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TECHNIQUES
PRE-ATT&CK
Priority Definition Planning
Priority Definition Direction
Target Selection
Technical Information Gathering
People Information Gathering
Organizational Information Gathering
Technical Weakness Identification
People Weakness Identification
Organizational Weakness Identification
Adversary OPSEC
Establish & Maintain Infrastructure
Persona Development
Build Capabilities
Test Capabilities
Stage Capabilities
Enterprise
Initial Access
Phishing
Supply Chain Compromise
Valid Accounts
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter
Inter-Process Communication
Scheduled Task/Job
System Services
User Execution
Persistence
Account Manipulation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
Create Account
Create or Modify System Process
Event Triggered Execution
Hijack Execution Flow
Office Application Startup
Pre-OS Boot
Scheduled Task/Job
Server Software Component
Traffic Signaling
Valid Accounts
Privilege Escalation
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Access Token Manipulation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
Create or Modify System Process
Event Triggered Execution
Hijack Execution Flow
Process Injection
Scheduled Task/Job
Valid Accounts
Defense Evasion
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Access Token Manipulation
Execution Guardrails
File and Directory Permissions Modification
Hide Artifacts
Hijack Execution Flow
Impair Defenses
Indicator Removal on Host
Masquerading
Modify Authentication Process
Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure
Obfuscated Files or Information
Pre-OS Boot
Process Injection
Signed Binary Proxy Execution
Signed Script Proxy Execution
Subvert Trust Controls
Traffic Signaling
Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
Use Alternate Authentication Material
Valid Accounts
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Credential Access
Brute Force
Credentials from Password Stores
Input Capture
Man-in-the-Middle
Modify Authentication Process
OS Credential Dumping
Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
Unsecured Credentials
Discovery
Account Discovery
Permission Groups Discovery
Software Discovery
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Lateral Movement
Remote Service Session Hijacking
Remote Services
Use Alternate Authentication Material
Collection
Archive Collected Data
Data from Information Repositories
Data Staged
Email Collection
Input Capture
Man-in-the-Middle
Command and Control
Application Layer Protocol
Data Encoding
Data Obfuscation
Dynamic Resolution
Encrypted Channel
Proxy
Traffic Signaling
Web Service
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium
Exfiltration Over Web Service
Impact
Data Manipulation
Defacement
Disk Wipe
Endpoint Denial of Service
Network Denial of Service
Mobile
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Privilege Escalation
Defense Evasion
Credential Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
Command and Control
Exfiltration
Impact
Network Effects
Remote Service Effects
  1. Home
  2. Techniques
  3. Enterprise
  4. Impair Defenses
  5. Disable Windows Event Logging

Impair Defenses: Disable Windows Event Logging

ID Name
T1562.001 Disable or Modify Tools
T1562.002 Disable Windows Event Logging
T1562.003 HISTCONTROL
T1562.004 Disable or Modify System Firewall
T1562.006 Indicator Blocking
T1562.007 Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall

Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more.[1] This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections.

Adversaries may targeting system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. By disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind.

ID: T1562.002
Sub-technique of:  T1562
Tactic: Defense Evasion
Platforms: Windows
Permissions Required: Administrator
Data Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Defense Bypassed: Log analysis
Version: 1.0
Created: 21 February 2020
Last Modified: 29 March 2020

Procedure Examples

Name Description
Ebury

Ebury has disabled logging when the backdoor is used.[2]

Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 has used appcmd.exe to disable logging on a victim server.[3]

Mitigations

Mitigation Description
Restrict File and Directory Permissions

Ensure proper process and file permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering logging.
Restrict Registry Permissions

Ensure proper Registry permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering logging.
User Account Management

Ensure proper user permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with logging.

Detection

Monitor processes and command-line arguments for commands that can be used to disable logging. Lack of event logs may be suspicious.

References

  1. Franklin Smith. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Events. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
  2. M.Léveillé, M.. (2014, February 21). An In-depth Analysis of Linux/Ebury. Retrieved April 19, 2019.
  1. Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, June 27). BRONZE UNION Cyberespionage Persists Despite Disclosures. Retrieved July 13, 2017.