Chapter 899 - Evidence

Sec. 52-144. Form of subpoena. The form of a subpoena may be as follows:

To A. B. and C. D. of ....:

By authority of the state of Connecticut, you are hereby commanded to appear before the .... court, to be held at .... on the .... day of .... or to such day thereafter and within sixty days hereof on which the action is legally to be tried, to testify what you know in a certain civil action pending in the court, between E. F. of H., plaintiff, and G. A. of M., defendant.

Hereof fail not, under penalty of the law.

To any proper officer or indifferent person to serve and return.

Dated at H., etc.

J. K., (title of officer authorized to sign subpoena).

(1949 Rev., S. 7867; 1955, S. 3151d; P.A. 79-6; P.A. 82-160, S. 60.)

History: P.A. 79-6 required appearance within 60 rather than 30 days after subpoena; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.

Cited. 12 CA 364.

Sec. 52-145. Certain witnesses not disqualified. Credibility. (a) A person shall not be disqualified as a witness in any action because of, (1) his interest in the outcome of the action as a party or otherwise, (2) his disbelief in the existence of a supreme being, or (3) his conviction of crime.

(b) A person's interest in the outcome of the action or his conviction of crime may be shown for the purpose of affecting his credibility.

(1949 Rev., S. 7868; P.A. 82-160, S. 61.)

History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators.

Wife may testify for husband. 3 D. 57; 20 C. 354. The conviction must be of an infamous crime; a petty offense is not sufficient. 57 C. 432; 104 C. 124. Record of a judgment of conviction vacated by appeal is insufficient. 57 C. 432. Cited. 58 C. 64. Particular instances of untruthfulness inadmissible to affect credit of witness. 72 C. 204. Attorney trying case cannot ordinarily be witness therein; Id., 437; 80 C. 531; 81 C. 350; otherwise, if he is also a party; 68 C. 206; 85 C. 211; and he may be called by adverse party. 81 C. 344. Insolvent debtor may testify as to knowledge of insolvency when transfer was made. 75 C. 17. Incapacity to manage his affairs does not disqualify witness. 76 C. 406. Where accused becomes witness for himself, usual rules as to attacking credit apply. 67 C. 290; 76 C. 94; 87 C. 22; 89 C. 417. Evidence of arrest alone not sufficient. 76 C. 92; 86 C. 262. Party to action is ordinarily competent. 79 C. 478. Members of a commission may testify as to proceedings before it; 75 C. 248; 76 C. 567; so judge, as to claims of law made on trial. 82 C. 51. Evidence that witness has incurred expenses which he must pay if party producing him loses is admissible. 74 C. 555. Nature of crimes conviction of which may be shown. 95 C. 501; 104 C. 124; Id., 264; 106 C. 350. When a child is competent. 100 C. 570. Improper reference to statute held cured by instruction of judge. 108 C. 192. Statement of witness that he has scruples against taking oath must be taken as true; belief in supreme being does not destroy witness's right to take affirmation instead of oath. 109 C. 712. Purpose of statute to remove common law disqualification of witness because of conviction of crime. 121 C. 678. For purpose of affecting credibility, conviction of crime may be shown by questions on cross-examination. Id.; 132 C. 574, overruling 72 C. 205 and 97 C. 452. Owner is competent witness to location of bounds and occupancy of own land when within his personal knowledge. 125 C. 333. Where plaintiff administrator was questioned on direct as to decedent's health and financial standing, question on cross as to whether he expected to share in recovery in case was proper. 131 C. 515. Cited. 136 C. 106. Fact that conviction was 10 years before went to weight, not to admissibility. 137 C. 140. Conviction of Sec. 53-246 “intoxication” is not infamous crime to attack credibility of a witness. 140 C. 39. Cited. 149 C. 125. A plea of guilty by one of several persons charged with a crime can be no more than hearsay as to others so charged; therefore, while the plea may be used to attack the credibility of the one so pleading if he testifies as a witness for or against the others, it is not admissible on the trial of the others to establish that the crime was committed. 150 C. 195. The conviction of a crime, whether or not denominated a felony by statute, is admissible in evidence to affect credibility under section only if the maximum permissible penalty for the crime may be imprisonment for more than 1 year, and the presence or absence of moral turpitude is not a consideration affecting admissibility. 152 C. 472. Where defendant chose to take stand on his own behalf, question on cross-examination as to prior conviction was properly asked of him in his capacity as a witness, but court does not consider whether defendant could raise his constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. 153 C. 30. Use of defendant's answer, over his objection, in second part of information, brought under habitual criminal statute, was a violation of his constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Id., 34, 35. Cited. Id., 208; 154 C. 68, 74. Writ, summons and complaint in another action brought by plaintiff admissible to affect credibility insofar as testimony in present action is inconsistent with prior claim; on redirect, plaintiff should be allowed to show extent of his knowledge of allegations in prior writ. 155 C. 197. Cited. 158 C. 156. Where statement of witness was offered to show bias against defendant, it was properly excluded where it related to criminal activity of witness for which he had not been convicted. Id., 536. Judge's discretion to exclude evidence as prejudicial. 160 C. 47. Court's instructions to jury as to historic common law background and purpose of statute does not raise any federal constitutional questions. Id., 171, 175. Cited. Id., 378. Impeachment of witness on the basis of misconduct accomplished only by proof of felony convictions; specific acts of misconduct to show lack of veracity cannot be shown by extrinsic evidence. 164 C. 145. Cited. 165 C. 559; 166 C. 226, 230. Credibility of a witness may be impeached by proof of convictions of crimes for which imprisonment may be more than 1 year. 167 C. 539. Cited. 182 C. 207; 185 C. 372; 186 C. 654; 187 C. 513; 188 C. 259; Id., 515; 189 C. 631; 190 C. 20. Prudent course where trial court faced with decision on admission as evidence of credibility prior convictions for crimes not directly reflecting on credibility is to allow prosecution to mention that defendant was convicted of unspecified crime or crimes carrying a penalty of more than 1 year. 194 C. 1. Cited. Id., 297. Where a prior charge resulted in a determination that defendant was a youthful offender and not in a criminal conviction, it was not admissible for impeachment purposes under statute. 196 C. 122, 128. Cited. 198 C. 273; Id., 454; 199 C. 255; 201 C. 74; 202 C. 224; 210 C. 359; 211 C. 555; 227 C. 389; Id., 417; Id., 711; 228 C. 412. Trial court abused discretion in barring evidence of victim's prior felony conviction for larceny since outcome of case depended upon relative credibility of victim and defendant, and state was allowed to impeach credibility of defendant with a prior felony conviction. 245 C. 351.

Cited. 3 CA 459; Id., 684; 6 CA 189; 7 CA 217; Id., 377; Id., 445, 451; Id., 601; 10 CA 71; 16 CA 346; 20 CA 6; 22 CA 610; 23 CA 479; Id., 692; 26 CA 157; Id., 758; 27 CA 279; 32 CA 773; 34 CA 823; 37 CA 722; 38 CA 815; 40 CA 151; 42 CA 810; 44 CA 280; Id., 790; 45 CA 390; 46 CA 285.

Credit of witness may not be attacked by showing his conviction of a crime which is not infamous, that is, for which maximum penalty cannot be more than 6 months in jail. 23 CS 294. Cited. 33 CS 586; 36 CS 89.

Conviction of crime of trespass inadmissible under statute. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 391. Any question about previous arrests is improper because statute allows questions about convictions only in establishing credibility and reputation of witness. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 441.

Sec. 52-146. Wife as a witness against her husband. A wife may be compelled to testify in any action brought against her husband for necessaries furnished her while living apart from him.

(1949 Rev., S. 7869.)

Cited. 190 C. 813; 211 C. 555.

Statute applies only when agreement does not specify time within which award must be rendered. 80 CA 1.

Sec. 52-146a. Transferred to Sec. 52-146d.

Sec. 52-146b. Privileged communications made to clergymen. A clergyman, priest, minister, rabbi or practitioner of any religious denomination accredited by the religious body to which he belongs who is settled in the work of the ministry shall not disclose confidential communications made to him in his professional capacity in any civil or criminal case or proceedings preliminary thereto, or in any legislative or administrative proceeding, unless the person making the confidential communication waives such privilege herein provided.

(1967, P.A. 826.)

“Priest-penitent” privilege found waived where defendant testified as to what he told priest and conversation did not relate to religious or spiritual advice, aid or comfort. 171 C. 586. Cited. 211 C. 555. Clergy-penitent privilege did not exist at common law and is a creature of statute; to establish privilege, defendant must demonstrate that there was a communication, the communication was confidential, it was made to a member of the clergy within the meaning of section, communication was made to clergy member in his or her professional capacity, the disclosure was sought as part of a criminal or civil case, and defendant did not waive the privilege; in this case, defendant lacked a reasonable expectation that his inculpatory statements would be held in confidence. 300 C. 590.

Sec. 52-146c. Privileged communications between psychologist and patient. (a) As used in this section:

(1) “Person” means an individual who consults a psychologist for purposes of diagnosis or treatment;

(2) “Psychologist” means an individual licensed to practice psychology pursuant to chapter 383;

(3) “Communications” means all oral and written communications and records thereof relating to the diagnosis and treatment of a person between such person and a psychologist or between a member of such person's family and a psychologist;

(4) “Consent” means consent given in writing by the person or his authorized representative;

(5) “Authorized representative” means (A) an individual empowered by a person to assert the confidentiality of communications which are privileged under this section, or (B) if a person is deceased, his personal representative or next of kin, or (C) if a person is incompetent to assert or waive his privileges hereunder, (i) a guardian or conservator who has been or is appointed to act for the person, or (ii) for the purpose of maintaining confidentiality until a guardian or conservator is appointed, the person's nearest relative.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, in civil and criminal actions, in juvenile, probate, commitment and arbitration proceedings, in proceedings preliminary to such actions or proceedings, and in legislative and administrative proceedings, all communications shall be privileged and a psychologist shall not disclose any such communications unless the person or his authorized representative consents to waive the privilege and allow such disclosure. The person or his authorized representative may withdraw any consent given under the provisions of this section at any time in a writing addressed to the individual with whom or the office in which the original consent was filed. The withdrawal of consent shall not affect communications disclosed prior to notice of the withdrawal.

(1) If a judge finds that any person after having been informed that the communications would not be privileged, has made the communications to a psychologist in the course of a psychological examination ordered by the court, provided the communications shall be admissible only on issues involving the person's psychological condition;

(2) If, in a civil proceeding, a person introduces his psychological condition as an element of his claim or defense or, after a person's death, his condition is introduced by a party claiming or defending through or as a beneficiary of the person, and the judge finds that it is more important to the interests of justice that the communications be disclosed than that the relationship between the person and psychologist be protected;

(3) If the psychologist believes in good faith that there is risk of imminent personal injury to the person or to other individuals or risk of imminent injury to the property of other individuals;

(4) If child abuse, abuse of an elderly individual or abuse of an individual who is disabled or incompetent is known or in good faith suspected;

(5) If a psychologist makes a claim for collection of fees for services rendered, the name and address of the person and the amount of the fees may be disclosed to individuals or agencies involved in such collection, provided notification that such disclosure will be made is sent, in writing, to the person not less than thirty days prior to such disclosure. In cases where a dispute arises over the fees or claims or where additional information is needed to substantiate the claim, the disclosure of further information shall be limited to the following: (A) That the person was in fact receiving psychological services, (B) the dates of such services, and (C) a general description of the types of services; or

(6) If the communications are disclosed to a member of the immediate family or legal representative of the victim of a homicide committed by the person where such person has, on or after July 1, 1989, been found not guilty of such offense by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to section 53a-13, provided such family member or legal representative requests the disclosure of such communications not later than six years after such finding, and provided further, such communications shall only be available during the pendency of, and for use in, a civil action relating to such person found not guilty pursuant to section 53a-13.

(1969, P.A. 597, S. 13; P.A. 82-160, S. 63; P.A. 89-154, S. 1; P.A. 92-225, S. 3, 5.)

History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators; P.A. 89-154 amended Subsec. (a) to redefine “person” and to add the definitions of “psychologist”, “communications”, “consent”, and “authorized representative”, amended Subsec. (b) to rephrase its provisions, to extend the prohibition on disclosure to “juvenile, probate, commitment and arbitration proceedings”, and to add provisions re the manner and effect of a withdrawal of consent, and amended Subsec. (c) to replace the introductory provision that “Relevant communications under this section shall not be privileged” with “Consent of the person shall not be required for the disclosure of such person's communications”, deleting reference to a “clinical” psychologist in Subsec. (c)(1) and adding Subsecs. (c)(3) to (5), inclusive, re exceptions when there is risk of imminent injury to person or property, when abuse is known or suspected, and when claim is made for collection of fees for services rendered; P.A. 92-225 added Subsec. (c)(6) re exception when communications are disclosed under limited circumstances to the immediate family or legal representative of certain homicide victims.

Cited. 191 C. 453; 203 C. 641. Erroneous denial of psychiatrist-patient privilege does not infringe upon right of any person other than the one to whom the privilege is given. 208 C. 683. Cited. 211 C. 555.

Cited. 18 CA 273; 23 CA 98; Id., 330; 24 CA 287. Court did not violate statute by ordering disclosure of substance abuse and psychiatric treatment records of parents in case involving termination of their parental rights. 48 CA 563.

Sec. 52-146d. (Formerly Sec. 52-146a). Privileged communications between psychiatric mental health provider and patient. Definitions. As used in sections 52-146d to 52-146i, inclusive:

(1) “Authorized representative” means (A) a person empowered by a patient to assert the confidentiality of communications or records which are privileged under sections 52-146c to 52-146i, inclusive, or (B) if a patient is deceased, his or her personal representative or next of kin, or (C) if a patient is incompetent to assert or waive his privileges hereunder, (i) a guardian or conservator who has been or is appointed to act for the patient, or (ii) for the purpose of maintaining confidentiality until a guardian or conservator is appointed, the patient's nearest relative;

(2) “Communications and records” means all oral and written communications and records thereof relating to diagnosis or treatment of a patient's mental condition between the patient and a psychiatric mental health provider, or between a member of the patient's family and a psychiatric mental health provider, or between any of such persons and a person participating under the supervision of a psychiatric mental health provider in the accomplishment of the objectives of diagnosis and treatment, wherever made, including communications and records which occur in or are prepared at a mental health facility;

(3) “Consent” means consent given in writing by the patient or his authorized representative;

(4) “Identifiable” and “identify a patient” refer to communications and records which contain (A) names or other descriptive data from which a person acquainted with the patient might reasonably recognize the patient as the person referred to, or (B) codes or numbers which are in general use outside of the mental health facility which prepared the communications and records;

(5) “Mental health facility” includes any hospital, clinic, ward, psychiatric mental health provider's office or other facility, public or private, which provides inpatient or outpatient service, in whole or in part, relating to the diagnosis or treatment of a patient's mental condition;

(6) “Patient” means a person who communicates with or is treated by a psychiatric mental health provider in diagnosis or treatment;

(7) “Psychiatric mental health provider” means a physician specializing in psychiatry and licensed under the provisions of sections 20-9 to 20-12, inclusive, an advanced practice registered nurse licensed under chapter 378 who is board certified as a psychiatric mental health provider by the American Nurses Credentialing Center, a person licensed to practice medicine who devotes a substantial portion of his or her time to the practice of psychiatry or a person reasonably believed by the patient to be so qualified.

(1961, P.A. 529; 1969, P.A. 819, S. 1; P.A. 75-567, S. 36, 80; P.A. 82-160, S. 64; P.A. 89-154, S. 2; P.A. 19-98, S. 24.)

History: 1969 act deleted detailed provisions re privileged communications and added definitions of “consent”, “communications and records”, “mental health facility” and records which “identify” or are “identifiable”; Sec. 52-146a transferred to Sec. 52-146d in the 1969 Supplement to the General Statutes; P.A. 75-567 applied definitions to Secs. “52-146c to 52-146i” rather than to Secs. “52-146d to 52-146j”; P.A. 82-160 alphabetized the defined terms and inserted Subdiv. indicators; P.A. 89-154 applied definitions to Secs. “52-146d to 52-146i” rather than to Secs. “52-146c to 52-146i”; P.A. 19-98 replaced references to psychiatrist with references to psychiatric mental health provider, amended Subdiv. (7) to replace provisions defining psychiatrist with provisions defining psychiatric mental health provider, and made technical changes.

Case decided before effective date of statute. 150 C. 689. Cited. 152 C. 510, 512. Psychiatrist-patient privilege does not extend to records relative to drug-dependency treatment. 169 C. 223. Psychiatric-patient privilege not waived and testimony of psychiatrist hired by state, but not as a result of court order, held inadmissible. 178 C. 626. Purpose of statutory privilege is to protect a therapeutic relationship; communications that bear no relationship to the purpose for which privilege was enacted are admissible subject to normal rules of evidence. 190 C. 813. Cited. 191 C. 453; 199 C. 693; 201 C. 211; 203 C. 641; 208 C. 365; Id., 683; 211 C. 555; 212 C. 50; 217 C. 243; 218 C. 85; 219 C. 314; 223 C. 450; 225 C. 700; Id., 450; 228 C. 1; 235 C. 185; 236 C. 625; 238 C. 313. Statute reflects public policy against suit by patient's former spouse. 250 C. 86. Evidence of conversation between defendant and third party overheard by mental health worker not protected by privilege provided for under section. 254 C. 694. Medical and dental records created during a patient's inpatient treatment at a mental health facility are mental health records exempt from disclosure under Sec. 52-146e. 318 C. 769.

Cited. 1 CA 384; 14 CA 552; 19 CA 304; 24 CA 287; 25 CA 653; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52; 30 CA 839; 33 CA 253; Id., 647; 35 CA 94; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 185. Subdiv. (2): Communications and records relating to diagnosis and treatment of an alcohol-related disorder falls within ambit of a “mental condition”; phrase “including communications and records which occur in or are prepared at a mental health facility” interpreted as an illustrative application of phrase “wherever made”, not as a limitation on its scope; therefore, trial court improperly concluded that plaintiff was required to establish that treatment facility located in Maine was a mental health facility as defined in Subdiv. (5) as a condition precedent to invocation of statutory psychiatrist-patient privilege. 54 CA 663. Nursing assessment containing consent form in which defendant consented to “mental health assessment and treatment” and conducted by nurse under supervision of psychiatrist is a mental health record that is privileged under Secs. 52-146d to 52-146f. 73 CA 150.

Cited. 28 CS 57.

Sec. 52-146e. Disclosure of communications. (a) All communications and records as defined in section 52-146d shall be confidential and shall be subject to the provisions of sections 52-146d to 52-146j, inclusive. Except as provided in sections 52-146f to 52-146i, inclusive, no person may disclose or transmit any communications and records or the substance or any part or any resume thereof which identify a patient to any person, corporation or governmental agency without the consent of the patient or his authorized representative.

(b) Any consent given to waive the confidentiality shall specify to what person or agency the information is to be disclosed and to what use it will be put. Each patient shall be informed that his refusal to grant consent will not jeopardize his right to obtain present or future treatment except where disclosure of the communications and records is necessary for the treatment.

(c) The patient or his authorized representative may withdraw any consent given under the provisions of this section at any time in a writing addressed to the person or office in which the original consent was filed. Withdrawal of consent shall not affect communications or records disclosed prior to notice of the withdrawal.

(1969, P.A. 819, S. 2, 3; P.A. 82-160, S. 65.)

History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased and reorganized section.

Cited. 169 C. 223. Psychiatrist-patient privilege not waived and testimony of psychiatrist hired by state, but not as a result of court order, held inadmissible. 178 C. 626. Cited. 190 C. 813; 191 C. 453; 192 C. 166; 197 C. 326; 199 C. 693. Before privilege is applied, court should conduct voir dire for purpose of determining existence of impeaching evidence in order to protect constitutional right of confrontation. 201 C. 211. Cited. Id., 244; 205 C. 386; 211 C. 555; 212 C. 50; 217 C. 243; 218 C. 85; 221 C. 447; 223 C. 450; 225 C. 450; Id., 700; 228 C. 1; 230 C. 43; 235 C. 185; Id., 595; 236 C. 514; Id., 625; 238 C. 313; 242 C. 666. Statute reflects public policy against suit by patient's former spouse. 250 CA 86. Legislative intent was not to give courts discretion to override privileged communication. 254 C. 321. Broad sweep of statute covers not only disclosure to defendant or his counsel, but also disclosure to a court even for the limited purpose of an in camera examination; section does not impose an obligation on the holder of privilege to state expressly to whom the records cannot be disclosed, rather, statute indicates that the holder of privilege must state in writing to whom the documents may be disclosed and for what purpose; there is no authority to support the proposition that defendant has a right, even when the complaining witness' credibility is central to the case, to have her confidential records produced directly to him. 289 C. 411. Medical and dental records created by an inpatient mental health facility during the treatment of a patient are exempt from disclosure under section. 318 C. 769. A trial court, in certain circumstances, may be constitutionally required to review in camera privileged psychiatric records of a homicide victim to determine whether information contained therein supports accused's claim of self-defense, provided the accused first demonstrates a compelling need for the privileged records, predicated on the relevance of the records to the self-defense claim, the potential significance of the records in establishing that defense, and the unavailability of alternative sources of information. 326 C. 742.

Psychiatric patient privilege and defendant's right to confrontation discussed. 1 CA 384. Cited. 8 CA 216; 10 CA 103. Psychiatrist-patient privilege cannot be overridden by provisions of Sec. 19a-14(a)(10). 14 CA 552. Cited. 15 CA 222; 17 CA 174; 18 CA 273; 19 CA 304; 20 CA 101; 24 CA 287; 25 CA 653; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52; 30 CA 839; 33 CA 253; Id., 647; 35 CA 94; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 185. Need for information to institute claim creates compelling countervailing interest that requires disclosure of limited information. 50 CA 694. Cited. 52 CA 408.

Sec. 52-146f. Consent not required for disclosure, when. Consent of the patient shall not be required for the disclosure or transmission of communications or records of the patient in the following situations as specifically limited:

(1) Communications or records may be disclosed to other persons engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of the patient or may be transmitted to another mental health facility to which the patient is admitted for diagnosis or treatment if the psychiatric mental health provider in possession of the communications or records determines that the disclosure or transmission is needed to accomplish the objectives of diagnosis or treatment. The patient shall be informed that the communications or records will be so disclosed or transmitted. For purposes of this subsection, persons in professional training are to be considered as engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of the patients.

(2) Communications or records may be disclosed when the psychiatric mental health provider determines that there is substantial risk of imminent physical injury by the patient to himself or others or when a psychiatric mental health provider, in the course of diagnosis or treatment of the patient, finds it necessary to disclose the communications or records for the purpose of placing the patient in a mental health facility, by certification, commitment or otherwise, provided the provisions of sections 52-146d to 52-146j, inclusive, shall continue in effect after the patient is in the facility.

(3) Except as provided in section 17b-225, the name, address and fees for psychiatric services to a patient may be disclosed to individuals or agencies involved in the collection of fees for such services. In cases where a dispute arises over the fees or claims or where additional information is needed to substantiate the fee or claim, the disclosure of further information shall be limited to the following: (A) That the person was in fact a patient; (B) the diagnosis; (C) the dates and duration of treatment; and (D) a general description of the treatment, which shall include evidence that a treatment plan exists and has been carried out and evidence to substantiate the necessity for admission and length of stay in a health care institution or facility. If further information is required, the party seeking the information shall proceed in the same manner provided for hospital patients in section 4-105.

(4) Communications made to or records made by a psychiatric mental health provider in the course of a psychiatric examination ordered by a court or made in connection with the application for the appointment of a conservator by the Probate Court for good cause shown may be disclosed at judicial or administrative proceedings in which the patient is a party, or in which the question of his incompetence because of mental illness is an issue, or in appropriate pretrial proceedings, provided the court finds that the patient has been informed before making the communications that any communications will not be confidential and provided the communications shall be admissible only on issues involving the patient's mental condition.

(5) Communications or records may be disclosed in a civil proceeding in which the patient introduces his mental condition as an element of his claim or defense, or, after the patient's death, when his condition is introduced by a party claiming or defending through or as a beneficiary of the patient and the court or judge finds that it is more important to the interests of justice that the communications be disclosed than that the relationship between patient and psychiatric mental health provider be protected.

(6) Communications or records may be disclosed to (A) the Commissioner of Public Health in connection with any inspection, investigation or examination of an institution, as defined in subsection (a) of section 19a-490, authorized under section 19a-498, or (B) the Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services in connection with any inspection, investigation or examination authorized under subsection (f) of section 17a-451.

(7) Communications or records may be disclosed to a member of the immediate family or legal representative of the victim of a homicide committed by the patient where such patient has, on or after July 1, 1989, been found not guilty of such offense by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to section 53a-13, provided such family member or legal representative requests the disclosure of such communications or records not later than six years after such finding, and provided further, such communications shall only be available during the pendency of, and for use in, a civil action relating to such person found not guilty pursuant to section 53a-13.

(8) If a provider of behavioral health services that contracts with the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services requests payment, the name and address of the person, a general description of the types of services provided, and the amount requested shall be disclosed to the department, provided notification that such disclosure will be made is sent, in writing, to the person at the earliest opportunity prior to such disclosure. In cases where a dispute arises over the fees or claims, or where additional information is needed to substantiate the claim, the disclosure of further information shall be limited to additional information necessary to clarify only the following: (A) That the person in fact received the behavioral health services in question, (B) the dates of such services, and (C) a general description of the types of services. Information the department receives pursuant to this subdivision shall be disclosed only to federal or state auditors and only as necessary for the purposes of auditing.

(1969, P.A. 819, S. 4; 1971, P.A. 81; P.A. 74-215, S. 2, 3; P.A. 82-160, S. 66; P.A. 84-26, S. 3; P.A. 92-225, S. 4, 5; P.A. 93-381, S. 9, 39; P.A. 95-257, S. 12, 21, 58; June 18 Sp. Sess. P.A. 97-8, S. 82, 88; P.A. 99-178, S. 1; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2, S. 21; P.A. 19-98, S. 25.)

History: 1971 act amended Subsec. (d) to allow disclosure of communications made or records in connection with applications for appointment of conservator by probate court and to allow disclosures in proceedings where question of incompetence because of mental illness is an issue; P.A. 74-215 amended Subsec. (c) to add exception re Sec. 17-295c and to place specific limits on disclosure of further information replacing generally stated provision which had allowed disclosure of “only such additional information as is needed to substantiate the fee or claim”; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section, replaced alphabetic Subsec. indicators with numeric indicators and replaced numeric Subdiv. indicators with alphabetic indicators; P.A. 84-26 added Subsec. (6) re the disclosure of records pursuant to a department of health services inspection, investigation or examination of a health care institution; P.A. 92-225 added Subsec. (7) re the disclosure under limited circumstances to the immediate family or legal representative of certain homicide victims; P.A. 93-381 substituted commissioner and department of public health and addiction services for commissioner and department of health services, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 95-257 replaced Commissioner and Department of Public Health and Addiction Services with Commissioner and Department of Public Health, effective July 1, 1995; June 18 Sp. Sess. P.A. 97-8 added new Subdiv. (8) re disclosure by providers of behavioral health services, effective July 1, 1997; P.A. 99-178 added Subdiv. (6)(B) re disclosure to Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services under Sec. 17a-451(f); June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 amended Subdiv. (8) by replacing “not less than thirty days” with “at the earliest opportunity”; P.A. 19-98 amended Subdivs. (1), (2), (4) and (5) by replacing “psychiatrist” with “psychiatric mental health provider”.

Cited. 169 C. 223; 172 C. 22. Psychiatrist-patient privilege not waived and testimony of psychiatrist hired by state, but not as a result of court order, held inadmissible. 178 C. 626. Cited. 190 C. 813; 191 C. 453; 201 C. 517; 211 C. 555; 231 C. 922; 235 C. 185; 236 C. 625; 238 C. 313. Statute reflects public policy against suit by patient's former spouse. 250 CA 86.

Cited. 1 CA 384; 19 CA 304; 24 CA 287; 30 CA 839; 35 CA 94; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 185. Disclosure of patient's name, address and Social Security number not precluded when purpose is to bring suit against patient for assault and battery. 50 CA 654.

Cited. 44 CS 468.

Subdiv. (5):

Legislature did not intend to authorize a subrogee to obtain a subrogor's confidential psychiatric records in a subrogation action wherein subrogor is not a party; judgment of Appellate Court in 35 CA 94 reversed. 235 C. 185.

Subdiv. (6):

Does not apply to investigations of individual psychiatrists. 14 CA 552.

Sec. 52-146g. Access to communications and records by persons engaged in research. (a) A person engaged in research may have access to psychiatric communications and records which identify patients where needed for such research, if such person's research plan is first submitted to and approved by the director of the mental health facility or his designee.

(b) The communications and records shall not be removed from the mental health facility which prepared them. Coded data or data which does not identify a patient may be removed from a mental health facility, provided the key to the code shall remain on the premises of the facility.

(c) The mental health facility and the person doing the research shall be responsible for the preservation of the anonymity of the patients and shall not disseminate data which identifies a patient except as provided by sections 52-146d to 52-146j, inclusive.

(1969, P.A. 819, S. 5; P.A. 82-160, S. 67.)

History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators.

Cited. 1 CA 384; 14 CA 552; 19 CA 304; 24 CA 287.

Sec. 52-146h. Transfer of information to Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services. Storage of records and communications. (a) Any facility or individual under contract with the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services to provide behavioral health services shall transmit information and records, if requested, to the Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services pursuant to his obligation under section 17a-451 to maintain the overall responsibility for the care and treatment of persons with psychiatric disorders or substance use disorders. The Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services may collect and use the information and records for administration, planning or research, subject to the provisions of section 52-146g. The Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services may enter into contracts within the state and into interstate compacts for the efficient storage and retrieval of the information and records.

(b) Identifiable data shall be removed from all information and records before issuance from the individual or facility which prepared them, and a code, the key to which shall remain in possession of the issuing facility and be otherwise available only to the Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services for purposes of planning, administration or research, shall be the exclusive means of identifying patients. The key to the code shall not be available to any data banks in which the information is stored or to any other persons, corporations or agencies, private or governmental.

(1969, P.A. 819, S. 6; P.A. 82-160, S. 68; P.A. 95-257, S. 11, 13, 58; June 18 Sp. Sess. P.A. 97-8, S. 31, 88.)

History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators; P.A. 95-257 replaced Commissioner, Department and Board of Mental Health with Commissioner, Department and Board of Mental Health and Addiction Services, effective July 1, 1995; June 18 Sp. Sess. P.A. 97-8 amended Subsec. (a) to apply section to individuals under contract with the department to provide behavioral health services, to delete provision re approval of Board of Mental Health and Addiction Services and to replace reference to the mentally ill with reference to persons with psychiatric or substance abuse disorders and amended Subsec. (b) to change “mental health facility” to “individual or facility”, effective July 1, 1997.

Cited. 169 C. 223. Psychiatrist-patient privilege not waived and the testimony of psychiatrist hired by state, but not as a result of court order, held inadmissible. 178 C. 626. Cited. 191 C. 453; 211 C. 555; 236 C. 625; 238 C. 313.

Cited. 1 CA 384; 14 CA 552; 19 CA 304; 24 CA 287.

Sec. 52-146i. Labeling of confidential records. All written communications or records disclosed to another person or agency shall bear the following statement: “The confidentiality of this record is required under chapter 899 of the Connecticut general statutes. This material shall not be transmitted to anyone without written consent or other authorization as provided in the aforementioned statutes.” A copy of the consent form specifying to whom and for what specific use the communication or record is transmitted or a statement setting forth any other statutory authorization for transmittal and the limitations imposed thereon shall accompany such communication or record. In cases where the disclosure is made orally, the person disclosing the information shall inform the recipient that such information is governed by the provisions of sections 52-146d to 52-146j, inclusive.

(1969, P.A. 819, S. 7.)

Cited. 1 CA 384; 14 CA 552; 19 CA 304; 24 CA 287.

Sec. 52-146j. Judicial relief. (a) Any person aggrieved by a violation of sections 52-146d to 52-146j, inclusive, may petition the superior court for the judicial district in which he resides, or, in the case of a nonresident of the state, the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford, for appropriate relief, including temporary and permanent injunctions, and the petition shall be privileged with respect to assignment for trial.

(b) Any person aggrieved by a violation of sections 52-146d to 52-146j, inclusive, may prove a cause of action for civil damages.

(1969, P.A. 819, S. 8; P.A. 78-280, S. 2, 6, 127; P.A. 82-160, S. 69; P.A. 88-230, S. 1, 12; P.A. 90-98, S. 1, 2; P.A. 93-142, S. 4, 7, 8; P.A. 95-220, S. 4–6.)

History: P.A. 78-280 substituted “judicial district” for “county” generally and “the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain” for “Hartford county”; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators; P.A. 88-230 replaced “judicial district of Hartford-New Britain” with “judicial district of Hartford”, effective September 1, 1991; P.A. 90-98 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1991, to September 1, 1993; P.A. 93-142 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1993, to September 1, 1996, effective June 14, 1993; P.A. 95-220 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1996, to September 1, 1998, effective July 1, 1995.

Psychiatrist-patient privilege not waived and testimony of psychiatrist hired by state, but not as a result of court order, held inadmissible. 178 C. 626. Cited. 211 C. 555; 236 C. 625; 238 C. 313.

Cited. 1 CA 384; 14 CA 552; 19 CA 304.

Sec. 52-146k. Privileged communications between victim and domestic violence counselor or sexual assault counselor. (a) As used in this section:

(1) “Domestic violence agency” means any office, shelter, host home or agency offering assistance to victims of domestic violence through crisis intervention, emergency shelter referral and medical and legal advocacy, and which meets the Department of Social Services criteria of service provision for such agencies.

(2) “Domestic violence counselor” means any person engaged in a domestic violence agency (A) who has undergone a minimum of twenty hours of training which shall include, but not be limited to, the dynamics of domestic violence, crisis intervention, communication skills, working with diverse populations, an overview of the state criminal justice system and information about state and community resources for victims of domestic violence, (B) who is certified as a counselor by the domestic violence agency that provided such training, (C) who is under the control of a direct service supervisor of a domestic violence agency, and (D) whose primary purpose is the rendering of advice, counsel and assistance to, and the advocacy of the cause of, victims of domestic violence.

(3) “Confidential communication” means information transmitted between a victim of domestic violence or a victim of a sexual assault and a domestic violence counselor or a sexual assault counselor in the course of that relationship and in confidence by a means which, so far as the victim is aware, does not disclose the information to a third person other than any person who is present to further the interests of the victim in the consultation or any person to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or for the accomplishment of the purposes for which such counselor is consulted, and includes all information received by, and any advice, report or working paper given or made by, such counselor in the course of the relationship with the victim.

(4) “Rape crisis center” means any office, institution or center offering assistance to victims of sexual assault and their families through crisis intervention, medical and legal advocacy and follow-up counseling.

(5) “Sexual assault counselor” means (A) any person engaged in a rape crisis center who (i) has undergone a minimum of twenty hours of training which shall include, but not be limited to, the dynamics of sexual assault and incest, crisis intervention, communication skills, working with diverse populations, an overview of the state criminal justice system, information about hospital and medical systems and information about state and community resources for sexual assault victims, (ii) is certified as a counselor by the sexual assault center which has provided such training, (iii) is under the control of a direct services supervisor of a rape crisis center, and (iv) whose primary purpose is the rendering of advice, counseling and assistance to, and the advocacy of the cause of, victims of sexual assault, or (B) any member of the armed forces of the state or the United States who is trained and certified as a victim advocate or a sexual assault prevention coordinator in accordance with the military's sexual assault prevention and response program.

(6) “Victim” means any person who consults a domestic violence counselor or a sexual assault counselor for the purpose of securing advice, counseling or assistance concerning a mental, physical or emotional condition caused by domestic violence or a sexual assault.

(b) On or after October 1, 1983, a domestic violence counselor or a sexual assault counselor shall not disclose any confidential communications made to such counselor at any time by a victim in any civil or criminal case or proceeding or in any legislative or administrative proceeding unless the victim making the confidential communications waives the privilege, provided under no circumstances shall the location of the domestic violence agency or rape crisis center or the identity of the domestic violence counselor or sexual assault counselor be disclosed in any civil or criminal proceeding. Any request made on or after October 1, 1983, by the defendant or the state for such confidential communications shall be subject to the provisions of this subsection.

(c) When a victim is deceased or has been adjudged incompetent by a court of competent jurisdiction, the guardian of the victim or the executor or administrator of the estate of the victim may waive the privilege established by this section.

(d) A minor may knowingly waive the privilege established by this section. In any instance where the minor is, in the opinion of the court, incapable of knowingly waiving the privilege, the parent or guardian of the minor may waive the privilege on behalf of the minor, provided the parent or guardian is not the defendant and does not have a relationship with the defendant such that the parent or guardian has an interest in the outcome of the proceeding.

(e) The privilege established by this section shall not apply: (1) In matters of proof concerning chain of custody of evidence; (2) in matters of proof concerning the physical appearance of the victim at the time of the injury; or (3) where the domestic violence counselor or sexual assault counselor has knowledge that the victim has given perjured testimony and the defendant or the state has made an offer of proof that perjury may have been committed by the victim.

(f) The failure of any party to testify as a witness pursuant to the provisions of this section shall not result in an inference unfavorable to the state's cause or to the cause of the defendant.

(P.A. 83-429; P.A. 85-112; P.A. 93-262, S. 1, 87; 93-381, S. 9, 39; P.A. 95-257, S. 12, 21, 58; P.A. 12-90, S. 2; 12-197, S. 6; P.A. 13-214, S. 13.)

History: P.A. 85-112 amended Subsec. (b) by adding provision that communications made to counselor at any time are privileged communications on or after October 1, 1983; P.A. 93-262 authorized substitution of commissioner and department of social services for commissioner and department of human resources, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 93-381 replaced department of health services with department of public health and addiction services, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 95-257 replaced Commissioner and Department of Public Health and Addiction Services with Commissioner and Department of Public Health, effective July 1, 1995; P.A. 12-90 amended Subsec. (a)(5) to redefine “sexual assault counselor”, effective June 6, 2012; P.A. 12-197 amended Subsec. (a)(4) to redefine “rape crisis center”; P.A. 13-214 amended Subsec. (a) to substitute definition of “domestic violence agency” for definition of “battered women's center” in Subdiv. (1), substitute definition of “domestic violence counselor” for definition of “battered women's counselor” in Subdiv. (2) and substitute references to victims of domestic violence for references to battered women, and made technical and conforming changes.

Cited. 199 C. 693; 200 C. 734; 201 C. 211; 202 C. 259; 204 C. 259; 211 C. 555; 230 C. 43; 240 C. 658; 242 C. 1.

Cited. 8 CA 216; 10 CA 103; 23 CA 509.

Subsec. (b):

Defendant's communication with her counselor made before effective date of act held erroneously admitted at her trial held after the effective date. 204 C. 259.

Sec. 52-146l. Disclosure of privileged communication by interpreter prohibited. Any confidential communication which is deemed to be privileged under any provision of the general statutes or under the common law made by a person with the assistance of an interpreter shall not be disclosed by such interpreter in any civil or criminal case or proceeding or in any legislative or administrative proceeding, unless the person making the confidential communication waives such privilege.

(P.A. 83-395, S. 1.)

Cited. 211 C. 555.

Sec. 52-146m. Communication made by or to person who is deaf or hard of hearing with assistance of operator of special telecommunications equipment deemed privileged. Any communication made by or to a person who is deaf or hard of hearing with the assistance of a person operating special telecommunications equipment capable of serving the needs of persons who are deaf or hard of hearing shall be deemed to be confidential and privileged and shall not be disclosed by such operator in any civil or criminal case or proceeding or in any legislative or administrative proceeding, unless the person making the confidential communication waives such privilege.

(P.A. 83-314; P.A. 17-202, S. 100.)

History: P.A. 17-202 replaced references to deaf or hearing impaired person with references to person who is deaf or hard of hearing.

Cited. 211 C. 555.

(1) “Employee assistance program counselor” means any person engaged in directing or staffing any employee assistance program which may be established by the Supreme Court upon recommendation of the Chief Court Administrator for the employees of the Judicial Department;

(2) “Confidential communications” means all oral and written communications transmitted in confidence between an employee of the Judicial Department and an employee assistance program counselor in the course of their relationship in the employee assistance program and all records prepared by the counselor in the course of that relationship with such employee; and

(3) “Employees of the Judicial Department” means full-time and part-time employees of the Judicial Department including judges of the Supreme Court, Appellate Court and Superior Court but excluding the employees and judges of the probate courts.

(b) No employee assistance program counselor shall disclose any confidential communications to any third person, other than a person to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purposes for which such counselor is consulted, or in any civil or criminal case or proceeding or in any legislative or administrative proceeding, unless the employee making the confidential communication waives the privilege.

(c) No person in any civil or criminal case or proceeding or in any legislative or administrative proceeding may request or require information from any employee of the Judicial Department relating to an employee's participation in an employee assistance program, including whether or not such employee at any time participated in such employee assistance program.

(P.A. 88-190.)

Cited. 211 C. 555.

Sec. 52-146o. Disclosure of patient communication or information by physician, surgeon or health care provider prohibited. (a) Except as provided in sections 52-146c to 52-146j, inclusive, sections 52-146p, 52-146q and 52-146s, and subsection (b) of this section, in any civil action or any proceeding preliminary thereto or in any probate, legislative or administrative proceeding, a physician or surgeon, licensed pursuant to section 20-9, or other licensed health care provider, shall not disclose (1) any communication made to him or her by, or any information obtained by him or her from, a patient or the conservator or guardian of a patient with respect to any actual or supposed physical or mental disease or disorder, or (2) any information obtained by personal examination of a patient, unless the patient or that patient's authorized representative explicitly consents to such disclosure.

(b) Consent of the patient or the patient's authorized representative shall not be required for the disclosure of such communication or information (1) pursuant to any statute or regulation of any state agency or the rules of court, (2) by a physician, surgeon or other licensed health care provider against whom a claim has been made, or there is a reasonable belief will be made, in such action or proceeding, to the physician's, surgeon's or other licensed health care provider's attorney or professional liability insurer or such insurer's agent for use in the defense of such action or proceeding, (3) to the Commissioner of Public Health for records of a patient of a physician, surgeon or health care provider in connection with an investigation of a complaint, if such records are related to the complaint, or (4) if child abuse, abuse of an elderly individual, abuse of an individual who is physically disabled or incompetent or abuse of an individual with intellectual disability is known or in good faith suspected.

(P.A. 90-177; P.A. 91-141; P.A. 96-47, S. 13; P.A. 11-129, S. 20; P.A. 13-208, S. 63.)

History: P.A. 91-141 rephrased provisions re exceptions to the prohibition on disclosure and added Subsec. (b)(2) and (3) re disclosure to the attorney or professional liability insurer of a physician, surgeon or licensed health care provider and disclosure when abuse of certain individuals is known or suspected; P.A. 96-47 deleted “or other licensed health care provider” in Subsec. (a), adding reference to definitions in Sec. 20-7b(b) and inserted new Subsec. (b)(3) authorizing disclosure to Commissioner of Public Health, renumbering former Subdiv. as Subdiv. (4) (Revisor's note: In Subsec. (a) the phrase “..., a physician, surgeon, as defined in ...” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “..., a physician or surgeon, as defined in ...”); pursuant to P.A. 11-129, “mental retardation” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “intellectual disability” in Subsec. (b); P.A. 13-208 amended Subsec. (a) by adding reference to Secs. 52-146p, 52-146q and 52-146s, substituting reference to Sec. 20-9 for reference to Sec. 20-7b(b), adding provision re other licensed health care provider and making technical changes, and amended Subsec. (b) by making technical changes.

Cited. 225 C. 700; 240 C. 658. A duty of confidentiality arises from the physician-patient relationship and that unauthorized disclosure of confidential information obtained in the course of that relationship gives rise to a cause of action sounding in tort against the health care provider, unless the disclosure is otherwise allowed by law. 327 C. 540. Court cannot conclude that any disclosure of medical records in response to a subpoena complies with Subsec. (b) because a subpoena, without a court order, is not a statute, regulation of a state agency, or rule of the court. Id.

Statutory privilege for medical records does not apply to criminal proceedings. 74 CA 633.

Sec. 52-146p. Disclosure of privileged communications between marital and family therapist and person consulting such therapist prohibited. Exceptions. (a) As used in this section:

(1) “Person” means an individual who consults a marital and family therapist for purposes of diagnosis or treatment;

(2) “Marital and family therapist” means an individual certified as a marital and family therapist pursuant to chapter 383a;

(3) “Communications” means all oral and written communications and records thereof relating to the diagnosis and treatment of a person between such person and a marital and family therapist or between a member of such person's family and a marital and family therapist;

(4) “Consent” means consent given in writing by the person or his authorized representative;

(5) “Authorized representative” means (A) an individual empowered by a person to assert the confidentiality of communications which are privileged under this section, or (B) if a person is deceased, his personal representative or next of kin, or (C) if a person is incompetent to assert or waive his privileges under this section, (i) a guardian or conservator who has been or is appointed to act for the person, or (ii) for the purpose of maintaining confidentiality until a guardian or conservator is appointed, the person's nearest relative.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, all communications shall be privileged and a marital and family therapist shall not disclose any such communications unless the person or his authorized representative consents to waive the privilege and allow such disclosure. In circumstances where more than one person in a family is receiving therapy, each such family member shall consent to the waiver. In the absence of such a waiver from each such family member, a marital and family therapist shall not disclose communications with any family member. The person or his authorized representative may withdraw any consent given under the provisions of this section at any time in a writing addressed to the individual with whom or the office in which the original consent was filed. The withdrawal of consent shall not affect communications disclosed prior to notice of the withdrawal.

(1) Where mandated by any other provision of the general statutes;

(2) Where a marital and family therapist believes in good faith that the failure to disclose such communications presents a clear and present danger to the health or safety of any individual;

(3) Where a marital and family therapist makes a claim for collection of fees for services rendered, the name and address of the person and the amount of the fees may be disclosed to individuals or agencies involved in such collection, provided notification that such disclosure will be made is sent, in writing, to the person not less than thirty days prior to such disclosure. In cases where a dispute arises over the fees or claims or where additional information is needed to substantiate the claim, the disclosure shall be limited to the following: (A) That the person was receiving services from a marital and family therapist, (B) the dates of such services, and (C) a general description of the types of services.

(P.A. 92-225, S. 1, 5.)

Sec. 52-146q. Disclosure of confidential communications between social worker and person consulting such social worker prohibited. Exceptions. (a) As used in this section:

(1) “Person” means an individual who consults a social worker for purposes of evaluation or treatment;

(2) “Social worker” means an individual licensed as a clinical social worker pursuant to chapter 383b or an individual reasonably believed by the person to be so licensed;

(3) “Communications and records” means all oral and written communications and records thereof relating to the evaluation or treatment of a person between such person and a social worker, or between a member of such person's family and a social worker, or between such person or a member of such person's family and an individual participating under the supervision of a social worker in the accomplishment of the objectives of evaluation or treatment, wherever made;

(4) “Consent” means consent given in writing by the person or his authorized representative;

(5) “Authorized representative” means (A) an individual empowered by a person to assert the confidentiality of communications and records under this section, or (B) if a person is deceased, his administrator or executor or, in the absence of such fiduciary, his next of kin, or (C) if a person has been declared incompetent to assert or waive his privileges under this section, a guardian or conservator who is duly appointed to act for the person;

(6) “Mental health facility” includes any hospital, clinic, ward, social worker's office or other facility, public or private, which provides inpatient or outpatient service, in whole or in part, relating to the diagnosis or treatment of a person's mental condition.

(b) All communications and records shall be confidential and, except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a social worker shall not disclose any such communications and records unless the person or his authorized representative consents to such disclosure. Any consent given shall specify the individual or agency to which the communications and records are to be disclosed, the scope of the communications and records to be disclosed, the purpose of the disclosure and the expiration date of the consent. A copy of the consent form shall accompany any communications and records disclosed. The person or his authorized representative may withdraw any consent given under the provisions of this section at any time by written notice to the individual with whom or the office in which the original consent was filed. The withdrawal of consent shall not affect communications and records disclosed prior to notice of the withdrawal, except that such communications and records may not be redisclosed after the date of the notice of withdrawal.

(c) Consent of the person shall not be required for the disclosure or transmission of such person's communications and records in the following situations as specifically limited:

(1) Communications and records may be disclosed to other individuals engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of the person or may be transmitted to a mental health facility to which the person is admitted for diagnosis or treatment if the social worker in possession of the communications and records determines that the disclosure or transmission is needed to accomplish the objectives of diagnosis or treatment, or when a social worker, in the course of evaluation or treatment of the person, finds it necessary to disclose the communications and records for the purpose of referring the person to a mental health facility. The person shall be informed that the communications and records have been so disclosed or transmitted. For purposes of this subdivision, individuals in professional training are to be considered as engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of the person.

(2) Communications and records may be disclosed when a social worker determines that there is a substantial risk of imminent physical injury by the person to himself or others, or when disclosure is otherwise mandated by any provision of the general statutes.

(3) Communications and records made in the course of an evaluation ordered by a court may be disclosed at judicial proceedings in which the person is a party provided the court finds that the person has been informed before making the communications that any communications and records may be so disclosed and provided further that communications and records shall be admissible only on issues involving the person's mental condition.

(4) Communications and records may be disclosed in a civil proceeding in which the person introduces his mental condition as an element of his claim or defense or, after the person's death, when his condition is introduced by a party claiming or defending through or as a beneficiary of the person. For any disclosure under this subdivision, the court shall find that it is more important to the interests of justice that the communications and records be disclosed than that the relationship between the person and the social worker be protected.

(5) If a social worker makes a claim for collection of fees for services rendered, the name and address of the person and the amount of the fees may be disclosed to individuals or agencies involved in such collection, provided written notification that such disclosure will be made is sent to the person not less than thirty days prior to such disclosure. In cases where a dispute arises over the fees or claims or where additional information is needed to substantiate the fees or claims, the disclosure of further information shall be limited to the following: (A) That the person did in fact receive the services of the social worker, (B) the dates and duration of such services, and (C) a general description of the types of services.

(P.A. 92-225, S. 2, 5; P.A. 95-116, S. 9.)

History: P.A. 95-116 redefined “social worker”, changing reference to “certified independent” social workers to “licensed clinical” social workers.

Cited. 37 CA 213.

Subsec. (c):

Subdiv. (2) is unambiguous and does not permit in-court testimony by a social worker; communications and records are both confidential and not subject to disclosure, except as “specifically limited” by Subsec. 291 C. 642.

Sec. 52-146r. Disclosure of confidential communications between government attorney and public official or employee of public agency prohibited. (a) As used in this section:

(1) “Authorized representative” means an individual empowered by a public agency to assert the confidentiality of communications that are privileged under this section;

(2) “Confidential communications” means all oral and written communications transmitted in confidence between a public official or employee of a public agency acting in the performance of his or her duties or within the scope of his or her employment and a government attorney relating to legal advice sought by the public agency or a public official or employee of such public agency from that attorney, and all records prepared by the government attorney in furtherance of the rendition of such legal advice;

(3) “Government attorney” means a person admitted to the bar of this state and employed by a public agency or retained by a public agency or public official to provide legal advice to the public agency or a public official or employee of such public agency; and

(4) “Public agency” means “public agency” as defined in section 1-200.

(b) In any civil or criminal case or proceeding or in any legislative or administrative proceeding, all confidential communications shall be privileged and a government attorney shall not disclose any such communications unless an authorized representative of the public agency consents to waive the privilege and allow such disclosure.

(P.A. 99-179, S. 1.)

Section, even if applied retroactively, would not affect the legal standard applied in deciding that certain invoices were not protected by attorney-client privilege. 260 C. 143. “Confidential communications” are those where the attorney is acting in a professional capacity for the agency, the communications are made to the attorney by current employees or officials of the agency, the communications relate to the legal advice sought by the agency from the attorney, and the communications are made in confidence. 300 C. 511.

Sec. 52-146s. Disclosure of confidential information between professional counselor and person consulting such professional counselor prohibited. Exceptions. (a) As used in this section:

(1) “Person” means an individual who consults a professional counselor for purposes of diagnosis or treatment;

(2) “Professional counselor” means an individual licensed as a professional counselor pursuant to chapter 383c;

(3) “Communications” means all oral and written communications and records thereof relating to the diagnosis and treatment of a person between such person and a professional counselor or between a member of such person's family and a professional counselor;

(4) “Consent” means consent given in writing by the person or such person's authorized representative;

(5) “Authorized representative” means (A) an individual empowered by a person to assert the confidentiality of communications which are privileged under this section, or (B) if a person is deceased, the personal representative or next of kin of such person, or (C) if a person is incompetent to assert or waive such person's privileges hereunder, (i) a guardian or conservator who has been or is appointed to act for the person, or (ii) for the purpose of maintaining confidentiality until a guardian or conservator is appointed, the person's nearest relative.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a professional counselor shall not disclose any such communications unless the person or the authorized representative of such person consents to waive the privilege and allow such disclosure. The person or the authorized representative of such person may withdraw any consent given under the provisions of this section at any time in writing addressed to the individual with whom or the office in which the original consent was filed. The withdrawal of consent shall not affect communications disclosed prior to notice of the withdrawal.

(1) If a judge finds that a person, after having been informed that the communications would not be privileged, has made the communications to a professional counselor in the course of a mental health assessment ordered by the court, provided the communications shall be admissible only on issues involving the person's mental health condition;

(2) If, in a civil proceeding, a person introduces such person's mental health condition as an element of the claim or defense of such person or, after a person's death, the condition of such person is introduced by a party claiming or defending through or as a beneficiary of the person, and the judge finds that it is more important to the interests of justice that the communications be disclosed than that the relationship between the person and professional counselor be protected;

(3) Where mandated by any other provision of the general statutes;

(4) Where the professional counselor believes in good faith that the failure to disclose such communication presents a clear and present danger to the health or safety of any individual;

(5) If the professional counselor believes in good faith that there is risk of imminent personal injury to the person or to other individuals or risk of imminent injury to the property of other individuals;

(6) If child abuse, abuse of an elderly individual or abuse of an individual who is disabled or incompetent is known or in good faith suspected; or

(7) Where a professional counselor makes a claim for collection of fees for services rendered, the name and address of the person and the amount of the fees may be disclosed to individuals or agencies involved in such collection, provided notification that such disclosure will be made is sent, in writing, to the person not less than thirty days prior to such disclosure. In cases where a dispute arises over the fees or claims or where additional information is needed to substantiate the claim, the disclosure of further information shall be limited to the following: (A) That the person was in fact receiving professional counseling, (B) the dates of such services, and (C) a general description of the types of services.

(P.A. 00-190.)

Confidential communications disclosed under Subsec. (c)(6) pursuant to a mandatory report of child sexual abuse may be used both in an investigation to prevent future abuse and in a criminal investigation and prosecution to address past abuse. 300 C. 590.

Sec. 52-146t. Protection from compelled disclosure of information obtained by news media. (a) As used in this section:

(1) “Information” has its ordinary meaning and includes, but is not limited to, any oral, written or pictorial material, whether or not recorded, including any notes, outtakes, photographs, video or sound tapes, film or other data of whatever sort in any medium; and

(2) “News media” means:

(A) Any newspaper, magazine or other periodical, book publisher, news agency, wire service, radio or television station or network, cable or satellite or other transmission system or carrier, or channel or programming service for such station, network, system or carrier, or audio or audiovisual production company that disseminates information to the public, whether by print, broadcast, photographic, mechanical, electronic or any other means or medium;

(B) Any person who is or has been an employee, agent or independent contractor of any entity specified in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision and is or has been engaged in gathering, preparing or disseminating information to the public for such entity, or any other person supervising or assisting such person with gathering, preparing or disseminating information; or

(c) Any parent, subsidiary, division or affiliate of any person or entity specified in subparagraph (A) or (B) of this subdivision to the extent the subpoena or other compulsory process seeks the identity of a source or the information described in subsection (b) of this section.

(b) No judicial, executive or legislative body with the power to issue a subpoena or other compulsory process may compel the news media to testify concerning, or to produce or otherwise disclose, any information obtained or received, whether or not in confidence, by the news media in its capacity in gathering, receiving or processing information for potential communication to the public, or the identity of the source of any such information, or any information that would tend to identify the source of any such information, unless such judicial, executive or legislative body complies with the provisions of subsections (c) to (e), inclusive, of this section.

(c) Prior negotiations with the news media shall be pursued in all matters in which the issuance of a subpoena to, or the initiation of other compulsory process against, the news media is contemplated for information described in subsection (b) of this section or the identity of the source of such information, or any information that would tend to identify the source of any such information.

(d) If the news media and the party seeking to compel disclosure of information described in subsection (b) of this section or the identity of the source of any such information, or any information that would tend to identify the source of any such information, fail to reach a resolution, a court may compel disclosure of such information or the identity of the source of such information only if the court finds, after notice to and an opportunity to be heard by the news media, that the party seeking such information or the identity of the source of such information has established by clear and convincing evidence:

(1) That (A) in a criminal investigation or prosecution, based on information obtained from other sources than the news media, there are reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has occurred, or (B) in a civil action or proceeding, based on information obtained from other sources than the news media, there are reasonable grounds to sustain a cause of action; and

(2) That (A) the information or the identity of the source of such information is critical or necessary to the investigation or prosecution of a crime or to a defense thereto, or to the maintenance of a party's claim, defense or proof of an issue material thereto, (B) the information or the identity of the source of such information is not obtainable from any alternative source, and (C) there is an overriding public interest in the disclosure.

(e) A court of this state shall apply the procedures and standards specified by this section to any subpoena or other compulsory process whether it arises from or is associated with a proceeding under the laws of this state or any other jurisdiction, except that with respect to a proceeding arising under the laws of another jurisdiction, a court of this state shall not afford lesser protection to the news media than that afforded by such other jurisdiction. No subpoena or compulsory process arising from or associated with a proceeding under the laws of another jurisdiction shall be enforceable in this state unless a court in this state has personal jurisdiction over the person or entity against which enforcement is sought.

(f) The provisions of subsection (b) of this section protecting from compelled disclosure information described in said subsection and the identity of the source of any such information shall also apply if a subpoena is issued to, or other compulsory process is initiated against, a third party that seeks information concerning business transactions between such third party and the news media for the purpose of obtaining information described in said subsection or discovering the identity of a source of any such information. Whenever a subpoena is issued to, or other compulsory process is initiated against, a third party that seeks information concerning business transactions between such third party and the news media, the affected news media shall be given reasonable and timely notice of the subpoena or compulsory process before it is executed or initiated, as the case may be, and an opportunity to be heard.

(g) Publication or dissemination by the news media of information described in subsection (b) of this section, or a portion thereof, shall not constitute a waiver of the protection from compelled disclosure provided in said subsection with respect to any information that is not published or disseminated.

(h) Any information obtained in violation of the provisions of this section, and the identity of the source of such information, shall be inadmissible in any action, proceeding or hearing before any judicial, executive or legislative body.

(i) Whenever any person or entity seeks the disclosure from the news media of information that is not protected against compelled disclosure pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, such person or entity shall pay the actual cost that would be incurred by the news media in making a copy of such information if a subpoena or other compulsory process was not available, and may not use a subpoena or other compulsory process as a means to avoid paying such actual cost.

(j) Nothing in subsections (a) to (i), inclusive, of this section shall be construed to deny or infringe the rights of an accused in a criminal prosecution guaranteed under the sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States and article twenty-ninth of the amendments to the Constitution of the state of Connecticut.

(P.A. 06-140, S. 1–8.)

Sec. 52-146u. Disclosure of confidential communication between public defender and represented person prohibited. (a) As used in this section:

(1) “Person” means an indigent defendant, as defined in section 51-297;

(2) “Confidential communications” means all oral and written communications transmitted in confidence between a public defender and a person the public defender has been appointed to provide legal representation to relating to legal advice sought by the person and all records prepared by the public defender in furtherance of the rendition of such legal advice; and

(3) “Public defender” means the Chief Public Defender, Deputy Chief Public Defender, public defenders, assistant public defenders, deputy assistant public defenders, Division of Public Defender Services assigned counsel and the employees of the Division of Public Defender Services.

(b) In any civil or criminal case or proceeding or in any legislative or administrative proceeding, all confidential communications shall be privileged and a public defender shall not disclose any such communications unless the person who is represented by the public defender provides informed consent, as defined in the Rules of Professional Conduct, to waive the privilege and allow such disclosure.

(P.A. 11-51, S. 12.)

History: P.A. 11-51 effective July 1, 2011.

Sec. 52-146v. Disclosure of confidential communications between peer support team member and first responder prohibited. Exceptions. (a) As used in this section:

(1) “Peer support team member” means any person engaged in directing or staffing any peer support program established by an employer for the benefit of an employee who is a first responder;

(2) “First responder” means: Any peace officer, as defined in section 53a-3; any firefighter, as defined in section 7-313g; any person employed as a firefighter by a private employer; any ambulance driver, emergency medical responder, emergency medical technician, advanced emergency medical technician or paramedic, as defined in section 19a-175; and any telecommunicator, as defined in section 28-30; and

(3) “Confidential communications” means all oral and written communications transmitted in confidence between a first responder and a peer support team member in the course of participation in an employer established peer support program and all records prepared by a peer support team member related to such first responder's participation in such program.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, and unless the first responder making the confidential communication waives the privilege, no peer support team member shall disclose any confidential communications (1) to any third person, other than a person to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purposes for which such member is consulted, (2) in any civil or criminal case or proceeding, or (3) in any legislative or administrative proceeding.

(c) No person in any civil or criminal case or proceeding or in any legislative or administrative proceeding may request or require information from any first responder relating to the first responder's participation in a peer support program, including whether or not such first responder at any time participated in such peer support program.

(d) Consent of a first responder shall not be required for the disclosure of such first responder's confidential communications:

(1) Where mandated by any other provision of the general statutes;

(2) Where a peer support team member believes in good faith that the failure to disclose such confidential communications presents a clear and present danger to any individual, including the first responder; and

(3) Where the peer support team member was a witness or party to an incident that resulted in the delivery of peer support services to the first responder.

(P.A. 19-188, S. 1; P.A. 21-40, S. 49.)

History: P.A. 21-40 made a technical change in Subsec. (a)(2).

Sec. 52-146w. Disclosure of patient communication or information relating to reproductive health care services by covered entity prohibited. Exceptions. (a) Except as provided in sections 52-146c to 52-146k, inclusive, sections 52-146o, 52-146p, 52-146q and 52-146s and subsection (b) of this section, in any civil action or any proceeding preliminary thereto or in any probate, legislative or administrative proceeding, no covered entity, as defined in 45 CFR 160.103, shall disclose (1) any communication made to such covered entity, or any information obtained by such covered entity from, a patient or the conservator, guardian or other authorized legal representative of a patient relating to reproductive health care services, as defined in section 52-571m, that are permitted under the laws of this state, or (2) any information obtained by personal examination of a patient relating to reproductive health care services, as defined in section 52-571m, that are permitted under the laws of this state, unless the patient or that patient's conservator, guardian or other authorized legal representative explicitly consents in writing to such disclosure. A covered entity shall inform the patient or the patient's conservator, guardian or other authorized legal representative of the patient's right to withhold such written consent.

(b) Written consent of the patient or the patient's conservator, guardian or other authorized legal representative shall not be required for the disclosure of such communication or information (1) pursuant to the laws of this state or the rules of court prescribed by the Judicial Branch, (2) by a covered entity against whom a claim has been made, or there is a reasonable belief will be made, in such action or proceeding, to the covered entity's attorney or professional liability insurer or such insurer's agent for use in the defense of such action or proceeding, (3) to the Commissioner of Public Health for records of a patient of a covered entity in connection with an investigation of a complaint, if such records are related to the complaint, or (4) if child abuse, abuse of an elderly individual, abuse of an individual who is physically disabled or incompetent or abuse of an individual with intellectual disability is known or in good faith suspected.

(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to impede the lawful sharing of medical records as permitted by state or federal law or the rules of the court prescribed by the Judicial Branch, except in the case of a subpoena commanding the production, copying or inspection of medical records relating to reproductive health care services, as defined in section 52-571m.

(P.A. 22-19, S. 2.)

History: P.A. 22-19 effective July 1, 2022.

Sec. 52-146x. Disclosure of patient communication or information relating to gender-affirming health care services or reproductive health care services by covered entity prohibited. Exceptions. (a) Except as provided in sections 52-146c to 52-146k, inclusive, sections 52-146o, 52-146p, 52-146q and 52-146s and subsection (b) of this section, in any civil action or any proceeding preliminary thereto or in any probate, legislative or administrative proceeding, no covered entity, as defined in 45 CFR 160.103, shall disclose (1) any communication made to such covered entity, or any information obtained by such covered entity from, a patient or the conservator, guardian or other authorized legal representative of a patient relating to reproductive health care services or gender-affirming health care services, as defined in section 52-571n, that are permitted under the laws of this state, or (2) any information obtained by personal examination of a patient relating to reproductive health care services or gender-affirming health care services, as defined in section 52-571n, that are permitted under the laws of this state, unless the patient or that patient's conservator, guardian or other authorized legal representative explicitly consents in writing to such disclosure. A covered entity shall inform the patient or the patient's conservator, guardian or other authorized legal representative of the patient's right to withhold such written consent.

(P.A. 22-118, S. 485.)

History: P.A. 22-118 effective July 1, 2022.

Sec. 52-147. Written statements in actions to recover damages for personal injuries. In any action to recover damages for personal injuries no written statement concerning the facts out of which the cause of action arose given by either party to the other, or to his agent, attorney or insurer, shall be admissible in evidence unless the name and address of the person taking such statement appears thereon and unless a copy thereof is retained by the party giving such statement or delivered to him at the time such statement was given or within thirty days thereafter.

(1949 Rev., S. 7870; 1959, P.A. 541.)

History: 1959 act required name and address of person taking statement.

Provides only for recovery of damages for personal injuries and does not apply in an action to recover for breach of contract. 143 C. 372. Retroactive effect should not be given to 1959 amendment re name and address of person taking statement. 148 C. 447. Cited. 211 C. 555.

Work-product privilege is accorded only to product of lawyers; hence statement obtained by claims adjuster of defendant's insurer from defendant operator was ordered produced upon plaintiff's motion for disclosure and production. 28 CS 212.

A printed form sent by defendant's liability insurer to plaintiffs and filled out by them was properly excluded from evidence in personal injury action of named plaintiff because no copy was given to him as required by section. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 366.

Sec. 52-148. Depositions in civil actions and probate proceedings. Section 52-148 is repealed.

(1949 Rev., S. 7871; 1955, S. 3152d; 1957, P.A. 212; 1961, P.A. 505, S. 1; 1963, P.A. 98; 642, S. 83; P.A. 76-80, S. 2, 3; 76-273, S. 6.)

Sec. 52-148a. Taking of depositions. When court order necessary. (a) Any party in a civil action or probate proceeding may, after the commencement of such action or proceeding, take the testimony of any person by deposition.

(b) If the party initiating the action or proceeding seeks to take a deposition prior to the expiration of twenty days after the return day in civil actions or prior to twenty days after service of the notice of deposition in a probate proceeding, he shall obtain an order of the court, except such order shall not be required (1) if an adverse party has served a notice of taking a deposition or otherwise sought discovery, or (2) if special notice has been given as provided in subsection (b) of section 52-148b.

(c) The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only by an order of the court on such terms as the court prescribes.

(P.A. 76-273, S. 1.)

Cited. 211 C. 555; 216 C. 483; 229 C. 716; 230 C. 1.

Cited. 25 CA 126.

Sec. 52-148b. Notice of taking of deposition. (a) No party may take the deposition of any person unless he has first given reasonable written notice to each adverse party or his known agent or attorney of the time and place for taking the deposition and the name and address of each person to be examined, if known, and, if the name is not known, a general description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or group to which he belongs. Such notice shall be served by an indifferent person at the usual place of abode of each person entitled to notice or by mailing such notice to him by certified mail.

(b) An order of the court is not required for the taking of a deposition by the party initiating a civil action or probate proceeding if the notice (1) states that the person to be examined is about to go out of this state, or is bound on a voyage to sea, and will be unavailable for examination unless his deposition is taken before expiration of the twenty-day period, and (2) sets forth facts to support such statements. The attorney for the party seeking to take the deposition shall sign the notice, and his signature constitutes a certification by him that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief the statement and supporting facts are true.

(c) Whenever the whereabouts of any adverse party is unknown, a deposition may be taken pursuant to section 52-148a after such notice as the court, in which such deposition is to be used, or, when such court is not in session, any judge thereof, may direct.

(P.A. 76-273, S. 2.)

Cited. 211 C. 555; 216 C. 483; 229 C. 716.

Sec. 52-148c. *(See end of section for amended version and effective date.) Before whom depositions may be taken. (a) Within this state, depositions shall be taken before a judge or clerk of any court, justice of the peace, notary public or commissioner of the Superior Court.

(b) In any other state or country, depositions for use in a civil action or probate proceeding within this state shall be taken before a notary public, a commissioner appointed by the Governor of this state, any magistrate having power to administer oaths or a person commissioned by the court before which such action or proceeding is pending, or when such court is not in session, by any judge thereof. Any person so commissioned shall have the power by virtue of his commission to administer any necessary oath and to take testimony. Additionally, if a deposition is to be taken out of the United States, it may be taken before any foreign minister, secretary of a legation, consul or vice-consul, appointed by the United States or any person by him appointed for the purpose and having authority under the laws of the country where the deposition is to be taken; and the official character of any such person may be proved by a certificate from the Secretary of State of the United States.

(P.A. 76-273, S. 3.)

*Note: On and after July 1, 2023, this section, as amended by section 50 of public act 22-26, is to read as follows:

“Sec. 52-148c. Before whom depositions may be taken. (a) Within this state, depositions shall be taken before a judge or clerk of any court, justice of the peace, notary public or commissioner of the Superior Court.

(b) In any other state or country, except a state, as defined in section 52-656, that has enacted laws substantially similar to sections 52-655 to 52-660, inclusive, depositions for use in a civil action or probate proceeding within this state shall be taken before a notary public, a commissioner appointed by the Governor of this state, any magistrate having power to administer oaths or a person commissioned by the court before which such action or proceeding is pending, or when such court is not in session, by any judge thereof. Any person so commissioned shall have the power by virtue of his commission to administer any necessary oath and to take testimony. Additionally, if a deposition is to be taken out of the United States, it may be taken before any foreign minister, secretary of a legation, consul or vice-consul, appointed by the United States or any person by him appointed for the purpose and having authority under the laws of the country where the deposition is to be taken; and the official character of any such person may be proved by a certificate from the Secretary of State of the United States.”

(P.A. 76-273, S. 3; P.A. 22-26, S. 50.)

History: P.A. 22-26 amended Subsec. (b) by adding exception re “state as defined in section 52-656, that has enacted laws substantially similar to sections 52-655 to 52-600, inclusive”, effective July 1, 2023.

Cited. 205 C. 542; 211 C. 555; 229 C. 716.

Sec. 52-148d. Requirements for taking of depositions. Party subject to taking of deposition. (a) All witnesses or parties giving depositions shall be cautioned to speak the whole truth and be carefully examined, and shall subscribe their depositions, and make oath before the authority taking the depositions.

(b) The authority taking a deposition shall: (1) Attest the subscribing of the deposition and oath of the person deposed, (2) certify whether each adverse party or his agent was present and notified, (3) certify the reason for taking the deposition, and (4) seal the deposition and direct it to the court where it is to be used and deliver it, if requested, to the party at whose request it was taken.

(c) The party on whose behalf the deposition of an adverse party is taken shall be subject to having his deposition taken on behalf of such adverse party. The party on whose behalf a deposition is taken shall at his expense provide a copy of the deposition to each adverse party.

(P.A. 76-273, S. 4; P.A. 82-160, S. 70.)

History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators.

Cited. 211 C. 555; 229 C. 716.

Sec. 52-148e. Issuance of subpoena for taking of deposition. Deposition to be used in federal court or court of other state or foreign country. Objection to subpoena. (a) Each judge or clerk of any court, justice of the peace, notary public or Commissioner of the Superior Court, in this state, may issue a subpoena, upon request, for the appearance of any witness before him to give his deposition in a civil action or probate proceeding, if the party seeking to take such person's deposition has complied with the provisions of sections 52-148a and 52-148b and may take his deposition, each adverse party or his agent being present or notified.

(b) The subpoena may command the person to whom it is directed to produce and permit inspection and copying of designated books, papers, documents or tangible things which are material to the cause of action or the defense of the party at whose request the subpoena was issued and within the possession or control of the person to be examined. However, no subpoena may compel the production of matters which are privileged or otherwise protected by law from discovery.

(c) Any person to whom a subpoena commanding production of books, papers, documents or tangible things has been directed may, within fifteen days after the service thereof or on or before the time specified in the subpoena for compliance if such time is less than fifteen days after service, serve upon the issuing authority designated in the subpoena written objection to inspection or copying of any or all of the designated materials. If objection is made, the party at whose request the subpoena was issued shall not be entitled to inspect and copy the disputed materials except pursuant to an order of the court in which the cause is pending. The party who requested the subpoena may, if objection has been made, move upon notice to the deponent for an order at any time before or during the taking of the deposition.

(d) The court in which the cause is pending may, upon motion made promptly and in any event at or before the time for compliance specified in a subpoena authorized by subsection (b) of this section, (1) quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable and oppressive or if it seeks the production of materials not subject to production under the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, or (2) condition denial of the motion upon the advancement by the party who requested the subpoena of the reasonable cost of producing the materials which he is seeking.

(e) If any person to whom a lawful subpoena is issued under any provision of this section fails without just excuse to comply with any of its terms, the court before which the cause is pending, or any judge thereof, may issue a capias and cause him to be brought before such court or judge, as the case may be, and, if the person subpoenaed refuses to comply with said subpoena, such court or judge may commit him to jail until he signifies his willingness to comply with it.

(f) (1) Deposition of witnesses living in this state may be taken in like manner to be used as evidence in a civil action or probate proceeding pending in any court of the United States or of any other state of the United States or of any foreign country, on application to the court in which such civil action or probate proceeding is pending of any party to such civil action or probate proceeding. The Superior Court shall have jurisdiction to quash or modify, or to enforce compliance with, a subpoena issued for the taking of a deposition pursuant to this subsection.

(2) Any person to whom a subpoena has been directed in a civil action or probate proceeding, other than a party to such civil action or probate court proceeding, pending in any court of any other state of the United States or of any foreign country, which subpoena commands (A) the person's appearance at a deposition, or (B) the production, copying or inspection of books, papers, documents or tangible things may, within fifteen days after the service thereof or on or before the time specified in the subpoena for compliance if such time is less than fifteen days after service, serve upon the party who requested issuance of the subpoena written objection to appearing or producing, copying or permitting the inspection of such books, papers, documents or tangible things on the ground that the subpoena will cause such person undue or unreasonable burden or expense. Service of the objection shall be made by United States mail, certified or registered, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, without the use of a state marshal or other officer. Such written objection shall be accompanied by an affidavit of costs setting forth the estimated or actual costs of compliance with such subpoena, including, but not limited to, the person's attorney's fees or the costs to such person of electronic discovery. If a person makes such written objection, the party who requested issuance of the subpoena (i) shall not be entitled to compel such person's appearance or receive, copy or inspect the books, papers, documents or tangible things, except pursuant to an order of the Superior Court, and (ii) may, upon notice to such person, file a motion with the Superior Court for an order to compel such person's appearance or production, copying or inspection of such materials in accordance with the terms of such subpoena. When ruling on such motion to compel, the Superior Court shall make a finding as to whether the subpoena subjects the person to undue or unreasonable burden or expense prior to entering any order to compel such person's appearance or the production, copying or inspection of such materials. If the Superior Court finds that the subpoena issued to the person subjects such person to undue or unreasonable burden or expense, any order to compel such person's appearance or production, copying or inspection of such materials shall protect the person from undue or unreasonable burden or expense resulting from compliance with such subpoena and, except in the case of a subpoena commanding the production, copying or inspection of medical records, may include, but not be limited to, the reimbursement of such person's reasonable costs of compliance, as set forth in the affidavit of costs.

(3) The provisions of subdivision (2) of this subsection shall not apply to a civil action filed to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death in which it is alleged that such injury or death resulted from the professional malpractice of a health care provider or health care institution.

(P.A. 76-273, S. 5; P.A. 77-604, S. 32, 84; P.A. 06-152, S. 4; P.A. 15-211, S. 29.)

History: P.A. 77-604 made technical correction; P.A. 06-152 amended Subsec. (f) by adding provisions re application to court in which civil action or probate proceeding is pending and re jurisdiction of Superior Court to quash, modify or enforce compliance; P.A. 15-211 amended Subsec. (f) by designating existing provisions as Subdiv. (1), adding Subdiv. (2) re objection to subpoena that commands a nonparty to appear at a deposition or produce certain documents and adding Subdiv. (3) re provisions of Subdiv. (2) not to apply to certain professional malpractice actions.

See Sec. 52-161b re issuance of subpoena to crime victim by pro se litigant.

Cited. 211 C. 555; 216 C. 483; 230 C. 1. Because statute authorizes issuance of subpoenas for taking of a deposition to be used outside Connecticut in a civil action or probate proceeding only, defendant's attorney lacked authority to issue subpoenas compelling deposition testimony in connection with Rhode Island administrative proceeding. 276 C. 544.

Sec. 52-149. Depositions of persons sixty years old. Section 52-149 is repealed.

(1949 Rev., S. 7872; 1955, S. 3153d; 1961, P.A. 505, S. 2; P.A. 76-273, S. 6.)

Sec. 52-149a. Depositions of medical witnesses. (a) The deposition of any physician, psychologist, chiropractor, naturopathic physician or dentist licensed under the provisions of the general statutes, may be taken on behalf of either party to any civil action, workers' compensation matter or probate proceeding, in which the physician, psychologist, chiropractor, naturopathic physician or dentist may be called as an expert witness, on notice by certified mail to each adverse party or the party's attorney, as the case may be. The deposition may be received in evidence at the trial or hearing of the civil action, workers' compensation matter or probate proceeding in lieu of the appearance of the witness in court or at the hearing. The deposition may be taken by stenographic means, videotape or in such other manner as may be provided by rule of court or of the administrative law judges.

(b) Whenever the deposition of a physician, psychologist, chiropractor, naturopathic physician or dentist is so taken, the party requesting the deposition shall pay to the medical expert the fee for giving testimony for the deposition.

(P.A. 76-423; P.A. 77-210; P.A. 79-376, S. 71; P.A. 82-160, S. 71; P.A. 99-102, S. 47; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 77-210 added Subsec. (b) re payment of fee for testimony to medical experts; P.A. 79-376 substituted “workers' compensation” for “workmen's compensation” where appearing; P.A. 82-160 made minor technical changes; P.A. 99-102 deleted obsolete references to osteopathic physicians and made a technical change re gender neutrality; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “compensation commissioners” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judges” in Subsec. (a), effective October 1, 2021.

Cited. 203 C. 554; 211 C. 555; 229 C. 716.

Cited. 45 CA 165.

Sec. 52-150. Interested persons not to write depositions. Any deposition written, drawn up or dictated by the party, his attorney or any person interested, or returned to court unsealed, or with the seal broken, may be rejected by the court.

(1949 Rev., S. 7873.)

Deposition must not include any written statement by party. 5 C. 340. Nor be drawn by party, though copied by another. 1 R. 259; 4 C. 572. Nor be drawn up in advance, by procurement of party. 5 C. 324; 4 D. 126, 127. The magistrate must not be partner of the party's attorney. 37 C. 217. A deposition in behalf of a town may be taken before a magistrate who is a taxpayer of the town. 52 C. 165. Rejection of deposition taken in violation of section is in discretion of trial court. 100 C. 381. Cited. 211 C. 555; 229 C. 716.

Application to take deposition by tape recording and transcription by opposite party refused as violation of statutory and practice book provision. 31 CS 289.

Sec. 52-151. Custody and opening of depositions. Depositions returned to the court shall remain in the custody of its clerk, unless suppressed by order of court, until final judgment is rendered in the case. Any such deposition may be opened by any clerk of the court at any time and in any judicial district. The clerk shall certify thereon the time and place of opening the deposition.

(1949 Rev., S. 7874; P.A. 78-280, S. 2, 127; P.A. 82-160, S. 72.)

History: P.A. 78-280 substituted “judicial district” for “county”; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.

Infraction of statute does not necessarily render deposition inadmissible. 58 C. 495. Deposition is not an exhibit, but testimony in the custody of the clerk until offered in evidence; court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit deposition in which plaintiff had been deprived of complete cross-examination. 164 C. 262. Cited. 211 C. 555; 229 C. 716.

Sec. 52-152. Depositions of persons in armed forces. (a) The court in which any civil action or probate proceeding is pending, and any judge of the court when the court is not in session, may issue a commission to any person in the armed forces, as defined in section 27-103, authorizing him to take the deposition of any person in the armed forces, to be used as testimony in the civil action or probate proceeding. Such commissioner may administer the requisite oath to any such person to be deposed.

(b) The deposition shall be taken by interrogatories on the part of the party taking the deposition, of which reasonable notice shall be given to each adverse party, and by cross-interrogatories by each adverse party, with like notice to the other side. The commission, with the interrogatories and cross-interrogatories, shall be forwarded to the commissioner, who shall make return of his proceedings to the court, under seal, addressed to the clerk of the court, if there is one, otherwise to the judge.

(1949 Rev., S. 7875; 1955, S. 3154d; 1957, P.A. 163, S. 43; 1967, P.A. 656, S. 39; P.A. 82-160, S. 73; P.A. 18-72, S. 13.)

History: 1967 act substituted language “when the court is not sitting” for reference to court's being “in vacation”; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators; P.A. 18-72 made a technical change in Subsec. (a).

Cited. 146 C. 252; 211 C. 555; 229 C. 716; 230 C. 1.

Cited. 23 CS 249.

Secs. 52-153 and 52-154. Subpoena to deponent; commitment. Commission to take deposition of nonresident; notice where whereabouts of adverse party unknown. Sections 52-153 and 52-154 are repealed.

(1949 Rev., S. 7876, 7877; 1955, S. 3155d, 3156d; March, 1958, P.A. 27, S. 65; 1961, P.A. 517, S. 42; P.A. 76-273, S. 6; 76-436, S. 403, 685, 686.)

Sec. 52-155. (Note: This section is repealed, effective July 1, 2023.) Depositions before commissioner appointed by other jurisdiction. Compulsory process for witnesses. (a) Each commissioner, appointed according to the laws or usages of any other state or government, or by any court of the United States or of any other state or government, to take testimony in this state to be used in any such court, may apply to a judge of any court of record, or to any justice of the peace, notary public or commissioner of the Superior Court, for a subpoena or to any such judge for a capias, to compel the appearance of any witness before such commissioner.

(b) Upon proof of the commissioner's authority and that the testimony of the witness is material, the judge, justice of the peace, notary public or commissioner of the Superior Court shall issue the subpoena or capias requested. If any person summoned as a witness to testify before the commissioner refuses to appear and testify, the judge of any court of record may commit the person to prison until he signifies his willingness to appear and testify.

(c) Before any compulsory process issues to cause any witness to attend and give his deposition, it shall appear to the officer who was to take the deposition, or, in the case of a commissioner, to the officer issuing the summons, that the witness has been duly summoned and the amount of his fees tendered to him by the officer serving the same.

(1949 Rev., S. 7878; 1959, P.A. 615, S. 13; P.A. 82-160, S. 74; P.A. 22-26, S. 68.)

History: 1959 act provided only judge of court of record may issue capias or commit to prison, deleting provision for such action by justice, notary public or commissioner of superior court; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators; P.A. 22-26 repealed section, effective July 1, 2023, and applicable to any request for discovery in an action pending on or filed on or after said date.

Cited. 211 C. 555; 229 C. 716.

Cited. 40 CS 198.

Sec. 52-155a. Limitations on issuance of out-of-state subpoena request relating to reproductive health care services. Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 52-155 and 52-657, a judge, justice of the peace, notary public or commissioner of the Superior Court shall not issue a subpoena requested by a commissioner, appointed according to the laws or usages of any other state or government, or by any court of the United States or of any other state or government, when such subpoena relates to reproductive health care services, as defined in section 52-571m, that are permitted under the laws of this state, unless the subpoena relates to: (1) An out-of-state action founded in tort, contract or statute, for which a similar claim would exist under the laws of this state, brought by a patient or the patient's authorized legal representative, for damages suffered by the patient or damages derived from an individual's loss of consortium of the patient; or (2) an out-of-state action founded in contract, and for which a similar claim would exist under the laws of this state, brought or sought to be enforced by a party with a contractual relationship with the person that is the subject of the subpoena requested by a commissioner appointed according to the laws or usages of another state.

(P.A. 22-19, S. 3.)

History: P.A. 22-19 effective July 1, 2022.

Sec. 52-155b. Limitations on issuance of out-of-state subpoena request relating to gender-affirming health care services or reproductive health care services. Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 52-155 and 52-657, a judge, justice of the peace, notary public or commissioner of the Superior Court shall not issue a subpoena requested by a commissioner, appointed according to the laws or usages of any other state or government, or by any court of the United States or of any other state or government, when such subpoena relates to reproductive health care services or gender-affirming health care services, as defined in section 52-571n, that are permitted under the laws of this state, unless the subpoena relates to: (1) An out-of-state action founded in tort, contract or statute, for which a similar claim would exist under the laws of this state, brought by a patient or the patient's authorized legal representative, for damages suffered by the patient or damages derived from an individual's loss of consortium of the patient; or (2) an out-of-state action founded in contract, and for which a similar claim would exist under the laws of this state, brought or sought to be enforced by a party with a contractual relationship with the person that is the subject of the subpoena requested by a commissioner appointed according to the laws or usages of another state.

(P.A. 22-118, S. 486.)

History: P.A. 22-118 effective July 1, 2022.

Sec. 52-156. Preservation of the testimony of a witness. (a) Any person who desires to preserve the testimony of any witness, concerning any matter which is or may be the subject of a civil action, may present a petition in writing to any judge of the Superior Court, setting forth the reasons for his application, the name of the witness, the subject matter of the controversy and the names of all persons interested therein and praying that the deposition of the witness may be taken. Upon presentation of the petition, the judge shall appoint a time and place for the respondents to appear before him and show cause why the prayer of the petition should not be granted, and order such notice thereof to the parties, whether resident in this state or not, as he thinks reasonable. If, at the time appointed, he finds that the notice ordered has been given, he shall further direct, if no sufficient cause is shown to the contrary, that depositions shall be taken at such times and places as he may prescribe, either by himself or by some other person or persons whom he may appoint for that purpose, who shall receive therefor from the petitioner three dollars a day.

(b) Depositions taken pursuant to this section shall be sealed and directed to the clerk of the superior court for the judicial district in which the petitioners or some of them reside, or, if none of the petitioners resides within this state, to the clerk of the superior court for the judicial district in which the respondents or some of them reside. The clerk shall file the sealed depositions together with the petition and all the proceedings thereon. Copies of depositions taken in the manner prescribed in this section and certified by the clerk of the court shall be received in evidence in the cause for which they were taken, and in all other causes in which the same subject matter is in suit between the same parties, or between the heirs or personal representatives of the persons who petitioned for the taking of the depositions and the other parties thereto.

(1949 Rev., S. 7879; P.A. 78-280, S. 2, 127; P.A. 82-160, S. 75; P.A. 13-194, S. 10.)

History: P.A. 78-280 substituted “judicial district” for “county”; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators; P.A. 13-194 amended Subsec. (b) to substitute requirement that clerk file sealed depositions for requirement that clerk open and lodge depositions on file.

Equity jurisdiction over such petitions. 5 C. 352. Powers of compensation commissioner to hold hearing to perpetuate testimony. 132 C. 173. Cited. 157 C. 226; 211 C. 555; 229 C. 716; 230 C. 1.

Having by its cross-examination created testimony, a party does not “own” that cross-examination so as to be able to exclude its introduction into evidence solely on the basis of waiver. 1 CA 496. Cited. 41 CA 625.

In proper case, statute can be invoked for the purpose of “discovery before suit”. 24 CS 452. If purpose for taking deposition would be defeated by delay, court may terminate stay of execution on appeal from such order. Id., 455. History discussed. 25 CS 273. Procedure under section for perpetuating the testimony of witnesses furnishes an extraordinary remedy, to be confined to cases where there is a substantial risk that the testimony will be lost. Id., 274.

Sec. 52-156a. Deposition to perpetuate testimony before action or pending appeal. (a)(1) A person who desires to perpetuate testimony regarding any matter that may be cognizable in the Superior Court may file a verified petition in the superior court for the judicial district of the residence of any expected adverse party. The petition shall be entitled in the name of the petitioner and shall show: (A) That the petitioner expects to be a party to an action cognizable in the superior court but is presently unable to bring it or cause it to be brought, (B) the subject matter of the expected action and the petitioner's interest therein, (C) the facts which the petitioner desires to establish by the proposed testimony and the reasons for desiring to perpetuate it, (D) the names or a description of the persons the petitioner expects will be adverse parties and their addresses so far as known, and (E) the names and addresses of the persons to be examined and the substance of the testimony which the petitioner expects to elicit from each, and shall ask for an order authorizing the petitioner to take the depositions of the persons to be examined named in the petition, for the purpose of perpetuating their testimony.

(2) The petitioner shall thereafter serve a notice upon each person named in the petition as an expected adverse party, together with a copy of the petition, stating that the petitioner will apply to the court, at a time and place named therein, for the order described in the petition. At least twenty days before the date of hearing the notice shall be served in the manner provided by section 52-57; but if such service cannot with due diligence be made upon any expected adverse party named in the petition, the court may make such order as is just for service by publication or otherwise, and shall appoint, for persons not served in the manner provided by section 52-57, an attorney who shall represent them, and, in case they are not otherwise represented, shall cross-examine the deponent.

(3) If the court is satisfied that the perpetuation of the testimony may prevent a failure or delay of justice, it shall make an order designating or describing the persons whose depositions may be taken and specifying the subject matter of the examination and whether the depositions shall be taken upon oral examination or written interrogatories. The depositions may then be taken in accordance with this section; and the court may make orders for the production of documents and things and the entry upon land for inspection and other purposes, and for the physical or mental examination of persons. For the purpose of applying this section to depositions for perpetuating testimony, each reference in this section to the court in which the action is pending shall be deemed to refer to the court in which the petition for such deposition was filed.

(4) If a deposition to perpetuate testimony is taken under this section, it may be used in any action involving the same subject matter subsequently brought in the Superior Court.

(b) If an appeal has been taken from a judgment of the Superior Court or before the taking of an appeal if the time therefor has not expired, the superior court in which the judgment was rendered may allow the taking of the depositions of witnesses to perpetuate their testimony for use in the event of further proceedings in the Appellate or Supreme Court. In such case the party who desires to perpetuate the testimony may make a motion in the Superior Court for leave to take the depositions, upon the same notice and service thereof as if the action was pending in the Superior Court. The motion shall show (1) the names and addresses of persons to be examined and the substance of the testimony which the party expects to elicit from each; and (2) the reasons for perpetuating their testimony. If the court finds that the perpetuation of the testimony is proper to avoid a failure or delay of justice, it may make an order allowing the depositions to be taken and may make orders for the production of documents and things and the entry upon land for inspection and other purposes, and for the physical or mental examination of persons, and thereupon the depositions may be taken and used in the same manner and under the same conditions as are prescribed in this section for depositions taken in actions pending in the Superior Court.

(P.A. 91-324, S. 14.)

Cited. 229 C. 716; 230 C. 1. Standards for issuance of equitable bills of discovery, and types of bills of discovery, discussed. 261 C. 673.

Sec. 52-157. Taking of deposition may be adjourned. The authority before whom a deposition is taken may adjourn the taking thereof from time to time, as necessity or convenience may require, giving notice thereof to the parties present.

(1949 Rev., S. 7880.)

Cited. 211 C. 555; 229 C. 716.

Sec. 52-158. Deposition may be used in Appellate Court. Section 52-158 is repealed, effective October 1, 2019.

(1949 Rev., S. 7881; P.A. 19-64, S. 26.)

Sec. 52-159. Deposition may be used in another action. The testimony of any witness, taken by deposition, in any civil action may be used in another civil action between the same parties, or their executors or administrators, and upon the same cause of action, to the same extent and as fully as though originally taken for use in such cause. The original deposition, when the authenticity of the same has been established, or a copy thereof, certified by the clerk of the court to which the original action was brought, shall be admitted in evidence as though originally taken for use in such cause.

(1949 Rev., S. 7882.)

Rule before section was enacted. 80 C. 140; 86 C. 583. Cited. 211 C. 555.

Sec. 52-159a. Disclosure of names or reports of plaintiff's expert witnesses in malpractice action. Section 52-159a is repealed.

(1967, P.A. 702; 1969, P.A. 362; P.A. 76-137.)

Sec. 52-160. Admissibility in subsequent trial of testimony of witness recorded in former trial. If any witness in a civil action is beyond the reach of the process of the courts of this state, or cannot be found, and his testimony has been taken by the court stenographer or reporter upon a former trial of the action, a transcript of the record of the testimony, verified by the oath of the stenographer or court reporter, shall be admissible in evidence, in the discretion of the court, upon any subsequent trial of the action, in the same manner and to the same extent as a deposition of the witness would be if legally taken.

(1949 Rev., S. 7883; 1953, S. 3157d; P.A. 82-160, S. 76.)

History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.

Applies where substitute complaint modifying cause of action has been filed. 74 C. 694. Cited. 211 C. 555.

Testimony of witness taken during trial of a different cause of action does not fall under purview of section. 51 CA 24. An unemployment hearing, which is an administrative proceeding, was not same as or substantially similar to a civil action in which claims of a hostile work environment, retaliation, vexatious litigation and intentional infliction of emotional distress were claimed, therefore preclusion of prior testimony given at unemployment hearing was proper. 117 CA 680.

Sec. 52-161. Transcript of stenographer's or court reporter's record part of official record. An exemplified transcript of the record of any official stenographer or court reporter shall be prima facie a correct statement of the testimony and proceedings and shall constitute a part of the official record in the cause or matter in which such stenographer's or reporter's record was made.

(1949 Rev., S. 7884; 1953, S. 3158d.)

Notes of charge of court may be used to show issues determined by judgment. 74 C. 568. Court may have notes read or transcript submitted to jury. 82 C. 66. Notes not part of record for appeal unless made so by proper procedure. 71 C. 668; 79 C. 315; 82 C. 547; 87 C. 333; Id., 616; 89 C. 385. Cited. 165 C. 152; 208 C. 156; 211 C. 555.

Cited. 14 CS 503; 42 CS 574.

Sec. 52-161a. Subpoenaing of court reporter as witness. No court reporter may be subpoenaed to testify as a witness, or to give a deposition, with respect to any notes taken or transcripts made in his official capacity unless the party issuing the subpoena pays, for the use of the state, to the clerk of the court in which the court reporter is regularly employed, the sum of thirty dollars. This payment shall be waived by the state if the reporter is served with the subpoena not less than three days prior to the date he is commanded to appear.

(February, 1965, P.A. 152, S. 1; P.A. 82-160, S. 77.)

History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.

Cited. 211 C. 555.

Sec. 52-161b. Subpoenaing of crime victim by pro se litigant. Court authorization required. (a) A pro se litigant in any civil matter, including a habeas corpus proceeding, shall notify the clerk of the court if such litigant has been convicted of a family violence crime, as defined in section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or section 46b-38a, or a violation of section 53-21, 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a, 53a-72b, 53a-73a, 53a-181c, 53a-181d or 53a-181e and if the subject of a subpoena to be issued by such litigant in such matter is the victim of the crime for which such litigant was convicted.

(b) A pro se litigant who has been convicted of said family violence crime or a violation of any of said sections shall not issue a subpoena summoning a victim of the crime for which such litigant was convicted to appear and testify at a court hearing or deposition in any civil matter, including a habeas corpus proceeding, unless a court authorizes the issuance of such subpoena in accordance with subsection (c) of this section.

(c) Whenever such pro se litigant intends to issue a subpoena to any such victim, such litigant shall provide the clerk of the court with notice of such intention. Upon receipt of such notice, the clerk of the court shall schedule a hearing and provide notice to the pro se litigant of the date, time and place of such hearing. At such hearing, the pro se litigant shall make an offer of proof as to the content of the testimony expected to be given by the victim. If the court finds that the testimony expected to be given by the victim is relevant and necessary to the civil matter, the court shall authorize the pro se litigant to issue such subpoena to such victim. The scope of such litigant's examination of the victim shall be limited in accordance with the court's findings on the offer of proof.

(P.A. 06-100, S. 1; P.A. 19-189, S. 13.)

History: P.A. 06-100 effective June 2, 2006; P.A. 19-189 amended Subsec. (a) by replacing “53a-70b” with “section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019” and making a technical change.

Sec. 52-162. Exemplification of laws of other states. Section 52-162 is repealed.

(1949 Rev., S. 7885; P.A. 90-19, S. 4.)

Sec. 52-163. Judicial notice of special acts, regulations of state and municipal agencies and municipal ordinances. The court shall take judicial notice of: (1) Private or special acts of this state, (2) regulations of any agency of this state, as defined in section 4-166, (3) ordinances of any town, city or borough of this state, and (4) regulations of any board, commission, council, committee or other agency of any town, city or borough of this state.

(1949 Rev., S. 7886; 1967, P.A. 353; P.A. 90-19, S. 2.)

History: 1967 act added municipal ordinances to purview of statute; P.A. 90-19 reorganized provisions, deleted provision re judicial notice of “printed books or pamphlets purporting on their face to be the session or other statutes of the several states and territories in the United States or of any foreign jurisdiction”, added provision requiring judicial notice of regulations of any agency of this state and of any board, commission, council, committee or other agency of any town, city or borough of this state, and inserted Subdiv. indicators.

Statutes not printed by public authority, no evidence. 2 R. 250; Id., 300. Construction given by the state where the statute was enacted will be followed by the courts of this state. 47 C. 599. Cited. 65 C. 214; 69 C. 390, 391; Id., 650; 73 C. 181; 79 C. 585; 88 C. 681; 93 C. 46; 114 C. 74; 142 C. 278. Applies to judge performing judicial function. 78 C. 2. Supreme Court will notice foreign statute overlooked by trial judge. 81 C. 152, 164; 87 C. 251. But birth certificate properly authenticated under statute of state where issued is inadmissible here unless under great seal of foreign state, or under seal of foreign secretary of state attesting seal and official character of official signing. 99 C. 277. Court will not take judicial notice of orders of a city board of health even in a Connecticut city. 100 C. 102. Statute obviates necessity of specially pleading law of a foreign state. 103 C. 505; 106 C. 688. Court does not take judicial notice of zoning regulations. 145 C. 735. Court need not take judicial notice of law of foreign jurisdiction under this section or Sec. 51-32 or 52-164, unless authoritative sources of the foreign law, subject to inspection or verification by opposing counsel, are made available to the court by reference or otherwise, under the usual rules for judicial notice. 152 C. 475. Cited re town ordinances. 164 C. 175. Court need not take judicial notice of the law of a foreign jurisdiction unless authoritative sources of the foreign law are made available to the court. 165 C. 177. Cited. 211 C. 555.

Cited. 2 CA 315. Statute permits courts to take judicial notice of municipal ordinances which include zoning regulations. 5 CA 455, 457. Cited. 13 CA 124. Scope of statute not extended to include rules and procedures of a local housing authority. 23 CA 366. Cited. 24 CA 49.

Cited. 8 CS 257; 27 CS 514; 33 CS 562.

Where law of New York applicable by stipulation of parties applied to case, and parties failed to establish what that law is, court will assume it is same as Connecticut law. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 629. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 539.

Sec. 52-163a. Determination of the law of jurisdictions outside this state. (a) In determining the law of any jurisdiction or governmental unit thereof outside this state, the court may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the rules of evidence.

(b) The court, not the jury, shall determine the law of any jurisdiction or governmental unit thereof outside this state. Its determination is subject to review on appeal as a ruling on a question of law.

(P.A. 90-19, S. 1.)

Sec. 52-164. Reports of judicial decisions of other states. The reports of the judicial decisions of other states and countries may be judicially noticed by the courts of this state as evidence of the common law of such states or countries and of the judicial construction of the statutes or other laws thereof.

(1949 Rev., S. 7887.)

If they contain conflicting decisions, that of the highest court is not necessarily controlling. 14 C. 387. Laws of other states presumed to be like our own, or the common law. 15 C. 18; 18 C. 370; 33 C. 432; 82 C. 352; 86 C. 234; Id., 243. Such reports are conclusive as to the laws of the jurisdiction from which they come. 18 C. 370, 371. Cited. 47 C. 599; 93 C. 46; 118 C. 156; 142 C. 278. Statute of another state construed in accordance with the decisions of its courts. 87 C. 463. Obviates necessity for specially pleading law of foreign state. 103 C. 505; 106 C. 688. Court need not take judicial notice of law of foreign jurisdiction under this section or Sec. 51-32 or 52-163 unless authoritative sources of the foreign law, subject to inspection or verification by opposing counsel, are made available to the court by reference or otherwise, under the usual rules of judicial notice. 152 C. 475. Court need not take judicial notice of the law of a foreign jurisdiction unless authoritative sources of the foreign law are made available to the court. 165 C. 777. Cited. 211 C. 555.

Cited. 2 CA 315.

Statutes and decisions in foreign states are only evidence of what the law may be found to be and not what the law is. 8 CS 259. Court refused to take judicial notice of foreign law where unfairly introduced by defendant, after conclusion of evidence, by motion for directed verdict and verdict for plaintiffs was properly sustained. 27 CS 508.

Parties not having established New York law with respect to matters in issue, court assumes that law is same as Connecticut. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 629. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 539.

Sec. 52-165. Records of corporations and public offices. The entries or records of all corporations and all public offices, where entries or records are made of their acts, votes and proceedings, by some officer appointed for that purpose, may be proved by a copy certified under the hand of such officer, and the seal of such corporation or office, if any; and, if any such officer knowingly makes a false certificate, he shall be subject to the penalties provided for false statement.

(1949 Rev., S. 7888; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 120.)

History: 1971 act specified that person who makes a false certificate is punishable by penalties for perjury rather than by penalties for false statement as was previously the case.

Certificate of the clerk indispensable, if it can be had. 26 C. 416. The record must be copied at length. 21 C. 112; 67 C. 459. Proceedings of municipal corporation, which should be recorded, cannot be proved by parol. 40 C. 105. Refers only to domestic entries, files or records. 73 C. 602. Applies to registrar of births, marriages and deaths. 74 C. 706; Id., 718; 98 C. 542; 99 C. 277; 103 C. 516. Stock books of corporation admissible in action against stockholder. 73 C. 379. Records of board of aldermen or city council. 64 C. 237; 81 C. 142. Docket entries of referee in bankruptcy. 69 C. 502; 75 C. 611. Abstract of tax list. 76 C. 174. Reports of selectmen of town. 72 C. 561; 121 U.S. 121. Record of town meeting. 78 C. 98. Records of deeds. 75 C. 68; 78 C. 106. Every state determines what shall constitute record in its courts. 69 C. 493. Records of foreign courts. Id.; 73 C. 588. Effect of copy. 74 C. 718. Certificate of registrar of births admissible to prove any official fact stated therein; as paternity of child. 98 C. 542. Copy of report of state chemist stating alcoholic content of liquor held admissible. 103 C. 515. Certificate of medical examiner stating that in his opinion death was suicidal is admissible to establish that fact; but jury should be cautioned that it is statement of opinion. 102 C. 486. Cited. 128 C. 279. Report of laboratory test which had been made by public agency under duty to perform such tests is competent evidence of its contents under public records exception to hearsay rule. 160 C. 1. Cited. 166 C. 439; 176 C. 131; 181 C. 454; 201 C. 1; 204 C. 507; 211 C. 555.

Cited. 25 CA 217. Certificate was properly admitted into evidence because section has no provision requiring corporate officer to state he is authorized to act in the manner in which he is acting, but merely prescribes that the act may be proved by a document under seal. 51 CA 733.

Cited. 38 CS 384; 42 CS 602.

Cited. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 487.

Sec. 52-166. Orders of state officials. Any order made by any state official in the performance of his duties may be proved in any court by a copy of such order certified by the person having the legal custody of the same.

(1949 Rev., S. 7889; P.A. 90-19, S. 3.)

History: P.A. 90-19 deleted references to any “regulation” made by any state official.

See Sec. 52-163 re judicial notice of regulations of state agencies.

Court could take judicial notice of regulation of public utilities commission, copy of which was placed before it under certificate of commission's secretary. 113 C. 416. Where regulations cover broad field, proper procedure is to ask court to take judicial notice of applicable portion only and regulations in entirety should not be admitted as exhibit in evidence. 149 C. 192. Cited. 186 C. 370; 204 C. 507; 211 C. 555.

Cited. 23 CA 366.

Cited. 42 CS 602.

Sec. 52-167. Corporation certificates; copies as prima facie evidence. A copy of any certificate filed by any corporation for record in the office of the Secretary of the State in compliance with the requirements of law shall, when attested by said secretary under his hand and the seal of the state, be prima facie evidence of the facts set forth therein.

(1949 Rev., S. 7890.)

Certificate is prima facie evidence not merely that the corporation is a legal entity, but that there is no legal bar to its transaction of business as such. 56 C. 97. Object of statute stated. 66 C. 21. Certificate of incorporation in another state. 73 C. 379. Cited. 103 C. 519; 204 C. 507; 211 C. 555.

Cited. 42 CS 602.

Sec. 52-168. U.S. revenue stamps on recorded documents. Certified copies of any memorandum made by a recording officer, showing the amount of the United States internal revenue stamps affixed to any document lodged for record in his office, and of their cancellation, shall be admissible in evidence.

(1949 Rev., S. 7891.)

Stamp act of Congress construed. 32 C. 95. Congress has no power to make a stamp an essential part of state process. 35 C. 45. Act requiring stamp on instruments used as evidence applies only to federal courts. Id., 240; 40 C. 330; 73 C. 665. Cited. 211 C. 555.

Sec. 52-169. Protests of bills and notes. Protests of inland bills of exchange and promissory notes, protested without this state, shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

(1949 Rev., S. 7892.)

If protest states that due notice was given to the endorser in a particular way, statute makes this evidence that such notice was in fact given. 33 C. 95. Cited. 211 C. 555.

Sec. 52-170. Records of directors of health and religious societies. The records of the proceedings of directors of health of towns or of any ecclesiastical society or religious congregation, or copies thereof, certified by its clerk, shall be admissible evidence of such proceedings in all courts.

(1949 Rev., S. 7893.)

Form of certificate. 14 C. 279. Church records of marriages and baptisms. 93 C. 39. Cited. 211 C. 555.

Sec. 52-171. Sworn copies of files and records. The files, records, votes and proceedings of any court, community, corporation, society or public board, having a clerk, may, when he is absent or unable to perform the duties of his office, be proved in any court by copies examined and sworn to by credible witnesses.

(1949 Rev., S. 7894.)

Cited. 4 D. 436; 2 C. 377; 5 C. 538. Such witnesses must testify in court. 26 C. 425. Parol evidence of the proceedings of the common council of a city, held inadmissible. 40 C. 104. Refers only to domestic entries, files or records. 73 C. 602. Cited. 211 C. 555.

Sec. 52-172. Declarations and memoranda of deceased persons. In actions by or against the representatives of deceased persons, and by or against the beneficiaries of any life or accident insurance policy insuring a person who is deceased at the time of the trial, the entries, memoranda and declarations of the deceased, relevant to the matter in issue, may be received as evidence. In actions by or against the representatives of deceased persons, in which any trustee or receiver is an adverse party, the testimony of the deceased, relevant to the matter in issue, given at his examination, upon the application of such trustee or receiver, shall be received in evidence.

(1949 Rev., S. 7895.)

Statute is comprehensive and does not exclude any memoranda left by decedent. 26 C. 92; 32 C. 518; 42 C. 153. Applies only in favor of those who sue or defend either as personal representatives, heirs and distributees, or purchasers by will; it does not embrace purchasers by contract. 32 C. 509; 56 C. 338; 71 C. 252; 109 C. 311. Statement in will held admissible under statute. 43 C. 123. Endorsement of interest on note by payee, held admissible but insufficient to prove an acknowledgment of indebtedness. 49 C. 495. Cited. 54 C. 243. “Representatives of deceased persons” construed; declaration held inadmissible. 56 C. 106; 109 C. 311. Declaration by testator as to the meaning of his will is inadmissible. 56 C. 167; 91 C. 49. Account books of decedent in his own handwriting are admissible; their weight is for the jury. 57 C. 479. Entries need not refer in terms to the matter in controversy, but may be shown to be relevant aliunde. 63 C. 313. The generality of an oral statement touching the question affects only its weight. Id., 315. An appeal from the probate of a will is not an “action” within the meaning of statute. Id., 413. Statute applies to a suit continued by original plaintiff's executor. Id., 417. Memoranda and declarations inadmissible if decedent has given a deposition covering the case. Id., 419. Declarations must be testified to by one who heard them, and cannot be supplied by evidence of the declarations of another person, since deceased, as to what the intestate said to him. 71 C. 581. Declarations of deceased landowner de his continued ownership, held admissible. 72 C. 479. Does not apply where neither estate nor legal representatives are interested; 80 C. 446; as where question is as to gift made during life; 89 C. 321; or conveyance made during lifetime. 109 C. 311. Purpose of statute includes appeal from allowance of account. 84 C. 662. Applies to statements made after action brought; so makes all statements written or oral admissible, even though deceased could not testify to them, if alive. 86 C. 474. Does not include declarations made to deceased. 87 C. 341. Declaration of deceased landowner admissible in support of title of devisee. 81 C. 219, 228. Statements of one killed by negligent act admissible in action by his administrator. 86 C. 422; 91 C. 728; 109 C. 238. When admissible; not for purchaser by contract. 71 C. 246; 72 C. 693; 109 C. 311. Statement must be relevant and material. 78 C. 337. Declarations of testamentary intent not ordinarily admissible. 91 C. 47. Statements of deceased agent of party are not admissible in his behalf. 95 C. 159. Applicable to workmen's compensation act hearings. 98 C. 649. Discretionary with trial court whether to specifically call attention of jury in charge to declarations of deceased. 99 C. 482. Statute does not apply in contest as to title of property between alleged grantee of deceased and grantee of her administrator in carrying out contract of deceased to sell land. 109 C. 311. Incompletely executed will signed by defendant's intestate and conversation he had with plaintiff admissible as written memorandum and oral statements relevant to issue of whether plaintiff's services were gratuitous. 110 C. 217. But communications between deceased and attorney and unsigned draft of new will inadmissible as privileged in suit by person not claiming under deceased. 112 C. 521. Statement by deceased contradictory to another statement by him not admissible solely to impeach his credibility, but both statements admissible in proof of facts stated. 110 C. 540. Cited. 116 C. 729; 119 C. 551; 126 C. 605. Diary of deceased containing detailed entries but lacking mention of sickness relevant to contradict allegations of plaintiff claiming compensation for nursing services. 124 C. 52. Declaration is evidence of facts stated but weight is ordinarily for jury. 135 C. 248. Letter written by decedent containing statements laudatory of plaintiff, including quotation from words of another, is admissible. 138 C. 398. A letter was held not to be admissible because the writer was not a party to the litigation. 142 C. 558. Statute broad enough to include a motion of the head of decedent. 146 C. 129. The fact that a statement contains an opinion does not necessarily make it inadmissible; statute calls for a liberal interpretation; oral declarations of deceased are admissible under statute. 148 C. 510. Cited. 153 C. 603; 154 C. 507, 511. Wife of deceased defendant permitted to testify to statements by deceased about the accident in issue. 175 C. 97. Cited. Id., 297; 183 C. 41; 202 C. 609; 211 C. 555; 217 C. 260; 218 C. 220; 237 C. 209. Overruled earlier holding that declarant must be representative of a decedent; statute does allow a third party who is not an heir or other representative of decedent's estate to invoke statute to testify as to decedent's statements. 279 C. 558.

Cited. 3 CA 111; 13 CA 101; 30 CA 305; 38 CA 73; 46 CA 620. To deny decedent the benefit of an evidentiary rule, such as the exclusions of offers of compromise, defeats purpose of statute. 50 CA 405. Out of court statement of decedent not admissible when the action was not brought by official representative of deceased person. 58 CA 19. Applicability of “dead man's statute” discussed. 70 CA 477.

Hearsay declaration of deceased person must be examined with care; trier to decide weight to be accorded it. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 148, 154. Declaration admissible under life insurance contract, not under annuity contract. Id., 676.

Sec. 52-173. Entries admissible for those claiming title from decedent. Whenever the entries and written memoranda of a deceased person would be admissible in favor of his representatives, such entries and memoranda may be admitted in favor of any person claiming title under or from the decedent.

(1949 Rev., S. 7896.)

Apparently designed as an extension of the operation of Sec. 52-172. 56 C. 340. Cited. 63 C. 413; 211 C. 555.

Sec. 52-174. Admissibility of records and reports of certain expert witnesses as business entries. (a) In all actions for the recovery of damages for personal injuries or death, (1) if a physician, dentist, chiropractor, naturopath, physical therapist, podiatrist, psychologist, social worker, mental health professional, emergency medical technician, optometrist, physician assistant, advanced practice registered nurse, professional engineer or land surveyor has died prior to the trial of the action, or (2) if such physician, dentist, chiropractor, naturopath, physical therapist, podiatrist, psychologist, social worker, mental health professional, emergency medical technician, optometrist, physician assistant, advanced practice registered nurse, professional engineer or land surveyor is physically or mentally disabled at the time of the trial of the action to such an extent that such person is no longer actively engaged in the practice of the profession, the party desiring to offer into evidence the written records and reports of the physician, dentist, chiropractor, naturopath, physical therapist, podiatrist, psychologist, social worker, mental health professional, emergency medical technician, optometrist, physician assistant or advanced practice registered nurse concerning the patient who suffered the injuries or death, or the reports and scale drawings of the professional engineer or land surveyor concerning matters relevant to the circumstances under which the injuries or death was sustained shall apply to the court in which the action is pending for permission to introduce the evidence. Notice of the application shall be served on the adverse party in the same manner as any other pleading. The court to which the application is made shall determine whether the person is disabled to the extent that the person cannot testify in person in the action. Upon the court finding that the person is so disabled, the matters shall be admissible in evidence as a business entry in accordance with the provisions of section 52-180 when offered by any party in the trial of the action.

(b) In all actions for the recovery of damages for personal injuries or death, pending on October 1, 1977, or brought thereafter, and in all court proceedings in family relations matters, as defined in section 46b-1, or in the Family Support Magistrate Division, pending on October 1, 1998, or brought thereafter, and in all other civil actions pending on October 1, 2001, or brought thereafter, any party offering in evidence a signed report and bill for treatment of any treating physician or physician assistant, dentist, chiropractor, naturopath, physical therapist, podiatrist, psychologist, social worker, mental health professional, an emergency medical technician, optometrist or advanced practice registered nurse, may have the report and bill admitted into evidence as a business entry and it shall be presumed that the signature on the report is that of such treating physician, physician assistant, dentist, chiropractor, naturopath, physical therapist, podiatrist, psychologist, social worker, mental health professional, emergency medical technician, optometrist or advanced practice registered nurse and that the report and bill were made in the ordinary course of business. The use of any such report or bill in lieu of the testimony of such treating physician, physician assistant, dentist, chiropractor, naturopath, physical therapist, podiatrist, psychologist, social worker, mental health professional, emergency medical technician, optometrist or advanced practice registered nurse shall not give rise to any adverse inference concerning the testimony or lack of testimony of such treating physician, physician assistant, dentist, chiropractor, naturopath, physical therapist, podiatrist, psychologist, social worker, mental health professional, emergency medical technician, optometrist or advanced practice registered nurse. In any action to which this subsection applies, the total amount of any bill generated by such physician, physician assistant, dentist, chiropractor, naturopath, physical therapist, podiatrist, psychologist, social worker, mental health professional, emergency medical technician, optometrist or advanced practice registered nurse shall be admissible in evidence on the issue of the cost of reasonable and necessary medical care. The calculation of the total amount of the bill shall not be reduced because such physician, physician assistant, dentist, chiropractor, naturopath, physical therapist, podiatrist, psychologist, social worker, mental health professional, emergency medical technician, optometrist or advanced practice registered nurse accepts less than the total amount of the bill or because an insurer pays less than the total amount of the bill.

(c) This section shall not be construed as prohibiting either party or the court from calling the treating physician, dentist, chiropractor, naturopath, physical therapist, podiatrist, psychologist, social worker, mental health professional, emergency medical technician, optometrist, physician assistant or advanced practice registered nurse as a witness for purposes that include, but are not limited to, providing testimony on the reasonableness of a bill for treatment generated by such physician, dentist, chiropractor, naturopath, physical therapist, podiatrist, psychologist, social worker, mental health professional, emergency medical technician, optometrist, physician assistant or advanced practice registered nurse.

(1957, P.A. 414; February, 1965, P.A. 235; 1967, P.A. 656, S. 40; 848; 1969, P.A. 215; 1972, P.A. 24; P.A. 77-226; P.A. 78-140; P.A. 82-160, S. 78; P.A. 84-101; P.A. 89-153; P.A. 94-158, S. 1; P.A. 95-42; P.A. 98-81, S. 8; P.A. 99-102, S. 48; P.A. 01-15; P.A. 08-48, S. 1; P.A. 12-142, S. 3; P.A. 14-37, S. 1.)

History: 1965 act added provisions re professional engineers; 1967 acts added Subdiv. (2) re use of written records as testimony where physician, dentist or engineer has impairment of mental faculties which prevents him from testifying and specified evidence consisting of reports, records, etc. is admissible “as a business entry in accordance with the provisions of section 52-180”; 1969 act applied provisions to chiropractors, osteopaths and land surveyors; 1972 act applied provisions to naturopaths and revised provisions to allow use of records, etc. when person is either physically or mentally disabled “to such an extent that he is no longer actively engaged in the practice of his profession” and to make court responsible for determining if person is disabled so that he cannot testify where previously use of records allowed if person was judged mentally unfit to testify upon determination of hospital superintendent; P.A. 77-226 added Subsec. (b) re use of signed report and bill for services as evidence in actions for recovery of damages for personal injury or death; P.A. 78-140 restated Subsec. (b), specifying that report signature is presumed to be that of treating physician, dentist, etc. and the report and bill are presumed to have been made in ordinary course of business and deleting details re subpoena of medical expert; P.A. 82-160 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting provisions stating that the section was applicable to actions “pending on October 1, 1957, or which are thereafter brought”, designated the last sentence of Subsec. (b) as a new Subsec. (c), and made minor technical changes to the section; P.A. 84-101 applied provisions to podiatrists; P.A. 89-153 amended Subsec. (b) to add provision that the use of any report or bill in lieu of the testimony of a treating health care provider shall not give rise to any adverse inference re testimony or lack of testimony of such treating health care provider; P.A. 94-158 applied provisions to psychologists, emergency medical technicians and optometrists; P.A. 95-42 applied provisions to physical therapists; P.A. 98-81 amended Subsec. (b) making provisions of section apply to proceedings in family relations matters or in the Family Support Magistrate Division; P.A. 99-102 deleted obsolete references to osteopathy and made technical changes re gender neutrality; P.A. 01-15 amended Subsec. (b) by adding provision re all other civil actions pending on October 1, 2001, or brought thereafter; P.A. 08-48 applied provisions to physician assistants and advanced practice registered nurses and made technical changes; P.A. 12-142 amended Subsecs. (a) and (b) by adding chapter references applicable to licensing of health care providers and making technical changes and, in Subsec. (b), by adding provisions re total amount of bill generated by certain health care providers to be admissible in evidence re cost of medical care and re total amount not to be reduced when provider accepts less than total amount or insurer pays less than total amount, and amended Subsec. (c) by adding provision re certain health care providers may be called to provide testimony on reasonableness of a bill for treatment, effective October 1, 2012, and applicable to all actions pending on or filed on or after that date; P.A. 14-37 amended Subsecs. (a) and (b) by deleting chapter references re licensure or certification and adding references to social worker and mental health professional, and amended Subsec. (c) by adding references to social worker and mental health professional, effective October 1, 2014, and applicable to all actions pending on or filed on or after that date.

Cited. 159 C. 397; 177 C. 677; 211 C. 555; 225 C. 637.

Cited. 5 CA 629; 17 CA 684; 23 CA 468; 24 CA 276; 29 CA 519; 36 CA 737.

Subsec. (b):

Statute not limited to resident medical practitioners. 205 C. 542. Cited. Id., 623; 219 C. 324. Statute not extended to dissolution case. 247 C. 356. Summary process actions are “other civil actions” under Subsec. for purposes of application of the medical treatment records exception to the hearsay rule. 325 C. 394. Medical records that were created in the ordinary course of diagnosing, caring for and treating a patient are admissible under Subsec. even if there was no opportunity to cross-examine the records' author, and to the extent Rhode v. Milla, 287 C. 731, and Millium v. New Milford Hospital, 310 C. 711, suggest that an opportunity for cross-examination is absolute prerequisite for admission of medical records prepared for use in diagnosis, care and treatment of a patient, such proposition is disavowed. 339 C. 495.

Cited. 2 CA 167; 12 CA 632; 38 CA 628; 45 CA 165; Id., 248; 47 CA 46. No adverse inference concerning use of written medical reports is permitted in court's charge to the jury. 65 CA 776. Section does not require that bill for treatment accompany a medical report admitted into evidence; requirements under section re admissibility of report were met where there was evidence that the signatory psychologist had treated the patient and had signed the report. 80 CA 111. Subsec. applies to document on a physician's letterhead, signed by such physician, who is plaintiff's treating physician; plaintiff is not required to lay a foundation under the business record exception in Sec. 52-180. 84 CA 667. Where a party seeks to offer an expert's reports or records into evidence, it is improper for the court to assist in precluding the deposition of an expert. 129 CA 81; judgment affirmed, see 310 C. 711. Medical records authored by a primary care provider who was prohibited from providing any opinion or expert testimony by 38 CFR 14.808, and therefore unavailable for cross-examination at any time, should not have been admitted into evidence. 190 CA 449; judgment reversed, see 339 C. 495.

Cited. 39 CS 301.

Sec. 52-174a. Admissibility of reports or bills re pregnancy, childbirth or genetic or blood testing as business record. In any action, petition or proceeding under chapters 815j, 815y and 816, any reports or bills related to pregnancy, childbirth or genetic or blood testing, shall be admissible into evidence as a business record without the need of further foundation, provided any such report or bill is certified to be the original or a copy thereof by the creator or custodian of such report or bill and shall constitute prima facie evidence of amounts incurred for such services or tests. The use of any such report or bill in lieu of actual testimony shall not give rise to any adverse inference concerning the testimony of the creator of the record. This section shall not be construed to prohibit any party or the court from calling any such medical practitioner as a witness.

(June 18 Sp. Sess. P.A. 97-7, S. 18, 38.)

History: June 18 Sp. Sess. P.A. 97-7 effective July 1, 1997.

Sec. 52-175. Entries and memoranda of mentally ill and incapable persons. (a) In the trial of any civil action in which any party is, at the time of the trial, mentally ill or unable to testify by reason of incurable sickness, failing mind, old age, infirmity or senility, the entries and memoranda of the party, made while he was sane and which are relevant to the matter in issue, may be received as evidence.

(b) If the entries and memoranda of any such mentally ill person or person unable to testify would be admissible, under the provisions of this section, in his favor in any action to which he is a party, the entries and memoranda may be admitted in favor of any person claiming title under or from the mentally ill person or person unable to testify.

(c) The court shall determine, upon competent evidence, as a preliminary question of fact, whether the provisions of this section apply to any party or parties to any action on trial before it.

(1949 Rev., S. 7897; P.A. 82-160, S. 79; P.A. 83-587, S. 62, 96.)

History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators; P.A. 83-587 made a technical amendment to Subsec. (a).

Cited. 168 C. 498; 211 C. 555.

Statute does not apply if person making the statement is not a party. 49 CA 365.

Sec. 52-175a. Negligence action, construction of acts of blind person. The failure of a blind person to use a guide dog or to carry a cane or walking stick which is predominantly white or metallic in color, with or without red tip, shall not be construed as evidence of comparative or contributory negligence in any negligence action.

(P.A. 73-279, S. 4.)

See Sec. 1-1f for definitions of “blind” and “physically disabled”.

Cited. 211 C. 555.

Sec. 52-176. Promise to pay barred debt to be in writing. In any action against the representatives of a deceased person, an acknowledgment or promise shall not be sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract to take the case out of the statute of limitations, unless it is contained in a writing made or signed by the party to be charged thereby. This provision shall not alter the effect of any payment of principal or interest.

(1949 Rev., S. 7898; P.A. 82-160, S. 80.)

History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.

Statute applies to claims presented against estates. 68 C. 305, 306. Signature to letter made by stenographer by means of a rubber stamp, held a sufficient compliance with statute. 73 C. 346. Unequivocal acknowledgment enough; reference to extraneous papers. 80 C. 415. Letters of administrator as such though sole heir, held not to remove bar. 84 C. 54. Effect of act of executor in charging debt in his account. Id., 137. In action on insurance policy, assignment by deceased to secure debt made after debt barred, held sufficient evidence. 88 C. 544. Cited. 129 C. 544. Statute applies where action commenced prior to death of executrix' decedent. 178 C. 529. Cited. 211 C. 555.

Cited. 17 CS 222.

Sec. 52-177. Action on bond. Burden of proving value of principal's interest. Whenever, in any action brought upon a bond given in accordance with the provisions of section 52-308, the defendant sets up in his answer, or claims, that the interest of the principal in the bond in the property attached in the action in which the bond was given was, at the time of the giving of the bond, of less value than the amount ordered by the process in the action to be attached, the burden of proving the actual value of the interest shall be upon the defendant.

(1949 Rev., S. 7900; P.A. 82-160, S. 81.)

History: P.A. 82-160 replaced “suit” with “action” and “such” with “the” where appearing.

Statute construed; presumption as to value. 58 C. 437; 102 C. 689; 109 C. 364. Cited. 86 C. 620. Recital in bond that attachment was placed on property of J. and E. estops parties to it from claiming that J. did not have any interest at all in the property. 114 C. 98. The burden of proving actual value of principal's interest is on defendant. 138 C. 428. Cited. 141 C. 675; 211 C. 555.

Sec. 52-178. Adverse party or officer, agent or employee thereof may be compelled to testify. A party to a civil action or probate proceeding: (1) May compel any adverse party, any person for whose benefit the action or proceeding is instituted, prosecuted or defended, or any officer, director, managing agent, or other agent or employee having knowledge of facts relevant to the action or proceeding, of a public or private corporation, partnership or association which is an adverse party or for whose benefit the action or proceeding is instituted, prosecuted or defended, to testify as a witness in his behalf, in the same manner and subject to the same rules as other witnesses; (2) may take the deposition of such party or person in the same manner and subject to the same rules as those pertaining to the taking of other depositions; and, (3) in either case, may examine such party to the same extent as an adverse witness.

(1949 Rev., S. 7901; March, 1958, P.A. 27, S. 64; 1959, P.A. 444; 1961, P.A. 177; P.A. 73-209; P.A. 82-160, S. 82.)

History: 1959 act provided party may be examined to same extent as adverse witness; 1961 act extended application to officers, etc. of corporations, partnerships or associations and provided for taking depositions; P.A. 73-209 allowed party to compel agents or employees “having knowledge of facts relevant to the action or proceeding” to testify; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subdiv. indicators.

Authorizes a party to require his adversary to give a deposition. 30 C. 358. Cited. 76 C. 116. Court can compel party to produce document in his hands in court. Id., 479. Defaulted defendant could be called as witness by plaintiffs in proceeding against other defendants, although he could not disclaim his own liability. 149 C. 459. Plaintiff may introduce in evidence defendant's motor vehicle accident report to show inconsistencies between testimony of defendant as a witness for plaintiff and statements in the report; since defendant had identified the report as his own, the fact that someone else may actually have filled in the body of the report did not make it inadmissible. 150 C. 349. Testimony re matters not brought to issue by the pleadings inadmissible on plaintiff's examination. 151 C. 193. Counsel for party called as witness under statute can ask leading questions on his cross-examination. Id., 402. After plaintiff's statutory direct examination, cross-examination of defendant must deal only with matters covered on direct examination. 154 C. 129, 154. Defendant called as a witness by plaintiff testified he did not know the passengers in his own car; fact for jury whether potential witnesses were known to defendant. Id., 212. Cited. 158 C. 165; 171 C. 35; 200 C. 9; 211 C. 555; 232 C. 632.

Cited. 14 CA 178.

History discussed; act as amended merely broadens definition of “adverse party” to include specified personnel of corporations, partnerships or associations; the taking of depositions is still restricted by Secs. 52-148, 52-149 and 52-152. 23 CS 249. Cited. 26 CS 338.

In motion to open judgment, mover must show how alleged erroneous ruling was prejudicial to him. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 110. Defendant's failure to produce witnesses, relying on insufficiency of plaintiff's case, does not permit inference that witness' testimony would have been favorable to plaintiff. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 649.

Sec. 52-178a. Physical examination of plaintiff, when. In any action to recover damages for personal injuries, the court or judge may order the plaintiff to submit to a physical examination by one or more physicians or surgeons. No party may be compelled to undergo a physical examination by any physician to whom he objects in writing submitted to the court or judge.

(February, 1965, P.A. 477; P.A. 82-160, S. 83.)

History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.

Cited. 211 C. 555.

History discussed; this section is an extension of Sec. 52-178 providing that an adverse party must testify; discussion of legislative intent; it is within the discretion of the court to decide whether plaintiff's objection to the examination is reasonable and to order said examination if plaintiff does not sustain his burden of proof. 26 CS 338. Plaintiff's objection to particular doctor was sustained where it appeared on oral argument he would have accepted examination by others. 28 CS 11. Cited. 40 CS 265. Legislative history analyzed; second sentence provides that right of a party to object to a physician is unconditional. 46 CS 301.

Sec. 52-179. Seal and its equivalent. All instruments in writing executed by any person or corporation not having an official or corporate seal, purporting and intended to be a specialty or under seal, and not otherwise sealed than by the addition of the word “seal” or the letters “L.S.”, or, in the case of an official or corporate seal, by an impression of such seal upon the paper or other material employed, shall be deemed in all respects sealed instruments, and received in evidence as such.

(1949 Rev., S. 7902.)

A scrawl is no seal at common law. 17 C. 343. Effect of section and of seal upon an instrument in general. 97 C. 196. Word “seal” or letters “L.S.” do not make instrument a specialty unless instrument itself purports to be a specialty and it was intended to be. 110 C. 413. Cited. 141 C. 583; 211 C. 555.

Affixing of corporate seal on instrument renders it in all respects a sealed instrument. 2 CS 163. Whether or not a mark is a seal depends on the intent. 9 CS 393. Word “seal” does not automatically denote intention to make a sealed instrument. 30 CS 596.

Whether defendants adopted seal was under pleading, a question of contested fact; consequently, intention of defendants with reference to their sealing of instrument should not, as it was, have been disposed of summarily as matter of law. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 78, 84.

Sec. 52-180. Admissibility of business entries and photographic copies. (a) Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence or event, shall be admissible as evidence of the act, transaction, occurrence or event, if the trial judge finds that it was made in the regular course of any business, and that it was the regular course of the business to make the writing or record at the time of the act, transaction, occurrence or event or within a reasonable time thereafter.

(b) The writing or record shall not be rendered inadmissible by (1) a party's failure to produce as witnesses the person or persons who made the writing or record, or who have personal knowledge of the act, transaction, occurrence or event recorded or (2) the party's failure to show that such persons are unavailable as witnesses. Either of such facts and all other circumstances of the making of the writing or record, including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect the weight of the evidence, but not to affect its admissibility.

(c) Except as provided in the Freedom of Information Act, as defined in section 1-200, if any person in the regular course of business has kept or recorded any memorandum, writing, entry, print, representation or combination thereof, of any act, transaction, occurrence or event, and in the regular course of business has caused any or all of them to be recorded, copied or reproduced by any photographic, photostatic, microfilm, microcard, miniature photographic or other process which accurately reproduces or forms a durable medium for so reproducing the original, the original may be destroyed in the regular course of business unless its preservation is otherwise required by statute. The reproduction, when satisfactorily identified, shall be as admissible in evidence as the original in any judicial or administrative proceeding, whether the original is in existence or not, and an enlargement or facsimile of the reproduction shall be likewise admissible in evidence if the original reproduction is in existence and available for inspection under direction of court. The introduction of a reproduced record, enlargement or facsimile shall not preclude admission of the original.

(d) The term “business” shall include business, profession, occupation and calling of every kind.

(1949 Rev., S. 7903; 1955, S. 3159d; 1971, P.A. 19; P.A. 82-160, S. 84; P.A. 97-47, S. 41.)

History: 1971 act amended provision re destruction of original documents to delete prohibition against destruction of documents “held in a custodial or fiduciary capacity”; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators; P.A. 97-47 amended Subsec. (c) by substituting “the Freedom of Information Act, as defined in section 1-18a” for “chapter 3”.

Annotations to former statute making book entries admissible in action for book debt: Statute was peculiar to this state, and was the earliest judicial proceeding in which parties were allowed to testify in their own behalf, a statute to this effect having been adopted in 1715. Book debt does not lie for articles delivered under a special contract; 9 C. 349; nor for damages; K. 289; 11 C. 206; nor on a promise of indemnity. 1 C. 78. It lies for money lent; 20 C. 260; and for goods sold to be paid for in kind if not so paid for; 11 C. 471; and for moneys withheld by an agent. 1 R. 85. Plaintiff is not required to prove charge on book, if he can account satisfactorily for not having made them. 6 C. 17. When entries must be verified by the maker if living and within the jurisdiction of the court. 41 C. 108. Entry not inadmissible because made upon information given by salesman. 47 C. 435. Where maker of entries is beyond the reach of process, or is incompetent to testify, his handwriting may be proved as if he were dead. 54 C. 217. It is not necessary that the transaction to which the entries apply should be directly between the original debtor and creditor. Id., 218. Physician's entries held admissible in pauper suit between towns. Id., 216. Shop-books admissible to prove a sale to the person to whom the goods were charged. 66 C. 162. Nature of action of book debt; entries must be charges in regular account book. 78 C. 646. Entries in account book admissible to prove payment by merchandise delivered. 77 C. 167. Cited. 111 C. 419; 137 C. 320; 138 C. 23. Where the entry in a hospital record is pertinent to the care and treatment of a patient, it is admissible. 140 C. 54.

Cited. 115 C. 230. Books of account are not the only admissible evidence; testimony of person who performed work is also admissible. 118 C. 331. Cited. Id., 453; 122 C. 382. To be admissible, court must find both that entry was made in regular course of business and that it was regular course of business to make such entry. 123 C. 60. History reviewed; statute is of much broader scope than former statute; hospital and laboratory records admissible with respect to diagnosis, treatment and condition. 125 C. 92. Establishes general rule as to admissibility of evidence applicable in criminal as well as civil cases. 127 C. 598. Written records of Visiting Nurse Association properly admitted. 134 C. 173. Testimony of supervising investigator of welfare department based on information in department files, held not hearsay. 145 C. 458. Portions of exhibit not established as made in the regular course of business, properly deleted. Id., 714. The fact that a record is generally admissible under section does not mean that everything contained in the record is necessarily admissible in a given case. 147 C. 663. That witness, employee of defendant and in charge of its books, was not in its employ at time entries were made, did not, in and of itself, render records incompetent. 149 C. 45. To be admissible, record must be based on entrant's own observation or upon information transmitted to him by observer whose duty it was to so transmit. Id., 195. History discussed. 153 C. 445, 448. Representation by purchaser on printed form beneath conditional bill of sale not admissible as a business entry but hearsay where he was not a party or a witness. 154 C. 593. Bills for extra material and labor sent to defendant in regular course of business of plaintiff were admissible entries made in regular course of business and court correctly overruled objections to them as hearsay. 156 C. 55. Plaintiff's journal, although excluded from evidence, was marked as exhibit for identification and should have been retained in custody of court clerk to be available for examination by appeals court upon appeal of ruling of exclusion. Id., 401. Where general objection to admission of police record was overruled, plaintiff could not on appeal object to specific items. 157 C. 566. Testimony of director of hospital laboratory that record of complaining witness' medical examination was kept in regular course of business made it acceptable under section as evidence in trial for rape. 158 C. 22. Statement in hospital record that plaintiff patient was driver of car in which his injury occurred, not admissible under section. Id., 281. Cited. 159 C. 397; 161 C. 6; 165 C. 288; Id., 364; 167 C. 631; 172 C. 275; 173 C. 520. Although police report of traffic accident generally admissible as business entry, statute does not require that everything in it be admitted into evidence. 175 C. 1. Admission of a party opponent in statement to investigating officer and contained in latter's report is admissible as an exception to hearsay rule. Id., 41. Cited. 176 C. 33; Id., 170; 177 C. 401; Id., 677, 733. Discussion of business records generated by computer and credentials of witness testifying to establish admissibility thereof. 179 C. 349. Trial court did not err in admitting bills and invoices based on testimony of vice-president who was not the bookkeeper at the time the records were made. 180 C. 120. Cited. 181 C. 454. Discussion of admissibility of laboratory report or similar record in face of sixth amendment objection. Id., 562. Cited. 185 C. 37; 190 C. 371; 195 C. 651; 202 C. 128; 205 C. 542; Id., 623; 206 C. 512; 211 C. 555; 214 C. 146; 215 C. 31; 217 C. 260; Id., 476; 219 C. 787; 228 C. 487; 238 C. 183. Erroneous admission of double hearsay evidence was harmless; claimant bears burden of demonstrating that error was harmful. 245 C. 640. Certain bank statements ruled admissible where testimony of bank's director of operations was sufficient to establish a foundation. 246 C. 594. Letters written for litigation purposes at plaintiff's request and summary of doctor's opinion are not business records admissible pursuant to statute. 247 C. 356. Transcription of physician's notes is admissible under the business records exception where the original document (physician's notes) is prepared contemporaneously with the acts described. 257 C. 230. Trial court improperly concluded that because hospital test satisfied Sec. 52-180, it did not need to consider whether a Porter hearing was required. 263 C. 390. Although business records are subject to redaction by trial court on grounds of relevancy, insufficient connection to “business” of department or status as inadmissible hearsay, the burden is on opponent of the evidence properly to object to any challenged portion of the records. 267 C. 686.

Cited. 1 CA 454; Id., 501; 2 CA 58; 5 CA 296; 6 CA 429; 7 CA 326; Id., 364; Id., 398; 8 CA 177; Id., 673; 9 CA 59; Id., 379; 11 CA 327; 12 CA 468; 17 CA 121; Id., 416; Id., 460; Id., 684; 18 CA 597; 21 CA 138; Id., 162; Id., 496; Id., 645; 22 CA 689; 23 CA 19; 24 CA 57; 25 CA 298; Id., 681; 28 CA 56; Id., 521; 29 CA 600; 30 CA 346; Id., 827; Id., 839; 31 CA 94; Id., 660; 33 CA 702; 34 CA 535; 35 CA 828; 36 CA 216; 37 CA 515; 38 CA 575; 39 CA 684; 40 CA 268; 41 CA 225; 44 CA 271; 45 CA 165; Id., 352; Id., 455. Attorney trial referee did not abuse discretion by admitting exhibits pursuant to business records exception to hearsay rule. 48 CA 205. Printout of loan history and affidavit of debt were properly admitted. 51 CA 733. Documents need not be prepared by the organization itself to be admissible. 55 CA 384. Trial court properly admitted defendant's blood alcohol level content test results as part of his hospital records because the records met requirements for a business record as an exception to the hearsay rule under section. 61 CA 164. Section allows otherwise inadmissible hearsay to be admissible, with certain limitations. 63 CA 72. Computer-generated maps were properly admitted because they met the three conditions set forth in section and witness laid the proper foundation for admission. 69 CA 169. Capital needs assessment offered by defendant to show type of report lenders typically rely upon in deciding whether to loan money deemed admissible under business record exception to hearsay rule, despite fact that assessment was not prepared by defendant; assessment was made in the regular course of business by an organization that had a duty to prepare assessment. 88 CA 638. In foreclosure action, plaintiff bank's former employee who held several different positions within the bank and was very familiar with bank's records and computer system but had no personal knowledge of defendant's loan or the origin of the loan document was deemed qualified to authenticate bank's records for purposes of admitting defendant's loan records into evidence as exhibits; business records exception does not require documents to have been prepared by company seeking to admit them as business records, nor is company required to establish a chain of custody for the documents or establish that witnesses have personal knowledge of their origins. 92 CA 696. Document offered through testimony of assistant vice president and manager of foreclosure department who had personal knowledge of facts and circumstances surrounding defendant's mortgage qualified as business record and testimony that document was created in regular course of plaintiff's business, having satisfied elements of trustworthiness under section, was properly authenticated. 94 CA 793. Documents admitted into evidence under business records exception to hearsay rule were properly authenticated by witness who testified that he worked for plaintiff for 3 years and was familiar with its books and records, specifically as they related to defendants, that plaintiff created the types of documents at issue in the regular course of its business, that he knew such documents were generated in the regular course of plaintiff's business and that he had personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding defendant's loan and personal experience with plaintiff's general record keeping procedures. 156 CA 441. Affidavit was not sufficient to admit computer generated documents under business records exception to hearsay rule because it did not establish that the computer systems were reliable; business records that are generated by computers present structural questions of reliability that transcend the reliability of the underlying information that is entered into the computer. 163 CA 648.

Applies to entries and receipts of a bank indicating withdrawals. 9 CS 358. Autopsy and toxicological reports properly admitted as official reports made in the regular course of business. 19 CS 278. Medical report of a deceased physician as to defendant's intoxication held inadmissible, though it appeared on a mimeographed form of the police department. 24 CS 45. Requirements for admission; evidence not admissible; discussion. 31 CS 510. Business entry exception to hearsay rule must be construed to mean that all requirements for admission must be satisfied by appropriate foundation testimony before business record can be admitted into evidence. 33 CS 668. Cited. 36 CS 632; 37 CS 637; 38 CS 384; Id., 426; 39 CS 381.

Failure of finding in trial court to indicate compliance with requirements fatal. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 264. Cited. Id., 693; 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 192. Appellant failed to establish that improper admission of document as business entry was harmful error. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 160–165. Police report may be admitted as business entry if it complies with rest of statute. Id., 599–601.

Subsec. (a):

Although computer printouts were arguably not made in the regular course of business, the computer information itself satisfied the three statutory conditions for admissibility. 57 CA 1.

Subsec. (b):

Failure to produce witness re reports did not affect admissibility of a payment history report, but could affect weight of the evidence. 49 CA 563. Failure to produce as witness the person who actually drew, labeled and tested defendant's blood and recorded test results in defendant's hospital records is not a bar to admission of the evidence as a business record. 61 CA 164.

Sec. 52-180a. Admissibility of out-of-state hospital record or bill for treatment. Any and all parts of any hospital record or bill for treatment, or copy thereof, made by a hospital located without this state in connection with the treatment of a patient, if not otherwise inadmissible, shall be admissible in evidence without any preliminary testimony if there is attached thereto the certification in affidavit form of the person in charge of the record room of the hospital or his authorized assistant indicating that such record, bill or copy is the original record or bill or a copy thereof, made in the regular course of the business of the hospital, and that it was the regular course of such business to make such record or bill at the time of the transaction, occurrence or event recorded therein or within a reasonable time thereafter.

(P.A. 89-156.)

Cited. 31 CA 94.

Sec. 52-180b. Presumption against admission of evidence of prior criminal conviction of applicant or employee. There shall be a rebuttable presumption against admission of evidence of the prior criminal conviction of an applicant or employee in an action alleging that an employer has been negligent in hiring an applicant or retaining an employee, or in supervising the employer's agent, representative or designee with respect to hiring an applicant or retaining an employee, if the applicant or employee held a valid provisional pardon or certificate of rehabilitation at the time such alleged negligence occurred and a party establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employer knew that the applicant or employee held a valid provisional pardon or certificate of rehabilitation at the time such alleged negligence occurred. For the purposes of this section, “employer” has the same meaning as provided in section 46a-80a.

(P.A. 14-27, S. 7; P.A. 21-32, S. 34.)

History: P.A. 21-32 redefined “employer”, effective January 1, 2023.

Sec. 52-180c. Admissibility of evidence of sexual misconduct. (a) As used in this section: (1) “Sexual misconduct” means any act that is prohibited by section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70c, 53a-71, 53a-72a, 53a-72b or 53a-73a, and any act that constitutes sexual harassment, as defined in subdivision (8) of subsection (b) of section 46a-60; and (2) “victim” includes an alleged victim.

(b) The following evidence is not admissible in a civil proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct: (1) Evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior; or (2) evidence offered to prove a victim's sexual predisposition.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, the court may admit the evidence in a civil case if the probative value of such evidence substantially outweighs the danger of (1) harm to any victim; and (2) unfair prejudice to any party. The court may admit evidence of a victim's reputation only if the victim has placed the victim's reputation in controversy.

(d) If a party intends to offer evidence under subsection (c) of this section, the party shall: (1) File a motion by lodging a record pursuant to the requirements set forth in the Connecticut Practice Book that specifically describes the evidence and states the purpose for which it is to be offered; (2) file such motion not later than fourteen days before the date on which the case is to be heard, unless the court, for good cause shown, prescribes a different time for the filing of such motion; (3) serve the motion on all parties in accordance with the rules of the court; and (4) notify the victim or, when appropriate, the victim's guardian or representative.

(e) Before admitting evidence pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, the court shall conduct an in camera hearing and give the parties and the victim the right to attend such hearing and be heard. Unless the court orders otherwise, the motion, related materials and the record of the hearing shall be sealed and remain sealed.

(P.A. 19-16, S. 12; P.A. 21-40, S. 50.)

History: P.A. 21-40 amended Subsec. (a) to redefine “sexual misconduct”.

Sec. 52-181. Evidence of death or capture. An official written report or record, or certified copy thereof, that a person is missing, missing in action, interned in a neutral country or beleaguered, besieged or captured by an enemy, or is dead, or is alive, made by any officer or employee of the United States authorized by any law of the United States to make the same, shall be received in any court, office or other place in this state as evidence that such person is missing, missing in action, interned in a neutral country or beleaguered, besieged or captured by an enemy, or is dead, or is alive, as the case may be.

(1955, S. 3160d.)

Cited. 211 C. 555.

Sec. 52-182. Presumption of family car or motorboat in operation by certain person. Proof that the operator of a motor vehicle or a motorboat, as defined in section 15-127, was the husband, wife, father, mother, son or daughter of the owner shall raise a presumption that such motor vehicle or motorboat was being operated as a family car or boat within the scope of a general authority from the owner, and shall impose upon the defendant the burden of rebutting such presumption.

(1949 Rev., S. 7904; 1967, P.A. 310.)

History: 1967 act added motorboats to scope of section.

Complaint must allege relationship, but not necessary to allege agency. 117 C. 101. Statute procedural, not substantive. Id., 545. Presumption avails plaintiff until trier finds proven the circumstances re use of car and authority to drive it, whereupon burden is on plaintiff to establish that the car was being operated at the time of accident as a family car. 118 C. 58. Cited. Id., 656; 123 C. 462; 126 C. 587. Presumption compared with those under Secs. 52-114 and 52-183. 130 C. 187, 188. Cited. 132 C. 464. Mere production of evidence by defendant will not suffice to remove presumption created by statute for the court might disbelieve it; it is only when the facts are found that the presumption disappears. 135 C. 428. Conclusion of court that necessary conditions prevailed upheld. 138 C. 506. Doctrine held applicable. Id., 551. Cited. 142 C. 80. Wife can recover from husband because of delict of son who was agent of husband. 145 C. 663. Court below correct in applying family car doctrine, holding defendant liable, although decision in another case held defendant not an owner of the car causing accident; doctrine of collateral estoppel did not apply as plaintiff and defendant were not adversaries in prior case. 154 C. 328. Cited. 155 C. 218, 221; 157 C. 260. Married son living outside family not within scope of family car doctrine. 163 C. 89. Burden on defendant to rebut presumption of family car doctrine. Id., 91. Cited. 176 C. 285; 190 C. 774; 211 C. 555.

Cited. 9 CA 221; 38 CA 852.

Defendant must prove facts sufficient to rebut presumption, not merely introduce evidence. 5 CS 97. Doctrine not applicable to serviceman who, while overseas, loaned car to brother. 14 CS 236. Where father lived in Massachusetts and son in Connecticut, car not regarded as family car. 15 CS 146. In-law relationship does not come within section. 16 CS 195. Presumption avails plaintiff even where defendant driver was operating wife's vehicle on company business for which company was paying for gas and oil. 17 CS 64. Failure of plaintiff to allege agency under family car doctrine not demurrable. Id., 75. Presumption does not arise where driver is son of owner's employee; father and son relationship must be shown between driver and owner. 25 CS 35. Contributory negligence of operator of family car is imputable to plaintiff-owner so as to bar recovery by him for damage to it. 26 CS 387. Negligence of driver of family car is not imputed to owner-occupant and demurrer to defense of imputed negligence should be sustained. 28 CS 90. The purpose of section is to govern procedure, not to affect or create substantive rights. 32 CS 158. Cited. 42 CS 114.

Applies only to cases where plaintiff invokes statute to assist recovery against defendant and not to cases where defendant invokes statute to prevent recovery by plaintiff. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 654. Statute evidences no legislative intent to create a universally applicable vicarious responsibility. Id., 659. An indispensable requisite of the family purpose doctrine is that the person on whom it is sought to impose liability exercise some degree of control over the automobile's use. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 591, 594.

Sec. 52-183. Presumption of agency in motor vehicle operation. In any civil action brought against the owner of a motor vehicle to recover damages for the negligent or reckless operation of the motor vehicle, the operator, if he is other than the owner of the motor vehicle, shall be presumed to be the agent and servant of the owner of the motor vehicle and operating it in the course of his employment. The defendant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption.

(1949 Rev., S. 7905; P.A. 82-160, S. 85.)

History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.

Cited. 123 C. 396. Presumption avails plaintiff until trier finds proven the circumstances with reference to use of car and authority to drive it, leaving burden then on plaintiff to establish that car was being operated by agent in course of employment. Id., 459. Presumption not rebutted by mere offer of substantial countervailing evidence; jury not obliged to accept testimony offered by defendant on agency and may find for plaintiff even if he produces no evidence on that issue. 126 C. 587. Nature of presumption; burden on defendant is restricted to rebutting presumption. 130 C. 185; Id., 684. Plaintiff does not waive benefit of presumption of agency by introducing evidence of the fact of agency on his case in chief. 137 C. 675. Inapplicable where there is no allegation re ownership of car. 145 C. 605. If dealer's plates are affixed to motor vehicle, they constitute prima facie evidence of ownership by dealer to whom plates were issued. 151 C. 252. Cited. 155 C. 218, 221; 156 C. 194. Directed verdict for defendant was proper where plaintiff's proof showed defendant loaned her car to her nephew for his personal family use in course of which accident occurred. 157 C. 258. Presumption is not ousted by mere introduction of contrary evidence, but ceases to operate when trier finds proven facts which fairly put question in issues; direction of verdict for defendant is generally precluded. 164 C. 277. Cited. 190 C. 774; 211 C. 555. Section creates rebuttable presumption of employer-employee relationship between owner and operator of a motor vehicle, rendering owner vicariously liable for compensatory damages arising out of negligent and reckless conduct of the operator, but not vicariously liable for punitive damages stemming from that conduct. 266 C. 822.

Cited. 9 CA 221; 11 CA 485; 19 CA 85; 25 CA 665. Discussion of the word “owner”; trial court improperly granted defendant's motion to set aside verdict where jury reasonably could have found from evidence presented that public transit bus involved in accident was owned by defendant and that defendant did not rebut presumption arising under section that bus was operated by agent of defendant acting within the scope of his agency at the time of the accident. 61 CA 29. Presumption is not ousted simply by introduction of any evidence to the contrary. 83 CA 782.

It is unnecessary to allege agency since statute raises such presumption. 4 CS 226, but see 12 CS 279 and 14 CS 342. Presumption is not overcome by any substantial countervailing evidence but is effective until defendant proves the truth as to what the facts are by a fair preponderance of evidence. 5 CS 20; Id., 97. Describing defendant as “brother, agent and servant” does not waive presumption of agency in favor of plaintiff. 9 CS 193. Statute does not create a new kind of agency but only creates a presumption of agency susceptible to rebuttal. 12 CS 279. Cited. 14 CS 238; 15 CS 148; 16 CS 194. Allegation of ownership and operation are sufficient to raise statutory presumption of agency. 17 CS 49. Section primarily designed to apply to commercial vehicles. Id., 73. Motion for summary judgment by defendant in effect sought to deprive plaintiff of benefit of presumption; denied. 27 CS 108. Cited. 32 CS 158.

Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 653. Where a minor's vehicle is registered in the name of the father for the purpose of evading financial responsibility, the registered owner of the vehicle is estopped to deny not only ownership of the vehicle but also that the minor-owner was acting in furtherance of the business of the father when the tort occurred. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 591, 598. Statute does not establish that operator of car is agent of owner, acting within scope of his employment, but only creates a rebuttable presumption. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 113.

Sec. 52-184. Transferred to Chapter 815y, Sec. 46b-168.

Sec. 52-184a. Evidence obtained illegally by electronic device inadmissible. No evidence obtained illegally by the use of any electronic device is admissible in any court of this state.

(1967, P.A. 871.)

See Sec. 53a-187 et seq re tampering with private communications and eavesdropping.

Cited. 211 C. 555.

Cited. 15 CA 529.

Cited. 39 CS 392.

Sec. 52-184b. Failure to bill and advance payments inadmissible in malpractice cases. (a) For the purposes of this section, “health care provider” means any person, corporation, facility or institution licensed by this state to provide health care or professional services, or an officer, employee or agent thereof acting in the course and scope of his employment.

(b) The failure of a health care provider to bill a patient for services rendered shall not be construed as an admission of liability and shall not be admissible in evidence as to liability in any trial for malpractice, error or omission against a health care provider in connection with the provision of health care or professional services.

(c) Any advance payment for medical bills by a health care provider or by the insurer of a health care provider shall not be construed as an admission of liability and shall not be admissible in evidence as to liability in any trial for malpractice, error or omission against a health care provider in connection with the provision of health care or professional services.

(P.A. 76-125, S. 1–3.)

Cited. 211 C. 555; 242 C. 1.

Sec. 52-184c. Standard of care in negligence action against health care provider. Qualifications of expert witness. (a) In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death occurring on or after October 1, 1987, in which it is alleged that such injury or death resulted from the negligence of a health care provider, as defined in section 52-184b, the claimant shall have the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that the alleged actions of the health care provider represented a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care for that health care provider. The prevailing professional standard of care for a given health care provider shall be that level of care, skill and treatment which, in light of all relevant surrounding circumstances, is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably prudent similar health care providers.

(b) If the defendant health care provider is not certified by the appropriate American board as being a specialist, is not trained and experienced in a medical specialty, or does not hold himself out as a specialist, a “similar health care provider” is one who: (1) Is licensed by the appropriate regulatory agency of this state or another state requiring the same or greater qualifications; and (2) is trained and experienced in the same discipline or school of practice and such training and experience shall be as a result of the active involvement in the practice or teaching of medicine within the five-year period before the incident giving rise to the claim.

(c) If the defendant health care provider is certified by the appropriate American board as a specialist, is trained and experienced in a medical specialty, or holds himself out as a specialist, a “similar health care provider” is one who: (1) Is trained and experienced in the same specialty; and (2) is certified by the appropriate American board in the same specialty; provided if the defendant health care provider is providing treatment or diagnosis for a condition which is not within his specialty, a specialist trained in the treatment or diagnosis for that condition shall be considered a “similar health care provider”.

(d) Any health care provider may testify as an expert in any action if he: (1) Is a “similar health care provider” pursuant to subsection (b) or (c) of this section; or (2) is not a similar health care provider pursuant to subsection (b) or (c) of this section but, to the satisfaction of the court, possesses sufficient training, experience and knowledge as a result of practice or teaching in a related field of medicine, so as to be able to provide such expert testimony as to the prevailing professional standard of care in a given field of medicine. Such training, experience or knowledge shall be as a result of the active involvement in the practice or teaching of medicine within the five-year period before the incident giving rise to the claim.

(P.A. 86-338, S. 11; P.A. 87-227, S. 8.)

History: P.A. 87-227 amended Subsec. (a) to change applicability of section from “In any cause of action accruing on or after October 1, 1986, to recover damages for personal injury or wrongful death” to “In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death occurring on or after October 1, 1987” and specified that a health care provider is “as defined in section 52-184b”.

Cited. 211 C. 555; 214 C. 1; 215 C. 701; 239 C. 574; 242 C. 1. There is no explicit incorporation of the definition in Sec. 52-184b with reference to a similar health care provider anywhere in this section; this suggests that legislature intended to incorporate the definition only with reference to defendant health care providers and not with reference to similar health care providers. 265 C. 79.

Cited. 34 CA 871; 44 CA 257; 46 CA 391.

Subsec. (a):

In claim for ordinary negligence for failure of health care provider to warn third party, expert testimony required to prove standard of care, breach of that standard and causation of injury. 262 C. 248. Expert testimony establishing standard of care at a particular hospital is relevant only if it comports with an accepted, applicable national standard of care. 289 C. 61.

Subsec. (b):

Absent evidence of specialized training, registered nurses are considered nonspecialists under Subsec. 172 CA 699.

Subsec. (c):

Good faith opinion letter from physician who is board certified in obstetrics and gynecology meets requirements of Subsec. because claims were related to care given by certified nurse-midwives and a registered nurse in same specialty. 314 C. 709.

Plaintiff's author of opinion letter does not fall within definition of “similar health care provider” under section because, unlike defendant physician, the author of the opinion letter is not board certified in emergency medicine. 168 CA 47. Author of plaintiff's opinion letter does not fall within definition of “similar health care provider” under section because, unlike defendant who is an anatomic pathologist, the author of the opinion letter is a clinical pathologist. 187 CA 555.

Subsec. (d):

Does not preclude board-certified physician from testifying as an expert solely because the physician was not board-certified at the time of the alleged malpractice. 262 C. 637.

Subsec. deals with situations where specialties overlap. 77 CA 307. Affords court discretion in determining whether an expert may testify and thus it is possible that expert could qualify to testify at trial under Subsec. but not qualify to provide a prelitigation opinion pursuant to Sec. 52-190a(a). 117 CA 535.

Sec. 52-184d. Inadmissibility of apology made by health care provider to alleged victim of unanticipated outcome of medical care. (a) For the purposes of this section:

(1) “Health care provider” means a provider, as defined in subsection (b) of section 20-7b, or an institution, as defined in section 19a-490, and includes a health care institution or facility operated by the state;

(2) “Relative” means a victim's spouse, parent, grandparent, stepfather, stepmother, child, grandchild, brother, sister, half brother, half sister or spouse's parents, and includes such relationships that are created as a result of adoption and any person who has a family-type relationship with a victim;

(3) “Representative” means a legal guardian, attorney, health care representative or any person recognized in law or custom as a patient's agent; and

(4) “Unanticipated outcome” means the outcome of a medical treatment or procedure that differs from an expected result.

(b) In any civil action brought by an alleged victim of an unanticipated outcome of medical care, or in any arbitration proceeding related to such civil action, any and all statements, affirmations, gestures or conduct expressing apology, fault, sympathy, commiseration, condolence, compassion or a general sense of benevolence that are made by a health care provider or an employee of a health care provider to the alleged victim, a relative of the alleged victim or a representative of the alleged victim and that relate to the discomfort, pain, suffering, injury or death of the alleged victim as a result of the unanticipated outcome of medical care shall be inadmissible as evidence of an admission of liability or as evidence of an admission against interest.

(P.A. 05-275, S. 9; P.A. 06-40, S. 2; 06-195, S. 78.)

History: P.A. 05-275 effective July 13, 2005; P.A. 06-40 redefined “health care provider” in Subsec. (a)(1) to include a health care institution or facility operated by the state, effective May 8, 2006; P.A. 06-195 substituted “health care representative” for “health care agent” in Subsec. (a)(3).

Sec. 52-184e. Admissibility of amount of damages awarded to plaintiff in separate action against different health care provider. (a) For the purposes of this section:

(1) “Licensed health care provider” means any health care institution licensed pursuant to the provisions of chapter 368v or any individual provider of health care licensed pursuant to the provisions of chapters 370 to 373, inclusive, or 375 to 383c, inclusive, or a pharmacist or other person licensed pursuant to chapter 400j;

(2) “Health care services” means acts of diagnosis, treatment, medical evaluation or advice or such other acts as may be permissible under the health care licensing statutes of this state.

(b) In any action to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death, whether in tort or contract, in which it is alleged that such injury or death resulted from the professional negligence of a licensed health care provider in the provision of health care services, such provider may introduce evidence of the amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff for such injury or death by the trier of fact in a separate action by such plaintiff against a different health care provider.

(P.A. 05-275, S. 8.)

History: P.A. 05-275 effective October 1, 2005, and applicable to actions accruing on or after that date.