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Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Registry
Other sub-techniques of Unsecured Credentials (6)
| ID | Name |
|---|---|
| T1552.001 | Credentials In Files |
| T1552.002 | Credentials in Registry |
| T1552.003 | Bash History |
| T1552.004 | Private Keys |
| T1552.005 | Cloud Instance Metadata API |
| T1552.006 | Group Policy Preferences |
Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.
Example commands to find Registry keys related to password information: [1]
- Local Machine Hive:
reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s - Current User Hive:
reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s
Procedure Examples
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| APT32 |
APT32 used Outlook Credential Dumper to harvest credentials stored in Windows registry.[3][4] |
| PowerSploit |
PowerSploit has several modules that search the Windows Registry for stored credentials: |
| Reg |
Reg may be used to find credentials in the Windows Registry.[1] |
| TrickBot |
TrickBot has retrieved PuTTY credentials by querying the |
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|
| Audit |
Proactively search for credentials within the Registry and attempt to remediate the risk. |
| Password Policies |
Do not store credentials within the Registry. |
| Privileged Account Management |
If it is necessary that software must store credentials in the Registry, then ensure the associated accounts have limited permissions so they cannot be abused if obtained by an adversary. |
Detection
Monitor processes for applications that can be used to query the Registry, such as Reg, and collect command parameters that may indicate credentials are being searched. Correlate activity with related suspicious behavior that may indicate an active intrusion to reduce false positives.