Laos is a one-party communist state, and the LPRP’s 69-member Central Committee, under the leadership of the 11-member Politburo, makes all major decisions. The LPRP vets all candidates for election to the National Assembly, whose members elect the president and prime minister.

In an opaque January 2021 party congress, former prime minister Thongloun Sisoulith was named LPRP secretary-general. That March, Thongloun was named president by the National Assembly, while former vice president Phankham Viphavanh was named prime minister. In late December 2022, Phankham resigned, citing his health. He was succeeded by his deputy prime minister, Sonexay Siphandone.

National Assembly elections are held every five years, but they are not free or fair, and international observers are not permitted to monitor them. The LPRP won 158 of the body’s 164 seats in the February 2021 elections, with the remainder going to carefully vetted independents.

The electoral laws and framework are designed to ensure that the LPRP, the only legal party, dominates every election and controls the political system.

The constitution makes the LPRP the sole legal political party and grants it a leading role at all levels of government.

Although nominally independent candidates are allowed to seek National Assembly seats, all candidates must be approved by National Assembly–appointed committees, effectively barring genuine opposition figures from contesting elections and challenging the LPRP’s dominance.

Laos’s authoritarian one-party system excludes the public from any genuine and autonomous political participation.

The rights to vote and run for office are constitutionally guaranteed, but due to the one-party system, no segment of the population can exercise full political rights and electoral opportunities.

Women’s interests are not addressed in the political system, and women are poorly represented in the legislature; women candidates won 22 percent of the National Assembly’s seats in the February 2021 elections, a decrease from 27.5 percent in the 2016 polls.

None of Laos’s nominally elected officials are chosen through free and fair contests, and major policy decisions are reserved for the LPRP and particularly a small cadre of its top leaders.

Corruption by government officials is widespread. Laws aimed at curbing graft are poorly enforced, and government regulation of virtually every facet of life provides many opportunities for bribery. Punishments for corruption are often administered through LPRP disciplinary mechanisms rather than the judicial system.

President Thongloun initiated an anticorruption drive while serving as prime minister from 2016 to 2021. The State Audit Organization, which gained the power to conduct financial and budget investigations during his premiership, uncovered instances of misappropriated state funds and unreported expenditures. However, rumors persisted that recent borrowing from China was partially inflated by corruption, affecting associated infrastructure projects.

There is no law guaranteeing access to official information in Laos. The 2012 Law on Making Legislation increased legislative transparency by requiring bills proposed at the central and provincial levels to be published for a 60-day comment period and, once passed, to be posted for 15 days before coming into force.

Growing public anger over the country’s economy, particularly among young people and particularly online, has led to some modest degree of openness within the government and influenced Phankham’s resignation. The government has also made some admissions regarding the economic difficulties faced by Laotians.

Authorities use restrictive laws and intimidation tactics against critics of the government, and as a result, self-censorship is the norm among journalists. The state owns nearly all media, though some independent outlets, primarily entertainment magazines, have emerged in recent years. In 2019, the government required news outlets that disseminate material through social media to register themselves, threatening fines and prison sentences for noncompliance. The move was ostensibly intended to halt the spread of “fake news.”

State media were sometimes obliged to acknowledge fuel shortages and other hardships during the economic crisis in 2023, but there was no consistent trend of more critical reporting.

Religious freedom is constitutionally guaranteed but is constrained in practice, in part through the LPRP’s control of clergy training and supervision of Buddhist temples. There have been multiple cases in recent years of Christians being briefly detained or sentenced to jail for unauthorized religious activities, or being pressured by authorities to renounce their faith.

University professors cannot teach or write about politically sensitive topics, though select foreign academics have been invited to teach courses in the country.

Security agencies and LPRP-backed mass organizations monitor for public dissent, which is punishable under a variety of laws. As a result, there is little space for open and free private discussion of sensitive issues.

In 2021, the government formed a task force to scrutinize social media content. In August 2023, the government issued tighter regulations on social media, and introduced restrictions on pages that provide “misleading or distorted information” on it. Meanwhile, a Ministry of Telecommunications and Technology official warned that the police would question those who criticize the government on social media, as users voiced disapproval over inflation, which reached as high as 41 percent in March; the devaluation of the kip; and related cost-of-living concerns.

The government severely restricts freedom of assembly, and protests are extremely rare in practice.

Alongside LPRP-affiliated mass organizations, there are some domestic nongovernmental welfare and professional groups, but they are prohibited from pursuing political agendas. A harsh decree on associations, which came into force in 2017, mandates that nongovernmental organizations secure government approval for their initiatives and funding.

Human rights and prodemocracy activists are at risk of unexplained disappearances or violence, within Laos and abroad. In 2019, Laotian prodemocracy activist Od Sayavong disappeared in Bangkok, where he resided. Also in 2019, Phetphouthon Philachane, a Laotian citizen who demonstrated in front of the Laotian embassy in Bangkok, disappeared after returning to Laos. In April 2023, an unknown individual shot and seriously wounded Anousa “Jack” Luangsuphom, who administrates a Facebook page that hosts politically critical discourse, in Vientiane. In May, Laotian human rights activist Bounsuan Kitiyano was shot to death in Thailand.

Activists from other countries are at physical risk within Laos. Savang Phaleuth, a leading Laotian activist who resides in Thailand, was arrested in Laos in April 2023 but was released in June. Lu Siwei, a Chinese dissident and lawyer, was arrested in Laos while en route to the United States in July 2023 and was later sent back to China. Chinese authorities detained Lu by October.

Most unions belong to the official Lao Federation of Trade Unions. Strikes are not expressly prohibited, but workers rarely stage walkouts.

Laotian courts are deeply penetrated by corruption and subject to systemic LPRP influence. Major decisions are often made secretly.

Due process rights are outlined in law but routinely denied in practice. Defendants are often presumed guilty, and long procedural delays in the judicial system are common. Appeals processes are often nonexistent or delayed, sometimes indefinitely. Warrantless searches and arbitrary arrests also occur.

The Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone (GTSEZ) in Bokeo Province has been affected by criminal activity. Individuals trafficked from abroad have been forced to participate in cybercrime rings in the GTSEZ. In a May 2023 article, the Diplomat news outlet noted that drug trafficking, acts of torture, and murder were reported in the zone.

Prison conditions are substandard, with reports of inadequate food and medical facilities. Prisoners are also subject to torture.

Antigovernment groups have reportedly attacked border checkpoints and transportation hubs over the last two decades.

Members of the Hmong ethnic group face violence at the hands of the military and other government authorities.

Equal rights are constitutionally guaranteed but are not upheld in practice. Discrimination against members of ethnic minority tribes is common. The Hmong, who fielded a guerrilla army allied with US forces during the Vietnam War, are particularly distrusted by the government and face harsh treatment.

While same-sex relations are legal and violence against LGBT+ people is rare, no legislation provides explicit protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. Laotians have participated in modest events celebrating the LGBT+ community.

Gender-based discrimination and violence are widespread.

The dominance of the LPRP over most aspects of society can effectively restrict individuals’ ability to choose their place of residence, employment, or education. Freedom of movement is sometimes restricted for ethnic Hmong.

All land is owned by the state, though citizens have rights to use it. Violations of land rights have become a source of public discontent in recent years. Villagers who live on or near the sites of planned dams and other development projects are often forced to leave their homes and fields without adequate compensation. Construction began on a high-speed rail line from China through Laos in 2016, resulting in large-scale displacement; the rail line was inaugurated in late 2021.

Social freedoms can be restricted, especially for women and children. Domestic violence is apparently widespread but rarely reported to police. Abortion is illegal and only permitted when the mother’s life is at risk. Marriage among girls younger than 18 is allowed with parental permission and fairly common in practice, especially in rural areas.

Regulations against unsafe or exploitative working conditions are poorly enforced. Trafficking in persons is common, and enforcement of antitrafficking measures is hindered by a lack of transparency and weak rule of law. Laotian workers have sought employment elsewhere in Southeast Asia in large numbers, with the country’s economy being affected by inflation and the devaluation of the kip. In 2023, the Laotian government said that 203,000 workers abroad lacked permits.

In August 2023, the government increased the monthly minimum private-sector wage by 300,000 kip ($16). In December, Prime Minister Sonexay said the government would introduce controls on the exchange rate and food prices. He also said the government would offer a 150,000 kip ($8) monthly allowance for civil servants.

Human trafficking victims have been discovered in the GTSEZ. In late 2022, Radio Free Asia reported that nearly 1,700 victims, including Laotians and foreigners, had been found by authorities in the zone since 2007.