Summary

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is pursuing an improved ability to more closely integrate and operate jointly against agile adversaries through Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2). This framework will seamlessly integrate sensors, networks, platforms, commanders, operators, and weapon systems for rapid information collection, decision-making, and projection of joint and multi-national forces. The Department of the Air Force’s (DAF’s) contribution to JADC2 is the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS).

There are questions as to what ABMS is and concerns as to whether it is properly structured, because it lacks a well-defined set of discrete, allocated minimum performance objectives, a single set of fixed requirements, a timeline of proposed capability deliveries, and a systems allocation of budget and resources to execute against these objectives. While agility, flexibility, and adaptability are worthy goals, without a plan that offers sufficient details, specificity, and metrics to synchronize such a vast and complex system of systems approach, successful capability delivery at scale is challenged and unlikely.

To address these concerns, the committee was charged to examine the following:

1. Evaluate the planned ABMS data and communication architecture and compare the architecture anticipated performance characteristics needed to support real-time fire control and all-domain sensor-to-shooter data flow, command and control (C2) activities, artificial intelligence (AI)-based patterns-of-life training, battle damage assessment, and other related data-based activities;

2. Determine any technical gaps and shortfalls in ABMS technology and planned system integration architecture; and
3. Review ABMS governance and recommend how planned organizational and execution plans and processes may be improved to better enable a rapid realization of JADC2 operations for the DAF and DoD, as a whole.

In the conduct of the study, the former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (SAF/AQ) transferred office of primary responsibility (OPR) for ABMS from the DAF’s Chief Architect’s Office (DAF CAO) to the DAF’s Rapid Capabilities Office (RCO). The result of this change was twofold. First, the tasks that the committee was originally charged to examine did not fully align with the ABMS priorities and responsibilities of the RCO. For this reason, some of the information that the committee requested to complete the required analyses could not be provided and some of the information that the committee received was subsequently supplanted by newer information. Second, the committee received a largely transitory picture of ABMS, because both the system’s technical design and governance were undergoing significant changes within the DAF.

As an evolving system in the early stages of definition, ABMS architecture and its supporting elements remain dynamic. The ABMS technical architecture presented to the committee from October 2020 to March 2021 largely reflected the status of ABMS emerging out of large-scale exercises known as “on-ramp” demonstrations managed by the DAF CAO. The early architecture and approach are undergoing assessments and revisions by the DAF RCO as it works to create a set of acquisition programs within the capability releases to be fielded. As such, the committee’s analyses reflect the approach, benefits, challenges, and opportunities of that early architecture and constitute insights and recommendations for the CAO, RCO, DAF, and broader DoD elements to consider, as they pursue the updated ABMS architecture, the individual acquisition programs within it, and the larger JADC2 framework. The DAF RCO is already addressing some of these issues under the direction of the new Secretary of the Air Force in their evolving plans and designs for ABMS, but others (especially the non-technical elements) require further consideration.

REPORT ORGANIZATION AND MAJOR OBSERVATIONS

This report is organized by topic into four chapters: perspectives, architecture and data, governance, and challenges and opportunities. Chapter 1 describes why ABMS is needed and how it has evolved from a replacement program for a joint surveillance and radar system to an all-encompassing C2 family of systems. Chapter 2 examines current and planned architecture to include data standards, software,

security, testing, and modeling. Chapter 3 outlines past and current governance for ABMS and highlights human systems integration, training, culture, and other considerations. Chapter 4 details interoperability and intelligence, and summarizes the committee’s recommendations.

At a high level, the committee concludes that as a non-traditional acquisition program, ABMS is on track, but it remains a work in progress. Its technical design and architecture remain nascent and evolving, so it was difficult for the committee to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of its data and communication architecture, particularly as they relate to the JADC2 framework, which is also being developed and defined. Moreover, the committee found that performance characteristics were largely limited in scale and scope, because they were largely tied to on-ramp demonstrations and not actual operational activities, where real-world physical constraints may restrict actual performance.

The committee considers the assignment of the DAF RCO as the lead organization for ABMS to be a positive step toward shifting ABMS from demonstrations and experimentations to focused capability releases. The committee also supports the Secretary of the Air Force’s call for the establishment of performance metrics to gauge improvements and measure operational outcomes.

As a family of systems, ABMS is difficult to quantify. The committee was not able to detail and assess the exact costs for ABMS, because it involves a portfolio of programs—some of which were not designated as elements of ABMS, but were still included as part of the broader ABMS ecosystem. Congress’s decision to reduce the overall budget for ABMS by nearly one-half clearly limits what ABMS can accomplish in the near to mid-term. But this budget constraint may also compel DAF leaders to make imperative decisions and prioritizations regarding ABMS investments and capabilities, which the committee supports.

The committee found that the current ABMS, and the broader JADC2 governance structure, is insufficient and lacks proper authority to execute C2 across all domains. The absence of a DoD-level executive agent to address and resolve technical, operational, and command decisions for all contributors to the JADC2 framework leads to each Service and DoD agency developing its own C2 system, with unique requirements, standards, and technical specifications that challenge the achievement for interoperability.

The committee recognizes that ABMS has evolved in both its technical approach and its governance structure during the course of this analysis. It is thus important to note that some of the recommendations summarized below and detailed in the rest of this report are specific to the earlier ABMS approach, while others may remain relevant to a newer, more focused program.

RECOMMENDATIONS BY ORGANIZATION

The DAF’s CAO and the RCO recommendations:

• Define the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) architecture at the Joint All-Domain Command and Control level to ensure interoperability with other ABMS-like systems being developed (Recommendation 1).
• Design the Advanced Battle Management System architecture to be modular and include open standards and interfaces that would enable configuration with other Service variants (Recommendation 3).
• Design the Advanced Battle Management System’s architecture with specific technical requirements and solutions for ensuring that communications, data, and computation may continue to operate in degraded or denied access environments (Recommendation 4).
• To the maximum extent possible, design and execute a comprehensive artificial intelligence strategy that would encompass all elements, to include doctrine, chain of command, policy, authorization for weapon release in a joint environment, interfaces to Joint All-Domain Command and Control, and not just select capabilities of the Advanced Battle Management System (Recommendation 6).
• In coordination with the Department of the Air Force’s Chief Software Officer, expand the use of containerization and Kubernetes for continuous Advanced Battle Management System development and for detecting and mitigating security vulnerabilities (Recommendation 8).
• Adopt development, security, and operations as the common development environment using containerization and continuous integration/continuous delivery across all of the Advanced Battle Management System (Recommendation 9).
• Design resilience into the Advanced Battle Management System architecture and specify dynamic criteria for needed performance (Recommendation 11).
• Work with the Department of the Air Force’s Digital Engineering Enterprise Office to apply model-based systems engineering (MBSE) methods across Advanced Battle Management System engineering and sustainment activities and to enable MBSE to serve as a bridge between operator requirements and development teams (Recommendation 17).

The DAF’s RCO recommendations:

• Adopt an array of data-exchange technologies that could support the entire spectrum of capabilities, from tactical to strategic (Recommendation 5).
• For modular open-system designs with robust interface specifications, acquire performance and interface requirements instead of all intellectual property rights (Recommendation 10).
• Apply zero trust (ZT) in stages as technologies mature and integrate ZT services to include the use of multi-factor authentication across all of the Advanced Battle Management System (Recommendation 13).
• In addition to adopting zero trust, leverage the best available mature cybersecurity practices and capabilities, including multi-factor authentication; identity, credential, and access management; encryption; penetration testing; managed detection services; behavior monitoring applications; among others (Recommendation 14).
• Employ the Air Force’s Mission Defense Teams to red team the Advanced Battle Management System’s cyber defenses against attacks from malicious actors. Based on these red team exercises, the Department of the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office should address vulnerabilities by bolstering and enhancing cyber defenses accordingly (Recommendation 15).
• Work in partnership with the U.S. Cyber Command to address Internet of Things defense and other cyber vulnerabilities and exploits that are highlighted in the “United States Cyber Command Technical Challenge Problem Set” document (Recommendation 16).
• Building on existing activities in digital engineering and modeling and simulations, expand the use of digital twins in Advanced Battle Management System development, particularly as new capabilities and technologies are introduced (Recommendation 18).
• Consider scaling the Common Mission Control Center and designate it as phase zero for the Advanced Battle Management System (Recommendation 19).
• Incorporate human systems integration methodologies into the Advanced Battle Management System to ensure that all human users are fully and effectively integrated with current and future systems elements (Recommendation 22).

The Joint Staff, military services, and the U.S. DoD leaders’ recommendations:

• Establish interoperability requirements and performance metrics for all participants in Joint All-Domain Command and Control to allow for eventual integration of all capabilities (Recommendation 2).
• Reach immediate agreement on a common data fabric and security levels of the data with data standards and tools defined at the Joint level. Without a common set of agreed upon open standards with known interface exchange requirements that do not limit innovation, the military Services risk developing incompatible and stove-piped solutions (Recommendation 7).
• Establish and implement a robust enterprise-wide offensive and defensive cybersecurity strategy for Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) and the Advanced Battle Management System. Security is a fundamental requirement that must be designed and fully integrated into the all JADC2-supporting systems’ architecture from the start (Recommendation 12).
• Establish an authoritative Joint-level body to address and resolve technical, operational, and command decisions for all contributors to the Joint All-Domain Command and Control framework (Recommendation 20).
• Tackle the cultural, social, and emotional barriers to true Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) horizontal integration if the Advanced Battle Management System and the larger Joint All-Domain Command and Control constructs are to enable the truly joint and multi-national integrated operations envisioned by the JWC (Recommendation 21).
• Ensure that the ethical use of artificial intelligence is examined and addressed in the Advanced Battle Management System’s (and in other systems supporting the broader Joint All-Domain Command and Control framework’s) design, operation, staffing, and training, as dictated by policy and the law of war (Recommendation 24).

The DAF’s SAF/AQ and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategy, Integration, and Requirements recommendation:

• Consider and weave personnel, cultural, training, and other non-materiel doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, education, personnel, facilities, and policy issues into designs and implementation plans for the broader Advanced Battle Management System ecosystem (Recommendation 23).

The Air Education Training Command recommendation:

• Establish a curriculum that would train or recruit highly qualified experts in artificial intelligence/machine learning, model-based systems engineering, cybersecurity, intelligence assessment, and test and evaluation for information technology, software, and hardware who can work with experts in military operations and culture (Recommendation 25).

Each of these recommendations is explored in detail in the full report.

This page intentionally left blank.