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CHAPTER TWO Scenarios of Sustainable Hazards Mitigation THE 1975 NATIONAL ASSESSMENT of natural hazards (see White and Haas, 1975) presented various sce- narios of hypothetical hurricane, flood, and earth- quake disasters for the cities of Miami, Boulder, and San Francisco, respectively. The scenarios were writ- ten to show how large future U.S. disasters could be. They came uncannily close to foretelling the impacts and consequences of Hurricane Andrew in 1992, the catastrophic 1993 Midwest floods, and the 1989 Loma Prieta and 1994 Northridge earthquakes, which together have cost the nation some $100 billion. Innovative mitigation activities have been devel- oped and implemented since 1975 to lessen some communities' vulnerability to natural disaster. One consequence (see Chapter 3) has been that loss of life from U.S. disasters in the past two decades has gone down, although the average annual cost in dollars has continued to rise. In addition, the potential for catastrophic loss of life in extraordinarily large future events is now greater than ever. Like the 1975 assessment, this chapter presents three scenarios. Unlike the 1975 scenarios, the ones here are not designed to illustrate how large future 41
42 Disasters by Design disasters could be. Instead, they were written to illustrate some of the previously ignored causes of disasters and to suggest how to tie together the related concepts of disaster resiliency, economic vitality, environmen- tal quality, and quality of life. These scenarios are by no means compre- hensive and focus briefly on only a few issues in each city: the natural environment and social capital in Miami, decisionmaking and education in Boulder, and energy and transportation in San Francisco. Of course, all of the perplexing problems involved in sustainable hazards mitigation have not been addressed in these brief scenarios, and more questions have probably been raised than answered. Some may say that the sce- narios are fanciful and Pollyannaish, and to this the authors plead guilty. They are primarily fantasy, although the statistics and facts about the predisaster community are all true, and damage predictions are reason- able averages of those found in the hazards research literature. Despite the creative license taken with potential future social behavior, it is hoped that these scenarios prompt readers to think about and discuss the possi- bility of making sustainable hazards mitigation a reality. MIAMI, FLORIDA Perhaps because very few catastrophic hurricanes made landfall in the United States between 1965 and 1989, the focus of major national attention and programs was on other types of natural hazards, and hur- ricane loss potential was given relatively little attention. During this time, the eastern coast of the United States became densely developed and populated. South Florida grew from fewer than 3 million people in 1950 to over 13 million in 1991, and 80 percent of that growth was in coastal areas. After some especially damaging hurricanes in the early l990s, some researchers noted that hurricane activity seemed to be returning to a cycle similar to that of the 1940s and 1950s. After many years of disagreement and uncertainty, most climate sci- entists were in agreement that the earth's climate was changing. The highly respected Intergovernmental Pane! on Climate Change came to an unambiguous conclusion in 1995. Global warming, it said, was occur- ring and continued emissions of greenhouse gases, through a direct chain of events, would cause a rise in sea level and increasingly malevolent weather extremes, such as flooding. Many policymakers ignored or con- tested the implications, but scientists were in agreement, and insurance and reinsurance companies studying the data became particularly wor- ried. For example, the president of the Reinsurance Association of
Scenarios of Sustainable Hazards Mitigation 43 America claimed that climate change could bankrupt the industry. In addition, throughout the years insurance agencies had been creatively "protecting" their assets from potential catastrophe, thus leaving south Florida in the dangerous position of possibly having no reliable property insurance in the aftermath of a large hurricane. Unsafe and unplanned development, climate change, and social institutions conspired to make Miami a hazardous place to live and work. H· ~. ~ urrlcane Turin In the midst of national handwringing over the hurricane vulnerabil- ity of coastal communities, Hurricane Sirin made landfall. Official pre- Sirin estimates predicted that 41 to 99 hours would be needed to evacu- ate everyone in this part of Florida. However, 21 hours after the first evacuation notice, Hurricane Sirin hit Miami Beach as a category 4 storm. After destroying much of Miami, it moved across the Everglades and Big Cypress National Preserve, devastated much of the Fort Myers area on the western Florida coast, entered the Gulf of Mexico, flooded New Orleans after it was downgraded to a tropical storm, and caused rain- storms and flooding in Mississippi and Tennessee. Hurricane Sirin died out as a rainstorm in Kentucky. The joint efforts of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's National Weather Service, the Na- tional Hurricane Center in Miami, and Miami's vigilant local officials had provided one of the best hurricane forecast and warning systems in the world. But the warning system could not compensate for the conse- quences imposed by previous rapid environmental destruction and un- sound and unplanned development. Hurricane Sirin surpassed all previ- ous hurricanes in the numbers of people injured, killed, and left homeless and jobless and in environmental and property damage. Most critical facilities (water, phone, sewer, utilities, transportation, shelters, hospi- tals, fire and police stations) were either destroyed or damaged. Flooding and water seepage after roofs blew off did further damage to critical public and private property. After Hurricane Andrew in 1992, Florida had led the nation in ex- ploring the feasibility of working toward sustainability, including the worthwhile future of a state made up of disaster-resilient communities. By the time Hurricane Sirin struck, sustainability was not only on the tip of most officials' tongues, it was actually becoming a household word. Sirin created a window of opportunity for sustainable mitigation strate- gies during reconstruction. Because Florida already had many post
44 Disasters by Design Motorists battle the 145-mph winds of Hurricane Andrew, which struck south Florida on August 24, 1992. Photograph by C.T. Walker, copyright Palm Beach Post. disaster recovery plans in place, and owing to the insight of a number of key figures (the governor, the state director of emergency services, the mayor of Miami, many other local officials, hazards professionals, the insurance industry, and a growing number of environmental justice and sustainable development experts), Miami and other affected areas recon- structed themselves as national models of sustainability and disaster re- siliency. The region built on its strengths: a strategic gateway linking North America, South America, and the Caribbean; a multicultural, multilingual work force and community; warm weather; unique natural ecosystems; and a worldwide reputation as a tourist attraction. Ecosystem Health The main reason Hurricane Sirin resulted in the largest disaster in U.S. history was the way human settlements had developed on the south Florida coastline in the latter part of the twentieth century. Development density along the coastal ridge had reduced the ability of natural systems to provide protection from hurricanes. For example, area beaches, which had once served as natural protection from severe weather and storm
Scenarios of Sustainable Hazards Mitigation 45 surges (and provided habitat for endangered turtles), were of little use during Hurricane Sirin because houses, condominiums, and hotels with walls primarily of glass were located right on top of them in fact, the beaches had been eroding because of excessive development before Hur S. . . Arcane Iran struc" a. In addition, natural stands of mangrove trees had been considered a nuisance and were removed with fervor. They once had stabilized the shorelines; filtered runoff; acted as a buffer against storm winds and tides; and provided a habitat for shrimp, fish, and crabs. Finally, since the early l900s, a variety of local, state, and national laws and regula- tions had encouraged the draining, filling, channeling, damming, and general demise of the Florida Everglades. What was left of the Ever- glades the nation's only tropical national park supported a number of important ecosystems and purified south Florida's drinking water. Human encroachment into the Everglades had become an increasingly important problem, as flood protection and the area's freshwater supply depended on the Everglades' health. Not only were the natural systems not available to help dampen the impacts of Hurricane Sirin, they were tragically affected by the storm. The native ecosystems of south Florida originally had evolved to be able to bounce back after hurricanes, which after all are a normal occurrence in the region. However, encroachment and urbanization had weakened and whittled them down to such a small size that the trauma of Hurri- cane Sirin further damaged many beyond repair. After Sirin it became clear to many people that it was socially, fis- cally, and ecologically irresponsible to rebuild without protecting valu- able natural resources. This meant some difficult decisions. For example, after two years of contentious, even bitter, debate and civic soul search- ing (and some arm twisting), it was decided that Miami Beach should be re-created as a sustainable mixed-use area. Much of the land was bought for a fair price by the city, state, and federal governments and turned into a national seashore consisting largely of public recreation areas and a few public buildings: a hurricane museum and wind/sun shelters for beachcombers, swimmers, and picnickers. When it became clear that no insurance company in the world would provide coverage to any building on the outer shore, many owners sold their property, and some individuals donated small parcels of land. Oth- ers took the chance and rebuilt small self-insured hotels, restaurants, and golf courses but they built low and sturdy since they knew they alone were financially responsible for future damage. There were no residential
46 Disasters by Design buildings left on the island. No cars were allowed on much of the Miami peninsula, and an extensive transit system a hurricane-resistant solar/ electric train became an efficient way to visit and tour the beach. Once again, the beach became a barrier that protected the greater Miami area from storms, and it also protected Biscayne Bay and Miami's freshwater supply. The coastline became a wildlife sanctuary and a world-class national ecological and recreation treasure that drew more tourists to the area than before Hurricane Sirin's strike. Because few hotels were left on the beach, new ones sprung up inland. The new hotels were built with hurricanes in mind, including tsunami lobbies; window shutters; and roofs, walls, and foundations that were tied together. Similar reconstruc- tion decisions were made in other ecologically sensitive hurricane- damaged areas of south Florida. Insurance agencies, along with the city of Miami, banks, financial institutions, and the construction industry, increased their advocacy of building codes and became wary of insuring highly hazardous coastal and floo~prone properties. At the same time, the federal government instituted strict policies that made it much more difficult for insurers to renege on their responsibility to their customers. In addition, insurers and governments recognized that investment in businesses that contributed to increased global warming was incompat- ible with their interests. Consequently, they began reducing their stock in of! and coal companies and reinvested in less carbon-intensive energy technologies. Although their "greenhouse politics" were criticized by some, the bottom line was that they saved themselves and their clients' money and contributed to a better quality of life for future communities. This move on the part of the city and insurance and reinsurance indus- tries ultimately pushed fossil fuel industries to reinvest in alternative energy sources. In time, as other global industries and investors followed suit, carbon emissions decreased and weather extremes, including hurri- canes, began to stabilize. Social Capita} Another predisaster factor that contributed to the severity of Hurri- cane Sirin's impact was the socioeconomic profile of the local popula- tion. A wide income gap existed, with a large number of people unem- ployed, underemployed, homeless, or poor, and there had been growing poverty even before the hurricane, especially among the elderly. In Miami per-capita income and home ownership were both low before Hurricane
Scenarios of Sustainable Hazards Mitigation 47 Sirin, and one in three people lived in poverty in 1990. In fact, 40 percent of all Floridians had low or very low incomes before Hurricane Sirin. Florida also had a large homeless population because of a lack of afford- able housing, unemployment, poor wages, family disintegration, poverty, lack of education, alcoholism, drug abuse, mental illness, and migration and immigration. One-third of Florida's homeless people were families. Before Hurricane Sirin, the state could shelter only 17 percent of its homeless. Hurricane Sirin destroyed 90 percent of the affected counties' mobile homes, a primary source of low-income housing. Most of the low-income housing was particularly hard hit because it was not built to current code and most was located in hazardous areas. More costly homes with mul- tiple roof lines, large unprotected windows, and gabled roofs also were especially vulnerable. Many homes, in all price ranges, that would have sustained only minor water and roof damage had they been built to code instead suffered massive water and structural damage when their roofs blew off. In the aftermath of the storm, affordable housing became non- existent, and what rental units there were rose dramatically in cost. The storm created a massive exodus from the area when people lost their homes and jobs. This created difficult-to-calculate service burdens for the places to which they moved. Additionally, the more affluent neigh- borhoods got more media attention after impact and received more immediate and abundant relief supplies. Domestic violence rose as the stress of recovery, homelessness, joblessness, and uncertainty began to sink in and tensions mounted. Despite these problems, Hurricane Sirin also made it clear to most people that Miami had to change dramatically if it was to recover and prosper in the future. The largest disaster in U.S. history robbed Florid- ians of their false sense of safety and exposed an infrastructure, social structure, and way of life that made Floridians recognize their vuiner- ability. It was also the last straw for a nation that had been paying for ever more expensive and tragic natural disasters. A compassionate and farsighted Congress realized that Florida's losses were also national losses and that losses of this magnitude should be prevented in the future. Slowly, policymakers realized that solving the problems of disaster miti gation and recovery meant solving age-old social problems. This was done in a variety of innovative ways. City planners, for example, knew that land-use decisions strongly affect both the population exposed to natural disasters and residential patterns that impact the availability of
48 Disasters by Design affordable housing. Consequently, they decided to make drastic changes in rebuilding the city. Affordable disaster-resistant housing became a priority. A variety of locations around the city were rezoned for affordable housing, some- times at the expense of highly profitable development. Diverse housing types were encouraged on adjacent sites. Infix! development in existing city centers that already had infrastructure and services was preferred over outward sprawl. Making communities more compact, with mixed- use development, transportation infrastructure, schools, homeless shel- ters, emergency shelters, senior centers, prisons, and landfills all located in the region, further reduced vulnerability to disasters. Although some neighborhoods slated for infix! protested, they were assured that, con- trary to popular assumptions, density did not have to mean the same thing as congestion. In fact, as the city focused on revitalizing urban areas, inkling actually improved most people's quality of life. Care was taken to reduce the impact of development on critical natural resources, to preserve freshwater supplies, and to reduce urban sprawl. Low-income residents and landowners with few resources to retrofit to comply with new building codes were offered help from the profes- sional engineering, science, and planning associations and from the city and state. An interdisciplinary group brought together land management experts, community leaders, engineers, geographers, social scientists, eco- nomics experts, and local advocacy groups to help manage reconstruc- tion projects for the poor. Faced with bearing a higher proportion of the costs locally, stakeholders tended to cooperate in ways never seen before. Contractors, engineers, architects, and other professionals used profits generated by affluent segments of society to fund locally sponsored design projects for poorer neighborhoods. This approach, labeled Robin Hood mitigation, was facilitated by short-term state and federal tax incentives; it was called one of the greatest achievements in disaster mitigation his- tory and won the President's Annual Award for Sustainability upon the recommendation of the director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Miami also drew on lessons and experiences from around the world to design comprehensive and effective programs for providing youths and adults with education and employable skills, supporting working families with child care and recreational opportunities, lowering crime rates, weatherizing and hurricane retrofitting homes, and promoting community gardens and open space. The city began incentive programs to encourage employers to offer flexible work schedules, job sharing,
Scenarios of Sustainable Hazards Mitigation 49 child care, elder care, and telecommuting. Despite early complaints that this would cut into profits, businesses found that it actually increased them by enhancing worker productivity and consumer loyalty and by decreasing employee absenteeism and turnover. Soon no incentives were needed from the city. With less commuter traffic, energy and time were conserved and the environment benefited, as did people's quality of life. The extensive investment in the new mass transit solar/electric trains not only made city life more pleasant and using public transportation more efficient, the city also reduced its carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions by 50 percent. Investments in social capital created a population able to participate in important ongoing policy decisions and in increasingly professional and technical job markets and better able to recover on its own after hurricane disasters. People felt that their children had brighter futures and that everyone had created a healthier and fairer society. Tourism based on the attractions of the improved environment increased, as people came to see and be a part of Florida's "sustainable city." Miami's leaders also realized that, as much as it had improved its own infrastructure, the city did not exist in a bubble. In fact, interna- tional trade through the city was a significant component of the national and regional economies. The city also realized that whatever the short- term gains it was not in its best interest to encourage dependency and ecological plunder of less developed countries. It prohibited policies or economic measures by the city, region, or local industry that would cause ecological and/or economic devastation in developing countries. The city began a policy of encouraging stronger ties with Latin American, Euro- pean, and Caribbean nations. Broader Implications In achieving their transformation to a mode! of sustainable develop- ment and disaster resiliency, the city of Miami and south Florida received a great deal of help from other communities and the federal government. Once the transformation was in place, south Florida became much less of a drain on national resources; it did not require as much disaster aid, welfare, or social services. South Florida also became a national and global ambassador for sustainability. Tourism, which depends on healthy beaches, coastal resources, parks, and preserves, increased. It also in- creased because the city became a more attractive place to visit because of public transportation and a lower crime rate. But it became a world
50 Disasters by Design tourist destination because of its commitment to sustainability. The citi- zens of the world came to south Florida to see the city of the future. By restructuring the community so that it was affordable and accessible, had high levels of economic health, environmental quality, and equity, and was much less vulnerable to disasters, south Florida also made itself into a magnet for global business. BOULDER, COLORADO The history of development in Boulder, Colorado, cannot be sepa- rated from the history of flooding on Boulder Creek. When the first miners and eventual residents of Boulder arrived at the foot of the Rocky Mountains in October 1858, they heard tales of catastrophic flooding from the Southern Arapaho tribe, which had frequented the region for 200 years. Floods were a common occurrence during the early years of the town's development, and the worst flood in Boulder's history hap- pened in 1894. Above-average snowfall, rapid warming resulting in fast snowmelt, and significant rain can cause serious flash flooding. In fact, Boulder has been rated as the city in Colorado in which the most people are the most likely to experience a catastrophic flood. A flood in Boulder of 12,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) is often called the 100-year flood, leading to the mistaken belief by many Boulder residents that such a flood will occur only once in 100 years. Since the great flood of 1894, Boulder has had a series of interesting developments in its struggle to come to terms with its flood hazard. While many reports and studies have been written and performed, only in the past 25 years have major changes in flood policy been made. In 1969 a 25-year flood occurred in Boulder that made some officials pay atten- tion. More significantly, the 1976 Big Thompson flash flood, 40 miles north of Boulder, killed 139 people and was destructive enough to cap- ture the attention of many Boulder policymakers. These experiences, as well as the restrictions required by the National Flood Insurance Program and the regional flood control board (Urban Drainage and Flood Control District), contributed to improvements in flood mitigation. Other important developments in Boulder's flood haz- ard management policy included the adoption of a warning system, a high-risk property purchase plan, and a nationally recognized greenways project. While extensive in nature, the warning system has never been fully tested and leaves several segments of the population unwarned and exposed. For example, Boulder draws a significant tourist population
Scenarios of Sustainable Hazards Mitigation 51 nearly year-round, and its large university houses a diverse international student population in the floodplain. Boulder also hosts a large transient homeless population, many of whom regularly inhabit the floodplain. The warning system is likely to be less effective for these special popula- tions than for most permanent Boulder residents. The city's buyout policy has been successful in removing some resi- dences from the floodplain. Although it has been an expensive and local- ized solution, it is a permanent one. Many at-risk buildings have been razed and the resulting land converted to playing fields for the local high school. The land was also designed to increase the flood conveyance of the property, thereby lowering the surrounding flood elevations. The greenways project is a multipurpose riparian park that contains a heavily used bike/walkway, parks throughout the city, a whitewater course, a restored stream habitat, fishing ponds, breakaway bridges, and, most importantly, a use of the floodplain that does not increase the exposure to property and life. On the other hand, the city of Boulder has taken . ... . . . secant chances In its own property management and owns many buildings in the floodplain. The Great Flood Summer had been slow in coming the year of the great Boulder Creek flood. Snowpack in the mountains was well above average and skiers were delighted, but rain persisted down on the front range and most folks were anxious for summer to begin. The three days before the flood were sunny and warm, and flooding was the last thing on most citizens' minds. City officials, though, had been nervous for several weeks because, as is usual for the late May/early Tune period, Barker Reservoir (18 miles above Boulder on Boulder Creek) was full, and water had been flowing over the dam spillway for weeks. Moisture levels were well above aver- age owing to the rapidly melting snow, high temperatures, and rain, and there was no room for excess water. Under these conditions a stalled rain storm 10 miles upstream from sunny Boulder was all it took to produce a flash flood. When the last great flood occurred in 1894, the hills in the canyon above town had been stripped of timber by miners and loggers, which contributed to the high runoff into the creek. Although trees had since grown back, increased housing, highways, and local roads offset some of the benefits of the reforestation. Such development caused water to run quickly off hillsides and roadways into the creek. Five inches of rain fell
52 Disasters by Design in less than four hours, with no sign of letting up. A creek that normally runs at 300 to 600 cfs, whose banks can handle 8,000 cfs during wet seasons, grew quickly to 12,500 cfs. At first, officials worried about the appropriate time to sound the alarms. The time required to warn the public of a flash flood in Boulder is longer than the time it takes a flood to form and reach the city. There- fore, the decision to announce an imminent flood and sound a warning must be made before enough rain has fallen to be sure that a flood will occur. On the one hand, Boulder officials feared losing credibility by sounding an unnecessary alarm; on the other, they feared not sounding an alarm soon enough for people to evacuate. They eventually did sound the alarm and 20 minutes later were sure they had made the right decision when reports from upstream indicated that a 12-foot wall of water had formed 9 miles up the canyon. Forty- five minutes later it arrived at the mouth of the canyon, inundating the city of Boulder. As the water careened down the canyon, many homes were ripped from their foundations and others were damaged beyond repair. The now-furious wall of water collected parts of trees and private- access bridges, debris from destroyed and damaged homes, yard equip- ment, cars, sheds, rocks, silt, and propane tanks full of gas. Although many city bridges were designed to break away on one side in the face of water pressure from a flood, the bridge on Broadway Avenue was a historical landmark. It was a low bridge not designed to break away, and debris and water backed up behind it. Because of this, more damage occurred behind the bridge than had been predicted. Fi- nally, the aging bridge gave way to the force and weight of the water and the debris behind it, sending a rush of concrete, debris, asphalt slabs, and more water than ever anticipated toward the high school and downtown neighborhoods. The water washed north and blanketed residential areas and parts of downtown. Hundreds of parked cars throughout town were picked up by the floodwaters, some to careen slowly and precariously down streets, others to be swept away by the stronger current and became half-ton torpedoes in the creek. The flood resulted in 30 deaths and hundreds of injuries. Half the deaths occurred in cars when people tried to cross flooded intersections. None realized that 18 inches of moving water can lift a car and carry it away. Economic damage was assessed at over $300 million, but that did not take into account the losses that could not be quantified, such as aesthetics, the sense of safety that many residents had permanently lost, psychological well-being, lost wages, and environmental degradation.
Scenarios of Sustainable Hazards Mitigation Sustainable Decisionmaking Processes and Cooperation 53 There was a silver lining, though, to this disaster. The flood was an "extraordinary moment," a wake-up call during which the citizens of Boulder were suddenly provided with a collective memory of a flash flood. The flood sparked imaginations and concerns and created a popu- lation far more willing to make long-term decisions for redevelopment in the floodplain that would result in a more flood-resilient community, to improve the city's warning system, to provide full-blown public educa- tion about floods, and to create detailed preflood plans. However, flood resiliency was just the tip of the iceberg; immedi- ately after the flood, the city began an assertive plan to link its disaster mitigation goals with its goals of ecological, social, and economic sustainability. A number of well-established Boulder County environ- mental citizens' groups had been generating public dialogue on the issue of sustainability long before the flood occurred. After the flood, they were sufficiently organized, educated, and enthusiastic to become infor mal consultants to the city. When word got out that the city was serious about addressing hazards, equity, power, growth, energy use, and diver- sity simultaneously, a wide variety of other local individuals and organi- zations volunteered their time and expertise to the undertaking. The city also hired local and outside experts in risk assessment, environmental problem solving, consensus building, conflict resolution, and educational outreach. The city was aided in this endeavor by the state and federal governments' new focus on facilitating local community commitment and capacity for undertaking innovative, collaborative, self-initiated, self- directed projects to increase resiliency and sustainability. The city of Boulder began by assessing its current condition in terms of hazards, quality of life, level of resource consumption, and carrying capacity. It also examined the potential alternatives to the status quo on a range of issues (beginning with flood and wildfire hazards, education, housing, transportation, growth, equity, and regional cooperation). Then there was an assessment of what was essential to the community, given current knowledge about its problems, risks, and alternatives. Each of these steps took time, not only because widespread public participation was important but also because it involved gathering, assimilating, and discussing a great deal of information. However, a new paradigm grew out of these initial assessments, as did strong, flexible local institutions with the ability to take action on issues affecting long-term sustainability. Various levels of cooperation were built by this new approach to
54 Disasters by Design Boulder's problems. Institutional ties and horizontal integration were developed among a variety of local organizations and between organiza- tions and local experts (professors, researchers, consultants, managers), students, nonactive citizens, and businesses. Also, ties and trust were increased between local organizations and the state and federal agencies that helped the city implement its plans. Citizens' organizations became equal partners with governmental officials in the decisionmaking process. The great flood and its resulting social disruption brought into stark relief the idea that social and environmental problems rarely respect political boundaries. Slowly, Boulder and the surrounding towns began working together on a variety of development, transportation, and edu- cational projects. Instead of each town being responsible for small parts of a creek, parcel of land, highway, or social problem, regional groups began to pool resources and responsibility and began thinking in terms of watersheds, ecosystems, communities, and regional quality of life goals. In time Boulder was able to make definitive plans about mitigation and sustainability goals, act on them, and continually monitor and evalu- ate the effectiveness of its actions. At first Boulder officials viewed the meetings at which their risks and alternatives were assessed as a way to accomplish a specific goal for example, to find out what to do about the flood hazard. However, they soon discovered not only that the pro- cedure had evolved into a beneficial social institution but that the con- tinual process of publicly assessing alternatives, priorities, and risks should never end because the contexts, facts, capacities, and commit- ments change with time. Boulder also found that examining alternative solutions to a wide variety of integrated community problems, with the participation of a wide variety of citizens, resulted in better, more appropriate plans, a higher degree of consensus, more public participation, enhanced com- munication, and a less polluted, less vulnerable, more efficiently run city. The city focused on long-term solutions to complex problems. It stopped trying to prioritize one risk and interest over another and instead focused on what it would take to create the kind of city and level of safety that residents desired in the long run. It was only through the long process of citizen participation in dis- cussions in which the assumptions, values, uncertainties, and tradeoffs were made explicit that the city was able to decide the extent to which the floodplain should be regulated. In most cases the city followed the precautionary principle, which advises that in the absence of absolute
Scenarios of Sustainable Hazards Mitigation 55 proof a strong hypothesis that catastrophic losses are possible should be enough to encourage conservative action. The floodplain was signifi- cantly widened, and the resulting watershed parks became catch basins for stormwater runoff a means to mitigate flooding as well as air pollu- tion, a wildlife corridor, a bird sanctuary, a place of serene beauty, hik- ing trails, and, in other cases, busy rollerblade parks, baseball diamonds, soccer fields, picnic areas, and community gardens. In addition, warning systems were improved through public education and by placing unob- trusive, highly reliable solar warning devices in neighborhoods, within earshot of most residents. Education The city began an aggressive educational program about floods for children in kindergarten through twelfth grade so that every local child would know about floodplain ecosystems, flood hazards, flood predic- tions, damage prevention, and warnings. Adults were educated by inno- vative, often interactive programs and information brochures sponsored by neighborhood organizations and city officials. A nationally hailed Interactive Urban Ecology Museum (with a focus on local social, eco- nomic, and natural systems, including a large interactive exhibit about floods) was built and staffed primarily by volunteers consisting of well- trained high school students, senior citizens, and scientists from the uni- versity and local branches of federal agencies. The museum attracted and educated tourists as well as locals and was a mode! for a movement to create similar local ecology museums in other cities. In the process of citywide education about flooding, many people began to realize that, as long as humans did not make themselves vuiner- able by developing the floodplain, floods had some very beneficial quali- ties! For example, flooding deposits rich silts that replenish topsoil in the floodplain (leading to bumper crops in the new community gardens of the floodplains. Large piles of silt deposited by the flood were redistrib- uted and used for topsoil, construction, and landfills, and local fly fishers found that fish communities flourished as a result of the flooding. The educational focus on community and water did not end with flooding and often spilled over into some interesting public policy. For example, in studying water, Boulderites also began to understand that they lived at the edge of the Colorado plains, an arid desert. Everyone was aware that in the summer there are regular water shortages in the city. Through the years, residents had also begun to hear more and more
56 Disasters by Design about water rights disputes, and the cost of bringing water to Boulder was increasing. In an effort to lower water use without lowering the quality of life, the city began by xeriscaping all of its own ornamental property. Gone were the out-of-control sprinklers watering the grassy medians (and the roads) at noon on a sunny day. Instead, beautiful rock gardens full of drought-resistant native plants, flowers, cacti, and herbs were designed. Seeing the possibilities and encouraged by the city, citi- zens soon got rid of their own water-intensive lawns in favor of elegant, functional, drought-resistant patios, decks, rock gardens, flower gardens, and other xeriscaped delights. Another example of innovative education was the new disaster miti- gation degree at the University of Colorado. This interdisciplinary degree brought together researchers, managers, and practitioners from engineer- ing, physical and social sciences, and policy studies to teach broad, holistic, comprehensive solutions to natural disaster problems. Fearful Afterthoughts The great flood was, in fact, fairly moderate. It could have occurred in the middle of the night, when most people would not have heard the sirens or radio and television warnings. It was a 100-year flood, but it could have been a 500- or 1,000-year flood. The Big Thompson flash flood of 1976, 40 miles north of Boulder, occurred under similar condi- tions, raised the water to 31,200 cfs, and killed 139 people. Such a flood is also possible in Boulder. A large truck or other obstruction could have fallen into the creek, causing water to be diverted from the creek channel onto, for example, Canyon Boulevard, swallowing areas that were never considered to be in danger of flooding. Barker Dam could have broken. It also could have been much worse if Boulder had not been as serious about flood mitigation as it had been for the few decades before the flood. In addition, Boulder has mostly high-technology industry, a high tax base, and a population with a higher than average education leve!- all of which probably helped in both pre- and postdisaster responses. Finally, of course, it could have been better. Much of the human life, social anguish, and monetary losses could have been minimized if more attention had been paid before the flood to floodplain management and sustainable development.
Scenarios of Sustainable Hazards Mitigation SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 57 San Francisco is one of the most publicized metropolitan earthquake risk zones in the world, largely because of the 1906 earthquake there- an 8.25-magnitude event on a segment of the San Andreas fault. After that quake, fires destroyed three-fifths of the city's housing and the en- tire business district, and thousands were left dead, injured, or homeless. While the downtown business district was well insured, some of the municipal bonds used to reconstruct public works were not paid off until the 1980s. A repeat of the 1906 event is estimated by seismologists to have a 2 percent chance of occurring between 1990 and 2020. An event of magnitude 7.0 on the San Andreas fault is estimated to have a 23 percent chance of occurring during the same period. But the combined probability of a major earthquake occurring before 2020 along one of the faults in the San Francisco Bay Area is estimated to be 67 percent. National and Local Shifts in Policy By the late l990s, natural disasters were beginning to be redefined as community-based problems that needed community-based solutions rather than unfortunate technological accidents or acts of God and nature. The nation's attention turned to disaster-resilient communities and sustainability. Many communities found innovative ways to miti- gate hazards by reevaluating growth, land management, risk equity, and financial decisions; some, such as San Francisco, did such things before disaster struck. The federal government played a key role in leading the nation's communities in this direction. Skyrocketing disaster recovery costs from increasingly frequent catastrophic events, combined with innovative lead- ership, helped agency leaders and Congress realize the many ways that the national government had historically encouraged unsustainability. They became unwilling to continue to foster unsustainable development in the nation's hazardous areas. The federal government took the bold bipartisan step of ending all subsidies to unsustainable endeavors (i.e., nonrenewable energy, building in hazardous areas, etc.), and began devel- oping incentives that would encourage sustainable choices. In addition, the President spoke bluntly, noting that the federal government was a resource for techniques, expertise, and financial support for redesigning the nation's infrastructure but was not a bank with an infinite credit line to underwrite unwise local decisions. The President promised federal
58 Disasters by Design assistance in achieving a national sustainability initiative, akin to the federal effort to "put a man on the moon." Federal and state governments began building a shared base of knowledge about sustainability and the long-term consequences of devel- opment and hazard and supported community projects to empower locals to make the needed cultural shift and to develop consensus. They found ways to disseminate technical information effectively and made plans to increase local commitment to and capacity for moving toward sustain- ability. Policies related to all hazards were integrated with policies for economic, social, and environmental objectives. Local communities and locally based branches of state and federal agencies were encouraged to develop innovative integrated plans for public investment and local resil- iency. Locales with well-known disasters in their past were quick to seek solutions because new federal policies limited federal disaster relief to humanitarian assistance if the stricken locale had no sustainable hazards . . . mitigation plan. The idea of integrated policies and sustainability (e.g., policy on housing density had to be linked to policies on urban transportation, social equity, environmental quality, and disaster safety) was not new to the city and county of San Francisco or to many of its citizens. Long- standing concern for the city's earthquake safety, the President's pro- nouncements, and leadership from the recently installed director for the sustainable mitigation directorate of the Federal Emergency Management Agency led San Francisco to shift from many small-scale, largely experi- mental sustainability projects to one integrated, politically powerful, regional investment in sustainability ideals and practices. San Francisco formed a partnership with other bay-area counties, private-sector stake- holders, technical and scientific experts, and federal and state agencies to plan and make decisions about the area's future. The aim was a commu- nity that was more economically vibrant, disaster resilient, equitable, environmentally sound, and livable. The city's first concern was to increase resiliency and quality of life for all citizens. Second, short-term gains that ignored long-term impacts and costs would no longer be tolerated. All city and regional policies were reviewed and revised to ensure that they did not subsidize or en- courage unsustainability. The new focus of development policy became the creation of healthy communities in the long term, rather than short- term economic growth for its own sake. The chief concerns became edu- cation; affordable housing; transportation; energy conservation; creating resilient social, economic, and energy systems; and environmental quality.
Scenarios of Sustainable Hazards Mitigation 59 Efforts were focused on accounting for the environmental and social costs of growth that were once hidden or externalized. Future resiliency against quakes as well as landslides, floods, and fires was a fundamental consideration in all policy decisions. In keeping with the requirements of the new federal Urban Environ- ment Act, the city created a Commission on the Environment to advise city boards; provide a centralized point of contact for environmental issues; regulate and enforce environmental standards; serve as a clearing- house on sustainability projects; promote scientific, technical, and com- mercial exchanges; and help create and review sustainability goals. Some of these goals were to have by the year 2025 a 35 percent reduction in energy use, 75 percent of all waste recycled, and a 30 percent reduction in direct and indirect earthquake losses as projected by the city's three computer-generated models. No one pretended that the solutions were easy. In most cases the city tried not to enforce changes without the deep support of local constitu- encies. There were many conflicts. In fact, major local and regional is- sues went unresolved for decades. But local, state, and federal initiatives continued to invest in the process of fair and informed negotiation, with- out losing sight of the goal of a sustainable future. Resilient Energy Systems One of the first major projects that San Francisco took on was less- ening its reliance on complex and highly centralized utility grids. It learned a lesson from the 1994 Northridge earthquake when 3.1 million customers lost electricity and close to 100,000 homes and businesses were without power for over 24 hours. San Francisco began supplement- ing or replacing utility-grid energy with localized solar, wind, biomass, and hydroelectric systems. Decentralized renewable energy systems are less vulnerable to large power outages and make a community more self- reliant after disasters. They also lessen the chances of loss of power because of blackouts, terrorism, malfunctions, or fuel embargoes. At first, some people balked at the initial expense of investing in disaster-resistant energy technologies. However, when the long-term costs of traditional energy were taken into account (including the cost of business disruptions following disasters, transmission and distribution, and environmental damage) and when the often-hidden benefits of the renewable energy system became part of the calculation (prevention of losses, shorter recovery time after disasters, lower operation costs, cleaner
60 Disasters by Design air) the critics realized that the cost of renewable energy was competitive. Adding to the competitiveness were new federal, state, and local policies that put an end to incentives that had steered development, financing, design, and construction of commercial buildings away from energy con- servation, quake resiliency, and contributions to quality of life. All new buildings were required to use some form of self-sufficient, renewable energy system, and owners of older buildings were encouraged to retrofit. General energy efficiency was also encouraged. Energy efficient windows which are less likely to break in earthquakes were installed in many buildings. Some innovative experiments were tried, including a large office building downtown that was redesigned so that excess heat from computers, lights, and air conditioning was redirected to a rooftop greenhouse. Organic vegetables were tended by volunteers and sold year- round to office workers on Fridays and to local residents every Saturday. Other downtown businesses formed partnerships to exchange their byproducts locally so that they could profit from each other's waste. City decisionmakers also tapped the job creation potential of the technologies used to implement environmental improvements: efficient lighting fix- tures, photovoltaic panels, solar cars, and fuel cells. With partners in Alameda County, they encouraged manufacturing and research firms to locate in Oakland and subsidized the sharing of old design prototypes with nonprofit organizations throughout the bay area. Resilient Transportation Systems Transportation was given close attention. It was agreed that housing, work, shopping, and recreational opportunities should be near each other and that inexpensive efficient transportation should link them. After studying the costs of various options, it was concluded that contrary to popular opinion the cost of transportation could be significantly reduced if communities were redesigned to give more choices to citizens bicycle paths, public transportation, and solar/electric cars. For example, a study in the 1990s that compared household automobile costs between a pedestrian-friendly section of northeast San Francisco and a more car- dependent suburban area found an annual difference of $13,000 between the two. City leaders concluded that rail systems, bikes, and smaller solar/ electric cars were a more sustainable form of transportation in earth- quake country, that they were safer than personal cars, and that they reduced air pollution. With the help of a progressive gasoline tax the city
Scenarios of Sustainable Hazards Mitigation 61 The 1994 earthquake in Northridge, California ruptured gas mains, sparking numerous fires. Photograph by David Butow. embarked on an ambitious transportation plan, including a fleet of solar/ electric city buses, hundreds of miles of bike and pedestrian paths, and an earthquake-proof light rail system (the city's cable car system, of course, was left as is). Not only did the changes in transportation free people from sitting in traffic, reduce traffic-related accidents (to car occupants and pedestrians), improve air quality, and increase neighbor- hood identity, it also lowered the chances of business losses in the after- math of a disaster and ensured that residents would have access to everyday necessities in the aftermath of a disaster without being endan- gered or inconvenienced. Related to transportation, a unified effort of the bay area counties also helped end urban sprang! and protect, once and for all, the bay area's Greenbelt, a broad band of open lands 3.75 million public and private acres that surrounds the cities and towns of the bay area. It is one of the largest and most productive systems of open space in any metropoli- tan area, providing recreation, plant and wildlife habitat, clean air and
62 Disasters by Design water, community identity, and agricultural output worth $1.2 billion annually. In the 1990s it was estimated that much of the land would be developed by the year 2020. Urban sprang! historically has been driven by the perception that costs are lower in outlying areas and that new communities do not have the problems (high taxes, crime, overcrowding) associated with urban areas. However, the costs of sprang! itself have often been unrecognized, de- ferred, externalized, and hard to quantify. In San Francisco, sprang! was creating a burden to be borne by future generations, by the environment, and by those who remained in the urban core. The cities and counties of the bay area successfully lobbied for changes in federal and state tax and transportation policies that had provided incentives for sprawl. By revi- talizing the urban core, communities met their needs by building on a fraction of the land. Consequently, much of the Greenbelt was still intact in 2020. The importance of "green space" was also incorporated into city planning. If developers, for example, were unable or unwilling to incorporate parks into their developments, they were taxed to ensure that parks could be built nearby. This ensured the existence of aesthetic natural areas for recreation and wildlife and would also serve as fire breaks after a future earthquake and provide places for neighbors to camp, close to their homes, during aftershocks. Community Prosperity and Resiliency Of course, the previously mentioned changes in energy systems and transportation were just two of the many changes that occurred in San Francisco. One of the most dramatic overarching changes was in eco- nomic priorities. While considering and debating long-term costs and benefits, people realized that many current indicators of community and economic well-being were inadequate and also inappropriate to sustain- ability. For example, the traditional measures of prosperity economic growth and employment levels do not reflect people's lives and aspira- tions and, in fact, increases in such indicators often reflect human tragedy. The economy and employment levels often grow in the short term as a result of devastating disasters, the destruction of old-growth forests or aquatic ecosystems, increases in pollution, layoffs of professional workers, shoddily made appliances that must be replaced frequently, and the replacement of low-income housing with urban penthouses. San Francisco wanted a broader definition of prosperity that included the value of natural resources, environmental protection, scenic beauty,
Scenarios of Sustainable Hazards Mitigation 63 education, literacy, safety, access to public lands, satisfaction with employment, health, earthquake resiliency, and the economic and social well-being of diverse future generations. One result of this new way of thinking was new federal policies, which began transferring costs traditionally covered by federal tax dol- lars and private citizens to businesses. These long-recognized indirect costs included ecological degradation, potential costs from hazards, and large-scale unemployment. The incentives for self-insurance, private insurance, and managing a comprehensive "risk portfolio" were funded through federal tax incentives and regional bond issues. The transition was deliberately slow and gradual to avoid economic turmoil. An un- precedented long-range plan shifted actual risks and associated costs to those producing the risks and costs. While San Francisco and the bay area were forging their long-term sustainability, other West Coast cities continued to decay from within; let unplanned and unsustainable growth continue; let the few take or spot! the social, ecological, and economic resources that belonged to the community; and ignored the consequences of poverty, vulnerability, and ecological ruin. San Francisco had become a strong, disaster-resilient community, capable not only of providing most of its citizens with a safe, high-quality way of life with little ecological impact but also of exporting sustainable values, techniques, know-how, and technology to other interested cities around the world. And then the ground under San Francisco began to shake violently.... SUSTAINABILITY AND HAZARDS MITIGATION The three scenarios in this chapter are a request to stop viewing natural disasters as isolated problems. The Miami scenario focuses on two root causes of disaster: historical ecological destruction and lack of investment in social capital. The Boulder scenario focuses on two ways of addressing the process of change: innovative decisionmaking and edu- cation. The San Francisco story focuses on creating more resilient life- lines by looking at two systems: energy and transportation. No one would argue that a transition toward sustainable hazards mitigation is easy or that any one person has all of the answers. True sustainability is both a process and a goal, and many of the most impor- tant changes that need to be made are not immediately fathomable. The process of transforming the future requires open-minded debate; full public participation; a willingness to experiment, learn, fine-tune, and
64 Disasters by Design alter; and a consensus among stakeholders to stand behind their shared commitment to the goal. Many disaster vuinerabilities can be addressed with existing tools and information, given a commitment to solving the problem. Disaster- resilient communities are built with the same building blocks that create resiliency to other social and environmental problems. Until people are ready to address the interdependent root causes of disasters and to do the difficult work of coming to negotiated consensus about which losses are acceptable, which are unacceptable, and what type of action to take, our nation's communities will continue on a path toward ever-larger natural catastrophes.
