SYCIP V CA
SYCIP V CA
Emergency Recit:
Doctrine:
Facts:
1. On August 24, 1989, petitioner Francisco T. Sycip, Jr., agreed to buy, on installment,
from Francel Realty Corporation (FRC), a townhouse unit in the latter’s project at
Bacoor, Cavite.
2. Upon execution of the contract to sell, as required, issued to FRC, forty-eight (48)
postdated checks, each in the amount of P9,304.00,covering 48 monthly installments.
3. After moving in his unit, Sycip complained, to FRC regarding defects in the unit and
incomplete features of the townhouse project.
4. FRC ignored the complaint. Dissatisfied, Sycip served on FRC two (2) notorial notices
to the effect that he was suspending his installment payments on the unit pending
compliance with the project plans and specifications, as approved by the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
5. Sycip and twelve (12) out of fourteen (14) unit buyers then filed a complaint with the
HLURB. The complaint was dismissed as to the defect, but FRC was ordered by the
HLURB to finish all incomplete features of its townhouse project.
6. Sycip appealed the dismissal of the complaint as to the alleged defects.
7. Notwithstanding the notorial notices, FRC continued to present for encashment Sycip’s
postdated checks in its possession.
8. Sycip sent “stop payment orders” to the bank. When FRC continued to present the other
postdated checks to the bank as the due date fell, the bank advised Sycip to close his
checking account to avoid paying bank charges every time he made a “stop payment”
order on the forthcoming check.
9. Due to the closure of petitioner’s checking account, the drawee bank dishonored six
postdated checks.
10. FRC file a complaint against petitioner for violations of B.P. Blg. 22 involving said
dishonored checks.
Issue/s: W/N the accused is criminally liable of the B.P. Blg. 22? - NO
Ratio:
The Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. No. 22), is violated when the following elements are
present:
(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment.
In this case, although the first element of the offense exists, the other elements have
not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
The second element involves knowledge on the part of the issuer at the time of the
check’s issuance that he did not have enough funds or credit in the bank for payment
thereof upon its presentment. B.P. No. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that the
second element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense are
present.
But such evidence may be rebutted. If not rebutted or contradicted, it will suffice to
sustain a judgment in favor of the issue, which it supports. Such knowledge of the
insufficiency of petitioner’s funds “is legally presumed from the dishonor of his checks
for insufficiency of funds.” But such presumption cannot hold if there is evidence to the
contrary. In this case, the other party has presented evidence to contradict said
presumption.
Hence, the prosecution is duty bound to prove every element of the offense charged,
and not merely rely on a rebuttable presumption.
What are involved in this case are postdated checks. Postdating simply means that on
the date indicated on its face, the check would be properly funded, not that the checks
should be deemed as issued only then.
The checks were issued at the time of the signing of the Contract to Sell in August 1989.
However, there was no showing that at the time said checks were issued, petitioner had
knowledge that his deposit or credit in the bank would be insufficient to cover them when
presented for encashment.
The closure of petitioner’s Account No. 845515 with Citibank was not for insufficiency
of funds. It was made upon the advice of the drawee bank, to avoid payment of hefty
bank charges each time petitioner issued a “stop payment” order to prevent encashment
of postdated checks in private respondent’s possession.
Said evidence contradicts the prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of
funds. But it establishes petitioner’s state of mind at the time said checks were issued.
Petitioner definitely had no knowledge that his funds or credit would be insufficient when
the checks would be presented for encashment.
While B.P. Blg. 22 was enacted to safeguard the interest of the banking system, 18 it is
dicult to see how conviction of the accused in this case will protect the sanctity of the
nancial system. Moreover, protection must also be afforded the interest of townhouse
buyers under P.D. No. 957. 19
A statute must be construed in relation to other laws so as to carry out the legitimate
ends and purposes intended by the legislature. 20 Courts will not strictly follow the letter
of one statute when it leads away from the true intent of legislature and when ends are
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. 21 More so, when it will mean the
contravention of another valid statute . Both laws have to be reconciled and given due
effect.