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Great Philosophical Debates: Free Will and Determinism
"Do you make your own choices or have circumstances beyond your control already decided your destiny?
For thousands of years, this very question has intrigued and perplexed philosophers, scientists, and everyone who thinks deliberately about how they choose to live and act. The answer to this age-old riddle is universally relevant to our lives. The implications of our views on it can affect everything from small choices we make every day to our perspective on criminal justice and capital punishment. From the Stoics to Boethius, from Kant to Hume, from Sartre to contemporary philosophers, great minds have puzzled over this debate for centuries.
Now you can learn the intriguing details of this fundamental philosophical question with Great Philosophical Debates: Free Will and Determinism, 24 fascinating lectures by Shaun Nichols, award-winning Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at the University of Arizona."
The Great Courses.com
For thousands of years, this very question has intrigued and perplexed philosophers, scientists, and everyone who thinks deliberately about how they choose to live and act. The answer to this age-old riddle is universally relevant to our lives. The implications of our views on it can affect everything from small choices we make every day to our perspective on criminal justice and capital punishment. From the Stoics to Boethius, from Kant to Hume, from Sartre to contemporary philosophers, great minds have puzzled over this debate for centuries.
Now you can learn the intriguing details of this fundamental philosophical question with Great Philosophical Debates: Free Will and Determinism, 24 fascinating lectures by Shaun Nichols, award-winning Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at the University of Arizona."
The Great Courses.com
Unknown Binding
Published January 1, 2008
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November 5, 2017
الإرادة الحرة والحتمية
في عالم يحكمه قانون السببية، هل خياراتنا حرة حقًا؟ هل يمكن لنا أن نختار ما نختار، أي أن نختار رغباتنا، أم أننا ننفذ الرغبات التي تتولد في عقولنا دون علمنا بالأسباب ولا يعدو دور الوعي سوى التبرير؟ ألن تمتد هذه السلسلة من الأسباب إلى ما قبل ولادتنا؟ فمن أين تأتي إذًا إرادتنا الحرة إن وجدت؟ وهل يمكن ألا يعدو هذا الشعور بالحرية في الاختيار الوهم الجميل الذي يخلقه العقل؟ ألا يمكن التوفيق بين الحتمية والإرادة الحرة؟ ما هي التبعات الأخلاقية المتربة على كل هذا؟
في هذه السلسلة من المحاضرات يقوم بروفيسور الفلسفة شون نيكولس من جامعة أريزونا بتقديم هذا الموضوع بدءًا بتعريف المواقف الثلاثة منه، وهي:
1. نفي الحتمية المطلقة وتأكيد وجود الإرادة مهما كانت محدودة
2. التوفيق بين الحتمية والإرادة الحرة
3. التشكيك في وجود الإرادة الحرة ونفيها
ثم يستعرض البروفيسور بشكل مختصر التاريخ الطويل لهذا الموضوع في مختلف الحضارات والديانات التي فكرت فيه وبعد ذلك ينتقل للحجج التي تؤيد وتعارض على كل موقف.
ما يميز هذه المحاضرات هو تقديمها بصورة محايدة، فلا يتم الانحياز لأي وجهة نظر، بل الهدف هو التعليم، لا الاقناع. ويقوم البروفيسور بطرح بعض المواضيع العلمية المرتبطة بالموضوع مثل البيولوجيا وعلم الأعصاب وميكانيكا الكم. ويتم استعراض التبعات الأخلاقية والعملية، خاصة تلك المترتبة على نفي الإرادة الحرة، وفيما يتعلق بأصحاب الشخصية السايكوباثية.
من بين جميع ما قرأت واستمعت له هذا العام، فإن هذه السلسلة من المحاضرات كان لها التأثير الأكبر علي، فقد ساهمت في توضيح بعض مواقفي وتنقية بعض أفكاري والتي كانت ضبابية بعض الشيء، ولم أشعر بأي لحظة من الملل أثناء استماعي للمحاضرات. أنصح به كل من تراوده الأسئلة حول موضوع الإرادة.
في عالم يحكمه قانون السببية، هل خياراتنا حرة حقًا؟ هل يمكن لنا أن نختار ما نختار، أي أن نختار رغباتنا، أم أننا ننفذ الرغبات التي تتولد في عقولنا دون علمنا بالأسباب ولا يعدو دور الوعي سوى التبرير؟ ألن تمتد هذه السلسلة من الأسباب إلى ما قبل ولادتنا؟ فمن أين تأتي إذًا إرادتنا الحرة إن وجدت؟ وهل يمكن ألا يعدو هذا الشعور بالحرية في الاختيار الوهم الجميل الذي يخلقه العقل؟ ألا يمكن التوفيق بين الحتمية والإرادة الحرة؟ ما هي التبعات الأخلاقية المتربة على كل هذا؟
في هذه السلسلة من المحاضرات يقوم بروفيسور الفلسفة شون نيكولس من جامعة أريزونا بتقديم هذا الموضوع بدءًا بتعريف المواقف الثلاثة منه، وهي:
1. نفي الحتمية المطلقة وتأكيد وجود الإرادة مهما كانت محدودة
2. التوفيق بين الحتمية والإرادة الحرة
3. التشكيك في وجود الإرادة الحرة ونفيها
ثم يستعرض البروفيسور بشكل مختصر التاريخ الطويل لهذا الموضوع في مختلف الحضارات والديانات التي فكرت فيه وبعد ذلك ينتقل للحجج التي تؤيد وتعارض على كل موقف.
ما يميز هذه المحاضرات هو تقديمها بصورة محايدة، فلا يتم الانحياز لأي وجهة نظر، بل الهدف هو التعليم، لا الاقناع. ويقوم البروفيسور بطرح بعض المواضيع العلمية المرتبطة بالموضوع مثل البيولوجيا وعلم الأعصاب وميكانيكا الكم. ويتم استعراض التبعات الأخلاقية والعملية، خاصة تلك المترتبة على نفي الإرادة الحرة، وفيما يتعلق بأصحاب الشخصية السايكوباثية.
من بين جميع ما قرأت واستمعت له هذا العام، فإن هذه السلسلة من المحاضرات كان لها التأثير الأكبر علي، فقد ساهمت في توضيح بعض مواقفي وتنقية بعض أفكاري والتي كانت ضبابية بعض الشيء، ولم أشعر بأي لحظة من الملل أثناء استماعي للمحاضرات. أنصح به كل من تراوده الأسئلة حول موضوع الإرادة.
December 26, 2017
Professor of philosophy Shaun Nichols thoroughly investigates varied views and theories surrounding the issues of free will and determinism. This is successfully achieved via his references to various philosophical views both modern and historical, definitions and opinions...
September 3, 2016
First, some definitions courtesy of the Oxford Dictionary:
Free will: The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one’s own discretion.
Determinism: The doctrine that all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by causes external to the will. Some philosophers have taken determinism to imply that individual human beings have no free will and cannot be held morally responsible for their actions.
A series of 24 lectures that are broad in scope if not minute in detail - a sketch more than a portrait, if you will. The tension between free will and determinism has been vexing our tiny human minds for a long, long time: mythology, theology, philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, physics and criminal law are all represented here. He breaks his investigation down into three types of questioning:
Descriptive questions: What is free will? What is required for us to be morally responsible?
Substantive questions: Do we have free will? Are we morally responsible?
Prescriptive questions: How do we change our actions in response to our knowledge of free will?
One of the things I really appreciated about the lecturer was the complete lack of polemics on his part. His stated goal is 'to give a balanced presentation of the most important philosophical arguments and scientific evidence to put you in a position to draw your own conclusions.' There may be a certain level of irony in that statement: you can only make a choice between free will and determinism if there actually is such a thing as free will (that is to say, you are capable of freely choosing between alternatives). If you find the evidence for determinism convincing, a moment of reflection should suffice to see that you need to take the horse out from behind the cart and place it in front of it. You aren't a determinist because the evidence convinced you it is correct, rather, the evidence appears convincing to you because that was determined. Which is to say, evidence and arguments are inconsequential (indeed, everything is). A determinist does not draw conclusions because it is the determinist system that makes the evidence and argument appear convincing to one group of people and unconvincing to another group of people, not the evidence and argument itself.
This was an interesting series but it didn't change my mind about anything. Which is to say, I still believe I have the option to do just that. And, of course, if you are a determinist, there is no sense in arguing with me.... after all, you believe I have no choice but to think I have a choice. Just like you have no choice but to think otherwise.
But maybe you have no choice but to argue about it. Which is fine. There's a fifty/fifty chance I might freely choose to ignore you.
As you can see, this can all get a little silly.
I didn't say too much about the lecture series, did I? That's all right. You are either going to listen to it or you are not going to listen to it. Perhaps you've got a good idea by now which it is going to be. Or not. Que sera sera.
Free will: The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one’s own discretion.
Determinism: The doctrine that all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by causes external to the will. Some philosophers have taken determinism to imply that individual human beings have no free will and cannot be held morally responsible for their actions.
A series of 24 lectures that are broad in scope if not minute in detail - a sketch more than a portrait, if you will. The tension between free will and determinism has been vexing our tiny human minds for a long, long time: mythology, theology, philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, physics and criminal law are all represented here. He breaks his investigation down into three types of questioning:
Descriptive questions: What is free will? What is required for us to be morally responsible?
Substantive questions: Do we have free will? Are we morally responsible?
Prescriptive questions: How do we change our actions in response to our knowledge of free will?
One of the things I really appreciated about the lecturer was the complete lack of polemics on his part. His stated goal is 'to give a balanced presentation of the most important philosophical arguments and scientific evidence to put you in a position to draw your own conclusions.' There may be a certain level of irony in that statement: you can only make a choice between free will and determinism if there actually is such a thing as free will (that is to say, you are capable of freely choosing between alternatives). If you find the evidence for determinism convincing, a moment of reflection should suffice to see that you need to take the horse out from behind the cart and place it in front of it. You aren't a determinist because the evidence convinced you it is correct, rather, the evidence appears convincing to you because that was determined. Which is to say, evidence and arguments are inconsequential (indeed, everything is). A determinist does not draw conclusions because it is the determinist system that makes the evidence and argument appear convincing to one group of people and unconvincing to another group of people, not the evidence and argument itself.
This was an interesting series but it didn't change my mind about anything. Which is to say, I still believe I have the option to do just that. And, of course, if you are a determinist, there is no sense in arguing with me.... after all, you believe I have no choice but to think I have a choice. Just like you have no choice but to think otherwise.
But maybe you have no choice but to argue about it. Which is fine. There's a fifty/fifty chance I might freely choose to ignore you.
As you can see, this can all get a little silly.
I didn't say too much about the lecture series, did I? That's all right. You are either going to listen to it or you are not going to listen to it. Perhaps you've got a good idea by now which it is going to be. Or not. Que sera sera.
March 4, 2023
I really liked these lectures. I do not recall Nichols, however, ever bringing up what I consider some of the biggest problems with determinism. Most of these lectures were exploring the points of view of those who believe determinism is true and then wrestle with the consequences. I wish he spent a little more time sharing perspectives in opposition to determinism.
Imagine someone claimed that words and concepts don’t exist and he uses lots of words to try and convince you of this; his entire argument would be a refutation of his argument. There would be absolutely no way to try and convince you of this absurdity, without engaging in a blatant contradiction. That is the sense I get with determinists; everything they say just digs themselves further into a hole.
Determinists believe that nothing could have happened otherwise, meaning if we could rewind the clock to the beginning of time, every human choice would play out precisely like it had. Yet just about everything a determinist does and says seems to contradict this notion.
They work so hard to convince us through argumentation, thus acting as if we have a choice and may or may not be persuaded. For example, some are hell-bent on trying to get the justice system overhauled, since no one is morally responsible, and no one could have done otherwise. Which means they are working extremely HARD to alter the most likely future. See, if they stopped and thought about it, they’d know that future A (most people thinking determinism is absurd) IS FAR MORE LIKELY than possible future B (people largely embracing determinism). Since determinism is overwhelmingly contrary to human experience and common sense and seems manifestly irrational to many, they have a largely uphill battle. They continue to act as if their choices can alter the future. They act as if the future is OPEN, every argument assumes this, and to argue that it is instead determined is to engage in a contradiction.
There are so many of those convinced that determinism is true who then wrestle with what is best, what is moral, and what is fair, all this deliberation presupposes we can come to the truth, we have a choice in the matter. All this “SHOULD” talk to, suggests that we have an obligation to agree with what is true, that we are morally responsible to make adjustments to be aligned with reality, and yet if everything is determined and we have no choice, that is just utter nonsense! Why do they bother? It’s absurd as using words and concepts to try and argue that words and concepts don’t exist.
Every determinist, when they engage in argumentation for why determinism is true, is assuming there is Truth and thinks I should align my errant beliefs with the reality of determinism. But since what they think is true, was determined, why think it is true? The "truth" they embrace is they had no choice in what they believe, rather irrational and unconscious factors, social conditioning, genetics, and for the Calvinists--God's meticulous control made them think this is true and is making them try and convince me. But why should we suppose these deterministic forces care about truth?! I mean seriously, if they are right, it would be the same forces that determined that I think determinism is the most absurd notion conceivable. So, yes, why think determinism cares about truth since it determines us to believe things that are so diametrically opposed?
I guess these philosophers feel that they are predetermined to provide arguments that will determine other people’s beliefs and actions. Their genes and conditioning are making them present a supposed knockout argument that free will is an illusion, those determined to agree with them, have no choice but to be persuaded and experience the horrible life consequences that will follow this deluded belief. Now, it is true the subject will have the illusion they were persuaded by the argument, but another part of the brain will determine this and give them a meaningless residue of having made a choice to believe after the belief had already occurred, and also delude them into thinking they believed it BECAUSE it was true, as if they determining factor making people believed in determinism had any concern with truth.
After writing this review, I found a philosopher who expressed my points far more eloquently. And again, I don't think Nichols ever even mentioned these points in this series.
"If physical determinism is true then the person arguing for it has no choice as to whether he believes in physical determinism or not, nor whether he argues for determinism or not. He is in the grip of physical forces beyond his control. It is as though someone pushed the cosmic “play” button and the arguer starts arguing for something he never had any choice but to believe and to argue for. He is the victim of circumstance. Why should any attention be paid to such a victim – to such a mindless and compulsive machine – to such an idiot? He has an unfortunately not so rare form of Tourette’s syndrome and should be pitied.
It is a farce. The farce gets worse when the person being blasted with this nonsense is considered. According to determinism, the interlocutor too has no choice whether he listens to the sounds the other madman makes, for he too is mad. He listens or does not listen compulsively. He agrees or does not agree with the determinist’s argument through no free will of his own. While the arguer is a cosmic tape machine playing its predetermined recording, the interlocutor is affected by blind physical forces himself. The outcome of this travesty masquerading as “reasoning” has been predetermined since the beginning of time and the exercise is pointless.
The image of two tape machines alone in a room together playing their scripted comments and responses comes to mind. Nobody and nothing is really asserting anything nor really responding. Determinism is consciousness denying. No meaningful “thinking” is occurring if the determinist is right." -Richard Cocks (from The Illogicality of Determinism)
Imagine someone claimed that words and concepts don’t exist and he uses lots of words to try and convince you of this; his entire argument would be a refutation of his argument. There would be absolutely no way to try and convince you of this absurdity, without engaging in a blatant contradiction. That is the sense I get with determinists; everything they say just digs themselves further into a hole.
Determinists believe that nothing could have happened otherwise, meaning if we could rewind the clock to the beginning of time, every human choice would play out precisely like it had. Yet just about everything a determinist does and says seems to contradict this notion.
They work so hard to convince us through argumentation, thus acting as if we have a choice and may or may not be persuaded. For example, some are hell-bent on trying to get the justice system overhauled, since no one is morally responsible, and no one could have done otherwise. Which means they are working extremely HARD to alter the most likely future. See, if they stopped and thought about it, they’d know that future A (most people thinking determinism is absurd) IS FAR MORE LIKELY than possible future B (people largely embracing determinism). Since determinism is overwhelmingly contrary to human experience and common sense and seems manifestly irrational to many, they have a largely uphill battle. They continue to act as if their choices can alter the future. They act as if the future is OPEN, every argument assumes this, and to argue that it is instead determined is to engage in a contradiction.
There are so many of those convinced that determinism is true who then wrestle with what is best, what is moral, and what is fair, all this deliberation presupposes we can come to the truth, we have a choice in the matter. All this “SHOULD” talk to, suggests that we have an obligation to agree with what is true, that we are morally responsible to make adjustments to be aligned with reality, and yet if everything is determined and we have no choice, that is just utter nonsense! Why do they bother? It’s absurd as using words and concepts to try and argue that words and concepts don’t exist.
Every determinist, when they engage in argumentation for why determinism is true, is assuming there is Truth and thinks I should align my errant beliefs with the reality of determinism. But since what they think is true, was determined, why think it is true? The "truth" they embrace is they had no choice in what they believe, rather irrational and unconscious factors, social conditioning, genetics, and for the Calvinists--God's meticulous control made them think this is true and is making them try and convince me. But why should we suppose these deterministic forces care about truth?! I mean seriously, if they are right, it would be the same forces that determined that I think determinism is the most absurd notion conceivable. So, yes, why think determinism cares about truth since it determines us to believe things that are so diametrically opposed?
I guess these philosophers feel that they are predetermined to provide arguments that will determine other people’s beliefs and actions. Their genes and conditioning are making them present a supposed knockout argument that free will is an illusion, those determined to agree with them, have no choice but to be persuaded and experience the horrible life consequences that will follow this deluded belief. Now, it is true the subject will have the illusion they were persuaded by the argument, but another part of the brain will determine this and give them a meaningless residue of having made a choice to believe after the belief had already occurred, and also delude them into thinking they believed it BECAUSE it was true, as if they determining factor making people believed in determinism had any concern with truth.
After writing this review, I found a philosopher who expressed my points far more eloquently. And again, I don't think Nichols ever even mentioned these points in this series.
"If physical determinism is true then the person arguing for it has no choice as to whether he believes in physical determinism or not, nor whether he argues for determinism or not. He is in the grip of physical forces beyond his control. It is as though someone pushed the cosmic “play” button and the arguer starts arguing for something he never had any choice but to believe and to argue for. He is the victim of circumstance. Why should any attention be paid to such a victim – to such a mindless and compulsive machine – to such an idiot? He has an unfortunately not so rare form of Tourette’s syndrome and should be pitied.
It is a farce. The farce gets worse when the person being blasted with this nonsense is considered. According to determinism, the interlocutor too has no choice whether he listens to the sounds the other madman makes, for he too is mad. He listens or does not listen compulsively. He agrees or does not agree with the determinist’s argument through no free will of his own. While the arguer is a cosmic tape machine playing its predetermined recording, the interlocutor is affected by blind physical forces himself. The outcome of this travesty masquerading as “reasoning” has been predetermined since the beginning of time and the exercise is pointless.
The image of two tape machines alone in a room together playing their scripted comments and responses comes to mind. Nobody and nothing is really asserting anything nor really responding. Determinism is consciousness denying. No meaningful “thinking” is occurring if the determinist is right." -Richard Cocks (from The Illogicality of Determinism)
September 4, 2016
A well-presented lecture series. Perhaps more than I really wanted to know about the subject, but I listened to it with friends and followed each lecture with an enjoyable discussion. MUCH better than a live course I took on the same subject!
September 17, 2008
Generally good, but the latter lectures on punishment and ethics, while interesting, move too far off topic.
December 18, 2019
This course was disappointing on multiple levels, but particularly in its scope and approach to this question.
First of all, the question of free will in the religious sense was only given one lecture. That one lecture considered religious questions of free will only as a historical phenomenon in the context of Calvinism, following the previous lecture on Greek "Fate" and Stoic "necessity." The implication is that religious concerns are just a 'superstition' on par with the latter two. Once the superstitions have been mentioned, the course can move on to discussing the "real" questions while never again referencing God.
I say this is a major flaw because according to Gallup 87% of Americans believe in God. The percentage across the world is even higher. So 87% of Americans would find a crucial element missing from this discussion. On numerous occasions the professor references surveys of people's attitudes about free will and responsibility, many of which would be deeply influenced by their religious persuasions. And yet religion is not mentioned at all. It seems to me that religion is highly relevant to this topic regardless of whether one believes, as the professor seems to, that it's simply a superstition.
But the professor isn't a theologian, he has a scientific and philosophical background. So fine, perhaps this course was meant to be much narrower in scope, only addressing scientific and philosophical questions. Judging it by that standard, it's still a poor course.
First of all, the professor spends far too much time discussing esoteric questions of hard determinism (Are our decisions predetermined?), which he himself acknowledges can never actually be proven one way or another. And because he comes to no conclusions about what the "self" is or the nature of consciousness, the question is deeply confused: how can one conclude that we have no control over our actions when one can't even define what "we" is? What is the nature of our existence? If there's no agreement on *that* question, then it seems to me we can't even begin to discuss determinism in that sense.
His discussions of the consequences of determinism for morality also suffer from similar problems. He talks about morality in the context of modern theories: utilitarianism, deontology, Hume, etc. It's not clear that anybody thinks of morality in those terms except philosophers. Again, religious conceptions of morality (relevant to the vast majority) are conspicuously absent. But aside from this, I would like to have seen some discussion of Nietzschean morality.
The course was best at the few times when it stopped being concerned with absolutist questions of free will vs. hard determinism, and instead addressed the fact that free will is more limited than we often think. The neurological research about random decision making was really fascinating, and I liked his discussions of psychopathy and mental illness. I wanted to hear more about the role of genetics and upbringing in limiting our choices. There's a lot of interesting research on this, especially twin studies, but for some reason this was almost entirely omitted. Also perhaps a discussion of how we might want to rethink the distribution of resources in society if the qualities society prizes are largely accidental and not the result of deliberate effort. But again, none of this was there.
This course was in many ways a microcosm of all that I find wrong with most contemporary philosophy: Ivory tower elitist academics, full of appeals to authority, discussing esoteric questions by speculating wildly with no basis in either objective fact, or in what average people think.
This is probably not the course you're looking for.
First of all, the question of free will in the religious sense was only given one lecture. That one lecture considered religious questions of free will only as a historical phenomenon in the context of Calvinism, following the previous lecture on Greek "Fate" and Stoic "necessity." The implication is that religious concerns are just a 'superstition' on par with the latter two. Once the superstitions have been mentioned, the course can move on to discussing the "real" questions while never again referencing God.
I say this is a major flaw because according to Gallup 87% of Americans believe in God. The percentage across the world is even higher. So 87% of Americans would find a crucial element missing from this discussion. On numerous occasions the professor references surveys of people's attitudes about free will and responsibility, many of which would be deeply influenced by their religious persuasions. And yet religion is not mentioned at all. It seems to me that religion is highly relevant to this topic regardless of whether one believes, as the professor seems to, that it's simply a superstition.
But the professor isn't a theologian, he has a scientific and philosophical background. So fine, perhaps this course was meant to be much narrower in scope, only addressing scientific and philosophical questions. Judging it by that standard, it's still a poor course.
First of all, the professor spends far too much time discussing esoteric questions of hard determinism (Are our decisions predetermined?), which he himself acknowledges can never actually be proven one way or another. And because he comes to no conclusions about what the "self" is or the nature of consciousness, the question is deeply confused: how can one conclude that we have no control over our actions when one can't even define what "we" is? What is the nature of our existence? If there's no agreement on *that* question, then it seems to me we can't even begin to discuss determinism in that sense.
His discussions of the consequences of determinism for morality also suffer from similar problems. He talks about morality in the context of modern theories: utilitarianism, deontology, Hume, etc. It's not clear that anybody thinks of morality in those terms except philosophers. Again, religious conceptions of morality (relevant to the vast majority) are conspicuously absent. But aside from this, I would like to have seen some discussion of Nietzschean morality.
The course was best at the few times when it stopped being concerned with absolutist questions of free will vs. hard determinism, and instead addressed the fact that free will is more limited than we often think. The neurological research about random decision making was really fascinating, and I liked his discussions of psychopathy and mental illness. I wanted to hear more about the role of genetics and upbringing in limiting our choices. There's a lot of interesting research on this, especially twin studies, but for some reason this was almost entirely omitted. Also perhaps a discussion of how we might want to rethink the distribution of resources in society if the qualities society prizes are largely accidental and not the result of deliberate effort. But again, none of this was there.
This course was in many ways a microcosm of all that I find wrong with most contemporary philosophy: Ivory tower elitist academics, full of appeals to authority, discussing esoteric questions by speculating wildly with no basis in either objective fact, or in what average people think.
This is probably not the course you're looking for.
February 13, 2023
Free Will and Determinism is an exceptional course that is highly focussed, well structured, and with countless insights to stimulate thinking. The best tribute is to write one's conclusions to append the Professor's closing remarks about his intentions in the course of not to conclude but to make others think. So, this reviewer's views from hereon on the course's main topics.
The simple reality of a philosophical mind is that it struggles to accept a world that could be running only on specific mathematical, logical, or similar rules. It gets worse: these rational fields in which the world rules are set are not the most natural to a homo Sapien. Humanity has discovered the underlying rule-based structure of the world lately.
Contrasting with this is our philosophers' strong inclination to retain the traditional feeling/experience/intuition-based language concepts passed down to them through the mouths of the most well-known and respected thinkers of our kind. The efforts to reconcile the latest knowledge with historic concepts and queries invariably lead to unresolvable debates on definitions and meanings of the terms that are impossible to pin. More importantly, even after millennia-spanning debates, philosophers never settle debates on pet topics unless comprehensively refuted by later-day scientific studies.
Given this, it could be more productive to approach philosophical questions by starting with what is already known and working backward rather than trying again based on queries posed in the past. There is not enough space in a book review to scratch the surface of these ideas, but it is worth putting them here as notes.
Given the evidence of the weight, let us presume that the world runs on a set of rules. Let's call it a big axiom A. We will show that axiom A is at the root of countless philosophical debates, including free will and determinism: believers and disbelievers of many philosophical concepts effectively differ here.
The rule set of the world may or may not be fully comprehendible now or forever. Thankfully, we do not need assumptions about a sentient's complete comprehensibility for our purpose. One must still note that the whole of the rule set could be just slightly longer than what we know currently in our sciences, or it could be billions of times more complex with the number of parameters, interrelations, forces, fields, constants, etc. so large that no system on a rock like earth could encompass it fully with all the resources at disposal.
When a human language produces concepts like soul, consciousness, free will, determinism, or even God, there is a required assumption of something - like a field or a force - that works outside any rule system governing the material world. We are different from inanimate objects and other life forms. Our ancestors found it necessary to believe additional mystic sources were working on us to account for our higher-order existence.
Given that the rules uncovered so far are, at best, an approximation of the full set, it is impossible to rule out mystery concepts as comprehensively as geocentric theories. Proponents need consciousness and the likes to be outside the rule-based frameworks to give importance and agency to our race, not unlike the importance accorded to earth in geocentric theories. This inherently contradicts the axiom mentioned above. The contradictions lead one group to refute the starting assumption, another to rue the gaps in our knowledge, and the most to debate endlessly on finer points without conclusions. A disagreement on the axiom cannot simply be resolved through rational arguments based on them.
Here is one example from the book that falls into this category. In the chapters on neurosciences, we learn about the struggles of different philosophical schools in finding the space for consciousness and free will in what we are learning about the brain's processing of signals and actions. Some see a potential for consciousness to exert itself in the current measurement gaps between our awareness neurons becoming aware of something and another set acting. The others want to use the gap for free will to guide the action before its neurons are activated. It actually gets this silly!
There are more straightforward, obvious answers that require an overthrowing of historically-cherished concepts (the reviewer realizes practical difficulties but let's leave that aside, given the space constraints).
Let's start with an example from traditional physics - say, fluidity. One needs to know everything about individual liquid molecules and their interrelations when present in an enormous number to understand the behavior of droplets or onwards to fluid down a capillary. The reality is that not only do we not know all at a molecular level, but we cannot understand the complete interplay of even three of them, let alone billions.
Still, fluidity is an emergent concept that can be studied approximately using other types of equations. No scientific person thinks there is something non-scientific in between, like free will or consciousness, that suddenly causes molecules to behave like waves of one type versus the other.
Our minds and bodies are tiny instances of the large world equation set. We cannot work on how our body changes from one moment to the next without any external influence, let alone its dynamic evolution over time, given all the environmental variables. A soul, consciousness, free will, etc., are good functional ways to describe many emergent behaviors like viscosity in fluid mechanics (notwithstanding their utility in reconciling historic, spiritual, or religious beliefs). Yet, searching for their causes in scientific or rational realms is futile.
The last statement is important. A typical philosopher begins with questions like whether there is free will with the promise not to provide an answer through axiomatic authority but with didactic, reasoned discourses. The process of answering first tangles her in describing the term's meaning. The more she parses, the worse it becomes to ignore the gaps in scientific knowledge. Depending on her proclivity, she might feel tempted to use the knowledge gaps to provide the basis for her conclusions on the topic. Unfortunately, the closer she comes to asserting a non-rational concept, the more random and arbitrary it appears if she continues to pursue her logical exercise to find causality or reason. This point will have her recoil and leave the query without a definitive conclusion. Amid such tensions, she would also anguish whether a complete rule-based system will be deterministic, regardless of the possibility of the equation being unsolvable by any system smaller than the universe itself.
The simple reality is that for those who want to believe in concepts like soul, consciousness, or free will, it is imperative to abandon rationality or science somewhere. Efforts to reconcile are doomed to fail, given the starting point in the hypothesis. It is precisely for the same reason that people with different assumptions on the limits of rationality are unlikely to ever agree on the answers to these questions, given the gaps in our knowledge. Those who believe in a rule-based world can still have practical answers to moral, ethical, and legal dilemmas, as shown in the course toward the final chapters.
A small section on the determinism debate, which is slightly different. On the arrow of time, the observed world hurls in only one direction. To call this direction fated or not is a linguist's prerogative. Whether the equation is solvable using anything smaller than the universe is unimportant for our purposes. Like a three-body problem, even the most defined rule-based system may still not yield conclusions on where things are headed without waiting for the actuality to unfold. The defined rule-based system may have probabilistic parts. However, it is still an axiomatic assumption if we want to believe that there is no more profound, hidden theory behind any probabilistic fallout we observe. In the end, without mystic forces, a rule-based system is definitionally just rule-based, which is almost synonymous with the word deterministic. Some may use probabilistic parameters to dispute this, but that's an issue with the word's definition; it does not create any room for concepts like free will.
Back to the course: it is worth going through because it will make many come up with ideas, like for this reviewer.
The simple reality of a philosophical mind is that it struggles to accept a world that could be running only on specific mathematical, logical, or similar rules. It gets worse: these rational fields in which the world rules are set are not the most natural to a homo Sapien. Humanity has discovered the underlying rule-based structure of the world lately.
Contrasting with this is our philosophers' strong inclination to retain the traditional feeling/experience/intuition-based language concepts passed down to them through the mouths of the most well-known and respected thinkers of our kind. The efforts to reconcile the latest knowledge with historic concepts and queries invariably lead to unresolvable debates on definitions and meanings of the terms that are impossible to pin. More importantly, even after millennia-spanning debates, philosophers never settle debates on pet topics unless comprehensively refuted by later-day scientific studies.
Given this, it could be more productive to approach philosophical questions by starting with what is already known and working backward rather than trying again based on queries posed in the past. There is not enough space in a book review to scratch the surface of these ideas, but it is worth putting them here as notes.
Given the evidence of the weight, let us presume that the world runs on a set of rules. Let's call it a big axiom A. We will show that axiom A is at the root of countless philosophical debates, including free will and determinism: believers and disbelievers of many philosophical concepts effectively differ here.
The rule set of the world may or may not be fully comprehendible now or forever. Thankfully, we do not need assumptions about a sentient's complete comprehensibility for our purpose. One must still note that the whole of the rule set could be just slightly longer than what we know currently in our sciences, or it could be billions of times more complex with the number of parameters, interrelations, forces, fields, constants, etc. so large that no system on a rock like earth could encompass it fully with all the resources at disposal.
When a human language produces concepts like soul, consciousness, free will, determinism, or even God, there is a required assumption of something - like a field or a force - that works outside any rule system governing the material world. We are different from inanimate objects and other life forms. Our ancestors found it necessary to believe additional mystic sources were working on us to account for our higher-order existence.
Given that the rules uncovered so far are, at best, an approximation of the full set, it is impossible to rule out mystery concepts as comprehensively as geocentric theories. Proponents need consciousness and the likes to be outside the rule-based frameworks to give importance and agency to our race, not unlike the importance accorded to earth in geocentric theories. This inherently contradicts the axiom mentioned above. The contradictions lead one group to refute the starting assumption, another to rue the gaps in our knowledge, and the most to debate endlessly on finer points without conclusions. A disagreement on the axiom cannot simply be resolved through rational arguments based on them.
Here is one example from the book that falls into this category. In the chapters on neurosciences, we learn about the struggles of different philosophical schools in finding the space for consciousness and free will in what we are learning about the brain's processing of signals and actions. Some see a potential for consciousness to exert itself in the current measurement gaps between our awareness neurons becoming aware of something and another set acting. The others want to use the gap for free will to guide the action before its neurons are activated. It actually gets this silly!
There are more straightforward, obvious answers that require an overthrowing of historically-cherished concepts (the reviewer realizes practical difficulties but let's leave that aside, given the space constraints).
Let's start with an example from traditional physics - say, fluidity. One needs to know everything about individual liquid molecules and their interrelations when present in an enormous number to understand the behavior of droplets or onwards to fluid down a capillary. The reality is that not only do we not know all at a molecular level, but we cannot understand the complete interplay of even three of them, let alone billions.
Still, fluidity is an emergent concept that can be studied approximately using other types of equations. No scientific person thinks there is something non-scientific in between, like free will or consciousness, that suddenly causes molecules to behave like waves of one type versus the other.
Our minds and bodies are tiny instances of the large world equation set. We cannot work on how our body changes from one moment to the next without any external influence, let alone its dynamic evolution over time, given all the environmental variables. A soul, consciousness, free will, etc., are good functional ways to describe many emergent behaviors like viscosity in fluid mechanics (notwithstanding their utility in reconciling historic, spiritual, or religious beliefs). Yet, searching for their causes in scientific or rational realms is futile.
The last statement is important. A typical philosopher begins with questions like whether there is free will with the promise not to provide an answer through axiomatic authority but with didactic, reasoned discourses. The process of answering first tangles her in describing the term's meaning. The more she parses, the worse it becomes to ignore the gaps in scientific knowledge. Depending on her proclivity, she might feel tempted to use the knowledge gaps to provide the basis for her conclusions on the topic. Unfortunately, the closer she comes to asserting a non-rational concept, the more random and arbitrary it appears if she continues to pursue her logical exercise to find causality or reason. This point will have her recoil and leave the query without a definitive conclusion. Amid such tensions, she would also anguish whether a complete rule-based system will be deterministic, regardless of the possibility of the equation being unsolvable by any system smaller than the universe itself.
The simple reality is that for those who want to believe in concepts like soul, consciousness, or free will, it is imperative to abandon rationality or science somewhere. Efforts to reconcile are doomed to fail, given the starting point in the hypothesis. It is precisely for the same reason that people with different assumptions on the limits of rationality are unlikely to ever agree on the answers to these questions, given the gaps in our knowledge. Those who believe in a rule-based world can still have practical answers to moral, ethical, and legal dilemmas, as shown in the course toward the final chapters.
A small section on the determinism debate, which is slightly different. On the arrow of time, the observed world hurls in only one direction. To call this direction fated or not is a linguist's prerogative. Whether the equation is solvable using anything smaller than the universe is unimportant for our purposes. Like a three-body problem, even the most defined rule-based system may still not yield conclusions on where things are headed without waiting for the actuality to unfold. The defined rule-based system may have probabilistic parts. However, it is still an axiomatic assumption if we want to believe that there is no more profound, hidden theory behind any probabilistic fallout we observe. In the end, without mystic forces, a rule-based system is definitionally just rule-based, which is almost synonymous with the word deterministic. Some may use probabilistic parameters to dispute this, but that's an issue with the word's definition; it does not create any room for concepts like free will.
Back to the course: it is worth going through because it will make many come up with ideas, like for this reviewer.
September 28, 2018
Very, very interesting. A definite recommendation for anyone who likes to think.
August 11, 2017
The first two thirds of this lecture series were well done. But the section that got into Ethics seemed to go off the rails in significant ways.
For example...much of this section can be summarized by this statement beginning lecture 23:
"What kinds of moral thoughts 'should' we have about punishment and if we don't have free will is there a way to justify punishment..."
The lecturer veered into a discussion of moral ethics but seemed to forget, frequently, why he'd veered into this discussion. He'd give lengthy descriptions of various ethical systems and theories of justice and then almost as an afterthought try to tie it back to the discussion of Free Will and Determinism.
Several times he'd say things like "this moral system is not affected by a view of determinism..." which I found wholly unbelievable.
To argue that a person is causally determined in their behavior, that they 'couldn't' have 'chosen' to do other than they did, but then that we 'should' 'choose' to treat people in certain ways is simply glossing over the serious troubles with this conflict.
As I said, the first 2/3rds of the series was pretty good. I do think the lecturer could have spent more time explaining how determinism escapes fatalism. Again, I think he rushed past this critically important discussions and then simply referred back to it as though it had been covered in detail.
Finally, I wish those interested in this topic would lose the term "free" in this discussion. It's simply unproductive to argue that any agent is "free" in the Universe, and that becomes a straw man that is simply unable to fight back. Knocking down "free" teaches us nothing of import.
The fundamental question is whether we have the ability to uniquely influence our choices. Can we shape our own subconscious in meaningful ways? Can we navigate the forces that influence us? Of course we are acted upon by genetics and environmental forces beyond our control. Anyone who doesn't recognize this as a starting point in the discussion is simply not worth debating.
The arrogance, it seems to me, of the Free Will skeptics to simply claim victory long before we adequately understand brain science is a mistake that was skewered by Hume: just because we recognize causal determination in the Universe doesn't mean that complex brain activity will behave in the same way that Newtonian physics says objects act. The science is radically still out on this point.
Anyway...overall the lecture series was helpful to my thinking about Will and Determination. But I just wish it hadn't gone off the rails at the end.
For example...much of this section can be summarized by this statement beginning lecture 23:
"What kinds of moral thoughts 'should' we have about punishment and if we don't have free will is there a way to justify punishment..."
The lecturer veered into a discussion of moral ethics but seemed to forget, frequently, why he'd veered into this discussion. He'd give lengthy descriptions of various ethical systems and theories of justice and then almost as an afterthought try to tie it back to the discussion of Free Will and Determinism.
Several times he'd say things like "this moral system is not affected by a view of determinism..." which I found wholly unbelievable.
To argue that a person is causally determined in their behavior, that they 'couldn't' have 'chosen' to do other than they did, but then that we 'should' 'choose' to treat people in certain ways is simply glossing over the serious troubles with this conflict.
As I said, the first 2/3rds of the series was pretty good. I do think the lecturer could have spent more time explaining how determinism escapes fatalism. Again, I think he rushed past this critically important discussions and then simply referred back to it as though it had been covered in detail.
Finally, I wish those interested in this topic would lose the term "free" in this discussion. It's simply unproductive to argue that any agent is "free" in the Universe, and that becomes a straw man that is simply unable to fight back. Knocking down "free" teaches us nothing of import.
The fundamental question is whether we have the ability to uniquely influence our choices. Can we shape our own subconscious in meaningful ways? Can we navigate the forces that influence us? Of course we are acted upon by genetics and environmental forces beyond our control. Anyone who doesn't recognize this as a starting point in the discussion is simply not worth debating.
The arrogance, it seems to me, of the Free Will skeptics to simply claim victory long before we adequately understand brain science is a mistake that was skewered by Hume: just because we recognize causal determination in the Universe doesn't mean that complex brain activity will behave in the same way that Newtonian physics says objects act. The science is radically still out on this point.
Anyway...overall the lecture series was helpful to my thinking about Will and Determination. But I just wish it hadn't gone off the rails at the end.
December 1, 2009
More tapes I listen to while driving, these lectures thoroughly cover the bases of the Free Will versus Determinism debate. They start off with a survey of intellectual history, finding elements of the debate in each of the major religious traditions, for example Karma in Hinduism and predestination in Calvinism. They go on to trace the debate through Enlightenment science, into the influence of clinical psychology and current legal thinking.
Nichols specializes in experimental philosophy, a relatively new wrinkle in philosophy, which is interested in polls and experiments as they might bear on philosophical problems. Though I am often skeptical, it is an interesting fact, established experimentally, that if one does not believe in free will, one will act differently, more fatalistically I suppose.
As a result of working through these lectures, I have come to the conclusion that both sides of the debate have holes so big you could drive a truck through them, and thus the debate loses a lot of its point. I have always been a compatibilist, believing that the two sides can be reconciled, and I am now confirmed in this view.
On the side of determinism, quantum level indeterminacy and chaos theory indicate that there is a considerable element of randomness in the world, so that no determinism can be absolute. On the side of free will, unconscious factors in our thinking (going back to Freud and even Aristotle) make it clear that there are often determinants of our actions of which we are not aware, and from which we are not free. Nonetheless free will is so central to ethics and determinism is so central to science that we need to try to understand the role of these concepts as best we can.
My own view (which I may write up some time) is that free will is not achieved in spite of determinism, but rather accomplishes a measure of determinism. If I act freely, I put my actions into some context that makes sense to me, that is, a series of reasons that determines the result. I have refrained from allowing my actions to be random or irrational, and have established a causal nexus into which they fit. I am speaking somewhat glibly at the moment, but these are issues that one returns to again and again.
Nichols specializes in experimental philosophy, a relatively new wrinkle in philosophy, which is interested in polls and experiments as they might bear on philosophical problems. Though I am often skeptical, it is an interesting fact, established experimentally, that if one does not believe in free will, one will act differently, more fatalistically I suppose.
As a result of working through these lectures, I have come to the conclusion that both sides of the debate have holes so big you could drive a truck through them, and thus the debate loses a lot of its point. I have always been a compatibilist, believing that the two sides can be reconciled, and I am now confirmed in this view.
On the side of determinism, quantum level indeterminacy and chaos theory indicate that there is a considerable element of randomness in the world, so that no determinism can be absolute. On the side of free will, unconscious factors in our thinking (going back to Freud and even Aristotle) make it clear that there are often determinants of our actions of which we are not aware, and from which we are not free. Nonetheless free will is so central to ethics and determinism is so central to science that we need to try to understand the role of these concepts as best we can.
My own view (which I may write up some time) is that free will is not achieved in spite of determinism, but rather accomplishes a measure of determinism. If I act freely, I put my actions into some context that makes sense to me, that is, a series of reasons that determines the result. I have refrained from allowing my actions to be random or irrational, and have established a causal nexus into which they fit. I am speaking somewhat glibly at the moment, but these are issues that one returns to again and again.
July 28, 2016
This was the second great courses audiobook I've done, so I had a decent idea of what to expect on the style and depth of the material. In that respect, it was deep enough to get a good understanding of the topic, but probably not deep enough for someone whose done dedicated research into it before. For me, coming from some philosophy courses at university, I had a decent understanding of the concepts already, but I never delved into it much. Based on that, I really enjoyed this course.
The lectures all had clear points and were well connected to each other and the main topic. The philosophies of each argument seemed well summarised and nicely explained in each case. The narrator/lecturer spoke in a natural and expressive manner which gave me the impression that he was just as excited to be teaching this course as I was about learning the concepts. There were a couple of instances where I lost the train of thought a bit, but those were more from my internal diversions on thinking about the topics and not paying enough attention to what was being said.
I particularly enjoyed how the lectures were structured by going mostly chronologically on when the different concepts were developed. Some of the later lectures weren't quite as interesting since they went more into the legal and moral implications of some of the arguments of each side, but that's not to say they weren't still quite enjoyable and interesting to think about.
Based on the course, I've definitely been swayed to the determinist side. I actually came to that conclusion quite early on and it was fun to have internal arguments with myself based on arguments both against determinism and also interpretations and justifications for determinism that were not in line with my view on it. I honestly can't think of any noteworthy issues regarding the course and therefore I'd highly recommend this course for anyone even mildly curious on the topic.
The lectures all had clear points and were well connected to each other and the main topic. The philosophies of each argument seemed well summarised and nicely explained in each case. The narrator/lecturer spoke in a natural and expressive manner which gave me the impression that he was just as excited to be teaching this course as I was about learning the concepts. There were a couple of instances where I lost the train of thought a bit, but those were more from my internal diversions on thinking about the topics and not paying enough attention to what was being said.
I particularly enjoyed how the lectures were structured by going mostly chronologically on when the different concepts were developed. Some of the later lectures weren't quite as interesting since they went more into the legal and moral implications of some of the arguments of each side, but that's not to say they weren't still quite enjoyable and interesting to think about.
Based on the course, I've definitely been swayed to the determinist side. I actually came to that conclusion quite early on and it was fun to have internal arguments with myself based on arguments both against determinism and also interpretations and justifications for determinism that were not in line with my view on it. I honestly can't think of any noteworthy issues regarding the course and therefore I'd highly recommend this course for anyone even mildly curious on the topic.
January 14, 2011
A 12 hour series of 24 lectures. The first half focuses on the core free will debate, laying out the history of philosophy on the topic, weighing in arguments from the major perspectives (libertarian, compatibilist, determinist), and looking at how more recent science, particularly discoveries in neuroscience, might factor in with supporting evidence.
The second half proceeds into norms for Ethics and Punishment, which, as the common argument would hold, are rendered meaningless in a deterministic view (i.e. if all is fated who's to blame). I liked the way the professor Shaun Nichols presented reasons for why it doesn't make sense to jump to an extreme normative conclusion as policy, even if you believe in Hard Determinism, the view to which I found myself inclined toward throughout the lecture series.
I found the first half with its philosophizing on free will directly a bit more engaging than the later lectures on morality and policy, but every lecture was always interesting on its own and I enjoyed the course overall.
The Philosophy of Mind: Brains, Consciousness and Thinking Machines course by Patrick Grim covers very similar philosophical ground, and in comparison I might consider it slightly better than this course because of the added breadth.
The second half proceeds into norms for Ethics and Punishment, which, as the common argument would hold, are rendered meaningless in a deterministic view (i.e. if all is fated who's to blame). I liked the way the professor Shaun Nichols presented reasons for why it doesn't make sense to jump to an extreme normative conclusion as policy, even if you believe in Hard Determinism, the view to which I found myself inclined toward throughout the lecture series.
I found the first half with its philosophizing on free will directly a bit more engaging than the later lectures on morality and policy, but every lecture was always interesting on its own and I enjoyed the course overall.
The Philosophy of Mind: Brains, Consciousness and Thinking Machines course by Patrick Grim covers very similar philosophical ground, and in comparison I might consider it slightly better than this course because of the added breadth.
August 28, 2013
This did what I wanted it too. I'm satisfied. But my interest is much more specific and in depth.
June 4, 2021
[I wrote this review on June 4, 2016, and uploaded it to GoodReads on June 4, 2021.]
In this 24-lecture course, Shaun Nichols (University of Arizona Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science) outlines the history of efforts to answer the important question: Do we have a precharted destiny or do we make our own life choices? Our answer to this question, whose roots go back to more than 2500 years ago, affects every detail of our daily lives individually and how we view social structures and criminal justice laws/punishments at the collective level. This age-old riddle, viz. free will vs. determinism, has occupied not just philosophers, but also scientists and other great minds for centuries.
Determinism means that because nothing happens without a cause, everything is predetermined. For example, if we could roll back the universe to its exact state at the beginning of January 1, 1900, everything that has happened since then will happen again, and in exactly the same manner. The notions of fate and karma are in line with this way of thinking. Proponents of free will, or libertarians (not to be confused with a political philosophy that goes by the same name), contend that humans, and to some extent lower life forms, are capable of making decisions which can lead to choosing one path over another, thus potentially resulting in vastly different outcomes in the long run.
Most versions of the argument for free will postulate that it is incompatible with determinism. In other words, they take the conditional statement “If determinism is true then there is no free will” to be true. However, determinism being false does not automatically imply the existence of free will. One can point to probabilistic events (a la quantum mechanics) which lead to nondeterministic or unpredictable outcomes, even in the absence of free will. Of course, there is also the argument that some things appear to be random only because our knowledge is not yet deep enough to understand them.
One of the main arguments for the existence of free will is that humans seem to be wired for the concept. Children as young as 2 or 3 understand what it means to decide between alternatives. We humans are also wired for moral responsibility, which is nonsensical in the absence of free will. Determinism is supported by predictability in nature based on scientific laws. Given precisely known initial condition, natural laws predict what happens next, and there is no reason to think that our mind and the deliberation processes therein are exempt from such laws. Compatibilism is the view that determinism and free will are not mutually exclusive. This is sometimes viewed as the chicken’s way out of a serious debate.
Harry G. Frankfurt, an effective proponent of the free-will theory, is, unfortunately, better-known for his semiserious book, On Bullshit, which got him a gig on Jon Stewart’s “The Daily Show,” an indication that philosophical topics aren’t all that interesting to the general public! Frankfurt argued that the principle of alternate possibilities (someone can be said to have acted on free will only if he could have done otherwise) is not necessary for free will. He then advanced the concept of second-order desire (the desire to have a certain desire), which is unique to humans, as a hallmark of free will, in the process removing some of the prior objections to compatibilism. But problems remain nevertheless.
https://www3.nd.edu/~jspeaks/courses/...
In the 24 lectures of this highly enjoyable and informative course (listed at the end of my review), Professor Nichols tackles the problem from every possible angle, as he tries to shed light on why the problem is indeed very profound and how both psychology and neuroscience are playing key roles in advancing our understanding of the main issues. Hearing about these ideas from an award-winning professor is much more effective that reading a book. I recommend the course highly.
1. Free Will and Determinism
2. Fate and Karma
3. Devine Predestination and Foreknowledge
4. Causal Determinism
5. Ancient and Medieval Indeterminism
6. Agent Causation
7. Ancient and Classical Compatibilism
8. Contemporary Campatibilism
9. Hard Determinism
10. Free Will Impossibilism
11. The Belief in Free Will
12. Physics and Free Will
13. Neuroscience and Determinism
14. Neuroscience of Conscious Choice
15. Psychology and Free Will
16. Deontological Ethics and Free Will
17. Utilitarianism and Free Will
18. Responsibility and the Emotions
19. Pessimism and Illusionism
20. Optimism and Skepticism
21. The Ethics of Punishment
22. The Power of Punishment
23. Moral Responsibility and Psychopathy
24. The Future of Responsibility
In this 24-lecture course, Shaun Nichols (University of Arizona Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science) outlines the history of efforts to answer the important question: Do we have a precharted destiny or do we make our own life choices? Our answer to this question, whose roots go back to more than 2500 years ago, affects every detail of our daily lives individually and how we view social structures and criminal justice laws/punishments at the collective level. This age-old riddle, viz. free will vs. determinism, has occupied not just philosophers, but also scientists and other great minds for centuries.
Determinism means that because nothing happens without a cause, everything is predetermined. For example, if we could roll back the universe to its exact state at the beginning of January 1, 1900, everything that has happened since then will happen again, and in exactly the same manner. The notions of fate and karma are in line with this way of thinking. Proponents of free will, or libertarians (not to be confused with a political philosophy that goes by the same name), contend that humans, and to some extent lower life forms, are capable of making decisions which can lead to choosing one path over another, thus potentially resulting in vastly different outcomes in the long run.
Most versions of the argument for free will postulate that it is incompatible with determinism. In other words, they take the conditional statement “If determinism is true then there is no free will” to be true. However, determinism being false does not automatically imply the existence of free will. One can point to probabilistic events (a la quantum mechanics) which lead to nondeterministic or unpredictable outcomes, even in the absence of free will. Of course, there is also the argument that some things appear to be random only because our knowledge is not yet deep enough to understand them.
One of the main arguments for the existence of free will is that humans seem to be wired for the concept. Children as young as 2 or 3 understand what it means to decide between alternatives. We humans are also wired for moral responsibility, which is nonsensical in the absence of free will. Determinism is supported by predictability in nature based on scientific laws. Given precisely known initial condition, natural laws predict what happens next, and there is no reason to think that our mind and the deliberation processes therein are exempt from such laws. Compatibilism is the view that determinism and free will are not mutually exclusive. This is sometimes viewed as the chicken’s way out of a serious debate.
Harry G. Frankfurt, an effective proponent of the free-will theory, is, unfortunately, better-known for his semiserious book, On Bullshit, which got him a gig on Jon Stewart’s “The Daily Show,” an indication that philosophical topics aren’t all that interesting to the general public! Frankfurt argued that the principle of alternate possibilities (someone can be said to have acted on free will only if he could have done otherwise) is not necessary for free will. He then advanced the concept of second-order desire (the desire to have a certain desire), which is unique to humans, as a hallmark of free will, in the process removing some of the prior objections to compatibilism. But problems remain nevertheless.
https://www3.nd.edu/~jspeaks/courses/...
In the 24 lectures of this highly enjoyable and informative course (listed at the end of my review), Professor Nichols tackles the problem from every possible angle, as he tries to shed light on why the problem is indeed very profound and how both psychology and neuroscience are playing key roles in advancing our understanding of the main issues. Hearing about these ideas from an award-winning professor is much more effective that reading a book. I recommend the course highly.
1. Free Will and Determinism
2. Fate and Karma
3. Devine Predestination and Foreknowledge
4. Causal Determinism
5. Ancient and Medieval Indeterminism
6. Agent Causation
7. Ancient and Classical Compatibilism
8. Contemporary Campatibilism
9. Hard Determinism
10. Free Will Impossibilism
11. The Belief in Free Will
12. Physics and Free Will
13. Neuroscience and Determinism
14. Neuroscience of Conscious Choice
15. Psychology and Free Will
16. Deontological Ethics and Free Will
17. Utilitarianism and Free Will
18. Responsibility and the Emotions
19. Pessimism and Illusionism
20. Optimism and Skepticism
21. The Ethics of Punishment
22. The Power of Punishment
23. Moral Responsibility and Psychopathy
24. The Future of Responsibility
March 28, 2020
I was meant to like this course...
Of course I wasn't meant to like this course. I enjoyed these lectures because they were well-prepared and presented by an interesting and knowledgeable Professor Nichols. I'm a novice when discussing these nearly unanswerable philosophical questions, but here goes:
Within the human realm, there is both freewill and deterministic events and processes. The determined 'things' are like: if you are born, you will die. If you live, you will breathe, eat, drink (being merry is a freewill thing); our biology is determined through eons of evolution and cannot be (easily) changed. The freewill aspects in humans can be boiled down to individual and societal. For example the societal aspects might include the broad definition of 'morality', which has been defined by societies throughout history, changing as the needs require. As individuals, we may chose (freely) what aspects of the societal morality we wish to follow. As an example, in past centuries slavery was not considered to be amoral, yet many would disagree (especially the slaves), based on their own views and reflecting their experiences.
Within the non human realm, animals have a more direct relationship between animal freewill (quite different from human freewill in this discussion) and determinism. The donkey, when faced with two separate, but equal, piles of hay, will eat from both, most probably...all to help stay alive and procreate. I suppose the donkey's freewill choice is which pile he/she chooses first.
In the realm of physics, almost (?) everything is deterministic. A radioactive atom will decay in a prescribed manner, releasing the same amount and type energy every single time. The aspects of quantum physics that 'seem' to behave in a more 'freewill' manner, are (most probably) a result of their not being fully understood by the human observer.
All in all, I enjoyed the lectures because it made me think...possibly in a prescribed manner...possibly in my own, unique way. I freely acquired these lectures during a sale that was purposely proposed by the Great Courses...my use of a coupon was divinely ordained.
Of course I wasn't meant to like this course. I enjoyed these lectures because they were well-prepared and presented by an interesting and knowledgeable Professor Nichols. I'm a novice when discussing these nearly unanswerable philosophical questions, but here goes:
Within the human realm, there is both freewill and deterministic events and processes. The determined 'things' are like: if you are born, you will die. If you live, you will breathe, eat, drink (being merry is a freewill thing); our biology is determined through eons of evolution and cannot be (easily) changed. The freewill aspects in humans can be boiled down to individual and societal. For example the societal aspects might include the broad definition of 'morality', which has been defined by societies throughout history, changing as the needs require. As individuals, we may chose (freely) what aspects of the societal morality we wish to follow. As an example, in past centuries slavery was not considered to be amoral, yet many would disagree (especially the slaves), based on their own views and reflecting their experiences.
Within the non human realm, animals have a more direct relationship between animal freewill (quite different from human freewill in this discussion) and determinism. The donkey, when faced with two separate, but equal, piles of hay, will eat from both, most probably...all to help stay alive and procreate. I suppose the donkey's freewill choice is which pile he/she chooses first.
In the realm of physics, almost (?) everything is deterministic. A radioactive atom will decay in a prescribed manner, releasing the same amount and type energy every single time. The aspects of quantum physics that 'seem' to behave in a more 'freewill' manner, are (most probably) a result of their not being fully understood by the human observer.
All in all, I enjoyed the lectures because it made me think...possibly in a prescribed manner...possibly in my own, unique way. I freely acquired these lectures during a sale that was purposely proposed by the Great Courses...my use of a coupon was divinely ordained.
February 5, 2018
I listened to this to see if there were any good arguments for free will which I had missed out on after concluding that either determinism or indeterminism were true. But yeah, they dont exist. So this was mostly a review. I did learn a few things, but they were mostly having to do with history or with neuroscience. Tertiary things of little bearing to the core of this issue. I am more convinced now that free will is obviously false, that this was obvious a thousand or more years ago, and that discerning this easily is a good test of someone's basic critical thinking ability.
Read
December 5, 2023Spoiler alert: Free will is an illusion. We are the ever evolving conclusion of an eternal equation and everything we have ever thought/felt/acted is the result of everything that has ever happened. We have no control in this. If you were to intentionally scald yourself with freshly boiled water for the sake of free will you would be foolish in that your action is only a reaction.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
October 13, 2020
I felt it went unnecessary places, that the focus was rather lost talking about physics and more; the focus I expected was philosophical.
July 24, 2022
Watch a detailed review along with my favorite ideas and takeaways at:
https://youtu.be/3YGUGQqUEkc
https://youtu.be/3YGUGQqUEkc
December 18, 2022
(Listened to the audiobook at work, not sure about completed date!)
Interesting, casual listening.
Interesting, casual listening.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
Shelved as 'to-keep-reference'
February 27, 2023Sapolsky cita a Nichols en Compórtate.
May 31, 2023
I have no idea what I read/listen to but it was interesting and I will have to go over the material again.
too smart for me
too smart for me
February 13, 2015
Free will vs Determinism is one of those questions that I've always struggled to wrap my head around. How to reconcile what is clearly a universe whose parts are governed by well understood and well described forces and laws with human behavior that, at least for most of us, appears to entail acts of free will?
First off - this series of lectures from the Great Courses series doesn't settle the argument. Not only I, but philosophers in general are still struggling over it. However, what this course does and does well is introduce the various thoughts and concepts, both historical and current, on the nature of free will.
Cases are made from different approaches for both sides - that Free Will is true or that Free Will is false. These lectures cover the first half of the course and give me a lot of what I was expecting to find.
The later lectures that make up the second half of the course build on this and go in directions I didn't expect. Offering more abstract discussions on what free will really means. In addition, there are lectures bringing in the results and observations of neuroscience and speculations about what they mean to the free will consideration. Finally, there's discussion about morality, crime and punishment considered both from the notion that free will is true as well as the implications of determinism being true.
I found the lecturer easily listenable - neither put to sleep monotone, nor excessively dramatic. Overall I found the course interesting and challenging. It's helped me better understand my own beliefs and given me some new things to consider. I rate it a high success. This is my first exposure to one of The Great Courses products since they became available on Audible and I look forward to exploring other titles.
First off - this series of lectures from the Great Courses series doesn't settle the argument. Not only I, but philosophers in general are still struggling over it. However, what this course does and does well is introduce the various thoughts and concepts, both historical and current, on the nature of free will.
Cases are made from different approaches for both sides - that Free Will is true or that Free Will is false. These lectures cover the first half of the course and give me a lot of what I was expecting to find.
The later lectures that make up the second half of the course build on this and go in directions I didn't expect. Offering more abstract discussions on what free will really means. In addition, there are lectures bringing in the results and observations of neuroscience and speculations about what they mean to the free will consideration. Finally, there's discussion about morality, crime and punishment considered both from the notion that free will is true as well as the implications of determinism being true.
I found the lecturer easily listenable - neither put to sleep monotone, nor excessively dramatic. Overall I found the course interesting and challenging. It's helped me better understand my own beliefs and given me some new things to consider. I rate it a high success. This is my first exposure to one of The Great Courses products since they became available on Audible and I look forward to exploring other titles.
August 31, 2009
Nichols starts this Teaching Company course with a common sense proposition about free will that sets up the debate: we are free to choose, yet we acknowledge that events have causes. From this basic bifurcation, he adds that the brain is a physical object, yet its mental operations have the capacity to operate in a transcendent world. From this solid foundation, Nichols moves through the history of the free will debate in all of its iterations but does not develop fully this connection between the physical brain and non-physical mind. From an evolutionary viewpoint, mental activity develops from primal life forms where freedom to vary action is extremely limited to humans where such freedom is relatively unlimited. From this perspective, the end of action remains invariant throughout evolution (survival, well-being), but the means by which these overarching ends are obtained are progressively variable, reaching their culmination in humans where there is choice (free will) about how to survive and achieve well-being (and also the freedom to deviate from what is best for us). This line of thought might provide an underlying unity to the many either/or schools of thought that characterize the free will debate. It would not only pull together the connection between the brain and mind and, thus, man's essential continuity with all life forms, but would also help to explain why presumed objectivity is so often pervaded with subjectivity (needs of the body).
November 19, 2009
this was an enjoyable audio experience. Nichols does a commendable job of discussing issues to do with free will from a philosophical perspective.
He starts by giving many classic conceptions of free will and determinism, religious and otherwise, and follows by detailing many of the different philosophical theories regarding free will and determinism. He then moves on to different branches of science and what they have to say about free will and determinism, and ends by discussing different ethical systems and how they are impacted by the knowledge we gain from the free will/determinism debate. I know I keep using both free will and determinism a lot, but it's important to make the distinction that lack of free will can be compatible with indeterminism.
It had some weak points, particularly in the science sections. But on the whole he does a pretty thorough job of discussing all the different aspects important to this issue. I was a little surprised that as a philosopher who is obviously at least somewhat well versed in science he didn't offer up any suggestions for how scientific knowledge about cognition in general should effect our ethics. Maybe that wasn't his intent, he focused solely on preexisting theories(utilitarianism, consequentialism, etc..) and only as to how free will and determinism effect them. Interesting, and good food for thought, but in the end not very practical.
He starts by giving many classic conceptions of free will and determinism, religious and otherwise, and follows by detailing many of the different philosophical theories regarding free will and determinism. He then moves on to different branches of science and what they have to say about free will and determinism, and ends by discussing different ethical systems and how they are impacted by the knowledge we gain from the free will/determinism debate. I know I keep using both free will and determinism a lot, but it's important to make the distinction that lack of free will can be compatible with indeterminism.
It had some weak points, particularly in the science sections. But on the whole he does a pretty thorough job of discussing all the different aspects important to this issue. I was a little surprised that as a philosopher who is obviously at least somewhat well versed in science he didn't offer up any suggestions for how scientific knowledge about cognition in general should effect our ethics. Maybe that wasn't his intent, he focused solely on preexisting theories(utilitarianism, consequentialism, etc..) and only as to how free will and determinism effect them. Interesting, and good food for thought, but in the end not very practical.
June 20, 2013
Interesting course... the fact that research has shown through EEG and EMG that the brain's somatosensory cortex triggers a muscle movement 550 milliseconds before the muscle moves, yet subjects report conscious awareness of making the decision to move the muscle 200 milliseconds before the muscle moves (i.e. the brain decides up to 350 ms BEFORE the person does) is really fascinating; suggests we are more likely to be able to stop an action before it is realized than to decide not to take that action (instead of free will: free "won't").
Great intellectual exploration of the philosophical, moral, and scientific nature of free will vs determinism. Cool stuff!
Great intellectual exploration of the philosophical, moral, and scientific nature of free will vs determinism. Cool stuff!
January 7, 2017
It was a good course, if you already are introduced to logic and logical thinking. As though it covers a wide range of issues in this profound matter, it fails to deliver delicate arguments in favor or against what we should know.
I would've ignored such problems if the author was not a professional philosopher. Yet as a professional philosopher, he fails at his job to argue without relying on fallacies.
On the other hand, I find it time worth spending. It gave a good coverage of the matters that are important in this debate. And also their interactions.
I would've ignored such problems if the author was not a professional philosopher. Yet as a professional philosopher, he fails at his job to argue without relying on fallacies.
On the other hand, I find it time worth spending. It gave a good coverage of the matters that are important in this debate. And also their interactions.
April 4, 2015
Well, this was not what I thought it would be, on purpose or by accident I can not say. Nichols has some really good information to impart, but I do not feel that I understand the different discussions any better than I did before. One of the last lectures focusing on vengeance, specifically the discussion of blood feuds (think Hatfield vs McCoy), was probably the most eye opening for me in the whole series. Maybe I just need to re-listen to the whole thing again to _really_ get it.
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