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Data from Information Repositories
Sub-techniques (2)
| ID | Name |
|---|---|
| T1213.001 | Confluence |
| T1213.002 | Sharepoint |
Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information.
Adversaries may also collect information from shared storage repositories hosted on cloud infrastructure or in software-as-a-service (SaaS) applications, as storage is one of the more fundamental requirements for cloud services and systems.
The following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository:
- Policies, procedures, and standards
- Physical / logical network diagrams
- System architecture diagrams
- Technical system documentation
- Testing / development credentials
- Work / project schedules
- Source code snippets
- Links to network shares and other internal resources
Information stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include Sharepoint, Confluence, and enterprise databases such as SQL Server.
Procedure Examples
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| Turla |
Turla has used a custom .NET tool to collect documents from an organization's internal central database.[1] |
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|
| Audit |
Consider periodic review of accounts and privileges for critical and sensitive repositories. |
| User Account Management |
Enforce the principle of least-privilege. Consider implementing access control mechanisms that include both authentication and authorization. |
| User Training |
Develop and publish policies that define acceptable information to be stored in repositories. |
Detection
As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.
The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. [2] The user access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. [3] Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities.