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After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire Since 1405
Rise and Fall of the Great Powers for the post–Cold War era—a brilliantly written, sweeping new history of how empires have ebbed and flowed over the past six centuries.
The death of the great Tatar emperor Tamerlane in 1405, writes historian John Darwin, was a turning point in world history. Never again would a single warlord, raiding across the steppes, be able to unite Eurasia under his rule. After Tamerlane, a series of huge, stable empires were founded and consolidated; Chinese, Mughal, Persian, and Ottoman—realms of such grandeur, sophistication, and dynamism that they outclassed the fragmentary, quarrelsome nations of Europe in every respect. The nineteenth century saw these empires fall vulnerable to European conquest, creating an age of anarchy and exploitation, but this had largely ended by the twenty-first century, with new Chinese and Indian super-states and successful independent states in Turkey and Iran.
The death of the great Tatar emperor Tamerlane in 1405, writes historian John Darwin, was a turning point in world history. Never again would a single warlord, raiding across the steppes, be able to unite Eurasia under his rule. After Tamerlane, a series of huge, stable empires were founded and consolidated; Chinese, Mughal, Persian, and Ottoman—realms of such grandeur, sophistication, and dynamism that they outclassed the fragmentary, quarrelsome nations of Europe in every respect. The nineteenth century saw these empires fall vulnerable to European conquest, creating an age of anarchy and exploitation, but this had largely ended by the twenty-first century, with new Chinese and Indian super-states and successful independent states in Turkey and Iran.
This elegantly written, magisterial account challenges the conventional narrative of the “Rise of the West,” showing that European ascendancy was neither foreordained nor a linear process. Indeed, it is likely to be a transitory phase. After Tamerlane is a vivid, bold, and innovative history of how empires rise and fall, from one of Britain’s leading scholars. It will take its place beside other provocative works of “large history,” from Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers to David Landes’s The Wealth and Poverty of Nations or Niall Ferguson’s Empire.
592 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2007
About the author
John Darwin
30 books61 followersGareth John Darwin, CBE, FBA, is a British historian who from 1984 to 2019 was the Beit Lecturer in Commonwealth History at the University of Oxford and a Fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford. Prior to his appointment there he was a lecturer in history at the University of Reading between 1972 and 1984.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 147 reviews
June 26, 2024
Almost six centuries of world history in less than 500 pages: without discussion this is a tour de force, particularly if someone does it with the necessary depth and a large erudition. That is certainly the case for this book: the footnotes and the bibliography are nothing short of impressive. After having intensely read "After Tamerlane", spread over three months, I have gained plenty of new knowledge, nuances and insights. For that reason alone he deserves quite a few stars. However, I do have serious issues with this work.
1. Starting with the title: "After Tamerlane" refers to the last Mongol ruler who in the 15th century created a classic nomadic empire and lost it in record time, after which the course was free for imperia modern style. I have the impression that this starting point was chosen very randomly, since these other empires were there yet (China, India) or (in the case of the Western colonial empires) appeared only much later.
2. Darwin explains nowhere what he exactly means by the notion of empire, which is convenient for him, because so he can grasp a lot of historical phenomena under one denominator. One single time he gives a definition of imperialism, as the dominance of one State over another through integration in the political, economic or cultural structure. The result is that Darwin uses the term for a wide variety of phenomena like the Inca empire, the British colonial empire, the Soviet empire and the American empire. This is especially curious because Darwin indiscriminately lectures other scholars who don’t take into account the specificity of historical phenomena.
3. "the history of the world is an imperial history, a history of empires", this bold statement at the end of the book, should come as no surprise given the perspective of Darwin, but it is at least a strong and controversial form of reductionism. Economy is strongly reflected in the work, but only to the extent that it fits within imperial structures and systems; the same with culture, but social phenomena remain as good as completely unmentioned.
4. According to me the most troubling feature of this book is Darwin's tendency to commit ultra-revisionist historiography. He delivers continually criticism on current and recent theories and views. The worldsystems theory of Wallerstein is regularly attacked (rightly so), but he aims his fiercest arrows against the Eurocentric approach that focuses on the inevitable rise of the West, as a result of the Western lead on just about every human terrain. In this, of course, he also refers to the Great divergence debate. I don't feel up to the task to say who is right or who is wrong in this area, but Darwin commits the error to be constantly hyper correcting without being consistent: in almost every paragraph he underlines how minimalistic the Western dominance over the world was, how late it came, how strong the resistance against it was, and how quick it vanished ... and thereafter he just gives a thorough and dry description of the phenomenal growth of Western dominance on just about any terrain.
5. As a consequence Darwin is regularly contradicting himself. Just one example: in chapters 2 and 3 he emphasizes how the colonies in America were insignificant in the rise of Europe, but in Chapter 4 the Atlantic connection is called the engine of the European dominance over Eurasia. I could continue in this way for a while.
From Darwin's final chapter, I understand that he especially wanted to give insight in the contingency of history (nothing is forever, what happens is chained to very specific circumstances and contexts and is therefore necessary transient), and I think that's very arguable and for a historian even his Unique Selling Proposition. Only, Darwin is holding on to that view so convulsively that he seems to throw overboard almost all the great theories and schemes. Now, according to me, even an historian needs (a bit of these) theories and schemes to understand history, carefully adjusting them to reality in a long, continual process; I think science (even historical science) proceeds that way, as in a dialectical system that eventually leads to a higher level of understanding.
Don't understand me wrong: this is really a valuable book! Take for instance Darwin's plea to take seriously the large non-Western civilizations and to not underestimate their resilience. That is a firm and essential message, as it turns out at the beginning of the 21st century. Pity that he remains blind for the fact that these civilizations (or states, or empires) draw their (renewed) force essentially from taking over crucial elements of Western modernity (in a adjusted way of course).
1. Starting with the title: "After Tamerlane" refers to the last Mongol ruler who in the 15th century created a classic nomadic empire and lost it in record time, after which the course was free for imperia modern style. I have the impression that this starting point was chosen very randomly, since these other empires were there yet (China, India) or (in the case of the Western colonial empires) appeared only much later.
2. Darwin explains nowhere what he exactly means by the notion of empire, which is convenient for him, because so he can grasp a lot of historical phenomena under one denominator. One single time he gives a definition of imperialism, as the dominance of one State over another through integration in the political, economic or cultural structure. The result is that Darwin uses the term for a wide variety of phenomena like the Inca empire, the British colonial empire, the Soviet empire and the American empire. This is especially curious because Darwin indiscriminately lectures other scholars who don’t take into account the specificity of historical phenomena.
3. "the history of the world is an imperial history, a history of empires", this bold statement at the end of the book, should come as no surprise given the perspective of Darwin, but it is at least a strong and controversial form of reductionism. Economy is strongly reflected in the work, but only to the extent that it fits within imperial structures and systems; the same with culture, but social phenomena remain as good as completely unmentioned.
4. According to me the most troubling feature of this book is Darwin's tendency to commit ultra-revisionist historiography. He delivers continually criticism on current and recent theories and views. The worldsystems theory of Wallerstein is regularly attacked (rightly so), but he aims his fiercest arrows against the Eurocentric approach that focuses on the inevitable rise of the West, as a result of the Western lead on just about every human terrain. In this, of course, he also refers to the Great divergence debate. I don't feel up to the task to say who is right or who is wrong in this area, but Darwin commits the error to be constantly hyper correcting without being consistent: in almost every paragraph he underlines how minimalistic the Western dominance over the world was, how late it came, how strong the resistance against it was, and how quick it vanished ... and thereafter he just gives a thorough and dry description of the phenomenal growth of Western dominance on just about any terrain.
5. As a consequence Darwin is regularly contradicting himself. Just one example: in chapters 2 and 3 he emphasizes how the colonies in America were insignificant in the rise of Europe, but in Chapter 4 the Atlantic connection is called the engine of the European dominance over Eurasia. I could continue in this way for a while.
From Darwin's final chapter, I understand that he especially wanted to give insight in the contingency of history (nothing is forever, what happens is chained to very specific circumstances and contexts and is therefore necessary transient), and I think that's very arguable and for a historian even his Unique Selling Proposition. Only, Darwin is holding on to that view so convulsively that he seems to throw overboard almost all the great theories and schemes. Now, according to me, even an historian needs (a bit of these) theories and schemes to understand history, carefully adjusting them to reality in a long, continual process; I think science (even historical science) proceeds that way, as in a dialectical system that eventually leads to a higher level of understanding.
Don't understand me wrong: this is really a valuable book! Take for instance Darwin's plea to take seriously the large non-Western civilizations and to not underestimate their resilience. That is a firm and essential message, as it turns out at the beginning of the 21st century. Pity that he remains blind for the fact that these civilizations (or states, or empires) draw their (renewed) force essentially from taking over crucial elements of Western modernity (in a adjusted way of course).
December 27, 2010
Covering, to a degree, the timeframe and several themes popularly traversed by Paul Kennedy back in the mid-eighties with
The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers
, John Darwin has put together what is, in my opinion, one of the best Big Picture histories that I have ever had the pleasure to read. Clocking in a five-hundred-and-six pages of thick text, with the notes and chapter bibliographies to suitably awe the reader with the massive erudition and encompassing knowledge the British academic possesses, the book feels even longer, as Darwin covers an extraordinary range of narratives and timelines with just the right amount of detail to impart his thematic structures with a clarity and meticulousness that I found superb.
The author is exploring the history of empire within a global context, treading territory in between that of belief in an unstoppable European exceptionalism that inevitably catapulted its meritorious western exemplars to their dominant imperial position by the end of the nineteenth century, and the more recent school that holds such paramountcy was achieved both by lucky endowments of a geographic nature and an exploitation and oppression greedily and ignorantly enacted upon rich cultures that were continually the victims of aggressive violence, bad faith, and the misfortune of being located at a remove from a select portion of nature's bounty. Darwin's approach wields a broad outline that suggests there was a measure of global interconnectedness starting from the fifteenth century; that Europe must be considered as a geographic entity that includes not only its eastern realms and, more importantly, Russia, but - during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries at least - the North (and, to a degree, South) American nations erected upon a framework constructed by European settlers, culture and thought; that, in many ways, human history is the history of empire; that the progress of European imperialism and supremacy was a fitful one of many regressions, false starts, impediments, achievements, and fortunate circumstances - neither historically determined nor linearly progressive; and that the Asian empires - in particular, those of Eastern Asia (China and Japan) - proved far more resistant and impervious to European domination and penetration than is commonly held - that Asia itself has shown throughout history a marked disinclination to existence under one central unifying authority.
The launching point is the meeting between the Muslim scholar Ibn Khaldun and the Mongol-Turkic conqueror general Tamerlane prior to the latter's long-contemplated campaign against China. With his death - and the dissolution of his vast Central Asian empire - also died the supremacy of the steppe over the city, and of Central Asia over the Eurasian landmass. From this point onwards we see not only the spread of both marine exploration by Europe and tentative Asian expansion by Muscovy/Russia, but also a consolidation of the East Asian imperial realms of China and Japan. Central Asia, a muslim land, saw the rise of a new imperial superstructure, that of the tribal or clan chieftain and his army of slave convert - Mamluk - warriors loyal only to their master, establishing temporary and continually shifting imperial constructs over both steppe and settlement. Ruling over empires with a considerable population of nomads and muslim citizens with no inherent loyalty to their state, the central Asian Islamic empires would progress in a much different manner from the dynastic types that prevailed to the east and west.
Within this basic framework, Darwin covers the overthrow of the Aztec and Incan empires by a handful of adventurers - an archetype for the European seaborne method of subsuming the Asian and African coasts and, in the case of the latter, actually establishing vast states by exploiting ethnic and caste conflicts. With the initial contacts between European ships and east and southeast Asian ports, the Europeans took the first steps towards their eventual dominant position in continental trade, and it's wonderful how Darwin works over this historical era. Showing how the discovery of silver and gold in the Americas funded the European merchants in greatly expanding trade with Asia, he also examines the Ming dynasty and Tokugawa Shogunate to determine both how they were solidifying and strengthening their realms, while at the same time following paths that led away from any means of enacting an industrial revolution comparable to that which would propel the Europeans into the first tier globally. The Ottoman Empire is laid out, both as the terrifying Islamic aggressor it was at the time, and the surprisingly endurable and culturally powerful entity it would prove to be. The formation of the Mughal Empire in India and the interplay between Muslim and Hindu cultures in the subcontinent, and how these strains - local, linguistic, historical, ethnic, etc. - were important, are sifted through to find the answer to why India proved so amenable to control by Britain, first by the British East India Company, then by the Raj. The porous nature of the Iranian landscape reveals itself in the outline of the rise, reformations, mistakes and farseeing initiatives of the Safavid dynasty and its efforts to rid itself of the Mamluk structure that proved such a curse to stability in Central Asia. Meanwhile, Muscovy becomes Tsarist Russia, absorbing Western culture and ideas at an increasing rate while expanding, steadily and remorselessly, across the vast central Asian interior, crushing or diplomatically isolating the remnant Turkic khanates of the steppes and annexing the endless taiga forests of Siberia as far as the Pacific Ocean. Darwin stresses throughout this period the slow and unsure manner in which the New World and the north-central Asian interior was opened and settled, and how the Asian empires, in most cases allowing the European merchants considerable leeway shoreside, usually managed to prevent any manner of penetration of their interior lands where the masses lived, indifferent to these aggressive and far-traveling oceanic visitors and their strange ways and Christian-influenced ideas.
With what Darwin calls the long nineteenth century - 1789 to 1914 - we finally see Europe starting to pull away from the pack. Industrialized, entrepreneurial, militarily strong, scientifically bounding, culturally and philosophically assured, nationally secure in a flexible liberalism that freed the mind, body, and capital for the energetic furtherance of expansionist ends, the (West) Europeans first establish a lasting peace between their home nations before setting out to colonize the world. Dividing virtually the entirety of Africa - save Abyssinia - between the major European states, they also batter the Ottoman Empire (but don't partition it), harass Qing China (but cannot make much headway past the mandarin elites into the vast interior agrarian provinces), force Japan to open its ports (but don't add it to the list of imperial conquests, and soon come to respect its stunningly rapid rise to the status of regional power), and establish protectorates over Iran and parts of Arabia, without seriously displacing the Islamic culture that permeates its citizenry. All the while Darwin explores why and how the Europeans were able to seemingly so effortlessly achieve global paramountcy, the personalities involved, the economic, geopolitical, and cultural legacies and systems and trends that had come to arise at this particular period, and how Imperial Europe was often not in as dominant, or as sure, a position as was then commonly believed; how even in hapless imperial realms like China and Osmanli Turkey, the scornful dismissal of them as ossified and corrupt entities belied a select dynamism, reforms and cultural buttresses, that allowed them to survive far past their best before dates.
Then, in 1914, it all went up in flames. In many ways, Darwin's analysis and detailing of the short twentieth century is the best part of this immensely impressive work. The effects and aftereffects of the First World War; the retreat from a globally integrated economy in the uncertain decade of the twenties and the depression-riddled thirties that followed; the rise of the new imperialism created as an answer, or antidote, to liberal capitalist democracy - Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, Imperial Japan - and the quick and brutal method with which they set out to impose their new order upon a conflicted and suddenly doubting world; the triumph of American-backed liberalism allied with communism against the virulent Axis strains of domination, and the quick collapse of China into the unsuspecting hands of communist rule, along with the unexpectedly rapid rebirth of Germany and Japan within the fold of the American flock - it is covered in depth and convincingly. Darwin's knowledge of the British Empire, in particular, is incredible, and his outline of the rise of Indian nationalism, the British responses, the de-colonization after the Second World War, and the lingering dreams of an imperial role that Britain entertained before having them brutally snuffed out in the Suez debacle is just masterful. After laying out the histories of the various imperial structures and forms prior to the modern age, Darwin offers up the Soviet Union and postwar America as two exemplars of the newest imperial styling, one wherein overwhelming military, economic, cultural, and political power - and both the attractiveness and overweening influence of this global presence - replaces the older imperial structures with their emphasis on physical conquest or overlordship of colonial areas. Can any deny that this postmodern, electric-powered, nuclear-wielding type of bifurcated empire extended its cold war tentacles into the furthest reaches of the globe? And then, in 1991, the Soviet Union utterly disappeared, and America sits, alone and exposed, on the uppermost tier. From all that we have learned - and know - of empire, however, who would have the confidence to state with any certainty that this American supremacy will prove itself more permanent or enduring than the parade of imperial configurations that have had their brief-but-shining moments in the sun?
Once again, I've written up a lengthy review that barely scratches the surface of the wealth of erudition and analysis - and just plain lovely writing - that comprises After Tamerlane. This is by no means an easy read, and many passages require more than one attempt to be ingested in their entirety. What's more, Darwin commonly will explain his thematic intentions with four or five part examples that can run to several pages, by the end of which the reader can find himself struggling to remember exactly what is being delineated. There are also minor omissions - like the relatively scant attention paid to philosophic systems and schools of thought and their effect upon the different Eurasian cultures - and minor annoyances - like Darwin's arbitrary decision to render all Chinese spellings in the older Wade-Giles system, rather than the newer (and IMO more aesthetic and accurate) Pinyin format. However, these really are barely worth a mention, because this is just such an incredibly detailed, subtle, nuanced, impartial, and deeply impressive undertaking. Big Picture history has always been one of my favorite non-fictional genres, and I can honestly state that After Tamerlane is amongst the finest examples of this type I have ever come across - enjoyable, informative, and educational in the best of ways, and always imparting clarity and thoughtful interpretation to whatever subject falls under its far-ranging and perceptive lens. Absolutely the highest recommendation.
The author is exploring the history of empire within a global context, treading territory in between that of belief in an unstoppable European exceptionalism that inevitably catapulted its meritorious western exemplars to their dominant imperial position by the end of the nineteenth century, and the more recent school that holds such paramountcy was achieved both by lucky endowments of a geographic nature and an exploitation and oppression greedily and ignorantly enacted upon rich cultures that were continually the victims of aggressive violence, bad faith, and the misfortune of being located at a remove from a select portion of nature's bounty. Darwin's approach wields a broad outline that suggests there was a measure of global interconnectedness starting from the fifteenth century; that Europe must be considered as a geographic entity that includes not only its eastern realms and, more importantly, Russia, but - during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries at least - the North (and, to a degree, South) American nations erected upon a framework constructed by European settlers, culture and thought; that, in many ways, human history is the history of empire; that the progress of European imperialism and supremacy was a fitful one of many regressions, false starts, impediments, achievements, and fortunate circumstances - neither historically determined nor linearly progressive; and that the Asian empires - in particular, those of Eastern Asia (China and Japan) - proved far more resistant and impervious to European domination and penetration than is commonly held - that Asia itself has shown throughout history a marked disinclination to existence under one central unifying authority.
The launching point is the meeting between the Muslim scholar Ibn Khaldun and the Mongol-Turkic conqueror general Tamerlane prior to the latter's long-contemplated campaign against China. With his death - and the dissolution of his vast Central Asian empire - also died the supremacy of the steppe over the city, and of Central Asia over the Eurasian landmass. From this point onwards we see not only the spread of both marine exploration by Europe and tentative Asian expansion by Muscovy/Russia, but also a consolidation of the East Asian imperial realms of China and Japan. Central Asia, a muslim land, saw the rise of a new imperial superstructure, that of the tribal or clan chieftain and his army of slave convert - Mamluk - warriors loyal only to their master, establishing temporary and continually shifting imperial constructs over both steppe and settlement. Ruling over empires with a considerable population of nomads and muslim citizens with no inherent loyalty to their state, the central Asian Islamic empires would progress in a much different manner from the dynastic types that prevailed to the east and west.
Within this basic framework, Darwin covers the overthrow of the Aztec and Incan empires by a handful of adventurers - an archetype for the European seaborne method of subsuming the Asian and African coasts and, in the case of the latter, actually establishing vast states by exploiting ethnic and caste conflicts. With the initial contacts between European ships and east and southeast Asian ports, the Europeans took the first steps towards their eventual dominant position in continental trade, and it's wonderful how Darwin works over this historical era. Showing how the discovery of silver and gold in the Americas funded the European merchants in greatly expanding trade with Asia, he also examines the Ming dynasty and Tokugawa Shogunate to determine both how they were solidifying and strengthening their realms, while at the same time following paths that led away from any means of enacting an industrial revolution comparable to that which would propel the Europeans into the first tier globally. The Ottoman Empire is laid out, both as the terrifying Islamic aggressor it was at the time, and the surprisingly endurable and culturally powerful entity it would prove to be. The formation of the Mughal Empire in India and the interplay between Muslim and Hindu cultures in the subcontinent, and how these strains - local, linguistic, historical, ethnic, etc. - were important, are sifted through to find the answer to why India proved so amenable to control by Britain, first by the British East India Company, then by the Raj. The porous nature of the Iranian landscape reveals itself in the outline of the rise, reformations, mistakes and farseeing initiatives of the Safavid dynasty and its efforts to rid itself of the Mamluk structure that proved such a curse to stability in Central Asia. Meanwhile, Muscovy becomes Tsarist Russia, absorbing Western culture and ideas at an increasing rate while expanding, steadily and remorselessly, across the vast central Asian interior, crushing or diplomatically isolating the remnant Turkic khanates of the steppes and annexing the endless taiga forests of Siberia as far as the Pacific Ocean. Darwin stresses throughout this period the slow and unsure manner in which the New World and the north-central Asian interior was opened and settled, and how the Asian empires, in most cases allowing the European merchants considerable leeway shoreside, usually managed to prevent any manner of penetration of their interior lands where the masses lived, indifferent to these aggressive and far-traveling oceanic visitors and their strange ways and Christian-influenced ideas.
With what Darwin calls the long nineteenth century - 1789 to 1914 - we finally see Europe starting to pull away from the pack. Industrialized, entrepreneurial, militarily strong, scientifically bounding, culturally and philosophically assured, nationally secure in a flexible liberalism that freed the mind, body, and capital for the energetic furtherance of expansionist ends, the (West) Europeans first establish a lasting peace between their home nations before setting out to colonize the world. Dividing virtually the entirety of Africa - save Abyssinia - between the major European states, they also batter the Ottoman Empire (but don't partition it), harass Qing China (but cannot make much headway past the mandarin elites into the vast interior agrarian provinces), force Japan to open its ports (but don't add it to the list of imperial conquests, and soon come to respect its stunningly rapid rise to the status of regional power), and establish protectorates over Iran and parts of Arabia, without seriously displacing the Islamic culture that permeates its citizenry. All the while Darwin explores why and how the Europeans were able to seemingly so effortlessly achieve global paramountcy, the personalities involved, the economic, geopolitical, and cultural legacies and systems and trends that had come to arise at this particular period, and how Imperial Europe was often not in as dominant, or as sure, a position as was then commonly believed; how even in hapless imperial realms like China and Osmanli Turkey, the scornful dismissal of them as ossified and corrupt entities belied a select dynamism, reforms and cultural buttresses, that allowed them to survive far past their best before dates.
Then, in 1914, it all went up in flames. In many ways, Darwin's analysis and detailing of the short twentieth century is the best part of this immensely impressive work. The effects and aftereffects of the First World War; the retreat from a globally integrated economy in the uncertain decade of the twenties and the depression-riddled thirties that followed; the rise of the new imperialism created as an answer, or antidote, to liberal capitalist democracy - Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, Imperial Japan - and the quick and brutal method with which they set out to impose their new order upon a conflicted and suddenly doubting world; the triumph of American-backed liberalism allied with communism against the virulent Axis strains of domination, and the quick collapse of China into the unsuspecting hands of communist rule, along with the unexpectedly rapid rebirth of Germany and Japan within the fold of the American flock - it is covered in depth and convincingly. Darwin's knowledge of the British Empire, in particular, is incredible, and his outline of the rise of Indian nationalism, the British responses, the de-colonization after the Second World War, and the lingering dreams of an imperial role that Britain entertained before having them brutally snuffed out in the Suez debacle is just masterful. After laying out the histories of the various imperial structures and forms prior to the modern age, Darwin offers up the Soviet Union and postwar America as two exemplars of the newest imperial styling, one wherein overwhelming military, economic, cultural, and political power - and both the attractiveness and overweening influence of this global presence - replaces the older imperial structures with their emphasis on physical conquest or overlordship of colonial areas. Can any deny that this postmodern, electric-powered, nuclear-wielding type of bifurcated empire extended its cold war tentacles into the furthest reaches of the globe? And then, in 1991, the Soviet Union utterly disappeared, and America sits, alone and exposed, on the uppermost tier. From all that we have learned - and know - of empire, however, who would have the confidence to state with any certainty that this American supremacy will prove itself more permanent or enduring than the parade of imperial configurations that have had their brief-but-shining moments in the sun?
Once again, I've written up a lengthy review that barely scratches the surface of the wealth of erudition and analysis - and just plain lovely writing - that comprises After Tamerlane. This is by no means an easy read, and many passages require more than one attempt to be ingested in their entirety. What's more, Darwin commonly will explain his thematic intentions with four or five part examples that can run to several pages, by the end of which the reader can find himself struggling to remember exactly what is being delineated. There are also minor omissions - like the relatively scant attention paid to philosophic systems and schools of thought and their effect upon the different Eurasian cultures - and minor annoyances - like Darwin's arbitrary decision to render all Chinese spellings in the older Wade-Giles system, rather than the newer (and IMO more aesthetic and accurate) Pinyin format. However, these really are barely worth a mention, because this is just such an incredibly detailed, subtle, nuanced, impartial, and deeply impressive undertaking. Big Picture history has always been one of my favorite non-fictional genres, and I can honestly state that After Tamerlane is amongst the finest examples of this type I have ever come across - enjoyable, informative, and educational in the best of ways, and always imparting clarity and thoughtful interpretation to whatever subject falls under its far-ranging and perceptive lens. Absolutely the highest recommendation.
December 16, 2019
-Quizá las intenciones del libro sean algo distintas a su propuesta final, pero también hay que reconocer lo ambiciosas que resultaban.-
Género. Historia.
Lo que nos cuenta. El libro El sueño del imperio (publicación original: After Tamerlane. The Rise and Fall of Global Empires, 1400-2000, 2007), con el subtítulo Auge y caída de las potencias globales 1400-2000, a partir del rechazo a la linealidad de los cambios históricos, de la interpretación del concepto “Europa” dentro del seno de Eurasia y la interpretación del concepto “Imperio”, es una obra que intenta explicar la globalización como fruto de la conexión entre regiones del mundo a través de la historia, el papel de Europa/Occidente en ese fenómeno y la resistencia de otros estados a sus acciones.
¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:
https://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com...
Género. Historia.
Lo que nos cuenta. El libro El sueño del imperio (publicación original: After Tamerlane. The Rise and Fall of Global Empires, 1400-2000, 2007), con el subtítulo Auge y caída de las potencias globales 1400-2000, a partir del rechazo a la linealidad de los cambios históricos, de la interpretación del concepto “Europa” dentro del seno de Eurasia y la interpretación del concepto “Imperio”, es una obra que intenta explicar la globalización como fruto de la conexión entre regiones del mundo a través de la historia, el papel de Europa/Occidente en ese fenómeno y la resistencia de otros estados a sus acciones.
¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:
https://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com...
October 4, 2022
A enjoyable read.
It explores the explosion of European empires, and their subsequent fall, in the context of previous dominant regimes. Very interesting insights, and it certainly challenged my perceptions of the British Empire in particular.
Update 4/10/22. I saw this in a bookshop. I thought it's just the sort of book I like, so I bought it. Go to log it here and of course I already have it. Better than that I gave it a good review three years ago - you would think that I would remember it. Hey ho. Rack it up to old age.
Originally I joined Goodreads to stop this happening. TOP TIP: It only works if you take the time to look it up.
It explores the explosion of European empires, and their subsequent fall, in the context of previous dominant regimes. Very interesting insights, and it certainly challenged my perceptions of the British Empire in particular.
Update 4/10/22. I saw this in a bookshop. I thought it's just the sort of book I like, so I bought it. Go to log it here and of course I already have it. Better than that I gave it a good review three years ago - you would think that I would remember it. Hey ho. Rack it up to old age.
Originally I joined Goodreads to stop this happening. TOP TIP: It only works if you take the time to look it up.
April 21, 2009
Written by Oxford historian John Darwin, this is yet another of those grand sweeping books that covers centuries of world history. It is also one of the best works of history I have ever read. A single chapter on the history of the Middle East, for example, will give you more insight into that region than reading several years’ worth of New York Times op-eds and a pile of axe-grinding books. Likewise the Soviet Union. Or China. Or the British Empire. As vast as his scope is, Darwin does not have a single integrated theory to explain the history of everything. He is, however, a great story-teller, an insightful analyst, and a historian in the great tradition of authors ranging from Edward Gibbon to Jared Diamond. If this sounds like praise that is too overheated, well, it’s a terrific book.
The fact that Darwin is British is important. I don’t think a citizen of one of the current or recent empires, or a citizen of a country that had recently emerged from colonial status, such as an American or a Russian, could have written a book with this kind of scope or objectivity. True, the British long possessed an empire, but two generations have now passed since its post-WWII disintegration. And it’s been nearly a thousand years since the country was last conquered. This makes for better historians.
I’ll cite just two extracts from the book that provide a good flavor of his analysis:
• On the fall of the Soviet Union: “In less than half a decade this vast imperial structure – the ruling power across Northern Eurasia; the tenacious rival in Southern Asia, Africa and the Middle East – simply fell to pieces. By 1991 it was an empire in ruins. There was no ‘silver age’ or phase of decline: just a calamitous fall”. He then goes on to succinctly distill the economic failings of the Soviet Union, the inability of its central command structure to adapt to consumer demand and the technological revolution, and the reason why Gorbachev’s high-risk strategy of reform (aka “perestroika” i.e. re-structuring) brought the whole system crashing down.
• On the rise of the American imperial mindset after the fall of the Soviet Union: “But what would happen once the Soviet collapse brought an end to competition? … The American response to the end of the Cold War was to see it not as the chance to lay down an imperial burden, but as a meta-historic opportunity to shape the course of world history… It was hardly surprising that the seemingly unlimited scope of American ambition bred a mixed reaction. Unrestrained by the need to solicit goodwill, no longer in need of its Cold War alliances, and riding the wave of ideological triumph, America seemed free to use its economic and military muscle against all opposition, and the opposition of all. Talk of an America ‘empire’, previously confined to the Left, became increasingly common. A universal empire, in which one state imposed it domestic laws upon all the others, was the polar opposite of the long tradition of international law that had evolved in Europe since the seventeenth century… Unilateralism and universalism were harmless foibles in an isolationist power. In the world’s only superpower they became the chief elements of an imperial outlook.” That passage seems like an astute summary of the belief system that brought us to the crossroads where we stand today: trying to figure out how to repair our relations with our allies, extricate ourselves from two wars, and let the rest of the world know that we’re going back to honoring the Geneva convention after all.
In short, I find that Darwin cuts to the heart of the matter quite brilliantly, regardless of what period of history he touches upon in dissecting 600 years of empires. If a book makes me feel smarter about how the world works, I figure it’s likely a pretty good book. Right at the moment, I feel pretty smart. Of course, I’ll probably have to read it again in a couple of years to make sure my IQ does not backslide.
The fact that Darwin is British is important. I don’t think a citizen of one of the current or recent empires, or a citizen of a country that had recently emerged from colonial status, such as an American or a Russian, could have written a book with this kind of scope or objectivity. True, the British long possessed an empire, but two generations have now passed since its post-WWII disintegration. And it’s been nearly a thousand years since the country was last conquered. This makes for better historians.
I’ll cite just two extracts from the book that provide a good flavor of his analysis:
• On the fall of the Soviet Union: “In less than half a decade this vast imperial structure – the ruling power across Northern Eurasia; the tenacious rival in Southern Asia, Africa and the Middle East – simply fell to pieces. By 1991 it was an empire in ruins. There was no ‘silver age’ or phase of decline: just a calamitous fall”. He then goes on to succinctly distill the economic failings of the Soviet Union, the inability of its central command structure to adapt to consumer demand and the technological revolution, and the reason why Gorbachev’s high-risk strategy of reform (aka “perestroika” i.e. re-structuring) brought the whole system crashing down.
• On the rise of the American imperial mindset after the fall of the Soviet Union: “But what would happen once the Soviet collapse brought an end to competition? … The American response to the end of the Cold War was to see it not as the chance to lay down an imperial burden, but as a meta-historic opportunity to shape the course of world history… It was hardly surprising that the seemingly unlimited scope of American ambition bred a mixed reaction. Unrestrained by the need to solicit goodwill, no longer in need of its Cold War alliances, and riding the wave of ideological triumph, America seemed free to use its economic and military muscle against all opposition, and the opposition of all. Talk of an America ‘empire’, previously confined to the Left, became increasingly common. A universal empire, in which one state imposed it domestic laws upon all the others, was the polar opposite of the long tradition of international law that had evolved in Europe since the seventeenth century… Unilateralism and universalism were harmless foibles in an isolationist power. In the world’s only superpower they became the chief elements of an imperial outlook.” That passage seems like an astute summary of the belief system that brought us to the crossroads where we stand today: trying to figure out how to repair our relations with our allies, extricate ourselves from two wars, and let the rest of the world know that we’re going back to honoring the Geneva convention after all.
In short, I find that Darwin cuts to the heart of the matter quite brilliantly, regardless of what period of history he touches upon in dissecting 600 years of empires. If a book makes me feel smarter about how the world works, I figure it’s likely a pretty good book. Right at the moment, I feel pretty smart. Of course, I’ll probably have to read it again in a couple of years to make sure my IQ does not backslide.
April 11, 2019
To me, this is the central paragraph of this book (p 490): "For all the passions that they arouse, the evidence of this book is that histories founded on the rival grand narratives of ‘exploitation’ and ‘modernization’ have limited value as a guide to the Eurasian past. That is not because we cannot find plentiful evidence of both phenomena in action. But neither had a free rein. Each became entangled in the politics and culture of the states and regions where its influence was felt. Each was forced into compromise to win over the local allies and agents without which it was (usually) hamstrung. Both were dependent on the fluctuating conditions that favoured or deterred imperial ambition, commercial expansion and cultural assertion in different parts of the world. (...) There is no neat chronology of imperial rise and fall; no neat geography of European mastery over the rest of Eurasia. Nor indeed did the ‘empire’ of the West come to an end in the bonfire of colonial vanities that we call decolonization..”
History, according to Darwin, is so contingent that great narrative structures as 'imperialism', 'modernism', 'the Great Divergence' etc. are too simple. Everything is so conditioned by its circumstances that you simply can't generalise. According to me, in its turn, this is far too exaggerated by Darwin. I think every historian really has to generalize and seek for patterns and use theories,... BUT he/she mustn't forget history is always made in very precise circumstances, and broader contexts that are always very specific!
So this bulcky volume contains lots of flaws, but all in all it remains an impressive work. See more about this in my SenseofHistory-account on Goodreads: https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/9...
History, according to Darwin, is so contingent that great narrative structures as 'imperialism', 'modernism', 'the Great Divergence' etc. are too simple. Everything is so conditioned by its circumstances that you simply can't generalise. According to me, in its turn, this is far too exaggerated by Darwin. I think every historian really has to generalize and seek for patterns and use theories,... BUT he/she mustn't forget history is always made in very precise circumstances, and broader contexts that are always very specific!
So this bulcky volume contains lots of flaws, but all in all it remains an impressive work. See more about this in my SenseofHistory-account on Goodreads: https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/9...
September 4, 2014
This book nicely sums up all the more or less recent (1990s to about 2005) scholarship on the topic of 'Empires'. It's a great introduction to the subject for both students and general readers.
Unfortunately, that also proves to be the book's greatest weakness. Darwin combines this overview of very different topics with quite a forceful argument of his own. The former undermines the latter, as the details of his argument start to contradict each other. For example, was there a globalised world ecenomy in the early part of the early modern era, albeit one which did not allow Europe to dominate, as he concludes, or was it very small and limited, as Jan De Vries, whom he quotes earlier, argues? In the actual discussion of Europe's overseas trade in the 16th and 17th centuries those two views are on the opposite sides of a long standing debate - Darwin just swipes that under the carpet and pretends that both sides argue the same thing, which he supposedly agrees with. The same can be said about almost any other aspect of the book.
Another big shortcoming of the work is that Darwin completely ignores Latin America past the initial conquest. It becomes especially important as his argument about 19th century imperialism progresses. Regardless of whether a coverage of independent Latin American states would have supported or contradicted it, it is needed. Without such a discussion it looks like the biggest counter-argument to everything he says about Europe partitioning the world. After all, his main argument IS the fact that Europe physically partitioned the world only in the late 19th century rather than before. However, there are two problems with that - on the most basic level, a Wikipedia article would have told you that, a 600 page book is hardly necessary, and, secondly, the whole world was not partitioned after all, as an entire continent has just won political independence. The internal politics of that continent in an 'imperialist' context and the extent to which the people and political elites of those countries identified with Europe or imperialism (or didn't) is a very interesting question, which would have enriched the story of the 'expansion of Europe', told in Darwin's book. Unfortunately, it would also have made it less neat, so under the carpet it goes.
To sum up, it is a great book for identifying the key areas of the recent (ish) research on empires and colonialism - all the king's men, such as 'including Russia' or 'the great divergence' are here - but it hardly offers anything beyond that. It is good for an introduction and great for preparation for the likes of paper 21 in the Cambridge Historical Tripos (seriously, guys, if you're doing that paper, read it, it will make your life so much easier). However, if you are actually interested in the subject of imperialism and early modern global connections, make sure to read some proper stuff afterwards.
Unfortunately, that also proves to be the book's greatest weakness. Darwin combines this overview of very different topics with quite a forceful argument of his own. The former undermines the latter, as the details of his argument start to contradict each other. For example, was there a globalised world ecenomy in the early part of the early modern era, albeit one which did not allow Europe to dominate, as he concludes, or was it very small and limited, as Jan De Vries, whom he quotes earlier, argues? In the actual discussion of Europe's overseas trade in the 16th and 17th centuries those two views are on the opposite sides of a long standing debate - Darwin just swipes that under the carpet and pretends that both sides argue the same thing, which he supposedly agrees with. The same can be said about almost any other aspect of the book.
Another big shortcoming of the work is that Darwin completely ignores Latin America past the initial conquest. It becomes especially important as his argument about 19th century imperialism progresses. Regardless of whether a coverage of independent Latin American states would have supported or contradicted it, it is needed. Without such a discussion it looks like the biggest counter-argument to everything he says about Europe partitioning the world. After all, his main argument IS the fact that Europe physically partitioned the world only in the late 19th century rather than before. However, there are two problems with that - on the most basic level, a Wikipedia article would have told you that, a 600 page book is hardly necessary, and, secondly, the whole world was not partitioned after all, as an entire continent has just won political independence. The internal politics of that continent in an 'imperialist' context and the extent to which the people and political elites of those countries identified with Europe or imperialism (or didn't) is a very interesting question, which would have enriched the story of the 'expansion of Europe', told in Darwin's book. Unfortunately, it would also have made it less neat, so under the carpet it goes.
To sum up, it is a great book for identifying the key areas of the recent (ish) research on empires and colonialism - all the king's men, such as 'including Russia' or 'the great divergence' are here - but it hardly offers anything beyond that. It is good for an introduction and great for preparation for the likes of paper 21 in the Cambridge Historical Tripos (seriously, guys, if you're doing that paper, read it, it will make your life so much easier). However, if you are actually interested in the subject of imperialism and early modern global connections, make sure to read some proper stuff afterwards.
September 9, 2012
It is easy to see why this is an award winning look at empire and it is not limited to just the European empires, and its breadth covering six hundred years of history yet readable without being overloaded. It helped give me an insight to the spread of empires and how they are nothing new and what and how different cultures managed or lived through them.
There are no assumptions made in the book and does not take the view that the West would always become dominant. This is a wondeful book if you want a clear and consise vew of global history and it is worth reading. This book is the opposite of Nial Ferguson who says Britain created the modern world, Darwin argues that all empire building created the world of today its good and bad, and that no empire was meant to last forever.
There are no assumptions made in the book and does not take the view that the West would always become dominant. This is a wondeful book if you want a clear and consise vew of global history and it is worth reading. This book is the opposite of Nial Ferguson who says Britain created the modern world, Darwin argues that all empire building created the world of today its good and bad, and that no empire was meant to last forever.
May 3, 2015
I gave up on this book after a little more than 100 pages. So what made me dislike this book? To explain I will compare it to a favorite big picture history book of mine, "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers" by Paul Kennedy. What makes that book great? First, it has well defined theory, which is summed up by the term "imperial overreach". After 100 pages I don't really know what the theory in "After Tamerlane" is. I've been given a lot of reasons why the west was not yet ready to take on the rest of Eurasia as late as the 18th century, the latest reason (when I stopped reading) being that their military forces were geared towards fighting other forces of the same kind. This latest idea is presented without going into enough detail to be convinced unless you already know the story as well as John Darwin. I could say the same thing about every idea presented in the book, but the sad fact is that I don't remember anything else, as there is no overarching theory which ties everything together, like in Paul Kennedys book. As far as I remember, Kennedys book also had a better narrative. This may be because Kennedy is better at presenting his ideas, but it could also be that "After Tamerlane" tries to cover too much. Kennedy focuses on one power at a time (the domininant western power in each period) and the conflicts tied to that powers rise and fall, whereas Darwin covers the whole of Eurasia, all the time. Even though I read a lot of history books, there is just too much in Darwins book that is skimmed over for me. I would need a much more detailed narrative to be able to appreciate his arguments. As it is this book gave me nothing. There is no narrative and no grand theory that I will remember from this book. Even the one idea I presented above (about military forces in the west) will probably be forgotten in a week.
December 16, 2017
John Darwin's book concludes on a poetic premise. We're still living in the shadow of Tamerlane. More precisely, the shadow of his failure. This poetic conclusion by a serious historian, after nearly five hundred pages of tracing Eurasian history over more than six hundred years seems to be the perfect way of describing the beauty of the words within.
After Tamerlane is extremely deterministic in nature. Explicitly rejecting the very arguments of cultural superiority, Darwin weaves threads of geographic boundaries and historical events. The rise of the West was not obvious at the start of the fifteenth century. In fact, argues Darwin, a rational person given all the facts up to that time might reasonably believe that the next millennium would be either Islamic or Chinese, maybe even a mixture of both. European dominance? Pish-posh. Stop talking nonsense.
Of course, all of history is witness to how this imaginary rational person would be dead wrong. The vast agrarian empires of Asia were out-maneuvered by the commercial empires of North Western Europe. Control of sea trade, American silver and most importantly, being the home of the industrial revolution all contributed to this domination. And why did all these things happen in Europe and not Asia? Because Europe, being the archipelago of archipelagos was uniquely placed for such an event. The absence of a vast hinterland as present in Asia, the absence of world conquerors duly coming and wrecking established societies from the steppes, the inability of any one state to dominate over the others, the particular nature of Christianity allowing there to be a very definite relationship between the church and the state all led to Europe having very particular circumstances and a peculiarly insecure culture: one which ended up dominating the whole world.
Darwin's elegance is in making this argument so detailed and fluid that it adapts itself to every circumstance. His undertaking is ambitious: he covers nearly six hundred years, but the threads he weaves form a fabric sublime in its logic and awe-inducing in its reasoning. His greatest achievement in doing so is forming relationships between regions and explaining how the histories of every region interact. It's humbling to realise just how much India was affected by the Seljuk Turks, or how great the impact of Russian fur traders was on Imperial China and Iran. For all that we view the histories of disparate regions as unconnected, the lines of trade cris-crossing the supercontinent and the volcanic eruption of conquerors from central asia in periodic intervals made sure that every political entity in the world could feel the impact of every other, even in ways they didn't understand.
In my opinion, it's extremely important to see history in this way. We feel ourselves to be special, our histories to be separate from everything else in the world. That is not so. The world is a smaller place than it was a few hundred years ago, but that merely means it took longer for the echoes of power to be felt across the continent. The same connections that existed back then exist today, and unless we don't understand and study them, we'll lose out on why our world is the way it is.
The writing is very easily understood and well-sourced. It's admirable when a historian manages to connect British jitteriness in 1919 (which led to the Jallianwallah Bagh Massacre) with events in the Arabic world, manages to source it well, and explain it in a matter-of fact way which leads to one scratching one's head and wondering how he'd never heard of it before.
5/5 for a book which does precisely what it intended to do. Describe a world after Tamerlane, and do it well.
After Tamerlane is extremely deterministic in nature. Explicitly rejecting the very arguments of cultural superiority, Darwin weaves threads of geographic boundaries and historical events. The rise of the West was not obvious at the start of the fifteenth century. In fact, argues Darwin, a rational person given all the facts up to that time might reasonably believe that the next millennium would be either Islamic or Chinese, maybe even a mixture of both. European dominance? Pish-posh. Stop talking nonsense.
Of course, all of history is witness to how this imaginary rational person would be dead wrong. The vast agrarian empires of Asia were out-maneuvered by the commercial empires of North Western Europe. Control of sea trade, American silver and most importantly, being the home of the industrial revolution all contributed to this domination. And why did all these things happen in Europe and not Asia? Because Europe, being the archipelago of archipelagos was uniquely placed for such an event. The absence of a vast hinterland as present in Asia, the absence of world conquerors duly coming and wrecking established societies from the steppes, the inability of any one state to dominate over the others, the particular nature of Christianity allowing there to be a very definite relationship between the church and the state all led to Europe having very particular circumstances and a peculiarly insecure culture: one which ended up dominating the whole world.
Darwin's elegance is in making this argument so detailed and fluid that it adapts itself to every circumstance. His undertaking is ambitious: he covers nearly six hundred years, but the threads he weaves form a fabric sublime in its logic and awe-inducing in its reasoning. His greatest achievement in doing so is forming relationships between regions and explaining how the histories of every region interact. It's humbling to realise just how much India was affected by the Seljuk Turks, or how great the impact of Russian fur traders was on Imperial China and Iran. For all that we view the histories of disparate regions as unconnected, the lines of trade cris-crossing the supercontinent and the volcanic eruption of conquerors from central asia in periodic intervals made sure that every political entity in the world could feel the impact of every other, even in ways they didn't understand.
In my opinion, it's extremely important to see history in this way. We feel ourselves to be special, our histories to be separate from everything else in the world. That is not so. The world is a smaller place than it was a few hundred years ago, but that merely means it took longer for the echoes of power to be felt across the continent. The same connections that existed back then exist today, and unless we don't understand and study them, we'll lose out on why our world is the way it is.
The writing is very easily understood and well-sourced. It's admirable when a historian manages to connect British jitteriness in 1919 (which led to the Jallianwallah Bagh Massacre) with events in the Arabic world, manages to source it well, and explain it in a matter-of fact way which leads to one scratching one's head and wondering how he'd never heard of it before.
5/5 for a book which does precisely what it intended to do. Describe a world after Tamerlane, and do it well.
July 13, 2013
This book is just purely and simply badly written.
It has a strange structure. It is a big book (592 Pages). It somehow manages to ramble but yet not be discursive. It is very much skimming the surface. But yet it does not seem to have a grand theme or theory.
It is not compelling. He is not telling a story or making interesting links or even for that matter giving some sort of insight.
As a writer John Darwin seems to have problems. His writing just does not flow. He often uses cliché. He actually used the phrase "master of the universe" AND it was slightly out of context AND he did not explore what that meant in relation to the idea he was exploring. It was just dropped into the paragraph.
He is not clear in his writing. I do not mean that his prose style is dense but rather it just does not convey meaning. He seems to have no narrative voice at all.
There is altogether something deeply wrong with a book if it has no redeeming features. I can only guess at the reasons it was actually published but literary merit was not one of them. Certainly it was not published because of its value as a history.
There was not even decent maps in the book. They were confusing because they were all topographical. Why do we need to know elevation when the subject is imperialism? Initially these simple black and white maps gave me the impression that European influence in China started in the south west of the country and a bit to the north of Peking.
This sort of book might be excusable if it was self published by an amateur and I might be less harsh in my judgment but John Darwin is a professor of history at Oxford and this book is published by Bloomsbury Press.
It has a strange structure. It is a big book (592 Pages). It somehow manages to ramble but yet not be discursive. It is very much skimming the surface. But yet it does not seem to have a grand theme or theory.
It is not compelling. He is not telling a story or making interesting links or even for that matter giving some sort of insight.
As a writer John Darwin seems to have problems. His writing just does not flow. He often uses cliché. He actually used the phrase "master of the universe" AND it was slightly out of context AND he did not explore what that meant in relation to the idea he was exploring. It was just dropped into the paragraph.
He is not clear in his writing. I do not mean that his prose style is dense but rather it just does not convey meaning. He seems to have no narrative voice at all.
There is altogether something deeply wrong with a book if it has no redeeming features. I can only guess at the reasons it was actually published but literary merit was not one of them. Certainly it was not published because of its value as a history.
There was not even decent maps in the book. They were confusing because they were all topographical. Why do we need to know elevation when the subject is imperialism? Initially these simple black and white maps gave me the impression that European influence in China started in the south west of the country and a bit to the north of Peking.
This sort of book might be excusable if it was self published by an amateur and I might be less harsh in my judgment but John Darwin is a professor of history at Oxford and this book is published by Bloomsbury Press.
July 11, 2008
Was Europe's domination of the modern international order the inevitable rise of a superior civilization or the piratical hijacking of an evolving world system? A little of both, and a lot of neither, this ambitious comparative study argues—because world history's real center of gravity sits in Eurasia. Historian Darwin (The End of the British Empire) contends that an ascendant Western imperialism was a sideshow to vast, wealthy and dynamic Asian empires—in China, Mughal India, the Ottoman Middle East and Safavid Iran—which proved resistant to Western encroachment and shaped the world into the 21st century. Europe's overseas colonial empires as well as the expansions of the United States across North America and Russia across Siberia—was not inevitable, but rather a slow, fitful and often marginal enterprise that didn't accelerate until the mid-19th century. Darwin analyzes the technological, organizational and economic advantages Europeans accrued over time, but shows how dependent their success was on the vagaries of world trade (the driving force of modern imperialism, in his account) and the internal politics of the countries they tried to control. Nicely balanced between sweeping overview and illuminating detail, this lucid survey complicates and deepens our understanding of modern world history.
December 25, 2017
This is a real magnum opus; a broad-ranging overview of centuries of world history. As an overview, it has an odd mix of detail and omission, but tends to err on the side of details that makes for a sometimes disjointed narrative as it jumps across the extremes of East to West. This leaping about makes it sometimes difficult to follow, and makes it easy to lose the focus of the book. The author's major theme would appear to be to serve as a counter to many of the mainstream "causes" of world history that are often assumed. In presenting his large scale narrative, he quite correctly points out that history is the product of a much broader interaction of disparate cultural ideas and efforts. In doing so, he may call into question some of the easier assumptions of other histories and historians. He must also make his own assumptions, and I found myself often wondering if his were any more valid than those he occasionally (his focus is on the history more than his own ideas) expresses should be taken with any more of a grain of salt than those he rejects.
Overall, I don't think I would recommend this to anyone other than someone specifically looking for a "big picture" of world history and someone who was familiar with several other big picture histories at that. In that context, it's an interesting compare/contrast. For the more casual reader it may perhaps serve as a good general reference work. However, these days most of the referential qualities of the book could be more easily gleaned with Internet searches to more detailed texts and sites. One has to give credit where credit is due, however, and this is a massive piece of work detailing centuries of global history, and that's worth a few stars at the very least.
Overall, I don't think I would recommend this to anyone other than someone specifically looking for a "big picture" of world history and someone who was familiar with several other big picture histories at that. In that context, it's an interesting compare/contrast. For the more casual reader it may perhaps serve as a good general reference work. However, these days most of the referential qualities of the book could be more easily gleaned with Internet searches to more detailed texts and sites. One has to give credit where credit is due, however, and this is a massive piece of work detailing centuries of global history, and that's worth a few stars at the very least.
September 23, 2017
Though without a doubt a great achievement (six-hundred years of global history in as many pages), Darwin's work feels often more rambling than history writing. There is no overarching theme, no theory upon which the conclusions are founded. This makes for a read which is easy to read in a sense (if one does not agree with one conclusion, one might more readily agree with another), it can also be hard to follow as you are thrown from one end of the world to another by the flip of a page. As such, it is only after page 250 or so, that some consistency comes into the story. By focusing more on the European-style imperialism and how some areas resisted and others more easily succumbed to the system, how it seemed an inevitability that the world entire would someday be part of the system, Darwin has a sense of a foundation on which to pay the rest of the book. This improvement in the second half is why I gave it three instead of two stars. In conclusion, it is a great birds-eye view of the world, what made empires work, how they differed from one another and eventually, how they will not last. By conveniently not going into either world wars, Darwin retains a better focus, again in the latter half of the book. In the end, I would not recommend it for those who are looking for a stronger methodological work into the essence of what makes an empire, but rather as an overview work.
May 1, 2015
An excellent overview of empires since Tamerlane. He is determined to change your perspective about many things, so there is a soft polemical feel to some of it. Very soft though. Very readable and informative.
June 30, 2012
I found AFTER TAMERLANE to be an endlessly fascinating book, but I have to confess that its scope and ambition have left me a little unsure whether I'm qualified to review it. That is, at least on such minor matters as Darwin's command of the relevant academic literature, and whether he fairly characterizes opposing viewpoints, I'm a little at a loss.
(I can say that when it comes to Darwin's treatment of American history, which I do know a little bit about, I thought his judgments were concise and even surprising. American history, particularly pre-20th century, tends to be written as if America existed in a vacuum, with occasional exceptions when America is conquering Mexico or something. Placing American expansion into a global context shines new light on how America development was dependent on European diplomacy and high finance in a way that was often invisible to the American political establishment.)
Darwin is primarily interested in placing the rise of Western imperialism in a broader context. He argues that even as late as 1750 it was hardly inevitable: the Ottoman Empire had stabilized its borders; Qing China was reaching new heights of power, prestige and prosperity; even isolationist Japan was prospering from the development of the internal economy. Europe had been plagued by repeated religious and dynastic wars, which meant that Britain was more interested in checking France (and vice versa) than either was in exploiting the wealth of Asia. Meanwhile, European powers did not have anything that Asian consumers were terribly interested in buying, which restricted trade to a trickle.
That all this would change was hardly inevitable. One could hardly have imagined that the revolutionary fervor that killed Louis XVI and the military genius of Napoleon would lead to a more-or-less stable alliance of conservative European powers, permitting powers like Britain, America and Russia to expand without worrying overmuch about another general European war. Similarly, China's Jiangnan region was as prosperous, productive and densely populated as Western Europe, and yet Britain's economy sparked an industrial revolution and China's did not.
Darwin further argues that the successes of European imperialism were less thorough-going than they appeared at the time or since. For example, China suffered repeated humiliations, invasions and internal rebellions from the 19th century on, but the territorial gains that Qing emperors made during the 18th century were largely intact by the time that Mao took over mainland China in 1949.
AFTER TAMERLANE is not always an easy read; it is densely written and requires a lot of attention, and his argument is hard to summarize (I've only just scratched the surface of it above). But at the same time if the educated layman is willing to put in the effort the book is filled with insights, and I often found myself reading about, say, Russian expansion into Asia and wishing that I could read a whole book about that topic alone. And there's something that often's breathtaking about the connections he draws between seemingly disparate regions. (One paragraph, on the rejection of Western ideas following the First World War, ties together Japanese militarists, the Chinese New Life Movement, Mahatma Ghandi and Jomo Kenyatta.) I really enjoyed reading this book, and I expect to dipping back into it again and again as the years go by.
(I can say that when it comes to Darwin's treatment of American history, which I do know a little bit about, I thought his judgments were concise and even surprising. American history, particularly pre-20th century, tends to be written as if America existed in a vacuum, with occasional exceptions when America is conquering Mexico or something. Placing American expansion into a global context shines new light on how America development was dependent on European diplomacy and high finance in a way that was often invisible to the American political establishment.)
Darwin is primarily interested in placing the rise of Western imperialism in a broader context. He argues that even as late as 1750 it was hardly inevitable: the Ottoman Empire had stabilized its borders; Qing China was reaching new heights of power, prestige and prosperity; even isolationist Japan was prospering from the development of the internal economy. Europe had been plagued by repeated religious and dynastic wars, which meant that Britain was more interested in checking France (and vice versa) than either was in exploiting the wealth of Asia. Meanwhile, European powers did not have anything that Asian consumers were terribly interested in buying, which restricted trade to a trickle.
That all this would change was hardly inevitable. One could hardly have imagined that the revolutionary fervor that killed Louis XVI and the military genius of Napoleon would lead to a more-or-less stable alliance of conservative European powers, permitting powers like Britain, America and Russia to expand without worrying overmuch about another general European war. Similarly, China's Jiangnan region was as prosperous, productive and densely populated as Western Europe, and yet Britain's economy sparked an industrial revolution and China's did not.
Darwin further argues that the successes of European imperialism were less thorough-going than they appeared at the time or since. For example, China suffered repeated humiliations, invasions and internal rebellions from the 19th century on, but the territorial gains that Qing emperors made during the 18th century were largely intact by the time that Mao took over mainland China in 1949.
AFTER TAMERLANE is not always an easy read; it is densely written and requires a lot of attention, and his argument is hard to summarize (I've only just scratched the surface of it above). But at the same time if the educated layman is willing to put in the effort the book is filled with insights, and I often found myself reading about, say, Russian expansion into Asia and wishing that I could read a whole book about that topic alone. And there's something that often's breathtaking about the connections he draws between seemingly disparate regions. (One paragraph, on the rejection of Western ideas following the First World War, ties together Japanese militarists, the Chinese New Life Movement, Mahatma Ghandi and Jomo Kenyatta.) I really enjoyed reading this book, and I expect to dipping back into it again and again as the years go by.
July 24, 2011
Towards the end of this sweep across six centuries of global history, Darwin sums up the problem this book addresses by pointing out that histories of modern empire are quite good at explaining Europe's success in dominating the 'Outer World' but fail for the most part to adequately account for its uneven, and for the most part failed, domination of Eurasia, and the uneven forms that 'empire' took in Eurasia itself. This summation of the problem reveals the great strength of this book, it is global, it is comparative, and it breaks out of a Eurocentric model of world history. Anything that identifies Portugal as Far West Eurasia, and gives fair and close to equitable treatment to imperial activities by Europe, East Asia (China and Japan), and central Asia (mainly the Ottomans, but also the Iranians) over a 600 year span is worth a read.
His basic case is that empire is a not an aberration in world history, but that world history can be understood (only? He doesn't go that far, but mainly) through an exploration of the contest between and over empires. Rather than a Eurocentric focus that sees west, peninsular, Eurasia as the motive force of history, he paints a picture of imperial success in China (its modern borders being almost the same as during the Ch'ing era), the Ottoman empire as a successful perpetuation of the great Islamic state/empire of the medieval period, and points to a much more dynamic global history that that usually seen in histories of empire(s).
He suggests that a long view of global history might see the contemporary analyses of 'globalisation' not as a continuation of the impeiral part-globalisation of the 19th century, but as akin to the early modern 'Eurasia revolution' that was geopolitical, technological, and intellectual – but he is too good a historian to let that point be more than a paragraph long musing about the future. Not that I would agree with everything (in 500 pages of text, I hope no-one would) – but the argument is compelling, solidly grounded in evidence even if I disagree with some of the interpretation, and should be seen as a major contribution to postcolonial history. Arguably his Eurasian focus is not adequately global – he leaves out any significant consideration of Africa, and the great central and south American empires (Inca, Mayan, Aztec and so forth). Although this is correct, I doubt that their inclusion would have significantly changed his case: if anything, consideration of the great African states (Zimbabwe, Coptic Ethiopia, and so on) would probably have enhanced it. It is long, it is quite dense, and he (correctly) assumes some significant historical knowledge – but key events are clearly explained, and the social and historical interconnections lucidly outlined. It is well worth the effort.
His basic case is that empire is a not an aberration in world history, but that world history can be understood (only? He doesn't go that far, but mainly) through an exploration of the contest between and over empires. Rather than a Eurocentric focus that sees west, peninsular, Eurasia as the motive force of history, he paints a picture of imperial success in China (its modern borders being almost the same as during the Ch'ing era), the Ottoman empire as a successful perpetuation of the great Islamic state/empire of the medieval period, and points to a much more dynamic global history that that usually seen in histories of empire(s).
He suggests that a long view of global history might see the contemporary analyses of 'globalisation' not as a continuation of the impeiral part-globalisation of the 19th century, but as akin to the early modern 'Eurasia revolution' that was geopolitical, technological, and intellectual – but he is too good a historian to let that point be more than a paragraph long musing about the future. Not that I would agree with everything (in 500 pages of text, I hope no-one would) – but the argument is compelling, solidly grounded in evidence even if I disagree with some of the interpretation, and should be seen as a major contribution to postcolonial history. Arguably his Eurasian focus is not adequately global – he leaves out any significant consideration of Africa, and the great central and south American empires (Inca, Mayan, Aztec and so forth). Although this is correct, I doubt that their inclusion would have significantly changed his case: if anything, consideration of the great African states (Zimbabwe, Coptic Ethiopia, and so on) would probably have enhanced it. It is long, it is quite dense, and he (correctly) assumes some significant historical knowledge – but key events are clearly explained, and the social and historical interconnections lucidly outlined. It is well worth the effort.
September 24, 2018
I first came across John Darwin in the footnotes of a series of incredibly book history books I'd been reading in succession. This made me look into his work and add them to my reading list a few years ago. Now I've finally finished the first of the three books by him I marked.
This is a rare obviously very good book that made me ponder for a while about what to rate it when I finished reading. This is because a lot of the subject matter can be read better in subject specialist books - and in this present time seems a bit obvious. However, on second thought it's quite clear what a remarkable achievement this is. One that doesn't need you to put yourself in the time it was published to really be able to appreciate it. The writing is incisive and clear but not reportage. It sparkles with the clarity of judgement that can only come from being at the top of a field - and this shows. The scope of the book has been commented upon so I'll be more specific. The weaving of the Americas in the history are a particular tour de force that makes one rethink conventional wisdom.
There are many books that are remarkable because their predictions hold true over time. This is a rare book that, one feels, would hold just as true even if events took an entirely different course. It is obvious where the author is headed as he builds his case - and yet the way he frames his conclusions; when you get to them they come down with the force of epiphany (like the end of the Grave of the Fireflies), making you rethink the present (the ultimate test of a good history book).
I'll summarize this way how much I liked it. I read a fair number of books, especially history. Unless specifically contextually brought up I tend to forget most of what those books, even the good ones are about. This is one of the ones where I won't, even if it is not discussed often. This is because, quite likely, instead of just being yet more 'contextual knowledge' (which to be fair has its own value) it'll creep into my basic framing of the world we live in about the world we live in and reshape how I analyze its past, present and future.
5/5
Nitpick: Pinyin dude, come on.
This is a rare obviously very good book that made me ponder for a while about what to rate it when I finished reading. This is because a lot of the subject matter can be read better in subject specialist books - and in this present time seems a bit obvious. However, on second thought it's quite clear what a remarkable achievement this is. One that doesn't need you to put yourself in the time it was published to really be able to appreciate it. The writing is incisive and clear but not reportage. It sparkles with the clarity of judgement that can only come from being at the top of a field - and this shows. The scope of the book has been commented upon so I'll be more specific. The weaving of the Americas in the history are a particular tour de force that makes one rethink conventional wisdom.
There are many books that are remarkable because their predictions hold true over time. This is a rare book that, one feels, would hold just as true even if events took an entirely different course. It is obvious where the author is headed as he builds his case - and yet the way he frames his conclusions; when you get to them they come down with the force of epiphany (like the end of the Grave of the Fireflies), making you rethink the present (the ultimate test of a good history book).
I'll summarize this way how much I liked it. I read a fair number of books, especially history. Unless specifically contextually brought up I tend to forget most of what those books, even the good ones are about. This is one of the ones where I won't, even if it is not discussed often. This is because, quite likely, instead of just being yet more 'contextual knowledge' (which to be fair has its own value) it'll creep into my basic framing of the world we live in about the world we live in and reshape how I analyze its past, present and future.
5/5
Nitpick: Pinyin dude, come on.
December 15, 2018
Başarılı bir tarih çalışması. Avrupa ne zaman dünyaya hakim hale geldi? Coğrafi keşiflerin yapıldığı 15. yüzyıl sonunda mı, ikinci keşifler dalgasının gerçekleştiği 18. yüzyılda mı?
Darwin'e göre Avrupa 1830'lara kadar Hindistan, Çin, Japon ve Osmanlı uygarlıkları/İmparatorlukları karşısında güçsüzdü. Avrupalılar en rahat hareket ettikleri Latin Amerika ve Afrika'da bile yerel işbirlikçiler olmaksızın istediklerini yaptırabilecekleri durumda değilken, örneğin Çin uygarlığı karşısında bu tarihe kadar çaresizdi. Hatta aşağılanıyorlardı. Peki neden sömürgeciler Çinliler ya da Japonlar arasından çıkmadı da, Avrupalılar bu yolu tutabildiler? Darwin'e göre sorunun cevabı "konjonktür".
Yazarın üslubunun güzelliği, bizi önce dünyaya, kıtalara kuş bakışı bir yerden baktırması daha sonra da kentlere, kasabalara, köylülerin hayatına sokuvermesi. Bir burjuva tarihçisi tarafından yazıldığı düşünüldüğünde, kitabın en büyük eksikliğinin dünya tarihinde ezilenlerin tuttuğu yer oluşu anlaşılır. Ona göre tarih dünya coğrafyasına yayılmış imparatorluk merkezlerinin mücadelesi, sınıfların değil. Zaten kitabın daha en başında, ezilenlerin perspektifinden yazılmış tarih çalışmalarının aşırı duygusallığını ve ahlakçılığını eleştiriyor ve bu tavrın tarihi anlamamızı zorlaştırdığını söylüyor.
En azından ezenlerin tarihine dair kafamıza kakılan Batı'nın karşı konulamaz yükselişi fikrini sorgulatması açısından ufuk açıcı oldu. Batı'nın coğrafi keşifler ve bilimsel ilerlemelerle birlikte tıkır tıkır tüm dünyayı sömürgeleştirdiğini/medenileştirdiğini ve bunun karşı konulamaz bir süreç olduğunu söyleyen tarih anlayışı benim de kimi kabullerime yerlemiş olduğunu fark ettim, geçmişe bakışım gelişti.
Darwin'e göre Avrupa 1830'lara kadar Hindistan, Çin, Japon ve Osmanlı uygarlıkları/İmparatorlukları karşısında güçsüzdü. Avrupalılar en rahat hareket ettikleri Latin Amerika ve Afrika'da bile yerel işbirlikçiler olmaksızın istediklerini yaptırabilecekleri durumda değilken, örneğin Çin uygarlığı karşısında bu tarihe kadar çaresizdi. Hatta aşağılanıyorlardı. Peki neden sömürgeciler Çinliler ya da Japonlar arasından çıkmadı da, Avrupalılar bu yolu tutabildiler? Darwin'e göre sorunun cevabı "konjonktür".
Yazarın üslubunun güzelliği, bizi önce dünyaya, kıtalara kuş bakışı bir yerden baktırması daha sonra da kentlere, kasabalara, köylülerin hayatına sokuvermesi. Bir burjuva tarihçisi tarafından yazıldığı düşünüldüğünde, kitabın en büyük eksikliğinin dünya tarihinde ezilenlerin tuttuğu yer oluşu anlaşılır. Ona göre tarih dünya coğrafyasına yayılmış imparatorluk merkezlerinin mücadelesi, sınıfların değil. Zaten kitabın daha en başında, ezilenlerin perspektifinden yazılmış tarih çalışmalarının aşırı duygusallığını ve ahlakçılığını eleştiriyor ve bu tavrın tarihi anlamamızı zorlaştırdığını söylüyor.
En azından ezenlerin tarihine dair kafamıza kakılan Batı'nın karşı konulamaz yükselişi fikrini sorgulatması açısından ufuk açıcı oldu. Batı'nın coğrafi keşifler ve bilimsel ilerlemelerle birlikte tıkır tıkır tüm dünyayı sömürgeleştirdiğini/medenileştirdiğini ve bunun karşı konulamaz bir süreç olduğunu söyleyen tarih anlayışı benim de kimi kabullerime yerlemiş olduğunu fark ettim, geçmişe bakışım gelişti.
October 15, 2010
As several reviewers before me testify, Darwin has provided an impressive synthesis of world history centered on the "world empires" of Eurasia – which places the more celebrated (and reviled) careers of European imperialism in an illuminating context. Convenient points of comparison: Darwin avoids both the Eurocentric opprobrium of Mark Cocker's Rivers of Blood, Rivers of Gold and the triumphalism of William McNeill's classic The Rise of the West. His intellectual progenitor is the Victorian gentleman-scholar Halford Mackinder, author of the maxim "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; Who rules the World Island commands the World."
Easier said than done. From Tamerlane's crumbling Eurasian empire at the end of the 14th century to the current uneven adventures of globalization, Darwin concludes "if there is one continuity that we should be able to glean from a long view of the past, it is Eurasia's resistance to a uniform system, a single great ruler, or one set of rules." After Tamerlane is a brick of a book and not easy to digest (I had to read most of it twice) but it provides a spectacular overview from 100 miles up.
Easier said than done. From Tamerlane's crumbling Eurasian empire at the end of the 14th century to the current uneven adventures of globalization, Darwin concludes "if there is one continuity that we should be able to glean from a long view of the past, it is Eurasia's resistance to a uniform system, a single great ruler, or one set of rules." After Tamerlane is a brick of a book and not easy to digest (I had to read most of it twice) but it provides a spectacular overview from 100 miles up.
July 27, 2017
Shockingly bad. Darwin's writing has no flow, it is lethargically unimaginative and unimpassioned. Within a paragraph he will, without pretext, jump between completely random events without context. I was so excited to buy this book and I am sad that it is now on my shelf. I have never been so terribly bored by a book on civilisation. I am shocked that Penguin Press published this book and that Darwin lectures at Oxford ...
September 29, 2017
Certified grade-A mind blower. Our understanding of the world we live in is so stunted. I earnestly believe that if more people had this level of historical insight it would correct a lot of things that are wrong in the world.
Hands down there best history I've read in ages. Manages to parse out the last 600 years of political history in a way that never fails make clear it's own limitations, yet invariably leads to irrefutable conclusions. The end effect is to thoroughly explode almost every pop-history through line that you've ever encountered. Great-man, forces of history, and most importantly geographical-determinism (Jared Diamond can go hump up a gump stump) are all laid to waste. This book has so many profound things to say about race, wealth, and the nature of politics itself that there is no point in me trying to explain it all - just go read the damn book.
Hands down there best history I've read in ages. Manages to parse out the last 600 years of political history in a way that never fails make clear it's own limitations, yet invariably leads to irrefutable conclusions. The end effect is to thoroughly explode almost every pop-history through line that you've ever encountered. Great-man, forces of history, and most importantly geographical-determinism (Jared Diamond can go hump up a gump stump) are all laid to waste. This book has so many profound things to say about race, wealth, and the nature of politics itself that there is no point in me trying to explain it all - just go read the damn book.
November 30, 2022
Covers much the same ground as Wallerstein's multi-volume "The Modern World System." Ironically, although much of the book seems to be directed specifically against Wallerstein's theses, his overall treatment has a lot in common with Wallerstein's approach -- in particular, his emphasis on the continuities in the multi-century period covered, at the expense of the ruptural emphasis of most conventional historiography.
November 12, 2020
Five years ago, when I read Jonathan Spence's history of modern China, I was struck by the feeling that this was an entire new historical canon, no less rich than the one I'd grown up with, that I knew nothing about. A quote in the introduction to this book, from the 1939 work Rome and China, expresses a similar idea.
So, how did the West win? Darwin doesn't give one short, satisfying answer, but the reasons seems to be different for each empire on the world island: Japan's philosophical inwardness, China's high level of economic development and resources (which reduced incentives to innovation), the Ottoman and Persian empires in the thrall of reactionary religious clerics. As Western Europe emerged from the Renaissance and set to sea, it encountered weaker civilisations ripe for the picking. "Tamerlane would have made short work of Montezuma", but the Occident got there first (and was fortunate to find the Caribbean islands as a critical staging ground for prior acclimatisation). Thus Cortez basically single-handedly took out the Aztec Empire, and the silver of Potosí began to turbocharge Europe's rise. When the privately owned East India Company dealt the knockout blow to the Mughals, there were similar extenuating circumstances: Marathan secession, Persian invasion from the north, the rise of Sikhism.
Of course Cortez was also able to ally with all the other indigenous peoples the Azetcs had subjugated, and that is a pattern that repeats. "For Hill State peoples in Burma, or the Lao and Khmer in French Indochina, colonial rulers were far less threatening than ethnic Burmans or Vietnamese." It is commonplace for postcolonial thinkers to contrast a homogeneous subaltern with an aggressive imperial force, where the colonised yearns straightforwardly for a modern nation-state; it is never considered plausible that the Kurds or Assyrians might prefer British neglect to Hashemite ministrations. A virtue of global, synoptic histories such as this is their ability to show multiple sides of complex issues, eschewing simplistic answers, even as they inevitably trade breadth for depth.
The study of the past can become effective only when it is fully realized that all peoples have histories, that these histories run concurrently and in the same world, and that the act of comparing them is the beginning of knowledge.This is an updated version of that same idea, integrating new perspectives only recently absorbed into Anglophone scholarship (not least that of China), to trace the timeless question asked by books like Guns, Germs and Steel: how did the West win? But Darwin wants to look at the question from the equal perspective of all the civilisations of what he calls the Eurasian "world island", following Mackinder
Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;As the title implies, the book opens after the death of the last conqueror to try unite the world-island under one empire. Like Alexander the Great, Timur conquered pretty much all the territory known to his time, and after his death his empire split into smaller pieces. This is an insanely ambitious global history, jumping between the Mughal emperor Akbar I's attempt to fuse Hinduism and Islam and the military campaigns of Qajar Persia, between the "Manchu raj" of the Qing dynasty and the modernisation that followed the Tokugawa Shogunate. Nonetheless, Darwin is a Western writer with Western expertise (most of his career was spent as Beit Lecturer in Commonwealth History at Oxford), and the bulk of the book is about its last two centuries, about colonialism and empire (Clive of India, Gordon of Khartoum, Lawrence of Arabia...) In fact I felt the book would have been stronger had it focused on a smaller time period - each section is too short to get into much depth.
who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island;
who rules the World-Island commands the world.
So, how did the West win? Darwin doesn't give one short, satisfying answer, but the reasons seems to be different for each empire on the world island: Japan's philosophical inwardness, China's high level of economic development and resources (which reduced incentives to innovation), the Ottoman and Persian empires in the thrall of reactionary religious clerics. As Western Europe emerged from the Renaissance and set to sea, it encountered weaker civilisations ripe for the picking. "Tamerlane would have made short work of Montezuma", but the Occident got there first (and was fortunate to find the Caribbean islands as a critical staging ground for prior acclimatisation). Thus Cortez basically single-handedly took out the Aztec Empire, and the silver of Potosí began to turbocharge Europe's rise. When the privately owned East India Company dealt the knockout blow to the Mughals, there were similar extenuating circumstances: Marathan secession, Persian invasion from the north, the rise of Sikhism.
Of course Cortez was also able to ally with all the other indigenous peoples the Azetcs had subjugated, and that is a pattern that repeats. "For Hill State peoples in Burma, or the Lao and Khmer in French Indochina, colonial rulers were far less threatening than ethnic Burmans or Vietnamese." It is commonplace for postcolonial thinkers to contrast a homogeneous subaltern with an aggressive imperial force, where the colonised yearns straightforwardly for a modern nation-state; it is never considered plausible that the Kurds or Assyrians might prefer British neglect to Hashemite ministrations. A virtue of global, synoptic histories such as this is their ability to show multiple sides of complex issues, eschewing simplistic answers, even as they inevitably trade breadth for depth.
August 18, 2022
还是威廉·麦克尼尔世界史的研究角度和叙事思路，用精练的语言叙述帖木儿在十五世纪试图统一欧亚大陆后，各种各样的文明试图成立新帝国和失败的过程，主要就是欧洲人在欧亚腹地的殖民尝试和失败过程。可以看到，这个过程充满了外部和内部的各种挑战，以及国家间竞争。
总体而言书中的观点和事实，大多数是学界的主流观点。最值得注意的部分，是作者列举事实来纠正流行观点的努力。比如，在19世纪在欧洲列强的殖民压力之下，通常的观点是奥斯曼帝国和清朝中国早已老朽不堪，离轰然倒塌只差一步之遥。然而作者却列举事实，证明奥斯曼帝国在这样的局面之下，仍然革新了自己的行政系统，变得更有效率。而中国人民的强烈抵抗，以及欧洲帝国主义列强的内部矛盾，也让瓜分中国的企图破产，中国大体保存了自己的疆域和国家独立性。
总体而言书中的观点和事实，大多数是学界的主流观点。最值得注意的部分，是作者列举事实来纠正流行观点的努力。比如，在19世纪在欧洲列强的殖民压力之下，通常的观点是奥斯曼帝国和清朝中国早已老朽不堪，离轰然倒塌只差一步之遥。然而作者却列举事实，证明奥斯曼帝国在这样的局面之下，仍然革新了自己的行政系统，变得更有效率。而中国人民的强烈抵抗，以及欧洲帝国主义列强的内部矛盾，也让瓜分中国的企图破产，中国大体保存了自己的疆域和国家独立性。
January 13, 2010
"The West" is just an aberration.
Many histories profiling the rise of Europe and America in these centuries chart an unbroken accession of power that reaches new heights of progress. But the real story is more uneven and dynamic under the comparative worldview offered by John Darwin in his "After Tamerlane: the Global History of Empire Since 1405." Europe's rise to power was an accident of history, while it was no accident that Asia predominated in its many iterations of empire.
Darwin begins with the death of Tamerlane, the last Mongol conqueror who by force of arms forged a polity that spanned a continent. His path was no different from his predecessors, the outcome being a vast empire with internal order and massive trade to deliver taxable prosperity.
The oceans that Europe mastered in the Renaissance were but watery wastes compared to the richness of Persia, Central Asia, China and India. Spanish and Portuguese voyages led to enclaves perched at Asia's edge, Africa's coast or America's perimeter. The conquerors often lacked the overwhelming force needed to forge their way into the interior. Germs did the work of getting them in--or keeping them out. Aztec Mexico fell to Cortez's tiny band of ruthless conquistadors after smallpox and measles waged war, just as malaria and yellow fever kept his contemporaries out of the equatorial jungles of South America and Africa for several centuries.
There was little Europe could do to impose its culture and terms of trade upon far larger Asian polities that practiced massive pre-industrial manufacture. There was nothing Europe made that Asia wanted. The game changer was industrialization. And for one aberrational century, Europe tried to rule the world at the expense of Africa and Asia--with mixed results. The British took India. Russia expanded eastward unchecked. The United States did the same, albeit to the west. Iran and Egypt got repossessed by "foreign lenders". But China managed to keep its culture despite foreign incursion. Turkey got stronger once shorn of its Ottoman empire. Japan caught up to the west very quickly. Nationalism in many smaller colonies made it impossible for European nations to rule much longer after World War II. Europe's self-destruction in two general wars gave the rest of the world enough space to reclaim independence.
"After Tamerlane" may strike the reader more as an example of Darwin's relativism rather than as a "Darwinian proof" of culture and empire. The author makes his case for there being "many different modernities", but this strikes as cold comfort for many losing nations that lacked the technology to repel European and American invaders. Darwin's sketch of history implies that as things once were, so they shall be again. This is something to ponder in the post-Cold War world, as many nations once choked in the bi-polar world find find again their political voice and reach. No surprise that India and China are regaining their lost heights, while Europe slips into irrelevance and the United States finds out it is no longer the "indispensible nation."
Many histories profiling the rise of Europe and America in these centuries chart an unbroken accession of power that reaches new heights of progress. But the real story is more uneven and dynamic under the comparative worldview offered by John Darwin in his "After Tamerlane: the Global History of Empire Since 1405." Europe's rise to power was an accident of history, while it was no accident that Asia predominated in its many iterations of empire.
Darwin begins with the death of Tamerlane, the last Mongol conqueror who by force of arms forged a polity that spanned a continent. His path was no different from his predecessors, the outcome being a vast empire with internal order and massive trade to deliver taxable prosperity.
The oceans that Europe mastered in the Renaissance were but watery wastes compared to the richness of Persia, Central Asia, China and India. Spanish and Portuguese voyages led to enclaves perched at Asia's edge, Africa's coast or America's perimeter. The conquerors often lacked the overwhelming force needed to forge their way into the interior. Germs did the work of getting them in--or keeping them out. Aztec Mexico fell to Cortez's tiny band of ruthless conquistadors after smallpox and measles waged war, just as malaria and yellow fever kept his contemporaries out of the equatorial jungles of South America and Africa for several centuries.
There was little Europe could do to impose its culture and terms of trade upon far larger Asian polities that practiced massive pre-industrial manufacture. There was nothing Europe made that Asia wanted. The game changer was industrialization. And for one aberrational century, Europe tried to rule the world at the expense of Africa and Asia--with mixed results. The British took India. Russia expanded eastward unchecked. The United States did the same, albeit to the west. Iran and Egypt got repossessed by "foreign lenders". But China managed to keep its culture despite foreign incursion. Turkey got stronger once shorn of its Ottoman empire. Japan caught up to the west very quickly. Nationalism in many smaller colonies made it impossible for European nations to rule much longer after World War II. Europe's self-destruction in two general wars gave the rest of the world enough space to reclaim independence.
"After Tamerlane" may strike the reader more as an example of Darwin's relativism rather than as a "Darwinian proof" of culture and empire. The author makes his case for there being "many different modernities", but this strikes as cold comfort for many losing nations that lacked the technology to repel European and American invaders. Darwin's sketch of history implies that as things once were, so they shall be again. This is something to ponder in the post-Cold War world, as many nations once choked in the bi-polar world find find again their political voice and reach. No surprise that India and China are regaining their lost heights, while Europe slips into irrelevance and the United States finds out it is no longer the "indispensible nation."
February 7, 2014
DARWINS ORIGINS AND LIFES OF EMPIRES
John Darwin has a bitten off a fair chunk of history with his book on the Rise and Fall of Global Empires 1400-2000; the title of the book "After Tamerlane" seems, as other reviewers have suggested, to be a gimicky hook to attract customers.
The book itself starts off well, it covers the Moghul, Ottoman and Chinese Empires with admirable balance aswell as the European Empires. It doesnt stoop to pontificating on the inferiority of Islam or any other nonsense of that sort. With any book that covers such a broad era (basically the history of the world over the last 6 centuries) there is going to be simplifications and generalisations, but the lack of specifics is sometimes frustrating and a few questionable facts and judgements seem to creep into the book.
This only increases as the book reaches the 20th century, the choices the author makes seem somewhat doubtful. Kenya is covered more than Algeria, the parts on Vietnam would give you the impression it was a client of China and the War in Vietnam is barely covered at all; at one point he states that the Soviet Union supported the Greek Communists (totally wrong) and gave the nod for the North Korean invasion of South Korea (did they?). Its in the last century that it seems to lack direction and developments in the last twenty years with regards to say Iraq, Southern and Central America, Afghanistan are strangely absent. The picture it gives of the "U.S. Empire" is particularly blurred, and the book doesnt seem to be particlarly strong on economic or social aspects of empire in so far as what it meant for the Imperialised and Imperialiser.
In all, a fairly average book - I found Clive Pontings "World History" or for the 20th century his "Progress and Barbarism: World in the Twentieth Century" to be more thought provoking and both cover a wider range of issues; if you are interested in the post-war world a good introduction would be T.E.Vadneys "The World Since 1945: A Complete History of Global Change from 1945 to the Present".
So not particularly reccomended, which is not to say there are not good sections within it particularly early on when his attempts to be evenhanded are admirable and his historical analysis seems reasonable, but I felt the 20th Century part which is roughly a third of the book is nothing much to write home about. Very average and doesnt live up to the hype.
John Darwin has a bitten off a fair chunk of history with his book on the Rise and Fall of Global Empires 1400-2000; the title of the book "After Tamerlane" seems, as other reviewers have suggested, to be a gimicky hook to attract customers.
The book itself starts off well, it covers the Moghul, Ottoman and Chinese Empires with admirable balance aswell as the European Empires. It doesnt stoop to pontificating on the inferiority of Islam or any other nonsense of that sort. With any book that covers such a broad era (basically the history of the world over the last 6 centuries) there is going to be simplifications and generalisations, but the lack of specifics is sometimes frustrating and a few questionable facts and judgements seem to creep into the book.
This only increases as the book reaches the 20th century, the choices the author makes seem somewhat doubtful. Kenya is covered more than Algeria, the parts on Vietnam would give you the impression it was a client of China and the War in Vietnam is barely covered at all; at one point he states that the Soviet Union supported the Greek Communists (totally wrong) and gave the nod for the North Korean invasion of South Korea (did they?). Its in the last century that it seems to lack direction and developments in the last twenty years with regards to say Iraq, Southern and Central America, Afghanistan are strangely absent. The picture it gives of the "U.S. Empire" is particularly blurred, and the book doesnt seem to be particlarly strong on economic or social aspects of empire in so far as what it meant for the Imperialised and Imperialiser.
In all, a fairly average book - I found Clive Pontings "World History" or for the 20th century his "Progress and Barbarism: World in the Twentieth Century" to be more thought provoking and both cover a wider range of issues; if you are interested in the post-war world a good introduction would be T.E.Vadneys "The World Since 1945: A Complete History of Global Change from 1945 to the Present".
So not particularly reccomended, which is not to say there are not good sections within it particularly early on when his attempts to be evenhanded are admirable and his historical analysis seems reasonable, but I felt the 20th Century part which is roughly a third of the book is nothing much to write home about. Very average and doesnt live up to the hype.
April 1, 2011
When reading this book I was reminded of a certain 'Friends' episode - you know, the one where Joey learns how to use a thesaurus? He wants so desperately to sound smart that he uses the thesaurus on every single word. The result: an incromprehensible text. Sort of the same thing happened here, though I don't think it was a thesaurus that John Darwin used. I have no doubt that all the words in this book came from his own head, but do think thathe was so concerned about sounding smart and intelligent that he lost sight of the communication aspect of it all. In order to really understand this book you have to bite your tongue and focus, else the meaning of it will escape you. It is vital for an author, any kind of author, to be able to communicate his findings, his ideas and his goal. John Darwin failed in this aspect. At least in the larger scheme of things - you'd certainly have to be into these things to understand this book. If you're a 'layman' it won't make any sense at all.
August 16, 2018
在病中將這本厚重的《帖木兒之後︰一四○五～二○○○年全球帝國史》給啃完了。整體說來，這是一部「夾敘夾論」的全球近代通史書籍。
本書作者 John Darwin 在全書中的主旨，是想駁斥歐美長久以來的世界史觀，揚棄「歐洲中心論」、「亞非諸國停滯論」，詳述全球各地域的發展與成就。確實，雖然目前歐美史學界的「歐洲白人至上」還是隨處可見的流派；但這些年來，將視野放寬，正視世界各處的歷史，已經逐漸納入「人類全史」的統論之中了。如果談論通史，還是用戲劇化的角度，將葡西荷英諸英雄的海權發展作為劇情主軸（荷蘭商人的吵架事件比成吉思汗的征服更重要……），這種觀點早就該貶為偏狹的「小歷史」作品了。簡單說來，「每個地方的人都很拼命過活」，不是只有歐洲人才是人類。
本書的另一個重點，則是提出人類歷史當中的「帝國是常態」。承繼前一段的重點，由於歐洲（再嚴格說來是西歐）的中古屬於封建社會，因此當歐洲白人展開大航海貿易時才蹦出的商業軍事文化「帝國」，對傳統歐美學者有戲劇性的「帝國開啟」的時間變化。但若睽諸廣大的亞洲，人類原本一直都在各地興起各式各樣的帝國組織——見多不怪。《帖木兒之後》一書裡，作者依著時間順序，讓讀者看清楚，在西北歐洲自我感覺良好地在進步時，亞洲各處群雄勢力以更廣大、更全面性的規模建立起來來往往的「帝國」。即使在十八世紀所謂的歐洲興起，西北歐洲的生產力與富裕程度，仍難以與亞洲諸帝國相抗衡。
當然，由於本書書寫的範圍與立論十分龐大，許多細節便不可能太過精確描述。但在大體的方向上，這種「把全世界人類當人類」的書寫方式，避開歐美傳統的道德史觀、進化史觀，我認為應該是值得肯定的。
至於談到「殖民」，作者認為在十九世紀以來，只有英國對於印度的統治才稱得上是一種「特例」。而英國能成功殖民印度，也絕非印度人的退化與停滯——恰恰相反，正是印度人長內以來願意接來外來刺激與改變，才能讓英國找到施力點與當地的合作對象。我們心中那種「邪惡大魔王可以憑藉強權與暴力遂行統治意願」，根本不可能是事實。而另一項瘋狂殖民熱潮，則是十九世紀末歐洲列張瓜分非洲一事，作者則認為南撒哈拉非洲長期以來由於人口數少、社會組織程度不足，再加上歐洲人「和平協力」，才得以讓非洲成為全面遭受殖民的地區。
十分有意思的書。值得分段細細研讀。
本書作者 John Darwin 在全書中的主旨，是想駁斥歐美長久以來的世界史觀，揚棄「歐洲中心論」、「亞非諸國停滯論」，詳述全球各地域的發展與成就。確實，雖然目前歐美史學界的「歐洲白人至上」還是隨處可見的流派；但這些年來，將視野放寬，正視世界各處的歷史，已經逐漸納入「人類全史」的統論之中了。如果談論通史，還是用戲劇化的角度，將葡西荷英諸英雄的海權發展作為劇情主軸（荷蘭商人的吵架事件比成吉思汗的征服更重要……），這種觀點早就該貶為偏狹的「小歷史」作品了。簡單說來，「每個地方的人都很拼命過活」，不是只有歐洲人才是人類。
本書的另一個重點，則是提出人類歷史當中的「帝國是常態」。承繼前一段的重點，由於歐洲（再嚴格說來是西歐）的中古屬於封建社會，因此當歐洲白人展開大航海貿易時才蹦出的商業軍事文化「帝國」，對傳統歐美學者有戲劇性的「帝國開啟」的時間變化。但若睽諸廣大的亞洲，人類原本一直都在各地興起各式各樣的帝國組織——見多不怪。《帖木兒之後》一書裡，作者依著時間順序，讓讀者看清楚，在西北歐洲自我感覺良好地在進步時，亞洲各處群雄勢力以更廣大、更全面性的規模建立起來來往往的「帝國」。即使在十八世紀所謂的歐洲興起，西北歐洲的生產力與富裕程度，仍難以與亞洲諸帝國相抗衡。
當然，由於本書書寫的範圍與立論十分龐大，許多細節便不可能太過精確描述。但在大體的方向上，這種「把全世界人類當人類」的書寫方式，避開歐美傳統的道德史觀、進化史觀，我認為應該是值得肯定的。
至於談到「殖民」，作者認為在十九世紀以來，只有英國對於印度的統治才稱得上是一種「特例」。而英國能成功殖民印度，也絕非印度人的退化與停滯——恰恰相反，正是印度人長內以來願意接來外來刺激與改變，才能讓英國找到施力點與當地的合作對象。我們心中那種「邪惡大魔王可以憑藉強權與暴力遂行統治意願」，根本不可能是事實。而另一項瘋狂殖民熱潮，則是十九世紀末歐洲列張瓜分非洲一事，作者則認為南撒哈拉非洲長期以來由於人口數少、社會組織程度不足，再加上歐洲人「和平協力」，才得以讓非洲成為全面遭受殖民的地區。
十分有意思的書。值得分段細細研讀。
June 7, 2015
A wonderful and pleasingly balanced take on the trajectories of world history since the XV century. I am positively impressed with the amount of space he dedicates to non-European states and affairs, making your understanding of global and regional history far more deeper and coherent. Not for nothing the book was a winner of the History Book of the Year. You may however be unimpressed with the lack of "one single reason" explanations for the rise and fall of empires and civilizations. This guy is not after simple answers and sensationalism.
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