left little room for women's involvement.

47. While the constitution guarantees descriptive representation in government, women have not been welcomed to important political spaces. For example, during the Arusha negotiations, political elites negotiating the agreement argued that, given their low representation in decision-making bodies, both prior to and during the war, women's groups should not be included in the negotiations. The women's movement eventually secured observer status but has had to work through third parties to obtain their quota in the government.⁸⁶ Today, while 75 percent of Burundians believe that women have a rightful place in politics, many reject the idea that women currently face discrimination or structural inequalities in Burundi.⁸⁷ Patriarchal norms tend to require women to be subordinate to their fathers and their husbands.⁸⁸

48. Aside from politics, women are also economically vulnerable. In a country that is not only one of the most densely populated in the world, but also where 90 percent of the population relies on agriculture, the lack of legal infrastructure to ensure women's right to inherit land continues to marginalize women.⁸⁹ Despite making 55 percent of the workforce, mostly in the agricultural sector, they only account for about 18 percent of landowners.⁹⁰ This problem is likely to continue as an Afrobarometer survey suggests that 57 percent of the population believe women and men should not have equal land rights when it comes to inheritance, many believing that it would only be exacerbated from pressures on land and conflict. Finally, Burundian women experience a high rate of gender-based violence. Nearly 23 percent of Burundian women experiencing sexual abuse, and 50 percent of these victims being under the age of 13.⁹¹

2.2.5 Cross-Border Context related to Burundian Refugees

49. Burundi's numerous episodes of violence since its independence from Belgium in 1962 have led to waves of internal and regional displacement.⁹² Prior to 2015, there were two main waves of mass displacement in Burundi. First, in the wake of the 1972 ethnic violence, approximately 300,000 Hutu fled the country. While some fled for safety, others were victims of systematic expropriation of their land. The second wave of displacement started with the outbreak of civil war in 1993. By the end of 1996, approximately 285,000 Burundians were refugees in neighboring countries and another 400,000 were internally displaced.⁹³

50. The signature of the Arusha Agreement in 2000 and the end of the transition period in 2005 opened the door for the safe return of hundreds of thousands of refugees. Between 2002 and 2008, more than 450,000 Burundians had already been repatriated to their home country, with the highest

⁸⁶ Falch, Åshild. 2010. Women's Political Participation and Influence in post-conflict Burundi and Nepal. PRIO Paper.

⁸⁷ Ndikumana, Alain. 2015. Gender Equality in Burundi: Why does support not extend to women's rights to inherit land? Afrobarometer.

⁸⁸ Yssa Oumar Basse and Jocelyne Kwizera, *Norms and practices impeding gender equality in Burundian society*, Care International, July 25, 2017, [<http://careevaluations.org/wp-content/uploads/Norms-and-practices-impeding-Gender-Equality-in-Burundi.pdf>].

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Victoria Rames, Clémence Bununagi, and Caritas Niyonzima. USAID/Burundi Gender Analysis Report. Prepared by Banyan Global. 2017, [<https://banyanglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/USAID-Burundi-Gender-Analysis-Final-Report-2017.pdf>]

⁹¹ Yeboah, Helena. 2017. "Sexual Violence Against Women and Girls in Burundi." *International Journal of Current Research*, 9, (03), 48183-48187.


⁹² Rene Lemarchand, 1996, *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide*, New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press,

⁹³ United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, U.S. Committee for Refugees World Refugee Survey 1997 - Burundi, 1 January 1997, [<https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a8b824.html>].

number (77,970) in 2008 alone.⁹⁴ While the return of the refugees facilitated some reprieve for neighboring countries, such as Tanzania who had hosted Burundian refugees for decades, the return of these displaced people presented new challenges because of the small size of the country and its rapidly growing population.⁹⁵

51. Compared to prior displacement episodes, the displacement of Burundians after the 2015 crisis was one of the largest episodes in Burundian history. At the height of the 2015 insecurity in December, over 220,000 new Burundian refugees had fled to neighboring countries.⁹⁶ By 2017, approximately 270,000 Burundians were in Tanzania, only three years after the Tanzanian government’s decision to naturalize over 160,00 Burundian refugees from previous crises.⁹⁷ Many of the refugees who fled to Tanzania during the 2015 crisis had only recently returned to Burundi following post-war repatriation efforts mentioned above. The second largest group of Burundian refugees is located in Rwanda where more Tutsi Burundians had fled for safety. This mass exodus of Burundian refugees to Rwanda has resulted in pressures on and tensions with Tanzania and Rwanda.⁹⁸ Other countries hosting Burundian refugees include Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and to a lesser extent Kenya, Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique.

Figure 7: Map of Home Location of Registered Refugees - 2015 and 2017



Source: African Center for Strategic Studies.⁹⁹

⁹⁴ “Crisis Spotlight: Burundi,” Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), <http://www.ineesite.org/en/crisis-spotlights/burundi>

⁹⁵ United Nations Population Fund Burundi Overview (<https://www.unfpa.org/data/BI/>).

⁹⁶ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. December 14, 2015. Burundi Situation: Displacement of Burundians in Neighbouring Countries | As of 14 December 2015. [[http:// https://www.refworld.org/docid/5694b72b4.html](http://https://www.refworld.org/docid/5694b72b4.html)]

⁹⁷ United Nations Country Team in Tanzania. August 19, 2017. Tanzania – Burundi Refugee Response (As of July 30, 2017). [[http:// https://reliefweb.int/report/ united-republic-tanzania/ tanzania-burundi-refugee-response-30-july-2017](http://https://reliefweb.int/report/ united-republic-tanzania/ tanzania-burundi-refugee-response-30-july-2017)]

⁹⁸ Buchanan, Elsa. November 16, 2016. “Burundi will soon be one of 'Africa's biggest refugee crises', says MSF,” International Business Times, [<http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/burundi-will-soon-be-one-africas-biggest-refugee-crises-says-msf-1591871>].

⁹⁹ “Origin of Burundi Refugees,” Africa Center, 2017, [<http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Origin-of-Burundi-Refugees-by-Province-side-by-side.png>].

52. As depicted in Figure 7, refugee displacement did not impact all Burundi provinces equally. While Mwaro reported only small numbers of people leaving the country, large numbers of refugees left Kurindo, Muyinga, Ruyigi, Bujumbura, Rutana, and Makamba. In some cases, the decision of Burundians to flee Burundi was based on a combination of insecurity and land conflict. In Makamba, for example, 50 percent of the land is contested due to multiple waves of political violence and displacement.¹⁰⁰ In 2015, many of the refugees who left Burundi for Tanzania were from Makamba province. In Kirundo, many Tutsi fled to Rwanda because of threats of and real violence against Tutsi, following a subtle but dangerous trend of Tutsi targeting.¹⁰¹

53. There are currently over 275,000 Burundian refugees, approximately 130,000 of which are in Tanzania.¹⁰² This a significant decrease in refugees from 2017. This large return of refugees has led to increased pressure on land and related conflicts in their areas of return, at the same time as refugees still living in Tanzania report feeling increasingly insecure.¹⁰³

2.3 The aid context in Burundi

54. Between 2015 and 2020, in addition to the increased violence and the closing of the political space, the donor ecosystem drastically shrank. The EU's decision to invoke article 96 to suspend budgetary aid to Burundi led it and other donors to increasingly route their aid through the UN and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) rather than providing aid directly to the government budget. The Burundian Government expressed frustration at this approach and the UN's, NGOs', and European donors' increasing condemnation of Burundi, which it argued treated the government unfairly in comparison to their treatment of other countries within the broader Great Lakes region.¹⁰⁴ OECD donors' decision to work through the UN and NGOs exacerbated already tense relations between NGOs and the government, and precipitated growing restrictions on NGOs in Burundi.

55. It is worth pausing to understand the legal context in Burundi under which national and international NGOs have operated in recent years.¹⁰⁵ In early 2017, the government ratified two pieces of legislation that increase its control of the donor space. The first law focused on national organizations.¹⁰⁶ The law required that national NGOs receive the approval of the Ministry of Interior or the appropriate line ministry for all their activities or risk facing sanctions. Burundi has always required that NGOs renew their registration semi-annually. Additionally, NGOs funded by foreign entities were required to have their funding transferred through the Central Bank. Finally, the law imposed new limits on the formation of coalitions for NGOs working in the same sector, thereby outlawing organizations such as the Forum pour la Conscience et le Developpement (FOCODE), which was a powerful and influential umbrella organization gathering a large number of diverse civil

¹⁰⁰ Feed the Minds, [<http://www.feedtheminds.org/happens-refugees-return-home-read-work-burundi/>].

¹⁰¹ Samantha Lakin, February 3, 2016, African Arguments, "Let us be heard": Burundi's refugees tell stories of ethnic targeting," [<http://africanarguments.org/2016/02/03/let-us-be-heard-burundis-refugees-tell-stories-of-ethnic-targeting/>].

¹⁰² UN High Commissioner for Refugees, *Burundi Situation*, Operational Data Portal [<https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/burundi-situation.htm>].

¹⁰³ "Burundi refugees in Tanzania living in fear: UN rights experts," *UN News*, April 13, 2021, [<https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/04/1089632>].

¹⁰⁴ See, for example, Amb. Renovat Tabu's, Permanent Representative of Burundi to the UN Office at Geneva, statements regarding the government's decision to expel UN Human Rights Monitors: "Burundi is concerned by an unfair accusation which further entrenches the hostility which has been commonplace against Burundi for some time." Tom Miles, "Burundi under fire at U.N. for expelling U.N. human rights team," Reuters, September 11, 2018, [<https://www.reuters.com/article/instant-article/iduskcn1lr23r>]. See also, "Note d'information adressée au groupe des Ambassadeurs Africains accrédités à la Haye Concernant la décision d'ouverture d'un Examen préliminaire de la situation au Burundi," Bujumbura: Government of Burundi [<https://burundi.gov.bi/archives/spip.php?article1512>].

¹⁰⁵ "Burundi passes law cracking down on foreign NGOs," *Africanews*, December 24, 2016, [<https://www.africanews.com/2016/12/24/burundi-passes-law-cracking-down-on-foreign-ngos/>]; Godfrey M. Musila, "Freedom Under Threat: The Spread of Anti-NGO Measures in Africa," *Freedom House*, May 2019, [https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/05132019_UPDATED_FINAL_Africa_Special_Brief_Freedoms_Under_Threat.pdf].

¹⁰⁶ Loi No 1/02 du 27 janvier 2017 portant cadre organique des associations sans but lucrative.

society groups.¹⁰⁷ International NGOs were similarly constrained.¹⁰⁸ The new law required all their activities to be aligned with the programs and priorities set by the government. It also required that international NGOs sign program implementation agreements with the relevant ministerial departments and/or local partners to ensure they work within thematic spaces authorized by the state. Moreover, new spending and budgeting limits aimed to allow the government to have more control on how international funds were disbursed. The Burundian Government also required that NGOs release information about the ethnic composition of their staff, which many have refused to do.¹⁰⁹

56. While the PBF has worked in close collaboration with the Burundian Government, the recent changes to the legal framework forced the PBF, like other organizations, to realign some of these programmatic priorities with the Burundian National Development plan and incorporate more financial literacy, entrepreneurship, and income generating activities at the request of the state. Moreover, shortly after the new NGO legal framework described above was implemented, the Joint Steering Committee (JSC) stopped meeting (2018-2019), further complicating working relationships between the state, PBF, and implementing partners. The PBF and the RC deployed a significant amount of energy to negotiate with the government on behalf of implementing partners and sometimes adjust some of the projects that had been approved before the new legal dispensation. The PBF also responded to the new context by allowing for more flexibility in project timelines and facilitating no cost extension and amendments to projects as the need arose.

3 ASSESSMENT OF PBF ENGAGEMENT WITH BURUNDI

57. As discussed above, the 2015 crisis resulted in a closed political space, increased control of NGOs by the government, increased human rights abuses, restrictions on civil society and media, and the flight of hundreds of thousands of Burundians to neighboring countries.¹¹⁰ The PBF responded to this context by funding twenty-one projects in the following areas: human rights monitoring, political dialogue efforts, increased social cohesion among youth, community-level mediation by women, support for the reintegration of the thousands of Burundian refugees, and coordination by the PBF Secretariat (see Appendix C and D for a summary of each project). Their activities aimed to promote human rights, create the necessary environment for political dialogue, and reduce youth's vulnerability to political manipulation. Through the GYPI (established with the PBF 2017-2019 Strategic Plan) the PBF was able to distribute funds directly to NUNOs operating in Burundi, expanding the reach of the PBF's support. Below, we assess this project portfolio using our eight evaluation criteria: Relevance, Effectiveness and Catalytic Effects, Coherence, National Ownership, Gender and Conflict Sensitivity, and Management and Oversight (including risk management). (See Appendix B for a full definition of each criterion.)

3.1 Relevance

58. Relevance is a measure of a) the degree to which the projects and its activities are relevant to UN strategic documents, and b) the degree to which these strategic documents, the projects, and the project activities are relevant to the most important drivers of conflict and peace during the project

¹⁰⁷ "Burundi: UN experts raise alarm at growing repression of NGOs and human rights defenders," Geneva: Office of the High Commission for Human Rights, February 6, 2017, [<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21145>].

¹⁰⁸ Loi No 1/01 Du 23 Janvier 2017 portant modification de la loi No 1/011 du 23 juin 1999 portant modification du decret - loi No 1/033 du 22 août 1990 portant cadre general de la cooperation entre la République du Burundi et les organisations non-gouvernementales étrangères (ONGE).

¹⁰⁹ Vince Chadwick and Christin Roby, "Turmoil for international aid groups in Burundi over ethnic quotas," *Devex*, January 21, 2019.

¹¹⁰ "Unrest in Burundi sends thousands fleeing, threatening years of refugee gains – UN agency," *UNNews*, May 8, 2015, [<https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/05/498152-unrest-burundi-sends-thousands-fleeing-threatening-years-refugee-gains-un>].

implementation phase. Below, we first discuss the relevance of PBF projects to key UN and Burundian Government strategic documents and then to the broader drivers of conflict and peace in Burundi.

3.1.1 Relevance of PBF projects to strategic documents

59. There are several strategic and planning documents with which the PBF support to Burundi is aligned. The third Peacebuilding Priority Plan (PPP) (2014-2018) was approved in 2014 with an envelope of \$11.65m, aiming to sustain UN political accompaniment following the withdrawal of the United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB) and with a specific focus on supporting dialogue and stability around the 2015 elections. The thematic priorities of the third PPP were: 1) National dialogue and social cohesion with a focus on women and youth; 2) Youth participation in political and social life and reconciliation initiatives; 3) Democratic exercise of human rights; and 4) Peaceful resolution of land disputes. Following the electoral crisis in 2015, the PPP priorities were generally maintained, although land disputes was dropped and human rights observation was added. In 2016, PBSO approved a budget reallocation and a short extension of the third PPP until 31 May 2017, adjusting the overall allocation and its distribution among the sectors: \$3.25 million (instead of the original \$2.5 million) for 1) National dialogue and social cohesion; 2) Youth participation in political and social life and reconciliation initiatives; and 3) Democratic exercise of human rights.¹¹¹ This PPP was then further extended from May 2017 to June 2018 without the allocation of additional resources.¹¹² The twenty-one projects that the PBF funded were relevant to the original PPP and its updates, although our interviews revealed that these documents were not generally used as a strategic reference point for the JSC or for UN or NGO actors engaged in implementing the PBF projects.

60. The most recent conflict analysis was a 2018 conflict analysis by the United Nations Country Team (UNCT). At that time, the conflict analysis contained an explanation of the context, a discussion of the potential future scenarios for Burundi, an understanding of how PBF areas of work like youth or human rights are impacted by the conflict, and UNCT's conclusion of the peacebuilding priorities in Burundi. The 2018 conflict analysis mentions that UNCT conducted similar conflict analyses in 2016 and 2017, although the evaluation team was not given access to the 2016 and 2017 conflict analyses. There were several other guiding documents for the UN during this period, including the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF, 2010-2014, 2012-2016, 2019-2023), the Resilience Framework, and the Burundian Government's National Development Plan (2018-2027).

61. While there was no single strategic framework guiding the PBF support to Burundi from 2014 to 2020, the PBF projects aligned with the priorities outlined in the range of documents mentioned above. Our interviews revealed that the UN and PBF were unable to develop a transparent conflict analysis and clear guiding strategic framework because of the rapidly changing context, high levels of staff turnover within the UN, the resistance of the Burundian Government to openly discuss conflict dynamics, and the lack of strategic donor coordination. Furthermore, the infrequency of JSC meetings during this period not only illustrated the level of tension between the government and the UN, but also limited the spaces for meaningful strategic engagement between the government, the UN, implementing partners, and donors.

¹¹¹ PPP3_Burundi - Revision I (Extension to May 2017).

¹¹² PPP3_Burundi - Revision II (Extension to June 2018).

3.1.2 Relevance of PBF projects to drivers of conflict and peace

62. In spite of the particularly challenging context in Burundi between 2015 and 2020, the PBF designed and funded twenty-one projects that were relevant to Burundi's conflict and peace dynamics and to the UN and Burundian Government's priorities.¹¹³ This included adopting the Burundian Government's policy that aid to Burundi should focus on development, and the "capitalization of peace," not peacebuilding.¹¹⁴ In sum, the PBF-supported projects were generally part of a strategically coherent and complementary approach in that they all sought to address key challenges and opportunities in a difficult Burundian context. This strategic approach, as mentioned above, was not outlined in a clear guiding strategic framework but was an implicit strategy developed by the Chair of the PBC Configuration, PBSO, the RC, the PBF Secretariat, and the RUNOs and NUNOs. The implicit nature of this strategy meant that many actors involved in implementing and overseeing the PBF were not fully aware of the strategy or its relevance to their daily work.

63. The PBF-funded projects were largely relevant to the sectoral contexts that we outlined above in Section 2. The PBF's support for the UN Human Rights Office in Burundi and the AU human rights monitors enabled these inter-governmental organizations to monitor and report on the growing human rights abuses in an environment where few other domestic or international actors could do so. The support for the EAC's Inter-Burundian dialogue process also responded to a crucial need—growing political violence and inter-party tension at all levels of society; nonetheless, these dialogue efforts were thwarted by the refusal of the Burundian Government to continue participating in them. In other words, the idea of Inter-Burundian dialogue was relevant but it lacked the necessary political space to succeed. The PBF's substantial support for youth social cohesion efforts also addressed one of the most pressing issues facing Burundian communities: large numbers of unemployed youth who were participating in political militias or other types of community-level violence. The support for women's mediation efforts was less urgent but still addressed the longer-term needs for community-level conflict resolution capacity and for the empowerment of women in general. Finally, the cross-border project aimed to provide targeted support to the return, if not the reintegration, of Burundians who had fled the country after 2015. The focus on community-level socio-economic support for youth, women, and returnees also responded to the Burundian Government's requirement that the UN and international donors focus on development and socio-economic support, not peacebuilding.

64. Even though the PBF-supported projects were well-targeted to the Burundian context and part of a generally coherent strategy, the data collected for this evaluation revealed that their implementation suffered from multiple challenges: capacity deficits within RUNOs, resistance from the Burundian Government, the lack of political space to implement activities focused on political inclusion and human rights, procurement delays, rigid procedures, short project timeframes, fragmentation among implementing partners, and a rapidly-changing context. Moreover, the majority of the youth and women's projects, while important, did not sufficiently address the broader drivers of vulnerability for youth and women, as discussed in the context analysis above. For example, while women who participated in "Soutenir les femmes leaders d'aujourd'hui et de demain pour faire avancer la paix au Burundi" expressed a great deal of pride in their newly-acquired skills and their capacity to mediate interpersonal conflicts in their families and communities—an essential skill in highly-politicized

¹¹³ Our survey respondents also indicated that the PBF's priorities in Burundi aligned with the PBF's overall approach to other similar contexts (see Appendix F).

¹¹⁴ Our interviewees indicated that both UN staff and government officials adopted the focus on development and the capitalization of peace, in lieu of peacebuilding. See also *Presidence de la Republique*, "Communiqué de Presse No 17 de la Reunion du Conseil des Ministres du Mercredi 21 Avril 2021," Bujumbura: Republique du Burundi, April 22, 2021.

settings—our interviews also revealed that these peace promotion activities were disconnected from the central and peripheral conflict dynamics that have threatened Burundi’s stability in recent years. In other words, while the identification of these community-level projects was relevant, their implementation was disconnected from broader processes of political reconciliation making it difficult for them to be conflict-sensitive. Conflict sensitivity requires that projects integrate dynamics of the broader conflict into project implementation.¹¹⁵

3.2 Effectiveness

65. Effectiveness refers to whether a project or program achieves its aims. In this section, we first discuss the overall effectiveness of the PBF support to Burundi between 2014 and 2020 and, second, the sector-level effectiveness.

3.2.1 Overall Effectiveness

66. Within the broader Burundian context, the PBF support to Burundi played a role that extended beyond the effectiveness of the individual projects. This role was played through the Burundi configuration of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the broader political space that seemed to have been facilitated by the continued focus of PBF projects on inter-group dialogue and human rights accountability in a context of increasing retrenchment of both. The role of the PBC, and Amb. Lauber in particular, in maintaining dialogue with the Burundian Government at a time when it had little to no open communication with European donors, seemed to be a crucial effect of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture’s support to Burundi. Furthermore, the PBF projects enabled the UN and NGOs to address the potential drivers of conflict and engage in discussion with the Burundian Government at a time when the government resisted any discussion of potential or actual instability, violent conflict, or human rights abuses. In particular, when the UN in Burundi had a strong RC and a Peace and Development Advisor (PDA), the PBF projects permitted important political and strategic discussions that may not have otherwise been feasible. Although not at the project or sectoral levels, several interviewees argued that these discussions were an indirect positive effect of the PBF support to Burundi.

67. While it is impossible to assess the specific effect of the sustained dialogue facilitated by the UN Peacebuilding Architecture’s engagement with Burundi, many interviewees argued that this was the most important effect of the PBF support to Burundi. Some argued that this dialogue set the stage for the current improved relations between the Burundian Government and European donors, the World Bank, IMF, and the UN; nonetheless, given the number of other factors that could have contributed to this thawing of relations, it is impossible to attribute this outcome solely to the PBF. Furthermore, given the continued restrictions in the political and civic space in Burundi, it is unclear if a continuation of dialogue that is focused primarily on development cooperation and economic liberalization will also lead to changes that improve human rights, make political institutions more inclusive, and open civic space. The countries in the broader sub-region have increasingly prioritized economic liberalization and curtailed political freedoms, providing a model that Burundi may seek to follow.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁵ International Alert, *Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding: A resource pack*, London: International Alert, 2004, [<https://gsdrc.org/document-library/conflict-sensitive-approaches-to-development-humanitarian-assistance-and-peacebuilding-a-resource-pack/>].

¹¹⁶ Devon E.A. Curtis (2015) Development assistance and the lasting legacies of rebellion in Burundi and Rwanda, *Third World Quarterly*, 36:7, 1365-1381

3.2.2 Sectoral Effectiveness

68. The effectiveness of the projects supported by the PBF during this period varied significantly. The data collected for this show that the effectiveness of the PBF-supported projects was affected by: the closing political space in Burundi, the short-term nature of projects, the fact that the projects did not seek to address broader political or systemic issues, the lack of coordinated implementation by project partners, and the weak peacebuilding capacity of some RUNOs and implementing partners.

69. For example, the human rights projects supported transparent human rights reporting until the Burundian Government prevented them from doing so by forcing OHCHR to leave the country and curtailing the transparency of AU monitoring. As mentioned above, the Inter-Burundian dialogue project resulted in several meetings but never led to a fully-fledged dialogue process because of the refusal of the Burundian Government to engage in the dialogue process and poor access and coordination among the facilitators. The youth and women's projects were generally well-implemented, seemed to improve relationships among youth of different political parties, and provided women with mediation and leadership opportunities that they may not have otherwise had; nonetheless, none of these projects took place at the scale (neither geographic nor temporal) necessary to achieve their aims nor did they seek to change the Burundian Government's policies that led to problems for youth and women in the first place. Instead, these community-level projects sought to operate within the political space available to them. Within that space, they seemed to be effective. The cross-border project contributed to its aim of facilitating the return of refugees but, like some of the youth projects, the efforts of the different implementing agencies were uncoordinated and did not address the longer-term issues inhibiting the reintegration of returning refugees. In the paragraphs below, we discuss in more detail the effectiveness of PBF support to each of its target sectors.

Human Rights (4 projects with a total budget of \$7,521,172)

70. As many of the interviews conducted for this evaluation revealed, the PBF human rights projects were some of the most challenging and important projects that the PBF supported. As summarized in Appendix D, three of these projects supported the monitoring and reporting of the OHCHR in Burundi while one supported the AU Human Rights Observers and Military Experts Mission.

71. The data collected for this evaluation demonstrated that the ability of OHCHR and the AU observer mission in Burundi to operate at their full capacity was hindered by the government's frequent interference in and obstruction of their monitoring and reporting activities. In the words of the UN High Commission for Human Rights, the Burundian Government's 2016 decision to suspend all cooperation with the UN Human Rights Office in Burundi, "meant that UN human rights staff were severely hampered in their ability to look into allegations of violations."¹¹⁷ The inability of the AU observer mission to secure an MOU curtailed its ability to operate freely in the country and fulfill its mandate. It also limited the AU observer mission's ability to use standard public reporting mechanisms to convey the events that it observed. The AU observer mission closed at the end of May 2021.¹¹⁸ Furthermore, the replacement of members of the Burundian human rights monitoring body—the Independent Human Rights Commission (CNIDH)—also seriously compromised its functions

¹¹⁷ "UN Human Rights Office in Burundi closes," Geneva: OHCHR, March 5, 2019, [<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24254>].

¹¹⁸ "Communique of the 993rd meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council on the African Union Human Rights Observers and Military Experts Mission in Burundi, 27 April 2021," Addis Ababa: African Union, May 7, 2021, [<http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-993rd-meeting-of-the-african-union-peace-and-security-council-on-the-african-union-human-rights-observers-and-military-experts-mission-in-burundi-27-april-2021>].

and its impartiality, leading the Global Alliance of national Human Rights Institutions to downgrade its independence ranking.¹¹⁹

72. Despite these challenges facing the OHCHR and the AU observer mission, interviewees reported that the support provided by the PBF was important to their operations. With support from the PBF and other donors, these two human rights offices reported human rights violations in a context where few others were able to do so.¹²⁰ Their human rights reporting triggered responses from the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council and a broader awareness of the degree of human rights abuses in Burundi, pointing to important positive unintended effects. In other words, even though OHCHR and the AU observer mission fell short of their own aims and mandates, the PBF support to these entities was highly effective because it enabled them to carry out a crucial conflict prevention and peacebuilding function in Burundi that might not otherwise have been possible.

73. The closure of the UN Human Rights Office in Burundi in 2019, at the request of the Burundian Government, not only illustrated long-standing tensions between the two entities, but also crippled the PBF's ability to continue to support human rights in Burundi.

Dialogue (1 project with a total budget of \$984,400)

74. In its single dialogue project, the PBF allocated almost \$1 million to the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) to enable the Office of the Special Advisor of the Secretary-General for Prevention (OSASG) to provide support for dialogue between Burundian political parties, which eventually took the form of the Inter-Burundian Dialogue facilitated by the EAC. After the departure of the Special Advisor of the Secretary-General from Burundi in 2017 at the request of the Burundian Government, UNOPS collaborated with the Office of the Special Envoy to the Secretary-General to Burundi (OESG-B) in these dialogue efforts.¹²¹ The project allowed OESG-B to provide training to various stakeholders including journalists, youth and women's groups, and members of the opposition ahead of mediation summits. It was able to ensure "wide and inclusive participation [in dialogue efforts] including providing a platform to political and non-political stakeholders to air their views."¹²² It also financed the travel cost of members of the opposition in exile. The project also enabled the facilitator to organize five sessions of the Inter-Burundian Dialogue. The final dialogue session took place in October 2018.¹²³

75. The ability of the PBF's support to achieve the aim outlined in the PBF project document—"create an environment favorable to the resolution of the current crisis in Burundi"—was contingent upon the openness of the government to allow the dialogue to take place, participate in the dialogue, and attempt to use the dialogue to resolve the political crisis.¹²⁴ Unfortunately, diverging interests and foreign policy imperatives within the EAC made it impossible to achieve a united front for the

¹¹⁹ Lewis Mudge, "La Commission nationale des droits de l'homme du Burundi n'exerce plus de travail critique," *Le Monde*, April 13, 2018, [https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/04/13/la-commission-nationale-des-droits-de-l-homme-du-burundi-n-exerce-plus-de-travail-critique_5285243_3212.html#xtor=AL-32280270].

¹²⁰ US Department of State, "2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Burundi," Washington, DC: US Department of State, [https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/___trashed/]; US Department of State, "2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Burundi," Washington, DC: US Department of State, [https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/burundi/].

¹²¹ "Burundi: le président demande le départ du représentant de l'ONU," *RFI*, November 15, 2016, [https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20161115-burundi-onu-nkurunziza-demande-depart-representant-jamal-benomar].

¹²² Interview, virtual, June 2021.

¹²³ "5th and Final Round of Inter-Burundian Dialogue comes to a Close," *East African Community Press Release*, October 29, 2018, [https://www.eac.int/press-releases/1271-5th-and-final-round-of-inter-burundian-dialogue-comes-to-a-close].

¹²⁴ See summary of project document in Appendix D.

promotion of dialogue.¹²⁵ Moreover, the Burundian Government repeatedly undermined the negotiation process by imposing difficult conditions, delaying, and stalling the process.¹²⁶ The government eventually used its parallel National Inter-Burundian Dialogue Commission (CNDI) to try to delegitimize the EAC-led dialogue.¹²⁷ The project was closed after the fifth session in October 2018 after the Burundian Government refused to participate in further meetings outside of its territory. While there were likely individual gains achieved through training and meetings, and potential relationships and understanding built among individuals via repeated participation in the dialogue summits, the political context did not permit these individual changes to contribute to a sustained dialogue.

Youth (10 projects with a total budget of \$18,889,069)

76. The PBF supported ten projects focused on youth, the majority of which aimed to build inter-group social cohesion among youth who were engaged in or vulnerable to political violence, thus reducing the propensity for future violence. Most of the project included a “soft” component that focused on conflict resolution, mediation, or dialogue skills and a “hard” component that focused on the provision of some type of socio-economic assistance. This was in part due to basic best practice in peacebuilding project design and in part due to the Burundian Government’s insistence that the UN, and other international aid actors, focus on providing concrete, socio-economic benefits to the population.¹²⁸

77. There was widespread agreement among the people interviewed for this evaluation that the youth projects supported by the PBF were relevant to the Burundian context given the important role of youth in actual and potential political violence. Among the youth projects, however, there was significant variation in their ability to reach youth from different political parties or groups and gain access to youth most in need of social cohesion.

78. The youth-related projects were wide-ranging. For example, one of the projects developed by the Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP) and the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) consisted in convening youth affiliated with different political parties for leadership training. ACORD, on the other hand, hosted peacebuilding clubs to facilitate dialogue between youth from various ethnic and political backgrounds. Most project activities focused on bringing together young people from various ethnic and political backgrounds to engage in sustained dialogue over themes related to peace, coexistence, security, and good governance. As mentioned above, many of the projects also included livelihood components at the request of the government.

79. A number of implementing partners and observers who we interviewed argued that these diverse youth-focused activities fostered a climate of peace and social cohesion during the 2020 electoral cycle. While it is was not possible to measure the causal relationship between these activities and non-violent elections, people interviewed for this evaluation argued that the large number of youth-focused projects and their spread across various parts of the country, some of which were difficult to access due to insecurity, fostered bonds that helped to prevent the escalation of violence with communities.

¹²⁵ Running Out of Options in Burundi,” Africa Report No. 278, Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, June 20, 2019, [<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/burundi/278-running-out-options-burundi>].

¹²⁶ Running Out of Options in Burundi,” Africa Report No. 278, Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, June 20, 2019, [<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/burundi/278-running-out-options-burundi>].

¹²⁷ “Report of the Secretary-General on Burundi,” S/2017/165, New York: United Nations Security Council, February 27, 2017.

¹²⁸ Interviews, virtual, May/June 2021.

80. This set of youth-focused projects also faced numerous challenges that hindered their effectiveness. First, interviewees contended that the livelihood component of these projects was insufficient to address the high levels of poverty and unemployment among Burundian youth. They also argued that these projects lacked the financial and programmatic reinforcement necessary for youth to sustain the new skills and behaviors that they learned during the projects. Second, the final report from one project argued that “the short timeframe of peacebuilding interventions is still a barrier to promoting visible change in this field.”¹²⁹ This argument was not only found in final reports, but was also clearly articulated by a large number of our interviewees. Third, while implementing partners and observers pointed to the local peace dividends of youth-related activities, it remains unclear whether these community-focused activities enabled youth to be more active at the national level. In other words, while some projects seemed to foster horizontal inclusion of different groups within communities, there is little evidence of how this translated into improved party or group relationships at the national level. Finally, for youth activities that were deemed too political by the government, delays abrupt cessation of activities interrupted learning processes and shortened the project’s duration. Others were unable to include diverse party perspectives because of local government involvement.

Women (4 projects with a total budget of \$6,232,446)

81. The PBF funded four projects that focused on women, although at least one of the youth-focused projects also aimed to benefit women. The four PBF-supported women’s projects primarily focused on strengthening women’s conflict resolution and leadership capacities. A wide range of our interviewees—implementing partners, members of the JSC, observers, and beneficiaries—claimed that the PBF-supported women’s projects had been largely effective. More specifically, these projects aimed to build women’s capacity in three areas: 1) local conflict mediation, monitoring, and response; training and community awareness-raising on issues of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV); and gender-sensitive media reporting. As with the projects that fell under the youth sector, several of these projects included income-generating activities at the request of the government.

82. To take an example, the “Support Women Leaders” project was implemented by Search for Common Ground (SFCG), an international NGO with over two decades of experience operating in Burundi, aimed to use training and coaching in leadership, peaceful conflict resolution, advocacy, networking, and positive masculinity to strengthen existing women leaders and foster new women leaders. The external evaluation for this project and project participants whom we interviewed perceived this project to have a positive effect on community perceptions of women’s role in conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and their communities overall.¹³⁰ Our interviewees offered numerous examples of how this project’s capacity-building activities gave them the knowledge and confidence to mediate conflict in their communities and a sense of pride with being sought after and trusted as community leaders.¹³¹ They also indicated how local authorities have learned to turn to these women leaders to help promote peace in their communities. In addition, the external evaluation reported that “the qualitative data collected also show that Search for Common Ground – the implementing entity – played an important role in changing the behaviors of beneficiaries by building their technical and

¹²⁹ CORDAID (2021). *Rapport final de la Mission d’Evaluation finale du Projet ‘Jeunes, pilier de l’Émergence d’une Société Inclusive pour l’Égalité du Genre au Burundi’ Mis en Oeuvre par Cordaid au Burundi*. Page 21.

¹³⁰ Yssa Oumar Basse. 2020, Rapport De l’Evaluation Finale: Soutenit les femmes leaders d’aujourd’hui et de demain pour faire avancer la paix au Burundi, October 2020.

¹³¹ Interviews, Burundi, May 2021.

strategic capacities for peaceful conflict management and prevention to ensure the preservation of sustainable peace as a source of development for all.”¹³²

83. Out of all of the PBF-supported projects, the women’s projects were the least overtly political, with the post-2015 projects, in particular, focusing on local-level family and land disputes. These women’s projects also received strong support from and endorsement by the Burundian Government. Even though the PBF-supported women’s projects were less directly related to Burundi’s macro-level conflict dynamics, they seemed to increase the community-level and household-level conflict resolution capacity of the women who benefitted from them. While some interviewees praised such projects as facilitating women’s access to leadership roles, others commented that the projects did not address the inferior position of women within society; the projects only seldom offered opportunities for women to access positions of power or leadership that they would not have otherwise possessed.

84. Many of the challenges faced by the youth-related activities are also apparent with the women’s projects. First, interviewees noted that the livelihood components of these projects were insufficient to address women’s need for support. The trainings also lacked the necessary follow-up to reinforce the skills and relationships fostered during the project. Second, implementing partners interviewed lamented the short-term nature of PBF funding and the lack of a clear strategy for sustaining the projects’ gains as a clear obstacle to effectiveness. Finally, while implementing partners and observers pointed to local peace dividends of the women’s projects, it remains unclear whether trainings and activities will enable women to be more active at the national level. While a handful of women were able to use their training to access elected offices, like the youth projects, there is no evidence of sustained contributions to the type of vertical inclusion of women in political office discussed in the context analysis in Section 2. As a result, while these projects may empower women at the community level, there is no indication that they significantly improve the inferior position of women in social and political life.

Cross-Border (1 project with a total budget of \$1,054,399)

85. The cross-border project responded to a crucial need in Burundi: supporting the return of thousands of Burundians who had fled to Tanzania following the 2015 attempted coup d’état and subsequent government crackdown on potential opposition. The PBF-supported project aimed to “promote concrete cross-border, human rights-based and multi-agency approaches to peacebuilding” through border coordination and refugee protection, human rights and conflict resolution awareness-raising training, legal and dispute-resolution support, provision of livelihood support for returnees, and support for community-based conflict resolution mechanisms (see Results Table in Appendix D).

86. At the height of the 2015 insecurity in December, over 220,000 new Burundian refugees had fled to neighboring countries.¹³³ The majority of these refugees were in Tanzania. In this sense, the project was highly relevant. Furthermore, in a climate where communication among the UN, Tanzania, and Burundi was inhibited, it served a policy-level aftermath of 2015. The effectiveness of the project was, nonetheless, constrained by its focus on return, but not on sustainable reintegration. Supporting the return of approximately 100,000 Burundians to a country of 11.5 million people with a high dependence on subsistence agriculture, presents considerable challenges. Given the number of

¹³² Yssa Oumar Basse. 2020, Rapport De l’Evaluation Finale: Soutenir les femmes leaders d’aujourd’hui et de demain pour faire avancer la paix au Burundi, October 2020, p. 6. (Translated from French by the evaluation team.)

¹³³ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. December 14, 2015. Burundi Situation: Displacement of Burundians in Neighbouring Countries | As of 14 December 2015. [[http:// https://www.refworld.org/docid/5694b72b4.html](http://https://www.refworld.org/docid/5694b72b4.html)]

conflicts in Burundi related to land, and the weakness of the existing legal and community mechanisms to manage these land disputes, the lack of sustainable reintegration support for these returnees may set the stage for potential future conflicts.

87. According to this project's final evaluation, the time and geographical scope of the cross-border project, in conjunction with a limited budget and the changes in the political context, made it extremely difficult for the project to achieve its aims. The evaluator writes that "the project's budget was too small and the duration of the project too short to achieve a significant impact."¹³⁴ The evaluation identified two specific challenges. First, even though the "conflict resolution skills for peaceful dispute resolution is much appreciated, but there is no reliable monitoring system to collect and track data."¹³⁵ Second, "the legal assistance component is not sustainable, as when the project finished the legal staff were no longer available to provide free legal aid services."¹³⁶ In sum, the short-term nature of the project and lack of sustainable reintegration services meant that the gains for the project were likely to be temporary, at best.

88. Another project that focused on reintegration, but is listed under the youth sector because it targeted reintegrating youth, was the "Peacebuilding for sustainable reintegration for Peace in Burundi." The external evaluation for this project points to similar sustainability problems as those faced by the cross-border project and many of the women's and youth project: "the support time for the structures created was not long enough to sufficiently strengthen these community and social structures."¹³⁷ The project evaluation goes on to specify that even though the local and central government accompanied and supported the project activities, the government did not have the resources – financial and non-financial – to keep up these activities for the reintegration of returnees.¹³⁸ Our interviewees also argued that the short funding timeframe of the PBF projects inhibited the effectiveness of these refugee reintegration projects. Other interviewees argued that without addressing the broader political and policy barriers to sustainable reintegration, community-level projects would not be effective at sustainably reintegrating Burundians.

Coordination (1 project with a total budget of \$2,059,680)

89. The main coordination project supported the capacity of the PBF Secretariat in coordinating the Joint Steering Committee, supporting the capacity of the RUNOs and NUNOs, liaising with the PBSO, and supporting the Resident Coordinator. Generally, the PBF Secretariat faced serious challenges to its coordination efforts due to the position of the government regarding peacebuilding activities and the limited capacity of many RUNOs and some NUNOs to design and implement these projects. There were also capacity gaps within the PBF Secretariat, created in part by high turnover and the lack of staff in crucial positions, that prevented it from coordinating and monitoring to the degree that would have been necessary for such a challenging context. We further assess coordination in the discussion of management and oversight, below.

¹³⁴ Bugnion de Moreta, Christian (2019). "Executive Summary" In: Final Evaluation Report of the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) project entitled "Preventing conflict and building peace through addressing the drivers of conflict and instability associated with forced displacement between Burundi and Tanzania." Page 1.

¹³⁵ Ibid. Page 3.

¹³⁶ Ibid. Pages 3-4.

¹³⁷ Eloi Edouard Kwizera & Alphonsine Bikorimana (2020). Page xii. Translated from French by the evaluation team.

¹³⁸ Eloi Edouard Kwizera & Alphonsine Bikorimana (2020). Page xii. Translated from French by the evaluation team.

3.3 Catalytic Effects

90. For the PBF, catalytic effects measure of the degree to which the project triggers, accelerates, enables, or leverages resources so that follow-on peacebuilding actions are likely to occur.¹³⁹ The PBF tends to measure these effects in terms of the amount of funds raised for a follow-on project; however, the purpose of this additional funding, of course, is to catalyze changes in the peace and conflict context. Our interviewees agreed with this assessment, arguing that the PBSO's focus on catalytic funding led it to support one-off projects, whose results fizzled after their closure, rather than considering how the PBF could invest in institutions and projects that could sustain these results and catalyze real change in Burundi's peace and conflict dynamics.

91. The catalytic effects of this third phase of PBF support to Burundi were limited for several reasons. First, there was not sufficient funding available from other donors to support the continuation or scaling up of the types of projects that the PBF was implementing. Most donors were focused on funding basic health, education, and other types of development assistance, not peacebuilding. The scarcity of available funding was, of course, exacerbated by the suspension standard development cooperation by the EU and other donors after 2016 and the related increase in humanitarian and related emergency support. An analysis released by UNICEF on the socio-economic consequences of the 2015 crisis summarized the problem: "To date, the continuous instability led to withdrawal of significant donors, diversion of social budgets for the election implementation, and stagnating foreign direct investment. These factors combined increase the likelihood that the country will soon suffer from erratic, severe socio-economic consequences, with the most vulnerable populations to be most affected, specifically deprived and malnourished children."¹⁴⁰ In response to this dire context, donors prioritized immediate life-saving and livelihood support to Burundians, not peacebuilding activities focused on reconciliation or institutional reform, which they tend to view as most appropriate in the aftermath of a political crisis.¹⁴¹

92. Second, the government did not want donors to focus on peacebuilding or peace consolidation, but on providing development funds to support the "capitalization of peace."¹⁴² This focus on development also aligns with the incentive of the majority of donors, and the development agencies of the UNCT, to prioritize development cooperation over peacebuilding and maintain good relations with the host government.¹⁴³

93. Third, the coordination infrastructure among donors and between the PBF and donors was weak, preventing broader strategic discussions about how donors could support and catalyze PBF activities. In the first and second phase of PBF support to Burundi, the PBF Secretariat, the ERSG, the RC, and the Burundian Government had developed a robust donor coordination structure.¹⁴⁴ This donor

¹³⁹ "Catalytic programming does not transform a conflict root cause or defuse a trigger; instead it sets up the conditions for the root-cause to be transformed or the trigger resolved. These intermediate conditions (or enabling factors) still represent changes in the context, but they are not the ultimate peacebuilding changes desired. Therefore, like yeast and salt, enabling factors (conditions) should not be viewed in isolation of the larger or longer-term effect desired." Scharbatke-Church, Cheyanne, Susanna Campbell, Julia Doehrn, Philip Thomas, and Peter Woodrow. *Catalytic Programming and the Peacebuilding Fund*. (PeaceNexus Foundation, 2010) 9.

¹⁴⁰ "Burundi Budgeting Analysis: Socio-economic Consequences of the 2015 Crisis for Children," Bujumbura: UNICEF Burundi, 2015.

¹⁴¹ "International Support to Post-Conflict Transition: Rethinking Policy, Changing Practice," Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2012.

¹⁴² Presidence de la Republique, "Communique de Presse No 17 de la Reunion du Conseil des Ministres du Mercredi 21 Avril 2021," Bujumbura: Republique du Burundi, April 22, 2021.

¹⁴³ Susanna P. Campbell, *Global Governance and Local Peace: Accountability and Performance in International Peacebuilding*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018; OECD, *Transition Financing: Building a Better Response*, Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2010.

¹⁴⁴ Campbell, Susanna P., Tracy Dexter, Michael Findley, Stephanie Hofmann, Josiah Marineau, and Daniel Walker (2014). "Independent External Evaluation: UN Peacebuilding Fund Project Portfolio in Burundi." New York: UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO).

coordination structure had largely disintegrated by this third phase. Our interviews revealed that high turnover in the RC and the RCO, the EU sanctions, and the Burundian Government's resistance to donor engagement prevented the type of donor coordination necessary for the PBF Secretariat to even understand what type of catalytic funding might be available. Relatedly, the high turnover within the Burundian Government and the UN during this period left few interlocutors with sufficient institutional memory about what had happened before their arrival and what needed to be catalyzed. Our interviewees reported that even in the cases where they engaged in significant advocacy with donors for catalytic funding, based on clear results from successful projects like the women's mediation project, donors were still unwilling to provide follow-up funding.

94. In spite of these challenges, several of the projects had catalytic effects that led peacebuilding outcomes after the end of the project. First, UNWOMEN's women's mediation project ("Promoting women's roles in peacebuilding") built on existing structures and relationships to augment the leadership and conflict-resolution skills of women and to create a network of women mediators that would reinforce these skills. Our interviews indicate that the creation of this network structure seems to have had a catalytic effect because it survived beyond the life of the project and continued to support the capacity of the women trained by the project, although it is not clear if they were able to transfer these skills to other women. Second, the PBF support for human rights also had clear catalytic effects, particularly in spurring actions by the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council and in signaling that the protection of human rights was still a priority for the UN and the AU in Burundi.

95. The project evaluation for the "Youth LAB" project, implemented by NIMD, indicated that the project was partially extended to reach more beneficiaries.¹⁴⁵ This extension was eventually supposed to be integrated in another project funded by the EU but was still in negotiation at the time of the final evaluation. The evaluation report also indicated that "the monitoring report of June 2020 indicates an example of financial catalytic effect, meaning a project financed by the EU (USD 905,000) and USAID (USD 350,000)."¹⁴⁶ Unfortunately, Burundi's tense political context attenuated these catalytic effects: according to the evaluation report and multiple interviewees, one of the national implementing partners—BLTP—was forced to temporarily cease its activities in the midst of the project implementation.¹⁴⁷

96. Several other PBF projects—the support to the OHCHR and AU observers, the cross-border project—were co-funded by other donors, such as the European Union, but these donors were not aware that the PBF was also financing these projects. Rather than catalyzing new funding, the PBF seemed to supplement simultaneous grants from other donors. Interviewees reported that even though member state diplomatic personnel understood the need to support peacebuilding activities in Burundi, their development aid colleagues were highly reluctant to do so in what they perceived to be a high-risk environment.

97. Through prior tranches of PBF support, the PBF had also helped to catalyze the formation of the National Independent Commission on Human Rights (CNIDH) and reinforced the capacity of the National Commission for Land and Livelihoods (CNTB).¹⁴⁸ In spite of the PBF's initial support and

¹⁴⁵ Augustin Halerimana & Zéphirin Seleman (2020). Evaluation Finale du Project "Youth LAB."

¹⁴⁶ Augustin Halerimana & Zéphirin Seleman (2020). Evaluation Finale du Project "Youth LAB," p. 3.

¹⁴⁷ Augustin Halerimana & Zéphirin Seleman (2020). Evaluation Finale du Project "Youth LAB," p. 3; Interviews, virtual, May and June 2021.

¹⁴⁸ For more information about these PBF projects, see: Susanna P. Campbell, Leonard Kayobera, and Justine Nkurunziza, "Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi," New York: United Nations, March 2010, [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CABFEA3AB9A416D34925779C000EAE96-Full_Report.pdf];

these institutions' initial independence, during the 2014 to 2020 period, both of these institutions were coopted by the Burundian Government. The CNIDH was downgraded from an A-level institution to a B-level institution—referring to its level of independence—by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions.

98. For most of the people we interviewed for this evaluation, “catalytic” referred to the actual effect of the project, not the amount of money raised. They argued that the PBF’s focus on short-term, innovative projects did not give them sufficient time and resources to ensure that their projects achieved catalytic effects. The nature of the problems that they were addressing—particularly for the cross-border, youth social cohesion, and women’s mediation—were much greater than any single project, or group of projects, could address. Creating a catalytic effect for these projects would have required a much higher degree of outreach to donors and the design of a broader series of projects and programs, focused on one community or group of stakeholders, to ensure that the single project(s) funded by the PBF catalyzed a larger effect on peacebuilding. Overall, our evaluation suggests that, other than the human rights projects, one of the most important catalytic effects of the PBF support to Burundi during this period may have been within the UN Peacebuilding Architecture itself. The Head of the PBF configuration, the Burundian Government, the Resident Coordinator, the high-level staff within the UN Secretariat were able to have conversations about peace and security via the PBF projects.

3.4 Efficiency

99. Efficiency assesses two things: a) cost efficiency, or whether results were achieved with the least amount of money possible compared to other alternatives; and b) the timely delivery of the planned activities.¹⁴⁹ We lack sufficient data to assess the cost efficiency of the PBF support during this period. Based on interviews and existing project evaluations and reports, we are able to assess the timeliness of the delivery of the planned activities. Overall, the timeliness of the implementation of PBF projects was hindered by changes in the Burundian political landscape, reluctance of the government to approve PBF-supported activities, and slow and cumbersome procurement and human resources procedures within the UN, in general, and within UNDP, in particular.

100. The average project duration was two years, and the median budget was \$1.5 million. Most of the projects were extended and/or revised. The project “Promoting National Dialogue” had to postpone the start of its activities by a year.¹⁵⁰ The project “Fund supporting the dialogue for resolving the crisis in Burundi” had to be extended. According to its revised initial report: “Started in June 2016, the project was slowly and only partially executed, because of the absence of real engagement of stakeholders to the inclusive dialogue process led by the East African Community.”¹⁵¹

101. The challenging political landscape following the 2015 crisis, in particular, led to delays in several projects. The project “OHCHR Monitoring and reporting in Burundi” was supposed to hire its personnel by the start of the year 2015, but an assessment of the context of Burundi indicated a high risk of an increase in human rights violations during the electoral process. As a consequence, the project took longer than expected to recruit human rights officials with adequate professional experience.¹⁵² Similarly, the project “Strengthening the monitoring, report production and technical

¹⁴⁹ Campbell, Susanna P., Tracy Dexter, Michael Findley, Stephanie Hofmann, Josiah Marineau, and Daniel Walker (2014). “Independent External Evaluation: UN Peacebuilding Fund Project Portfolio in Burundi.” New York: UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO).

¹⁵⁰ 94613 Evaluation 2018: Constat #1, page 4.

¹⁵¹ 100897 Extension 2017, page 3.

¹⁵² 93122 Extension 2015, page 4.

cooperation of OHCHR in Burundi” was delayed at the beginning of its mandate because of a lack of resources at UNDP that slowed down the recruitment of national staff.¹⁵³

102. The project “Promoting women's roles in peacebuilding” was revised three times. The first revision was motivated by the fact that the project had identified more activities related to promoting women’s role in peacebuilding.¹⁵⁴ The second time, the project was extended along with the rest of the PBF portfolio; in addition, project documents mentioned that the leadership of implementing partners had changed, causing further delays in implementation.¹⁵⁵ The project’s third extension was justified by the change in context and the need for more time to reach their objectives.¹⁵⁶

3.5 Coherence

103. Coherence refers to how the PBF projects relate to one another as well as to the breadth of peacebuilding efforts within the host country. Internal coherence addresses “the synergies and interlinkages between the intervention and other interventions carried out by the same institution/government, as well as the consistency of the intervention with the relevant international norms and standards to which that institution/government adheres.”¹⁵⁷ External coherence refers to “the consistency of the intervention with other actors’ interventions in the same context.”¹⁵⁸ The assumption underlying this evaluation criterion is that more coherent peacebuilding efforts will reduce duplication and have an aggregate strategic effect. By definition, coherence requires the existence of an overall strategy to which the different activities cohere. The levels of coherence of the PBF-supported projects in Burundi were generally low, at both the policy and implementation levels.

104. At the policy level, for most of the period under review, there was no overarching strategy or analysis guiding the PBF projects. There was often an implicit strategy deployed by the PBC and the RC, in collaboration with the PBSO, but this strategy focused more on maintaining relationships and dialogue with the Burundian Government rather than ensuring that the PBF attained its desired programmatic outcomes. Furthermore, the relationship between the political and programmatic components of the UN presence in Burundi was inhibited by the fact that the Office of the Special Advisor of the Secretary-General (OSASG) for Prevention, and subsequently the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi (OESG-B), was unable to maintain strong diplomatic relations with the Burundian Government or, often, coordinate effectively with the RC or the broader UNCT. As a result, in spite of the complex political situation in Burundi, the UN did not have a clear political voice or strategy around which to cohere its peacebuilding efforts. As mentioned above, the Chairman of the Burundi Configuration of the PBC often stepped in to fill this void and the PBC, in general, seemed to be a place where productive discussions on Burundi could occur.

105. At the project implementation level, our interviewees indicated that there was little to no coherence among the PBF projects even when multiple partners were involved in implementing the same activity, such as the cross-border project. Furthermore, implementing partners working within the same thematic areas noted that there was little to no effort by the PBSO, the PBF Secretariat, RUNOs, or NUNOs to encourage them to strategize amongst themselves in order to facilitate an aggregate impact. Within joint projects, such as the cross-border project, RUNOs, NUNOs, and

¹⁵³ 98478 Extension 2016: page 5-6.

¹⁵⁴ 93147 Revision 2016: page 5.

¹⁵⁵ 93147 Extension (No cost) 2017: page 2-3.

¹⁵⁶ 93147 Extension (Cost) 2018: page 4.

¹⁵⁷ OECD DAC (2019).

¹⁵⁸ OECD DAC (2019).

implementing partners took a division of labor approach where they divided up geographic locations or tasks and each implemented their component separately without consideration for how it integrated with the other components, even though the project proposal emphasized the importance of integrated implementation.¹⁵⁹

106. The project evaluation of the “Peacebuilding for sustainable reintegration for Peace in Burundi” project, implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UN Development Program (UNDP), UN Population Fund (UNFPA), and UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), confirms this pattern: “an analysis of the project implementation approach reveals that the implementation of the joint project activities did not allow for complementarity of approaches. Each agency targeted its beneficiaries, and developed its interventions without consulting the approaches and interventions of other agencies, even though they were intervening in the same commune.”¹⁶⁰ The cross-border project—managed by UNDP, UNHCR, and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Burundi and Tanzania—implemented joint planning, organized regular calls/meetings to coordinate and held joint activities;¹⁶¹ nonetheless, the project evaluation concluded: “closer coordination would allow [the implementing agencies] to generate greater synergies amongst the project components, something that the UN agencies field staff and regional programme coordinator readily recognized.”¹⁶²

3.6 National Ownership

107. National ownership measures: a) national buy-in – the degree to which the main people affected by a project buy into the project idea and design; and b) national involvement in implementation – the degree to which the key stakeholders are involved in the implementation of the project and feel ownership over the project outcomes.¹⁶³

108. The data collected for this evaluation shows that national ownership during this third phase of PBF support to Burundi primarily meant ownership by (and compliance with the preferences of) the Burundian Government, not the broader set of civil society organizations that had more actively participated in the JSC during the two prior phases of PBF support. For much of the period under review, the resistance of the Burundian Government to peacebuilding prevented the PBF, in particular, and the UN, in general, from working to address the main drivers of Burundi’s conflict and the types of activities that the PBF supports in other countries—such as inclusive dialogue among political actors, addressing land issues, and monitoring human rights abuses. There were several projects that did not have the explicit support or endorsement by the Burundian Government, namely the support to the AU Human Rights observers and the support to the EAC-negotiated Inter-Burundian dialogue. Furthermore, the projects supported by the Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative did not require the same degree of ownership from the recipient government as the other PBF projects.

109. The data collected for this evaluation indicates that while there was national ownership in the approval of the majority of the PBF-supported projects, the national government was not closely involved in collaborating with RUNOs and NUNOs in the implementation of the majority of the projects, even though it increasingly monitored INGO and NNGO compliance with government

¹⁵⁹ Interviews, virtual and in Burundi, May and June 2021.

¹⁶⁰ Eloi Edouard Kwizera & Alphonsine Bikorimana (2020). Page 18.

¹⁶¹ Bugnion de Moreta, Christian (2019). Page 34.

¹⁶² Bugnion de Moreta, Christian (2019). Page 35.

¹⁶³ OECD DAC (2019).

priorities and policies. The dysfunction of the JSC during this period meant that, for most projects, the central government did not closely follow the implementation of the majority of the projects or directly participate in the activities. The local administrators, however, were highly involved in many of the community-level projects, particularly those focused on women's mediation networks and social cohesion among youth. Furthermore, the national NGO implementing partners were highly connected to Burundian politicians and a broad group of Burundian stakeholders, enabling a degree of national ownership in the initial conceptualization and implementation of their PBF-funded activities that was not apparent in the other PBF-supported projects.

110. According to its external evaluation, the “Peacebuilding for sustainable reintegration for Peace in Burundi” project also had a high level of national ownership. The four UN agencies implementing this project—UNDP, FAO, UNHCR, and UNFPA—worked hand in hand with various ministries at the national level and with local organizations.¹⁶⁴ The project evaluation indicates that it created “community structures (peace clubs, change agents) and social and community entities...that can intervene in the strengthening of the project's achievements...[and] involved the local and central administration in the different phases of project implementation, such as in periodic reviews, joint participatory needs assessment, monitoring visits of project's achievements.”¹⁶⁵

111. Furthermore, the Burundian Government's increased monitoring, in line with the NGO legal restrictions outlined above, of INGO and NNGO activities meant that both the central government and local administrators often had a high level of knowledge of the implementation of PBF activities. Our interviews indicated that the degree to which these governmental officials supported and collaborated in project implementation depended on the degree to which the activities aligned with the government's preferred policies and approaches, as well as those of the beneficiaries with whom they spoke. One limitation of this high level of involvement by local authorities was that it increased their ability to interfere in PBF-supported projects and act as gatekeepers. Data collected during this evaluation indicated that, in some cases, local authorities prioritized the inclusion of members of their own political party and forced the exclusion of the participants that the PBF-supported project was supposed to target, thereby negatively affecting the reach and expected peacebuilding outcomes of PBF-supported projects.

112. The general low level of government ownership in the direct implementation of most PBF-supported projects was in contrast to earlier tranches of PBF support where, for example, the Burundian Government and the UN co-directed and co-implemented projects related to governance and security-sector reform.¹⁶⁶ This should not be surprising given that the political context in Burundi from 2014 to 2020. Given that the government was increasingly curtailing human rights and political freedom, and the UN is mandated to protect human rights and foster peace and security, one could not expect full ownership by the Burundian Government of the PBF projects during this period. From this perspective, the participation of the Burundian Government in the JSC and agreement to allow

¹⁶⁴ “The implementation of the project favored a partnership and collaborative approach with the local administration and (i) the Ministry of the Interior and Patriotic Training and Local Development. Other ministries were involved in the implementation of the project, notably through their decentralized entities. These include: (i) the Ministry of Justice, Civil Protection and the Keeper of the Seals; (ii) the Ministry of Human Rights, Social Affairs and Gender; (iii) the Ministry of Youth, Post and Information Technology; (iv) the Ministry of the Environment, Agriculture and Livestock; and the Ministry of Public Security... The four agencies also worked with NGOs, including (vi) Food for the Hungry; (vii) Help Channel Burundi (HCB); (viii) SOPRAD Caritas Ruyigi; (ix) Réseau 2000 plus; (x) COPED; (xi) Burundi Red Cross (BRC); (xii) World Vision International (WVI); (xiii) Association des Scouts du Burundi; (xiv) Burundi Incubation Network/ SPARK; (xv) UNCHR's bar associations and operational partners (Caritas and JRS).” From Eloi Edouard Kwizera & Alphonsine Bikorimana (2020). Page 1. Translated from French by the evaluation team.

¹⁶⁵ Eloi Edouard Kwizera & Alphonsine Bikorimana (2020). Page xii. Translated from French by the evaluation team.

¹⁶⁶ Susanna P. Campbell, Leonard Kayobera, and Justine Nkurunziza, “Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi,” New York: United Nations, March 2010, [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CABFEA3AB9A416D34925779C000EAE96-Full_Report.pdf].

PBF projects to operate may be a contribution. Furthermore, in a context where full buy-in and ownership of PBF projects is not possible, national ownership that equates with the permission to operate may be the only type of government-level ownership that is feasible for PBF projects.

113. The Burundian Government has indicated that its priorities are development and “capitalizing” on the peace that it has already built, not on building peace.¹⁶⁷ This was validated during our interviews with government officials. Burundi’s National Development Plan supports this approach with figures illustrating the extreme poverty suffered by Burundian people.¹⁶⁸ As summarized by the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office in Burundi in 2019, “Burundi is one of the five least developed countries in the world, ranking 185th out of 189 countries on the Human Development Index (2017). It is also the second most densely populated country in Africa and levels of poverty are very high with small scale farmers particularly affected.”¹⁶⁹ In addition, 39 percent of the population in Burundi lacks access to basic sanitation and life expectancy in the country is 57 years.¹⁷⁰ On average, Burundians go to school for three years. Burundi also suffers heavily from climate change and environmental disasters such as droughts and floods. Within this broader context, the Burundian Government argues that development and economic liberalization, not political liberalization, are its top priorities. As a result, national ownership in this context requires the PBF to align with the government’s national development priorities as outlined in its National Development Plan.

3.7 Conflict Sensitivity and Risk Management

114. Conflict sensitivity refers to the ability of the organization to: 1) understand the context in which it operates; 2) understand the interaction between its interventions and the context; and 3) act upon the understanding of this interaction in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts.¹⁷¹ Risk management is the process of evaluating alternative regulatory and non-regulatory responses to risk and selecting among them.

115. The clearest evidence of strategic level conflict sensitivity of the PBF support to Burundi is the PPP III’s two revisions, in 2016 and 2017 respectively: first, the PBF reallocated funds towards human rights and youth as a result of the 2015 political crisis; second, the PBF extended the implementation time for the entire portfolio since many initiatives were delayed by the 2015 events and required more time to adapt to the new situation. While the PBF projects were adaptive at this strategic level, we were not able to find evidence of the conflict sensitivity of many of the PBF-supported projects during their implementation phase.

116. The 2019 evaluation of the cross-border project explained that the context surrounding the project evolved in Burundi and Tanzania.¹⁷² Yet, while the change in context were acknowledged in the project’s reports, the project did not seem to update its activities in response. According to the external evaluation: “The project adapted to the changes in the conditions with the request for the

¹⁶⁷ Presidence de la Republique, “Communique de Presse No 17 de la Reunion du Conseil des Ministres du Mercredi 21 Avril 2021,” Bujumbura: Republique du Burundi, April 22, 2021.

¹⁶⁸ Government of Burundi, *Plan National de developement du Burundi, PND Burundi, 2018-2027*, Bujumbura: Republique du Burundi, June 2018.

¹⁶⁹ Office of the Resident Coordination for Burundi, “Building Community-Level Resilience and Preventing Conflict in Burundi,” Bujumbura: United Nations, November 2019, p. 6.

¹⁷⁰ Office of the Resident Coordination for Burundi, “Building Community-Level Resilience and Preventing Conflict in Burundi,” Bujumbura: United Nations, November 2019.

¹⁷¹ International Alert, *Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding: A resource pack*, London: International Alert, 2004, [<https://gsdrc.org/document-library/conflict-sensitive-approaches-to-development-humanitarian-assistance-and-peacebuilding-a-resource-pack/>].

¹⁷² Bugnion de Moreta, Christian (2019). Pages 21-22.

extension of the implementation period, but it did not review its Theory of Change or results framework formally, to reflect the change in the conflict dynamics.”¹⁷³

117. Several other projects lacked a coherent conflict analysis or risk assessment. For example, the 2018 evaluation of the “Promoting National Dialogue” project does not specifically review whether the project kept an appropriate, up-to-date conflict analysis of Burundi or the regions where the project implemented its activities. The evaluation does not speak to the interaction between the intervention and the context; it implicitly refers to the fact that the project adapted to the context of the 2015 crisis, and as a consequence dropped three of its initial outcomes that were associated with the 2015 elections. The fact that the evaluation does not report on the project’s formal approach to conflict sensitivity, and that the project did not show an appropriate understanding of the context, flags an important area of improvement.¹⁷⁴

118. Both conflict sensitivity and risk management point to the importance of the project implementation process. Of course, a conflict analysis is likely to be a necessary starting point, but conflict sensitivity is determined not only by the project’s initial design but also by how the project activities interact with the evolving conflict dynamics. The RUNUs, NUNOs, and implementing partners that had experience with implementing peacebuilding activities in Burundi —such as the BLTP and NIMD —seemed also to be adept at conflict sensitivity. Those projects that were implemented by NUNOs or RUNOs with less peacebuilding experience seemed to view their project implementation as something that was isolated from the broader conflict and vulnerability dynamics that surrounded them. In relation to risk management, as discussed above, the short-term nature of the PBF projects and the inability of the RUNOs or NUNOs to reinforce the gains made by their projects prevented them from addressing the potential negative effects of the projects that may not be immediately visible. The short timeframe also prevented RUNOs and NUNOs from addressing the broader political or policy-level changes that would be necessary to mitigate negative effects.

119. There is also a broader risk in the PBF’s overall approach that has not been addressed in PBF strategy documents. By supporting and funding NGOs to engage in potentially risky peacebuilding interventions in an increasingly insecure environment, is the PBF, in fact, putting them at further risk or is it helping them to sustain their peacebuilding contribution? Future PBF support in these contexts should develop a strategy for supporting and mitigating the potential risk facing NUNOs, implementing partners, and project participants who engaging in peacebuilding activities.

3.8 Gender

120. Gender analysis is the systematic analysis of the impact of a program or policy on men/boys and on women/girls. A gender analysis assists donors to address gaps or opportunities that impact the ability of men/boys and women/girls to benefit equitably from the program or policy. Within the context of a conflict-affected society, UN member states have mandated that the Women Peace and Security Agenda (UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions) anchor program development and implementation.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷³ Bugnion de Moreta, Christian (2019). Page 22.

¹⁷⁴ Faye, Cheikh (2018).

¹⁷⁵ The WPS Agenda was crafted as a global initiative under the guides of the UN Security Council, which created a mandate for all states and UN agencies to implement the agenda.

121. For the PBF-supported projects in Burundi, gender-focused programming and considerations were primarily focused on women's empowerment projects and on descriptive representation of women in projects focused on other themes. Four of the PBF-funded projects, with a total budget of \$6,232,446, explicitly focused on women. The PBF's investment in women-focused programming is a response to the exclusion of Burundian women from broader national dialogue and political processes. As explained and illustrated above, the PBF projects were able to support women as conflict mediators in a context where existing traditional conflict resolution mechanisms were weak or mistrusted. Moreover, the income generating activities incorporated in these projects also created opportunities for increased financial independence for these women.

122. In spite of the contributions of these gender-focused contributions, the ability of RUNOs, NUNOs, and their implementing partners to incorporate gender-sensitive programming and gender mainstreaming (or the systematic incorporation of gender into all governing institutions and policies) varied widely. The eighteen PBF-supported projects that were not focused on women demonstrated no apparent focus on gender sensitivity. For example, many youth-focused projects saw gender-sensitivity as mostly ensuring gender parity in their programs and activities. The same can be said of the cross-border program, according to its evaluation: "Interviews and observation during the field data collection indicate that the issue of gender was largely considered in the project implementation. All statistics are gender disaggregated, women quotas were insured for the committees that were formed (although apparently there is a legal requirement in Tanzania regarding women participation in public associations) and women were largely represented in the mediators interviewed (4 of 5 were women in Burundi) and in the two FGD with CBCR committees in Tanzania (10 women of 27 members of both committees)."¹⁷⁶

123. Similarly, the evaluation of the "Promoting National Dialogue" project explains that while the equal representation of women and men is a given in the design and planning of activities, "demand for equal representation [...] in dialogue workshops is rarely satisfied by the entities, mainly political parties [...] At the end, only 5% of women participated in dialogue workshops [...] Social communication on social cohesion, carried out in an open environment, was itself more balanced, reaching 48% of women."¹⁷⁷

124. Few programs were able to articulate gender policies that addressed the context of gender roles and expectations in Burundi's conflict dynamics. Our interviews demonstrated that while implementing partners recognized the challenges women and girls faced with regards to social, economic, and political inclusion, many struggled to explain how their projects addressed the gendered needs and concerns of program participants, whether men or women. The conflation between women and gender demonstrates that more work is necessary to engage PBF partners in the development of gender-sensitive programming.

125. Several PBF-supported projects were able to offer a more nuanced understanding of gender dynamics. The evaluation of the "Youth leading the way for an engendered inclusive society in Burundi" project—a PBF project in the youth sector implemented by CORDAID—points out that one of the main activities of the project was raising awareness about female leadership and gender equality. The project's external evaluation found that it successfully helped the administration and government change perceptions on gender equality: "Finding 13: the government, through the

¹⁷⁶ Christian Bugnion de Moreta (2019). Pages 44.

¹⁷⁷ Cheikh Faye (2018). Page 5. Translated from French by the team.

commune administration, showed its commitment to maintaining the results of the project, in particular the participation of women in the decision-making process, which remains low.”¹⁷⁸

126. Women focused projects with UN Women as the RUNO consistently offered more a robust gender evaluation than other projects. The “Supporting Women Leaders” project was an initiative entirely focused on providing more opportunities to women and youth to participate in conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and more broadly in their communities. While the existence of the project itself shows the focus of the PBF portfolio on fostering women’s leadership, the external evaluation found that the project needed to have a more inclusive approach to gender programming: “if the project was to be extended, the implementing actors should put greater emphasis on *raising awareness among men*, youth and women to better develop positive masculinity and men-women complementarity for community development. In order for the process to be effective, all segments of the population (men, women, youth) must be reached. If awareness is not raised among men, they become obstacles to women and youth leaders who want to prevent and solve conflicts peacefully.”¹⁷⁹ Gender sensitivity goes beyond “just” empowering women: gender sensitivity is about the relationship between men and women, between girls and boys, and how peaceful gender relations can bring a society closer together and more willing to fight for peace. While the “Supporting Women Leaders” project seemed to foster improved conditions for the participation of women in their communities and in peacebuilding, there is no indication that it improved the relationship between men and women or integrated men into advocacy for women to have a more important role in their communities.

127. When asked why programming was not truly gender sensitive, one international RUNO representative explained that some local partners objected to the idea on the basis that it would over promote women and be in opposition to gender equality (read neutrality) programming. Some local implementing partners expressed similar sentiments. One way to dispel myths about what gender-sensitivity means could be to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the Burundian manifestations of masculinity and femininity and how gender expectations have contributed to past and present exclusions and tensions. For example, exploring Burundian conceptualizations of manhood that required access to land and resources in a context of extreme land scarcity and lack of employment may help develop a shared understanding of issues and dynamics related to the manifestation of violent masculinities and resistance to women’s access to land in an already competitive market.

3.9 Capacity

128. The capacity of the UN to support and implement PBF projects varied between 2014 and 2020. There was a high degree of turnover with the PBF Secretariat in Burundi and, even when key positions were filled, the PBF Secretariat was not able to satisfactorily monitor the implementation of PBF projects. Instead, the Secretariat focused on supporting the RUNO and NUNO project-application process and on ensuring that RUNOs and NUNOs submitted all of their required project reports. Multiple interviewees expressed frustration that RUNOs often lacked the capacity to conceptualize and write peacebuilding projects and make the distinction between PBF projects and their own standard development programming. The PBSO in New York often provided technical assistance to RUNOs in developing projects, but most interviewees felt that this support was insufficient to address the need for peacebuilding technical support among RUNOs in Burundi. When there was a PDA in

¹⁷⁸ CORDAID (2021). Rapport final de la Mission d’Evaluation finale du Projet “Jeunes, pilier de l’Émergence d’une Société Inclusive pour l’Égalité du Genre au Burundi” Mis en Oeuvre par Cordaid au Burundi. Page 19.

¹⁷⁹ Basse, Yssa Oumar (2020). Page 8.

the RCO's office, this individual supported the broader conflict analysis and strategic design of projects but was not mandated to support or oversee their implementation. Furthermore, the PDA position no longer exists in Burundi, for reasons that are unclear to the evaluation team.

129. The capacity of the NUNOs, and of Burundian NGO implementing partners, to design and implement high-quality peacebuilding projects seemed to be much greater than that of the RUNOs. This should not be surprising given that the NUNOs and their Burundian NGO partners had been working successfully on peacebuilding in Burundi over a long period of time. These organizations were adept at navigating Burundi's political dynamics and had managed to sustain wide and deep networks within government and civil society so that they could create the necessary widespread consent for their peacebuilding activities.

130. One particular challenge mentioned by multiple interviewees was the relatively short timeframe given for them to respond to the GYPI calls for proposals, in particular, and what they viewed as the lack of transparency around the calls and the exact types of projects that the PBF sought to fund. While this lack of clarity may lead to proposals that are diagnosed as manifestations of a capacity gap among NUNOs or RUNOs, the source of the capacity gap may also be the nature of the call and the submission timeframe.

3.10 Management and Oversight

131. The management and oversight of PBF projects is shared by multiple actors: the PBSO, the PBF Secretariat in Burundi, the JSC, RUNOs, NUNOs, and implementing partners. During the period under review (2014-2020), the JSC was not as effective as it had been during previous periods of PBF support to Burundi. During the first two phases of PBF support to Burundi, the JSC played an important role in enabling communication and debate among the Burundian Government, civil society organizations, OECD-DAC donors, and the UN. In other words, in addition to serving an oversight function for the selection and implementation of PBF projects, the JSC also enabled discussion around peacebuilding issues that may not have otherwise taken place. The ability of the JSC to facilitate these relationships, of course, depended on the willingness and ability of the participating Burundian Government, UN, donor, and civil society actors to engage in constructive discussions. During the period under review in this portfolio evaluation (2014-2020), the JSC did seem to offer a space for true dialogue. This is partly because there was a small, and largely unempowered, contingent of JSC members from civil society and the donor community. It was also because of the reluctance of the government to discuss peace and security issues. Moreover, the infrequent JSC meetings and high turnover in JSC membership resulted in a loss of institutional memory and general lack of continuity in its activities.

132. In spite of these challenges, the fact that the JSC included representatives from important ministries, such as the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Internal Security, enabled it to provide an important venue for discussion between the UN and the Burundian Government, which may otherwise have been difficult to create. In addition, the discussion of the PBF projects among the members of the JSC enabled the UN and the Burundian Government to discuss political and security matters through the lens of a more technical discussion of the PBF projects. There were few other venues in Burundi in which these peace and security discussions could take place.

4. LESSONS LEARNED, LESSONS LOST, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Lessons Learned and Lost

133. As indicated above, this assessment of the PBF support to Burundi provides important opportunities to learn broader lessons about the conditions for effective PBF support to a recipient country. Our overall assessment is that over the past fourteen years, there have been important lessons learned; but there have also been important lessons lost. The major lesson learned is that the PBSO should focus on supporting innovative peacebuilding projects that reinforce existing capacity and have the support of key stakeholders within the host government. But, this lesson learned has a downside: the pressure for RUNOs and NUNOs to always generate new, innovative projects seemed to prevent them from reinforcing and sustaining the results from existing innovative PBF projects.

134. The case of PBF support to Burundi also demonstrates that in spite of lessons learned, there are many lessons that have been lost along the way. First, we will discuss the lessons lost in relation to the management, support, and oversight of PBF projects. Then, we discuss the particular implications for how the PBF engages with different political contexts, which are represented by Burundi's transition between 2007 and 2020 from a post-conflict country implementing wide-ranging power-sharing reforms to a country with closing political space, widespread restrictions on civil society and media, allegations of continuing human rights abuses, and most opposition politicians living in exile.

135. One of the most important lessons lost by the PBF is that **RUNOs often lack the capacity to design and implement peacebuilding projects.** The UNCT is composed of UN entities whose mandate prioritizes development or humanitarian outcomes, not peacebuilding outcomes. With the exception of UNICEF, UN agencies, funds, departments, and programs have not invested in building significant staff capacity to design and implement peacebuilding projects. Furthermore, UN actors do not train their implementing partners, and instead rely on their partners' existing capacity. As a result, even if a RUNO has the capacity to design a peacebuilding project, there is no guarantee that its implementing partner will have the capacity to implement this project in a conflict-sensitive way. The generally poor peacebuilding programming capacity of RUNOs was raised in the two prior portfolio evaluations and again, in this portfolio review, by a wide range of interviewees as a significant factor impeding the effectiveness of PBF-supported projects.¹⁸⁰

136. A second important lesson lost is that **the PBF Secretariat does not have the programmatic or monitoring capacity to supplement inadequate RUNO capacity.** The PBF Secretariat in Burundi functioned as an administrative agent that was responsible for ensuring that all concept notes, proposals, and reports followed PBF guidelines; coordinating the JSC; and providing monitoring and evaluation frameworks to all RUNOs and NUNOs. The PBF Secretariat did not have the technical or strategic capacity to identify strategic areas for PBF engagement, help RUNOs or NUNOs design projects, or monitor the projects that the PBF decided to fund. The PBSO was unable to significantly supplement the PBF Secretariat's capacity. It provided important technical feedback on RUNO and NUNO project design, but was only able to allocate limited time to each project proposal.

¹⁸⁰ See Susanna P. Campbell, Leonard Kayobera, and Justine Nkurunziza, "Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi," New York: United Nations, March 2010, [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CABFEA3AB9A416D34925779C000EAE96-Full_Report.pdf]; Susanna P. Campbell, Tracy Dexter, Michael Findley, Stephanie Hofmann, Josiah Marineau, and Daniel Walker, "Independent External Evaluation: UN Peacebuilding Fund Project Portfolio in Burundi," New York: UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), February 1, 2014 [<https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/293211?ln=en>].

137. A third lesson lost is that over the entire portfolio of PBF support to Burundi, **the most successful projects were those that were designed and implemented by Burundian Government officials, national NGOs, and/or UN staff with significant peacebuilding capacity and strong networks across Burundian society.** In other words, the PBF's most successful projects worked largely because they supported Burundian actors who had done the hard work of building the peacebuilding networks and capacity necessary to implement successful peacebuilding projects, all of which they did prior to receiving PBF's short-term funding. Rather than funding one-off projects, the PBF should consider providing consistent core and project funding to domestic actors who are likely to implement high-quality peacebuilding activities, particularly in contexts where the political and civic space for these actors to operate is closing. When doing so, the PBF should also account for one potential risk: the UN may not be able to defend these domestic actors in contexts of increasing intimidation or other constraints on their operations.¹⁸¹

138. A fourth lesson lost is the importance of integrated political and programmatic capacity to support the strategy, design, and implementation of PBF projects. As indicated in the two previous PBF Burundi portfolio reviews, the PBF was instrumental in enabling BINUB to implement sensitive, high-risk activities that advanced Burundi's peace process. Because of the high-risk and political nature of these PBF projects, they require the buy-in and, often, the continuous support of the head of the UN in the country, whether the Resident Coordinator (RC), Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) or, in the case of BINUB, the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General (ERSG). This type of high-level in-country support is necessary because peacebuilding requires the integration of political strategy with programmatic capacity. Without the political strategy, PBF projects are likely to be designed and implemented as if they were normal RUNO projects with a peacebuilding "Band-Aid." Without the programmatic capacity, the UN's political strategy cannot be translated into concrete reforms or activities that lead to peacebuilding outcomes.

139. The integration of political strategy and programmatic capacity is likely to require that the office of the RC or the SRSG has the following characteristics: 1) an SRSG or RC that has strong political/diplomatic skills and strong programmatic knowledge and skills; 2) political officers or a Peace and Development Advisor (PDA) who engages in regular political analysis at the strategic level; 3) a PBF Secretariat that administers the PBF projects and ensures reporting requirements are followed; and 4) technical project design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) capacity to support RUNOs or NUNOs who do not already have this capacity. During the period under review in this portfolio evaluation, these four characteristics were either not present at all or were not present at the same time. Even though there was both a UN Special Envoy and an RC, these two offices did not coordinate with each other or ensure that the UN's political strategy and programmatic capacity were well-integrated. Even though there was a PDA for a period, this position replaced the PBF Coordinator. At no point in time was there a PDA and a PBF Coordinator at the same time. There was also a high turnover of RCs over this period, with four different people occupying this post, and two periods that were occupied by interim RCs. This high turnover in UN leadership inhibited the maintenance of relationships between the UN and key actors in the Burundian Government and civil society and undermined an integrated and coherent UN strategy. As multiple

¹⁸¹ Jason Beaubien, "Why Burundi Is Kicking Out Aid Groups," National Public Radio, January 23, 2019,

[<https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2019/01/23/687400070/why-burundi-is-kicking-out-aid-groups>].

"Burundi: UN experts raise alarm at growing repression of NGOs and human rights defenders," Geneva: United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 6 Feb 2017, [<https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21145&LangID=E>]; Stef Vandeginste, "Ethnic Quotas and Foreign NGOs in Burundi: Shrinking Civic Space Framed as Affirmative Action," *Africa Spectrum* 54.3 (2019): 181-200.

interviewees commented, Burundi was well-known as a difficult context in which to work, making it difficult to find personnel who could and would occupy key posts.

140. A fifth lesson lost is that short-term, catalytic funding is only appropriate in contexts where there is something to catalyze. In other words, in the absence of other donors who are interested in funding peacebuilding, PBF-funded projects are unlikely to catalyze additional funding. In the absence of a broader peacebuilding strategy that key domestic stakeholders support, PBF-funded projects are unlikely to catalyze momentum in the country's war-to-peace transition. In the first tranche of PBF support to Burundi, the PBF Secretariat and the office of the ERSG spent a great deal of time networking with and coordinating the broader donor community and ensured that donors were actively engaged in the JSC and the sector-specific technical working groups. Furthermore, most of the PBF projects were grounded in a strong political analysis and strategy that was co-developed between the Burundian Government and the UN. For the first tranche, the PBF funding was, thus, inserted within a broader peacebuilding strategy and funding environment that enabled the PBF projects to catalyze additional funding and create momentum in Burundi's post-conflict transition.

141. Catalytic outcomes require: 1) coordination with donors, government, and civil society organizations that can support follow-on peacebuilding initiatives; 2) a broader political strategy in which the PBF's short-term projects can be situated; and 3) a country environment with the political and civil space necessary for peacebuilding to occur. During the period under review in this portfolio evaluation (2014-2020), none of these factors were present, leading to numerous complaints from RUNOs, NUNOs, and beneficiaries that the PBF projects functioned more like short-term humanitarian projects than strategic peacebuilding projects. Interviewees felt that without follow-on funding or activities that build on the successes of PBF projects, their impact was likely to dissipate quickly. As indicated in the second portfolio evaluation (2011-2013), a peace dividend can easily become a peace disappointment if there are no efforts to build on its successes.¹⁸²

4.2 PBF engagement with post-conflict vs. closing democratic contexts

142. The three phases of PBF support to Burundi coincided with three different phases in the Burundian Government's state consolidation process. The first phase coincided with the immediate aftermath of Burundi's first post-conflict elections when the government, UN, civil society, and donors were all engaged in implementing the reforms outlined in Burundi's peace agreements. Although, even in this stage the CNDD questioned particular provisions of the Arusha Agreement and argued that they were consolidating, not building, peace and the FNL rebel group remained militarily active.¹⁸³ The second phase coincided with closing democratic space in Burundi that was marked by the withdrawal of the majority of the opposition parties from the 2010 elections, "alleging massive fraud and irregularities," and "opposition and civil society activists" warnings "about diminishing political space," "frequent prohibition or interruption of opposition party meetings" and

¹⁸² Susanna P. Campbell, Tracy Dexter, Michael Findley, Stephanie Hofmann, Josiah Marineau, and Daniel Walker, "Independent External Evaluation: UN Peacebuilding Fund Project Portfolio in Burundi." New York: UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), February 1, 2014[<https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/293211?ln=en>].

¹⁸³ "First report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi," S/2007/287, New York: United Nations Security Council, May 17, 2007; "Second report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi," S/2007/682, New York: United Nations Security Council, November 23, 2007; "Third report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi," S/2008/330, New York: United Nations Security Council, May 15, 2008; "Fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi," S/2008/745, New York: United Nations Security Council, November 28, 2008; "Fifth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi," S/2009/270, New York: United Nations Security Council, May 22, 2009; "Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi," S/2009/611, New York: United Nations Security Council, November 30, 2009; International Crisis Group, "Elections in Burundi: A Radical Shake-up of the Political Landscape," Africa Briefing 31, August 25, 2005.

new laws affecting “the status of the opposition, the media and civil society.”¹⁸⁴ The third PBF phase of support to Burundi coincided with rapidly closing political space “through repression” and “tense” government “relations with key bilateral partners.”¹⁸⁵ The fact that the PBF supported Burundi in both a post-conflict context and a context of closing democratic space allows us to draw important lessons about the effectiveness of the PBF’s approach in each context, which we outline below.

143. First, government ownership of PBF projects is a condition for PBF support to a host country. The government’s approval is required for PBF projects to proceed, except in those unique cases where projects are approved only by the UN Secretariat. A crucial innovation of the PBF is the JSC, which is co-chaired by the UN and the Government and includes members of the donor community and civil society. During the first phase of PBF support to Burundi, the JSC, and accompanying Technical Follow-up Groups, provided a unique space for the UN, donors, and civil society groups to discuss Burundi’s peace and security context. There was no other equivalent forum where these different stakeholders were able to discuss peace and security issues. Furthermore, during the first phase of PBF support to Burundi, many of the PBF projects were co-directed by the Burundian Government and the UN, enabling government buy-in to the policy, strategy, and operationalization of the PBF projects and contributing to the effectiveness and catalytic nature of these projects. **The PBF’s dual aims of sustaining inclusive peace and supporting government ownership seem to be most achievable in post-conflict and other contexts of opening political space where the host government and the UN can collaborate on the design, oversight, and implementation of PBF projects.**

144. Government ownership was significantly more difficult to achieve and navigate during the second and third phases of PBF support to Burundi. During the second phase, the PBF projects largely focused on the community level. The central government had little direct engagement in their design and implementation, although it did follow their implementation through regular reports to the JSC. The UN and international donors did not prioritize peacebuilding and, instead, focused on supporting the Burundian Government’s development policy.¹⁸⁶ This may have been the period in which conflict prevention activities could have been most appropriate, but the UN lacked the necessary government consent for these initiatives. Furthermore, the UN did not have country-level leadership that was willing and able to engage in this type of highly-political conflict prevention work, in spite of several attempts by the UN at high-level dialogue.¹⁸⁷ Conflict prevention that seeks to influence the behavior of the government (rather than just non-state actors) requires challenging the existing policies and approaches of the government, which the UN was unable or unwilling to do during this period.

¹⁸⁴ “Seventh report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi,” S/2010/608, New York: United Nations Security Council, November 30, 2010, para 7; “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi,” S/2011/751, New York: United Nations Security Council, November 30, 2011; “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi,” S/2013/36, New York: United Nations Security Council, January 18, 2013; “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi,” S/2014/36, New York: United Nations Security Council, January 20, 2014, para. 59; “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi,” S/2014/550, New York: United Nations Security Council, July 31, 2014; International Crisis Group, “Burundi: From Electoral Boycott to Political Impasse,” Africa Report 169, February 7, 2011; International Crisis Group, “Burundi: Bye-bye Arusha?” Africa Report 192, October 25, 2012.

¹⁸⁵ “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi,” S/2015/36, New York: United Nations Security Council, January 19, 2015; “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi,” S/2015/510, New York: United Nations Security Council, July 7, 2015; “Report of the Secretary-General on Burundi,” S/2017/165, New York: United Nations Security Council, February 27, 2017 “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Burundi,” S/2018/89, New York: United Nations Security Council, January 25, 2018; “The situation in Burundi: Report of the Secretary-General,” S/2018/1028, New York: United Nations Security Council, November 15, 2018; “The situation in Burundi: Report of the Secretary-General,” S/2019/837, New York: United Nations Security Council, October 24, 2019.

¹⁸⁶ Ivy Mungcal, “Burundi donors’ conference ends on a high note,” DEVEX, October 31, 2012, [https://www.devex.com/news/burundi-donors-conference-ends-on-a-high-note-79608]

¹⁸⁷ “Letter dated 27 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/2017/174, New York: United Nations Security Council, March 2, 2017.

145. The effectiveness of the PBF in different political contexts is, of course, shaped by the incentive structure of the UNCT and RC. The RC and UNCT are incentivized to maintain strong relationships with the host government, which is responsible not only for approving PBF projects, if there are any, but also for approving their country programs and collaborating on the majority of their activities within the country. Furthermore, if it wishes to do so, the host government can request that the RC or any member of the UNCT stop working on its territory. From this perspective, there are few incentives for the UNCT or RC to directly challenge the policies of the host government. This is in contrast, of course, to the OHCHR or a political or peacekeeping mission, which are mandated explicitly to advance political, security, and human rights priorities within the host country, in line with the human rights treaties signed by the host government and mandates of the UN Security Council. The implication is that the UNCT and RC are unlikely to have the incentive to support or implement potentially controversial peacebuilding activities in contexts with closing democratic space, such as during the second and third phases of PBF support to Burundi.

146. During the third phase of PBF support to Burundi, the JSC met infrequently and the government only cooperated in the implementation of projects that had specific socio-economic benefits for the population, such as the women's community-level mediation program and youth-focused projects.¹⁸⁸ Our interviewees reported that Burundian Government officials expressed support for the PBF when it delivered direct livelihood benefits to the population in line with the Government's National Development Plan, and were less concerned with the PBF's contributions to community-level reconciliation or resilience. Nonetheless, the main argument for PBF support and engagement to Burundi during this period was, as articulated above, that it enabled and supported higher-level political conversations that may not have otherwise taken place. In other words, the PBF enabled some dialogue and discussion about inclusive politics, political violence, civil society, and media in a context where the democratic space was narrowing, particularly in the 2015 pre-electoral period. While this is a valid theory of change for PBF engagement, it does not align with the PBF's broader commitment to governmental ownership in the design of the PBF, or even the PBF's focus on supporting projects that catalyze additional follow-on funding or spur peaceful change.¹⁸⁹ If the PBF wants to continue to engage in contexts of narrowing democratic space, then it needs to reexamine whether its leadership and oversight mechanisms support peacebuilding in these contexts; otherwise, it is likely to support projects that may purport to build peace but lack the political and civic space to do so.

147. Second, in contexts of closing democratic space, there is a tendency of many OECD donors and the UN to fund international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and national non-governmental organizations (NNGOs) to carry out peacebuilding projects on which the government is not willing or able to directly cooperate. In Burundi, the UN's and OECD donors' reliance on INGOs and NNGOs has led the Burundian Government to place significant restrictions on INGO and NNGOs, attempting to control the types of activities they

¹⁸⁸ The Burundian Government has prioritized donor engagement that directly supported "national efforts in the implementation of the National Development Plan." Republic of Burundi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation, "Participation of H.E The President of the Republic in the 75th Session of the United Nations General Assembly," 29 September 2020, [https://www.mae.gov.bi/en/2020/10/23/participation-of-h-e-the-president-of-the-republic-in-the-75th-session-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly/].

¹⁸⁹ "Catalytic programming does not transform a conflict root cause or defuse a trigger; instead it sets up the conditions for the root-cause to be transformed or the trigger resolved. These intermediate conditions (or enabling factors) still represent changes in the context, but they are not the ultimate peacebuilding changes desired. Therefore, like yeast and salt, enabling factors (conditions) should not be viewed in isolation of the larger or longer-term effect desired." Scharbatke-Church, Cheyanne, Susanna Campbell, Julia Doehrn, Philip Thomas, and Peter Woodrow. *Catalytic Programming and the Peacebuilding Fund*. (PeaceNexus Foundation, 2010) 9.

implement, who benefits from these activities, and who these organizations hire.¹⁹⁰ In Burundi, this has led many international and national NGOs to leave the country and a degree of politicization of the existing NGO sector.¹⁹¹ If the PBF wants to support truly independent INGOs and NNGOs in contexts of closing democratic space, it should consider whether it is capable of protecting them from threats, intimidation, and potential cooptation by the government.¹⁹² If the PBF is not able to provide this support, then it should not expect INGOs or NNGOs to implement high-risk peacebuilding projects that the UN is unwilling or unable to undertake itself. Recent history in Burundi has shown that the UNCT and RC are likely to lack the capacity and incentives to offer this type of protection.

148. Third, project-focused short-term funding may be best suited for post-conflict contexts when there is political and civic space, and related donor engagement, on which to capitalize. More flexible funding to support ongoing political processes is likely to be needed in contexts of closing democratic space. In contexts of closing democratic space, short-term project-focused funding that requires high-levels of government support is likely to be ill-suited to support conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives. These contexts require alternative funding models. One alternative funding model focuses on flexible, longer-term funding for uncertain political processes. Conflict prevention efforts may seek to support unpredictable high-level negotiation processes. Like the EAC dialogue process funded by the PBF after the 2015 attempted coup d'état, these processes do not align with standard logical frameworks or project proposal templates. A more flexible and longer-term financing modality may be better suited to support these unpredictable and highly sensitive political processes. Another alternative funding model focuses on repeated core and programmatic investment in domestic organizations with strong peacebuilding capacity. In contexts of closing democratic space, projects like the youth social cohesion and women's mediation projects that aim to address the root causes of conflict are likely to benefit from longer-term and sustained engagement that enables the recipient communities to build and sustain social cohesion and conflict resolution capacities, particularly within a broader political context that may seek to undermine these efforts. Furthermore, as mentioned above, if the PBF aims to support INGO and NNGO peacebuilding efforts in these contexts, then the PBF should consider how it can provide sustained engagement, including funding for core costs, and protection for these organizations.

4.3 Recommendations

149. The summary of the lessons learned and lost from Burundi sought to synthesize the main points that the PBF and PBSO should learn from its years of support to Burundi. In addition to applying the lessons above, we have three overarching recommendations, outlined below.

150. Recommendation 1: **The PBF and its management, support, and oversight mechanisms were designed primarily for post-conflict contexts where the host government and broader donor community are committed to peacebuilding** (Quadrant 1 in Typology below). In contexts of closing democratic space and increasing human rights violations, the PBF's current short-term

¹⁹⁰ "Burundi: UN experts raise alarm at growing repression of NGOs and human rights defenders," Geneva: United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 6 Feb 2017, [<https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21145&LangID=E>]; Stef Vandeginste, "Ethnic Quotas and Foreign NGOs in Burundi: Shrinking Civic Space Framed as Affirmative Action," *Africa Spectrum* 54.3 (2019): 181-200.

¹⁹¹ Jason Beaubien, "Why Burundi Is Kicking Out Aid Groups," National Public Radio, January 23, 2019, [<https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2019/01/23/687400070/why-burundi-is-kicking-out-aid-groups>].

¹⁹² Reuters Staff, "Burundi suspends some NGOs for violating new law," *Reuters*, September 28, 2018, [<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-rights/burundi-suspends-some-ngos-for-violating-new-law-idUSKCN1M81AI>]; US Department of State, "2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Burundi," Washington, DC: US Department of State, [<https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/burundi/>].

project focus that requires high-levels of host-government involvement is not fit for purpose. These contexts of closing democratic space are likely to require longer-term engagement with more flexible funding arrangements for the reasons that we outline above. These considerations lead to a descriptive typology depicted in Figure 8.

151. The PBF currently argues that it can support innovative and catalytic peacebuilding initiatives in all types of contexts, including those represented by Quadrant 1 (High levels of host government commitment to peacebuilding reforms + High levels of civil society strength); Quadrant 2 (Low levels of host government commitment to peacebuilding reforms + High levels of civil society strength); Quadrant 3 (High levels of host government commitment to peacebuilding reforms + Low levels of civil society strength); and Quadrant 4 (Low levels of host government commitment to peacebuilding reforms + Low levels of civil society strength). The case of PBF support to Burundi between 2007 and 2020 demonstrates that only contexts that have the characteristics of Quadrant 1 (High levels of host government commitment to peacebuilding reforms + High levels of civil society strength) are likely to provide an environment where the PBF can effectively support short-term, innovative, and catalytic peacebuilding projects. Quadrants 2 and 3 are likely to require a more strategic approach and longer-term funding, while it is unclear if there is space for PBF project-focused engagement in Quadrant 4, which is likely to require higher-level, flexible funding for inclusive political processes rather than short-term PBF projects as well as broader, higher-level political support of the PBC.

Figure 8: Typology of Country Contexts and ideal PBF support to different contexts

		Host Government Commitment to Peacebuilding Reforms	
		High	Low
Strength of Civil Society	High	1 PBF to support innovative and catalytic peacebuilding initiatives	2 PBF to focus on strengthening and protecting civil society; advocating with government to open political space
	Low	3 PBF to support civil society's peacebuilding capacity in collaboration with government	4 Space only for flexible support for political processes, not short-term, inflexible PBF project support

152. For contexts such as those represented by Quadrant 2 and 3, the PBSO should focus on strengthening the core capacity of civil society organizations and NNGOs by providing funding for core budget expenses and longer-term funding for peacebuilding activities. In addition, in Quadrant 2, the UN Secretariat should support efforts aimed at engaging the host government and advocating for more open political space. If peacebuilding funding is scarce, which is likely to be the case in all contexts but immediate post-conflict environments, the PBSO cannot rely on the RC, RUNOs, or UN member states to provide the necessary catalytic funding to support follow-on peacebuilding initiatives. The PBF should provide supplementary and longer-term funding itself as part of a

sustained strategy to support peacebuilding capacities. Our evaluation of Burundi also demonstrates that in contexts that resemble Quadrant 4 (Low levels of host government commitment to peacebuilding reforms + Low levels of civil society strength), the PBF will be unable to achieve its dual aims of national ownership and political inclusion and, thus, is unlikely to benefit from prioritizing project-support to these contexts. Instead, these contexts are likely to require higher-level political support from the UN Secretariat and associated flexible funding to support ongoing political dialogue. The PBSO should develop a different funding and disbursement strategy for each of the four contexts outlined in Figure 8.

153. Recommendation 2: **The PBSO needs to ensure that the RUNOs, NUNOs, RC (and his/her office), and the PBF Secretariat are equipped** with the programmatic capacity, political analysis, and monitoring and evaluation capacity necessary to support the design and implementation of high-quality peacebuilding activities. The existence of these capacities cannot be taken for granted. At the moment, these capacities are not assessed as part of the criteria for their qualification as a RUNO, NUNO, or RC operating in a PBF recipient country. The PBSO needs to ensure that the RC's Office, the PBF Secretariat, and RUNOs have the capacity necessary to support and implement high-quality peacebuilding activities. NUNOs are subject to more stringent approval and selection criteria but their peacebuilding programmatic capacity should also be addressed in these assessments.

154. Recommendation 3: Given that strong peacebuilding capacity often resides within national or international NGOs, rather than RUNOs, it is a positive development that the PBF is directly funding NGOs through the Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative (GYPI) and indirectly funding them as implementing partners of RUNOs. **Support for NGOs, however, raises three broader issues that the PBF should address.**

- First, greater transparency and communication is needed around PBF calls for proposals, indicating clearly who can apply and what types of partnerships are necessary for the application. Furthermore, if the PBF seeks to ensure that it reaches a broad range of national and international NGOs, it should broaden its outreach efforts beyond the usual NGOs that already have strong ties to the UN.
- Second, INGOs and NNGOs, because they are subject to domestic laws, are more vulnerable to threats, attacks, and manipulation by the host government. In cases where the PBF chooses to directly or indirectly support INGOs and NNGOs, it should ensure that it also protects and supports these organizations, including through longer-term engagement.
- Third, the PBF's GYPI approach is not linked to an overall peacebuilding strategy for the host country. This may lead the PBF to fund NGO peacebuilding initiatives, but it may not lead the PBF to fund the right and most strategic NGO peacebuilding initiatives that align with the UN's broader strategic approach. The PBSO should consider how GYPI calls for proposals align with its overall strategic priorities in the host country and reinforce the broader coherence and aggregate effect of PBF support to this country.

155. In addition to the recommendations outlined above, the majority of people whom we interviewed asked about the future support that the PBF would provide to Burundi. While we are not in a position to recommend specific types of activities, we **outline two potential visions of continued PBF support to Burundi.**

156. One vision for the potential added value of the PBF in Burundi was that it could capitalize on the recent thawing of relations between European donors and the Burundian Government and focus on support for conflict prevention activities in Burundi. As with the 2014 to 2020 PBF support to Burundi, the most important effect of the PBF may not be the individual projects implemented, but rather the broader environment that the JSC and the PBC create for dialogue among the UN, the Burundian Government, other bilateral cooperation partners (including the Chinese), and civil society organizations (depending on the political context). There was widespread agreement among interviewees that this type of constructive dialogue and consultation was badly needed and that the PBF and JSC may be well suited to provide it, particularly under the leadership of a new RC. There was less clarity among interviewees regarding which projects the PBF should support, although more dialogue initiatives at the national level and support for mechanisms that address land conflicts would be obvious choices.

157. Another vision emerged: if the Burundian Government does not want the PBF to engage in peacebuilding in its country, then the PBF should not engage in peacebuilding there. In this case, Burundi resembles Quadrant 4 in Figure 8, above. If the PBF seeks to support peacebuilding efforts that are disconnected from the national-level political process, such as the women's and youth projects it supported during the phase under review, then it may give the impression that peacebuilding and political openness are occurring when they are not. Furthermore, the PBF requires a high level of national ownership, which, in contexts that resemble Quadrant 4, is at odds with the PBF's goal of supporting political inclusion.

Appendix

Appendix A. Terms of Reference (TOR)

Evaluation of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) project portfolio in Burundi

Burundi became eligible for PBF funding in 2007, following its inclusion on the Peacebuilding Commission's agenda in 2006. Since then, the PBF has had four phases of engagement in Burundi, the first three within the framework of a Priority Plan with a financial envelope of \$35 million from 2007 to 2010; \$9.2 million from 2011 to 2013 and \$15.8 million from 2014 to 2018. Following the expiry of the last Priority Plan in 2018, the PBF entered a fourth phase of engagement with a funding envelope of \$11.8 million, approved based on an analysis and prioritization exercise undertaken by the UN and submitted by the Resident Coordinator. In 2019, one additional project was approved under the GYPI appeal for \$1.5 million.

This evaluation exercise focuses on the period 2014-2020 and builds on previous evaluations of the PBF portfolio in Burundi undertaken in 2010 and 2014. It aims to examine achievements and overall Fund performance under the four portfolio-level outcomes of the Peacebuilding Priority Plan covering 2014-2018 and under the priorities approved after the expiration of the Priority Plan, during the period 2018-2020.

Background

National Context

Since independence in 1962, Burundi experienced successive violent conflicts rooted in political power struggles with ethnic undertones in 1965, 1969, 1972 and 1988, culminating into a devastating civil war between starting in 1993 and officially ending with the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in 2000, which lay the foundation for a return to peace even though open conflict between the military and some non-state armed groups continued until 2004, with the last active armed group—the Front de Liberation Nationale (FNL)—and its splinter group only laying down their arms in 2006 and 2008 respectively.¹ The decades of violence, which claimed more than 300,000 lives and displaced over one million people, eroded the social fabric and trust among Burundians, crippled the economy, and instilled a culture of violence and impunity in Burundian society and institutions. In 2005, with a security sector reform having been largely completed and effective, a constitutional referendum and combined presidential and parliamentary elections were held peacefully and signaled the beginning of the 'normalization' of the political process.

The elections of 2010 saw the creation of a multi-party government which, although it was not all-inclusive, provided a period of relative political stability and economic growth. Despite the progress

¹ The peace process was long and complex. It included the Convention on Governance in 1994 and the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in 2000, setting the foundation for a return to peace even as conflict continued with some non-state armed groups unwilling to sign the Arusha agreement and some of its signatories unwilling to accept the implementation of all of its provisions. Implementation of the Arusha agreement included the installation of the transitional government beginning in 2001 and continued steps towards negotiation with remaining armed groups. A ceasefire agreement was signed between the transitional government and the Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) in 2002 but the Front National de Libération (FNL) remained unwilling to lay down its arms. The Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defense and Security Power Sharing in 2003 and the reform of the military which integrated some members of former non-state armed groups were important milestones towards the end of the conflict. The Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Burundi and the PALIPEHUTU- FNL was signed in September 2006 and the ceasefire agreement with FNL splinter group under Agathon Rwasa's leadership was signed in 2009.

made, the decision of President Nkurunziza to run for a widely disputed third term and his subsequent re-election in 2015, triggered a new severe political crisis that undermined the progress achieved through the implementation of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement and the elections of 2005 and 2010. The 2015 political crisis claimed hundreds of lives and sent tens of thousands of Burundians into exile. It caused a severe deterioration of the socioeconomic situation in Burundi while financial support from international partners, which had been significant since 2005, was partially suspended.

In May 2018, a constitutional referendum held in a context of political suppression, violent repression and fear led to the approval of constitutional amendments extending the President's term limit, removing reference to the Arusha Agreement and reducing the parliamentary majority required to pass legislation. Political tensions continued to rise in the lead up to general elections scheduled for 2020, accompanied by a closing of political space, rising reports of human rights violations and difficult relations between the Government and the international community. In March 2019, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Burundi closed indefinitely.

In May 2020 the elections were held with the CNDD-FDD winning the presidency, the majority of seats in the national assembly and at commune (municipal) level. Following the death of former President Nkurunziza, the new government was installed in August 2020 in a peaceful transition of power. In his inauguration speech, President Ndayishimiye highlighted peacebuilding and social cohesion and advancing the youth agenda as priorities for the country. In this context, there are positive prospects for improvement of relations between the Government and its international partners. In July 2020, the International Organization of the Francophonie announced it would resume cooperation with the Burundian Government for the first time since it had suspended its programs in 2016. Other large partners, including the EU which had suspended direct budgetary support to Burundi since 2015) may similarly resume funding support.

The first meeting of the PBF Joint Steering Committee, co-chaired by the Government, was held in July 2020.

Burundi and the UN's Peacebuilding Architecture

Peacebuilding Commission

Recognizing the specific needs and challenges of countries emerging from conflict, the United Nations General Assembly created three new pillars of the UN's Peacebuilding Architecture in 2005-2006, including the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), and the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), a Member-State body meant to accompany states seeking political and other support to consolidate peace.

At its meeting on 13 October 2006, based on a request by the Government of Burundi, the PBC announced that Burundi, together with Sierra Leone, would be among the first countries to be taken up by the Commission. Since then, the PBC, through its Burundi Configuration, has held regular ambassadorial-level meetings with participation from Burundi and its neighboring countries as well as key international partners. The PBC chair has made regular visits to Burundi at the invitation of the Government, supporting engagement between the Government and its development partners. The PBC co-sponsored two donor conferences for Burundi under the Chairmanship of Norway in 2007 and Switzerland in 2012. Since the 2015 political crisis, the PBC has championed high-level policy discussions on how to mitigate the socio-economic impact of the political crisis on the

Burundian population, has highlighted the positive role of women and youth as peacebuilding actors in Burundi, and has helped maintain relations between the Government and its international partners.

UN Political presence

Concomitantly, and pursuant to Security Council resolution 1719 (2006), the UN established an integrated peacekeeping presence in Burundi, the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) “*continue to help the Government of Burundi to consolidate peace while reinforcing the necessary national capacities to address the root causes of conflict*”, taking over from the earlier peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB). In January 2011, BINUB handed over responsibilities to the United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB) before ultimately transferring full responsibility for the UN’s support to the UN Country Team and Resident Coordinator on 31 December 2014. The handover coincided with the onset of the 2015 political crisis triggered by the controversial third-term candidature of former President Nkurunziza. To further support the efforts of the East African Community (EAC) for political dialogue among all Burundians as well as to lead and coordinate the UN political efforts to promote peace and sustainable development in Burundi, the Office of the Special Envoy of Secretary-General to Burundi was established in January 2016. With the smooth transition of power following the 2020 elections, the O/SESG is expected to draw down as from the end of 2020.

PBF engagement in Burundi

Alongside the PBC and the PBSO, the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) was established in 2006 as part of the UN’s Peacebuilding Architecture to provide assistance to post-conflict countries to address the most pressing challenges to prevent relapse into conflict. The 2006 inclusion of Burundi on the PBC’s agenda automatically triggered a declaration of eligibility to receive PBF support, as per the PBF Terms of Reference.

To access PBF support, the Government of Burundi and the United Nations, in collaboration with international partners and the civil society, developed Burundi’s first Peacebuilding Priority Plan (PPP) in December 2006, on the basis of which an envelope of \$35 million was approved for the country. The PPP was in effect from 2007 to early 2010 and outlined four priority areas:

1. Governance and peace (with a focus on democratic governance, elections and strengthening of peace and social cohesion by reinforcing the role of youth and women);
2. Rule of law in the security sector (with a focus on quartering and professionalizing the National Defense Forces, building the capacity of the National Police and disarming civil populations);
3. Justice, human rights and reconciliation (with a focus on strengthening the judiciary, establishing a Human Rights Commission and the national ownership of the reconciliation process); and
4. Land disputes (with a focus on peacefully resettling returnees and resolution of land disputes).

An independent evaluation of the First PPP found that, while the PBF made some important contributions to peace consolidation in Burundi and helped improved relations between the UN and the Government, improvements could be made to increase the peacebuilding impact of the PBF. In particular, the evaluation recommended that the Joint Steering Committee should be strengthened to provide more strategic guidance, better planning and monitoring of projects by recipient organizations, and to increase national ownership and creating partnerships with civil society.

The second PPP (2010-2014) was linked to the first and second Strategic Frameworks on Poverty Reduction which recognized the importance of peace consolidation to alleviating poverty and addressing underlying structural issues. The peacebuilding strategic framework was the result of a participatory process including inputs from the relevant government ministries, UNCT, UN mission in Burundi, civil society organizations and donors. The second PPP was approved with a funding envelope of \$9.2 million with the following priorities: i) political dialogue and social cohesion; ii) positive youth participation in political and social life; iii) and the democratic exercise of human rights.

The independent evaluation of the second PPP found that the PBF contributed to the smooth organization of the 2010 elections, to improved social cohesion in border provinces with high returnee rates, and to effective dialogue between political parties in the preparation of the 2015 election. However, it called for improved capacity of recipient organizations to design, implement and monitor peacebuilding programs and the implication of senior UN leadership in the monitoring of PBF interventions to address roadblocks and to ensure that the projects maintain a political lens.

The third Priority plan (2014-2018) was approved in 2014 with an envelope of \$11.65m, with a view to sustaining UN political accompaniment following the withdrawal of the UN political mission (BNUB) and with a specific focus on supporting dialogue and stability around the elections. The third PPP thematic priorities were as follows i) National dialogue and social cohesion; ii) Youth participation in political and social life and reconciliation initiatives; iii) Democratic exercise of human rights and iv) Peaceful resolution of land disputes.

Following the crisis caused by the elections in 2015, the PPP priorities were maintained but allocations revised to increase support for human rights' observation. Under this revision, the PBF also supported dialogue led by the UN Special Advisor to the Secretary General on Burundi; local dialogue initiatives through the civil society and through local women mediators and women groups; positive engagement of youth in social cohesion; community security, and activities to address trauma and conflict.

In 2017, PBSO approved a budget re-allocation and a short extension of the third Peacebuilding Priority Plan until 31 May 2017, without changing the overall envelope but adjusting the allocation per theme: i) National dialogue and social cohesion; ii) Youth participation in political and social life and reconciliation initiatives; iii) Democratic exercise of human rights - \$3.25 million (instead of the original \$2.5 million); and removing priority iv) Peaceful resolution of land disputes, for which no projects had been developed. This PPP was further extended from May 2017 to June 2018.

In 2018, a new phase of PBF engagement in Burundi identified 4 Priority Areas, namely 1) Localized Conflict Resolution and Prevention, 2) Empowerment of Youth and Women, 3) Alleviating the consequences of displacements and returns, 4) Strengthening the rule of law and good governance.

Purpose and use of the evaluation

PBF seeks an independent evaluation of PBF's investments in Burundi over the 2014-2020 period. This exercise will help assess the PBF's achievements and overall added value to peacebuilding in Burundi during the third Peacebuilding Priority Plan (2014-2018) and the period immediately after its expiration (2018-2020). It will also contribute to a better understanding of the effectiveness of the PBF's strategic decision-making, its alignment with national frameworks and international processes, implementation modalities and partnerships, and finally whether the PBF has successfully leveraged its role as a catalytic, innovative and risk-taking actor in Burundi. In addition, given that the PBF has supported peacebuilding initiatives in Burundi since 2006, this evaluation benefits from a

longer time horizon of engagement, which may offer opportunities for evaluators to observe successes or challenges to cumulative achievement or greater effects over time.

This evaluation, moreover, coincides with a new conflict analysis exercise to be facilitated by Interpeace in partnership with the Centre d'Alerte et de Prevention des Conflits (CENAP), a national NGO based in Bujumbura. The exercise aims to i) identify current factors, actors and dynamics of conflict in Burundi through inclusive, participatory analysis based on the CDA model in a gender and youth-sensitive manner; ii) facilitate a consultation process with local communities, Government, civil society, the UN and other international partners to contribute to a common understanding of key conflict dynamics and; iii) offer recommendations to the Joint Steering group, co-chaired by the Government and the UN, on strategic thematic and geographical priorities for PBF engagement in Burundi for 2021-2024. It is anticipated that some data collection and analysis undertaken by Interpeace for the conflict analysis could also be utilized for this evaluative exercise.

The evaluation and the conflict analysis together will inform the PBF engagement strategy and prioritization of funding in Burundi over the 2020-2024 period.

Hence, the purpose of this evaluation is to:

- assess to what extent PBF's support from 2014 to 2020 has achieved real and sustained positive results in terms of consolidating peace in Burundi, either through direct action or through catalytic effects;
- examine the timing of PBF's support and strategic decision-making through the third PPP and its subsequent extensions;
- assess how relevant, efficient, effective and catalytic the 3rd priority plan (2014-2018) and the PBF's engagement thereafter has been, with particular attention to whether the strategic framework of the PPP made a difference in the management and strategic direction of the Fund's investments; and
- assess to what extent the lessons from the first and second evaluations were integrated into the third phase of PBF support and served to improve effectiveness/ efficiency.

There are two main clients for the evaluation, to whom the recommendations will be addressed: (i) the leadership and management team of the PBF portfolio in Burundi, including the RC, the Burundi PBF Secretariat team, relevant UNCT members, and the Joint Steering Committee; and (ii) the Peacebuilding Support Office and its Financing for Peacebuilding Branch.

Scope of the evaluation

The evaluation will consider the overall performance of the PBF portfolio in Burundi from 2014 to 2020, including, where appropriate, consideration of the cumulative effects of PBF-funded initiatives over time and collectively within a given priority area. Importantly, the evaluation will not re-assess the performance of individual projects funded under the phase and already evaluated under project-level external evaluations. Instead, this evaluation will analyze the evidence of results and peacebuilding results that have been collectively achieved by the portfolio over the period 2014 to 2020.

The evaluation will be framed against the evaluation criteria of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC) and the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) norms and standards (including criteria

related to gender mainstreaming), which have been adapted to the context.¹ While examples of questions are provided below, the evaluation team should further adapt and elaborate on these in the Inception Report, noting where relevant the relative evaluability of each criteria. Questions of evaluability, and proposed revisions to the evaluation approach, will be critical given the largely remote nature of the evaluation process.

Relevance:

- Were the PPP and its underlying projects informed by an adequate, up-to-date conflict analysis?
- What was the relevance of the proposed (or inferred) theory of change for the PBF Burundi portfolio and the different sector interventions under the priority plan for 2014-2018 and subsequent extension?
- To what extent did the PBF respond to urgent funding needs and/or peace-relevant gaps?
- To what extent did PBF projects complement each other and have a strategically coherent approach?

Effectiveness:

- To what extent did the projects supported by the PBF contribute to higher-level outcomes of the PPP?
- Specifically, to what extent did the PBF support contribute to : i) strengthened community and national dialogue for improved social cohesion; ii) effective youth participation in civic and community life and their engagement in peace initiatives; iii) respect for human rights and greater access to justice for victims and; iv) peaceful resolution of land-related conflicts and the mitigation of related tensions?
- What were any other key overall effects or results of PBF support?

Coherence:

- To what extent were PBF projects complementary with each other in order to achieve a common peacebuilding objective in a given geographic area or on a given theme from different angles?
- To what degree did the PPP priorities align with or fill important gaps within national frameworks and policies? Within the UN Development Assistance Framework?
- To what degree were each project's design, implementation, monitoring and reporting aligned with that of other projects'?

National ownership/catalytic effects:

- What concrete evidence is there of the commitment of the Government and other stakeholders to sustain the results of PBF support and continue activities or initiatives?
- What, if any, catalytic effects did the PBF support in Burundi have (financial and nonfinancial)?
- How effectively were national stakeholders involved in the design and implementation of projects?

Conflict-Sensitivity and Risk Management

- Did the PBF project have an explicit approach to conflict-sensitivity?
- Were RUNOs and NUNOs' internal capacities adequate to ensure an ongoing conflict-sensitive approach?
- Did any unintended negative impacts result from PBF interventions?
- How adequate was the assessment, mitigation and ongoing monitoring of risk?

- Did UNCT and PBF Secretariat teams adequately apply a context-adaptive approach? If yes, how responsive was PBF to requested programmatic changes?

Gender:

- To what extent were gender considerations mainstreamed throughout the PBF support to Burundi?
- Were commitments made within the project documents to Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment realized throughout implementation?
- To what extent did the PBF portfolio contribute to key Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment objectives from a peacebuilding angle?

Evaluation of management and oversight structures in Burundi and PBSO

In addition to the OECD-DAC criteria above, the evaluation will examine the management of PBF's support in order to determine the overall fitness of purpose of management arrangements, both in-country and between PBSO/PBF and the Country Team, and assess progress made against recommendations from the PBF portfolio evaluation of 2014. As in the previous evaluation, criteria to consider will include the funding, programming and decision-making arrangements among all relevant actors, and the quality and inclusivity of national ownership of the processes.

Regarding PBC engagement:

- What were the synergies, challenges and major results/ catalytic effects of the relationship between PBSO and PBC in jointly supporting Burundi?

Regarding PBF's In-Country Mechanisms:

- How effective was the relationship among Fund Recipients, the Resident Coordinator's Office, the PBF Secretariat and PBSO?
- PBF Secretariat:
 - How effective and efficient was the support to Fund Recipients in terms of higher-level monitoring, coordination and quality assurance of project implementation and reporting?
 - Was the Secretariat appropriately resourced (in terms of human and financial resources as well as political support)?
 - How effective was the Secretariat's support to the JSC?
- Joint Steering Committee (JSC):
 - How transparent, effective and efficient was the JSC's decision-making regarding PBF support?
 - How suitable was the JSC composition to its role and how did JSC evolve over time?
 - How strong was the government leadership/ ownership within the JSC?
 - How effective was the in-country strategic oversight of the projects by the joint steering committee mechanism?
- Fund recipients (RUNO and NUNO):
 - Has the implementation capacity of the individual RUNOs and NUNOs, and their implementing partners improved since the evaluation of the 2nd Priority Plan?
 - Did RUNOs improve their capacities to work together towards common strategic objectives in comparison to earlier periods?
 - What was the process for compiling half yearly and annual reviews and reports and what was the quality of those reports, particularly with regards to reporting higher-level project outcomes and collaboration among the various Fund Recipients?

- How were the principles of Do No Harm integrated in day to day management and oversight?

Findings and recommendations

The evaluation should provide a clear, triangulated, evidence-based assessment of its findings. On the basis of these evidence-based findings, the evaluation should clearly articulate actionable recommendations, tailored to relevant actors, including the PBSO, PBC, Joint Steering Committee, in-county PBF Secretariat, Resident Coordinator's Office, UN Country Team and, where relevant, non-UN Fund Recipients.

Evaluation findings and recommendations should speak to:

- the main programming factors of success;
- the main programming factors of failure;
- the main implementation/ administration factors of success;
- the main implementation/ administration factors of failure;
- the main challenges and ways to address them.

The major lessons and recommendations should come out clearly in the evaluation Executive Summary.

Evaluation methodology and approach

The evaluation will use, to the greatest extent possible, a participatory approach whereby discussions with and surveys of key stakeholders provide/ verify the substance of the findings. It will build on the findings and lessons from the first and second evaluations and explore how the achievements found at that time have carried through and how any lessons have been used in the next phase.

Currently, COVID-19 related restrictions within Burundi are limited, and access to Government, civil society and community interlocutors is relatively unimpeded. The country's borders, including the Bujumbura airport, are open although the number of international flights has been reduced. When preparing the evaluation exercise, the evaluation team should consider in detail the security, health and logistical restrictions that may affect their efforts to collect data and how they will mitigate the risks this may pose to the completion of the exercise.

The methodology should include, but not be limited to:

- Review of documentation supplied by PBSO, the PBF Secretariat in Burundi, and the UN Country Team, including:
 - the three Priority Plans, including their higher-level outcomes, theories of change and results frameworks
 - the 2010 and 2014 evaluations
 - 8 external project-level evaluations completed between 2014 and 2020
 - project reports
 - results of a PBF perception survey completed in November 2019
 - any preliminary results and data from the conflict analysis being undertaken by Interpeace
 - additional research by the evaluation team of documentation on the Burundi peace context, as necessary.

- Teleconferences with major stakeholders in New York, including PBSO, PBC, MPTF, headquarters of UN agencies implementing PBF support in Burundi;
- Teleconference with key stakeholders based in Burundi, including Government and civil society partners and beneficiaries, implementing agencies and non-UN entities, other international partners engaged in supporting peacebuilding and development in Burundi.
- Launch of a survey through, if possible, an experimental design approach.
- Field visits (to the extent possible within the constraints of COVID-19 related or other travel restrictions)
- Review of monitoring data from the RUNOs, NUNOs and JSC and other sources.

Given global travel restrictions as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is expected that the evaluation team will work remotely. Through a separate recruitment process, however, the international evaluation team will be complimented a team of locally hired evaluation consultants who will conduct in-country data collection. The national evaluation team will be fully managed by the international evaluation Team Leader, who will also participate in the development of the national evaluation team's Terms of Reference as well as procurement. Day-to-day coordination of and logistics related to the work of national evaluators will be supported by the PBF Secretariat. The evaluation approach outlined by the international evaluation team, therefore, should include specific reference to how it will work together with the national evaluation team in data collection and analysis, as well as the presentation of findings.

Management arrangements and quality assurance process

The evaluation will be procured as an institutional contract through PBF's existing Long-Term Agreement with KonTerra Group.

The PBSO, through its Programme Officer in charge of Burundi and through its M&E Unit, will manage the evaluation process. An Evaluation Reference Group (ERG) that includes key stakeholders will be established to provide PBSO with advice on each of the deliverables. ERG membership will be drawn from the Joint Steering Committee, UNCT, PBF Burundi management team, and PBSO/PBF. Its TORs will be developed and shared with the evaluation team prior to the commencement of the assignment. The PBSO retains full authority to approve each of the deliverables by the evaluation team. The role of the ERG will be to provide feedback on and endorse key deliverables. The evaluation team will be provided with a commenting matrix that includes observations and questions from the ERG on each of the deliverables. The evaluation team will be expected to clearly note whether and how they have responded to the comments.

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Evaluation team composition and requirements

While KonTerra Group should propose a team composition based on its understanding of the needs of the evaluation, PBF expects at a minimum that the evaluation team possess the following skills: experience in peacebuilding evaluations, experience with peacebuilding programming, ideally within the context of Burundi, and deep knowledge of the current political, security, human rights, governance and reconciliation challenges in Burundi. At least one of the team members should have a background on evaluating gender equality and women's empowerment. The Team Leader will

maintain primary responsible for the evaluation methodology, the overall quality and timely submission of all deliverables.

In addition to the main evaluation team, PBSO and the PBF Secretariat may procure the support of a team of national evaluators located in Burundi who, depending on local conditions, may provide additional data collection and analysis. If it is determined that the support of a national evaluation team is both necessary and feasible, PBSO and the PBF Secretariat will coordinate selection of the national evaluation team with the evaluation Team Leader.

Evaluation timeline

The schedule of the evaluation is expected to be as follows: [to be agreed]

TASK/SCHEDULE	Expected start	Expected finish
Drafting and submission of Inception Report. (including preliminary reading, teleconferences/ meetings with New York stakeholders (PBSO, PBC, MPTF, other UN agencies).	XX 2021	XX 2021
Data Collection (including remote interviews and desk-based data collection. If conditions allow, field missions, including travel and interviews with key stakeholders, beneficiaries and partners, site visits and surveys)	XX 2021	XX 2021
Validation of preliminary findings through an Aide Memoire		XX 2021
Submission of draft final report		XX 2021
Submission of revised final report		XX 2021

The payments to KonTerra will be made in three tranches as set out below:

Milestone:	Fees payable:
Inception report	Payment of 20% of total contract value
Approval of Aide Memoire	Payment of 20 % of total contract value
Approval of draft report by PBSO	Payment of 40% of total contract value
Approval of final report by PBSO	Payment of remaining 20% of contract value. (This will be adjusted based on actual reimbursables and actual total days worked, up to the maximums specified in the contract and following submission of actual receipts)

Key evaluation deliverables

Deliverables:	Content:	Due:
Inception report	<p>The inception report will have a maximum of 20 pages and will include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - key challenges or limitations the team anticipates based on available information; - the evaluation team’s understanding of the TORs; - key evaluation questions and methodological tools for answering each question; - list of key risks and risk management strategies for the evaluation; - proposed work plan for the field mission; - table of contents for the evaluation report. <p>The Report will be approved by PBSO prior to the evaluation team’s launching of the data collection phase. PBSO will consult with the Reference Group and will have 5 working days to provide comments on the Inception Report.</p>	XX 2021
Aide memoire	<p>The aide memoire will have a maximum of 3 pages and will include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - a brief summary of the purpose of the evaluation; - an overview of the team’s work, including activities assessed and stakeholders consulted; - an overview of key findings; - an explanation of next steps. 	XX 2021

	The aide memoire will be presented to the PBSO and the PBF Secretariat in the last week of the data collection phase. It will be accompanied by a PowerPoint presentation.	
Draft report	The draft report will have a maximum of 40 pages (the Executive Summary and the annexes can be completed as part of the final report). It will be presented to PBSO in New York. The draft report will be approved by the PBSO. The PBSO will consult with the Reference Group and have two weeks to provide comments.	XX 2021
Final report	The final report will have a maximum of 50 pages plus Executive summary, title page ² and annexes. The Team Leader will be responsible to incorporate to the greatest extent possible the comments from the PBSO, the Government and the UN Country Office, while preserving his independent views as an evaluator. The Final Report should include an Executive Summary (max. five pages) with key findings and recommendations, which can be used as a standalone document. The final report will be evidence based and will respond to all the questions in the TORs with clear and succinct lessons learned and recommendations. The PBSO will approve the final report, following a consultation with the Reference Group. Following acceptance of the Final Report, PBSO will coordinate a management response as a separate document.	XX 2021


Statement of Ethics

The Evaluation team will be held to the highest ethical standards and is required to sign a code of conduct upon acceptance of the assignment. This evaluation will be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the UNEG ‘Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation’. The evaluators must safeguard the rights and confidentiality of information providers, interviewees and stakeholders through measures to ensure compliance with legal and other relevant codes governing collection of data and reporting on data. The evaluators must also ensure security of collected information before and after the evaluation and protocols to ensure anonymity and confidentiality of sources of information where that is expected. Stakeholder explicit informed consent must be given for use outside of the evaluation of information, knowledge and data gathered during the evaluation process.


² PBF will provide the cover page, which has been standardized.

ANNEX I -- Overview of PBF projects 2014-2020

Since 2014, more than 33 projects (\$37 million) have been approved for PBF funding, in line with the third PBF Priority Plan and, following its expiration, in line with the 4 priority themes identified based on a conflict analysis undertaken by the UNCT. 25 of these 33 projects have now been completed. Below is a diagram illustrating project breakdown by theme and timeline:



Most projects were jointly implemented by at least two United Nations recipient organizations (RUNOS). There are also 4 projects with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as recipient agencies, namely ACORD, CORDAID, NIMD and SFCG. Below is a diagram showing the distribution of PBF projects and funds to the various recipient organizations:



Appendix B. Evaluation Criteria

<i>Ends</i>	<i>Definition</i>
<i>Relevance</i>	Relevance is a measure of a) the degree to which the project and its activities are relevant to the Peacebuilding Priority Plan, b) the degree to which the project and its activities are relevant to the most important drivers of conflict and peace during the project implementation phase.
<i>Effectiveness</i>	Effectiveness assesses the degree to which the project attains its stated objectives. In peacebuilding interventions, it is important to consider the effectiveness and relevance together. A project may not be effective, but may be highly relevant, if the original objectives are no longer relevant to a changed context. In the instances where the project objective is no longer relevant to the context, we assess the degree to which the project alters its objective and activities to respond to the changed context and implements activities that follow this revised logic.
<i>Coherence</i>	Coherence assesses how well the intervention fits with the rest of initiatives implemented in the country. “ Internal coherence addresses the synergies and interlinkages between the intervention and other interventions carried out by the same institution/government, as well as the consistency of the intervention with the relevant international norms and standards to which that institution/government adheres. External coherence considers the consistency of the intervention with other actors’ interventions in the same context.”
<i>Catalytic Effect</i>	Catalytic effect is a measure of the degree to which the project triggers, accelerates, enables, or leverages resources so that follow-on peacebuilding actions are likely to occur.

<i>Means</i>	<i>Definitions</i>
<i>Efficiency</i>	Efficiency assesses two things: a) the cost efficiency, or whether results were achieved with the least amount of money possible compared to other alternatives; and b) the timely delivery of the planned activities.
<i>National Ownership</i>	National ownership measures: a) national buy-in – the degree to which the main people affected by a project buy into the project idea and design; and b) national involvement in implementation – the degree to which the key stakeholders are involved in the implementation of the project and feel ownership over the project outcomes.
<i>Conflict-sensitivity</i>	<p>“This means the ability of your organisation to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • understand the context in which you operate; • understand the interaction between your intervention and the context; and • act upon the understanding of this interaction, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts.

	<p><i>Note: the word ‘context’ is used rather than ‘conflict’ to make the point that all socio-economic and political tensions, root causes and structural factors are relevant to conflict sensitivity because they all have the potential to become violent. ‘Conflict’ is sometimes erroneously confused with macro-political violence between two warring parties (as with a civil war between a national government and a non-state actor).”</i></p>
<p><i>Risk Management</i></p>	<p>“Risk management is the process of evaluating alternative regulatory and non—regulatory responses to risk and selecting among them. The selection process necessarily requires the consideration of legal, economic and social factors.”</p>
<p><i>Gender sensitivity</i></p>	<p>“Gender-sensitive approaches integrate the findings of a gender analysis of the gender-related differences between men/boys and women/girls into all aspects of programme planning, design and delivery, and monitoring and evaluation.”</p> <p>“Gender analysis is the systematic analysis of the impact of a programme or policy on men/boys and on women/girls. A gender analysis enables donors to address gaps or opportunities that impact the ability of men/boys and women/ girls to benefit equitably from the programme or policy. When broader political economy and conflict analyses incorporate gender, they can provide valuable insights into the interplay between gender relations and statebuilding processes in a given context and can highlight opportunities to develop more equitable, targeted and effective programming.”</p>

Appendix C. PBF Project Portfolio (2014-2020)

PBF PROJECT PORTFOLIO (2014 - 2020)								
Project ID	Project	Theme	Implementing Partners	Location	Budget (USD)	Start	End	Duration YRS
92133/PBF/BDI	Coordination and Follow-up support for the Peacebuilding Program in Burundi	Coordination	UNDP (MDTF/PUNO only), RUNOs, NUNOs, PBSO, Interpeace		\$2,059,680	Oct 7, 2014	Apr 23, 2021	6.5
100897/PBF/BDI	Dialogue Support Fund for a Resolution of the Crisis in Burundi	Dialogue	UNOPS (UN Office for Project Services)	Country-wide	\$984,400	Jun 13, 2016	May 31, 2017	0.9
91554/PBF/BDI	Support for the promotion and protection of human rights in Burundi	Human Rights	OHCHR and UNDP	Country-wide	\$3,335,663	Aug 13, 2014	Dec 31, 2016	2.3
100241/PBF/IRF	African Union Human Rights observers support.	Human Rights	AUC (African Union Commission)	Country-wide	\$2,259,817	Apr 26, 2016	Nov 30, 2016	0.6
98478/PBF/IRF	Strengthening monitoring, reporting of OHCDH-B technical cooperation in Burundi	Human Rights	OHCHR	Country-wide	\$1,036,967	Feb 2, 2016	Oct 31, 2016	0.7
93122 PBF/IRF	OHCHR Monitoring and reporting in Burundi	Human Rights	OHCHR	Country-wide	\$888,725	Dec 16, 2014	Sep 30, 2015	0.8
103750/ME	ME Function of the Global Acceleration Instrument on Women, Peace, Security and Humanitarian Action	Women	UNWOMEN, CPAJ, SOJPAE, AICNDH		\$2,174,047	Dec 15, 2016	Aug 31, 2022	5.7
108391/PBF/IRF	Supporting women leaders	Women	Search for Common Ground	Country-wide	\$1,758,399	Feb 12, 2018	Dec 1, 2019	1.8
93147/PBF/BDI	Promoting the role of women in peacebuilding	Women	UNWOMEN	Country-wide	\$1,800,000	Dec 16, 2014	Jun 30, 2018	3.5
93148/PBF/BDI	Strengthening the response to sexual and gender-based violence in Burundi	Women	UNWOMEN	Kirundo, Rutana and Gitega	\$500,000	Dec 17, 2014	Mar 31, 2017	2.3

118938/PBF/IRF	“Community-based prevention of violence and social cohesion using innovation for young people in displaced and host communities.”	Youth	UNICEF and UNFPA	Makamba, Rumonge, Kirundo, Ruyigi, Bujumbura and Mwaro.	\$1,500,000	Dec 2, 2019	Jun 30, 2021	1.5
113468/PBF/IRF	“Youth leading the way for an engendered inclusive society in Burundi”	Youth	CORDAID	Bujumbura Rural, Bubanza, Cankuzo, Cibitoke, Mairie, Makamba, Mwaro	\$600,000	Dec 18, 2018	Dec 30, 2020	2.0
113451/PBF/IRF	"Investing in Youth for Social Cohesion and Sustainable Peace in Burundi"	Youth	ACORD	Bubanza, Citiboke, Kayanza, Marie de Bujumbura, Bujumbura Rural, Makamba	\$817,587	Dec 14, 2018	Dec 30, 2020	2.0
112731/PBF/BDI	"Strengthening local mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution in Burundi"	Youth	UNWOMEN, UNDP, IOM	Rutana, Kuyigi, Muyinga, Kirundo, Makamba, Cibitoke, Bubanza, Rumonge, Mwaro, Bururi, Mairie de Bujumbura, Cankuzo, Karusi	\$3,448,893	Oct 24, 2018	Oct 31, 2020	2.0
112622/PBF/BDI	"Supporting youth resilience in the face of socio-political conflicts in Burundi"	Youth	UNFPA, UNICEF, UNESCO	Ngozi, Kirundo, Makamba, Gitega, Rumonge, Ngozi, Mwaro, Bujumbura Rural	\$2,550,000	Oct 16, 2018	Sep 30, 2020	1.9
109327/PBF/IRF	"Youth LAB (Leaders politiques pour l'avenir du Burundi): Empowering Young Women and Men to Participate in Burundi's Political Parties"	Youth	NIMD	Country-wide	\$1,757,510	Mar 9, 2018	Sep 8, 2020	2.4
108359/PBF/IRF	Peacebuilding for sustainable reintegration for Peace in Burundi	Youth	UNDP, UNHCR, UNFPA, FAO	Ruyigi, Muyinga, Makamba, Kirundo	\$3,000,000	Jan 10, 2018	Dec 30, 2019	1.9
100207/BBF/BDI	Consolidation of peace gains by theatres based on UBUNTU values	Youth	UNICEF	Bururi, Karuzi, Kayanza, Makamba, Ngozi, Rutana, Gitega	\$1,000,000	Apr 26, 2016	Jun 30, 2018	2.2

100847/PBF/BDI	Support for community security and social cohesion among young people affected by conflict	Youth	UNFPA, UNDP, UNV	Bujumbura Mairie Bujumbura Rural Bururi	\$2,975,079	Jun 8, 2016	Jun 30, 2018	2.0
94613/PBF/BDI	Promoting National Dialogue	Youth	UNDP and UNESCO	Country-wide	\$1,240,000	Mar 19, 2015	Sep 30, 2016	1.5
108194/PBF/IRF combined with 108156/BU R (IOM, UNHCR, UNDP)	Preventing conflict and building peace through addressing the drivers of conflict and instability associated with forced displacement between Burundi and Tanzania (Burundi).	Cross border	UNDP Burundi, UNDP Tanzania, UNHCR Burundi, UNDP, IOM, UNHCR (Burundi & Tanzania), COPED, ACCORD, Burundi Scouts Association, BAR Association, ZOA International	In Burundi: Mabanda, Kayogoro, and Gisuru communes, situated in the provinces of Makamba, and Ruyigi.	\$1,054,399	Dec 22, 2017	Mar 31, 2019	1.3
				In Tanzania: Kibondo and Kakonko Districts in Kigoma Region.	\$1,054,399	Dec 15, 2017	Dec 31, 2018	1.0

Appendix D. Results Table for the PBF Portfolio

Project Information	TOCS	Objectives / Aims	Main Activities	Outputs	Outcomes	
COORDINATION						
Project ID:	92133/PBF/BDI(UNDP/RCO)	"If the Joint Steering Committee of the peacebuilding program and the Office of the Resident Coordinator are supported in their respective missions to guide PBF interventions given the context evolution, if agencies and implementing partners manage projects in an efficient way and if the PBSO and PBC are gradually informed on the achievements of the peacebuilding program, then the capitalization of peacebuilding gains will be effective, thus participating in prevention and peacebuilding."	By establishing a functioning PBF Technical Secretariat, the project aims to build the Joint Steering Committee's capacity to ensure the coordination, monitoring and evaluation of the Peacebuilding Priority Plan's implementation. The project will also support the monitoring of the inclusion of peacebuilding priorities in the PRSP-II, by supporting the implementation and the operation of a secretariat for the Sub-Sectoral Group for Peacebuilding Issues (SGSCP).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Establish a technical secretariat (TS) supporting the Joint Steering Committee (JSC); – Monitor the implementation of the CPC's recommendations; – Strengthen the role of monitoring and evaluation within TS; – Ensure good communication of projects' progress; – Provide advisory support on peacebuilding to the UNS Coordination; – Support the monitoring of the inclusion of peacebuilding priorities in the PRSP-II. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Output 1.1: Support to the Joint Steering Committee is provided. – Output 1.2: Support to the Resident Coordinator is provided. – Output 1.3: Support to RUNOs and NUNOs is provided. – Output 1.4: Liaison with the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) is provided. 	Outcome 1: Support for the PBF portfolio, including developing new projects, monitoring and evaluation, communication, and strategic supervision, is provided.
Project Name:	Coordination and Follow-up support for the Peacebuilding Program in Burundi					
Budget (\$):	\$2,059,680					
Implementing Partners:	UNDP (MDTF/PUNO only)					
Start Date:	Oct 7, 2014					
End Date:	Apr 23, 2021					
Project Status:	Ongoing					
Locations:	-					
DIALOGUE						
Project ID:	100897/PBF/BDI	Reconstructed based on ProDoc: If an efficient, credible and inclusive dialogue is implemented by national, regional and	Create an environment favorable to the resolution of the current crisis in Burundi, through	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Four dialogue sessions between stakeholders to facilitate the Inter-Burundian Dialogue Process; – Meetings of the Technical Group of Joint EAC-AU-UN 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Output 1.1: Partners at the sub-regional, regional and UN levels agree to implement an action plan that can contribute to solving the current crisis. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Outcome 1: Complementarity between the different approaches is ensured. – Outcome 2: Creation of a dialogue
Project Name:	Fund supporting the dialogue for resolving					

	the crisis in Burundi	international parties in a common approach, then tensions will decrease and trust will be strengthened, because stakeholders, including youth, women and civil society, can participate in a political dialogue and the population can talk about what repeatedly cause conflicts to arise.	consultations on a common approach at the sub-regional, regional and UN levels and through the establishment of a political dialogue process between the authorities, the political opposition and civil society.	(JTWG) work and consultations with different actors involved in the crisis, particularly in Burundi and in the region; – Creation of the CNDI (Inter-Burundian National Dialogue Commission); – Build civil society's capacity, particularly of women leaders in mediation and negotiations, and finance their participation in dialogue (funded by UN Women).	– Output 1.2: Joint facilitation mechanisms are established. – Output 2.1: National authorities and other Burundi stakeholders agree to participate in the dialogue. – Output 2.2: Women and youth contribute to the dialogue. – Output 2.3: A political dialogue is initiated, and it is credible, transparent, inclusive and contributes to a return to peace and stability in the country.	process that is credible, transparent, inclusive and contributes to the return to peace and stability in the country.
Budget (\$):	\$984,400					
Implementing Partners:	UNOPS (UN Office for project services)					
Start Date:	Jun 13, 2016					
End Date:	May 31, 2017					
Project Status:	Completed					
Locations:	Countrywide					
HUMAN RIGHTS						
Project ID:	91554/PBF/BDI	"If the accountability of the State for the protection of human rights is sought, if operational capacities of the Independent National Human Rights Commission and human rights defenders and that all three actors work together, then human rights will be promoted and better protected in Burundi." Because cases of human rights	The project aims to finance the immediate implementation of the Office of the High Commissioner in Burundi, after the closure of the BNUB mission, in order to allow for the monitoring and the production of pre-electoral, electoral, and post-electoral reports. Monitoring of the human rights situation during elections must inform	– Regular consultations with various authorities, especially ministers (justice, human rights, external relations, and security); – Human rights monitoring by OHCHR-B; – Capacity-building on the respect of human rights during an election period for law enforcement officers, political parties' members, media professionals, human rights defenders; – Technical support to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR);	– Output 1.1: The continuing presence of the OHCHR immediately after the closing of the BNUB mission. – Output 1.2: Production in a timely manner of independent and evidence-based reports on the human rights situation before, during and after elections. – Output 1.3: Preventive and corrective measures are taken by the national authorities and stakeholders.	– Outcome 1: Enhanced respect of human rights during pre-electoral and post-electoral periods thanks to the monitoring and production of credible and independent reports by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).
Project Name:	Support to the promotion and prevention of human rights in Burundi					
Budget (\$):	\$3,335,663					
Implementing Partners:	OHCHR and UNDP					
Start Date:	Aug 13, 2014					

End Date:	Dec 31, 2016	violations will be monitored and addressed, and information on such violations will allow the government to prevent and punish them, thus decreasing impunity.	the early warning system and contribute to the prevention of human rights violations.	– Establishment of a ‘crisis unit’ by OHCHR-B as a mechanism for analyzing the human rights situation and informing an early warning system regarding human rights violations during the electoral process.		
Project Status:	Completed					
Locations:	Countrywide					
Project ID:	93122 PBF/IRF	"The implementation of an OHCHR office will allow the monitoring and production of reports that will inform the advocacy of OHCHR, national authorities and other stakeholders, thus allowing the prevention or response to human rights violations committed during the election period."	The project aims to finance the immediate implementation of the Office of the High Commissioner in Burundi, after the closure of the BNUB mission, in order to allow for the monitoring and the production of pre-electoral, electoral, and post-electoral reports. Monitoring of the human rights situation during elections must inform the early warning system and contribute to the prevention of human rights violations.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Regular consultations with various authorities, especially ministers (justice, human rights, external relations, and security); – Human rights monitoring by OHCHR-B; – Capacity-building on the respect of human rights during an election period for law enforcement officers, political parties' members, media professionals, human rights defenders; – Technical support to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR); – Establishment of a ‘crisis unit’ by OHCHR-B as a mechanism for analyzing the human rights situation and informing an early warning system regarding human rights violations during the electoral process. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Output 1.1: The continuing presence of the OHCHR immediately after the closing of the BNUB mission. – Output 1.2: Production in a timely manner of independent and evidence-based reports on the human rights situation before, during and after elections. – Output 1.3: Preventive and corrective measures are taken by the national authorities and stakeholders. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Outcome 1: Enhanced respect of human rights during pre-electoral and post-electoral periods thanks to the monitoring and production of credible and independent reports by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).
Project Name:	OHCHR Monitoring and reporting in Burundi					
Implementing Partners:	\$888,725					
Budget (\$):	OHCHR					
Start Date:	Dec 16, 2014					
End Date:	Sep 30, 2015					
Project Status:	Completed					
Locations:	Countrywide					
Project ID:	98478/PBF/IRF	"A change in mindset and in behavior that is	The project aims to strengthen the Office	– Recruitment of international and national	– Output 1.1: Ongoing monitoring of human	– Outcome 1: A better visibility and

Project Name:	Strengthening the monitoring, report production and technical cooperation of OHCHR in Burundi	respectful of human rights requires the systematic and enhanced monitoring of human rights in order to understand the extent and the dynamic of violations, the perpetrators' motivations, the weaknesses of the systems and structures, and the responsibility of institutions. The ultimate goal is to define action strategies adapted to the needs for prevention, protection and progressive implementation of human rights. Strengthening monitoring will allow OHCHR-B to document human rights violations in a credible and contrasted manner, and to produce reports that will be shown to the authorities of Burundi in order to encourage them to prosecute and punish perpetrators of human rights violations, as well as take preventive,	of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights' human resources capacity in Burundi (OHCHR-B) in order to scale up the monitoring and production of reports on the human rights situation that deteriorated following the contested general elections of 2015. The enhanced monitoring of the human rights situation will serve as an early warning system and will enable the Office to engage in credible and informed advocacy with the relevant authorities to prevent new violations. The project also aims, with its national coverage, to monitor internally displaced people and returning Burundian people from asylum countries, as well as to assess the needs in their return areas in order to facilitate the formulation of a multisectoral strategy that meets their reintegration needs.	staff for OHCHR-B to support human rights monitoring in Burundi; – Monitoring of human rights situation in post-election period and publishing reports and briefing notes; – Increase advocacy with local authorities; – Training and advisory support to the African Union through a focal point at the OHCHR-B and advocacy based on AU's observation mission.	rights violations and abuse thanks to the monitoring and production of credible and independent reports by the OHCHR-B. – Output 1.2: Enhanced monitoring or gender-based violence thanks to the monitoring and production of thematic reports, in partnership with competent partners in the field. – Output 1.3: Reporting on human rights violations and abuse, including gender-based violence. – Output 1.4: Strengthen the enhanced presence of OHCHR-B during the post-elections period through international and national staffing (5xP3; 1 international UNV; 10 NGOs; et 6 drivers (G2)). – Output 2.1: National authorities take preventive and corrective measures in cases of human rights violations and abuse, including gender-based violence. – Output 2.2: Incidents of human rights violations and abuse, including gender-based violence perpetrated by Burundi's authorities and other	knowledge of the human rights violations and abuse, including gender-based violence, perpetrated in Burundi. – Outcome 2: A enhanced advocacy and a strengthened engagement from the OHCHR-B with its national partners and others. – Outcome 3: Synergy of action between AU and OHCHR-B to positively influence the human rights situation in Burundi through extensive monitoring, reporting, and advocacy with the authorities.
Implementing Partners:	OHCHR					
Budget (\$):	\$1,036,967					
Start Date:	Feb 2, 2016					
End Date:	Oct 31, 2016					
Project Status:	Completed					
Locations:	Countrywide					

		corrective and sustainable measures. Endemic violations like gender-based violence will be esteemed by implementing structural reforms."			actors, are known across the international community and enable them to put pressure on the Government of Burundi. – Output 3.1: The presence and work of the African Union human rights observation mission is facilitated by the authorities of Burundi. – Output 3.2: The African Union human rights observers have the capacities and a good knowledge of the context, the specific challenges and the human rights instruments applicable in Burundi.	
Project ID:	100241/PBF / IRF	"Strengthening technical and logistical capacity of the AU HR observers in Burundi will allow a more systematic and increased monitoring of human rights by a mandated regional organization in order to understand the extent and dynamics of violations, the motivations of the perpetrators, challenges regarding weak systems and structures and	This project will enable 32 African Union human rights observers to undertake their responsibilities of observing, monitoring and documenting human rights violations, including in Bujumbura and other areas of the country and, where possible, refugees.	– Deployment of human rights observers, military and police experts – Support the coordination, monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the Peacebuilding Priority Plan – Human rights observation, monitoring, reporting, advocacy.	– Output 1.1: 32 AU human rights observers have the requisite capacity and knowledge of the context, human instruments applicable to Burundi and their mandate and benefit from security and logistics support. – Output 1.2: 32 AU human rights observers provide weekly and monthly reports on the human rights situation in Burundi to the African Union Peace and Security Council	– Outcome 1: Increased visibility and strengthened AU and international community analysis of human rights violations in Burundi, leading to more informed and coordinated statements and actions by the AU and the international partners around human rights and peacebuilding in Burundi. – Outcome 2: Strengthened justice
Project Name:	African Union Human Rights observers support in Burundi					
Implementing Partners:	AUC (African Union Commission)					
Budget (\$):	\$2,259,817					
Start Date:	Apr 26, 2016					

End Date:	Nov 30, 2016	<p>accountability of institutions. It will also enable a strengthened and more strategic cooperation with OHCHR monitoring and advocacy activities on the ground. The presence of the AU human rights observers and the information collected from their monitoring activities will hopefully have a deterrent effect on the perpetrators, especially if the team is able to cover more territory and respond more quickly – this deterrence should happen both by their very presence but also through increased advocacy with and action by the Government. Indeed, this increased presence will allow the AU contingent and its partners to advocate with the Government of Burundi to strengthen the Government’s responses to human rights violations, including punishing the perpetrators and</p>					
Project Status:	Completed						
Locations:	Countrywide						
					<p>– Output 1.3: AU human rights observers pay particular attention to and provide specific reporting on the human rights situation of women and other vulnerable groups.</p> <p>– Output 1.4: AU human right observers and OHCHR strengthen coordination of visits, data, analysis and strategies on human rights monitoring and advocacy for greater joint impact.</p> <p>– Output 2.1: AU human rights observers advocacy with the Burundi Government on human rights violations leads to concrete responses by the Government and improved results for victims of violations.</p> <p>– Output 2.2: AU human rights observers’ advocacy with the Burundian Government leads to actions that address violations against women and better protection for women in the context of the conflict.</p>	<p>for victims of human rights violations, with a special emphasis on women, and increased responses from the Burundi Government to the human rights violations.</p>	

		protecting the most vulnerable. The reports issued from the fact-finding visits will be sent to the AU PSC."				
WOMEN						
Project ID:	93147/PBF/BDI	"If women's capacities, the institutional environment and their place in the national dialogue are strengthened, Then they will be able to raise their status in society, to make their voices heard, and take decisions in favor of the long-term prevention and resolution of conflicts."	The project aims to strengthen the dialogue at all levels of the Burundi society and involves all actors, thanks to the action of women facilitators and actors in this dialogue on conflict resolution and peacebuilding.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Establish a network of women mediators in Burundi; – Capacity building for FNF leaders and RFAPD mediators; – Partnership with the National School Administration and Parliament for capacity building of elected women at all levels. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Output 1.1: A network of women mediators is established at the community level to strengthen the national dialogue and peacebuilding. – Output 1.2: Meetings about communities' preoccupations are facilitated by women, at the province level and in Bujumbura Mairie, and advance peace and social cohesion. – Output 1.3: Stakeholders in the negotiations benefit from the conclusions of the meetings organized by women at all levels and from the support of these women to direct the political process towards sustainable peace. – Output 2.1: The political space is widened for increased women participation through the implementation of an advocacy strategy with Parliament, the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Outcome 1: Community conflicts (political tensions, communication issues, electoral violence against women) are greatly reduced thanks to the action of a network of actors at all levels based on the actions of women mediations recognized in their community. – Outcome 2: Women in communities and women leaders at all levels have the capacity to make their voices heard and effectively contribute to a democratic, peaceful and inclusive dialogue.
Project Name:	Promoting women's roles in peacebuilding					
Implementing Partners:	UNWOMEN					
Budget (\$):	\$1,800,000					
Start Date:	Dec 16, 2014					
End Date:	Jun 30, 2018					
Project Status:	Completed					
Locations:	Countrywide					

					Government, the local administration and political parties. – Output 2.2: mentioned in log frame but no description. – Output 3.1: Spaces for dialogue led by women increase the accountability of elected officials and bring political parties closer together.	
Project ID:	93148/PBF/BDI	"If the technical and operational capacities of the criminal system are strengthened and there is a favorable legal framework, as well as mechanisms of internal and external control on the repression of SGBV cases to ensure diligent handling of SGBV cases, and if at the same time the community is made aware and changes its behavior, Then there will be an improvement in the response to SGBV and a better protection of women rights in Burundi."	The project seeks to address human rights issues that predominantly affect women for an inclusive and gender-sensitive peace. It focuses on sexual and gender-based violence and particularly aims to improve the efficiency of the judicial system in reducing sexual violence with diligent handling procedures and an awareness and better organization of communities to fight against violence.	– Creation of community networks to fight SGBV – Capacity building sessions and resources for the police to deal with SGBV cases – Annual awareness sessions of SGBV for communities – Regular monitoring carried out by members of the SGBV cell of the Ministry of Justice – Establish a legal framework and mechanisms for the protection of victims' rights	– Output 1.1: Community mechanisms to prevent sexual and gender-based violence are strengthened and equipped. – Output 1.2: Populations, and specifically men and youth, have the knowledge that contributes to behavior change. – Output 2.1: A legal framework and mechanisms to protect victims' rights are implemented. – Output 2.2: Technical and operational capacities of actors in the criminal systems are strengthened. – Output 2.3: Mechanisms of external and internal control to the criminal system are strengthened.	– Outcome 1: Communities are made aware and engage in promoting and protecting the rights of victims of sexual and gender-based violence for a better social cohesion. – Outcome 2: Cases of sexual and gender-based violence are dealt with diligently in the criminal system and victims' rights are protected.
Project Name:	Strengthening the response to sexual and gender-based violence in Burundi					
Implementing Partners:	UNWOMEN					
Budget (\$):	\$500,000					
Start Date:	Dec 17, 2014					
End Date:	Mar 31, 2017					
Project Status:	Completed					
Locations:	Kirundo, Rutana and Gitega					

Project ID:	108391/PBF /IRF	<p>"If opportunities for capacity-building, mentoring and dialogue are created for potential women leaders; if these new leaders are put in touch with mentors and key actors, including young leaders; and if these actors, together, lead peacebuilding initiatives promoted by the medias;</p> <p>Then women from all walks of life, including young women and marginalized women, will have trust, expertise, enhanced capacities, and the visibility and legitimacy to get involved in and lead the processes of peacebuilding and local development within their communities, thus contributing to changing relative norms about women's participation and leadership, as well as peacefully changing existing conflicts, and preventing the emergence of new conflicts,</p>	<p>The project aims to strengthen existing women leaders and foster the emergence of new leaders among women of all ages, to work with their male peers to design and implement community-based initiatives to promote peace and reconciliation in Burundi.</p>	<p>– Training and refresher sessions on leadership, peaceful conflict resolution, advocacy, networking and positive masculinity;</p> <p>– Coaching sessions to develop collaborative initiatives between women and young people within their communities;</p> <p>– Round tables in the communes through which women have initiated community initiatives for peace, social cohesion or conflict prevention;</p> <p>– 17 support and coaching sessions in gender and conflict sensitive journalism for novice women journalists;</p> <p>– Produce magazines and articles;</p> <p>– Setup 'listener's clubs';</p> <p>– Produce radio shows.</p>	<p>– Output 1.1: Training including retraining in leadership and peacebuilding for women is being carried out, increasing women's abilities.</p> <p>– Output 1.2: Women-to-women coaching sessions and women-youth exchange workshops are facilitated, increasing women's abilities.</p> <p>– Output 2.1: Women leaders work with local actors to design peace initiatives during roundtable discussions.</p> <p>– Output 2.2: Women play a leading role in implementing local peace initiatives.</p> <p>– Output 3.1: Men and women journalists have a strategic vision and capacity for gender-sensitive journalism and enhanced conflict.</p> <p>– Output 3.2: The availability of gender-oriented radio programs is increased on the airwaves.</p> <p>– Output 3.3: The availability of gender-oriented articles written and published is increased.</p>	<p>– Outcome 1: The female leaders of today and tomorrow are increasing their effectiveness and credibility as actors in peace-building processes at the community level.</p> <p>– Outcome 2: Women are increasing their leadership on conflict transformation, collaboration and reconciliation initiatives, engaging both women and men of all ages.</p> <p>– Outcome 3: Community perceptions of the importance of women's role in peacebuilding are positively transformed, recognizing their role and added value.</p>
Project Name:	Support women leaders					
Implementing Partners:	Search for Common Ground					
Budget (\$):	\$1,758,399					
Start Date:	Feb 8, 2018					
End Date:	Dec 1, 2019					
Project Status:	Completed					
Locations:	Bujumbura Marie, Bujumbura Rural (Mutambu, Isare, Mutimbuzi), Bubanza (Gihanga, Musigati), Kirundo (Kirundo, Ntega, Busoni, Bugabira), Makamba (Makamba, Mabanda, Kibago), Cibitoke, Kayanza					

	(Matongo), Ruyigi (Butaganzwa)	Because women will be adequately supported, connected, and their efforts will be showcased through the media, promoting a favorable environment to their participation and leadership, and enabling them to shape the local conversations and actions towards peacebuilding and inclusion."				
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YOUTH

Project ID:	94613/PBF BDI	<p>"If... – political leaders, partis and political actors have a better organizational capacity and capacity to solve disputes, and have opportunities to meet in a neutral way to discuss key questions on the election and political process and to share their decisions with their members; – if youth from political movements are better supervised to promote a peaceful culture, and to peacefully participate in election processes;</p>	<p>The project aims to maintain a serene political and social climate before, during and after the 2015 elections. On one hand, the promotion and strengthening of dialogue between leaders and political actors will be encouraged by considering the role of young people affiliated with political parties as well as that of the Media. On the other hand, technical assistance will be provided to political parties, better preparing them to</p>	<p>– Exchanges between political parties on strategies for accompanying the electoral process, better participation in the electoral process, the preparation of political agents for election observation, and the roles and responsibilities of parties in electoral enlistment; – Organizing the election campaign; – Reflection of political actors on their involvement in the electoral process; – Training of political agents: their roles on election day, during counting and when the results are certified; – Organized at least 5 workshops at the municipal, provincial and national level</p>	<p>– Output 1: Local leaders and representatives of political parties at the provincial level have the capacity (negotiations) and provide a framework for the reference and channeling of community aspirations to the national dialogue process. – Output 2: Recommendations and ideas from regular exchanges between local leaders and representatives of grassroots political parties contribute to the process of national dialogue. – Output 3: Young people from political parties, civil society, key</p>	<p>Communities, political and civil society actors, including women and young people, have their capacities strengthened and their aspirations taken into account by the inter-Burundian dialogue process.</p>
Project Name:	Promoting National Dialogue					
Implementing Partners:	UNDP and UNESCO					
Budget (\$):	\$1,240,000					
Start Date:	Mar 19, 2015					
End Date:	Sep 30, 2016					
Project Status:	Completed					
Locations:	Countrywide					

		<p>– if the Burundi community, including women, youth, community leaders and the diaspora, have more opportunities to exchanges on important issues regarding the national and community life through a permanent democratic debate, that also benefits from media support; Then... This will promote the sustainability of a culture of dialogue before, during and after elections, allowing for the peaceful resolution of disputes and peaceful conduct of the 2015 elections."</p>	<p>participate in the electoral processes.</p>	<p>to deal with the most serious cases of political violence through dialogue between youth and political party leaders; – Election evaluation by all political parties; – Self- evaluation of the elections by each party participating in the electoral competition; – Strengthening the capacity of young people affiliated with political parties to support them in setting up joint committees (movement and opposition) to prevent and resolve political conflicts peacefully; – Animation and dissemination, through the media, of inclusive debates/exchanges at the community and national level (by ensuring that the diaspora is involved), on the challenges of peace-building and the solutions to them, contributing to a serene political and social environment.</p>	<p>community groups, targets of the project, including religious leaders, contribute peacefully and positively to the preservation of peace, and commit themselves to restricting any act of violence. – Output 4: The population is mobilized around the values of dialogue, peace and social cohesion, and has the opportunity to contribute to the promotion of these values.</p>	
Project ID:	100847/PBF/BDI	<p>"If vulnerable youth in communities affected by violence have access to information, training and economic opportunities, then they will help lead a peacebuilding and</p>	<p>The project aims to contribute to the social cohesion and promotion of peace in local conflict affected communities by giving young people from various social,</p>	<p>– Setting up peace clubs in communities – Supporting business plans for starting small businesses – Dialogue sessions to empower young volunteers to engage in the prevention and</p>	<p>– Output 1.1: Established Peace and Community Solidarity Clubs. – Output 1.2: The capacity and knowledge of "community change agents" to affect conflict resolution and youth</p>	<p>– Outcome 1: Positive relations and good understanding between young people from different socio-economic and political backgrounds is strengthened.</p>
Project Name:	Support for community security and social cohesion among					

	young people affected by conflict	stability process that will serve as the basis for an inclusive society and a transparent management system in order to promote peaceful coexistence, social cohesion and socio-economic development."	economic, and political backgrounds the opportunity to interact, learn, and acquire livelihoods; thus, strengthening their peaceful coexistence, social cohesion and socio-economic development.	management of conflict at the community level – Establish a resilience strategy at the community level – Establish networks of young leaders and entrepreneurs – Train Community Change Agents	resilience will be strengthened. – Output 1.3: Youth involvement in community safety decision-making processes. – Output 2.1: Youth committees set up to manage rehabilitation infrastructure. – Output 2.2: Small businesses and social enterprises created. – Output 2.3: Has indicators in log frame but no description. – Output 3.1: Equal access for young people to volunteering opportunities in social cohesion is ensured – Output 3.2: Skills in social cohesion, economic development, and participation strengthened through volunteering in peacebuilding clubs.	– Outcome 2: Young people affected by crises lead an inclusive process of community reconstruction to promote peaceful coexistence, social cohesion, and socio-economic development. – Outcome 3: Young people volunteer in the service of the community.
Implementing Partners:	UNFPA, UNDP and UNV					
Budget (\$):	\$2,975,079					
Start Date:	Jun 8, 2016					
End Date:	Jun 30, 2018					
Project Status:	Completed					
Locations:	Bujumbura Mairie, Bujumbura Rural, Bururi					
Project ID:	100207/BBF/BDI	"If participative theaters improve the cultural skills and appropriate interactions between community members, participants will increase their tolerance (attitude),	The project plans to raise awareness primarily among young people and those vulnerable and susceptible to the various manipulations of society (repatriated, ex-combatants,	– Narrative and interactive theater sessions; – Psychosocial animations; – Capacity building for youth on life skills, leadership, conflict resolution and transformation, non-violence, conflict sensitivity, etc.;	– Output 1.1: Young people's skills are strengthened in UBUNTU values, life skills, and the organization of self-help and solidarity initiatives. – Output 1.2: The management of self-help	– Outcome 1: Social cohesion between girls and boys from different social groups in the intervention communities is improved in order to prevent, manage and
Project Name:	Strengthen peace gains through theatres based on UBUNTU values					

Implementing Partners:	UNICEF	acceptance (behavior), and the understanding of differences (knowledge). Then exchanges within these interaction spaces will allow people to examine their issues together and try to solve them. And If youth who participated/attended theaters embodies and internalizes UBUNTU values (generosity, solidarity, mutual assistance, mutual respect, etc.), they will fully collaborate with solidarity activities related to economic opportunities, will become more autonomous and then will participate more efficiently to peacebuilding in their communities."	displaced persons) on the issues of peace and reconciliation through interactive plays and psychosocial animations with narrative plays. To achieve its objectives, the project will use the process of behavior change communication coupled with peacebuilding activities.	– The organization of community activities that aim to create social cohesion and reintegration through socio-cultural activities and the development of solidarity chains; – The creation of communication spaces to engage young people in identifying the problems that affect them in relation to peacebuilding and find solutions to reduce violence.	initiatives, conducted and led by young people through solidarity chains, is increased. – Output 1.3: Advocacy for an enabling environment for implementing peacebuilding activities is improved.	transform conflict, and build peace.
Budget (\$):	\$1,000,000					
Start Date:	Apr 26, 2016					
End Date:	Jun 30, 2018					
Project Status:	Completed					
Locations:	Bururi, Karuzi, Kayanza, Makamba, Ngozi, Rutana, Gitega					
Project ID:	108359/PBF/IRF	None found.	This project seeks to support the Government of Burundi and local communities with identifying and addressing the major prevailing protection	– Monitoring visits to ensure protection of refugees who have returned to Burundi – Community dialogues on peace, cultural activities – Training for agents (1800 people) of change at the community level	– Output 1.1: included in log frame but no description. – Output 1.2: Access to basic social services (for improved protection, resilience and social	– Outcome 1: Increased access to rights and services (for improved protection, resilience and social cohesion for sustainable reintegration).
Project Name:	Peacebuilding for sustainable reintegration for Peace in Burundi					

Implementing Partners:	UNDP, UNHCR, UNFPA and FAO		and socio-economic obstacles to sustainable reintegration of returnees, through enhanced protection and resilience in major areas of return in Burundi, in order to ensure peace and social cohesion.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Setting up peace clubs or community service sessions – Awareness and training sessions on peaceful resolution and conflict prevention, non-violent communication, community leadership, etc. – Support for IGAs provided by the project to groups, associations and individuals in the form of cash and / or starter kits or agricultural inputs – Capacity building on good practices of micro-enterprise management and monitoring 	cohesion for sustainable reintegration). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Output 2.1: included in log frame but no description. – Output 2.2: Support for livelihoods and social cohesion through entrepreneurship. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Outcome 2: Increased livelihoods and self-reliance for vulnerable households (for improved protection, resilience and social cohesion for sustainable reintegration).
Budget (\$):	\$3,000,000					
Start Date:	Jan 10, 2018					
End Date:	Dec 30, 2019					
Project Status:	Completed					
Locations:	Ruyigi, Muyinga, Makamba, Kirundo					
Project ID:	109327/PBF /IRF	"– If young women and men in the structures of political parties at the province and national levels are better equipped and placed to participate in political processes, and to influence them within their parties, – If their parties are more opened to their participation, – Then, political parties in Burundi will be better prepared to include their perspectives and	The proposed project contributes to peacekeeping in Burundi in the short term, but also in the long term by empowering young women and men to participate in political parties as agents of change within the parties themselves and the broader political landscape. The project is also aligned with resolution 2250 and the background documentation on	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Training sessions for young men and women on different themes – Multi-stakeholder workshop of the core of 36 young women and men trained to prepare – Restitution of learning outcomes; – Five regional workshops to present the results of the training to representatives – provincial political parties that are the most representative on the ground; – Exchange workshop on the place of young people in the orientations of the National 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Output 1.1: A training program is developed, adapted to the context, and validated. – Output 1.2: Curriculum modules are delivered by a group of trainers. – Output 1.3: A group of 504 young people (50% young women) from the most represented political parties have the necessary skills and competencies. – Output 2.1: A functional core group of 36 young women and men is established. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Outcome 1: Young women and men from the 7 most represented political parties in terms of national coverage, use their skills and knowledge to participate peacefully in political life within their parties and on a larger scale. – Outcome 2: A core group of 36 young women and men from the 7 most represented political parties formulate a
Project Name:	Youth LAB (Political leaders for the future of Burundi): Empowering Young Women and Men to Participate in Burundi's Political Parties					
Implementing Partners:	NIMD					

Budget (\$):	\$1,757,510	youth participation towards peaceful and inclusive elections in 2020. – Because young women and men have every interest in being forward looking, are able to think creatively outside of the political paradigms affected by conflict and are more likely to work together beyond the borders between parties because of the place they share as a marginalized political and socio-economic majority in Burundi, – Because political parties have every interest to involve youth both for organizational development and electoral success."	youth participation in peacebuilding.	– Development (PND) and taking into account the consolidation of peace; – 5-day reflection workshop for 36 young people trained on the overall orientation of the strategy and action plan on the participation of young women and men. 4 young representatives of the National Youth Council of Burundi also participated in this workshop.	– Output 2.2: A strategy document and action plan are developed. – Output 2.3: A media campaign and action plan are implemented. However, the media campaign for the strategy did not take place due to the suspension of activities by the political authorities.	shared strategy for the peaceful political participation of Burundi's youth. – Outcome 3: The organization of 16 replicated training sessions for 288 young people (M/F) affiliated to the 7 political parties including 36 young people from the National Youth Council of Burundi (CNJB) on the two modules directly related to the peaceful political participation of youth.
Start Date:	Mar 9, 2018					
End Date:	Sep 8, 2020					
Project Status:	Completed					
Locations:	Echelle pays					
Project ID:	112622/PBF/BDI	"If the history of this country is presented and perceived in a more peaceful manner to new generations that did not witness it, If self-victimization and accusation of the other make way for a	This project is built on lessons learned from previous MPTF consultations and interventions. This project is proposed by UNFPA, UNICEF and UNESCO to help break the cycle of	– 13,907 people including 3,597 men, 3,929 women, 3,261 boys and 3,120 girls participated in the peacebuilding theater performances. – 404 spectators including 129 Women, 134 Men and 72 Boys and 69 Girls were able	– Output 1.1: Young girls and boys are agents of change in community resilience and participate in the constructive presentation of the country's past. – Output 1.2: The capacities of community	– Outcome 1: Young girls and boys are resilient and contribute to reconciliation and violence prevention through a better perception of the past.
Project Name:	Supporting youth resilience to socio-political conflicts in Burundi					

Implementing Partners:	UNFPA, UNICEF, UNESCO	<p>resolute engagement towards a better future with all, without any prejudices and preconceived ideas,</p> <p>If leaders contribute to a peaceful and constructive presentation of painful past events, Then conditions and opportunities for an inclusive social dialogue will be created, anything that enables the young generation to talk to each other in a new language, without the hate cause by the past and without discrimination nor grudge."</p>	<p>violence that Burundi has been experiencing since its independence in 1962. It will specifically work towards a constructive perception of the country's painful past by young girls and boys, to reduce cases of frustration and discontent related to the past and to break the cycle of transferring pain to the new generations. This will promote reconciliation, the peaceful management of the legacy of the past and the resilience of young people in the face of potential incitements to hatred.</p>	<p>to express themselves and proposed constructive solutions for a peaceful cohabitation.</p> <p>– Advocacy sessions were held with 1509 local elected officials and opinion leaders (deputies, hill leaders) in favor of better management of the past by young girls and boys.</p> <p>– 12 magazines, 12 spots and sketches containing messages of peace were produced.</p> <p>– 1098 young leaders were trained in life skills and community mobilization. They then replicated the training received with 28,187 adolescents (14,845 girls and 13,342 boys).</p> <p>– A national consultant, recruited according to UN procedures and whose inception report has just been validated, is in the field to carry out the final evaluation of the project.</p>	<p>networks of young girls and boys are strengthened to relay a peaceful understanding of the past in communities.</p> <p>– Output 2.1: Opinion leaders, local authorities and the media contribute to building the capacity of young girls and boys for community resilience in relation to the past.</p>	<p>– Outcome 2: National institutions contribute to a constructive presentation of the past to girls and boys.</p>
Budget (\$):	\$2,550,000					
Start Date:	Oct 16, 2018					
End Date:	Sep 30, 2020					
Project Status:	Completed					
Locations:	Ngozi, Kirundo, Makamba, Gitega, Rumonge, Ngozi, Mwaro, Bujumbura Rural					
Project ID:	112731/PBF /BDI	<p>"If community mechanisms of mediation and conflict resolution are strengthened and operationalized; it psycho-social and legal support for victims of rights violations is provided;</p>	<p>This project focuses on the prevention and resolution of community conflicts and peaceful coexistence and social cohesion within communities through the strengthening of administrative and</p>	<p>– Establish a network of women mediators, community leaders and paralegals</p> <p>– Organize community dialogue sessions focused on a) peace, security and social cohesion, b)</p> <p>– Youth and unwanted pregnancies and, c) political</p>	<p>– Output 1.1: Strengthened and supported women mediators contribute to conflict prevention and resolution.</p> <p>– Output 1.2: The strategic networking of women mediators is strengthened and</p>	<p>– Outcome 1: Community members, including women and girl mediators, displaced persons, returnees, migrants, potential victims of trafficking and GBV, are empowered and contribute to conflict</p>
Project Name:	Strengthen local mechanisms of conflict prevention and resolution in Burundi					

Implementing Partners:	UNWOMEN, UNDP, IOM	if relations between the population, the administration, the police and immigration authorities are improved; if all actors at the community level act together to prevention and solve conflicts, Then a culture based on conflict prevention and resolution will take root in the areas of intervention."	procedural capacities of stakeholders in community conflict management, reconciliation, and psychosocial healing by professional mobile teams, and by strengthening the role of women peace mediators and paralegals in community conflict resolution. The innovative nature of the project is highlighted through the strengthening of cooperation between existing local conflict resolution mechanisms at the community level with the intervention of formal and informal actors in conflict resolution and reconciliation, including at the national level.	and economic empowerment of women – Provide free legal aid and psychosocial support to vulnerable community members such as people with disabilities – Training on administrative procedures in crisis situations to police officers and civil protection workers	expanded to include girl mediators and incubators. – Output 1.3: Formal and informal law enforcement actors (including migration agents and local elected officials) have improved capacity to prevent and resolve conflicts related to migration and repatriation. – Output 2.1: Networks of Community Leaders/Paralegals are established and provide legal aid services (listening, orientation and conciliation) for minor conflicts at the grassroots level. – Output 2.2: Free legal aid services are provided to vulnerable people. – Output 2.3: Community members traumatized by psychological and physical violence have improved capacity to heal through traditional rehabilitation and healing methods coupled with specialized psycho-social support to promote community healing. – Output 3.1: Spaces for consultation and dialogue are established and contribute to creating a	prevention and resolution. – Outcome 2: Legal aid and psychosocial care services are provided to the population in interaction with women mediators and community psychosocial leaders. – Outcome 3: Communities interact harmoniously with institutions through the capacity building received to resolve and prevent conflicts and promote reconciliation, social cohesion, and security.
Budget (\$):	\$3,448,893					
Start Date:	Oct 24, 2018					
End Date:	Oct 31, 2020					
Project Status:	Completed					
Locations:	Rutana, Kruyigi, Muyinga, Kirundo, Makamba, Cibitoke, Bubanza, Rumonge, Mwaro, Bururi, Mairie de Bujumbura, Cankuzo, Karusi					

					<p>safe environment for dialogue to promote community reconciliation and social cohesion.</p> <p>– Output 3.2: Formal and informal law enforcement actors have improved administrative and procedural capacity to increase internal accountability for preventing situational conflict.</p> <p>– Output 3.3: Women mediators with enhanced capacity interact with community leaders and local institutions to prevent and resolve conflicts and facilitate community dialogue on community concerns.</p>	
Project ID:	113468/PBF/IRF	<p>"If young women and men have the capacity to work as allies in strengthening safety and prospects for peace, in collaboration with communities and local authorities, and can influence policy on community safety and peacebuilding, then communities will become safer and more peaceful and community security</p>	<p>The proposed project brings together Cordaid, a leading international CSO, with established local CSOs REJA and YELI-Burundi, to invest in the leadership capacities of young leaders in 12 communes of the 6 provinces and catalyze them to collect evidence on safety issues in their communities and</p>	<p>– Mobilization sessions and dissemination of digital messages aimed at raising awareness among young people on their political participation and involvement in the peacebuilding and security process.</p> <p>– Forums to mobilize young women and men to take part in decision-making bodies.</p> <p>– Regular briefings and advocacy meetings with local and provincial leaders organized for their</p>	<p>– Output 1.1: Young women and men are trained in data collection, leadership, and advocacy for a transformative community on gender, security, and peacebuilding.</p> <p>– Output 1.2: Data is collected at the local level and jointly analyzed in collaboration with communities to identify priority security issues, with particular attention</p>	<p>– Outcome 1: Community security and prospects for inclusive peace in six provinces have improved significantly as a result of youth leadership and attention to the day-to-day security needs of women and girls.</p> <p>– Outcome 2: Meaningful participation of young women and men in relevant security and</p>
Project Name:	Youth leading the way for an engendered inclusive society in Burundi					
Implementing Partners:	CORDAID					
Budget (\$):	\$600,000					
Start Date:	Dec 18, 2018					

End Date:	Dec 30, 2020	and peacebuilding policy will be improved to the benefit of all Burundians, because presently youth voices are seldom heard, and policy rarely responds to them."	collaborate with community members to develop an array of targeted peacebuilding initiatives in response. Building on the frameworks provided by UNSCRs 2250 and 1325, the project will engage young female and male leaders, empowering them to work together as allies to contribute to everyday safety and peace in their communities, with specific attention to the everyday safety of women; in Burundi, this is innovative, as most gendered interventions focus exclusively on women. It is also catalytic, in that it associates young people with peace and security processes from which they are most often excluded and increases the prospects of their future inclusion. Finally, the project is innovative (and risk-tolerant) insofar as targeted peacebuilding initiatives will be diverse, context-specific and	involvement in project implementation. – Advocacy meetings with local and provincial leaders to encourage them to involve young women and men in the peace and security building process. – 36 peacebuilding initiatives were implemented by young leaders in their communities.	to the daily security needs of women and girls. – Output 1.3: Targeted Peacebuilding Initiatives are developed and implemented based on priority security issues. – Output 2.1: Emerging best practices identified through project implementation are shared with policymakers through a project advocacy report.	peacebuilding policy dialogues and results are improved at local, national and international levels.
Project Status:	Completed					
Locations:	Bujumbura Rural, Bubanza, Cankuzo, Cibitoke, Mairie, Makamba, Mwaro					

			experimental, with some likely to fail while many others will present opportunities for upscaling and replication elsewhere in Burundi.			
Project ID:	113451/PBF / IRF	"If young women and men of Burundi are trained and sensitized to the positive values of building a nation united through its diversity; if they become equipped, competent and active in conflict prevention and resolution, including the ability to understand, prevent and appropriately answer electoral violence and gender-based violence, as well as promote a dialogue for peace between communities and beyond; if they have support in asserting their interests and needs with the local authorities, political organizations and civil society, which would realize their right to participate in local governance mechanisms and decision making	The project "Investing in Youth for Social Cohesion and Sustainable Peace in Burundi" is an initiative formulated by ACORD and the SBA. It aims to strengthen the peace-building process in Burundi by ensuring a central role for young men and women in conflict prevention and resolution, promoting their effective participation in local governance mechanisms, and supporting them to resist political and ethnic manipulation throughout the upcoming general elections in 2020 and beyond.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Capacity building of young men and women on different topics – Peace clubs created and run by the young men and women trained by ACORD BURUNDI – Cultural activities and sports events organized by trained young people in favor of tolerance, gender equality, social cohesion and peace – Representatives of administrative authorities, traditional and religious leaders given awareness on how to better account for young people in governance and decision-making mechanisms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Output 1.1: Strengthened capacity of young men and women in conflict prevention, analysis and resolution enables the peaceful management of conflicts, including those related to gender-based violence, identified in the 18 target communes. – Output 1.2: Young men and women carry out awareness-raising, advocacy and mediation activities with communities in support of tolerance, gender equality, social cohesion and peace. – Output 2.1: Young men and women increase their knowledge of their rights and obligations and of governance mechanisms for greater participation in decision-making bodies. – Output 2.2: Administrative, traditional and religious authorities recognize the right of 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Outcome 1: 13,500 young men and women of different political and ethnic backgrounds from the 18 target communities are actively involved in the prevention and resolution of conflicts for a better life together. – Outcome 2: 13,500 young people and 2,700 decision-makers from the 18 target communities are aware of the right of young people to participate in local governance and the development of their communities and translate this right into action. – Outcome 3: 540 young men and women and 900 local decision-makers are committed to promoting an inclusive and violence-free electoral
Project Name:	Investing in youth for social cohesion and sustainable peace in Burundi					
Implementing Partners:	ACORD					
Budget (\$):	\$817,587					
Start Date:	Dec 14, 2018					
End Date:	Dec 30, 2020					
Project Status:	Completed					
Locations:	Bubanza, Citiboke, Kayanza, Marie de Bujumbura, Bujumbura Rural, Makamba					

		bodies; and if they are organized to contribute more to the prevention of conflict related to the elections, to deconstructing hate speech by the different political trends, and to resist political and ethnic manipulation during the election processes of 2020 and beyond, then young men and women of Burundi will realize their full potential as catalysts of change; they will act against the deep causes of conflicts and within the prevention and resolution mechanisms of these conflicts, and they will become major players for peace, specifically in the pre-election, election and post-election contexts, for good governance and gender equality so that they can benefit from inclusive and violence free elections, and live in a just, peaceful and inclusive society in Burundi."			young people, particularly young women, to participate in decision-making and encourage their engagement in promoting social cohesion. – Output 3.1: Young men and women organize themselves, actively participate in election-related conflict prevention, and advocate for cohabitation across political and ethnic diversity. – Output 3.2: Young people resist political and ethnic manipulation and encourage local decision makers to deconstruct hateful political discourse of different political persuasions, and promote positive values of tolerance, living together, and	environment in the 18 target communes.
Project ID:	118938/PBF/IRF	"If girls and boys (adolescents 10-19	The main objective of this project is to	– 50 trainers have been identified and received	– Output 1.1: Adolescent solidarity groups and	– Outcome 1: More adolescents girls and

Project Name:	Community-based prevention of violence and social cohesion using innovation for young people in displaced and host communities	and youth 20-35), particularly returnees, IDPs and host communities are equipped with skills to engage in peacebuilding activities, if safe spaces for adolescents and youth to organize themselves and collaborate, with a mechanism of support to trigger innovations are set in place, then they, girls and boys equally, will contribute in ensuring social cohesion and be agent of peace in the community they live because the skills they gain will increase their resilience, enable them to identify root causes of conflicts and give them the confidence to design and implement innovative solutions supported by the community at large."	empower adolescent girls and boys to build social cohesion in their communities and contribute to the peacebuilding process in Burundi.	training to ensure capacity building for 552 peer educators on peacebuilding skills and the establishment of solidarity groups – Selection of 15,895 adolescents and young people (8,996 girls and 6,899 boys). These – Adolescents and young people are now organized in 552 solidarity groups led by – Peer educators – A pool of 25 mentors (17 men and 8 women) trained to support workshops innovation using the Upshift methodology	youth centers serve as platforms for peace building. – Output 1.2: 15,000 adolescent girls and boys have strengthened peace building competencies and are engaged in solidarity groups. – Output 1.3: 200 adolescent girls and boys champions have increased social innovation and entrepreneurship skills.	boys and adults contribute to and enjoy a greater sense of social cohesion and peace as well as sense of self-reliance.
Implementing Partners:	UNICEF/UNFPA					
Budget (\$):	\$1,500,000					
Start Date:	Dec 2, 2019					
End Date:	Jun 30, 2021					
Project Status:	Ongoing					
Locations:	Makamba, Rumonge, Kirundo, Ruyigi, Bujumbura et Mwaro.					
CROSS-BORDER						
Project ID:	108156/BUR (IOM, UNHCR, UNDP) and 108194/PBF/IRF	No If... Then... Because... Statement, so reconstruction below from graph: If UNHCR and IOM lead enhanced and	This project aims to promote concrete cross-border, human rights-based and multi-agency approaches to	– Provide humanitarian border management (HBM) assessment and training utilizing standard operating procedures on Humanitarian Border Management.	– Output 1.1: Humanitarian Border Management mechanisms on both sides of the border possess the relevant technical and	– Outcome 1: The instability at the Tanzania-Burundi border is reduced, and the rights of stranded, vulnerable migrants,

Project Name:	Preventing conflict and building peace by addressing drivers associated with forced displacement (Burundi & Tanzania)	coordinated border management and protection monitoring in border areas, then the resilience capacities of local communities and returnees in the return areas along the Tanzanian border in Burundi will be strengthened, then social cohesion with host communities in Tanzania will be enhanced and refugees prepared to return, then social cohesion and formal and informal dispute resolution mechanisms at the community level in Burundi will be strengthened, because economic reintegration will be well prepared and displacement related conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms will be strengthened.	peacebuilding in line with Pillar 3 (mobility) and Pillar 6 (justice and conflict prevention) of the Great Lake Regional Strategic Framework in addressing the adverse effects of displacement on peacebuilding in cross-border areas between Burundi and Tanzania.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Build capacity of Burundi and Tanzania Police and Border Officials working in affected Burundi and Tanzania border areas. – Support joint meetings between police and immigration officials of both countries. – Monitor the cross-border areas and the border between Tanzania and Burundi on both sides of the border by protection border monitoring visits and joint inter-agency assessments. – Provide assistance to those who have returned to Burundi both spontaneously or forcibly, including asylum seekers and refugees. – Improve Tanzania/Burundi cross-border coordination to ensure adequate information sharing on cross-border population movements as well on the situation in Burundi. – Provide assistance to refugees with livelihood opportunities in the form of income-generating activities (IGAs). Emergency job creation through cash-for-work 	<p>institutional capacities as well as the coordination mechanisms to ensure protection sensitive border management (IOM).</p> <p>– Output 1.2: Guided by the UNHCR 10-Point Plan of Action, UNHCR in collaboration with its national partners ensures effective and efficient protection, and protection monitoring on both sides of the border (UNHCR).</p> <p>– Output 2.1: Returnees, IDPs and vulnerable members of host communities, with specific attention to women and young people, have access to both short-term employment and long-term livelihood opportunities (UNDP Burundi).</p> <p>– Output 3.1: Refugees, returnees, IDPs and host communities are sensitized on their rights and on conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms within their communities.</p>	<p>internally displaced persons, and asylum seekers are better protected by immigration officials and other relevant authorities.</p> <p>– Outcome 2: The resilience capacities of displaced persons and host communities are strengthened.</p> <p>– Outcome 3: Refugee and returnee populations and members of their respective host communities, supported by alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, engage in peaceful ways to resolve conflicts and address grievances.</p>
Implementing Partners:	UNDP, IOM, UNHCR (Burundi & Tanzania), COPED, ACCORD, Burundi Scouts Association, BAR Association, ZOA International					
Budget (\$):	\$1,054,399					
Start Date:	Dec 22, 2017					
End Date:	Dec 31, 2018					
Project Status:	Completed					

Locations:	Mabanda, Kayogoro, and Gisuru communes, situated in the provinces of Makamba, and Ruyigi.			<p>initiatives for the rehabilitation of community infrastructures.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Create income generating activities through the support of 10 community-based professional associations composed of 20 to 25 persons each. – Provision of technical support for production and marketing to local Income Generation Associations through Business Incubators. – Provide leadership training programs for refugee women and girls. – Ensure an improved community environment with host villages surrounding refugee camps through small-scale projects of a socio-economic nature. – Establish support in border municipalities by providing training to paralegals as well as Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), mediation, counseling, and referral services. – Provide legal services for people who do not have administrative documents. – Reduce/prevent land-related conflicts between host and repatriated communities through local level mediation and local community dialogues (ADR). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Output 3.2: Returnees and host communities have access to trusted and efficient legal assistance and alternative resolutions of conflicts to settle displacement related issues and disputes in a peaceful way (UNDP Burundi). – Output 3.3: Community-based conflict resolutions mechanisms are developed and strengthened in places of refuge (UNDP Tanzania). 	
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				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Collect data of local partners involved in conflict prevention to ensure that there is reliable conflict analysis including mapping of CSO/CBO capacities and local community leaders including women and youth representatives. – Provide technical and advisory support to local authorities, CSO partners and local communities, including women, to strengthen local outreach on conflict prevention issues. – Develop toolkits/training curriculums to train local peace and development committees in cross-border areas of return on either side of the border. – Create community spaces for dialogues and exchanges with a specific focus on women and youth. – Promote and encourage the participation of displaced persons and returns into the activities carried out in women’s houses and youth centers in return areas. 		
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Appendix E. Sectoral Level Theories of Change for PBF Portfolio (2014-2020)

Sector	PPP III ToC	Tentative Overarching ToC Developed by evaluation team
Youth	<p>“If vulnerable youth have access to information, training, and more economic opportunities, then they will become autonomous and more motivated to take part in building a better future for the country, which will decrease the risk of political manipulation.”</p>	Same as PPP III.
Human Rights	<p>Two from PPP III: “If the institutions in charge of fighting human rights violations are strengthened, the culture of impunity is abolished, and people are better informed about their rights and responsibilities, then human rights will be better respected and violations will decrease.”</p> <hr/> <p>“If the specific vulnerabilities of populations affected by the conflict are taken into account in the procedures and mechanisms of peaceful resolutions of land conflicts and if affected communities are informed about their rights, then tensions resulting from frustration at the lack of inclusion in the resolution process can be mitigated.”</p>	<p>If the consideration of human rights is incorporated into the conflict resolution processes in Burundi and institutions fighting against human rights violations are strengthened, then such violations will decrease and human rights will be better respected, because these institutions can inform individuals and communities about their rights and responsibilities, allowing them to hold violators accountable and society as a whole can then condemn the culture of impunity.</p>
Women	<p>None in PPP III but three projects in that sector had one:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 93147 PBF BDI ● 93148 PBF BDI ● 108391 PBF IRF (SFCG) 	<p>If women’s capacities, connections and place in the national dialogue are strengthened, then there will be better protection of women rights in Burundi – including rights to protection against sexual and gender-based violence –, norms about women's participation and leadership will be more inclusive, and the long term prevention and resolution of conflicts will be strengthened, because women, including young and/or marginalized women, will have the knowledge, enhanced capacities, connections, and the legitimacy to voice their concerns, get involved in and lead the processes of peacebuilding and local development within their communities, including raising awareness and changing behaviors about SGBV and enhancing technical and operational capacities of the criminal system vis-à-vis SGBV cases.</p>
Coordination	None in the PPP III and none in the projects' association with the coordination projects.	<p>If the international actors (including RUNOs and NUNOs), national stakeholders, and civil society agree on a shared approach to build peace in Burundi and partner on projects that can advance social cohesion and sustained peace, then the current crisis in Burundi and the consequences from past conflicts will recede, because all these</p>

		actors together can reach a bigger share of Burundi’s population and complement each other with regards to themes (women, youth, poverty fight, human rights, etc.).
Dialogue	Two in PPP III: “If people, including politicians, have more opportunities to engage in democratic debate on important issues related to their country and communities, then greater mutual understanding and respect between individuals and between different groups will be promoted.”	If all groups of the Burundian population, including politicians, can actively participate in socio-economic and political activities, and engage in the democratic debate on important issues related to the country and its communities, then sustainable peace will be strengthened in Burundi, because opportunities will be created for people to exchange their views, opinions and memories of the past, thus promoting a better mutual understanding and respect between individuals and communities, social cohesion will be strengthened and individuals and groups will feel they have a consequential part to play in building a better future for their country.
	“If the various components of Burundian population actively and equitably participate in socio-economic and political activities, as well as in democratic debates, and if human rights are respected, then they will be empowered to play a part in building a better future for their country, thus strengthening social cohesion and vertical accountability, which are both signs of peace and sustainability.”	
Cross-border	None in PPP III, nor in any of the reports of the cross-border projects.	If RUNOs and NUNOs involved in Burundi work at the border with Burundi’s neighboring countries to protect Burundians seeking asylum and returning refugees, then social cohesion and peace will be strengthened, because refugees – both returning and those still in neighboring countries – have access to reintegration mechanisms, economic opportunities and participation in the national dialogue.

Appendix F: Survey Results – Perceptions of PBF Priorities

The evaluation team surveyed relevant UN personnel and implementing partners to assess how they perceive PBF priorities. The survey was implemented using a purposive sampling strategy and administered to 49 interviewees with direct experience administering or managing multiple PBF projects.

The survey asked participants to assess how likely the PBF is to prioritize ten key focus areas. The focus areas are: 1) youth engagement and empowerment; 2) women’s rights protection; 3) security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); 4) rule of law promotion; 5) political dialogue and national reconciliation promotion; 6) human rights promotion and protection; 7) equitable access to social services promotion; 8) employment generation; 9) democratic governance promotion; and 10) civil society protection. The focus areas were randomly presented to minimize any order effects.

Figure 9: Perceptions of PBF Focus Areas




Figure 9 shows how people responded to each issue area. The three focus areas that people said were most likely to be prioritized are: women’s rights protection (85% said extremely or somewhat likely), youth engagement and empowerment (85% said extremely or somewhat likely), and political dialogue and national reconciliation promotion (83% said extremely or somewhat likely). The three focus areas that people said were less likely to be prioritized are: security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (64% said extremely or somewhat likely), equitable access to social services promotion (55% said extremely or somewhat likely) and employment generation (47% said extremely or somewhat likely).

Appendix G. List of Projects in Highest Density Provinces and Communes

Provinces	Count of Projects
Bujumbura Rural	13
Makamba	13
Kirundo	11
National	9
Bujumbura Mairie	9
Cibitoke	6
Mwaro	6
Bubanza	6
Rumonge	5
Ruyigi	5
Kayanza	5
Bururi	4
Gitega	4
Rutana	3
Karuzi	2
Ngozi	2
Cankuzo	2
Muyinga	2
Bujumbura	1

Appendix G.1 List of PBF-supported projects in high-density provinces

High Density Province	Project Number	Project Name	Implementing Partners	Sector	Status	Budget
Bujumbura Mairie	112622/PBF/BDI	Supporting youth resilience to socio-political conflicts in Burundi	UNFPA, UNDP, UNESCO	Youth	Completed in Sep. 2020	\$2,550,000
Bujumbura Mairie	100847/PBF/BDI	Support for community security and social cohesion among young people affected by conflict	UNFPA, UNDP, UNV	Youth	Completed in 2018	\$2,975,079
Bujumbura Mairie	113451/PBF/IRF	Investing in youth for social cohesion and sustainable peace in Burundi	ACORD	Youth	Completed in Dec. 2020	\$817,587
Bujumbura Mairie	108391/PBF/IRF	Support women leaders	SFCG	Women	Completed in 2019	\$1,758,399
Bujumbura Mairie	113468/PBF/IRF	Youth leading the way for an engendered inclusive society in Burundi	CORDAID	Youth	Completed in Dec. 2020	\$600,000
Bujumbura Rural	112622/PBF/BDI	Supporting youth resilience to socio-political conflicts in Burundi	UNFPA, UNDP, UNESCO	Youth	Completed in Sep. 2020	\$2,550,000
Bujumbura Rural	100847/PBF/BDI	Support for community security and social cohesion among young people affected by conflict	UNFPA, UNDP, UNV	Youth	Completed in 2018	\$2,975,079
Bujumbura Rural	113451/PBF/IRF	Investing in youth for social cohesion and sustainable peace in Burundi	ACORD	Youth	Completed in Dec. 2020	\$817,587
Bujumbura Rural	108391/PBF/IRF	Support women leaders	SFCG	Women	Completed in 2019	\$1,758,399
Bujumbura Rural	113468/PBF/IRF	Youth leading the way for an engendered inclusive society in Burundi	CORDAID	Youth	Completed in Dec. 2020	\$600,000
Kirundo	112622/PBF/BDI	Supporting youth resilience to socio-political conflicts in Burundi	UNFPA, UNDP, UNESCO	Youth	Completed in Sep. 2020	\$2,550,000
Kirundo	100847/PBF/BDI	Support for community security and social cohesion among young people affected by conflict	UNFPA, UNDP, UNV	Youth	Completed in 2018	\$2,975,079

Kirundo	118938/PBF/IRF	Community-based prevention of violence and social cohesion using innovation for young people in displaced and host communities	UNICEF, UNFPA	Youth	Ongoing	\$1,500,000
Kirundo	108359/PBF/IRF	Peacebuilding for sustainable reintegration for Peace in Burundi	UNDP, HCR, UNFPA, FAO	Youth	Completed in 2019	\$3,000,000
Kirundo	93148/PBD/BDI	Strengthening the response to sexual and gender-based violence in Burundi	UNW	Women	Completed in 2017	\$500,000
Kirundo	108391/PBF/IRF	Support women leaders	SFCG	Women	Completed in 2019	\$1,758,399
Makamba	112622/PBF/BDI	Supporting youth resilience to socio-political conflicts in Burundi	UNFPA, UNDP, UNESCO	Youth	Completed in Sep. 2020	\$2,550,000
Makamba	118938/PBF/IRF	Community-based prevention of violence and social cohesion using innovation for young people in displaced and host communities	UNICEF, UNFPA	Youth	Ongoing	\$1,500,000
Makamba	100207/PBF/BDI	Strengthening peace gains through theatres based on UBUNTU values	UNICEF	Youth	Completed in 2018	\$1,000,000
Makamba	113451/PBF/IRF	Investing in youth for social cohesion and sustainable peace in Burundi	ACORD	Youth	Completed in Dec. 2020	\$817,587
Makamba	108359/PBF/IRF	Peacebuilding for sustainable reintegration for Peace in Burundi	UNDP, UNHCR, UNFPA, FAO	Youth	Completed in 2019	\$3,000,000
Makamba	108194/PBF/IRF	Preventing conflict and building peace by addressing drivers associated with forced displacement (Burundi & Tanzania)	IOM, UNHCR, UNDP, UNHCR	Cross border	Completed in 2019	\$1,054,399
Makamba	108391/PBF/IRF	Support women leaders	SFCG	Women	Completed in 2019	\$1,758,399
Makamba	113468/PBF/IRF	Youth leading the way for an engendered inclusive society in Burundi	CORDAID	Youth	Completed in Dec. 2020	\$600,000

Appendix G.2 List of PBF-supported projects in high-density communes

High Density Commune	Province	Project Number	Project Name	Implementing Partners	Sector	Status	Budget
Busoni	Kirundo	108359/PBF/IRF	Peacebuilding for sustainable reintegration for Peace in Burundi	UNDP, HCR, UNFPA, FAO	Youth	Completed in 2019	\$3,000,000
Busoni	Kirundo	108391/PBF/IRF	Support women leaders	SFCG	Women	Completed in 2019	\$1,758,399
Gihanga	Bubanza	113451/PBF/IRF	Investing in youth for social cohesion and sustainable peace in Burundi	ACORD	Youth	Completed in Dec. 2020	\$817,587
Gihanga	Bubanza	108391/PBF/IRF	Support women leaders	SFCG	Women	Completed in 2019	\$1,758,399
Gisuru	Ruyigi	108359/PBF/IRF	Peacebuilding for sustainable reintegration for Peace in Burundi	UNDP, HCR, UNFPA, FAO	Youth	Completed in 2019	\$3,000,000
Gisuru	Ruyigi	108194/PBF/IRF	Preventing conflict and building peace by addressing drivers associated with forced displacement (Burundi & Tanzania)	IOM, UNHCR, UNDP, UNHCR	Cross border	Completed in 2019	\$1,054,399
Isare	Bujumbura Rural	100847/PBF/BDI	Support for community security and social cohesion among young people affected by conflict	UNFPA, UNDP, UNV	Youth	Completed in 2018	\$2,975,079
Isare	Bujumbura Rural	108391/PBF/IRF	Support women leaders	SFCG	Women	Completed in 2019	\$1,758,399

Kanyosha	Bujumbura Mairie	113451/PBF/IRF	Investing in youth for social cohesion and sustainable peace in Burundi	ACORD	Youth	Completed in Dec. 2020	\$817,587
Kayogoro	Makamba	113451/PBF/IRF	Investing in youth for social cohesion and sustainable peace in Burundi	ACORD	Youth	Completed in Dec. 2020	\$817,587
Kayogoro	Makamba	108359/PBF/IRF	Peacebuilding for sustainable reintegration for Peace in Burundi	UNDP, HCR, UNFPA, FAO	Youth	Completed in 2019	\$3,000,000
Kayogoro	Makamba	108194/PBF/IRF	Preventing conflict and building peace by addressing drivers associated with forced displacement (Burundi & Tanzania)	IOM, UNHCR, UNDP, UNHCR	Cross border	Completed in 2019	\$1,054,399
Kirundo	Kirundo	100847/PBF/BDI	Support for community security and social cohesion among young people affected by conflict	UNFPA, UNDP, UNV	Youth	Completed in 2018	\$2,975,079
Kirundo	Kirundo	108391/PBF/IRF	Support women leaders	SFCG	Women	Completed in 2019	\$1,758,399
Mabanda	Makamba	108194/PBF/IRF	Preventing conflict and building peace by addressing drivers associated with forced displacement (Burundi & Tanzania)	IOM, UNHCR, UNDP, UNHCR	Cross border	Completed in 2019	\$1,054,399
Mabanda	Makamba	108391/PBF/IRF	Support women leaders	SFCG	Women	Completed in 2019	\$1,758,399
Mukike	Bujumbura Rural	100847/PBF/BDI	Support for community security and social cohesion among young people affected by conflict	UNFPA, UNDP, UNV	Youth	Completed in 2018	\$2,975,079
Mukike	Bujumbura Rural	113451/PBF/IRF	Investing in youth for social cohesion and sustainable peace in Burundi	ACORD	Youth	Completed in Dec. 2020	\$817,587

Mutimbuzi	Bujumbura Rural	100847/PBF/BDI	Support for community security and social cohesion among young people affected by conflict	UNFPA, UNDP, UNV	Youth	Completed in 2018	\$2,975,079
Mutimbuzi	Bujumbura Rural	108391/PBF/IRF	Support women leaders	SFCG	Women	Completed in 2019	\$1,758,399
Ntega	Kirundo	100847/PBF/BDI	Support for community security and social cohesion among young people affected by conflict	UNFPA, UNDP, UNV	Youth	Completed in 2018	\$2,975,079
Ntega	Kirundo	108391/PBF/IRF	Support women leaders	SFCG	Women	Completed in 2019	\$1,758,399

Appendix H: Semi-Structured Interview Protocols

Semi-Structured Interview Protocol (English)

Informed Consent Protocol

I will take notes during this interview. Only myself and the other members of the evaluation team will have access to the notes I take in this interview. Our observations will be combined and included in our reports, but your statements will not be attributed to you or your position. You will have the right to ask me to refrain from recording something that you do not want to be written down. You also have the right to ask me not to use any of the material we discuss in this interview.

Interview Protocol

Interview Date:

Interview Location:

Interviewee:

Interview Duration:

Process Notes:

1. Placement of individual

1.1 What is your involvement with the PBF projects?

Probe:

- Position
- Duration of involvement

2. Context

2.1 What have been the most important/immediate enablers and obstacles to peace that you observed around you from 2014 until today?

2.2 What is “peace” to you?

3. Relevance and Effectiveness

3.1 How did the PBF projects that you worked with **aim** to support peace? Did they **succeed**?

Probes:

- What type of changes (in individuals, groups, or institutions) did it expect to create?
- How did the project(s) address some of the obstacles to peace you outlined earlier?
- Are there important gaps that were not addressed? Why not?

3.2 Did you observe **negative changes** related to the project?

Probes:

- If so, why do you think the project contributed to this negative change?
- (How do you make sense of these effects?)

3.3 How did these positive and negative changes relate to the project’s **conflict-sensitivity** or **gender-sensitivity** approach?

3.4 With which **strategies**, **organizational aims**, or **lessons learned**, if any, influenced the design of this project/intervention?

- Strategies and aims

- PPP (Peacebuilding Priority Plan)?
- UNDAF (UN Development Assistance Framework)?
- My own organization's priorities
- The government's priorities
- The UN's commitment to Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment
- Lessons learned
 - From other government/ NGO initiatives?
 - From previous PBF intervention and/or evaluation?
 - From your other experiences?
 - From PBSO?

3.5 Did the project **change** during the course of implementation? Were there **changes that you thought should happen** that you were not able to make?

Probes:

- What caused this change?
 - Your innovation?
 - Changes in the Burundian context?
 - Internal UN factors?
 - Something else?
- How was this change managed?
- How do you think this change influenced the effectiveness of the project?
- Did the project anticipate this change?
 - strategy for conflict sensitivity
 - risk management strategy

3.6 Do PBF-supported projects **differ from other projects** that you implement/have observed? If so, how?

Probes:

- In terms of design? In terms of timing?
- In terms of decision-makers involved?
- In terms of collaboration with the government?

3.7 What was the **implementation capacity** of RUNOs, NUNOs, and their implementing partners? Was there a **change over time** in this capacity?

3.8 **If you were in charge**, how would you design and/or implement that intervention(s) differently? What would you do the same way?

Probes:

- In the goal/ strategy?
- In the connections with other actors?
- In the design?
- In the timeframe?
- In the management?
- In the use of resources?

4. Ownership and Partnership

4.1 What was the degree of '**national ownership**' in the conceptualization, design, and implementation of this project(s)?

Probes:

- How was ownership assessed?
- Civil society participation?
- Community participation?
- Government participation?

4.2 What does **successful/efficient partnership** between the PBF, implementing partners, local implementing partners, and program beneficiaries look like?

- How was your experience in this partnership?

4.3 **What is inclusion** in the design, implementation, and oversight of peacebuilding activities?

Probe:

- Does your organization have a definition of inclusion? What does it entail? How is inclusion conceptualized? Who are the actors who should be included?

4.4 What is the **value added of the PBF** in this context (**why stay?**)?

5. Coherence

5.1 Were there direct or indirect **strategic or operational connections** between this project(s) and other projects? How did this change over time?

Probes:

- If so, what were they?
- With which projects/activities/actors? Why?
 - The PBF
 - The government
 - Other UN Agencies
 - Other donors
 - NGOs
 - Other projects operating in the same commune

6. PBF Oversight, Strategic, and Management Mechanisms

6.1 What was the role of the **Resident Coordinator's Office, the PBF Secretariat, and PBSO** in the project development, monitoring, implementation, and oversight? How did this role evolve over time?

Probes:

- What was constructive?
- What was not constructive?
- How were Do No Harm, Conflict-sensitivity, and Gender-Sensitivity integrated into day-to-day management and oversight?
- How would you do it differently?

6.2 What is the role of the **Joint Steering Committee** in the management and oversight of the strategy and projects? How did this role evolve over time?

Probes:

- What was constructive?
- What was not constructive?
- What role did the particular composition of the JSC play?
- How would you do it differently?

6.3 What was your and/or the project(s) interaction with the UN Peacebuilding Commission?

7. Further Information

7.1 Anything else I should know? Any additional documents that I should have?

7.2 Are there other people that you would recommend that I talk to?

Protocol d'entretien semi-structuré pour le personnel des Nations Unies (Français)

Protocole de consentement éclairé

Je vais prendre des notes durant cet entretien. Les autres membres de l'équipe d'évaluation et moi-même seront les seuls à avoir accès aux notes que je vais prendre durant l'entretien. Nos observations seront combinées et incluses dans nos rapports, mais vos déclarations ne vous seront pas attribuées, ni ne seront attribuées à votre poste. Vous avez le droit de me demander de m'abstenir de consigner quelque chose que vous ne souhaitez pas voir figurer sur papier. Vous avez aussi le droit de me demander de ne pas utiliser les éléments que nous allons discuter durant cet entretien.

Protocole d'entretien

Date d'entretien :

Lieu de l'entretien :

Répondant :

Durée de l'entretien :

Notes sur le processus :

1. Poste de travail de l'individu

1.1 Quel est votre engagement dans les projets du PBF ?

Sonde :

- Poste
- Durée de l'engagement

2. Contexte

2.1 Veuillez décrire les principaux changements positifs et négatifs que vous avez observés dans la transition du Burundi entre 2014 et aujourd'hui.

3. Pertinence, Efficacité, et Appropriation Nationale

3.1 Avec quel(s) projet(s) du PBF avez-vous interagi le plus ?

Sonde :

- Veuillez décrire votre engagement avec ces interventions.
- Si ces interventions étaient liées, y avait-il une stratégie explicite pour lier ces projets ?

3.2 Comment ce(s) projet(s) visait-il (visaient-ils) à la consolidation de la paix ?

Sonde :

- Quels types de changement (auprès des individus, groupes, ou institutions) s'attendait-il à créer ?
- Sur quelle analyse s'appuie l'objectif de consolidation de la paix ?
 - PPCP (Plan Prioritaire de Consolidation de la Paix) ?
 - PNUAD (Plan-cadre des Nations Unies pour l'aide au développement) ?
- À quels objectifs organisationnels le projet s'est-il aligné ?
 - Les priorités de ma propre organisation
 - Les priorités du gouvernement
 - L'engagement des Nations Unies en faveur de l'égalité des sexes et de l'autonomisation des femmes.

3.3 Avez-vous observé l'un de ces changements ? Avez-vous des preuves de la contribution du projet à ces changements ?

Sondes :

- Selon vous, pourquoi le projet a-t-il ou n'a-t-il pas contribué à ces changements ?
- (Comment faites-vous sens de ces effets ?)

3.4 Avez-vous observé des changements négatifs liés au projet ?

Sondes :

- Si oui, selon vous, pourquoi le projet a-t-il contribué à ces changements négatifs ?
- Comment ce changement négatif est-il lié à l'approche de sensibilité aux conflits et sensibilité au genre du projet ?
- (Comment faites-vous sens de ces effets ?)

3.5 Comment les changements que le projet s'attendait à créer sont-ils liés aux événements de la transition du Burundi que vous avez décrits ci-dessus ?

Sondes :

- D'après votre compréhension de la transition du Burundi, ce projet était-il bien ciblé ? Pourquoi ?
- Y avaient-ils des lacunes importantes qui n'ont pas été abordées ? Pourquoi pas ?

3.6 Les leçons apprises ont-elles été appliquées lors de la conception de cette intervention ?

Sonde :

- Leçons apprises d'autres initiatives gouvernementales ou d'ONG ?
- Leçons apprises de précédentes interventions et/ou évaluations du PBF ?
- Leçons apprises de vos autres expériences ?
- Leçons apprises de PBSO (Bureau d'appui à la consolidation de la paix) ?

3.7 Qu'est-ce qui a changé au cours de la mise en œuvre du projet ?

Sonde :

- Qu'est-ce qui a causé ce changement ?
 - Changements dans le contexte du Burundi ?
 - Facteurs internes aux Nations Unies ?
 - Quelque chose d'autre ?
- Comment ce changement a-t-il été géré ?
- Selon vous, comment ce changement a-t-il influencé l'efficacité du projet ?
- Le projet a-t-il anticipé ce changement ?
 - Stratégie de sensibilité aux conflits
 - Stratégie de gestion des risques

3.8 Quel a été le degré d'appropriation nationale dans la conceptualisation, conception, et mise en œuvre du (des) projet(s) ?

Sondes :

- Comment l'appropriation nationale a-t-elle été évaluée ?
- Participation de la société civile ?
- Participation de la (des) communauté(s) ?
- Participation du gouvernement ?

3.9 Si vous étiez responsable du projet, comment concevriez-vous et/ou mettriez-vous en œuvre cette (ces) intervention(s) différemment ? Que feriez-vous de la même manière ?

Sondes :

- Au niveau de l'objectif ou de la stratégie ?
- Au niveau des relations avec les autres acteurs ?
- Au niveau de la conception ?
- Au niveau de la durée ?
- Au niveau de la gestion ?
- Au niveau de l'utilisation des ressources ?

4. Cohérence et Évolution dans le Temps

4.1 Existaient-ils des liens stratégiques ou opérationnels, directes ou indirectes, entre ce(s) projet(s) et d'autres projets ? Comment cela a-t-il changé au fil du temps ?

Sondes :

- Si oui, quels étaient ces liens ?
- Avec quels projets/activités/acteurs ? Pourquoi ?
 - PBF
 - Le gouvernement
 - D'autres agences des Nations Unies
 - D'autres donateurs ?
 - ONGs ?

4.2 S'il y avait des liens, existait-il une stratégie explicite pour lier ces interventions ou cela s'est-il fait de manière plus spontanée ? Comment cela a-t-il changé au fil du temps ?

4.3 Quelle est la relation entre le(s) projet(s) et :

- Le PPCP ?
- PNUAD (Plan-cadre des Nations Unies pour l'aide au développement) ?
- L'approche de sensibilité aux conflits ?

4.4 Y a-t-il eu une différence dans la capacité de mise en œuvre des organisations des Nations Unies bénéficiaires, des organisations non-ONU, et de leurs partenaires de mise en œuvre au fil du temps ?

5. Mécanismes de Surveillance, de Stratégie, et de Gestion du PBF

5.1 Quel était le rôle du Bureau du Coordonnateur résident des Nations Unies, du Secrétariat du Fonds pour la Consolidation de la paix, et du Bureau d'appui à la consolidation de la paix dans l'élaboration, suivi, mise en œuvre et surveillance du (des) projet(s) ? Comment ce rôle a-t-il évolué au fil du temps ?

Sonde :

- Qu'est-ce qui était constructif ?
- Qu'est-ce qui n'était pas constructif ?
- Comment le principe "d'éviter de causer du tort", la sensibilité aux conflits et la sensibilité au genre ont-ils été intégrés dans la gestion et supervision quotidiennes ?
- Comment le feriez-vous différemment ?

5.2 Quel est le rôle du Comité de Pilotage conjoint dans la gestion et supervision de la stratégie et des projets ? Comment ce rôle a-t-il évolué au fil du temps ?

Sonde :

- Qu'est-ce qui était constructif ?
- Qu'est-ce qui n'était pas constructif ?
- Quel rôle la composition spécifique du Comité de Pilotage conjoint a-t-elle joué ?
- Comment le feriez-vous différemment ?

5.3 Quelle a été votre interaction et/ou celle du (des) projet(s) avec la Commission de consolidation de la paix ?

5.4 Comment les rapports semestriels et annuels étaient-ils élaborés ?

Sonde :

- Quelle est votre évaluation de la qualité de ces rapports ?
- Ces rapports abordent-ils les résultats des projets au plus haut niveau et la collaboration entre les bénéficiaires du PBF ?
- Comment le feriez-vous différemment ?

6. Leçons apprises

6.1 Quels enseignements avez-vous tirés de votre participation à la mise en œuvre de ce projet ?

Sonde :

- Comment, le cas échéant, ces enseignements sont-ils partagés ?

6.2 Y a-t-il quelque chose de particulièrement différent dans les interventions du PBF par rapport aux autres interventions que votre organisation met en œuvre au Burundi ?

Sonde :

- En termes de conception ? En termes de délais/timing ?
- En termes des décideurs impliqués ?
- En termes de collaboration avec le gouvernement ?

7. Informations complémentaires

7.1 Y a-t-il autre chose que je devrais savoir ? Ou y a-t-il des documents supplémentaires que je devrais avoir ?

7.2 Y a-t-il d'autres personnes à qui vous me recommanderiez de parler ?

Appendix I. PBF Survey Instrument

CONSENT FORM USED FOR QUALTRICS SURVEY

Dear Participant,

We greatly appreciate you taking the time to complete this survey. You are receiving this survey because of your expertise related to the UN Peacebuilding Fund. The quality of the findings from this survey depend on whether you read and think about each question carefully and express your true personal opinion. From the perspective of the research team, there are no right or wrong answers.

Thank you for taking your precious time to complete this survey. It will take approximately 7 minutes. Please take a moment and read the next page regarding informed consent.

Please read the following statement carefully. If you choose to participate in this survey, please select the option “I have read and understood this statement and agree to participate in this survey” at the bottom of this page. If you choose not to participate, please select the option “Cancel.”

This short survey is conducted by Dr. Susanna Campbell (American University), Dr. Yolande Bouka (Queen’s University), and Dr. Travis Curtice (Dartmouth College). Its purpose is to help provide an independent evaluation of the UN Peacebuilding Fund.

Participation in the survey is voluntary. There are no risks, nor will you experience any costs when participating in the survey. This survey is anonymous. The information you provide will not be stored or used in any way that could reveal your personal identity.

If you have any questions or concerns about participating in this survey, please contact us at susanna.campbell@american.edu. Principal Investigator: Dr. Susanna Campbell, School of International Service, American University, 4400 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20016, Tel: +1 (202) 885-1428.

Career Experience Block

1. Do you work for the United Nations (UN), a UN Member State, or an Implementing Partner of the UN?

The United Nations

UN Member State

Implementing Partner

Other

2. How long have you worked for or in partnership with the UN?

0 – 5 years

6-10 years

More than 10 years

3. Do you work at your organization’s Headquarters, Regional Office, or Country Office?

Headquarters

Regional Office
Country Office
Other

4. Which of the following countries do you have experience working on or in relation to peacebuilding or similar programming? Select all that apply:

Albania Benin Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Central African Republic Chad Colombia Comoros Congo Congo, The Democratic Republic Côte D'Ivoire Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Guatemala Guinea Guinea-Bissau Haiti Honduras Kenya Kiribati Kosovo Kyrgyzstan Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Libya Madagascar Mali Marshall Islands Mauritania Montenegro Myanmar Nepal Niger Nigeria Papua New Guinea Philippines Rwanda Serbia Sierra Leone Solomon Islands Somalia South Sudan Sri Lanka Sudan Tajikistan Tanzania Timor-Leste Togo Tunisia Tuvalu Uganda Ukraine Uzbekistan Yemen Zimbabwe Other

PBF Block (Note: Red font is control. Black bold font is treatment)

Now we would like to ask you about how the UN Peacebuilding Fund has navigated challenges posed by the Covid-19 pandemic. Please read the text displayed on the next screen carefully and answer the questions that follow.

The UN Peacebuilding Fund was established in 2006 to provide fast and flexible funding to help post-conflict countries recover from war. According to UN Secretary-General Guterres, the COVID-19 pandemic has placed increased pressure on post-conflict states and societies. This is true even in countries with strong civil society and opening civic space.

Drawing on your direct expertise, we want to understand how the PBF prioritizes its support in particular contexts. In countries with strong civil society and opening civic space, how likely is the PBF to prioritize the focus areas below?

The UN Peacebuilding Fund was established in 2006 to provide fast and flexible funding needed to help post-conflict countries to prevent a relapse into conflict. The challenges facing post-conflict countries have only increased with the COVID-19 pandemic, which, according to UN Secretary-General Guterres, has placed increased pressure on post-conflict states and societies. In response to the COVID-19 crisis, PBF recipient countries have requested increased support for economic, social, and security fallout of the pandemic. This is true even in countries with strong [weak] civil society and opening [shrinking] civic space.

5. Given that the PBF cannot equally fund all priorities in each country, we want to understand how the PBF prioritizes its support to these contexts. Drawing on your direct expertise with the PBF, which of these focus areas is the PBF likely to prioritize in countries suffering from the COVID-19, but with **strong** [weak] civil society and **opening** [shrinking] civic space

{Likert scale not likely to extremely likely}

Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)
Rule of Law Promotion
Human Rights Promotion and Protection
Civil Society Protection

Political Dialogue and National Reconciliation Promotion

Democratic Governance Promotion

Women's Rights Protection

Youth Engagement and Empowerment

Employment Generation

Equitable Access to Social Services Promotion

6. In countries with **strong civil society and opening civic space** [**weak civil society and shrinking civic space**], how important to the PBF is support from the following stakeholders?
{extremely important; very important; moderately important; slightly important; not at all important}

Host-government

Recipient population

Civil society

UN Resident Coordinator

UN Security Council

UN Secretary-General

Innovative UN Staff

Post-test question:

7. Do you have experience working in countries with weak civil society experiencing shrinking civic space or strong civil society with opening civic space? (Select all that apply)

Yes, weak civil society and shrinking civic space

Yes, strong civil society and opening civic space

No

Personal Block

12. Age: How old are you?

18 – 25

26 – 35

36 – 45

46 - 55

56 – older

13. What is your gender?

Male

Female

Other

14. Does your organization classify you as international or national staff?

International

National

Other

Appendix J. IRB Approval Letter

4/21/2021

Gmail - IRB-2021-292 - Initial Exemption Approval



Susanna Campbell <susanna.campbell@gmail.com>

IRB-2021-292 - Initial: Exemption Approval

do-not-reply@ayuse.com <do-not-reply@ayuse.com>
To: scampbel@american.edu

Fri, Apr 2, 2021 at 9:29 AM

EXTERNAL EMAIL: Use caution with links and attachments.



AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
OFFICE OF RESEARCH INTEGRITY

April 2, 2021

Susanna Campbell

Protocol # IRB-2021-292

Title: Project evaluation: PBF in Burundi

Determination date: April 1, 2021

Dear Susanna Campbell,

On April 1, 2021, the above-mentioned protocol was reviewed by the IRB and it was determined that this research meets one or more of the criteria for exemption. You may now begin the research.

This research was determined to qualify for exemption under the following category or categories of the Code of Federal Regulations Title 45 §46.101(b)

Category 2.(j). Research that only includes interactions involving educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures, or observation of public behavior (including visual or auditory recording). The information obtained is recorded by the investigator in such a manner that the identity of the human subjects cannot readily be ascertained, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects.

Any unanticipated problems that involve risks to subjects or others must be reported to the IRB in accordance with American University policies and procedures.

If you have any questions regarding this approval, please contact the IRB office at 202-885-3447.

On behalf of the Institutional Review Board and the Office of Research Integrity

<https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0?ik=684388caf6&view=pt&search=all&permmsgid=msg-P%3A1695935565701231639&siml=msg-P%3A1695935565701231639> 1/1

Appendix K. Partner List (Provided by the PBF Secretariat)

PROJETS APPUYES PBF DE 2014 à 2020

ID Projets	Projets	Agences et ONG	Partenaires de mise en œuvre	Date de Demarrage	Date de cloture
91554/P BF/BDI	2.Appui a la promotion et a la protection des droits de l'Homme au Burundi	OHCDH & UNDP	partenaires Gouvernementaux:la Ministère de la Solidarité Nationale, des Affaires Sociales, des Droits de la Personne Humaine et du Genre, Commission nationale indépendante des droits de l'homme, et non Gouvernementaux: Organisation de la société Civile: actives dans le domaine des droits de l'homme, avec une assise Nationale et une expérience dans le rapportage.	13 Aug 2014	31 Dec 2016
93122 PBF/IRF	3.OHCHR Monitoring and reporting in Burundi	OHCHR	la Ministère de la Solidarité Nationale, des Affaires Sociales, des Droits de la Personne Humaine et du Genre, Commission nationale indépendante des droits de l'homme, et Non Gouv: société civile	16 Dec 2014	30/09/2015
93147/P BF/BDI	4.Promotion du role de la femme dans la consolidation de la paix	ONU FEMMES	:la Ministère de la Solidarité Nationale, des Affaires Sociales, des Droits de la Personne Humaine et du Genre, Ministère de l'Intérieur, du Développement Communautaire et de la Sécurité Publique, Non Gouv:ACORD, Association pour la Promotion de la fille Burundaise, ACCORD, BLTP et AGB, Dushirehamwe, Radio Isanganiro, Radio Ijwi Ry'umukenyezi.	16 Dec 2014	30/06/2018
93148/P BF/BDI	4.Renforcement de la reponse en matiere de lutte contre les violences sexuelles et basees sur le genre au Burundi	ONU FEMMES	Gouvev: Ministère de La justice,Ministère de l'Intérieur, du Développement Communautaire et de la Sécurité Publique,Ministère de la Solidarité Nationale, des Affaires Sociales, des Droits de la Personne Humaine et du Genre, Commission Nationale Indépendante des droits de l'homme, ORG société civile:	17 Dec 2014	31/03/2017

			Sélectionner au moment de la mise en oeuvre.		
94613/P BF BDI	5.Appui a la promotion du dialogue national	UNDP et UNESCO	,Ministère de l'Intérieur, du Développement Communautaire et de la Sécurité Publique, Ministère de la Solidarité Nationale, des Affaires Sociales, des Droits de la Personne Humaine et du Genre, Commission Electorale Nationale indépendante, et NON GOUV: BLTP, NIMD,ICB,ACCORD, RTNB, Radio Privées, Télévision, Presse Ecrite, Renaissance et CHAIRE INESCO	19/03/2015	30/09/2016
98478/P BF/IRF	6.Renforcement du monitoring, de la production de rapports de la coopération technique du HCNUDH au Burundi	HCNUDH	Ministère de la Solidarité Nationale, des Affaires Sociales, des Droits de la Personne Humaine et du Genre, et Commission Nationale Indépendante des droits de l'homme	2 Feb 2016	31/10/2016
100 207/BBF /BDI	7.Consolidation des acquis de la paix par les theatres axes sur les valeurs UBUNTU	UNICEF	Centre Ubuntu (5 Faith based organization:OSC)	26 Apr 2016	30/06/2018
100241/P BF/ IRF	8.African Union Human Rights observers support in	AUC(African union commission)	AUC, Peace and Security & political affairs departments	26 Apr 2016	30/11/2016
100847/P BF/BDI	9.Appui a la securite communautaire et la cohesion sociale aupres des jeunes touches par les conflits	UNFPA, UNDP ET UNV	le Ministre des Affaires de la Communauté Est-Africaine, de la Jeunesse, des Sports et de la Culture,Gouvernement du Burundi, Maire de Bujumbura et non Gouv: SFCG, National Youth volunteering Programme, BBIN/SPARK, Association des Guides du Burundi, Centre Jeune Kamenge.	8/6/16	30/06/2018
100897/P BF /BDI	10. Fonds de soutien au dialogue pour une	OSASG	UNOPS	13/06/2016	31 May 2017

	résolution de la crise au Burundi				
108 194/PBF/IRF	13.Preventing conflict and building peace through addressing the drivers of conflict and instability associated with forced displacement between Burundi and Tanzania (Burundi).	UNDP Burundi UNDP Tanzania UNHCR Burundi	In Tanzania: Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Good Neighbours Tanzania (GNT) and Women's Legal Aid Centre (WLAC). In Burundi: World Vision International, Cordaid, COPED, Réseau Burundi, the Burundian Red Cross. Project Location: Cross border Burundi and Tanzania. In Burundi: Mabanda, Kayogoro, and Gis	22 Dec 2017	31-Mar-19
108 359/PBF/IRF	14.Peacebuilding for sustainable reintegration for Peace in Burundi	UNDP, HCR, UNFPA, FAO	DG Rapatriement (Ministry of Interior); PAFE (Border and Immigration Police); Provincial and local administration of targeted locations; Ministry of Justice; Local administrative branches of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock; Local Bar Associations of the targeted locations; National and International NGOs as UN Agencies implementing partners (to be confirmed): CEJP; Caritas; SOPRAD; ODEDIM and/or Burundian Red Cross; COPED; World Vision International Burundi; Associations des Scouts du Burundi; Consortium BBIN & Spark.	10/1/18	30/12/2019
112622/PBF/BDI	14."Appui à la Résilience des jeunes face aux conflits sociopolitiques au Burundi"	UNFPA/UNICEF, UNESCO	partenaires Gouvernementaux: le Ministère des Affaires de la Communauté Est-Africaine, de la Jeunesse, des Sports et de la Culture, le Ministre de l'Intérieur, du Développement Communautaire et de la Sécurité Publique et partenaires nos gouvernementaux: AFSC, Université du Burundi, COPED, Fondation Intahe, Tubiyage, FONEB, PMC, PEAB,NCA, CENTRE UBUNTU	15/10/2018	30/09/2020

112 731/PBF /BDI	15. "Renforcement des mécanismes locaux de prévention et de résolution des conflits au Burundi"	UNWOMEN/ UNDP, OIM	partenaires Gouvernementaux: le Ministère des Affaires de la Communauté Est-Africaine, de la Jeunesse, des Sports et de la Culture, le Ministre de l'Intérieur, du Développement Communautaire et de la Sécurité Publique et partenaires nos gouvernementaux: AFSC, Université du Burundi, COPED, Fondation Intahe, Tubiyage, FONEB, PMC, PEAB,NCA, CENTRE UBUNTU	23/10/2018	23/04/2021
109 327/PBF /IRF	17. "Youth LAB (Leaders politiques pour l'avenir du Burundi): Empowering Young Women and Men to Participate in Burundi's Political Parties"	NIMD	Burundi Leadership Training Programme(BLTP)	9-Mar-18	8-Sep-20
113 451/PBF / IRF	18. «Investir dans la jeunesse pour la cohésion sociale et la paix durable au Burundi»	ACORD	Association des Scouts du Burundi, Ministère de l'Intérieur, du Développement communautaire et de la sécurité Publique, Ministère de la Solidarité Nationale, Ministre des Affaires de la Communauté Est-Africaine, de la Jeunesse, des Sports et de la Culture des Affaires Sociales, des Droits de la Personne Humaine et du Genre ,	14-Dec-18	30-Jun-20
113 468/PBF /IRF	19 "Youth leading the way for an engendered inclusive society in Burundi"	CORDAID	Réseau des organisations des jeunes en action pour la paix, la Réconciliation et le Développement(REJA), Youth empowerment and Leadership Initiative Burundi(YELI-BURUNDI)	18-Dec-18	30-Jun-20

118938/P BF/IRF	20. "Community-based prevention of violence and social cohesion using innovation for young people in displaced and host communities."	UNICEF/UNF PA	Gouvernements: le Ministre des Affaires de la Communauté Est-Africaine, de la Jeunesse, des Sports et de la Culture, le Ministère de la Solidarité Nationale, des Affaires Sociales, des Droits de la Personne Humaine et du Genre et Non Gouvernements: Provinces de l'Eglise Anglicane du Burundi(PEAB), Association des Guides du Burundi(AGB), Association des Scouts du Burundi, Conseil pour l'Education et le Développement (COPED), Bibliothèque Sans Frontière(BSF), Université du Burundi, JImbere et le Journal Iwacu.	2-Dec-19	30-Jun-21
108391/P BF/IRF	21. Soutenir les femmes leaders d'aujourd'hui et de demain pour faire avancer la paix au Burundi	Search for common ground (SFCG)	Dushirhamwe, Association de Femmes rapatriés du Burundi,(AFRABU), Association pour la Promotion de la fille Burundaise,(APFB), Réseau des Organisations des jeunes en action(REJA), Collectif pour les associations des jeunes(CPAJ), Association des Femmes Journalistes du Burundi(ASFJ0)	2-Aug-18	12-Nov-19