If there is one number encapsulating why the Boston Celtics are up 2-0 over the Dallas Mavericks, hoping to cap a dominant season with their 18th title, it is this: Boston has attempted 60 catch-and-shoot 3s, the Mavericks just 28.
Boston's two-game average -- 30 -- would have led the league. The Mavs' -- 14 -- is six below the basement. They attempted a league-leading 11.3 corner 3s in the regular season. They are 2-of-8; Boston is 11-of-26.
The Mavs made it semi-interesting late in Game 2, and they'd be closer overall if not for their dismal 3-point shooting: 13-of-53 (24.5%). But Boston is only 26-of-81 (32%), and the attempt chasm matters more than the accuracy gap -- especially since catch-and-shoot 3s account for all of it. If that gap sustains, the Mavericks have no path to victory.
The door to a comeback cracks open if Kristaps Porzingis is out or limited after suffering a left leg injury in Game 2. Porzingis is day-to-day and expressed optimism Tuesday he would play in Game 3.
Boston's spacing shrinks without him. If Porzingis can't go, the Celtics might have to overextend Al Horford and expand the rotation to include one non-shooter: Luke Kornet, Xavier Tillman or Oshae Brissett as a small-ball center -- a look they flashed in the conference finals. The other alternative is playing super-small, with Tatum at center.
That catch-and-shoot number tells a story -- one of Boston's unwavering focus. In past playoff runs, these Celtics have been undone by periods of haze -- poor shot selection, and (less often) small breakdowns on defense that were beneath them.
Every team makes mistakes. Great opponents force mistakes, and despite the Mavericks' play so far -- and Kyrie Irving's addled 13-of-37 shooting -- they are a great opponent helmed by an all-time orchestrator. Boston has muffed a few switches. Jayson Tatum and Jaylen Brown have settled for some fading one-on-one jumpers over Daniel Gafford and Dereck Lively II on switches. Teammates have missed Boston's stars with favorable matchups -- missed chances to ping the ball right back to them.
But those mistakes have been rare -- rarer than ever for Boston. This has been a calculated performance befitting of a championship-level team that is now 78-20 and 14-2 in the playoffs. In its head-down, relentless, unpretty grit, it feels like the culmination of this era -- not the best they've played, but the way they have to play now.
Boston's stars are picking out matchups they like, roasting those guys, drawing help, and then hunting layups or spraying it out for open 3s. They just keep coming, even when the shots miss.
Dallas coach Jason Kidd tried to bait Tatum into hijacking the offense by labeling Brown Boston's "best player," but Tatum mostly went the other way -- driving over and over, and dishing a team-high 12 dimes in Game 2. Tatum isn't shooting well, but he's playing well.
As the 3s bricked, it must have been tempting for Boston's stars to play hero ball. That they didn't -- that they plowed forward -- shows a veteran understanding of the moment. It is a doggedness bred of past failures.
Tatum recorded 29 drives in Game 2, his highest number in any career game, per Second Spectrum. Brown compiled 23 drives in Game 2 -- one behind his single-game career-high. Boston's 66 drives in Game 2 blew away their previous season high of 58. Their efficiency out of those drives was middling, but if they generate the same kinds of looks, an avalanche is coming.
The most common victims have been Luka Doncic and the Mavs' three centers -- with Irving an occasional target, too. Doncic, dealing with several injuries, has been almost helpless trying to contain Tatum and Brown. Gafford is outside his comfort zone there. Lively has been a nimble switch defender this season, but the Celtics have him on tilt -- frenzied, overthinking. (Lively has four points, five fouls and four offensive rebounds in two games. The Mavs are minus-30 in his 38 minutes.)
Porzingis has mauled the Mavs' smaller defenders on the other end of those switches -- a weapon that would vanish in his absence.
What has stood out most about Tatum and Brown is their cruel decisiveness against those matchups. There is no wasted time or motion -- no dancing with the ball that allows the Mavs' defense to gird itself. They are catching and going with sudden force.
Tatum spots Irving in the dunker spot, an undersized last line of defense. Holiday dances under the rim like that precisely because he often has smaller defenders on him.
Tatum is defending the Mavs' centers -- a method of complicating Doncic's pet pick-and-roll game. After stops, those centers are often stuck on Tatum. When he spots that, Tatum knifes into attack mode:
The Mavericks won three rounds by packing the paint, flying out on the best opposing shooters, and sloughing away from the shakiest. They were effectively able to protect the rim and snuff the best catch-and-shoot 3s.
Against Boston, they are doing neither. With Porzingis, there is no shaky or unwilling shooter in Boston's rotation. Every player can put the ball on the floor when the Mavs run them off the arc. That changes some if Porzingis is limited.
The Mavericks made some tweaks on defense in Game 2, but none they could apply with real consistency or that made any real difference. They disguised some of their switches on Porzingis pick-and-pops, delaying them before having one defender veer late at Porzingis:
They tried rearranging the chessboard to pull Irving out of the paint and make sure the defender there had some size. Watch White and Brown switch places on the right side in hopes of luring White's defender -- Irving -- down low:
The Mavs sniff it out, stand their ground, and park P.J. Washington as the back-line deterrent.
The Celtics downloaded that and began to counter. They will be ready in Game 3. That little non-switch by Dallas leaves Irving on Brown. The same type of sequence left him on Tatum multiple times. If Boston has time on the shot clock, it can swing the ball to its stars and let them play bully ball against Irving.
This was a delightful 10-second chess match:
As Brown works up top, Holiday jogs into the dunker spot -- hoping to drag Irving there. The Mavs see that, and have Gafford tag onto Holiday -- leaving Irving on Porzingis in the right corner. That's almost a hybrid between man and zone defenses, with Gafford guarding an area of the floor. (The Mavericks did this a lot against the Oklahoma City Thunder in the second round.)
But Irving on Porzingis is a mismatch, too. As Brown begins his drive, Porzingis sneaks toward the rim. Washington digests that, and rescues Irving -- swapping places with him. Irving is now on Tatum, but Brown sticks to Plan A and attacks Doncic. The possession stalls.
That stop starts with Doncic at the point of attack, and he for a number of reasons -- health included -- has not been able to supply enough resistance. Dallas also can't pull off those matchup contortions every time. Boston is not affording them that luxury. The Celtics are moving players around and sprinkling in set pieces beyond the pick-and-roll -- including this corner pindown they've used on Doncic:
Double-big lineups with Maxi Kleber and one of Gafford and Lively offer more back-line heft, but Kleber has to make 3s, and his shot has not looked right since he suffered a shoulder injury. The Celtics are treating him like a total non-threat. The Mavs are minus-22 in 18 minutes when Kleber plays with either Mavs center.
They are plus-8 with Kleber as a small-ball center, but I'm not sure the benefits of those groups outweigh the absence of a vertical threat on both ends. It is hard to out-duel Boston in a battle of five-out lineups. That equation tilts a bit if Porzingis misses time.
The Mavs could sprinkle in more man-zone hybrid. Several scouts suggested Dallas play more straight-up zone, with Doncic likely stashed in the corners.
That would be an interesting ploy, and a fitting potential final hurdle for Boston. Zones once troubled them, most famously in their 2020 conference finals loss to the Miami Heat. That was a long time ago. This team is seasoned, with more shooting and cagier off-ball movers.
The Mavs could fight harder to avoid switching into bad matchups. So far, they have surrendered those switches without a fight. Their on-ball defenders would have to dig in getting over picks. The defenders on Boston's screeners might have to hedge out, cut off Boston's ball handlers, and then rotate back. That puts two on the ball; the three defenders behind the play would have to rotate to plug holes.
All of that opens passing and cutting windows. The Celtics know those windows. They may require more read-and-react thoughtfulness than the drive-and-kick passes Boston is getting, but the Celtics are comfortable with them.
The only answer is to mix things up so that Boston spends the first few seconds of possessions sussing out the defense. The Mavs also need their offense to help their defense. Dallas has committed a reasonable 26 turnovers, but not all turnovers are equal. Boston has 16 steals, above its average and the Mavs average steals allowed.
Those cough-ups -- including several at Doncic's expense -- are killing the Mavs. The Celtics have scored 2.1 points per possession off steals, per Cleaning The Glass.
Boston is forcing a lot of those mistakes. They are toggling coverages, pressuring Doncic, extending arms into passing lanes. Boston has the Mavericks out of rhythm. Slotting Tatum onto Gafford, and Lively has muddied Dallas' tentpole pick-and-roll: Doncic and a lob threat, three shooters orbiting them. With Tatum on the Mavs' centers, Boston can switch those plays.
Doncic went at Tatum more in Game 2, and had success burrowing by him. But those one-on-one plays come at the expense of ball movement and catch-and-shoot 3s.
Going after Boston's bigs on the pick-and-roll then requires Doncic use someone else -- Washington, Derrick Jones. Jr. -- as screener. If those players slice to the rim, they are cutting into crowds since the Mavs' centers and their defenders loiter around the basket. The Celtics can defend Doncic pick-and-rolls 3-on-3 instead of 2-on-2.
Boston is also mixing up tactics when Doncic prods at Horford and Porzingis. Sometimes they hang back -- a gambit that is most effective with Porzingis. He is big enough to play Doncic and the roller at the same time -- to at least make Doncic think about whether to loft a floater or thread the lob. Kornet has size, but he's not on Porzingis's level in terms of agility and rim protection.
Sometimes Boston's bigs meet Doncic as the point of the screen, and then retreat as he probes. If teammates see the play unfolding in time, they might yank the bigs out of it -- switching on the fly as the screener lumbers toward Doncic.
Sometimes they switch. They have blitzed only as an emergency last resort, or late in the shot clock, when the Mavs only have time for one or two passes. They will not give Doncic easy reads that get the ball moving.
Boston has been smart on switches about having Doncic's original man -- now tracking the screener -- lingering in the paint to cut Doncic off. Behind that lies the next layer of help: a third Boston defender sliding away from one of the Mavs' so-so shooters.
The Celtics didn't just let Doncic and Irving attack one-on-one all the time in Game 2. They flashed more help:
When Jones or Josh Green popped for 3s, the Celtics ignored them and swarmed Doncic. The Mavs might need to play Jaden Hardy and Tim Hardaway Jr. to juice their shooting and shot creation, but that comes at a cost on the other end.
Rotations aside, the Mavs have to get more creative on offense. They've gotten traction setting picks for Doncic at half-court, catapulting him into space. If one pick doesn't loosen the defense, the same screener can set one or two more as Doncic dribbles toward the arc. The Mavs can toss in a second screener to sew confusion.
Doncic could hunt White more, and work in the post. The Mavs can't forget the Irving-Doncic two-man game -- on and off the ball -- even if the Celtics can switch it between Holiday and Brown. The Mavs can try slipping more screens and beating the switch before it happens. They have levers.
They need to pull all of them to have any chance of rallying -- plus get some breaks. (The state of Porzingis could be one.) Boston is simply that good.