153253-1939-Gurbuxani v. Government of The Philippines
153253-1939-Gurbuxani v. Government of The Philippines
Jose Ozamiz and Del Rosario & Del Rosario for appellant.
Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Cañizares for appellee.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
IMPERIAL , J : p
Separate Opinions
LAUREL , J., concurring :
The applicant cannot be guilty of fraud, because in his application he stated the
place of his birth. But the majority makes the fraud to consist in the fact that the
applicant alleged under oath that, by reason of the place of his birth, he was not
disquali ed to become an American citizen and, consequently, to become a Filipino
citizen. But this allegation was a mere conclusion of law which depended entirely upon
the place where the applicant was born, a place which he did not conceal from the
court. The majority itself states "that the place of birth of the applicant clearly shows
that he had no right to be naturalized", wherefore, any allegation to the contrary made by
the applicant was immaterial and could in no wise influence the court.
Moreover, whether or not Hyderabad Sind, India, was outside the zone excepted
by the American exclusion law, is a fact of which the court may take judicial notice, as
the majority now does. The applicant could not, there- fore, conceal a fact of which the
court can take judicial notice. The British and Spanish encyclopedias were then as
accessible to the trial court as they are now to this court. If the trial court did not go
into the trouble of reading said encyclopedias, this does not constitute fraud on the
part of the applicant. The truth is that the data found in the said encyclopedias are not
well known, and the applicant might have overlooked them as the trial court did. And
there can be no fraud if the applicant, at the time he alleged that he was not disquali ed
from becoming a Filipino citizen, did not know that the place where he was born was
outside the zone excepted by the American exclusion law.
Moreover, such allegation of the applicant has been disputed by the Government
in its opposition to the application. The trial court, after hearing the parties, rendered a
decision which was not appealed and which became nal. I believe that the case is
governed by the general rule that a judgment cannot be annulled on the ground of fraud
when the facts in which the fraud i9 made to consist are alleged and controverted at
the trial of the principal case and were decided in the judgment sought to be annulled.
Otherwise, there would be multiplicity of suits so obnoxious to our law of procedure.
The annulment of the judgment can not be asked on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, because the trial court had jurisdiction not only over the subject matter but
also over the parties; and any error committed by the trial court in the determination of
whether the place of birth was within or outside the zone excepted by the American
exclusion law, would be one of judgment only and would not affect the validity of the
decision.
Aside from all the foregoing, it should be borne in mind that the applicant, after
obtaining his naturalization certi cate, was twice elected by the people to a public
o ce in the Philippines, and that, subsequently, the National Assembly enacted the
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Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473), which makes the applicant
eligible for Philippine citizenship. It may be argued, of course, that this law does not
govern the case, inasmuch as the application was led long before the law took effect;
but as the case has been reopened and the quali cations of the applicants have been
reconsidered, and under the present circumstances, I am of the opinion that, at least,
we may consider the provisions of the revised law as new orientations of national
policy to which this court, as much as possible, should adjust its pronouncements.
To cancel the naturalization certi cate issued in favor of the applicant, now that
he has all the quali cations to become a Filipino citizen, under the provisions of the new
law, is certainly to decide against the national spirit of these times. It is true that, by a
new application, the applicant may acquire a new naturalization certi cate; but this
does not remedy the juridical anomaly at the bottom of the majority decision which, in
effect, unmakes what existing laws consider well done. In my opinion, we can
realistically decide the case to the end that substantial justice be done, by denying the
petition for cancellation, not under the provisions of the new law, but upon
considerations of public interest underlying the said provisions and which cannot be
ignored in the light of the peculiar circumstances of the case at bar. A decision to this
effect will avoid the laying down of an inflexible doctrine, applicable to all cases, and will
not prejudice vested rights and much less the Government whose representative, the
Solicitor-General, signi cantly stated in open court that he asked for the cancellation of
the certi cate with regret, because the applicant was a ne man worthy to continue as
a citizen of the country.
I, therefore, dissent from the majority decision, and vote to reverse the appealed
decision for the foregoing reasons.