Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Ruling On School Choice
Ruling On School Choice
TO BE PUBLISHED
AND
2021-SC-0519-TG
(2021-CA-1323)
AND
2021-SC-0520-TG
(2021-CA-1320)
AND
2021-SC-0522-TG
(2021-CA-1323)
AFFIRMING
In 2021 the Kentucky General Assembly passed House Bill (HB) 563,1
1 Act of Mar. 30, 2021, ch. 167, 2021 Ky. Acts 1041.
granting organizations (AGOs) receive a nearly dollar-for-dollar tax credit
education opportunity accounts (EOAs) that are set up for eligible students.
Funds in the EOAs can be used for various education-related expenses but the
primary focus has been their availability to defray the costs of nonpublic school
overseeing the structure by which AGOs are certified, enabling those entities to
then accept funds and administer the EOAs. The Department has other
taxpayer application, issuing tax credit letters, creating a website, auditing the
AGOs and, notably, insuring that the annual tax credits attributable to the
141.528, became effective on June 29, 2021, and shortly thereafter was
59, the special legislation provision, and Section 184, an education provision
prohibiting the raising or collecting of any sum for education “other than in
2
Before this Court, the proponents of HB 563 urge our consideration of
needs of each child while the opponents emphasize the importance of a sound,
has no role in assessing the merits of competing policy positions but must
to review the EOA Act to determine whether the statute complies with or
Kentucky.
After a thorough review, we conclude the EOA Act violates Section 184
and, consequently, affirm the circuit court’s holding that the statute is
margin, with a 48-47 vote in the House. The Governor promptly vetoed the
3
AGOs in turn award funds to low-income families for education expenses
through EOAs. The program’s stated purpose is to “give more flexibility and
family whose household earns less than 175% of the amount of household
approximately $85,800 for a family of four during the 2021-22 school year.
Students can use EOA funds on a variety of services, including online learning
eligible for an EOA. Notably, for students in counties with populations over
90,000 based on the 2010 United States Census, EOA funds can also be used
for nonpublic school tuition. This limits nonpublic school tuition assistance to
schools, and the Warren County and Frankfort Independent School Boards, as
4
revenues to nonpublic schools. Plaintiffs named the Secretary of the Kentucky
action on behalf of the Commonwealth. Two parents who hope to receive EOA
program benefits, Akia McNeary and Nancy Deaton, were also permitted to
Intervening Defendants).
district where they do not reside. These sections of the legislation have not
been challenged and are not at issue here. Sections 5-19 of HB 563 outline
how the EOA program works, eligibility, the application process for parents and
Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and argued that KRS
141.500-.528 violate Sections 3, 59, 171, 183, 184 and 186 of the Kentucky
5
Constitution. Plaintiffs also requested injunctive relief. Intervening
Defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the circuit court
heard oral arguments. On October 8, 2021, the circuit court granted Plaintiffs’
motion for summary judgment on their claims involving Sections 59 and 184 of
sections. The circuit court highlighted that the taxpayers who “donate” to
AGOs are not donating their own money to AGOs—they are taking the money
they owe the state in income taxes and redirecting it to the AGOs, in lieu of
Kentucky Constitution. Specifically, the court held the singling out of a few
counties with populations over 90,000 at the time of the 2010 United States
Census for the lucrative benefit of tuition assistance for nonpublic schools, to
the exclusion of all other counties, falls squarely within the Section 59 ban on
Additionally, the circuit court noted the Legislature cannot provide funding
6
their place of residence. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky.
statute, KRS 446.090, and make the tuition assistance provisions available
statewide, the circuit court declined, having determined that these provisions
are integral to the overall scheme of the statute, and severance is not possible.4
The circuit court also held that the EOA Act violates Section 184 of the
Kentucky Constitution which provides that “no sum shall be raised or collected
for education other than in common schools until the question of taxation is
submitted to the legal voters.” Applying the plain language of this section, the
income tax credit raises money for nonpublic education and its
The circuit court cited Commonwealth v. O’Harrah, 262 S.W.2d 385, 389 (Ky.
1953), for the long-standing principle that “[i]n appraising the validity of the
statute we must look through the form of the statute to the substance of what
it does.” Every dollar raised under the EOA program to fund the AGOs is
raised by tax credits which diminish the tax revenue received to defray the
In its October 8, 2021 order, the Franklin Circuit Court also granted the
injunctive relief requested by Plaintiffs. The court order states that the
4 The circuit court referenced the “razor thin” vote on final passage in the House
of Representatives, 48-47. The circuit court could not presume that HB 563 would
have passed without the unconstitutional limitation allowing nonpublic school tuition
assistance in only eight counties, nor could it presume the bill would have passed if
the benefit was extended beyond the eight counties. “[A]ny material change in the bill
would have jeopardized its passage.”
7
Department is permanently enjoined from enforcing the provisions of the EOA
establishment of any EOAs, and the granting of any tax credits to fund such
Finally, the circuit court concluded that the factual record necessary to
Kentucky Constitution was not yet developed. Sections 3 and 171 prohibit
payment of public money “to any man or set of men, except in consideration of
provide for “an efficient system of common schools” that is adequately and
equitably funded, and that “[a]ll funds accruing to the school fund shall be
used for the maintenance of the public schools of the Commonwealth, and for
expert testimony to establish whether the EOA Act is consistent with these
issues.
intervene in the action to seek clarification on whether the circuit court’s ruling
8
struck down Sections 1-4 of HB 563. In a November 2, 2021 order, the circuit
court explicitly stated that Sections 1-4 of the legislation are not at issue, so
the motions to intervene were moot.5 The circuit court also reaffirmed its
holding that the EOA Act violates Sections 59 and 184 of the Kentucky
violations, the court reiterated that it was holding these claims in abeyance
November 9, 2021. On November 16, 2021, Plaintiffs and the Attorney General
filed separate motions to transfer the appeal to this Court, citing the important
This Court granted transfer on February 23, 2022, consolidated the actions on
April 20, 2022, and following extensive briefing heard oral arguments on
9
ANALYSIS
apply for certification, an AGO must submit proof of its incorporated non-profit
status and a description of how the AGO plans to function, including its
must submit its IRS forms and an annual report that details various aspects of
initial certifications within sixty days of receiving the application and renew
141.510(4).
an EOA for an eligible student. Each AGO is tasked with creating a uniform
process for determining the amount of funds allocated to each eligible student’s
in each EOA, and the expenses covered by an EOA. KRS 141.504. Qualifying
Census, can use funds received through the EOA program for tuition and fees
limited the students eligible for nonpublic school tuition payments to residents
Counties. The stated justification for this provision is that “students in these
and there is capacity in these counties to either grow existing tuition assistance
programs or form new nonprofits from existing networks that can provide
tuition assistance to students over the course of the pilot program.” KRS
create the tax credit application form, the forms used to notify the taxpayer and
11
create a website listing the amount of total credit pending verification, credit
notify the taxpayer and the AGO of the amount of credit allocated to the
taxpayer upon certification that the contribution has been made. KRS
overall annual report that aggregates the information obtained from annual
The Department may audit an AGO and, in the event the Department
determines that the AGO violated any section of the EOA Act, must notify the
AGO of its noncompliance. KRS 141.516(1)-(2). If the AGO fails to remedy its
taxpayer to apply for preapproval of the tax credit with the Department. The
application must include the total amount of proposed contributions, the name
of the AGO that will receive the contributions, and the year or years in which
12
approve all preliminary approval applications within ten business days of
based on the total annual tax credit cap of $25 million (KRS 141.522(3)(b)), the
Department must notify the taxpayer and the AGO that the application will be
held in abeyance and will be funded on a first-come, first-served basis (if other
taxpayers preapproved do not make their contributions and that “frees up”
credit) or will be denied if all preapproved contributions are timely made. KRS
141.508(3).
AGO no later than the earlier of fifteen business days following the date of the
KRS 141.508(4)(a). An AGO must certify to the Department the name of the
taxpayer, the amount of contribution made, and the date of contribution within
ten days of receipt. KRS 141.508(5)(a). Upon receipt of certification that the
whichever occurs first, the Department shall modify the amount of tax credit
13
These nonrefundable, nontransferable tax credits for contributions made
2021, but before January 1, 2026, are permitted against the taxes imposed on
one tax credit, they must follow the order for credit application as prescribed by
KRS 141.0205. The aggregate value of total annual tax credit awarded under
the EOA program shall not exceed $25 million. KRS 141.522(2). The EOA
taxpayers, awarding a credit per taxable year limited to the lesser of 95% of the
if the taxpayer elects to pledge a contribution for multiple taxable years, not to
exceed four years, and the amount of contributions for each of the multiple tax
the taxable year within which the pledge was made, the amount of allowable
credit increases to 97%. KRS 141.522(4).8 If a tax credit awarded under KRS
141.522 is not used by the taxpayer in the current taxable year, it may be
carried forward for up to five succeeding taxable years until the tax credit has
been utilized. KRS 141.522(5). The EOA program tax credits are awarded on a
first-come, first-served basis each fiscal year until the annual tax credit cap of
8 If the taxpayer does not remit the pledged amount of contributions during any
taxable year during which a multi-year pledge is made, the taxpayer shall repay the
portion of the credit resulting from the increase. KRS 141.522(4)(c).
14
$25 million is reached. KRS 141.522(6). Again, the Department is tasked with
monitoring credits to assure the $25 million annual cap is not exceeded. The
but before January 1, 2026,” KRS 141.522(1), which results in potential credits
of $125 million over five years, the currently authorized life of what is described
as a pilot program.
November 1 of each year in which tax credits permitted by KRS 141.522 are
taken. KRS 141.524. The Department must compile all information in each
annual report filed by AGOs, including the number and total amount of EOAs
the number and total EOAs awarded to students who are in foster care, who
has previously received an EOA; and “any other information that may be
EOA Act and the circuit court addressed two of them, we find the Section 184
schools throughout the State.” The next section, Section 184, addresses the
The second and third sentences, which are the real thrust of Section 184 and
(Emphasis added.) The circuit court concluded that the EOA Act “raises a sum
of money for private education outside the system of common schools” and
constitutionality,” Wynn v. Ibold, Inc., 969 S.W.2d 695, 696 (Ky. 1998), but that
9The first sentence identifies the then-existing bonds and stocks which
comprised the common school fund in 1890:
The bond of the Commonwealth issued in favor of the Board of Education
for the sum of one million three hundred and twenty-seven thousand
dollars shall constitute one bond of the Commonwealth in favor of the
Board of Education, and this bond and the seventy-three thousand five
hundred dollars of the stock in the Bank of Kentucky, held by the Board
of Education, and its proceeds, shall be held inviolate for the purpose of
sustaining the system of common schools.
The closing proviso provides for the continuation of an existing tax for “the
Agricultural and Mechanical College,” now the University of Kentucky: “Provided, The
tax now imposed for educational purposes, and for the endowment and maintenance
of the Agricultural and Mechanical College, shall remain until changed by law.”
16
presumption does not relieve us of the responsibility to take a clear-eyed look
and EOA accounts and considered the manner in which income taxes are
assessed and EOA tax credits operate, we are compelled to agree that the EOA
Act violates the plain language of Section 184. Simply stated, it puts the
in common schools.”
Education of Newport, 57 S.W. 612, 613 (Ky. 1900), this Court’s predecessor
any extent for educational purposes other than common schools.”10 Later in
Pollitt v. Lewis, 108 S.W.2d 671, 672 (Ky. 1937), the Court noted “it is equally
clear that the framers of the Constitution must have had in mind that they
Forty years ago, in Fannin v. Williams, 655 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1983), this
17
the department of education purchase the books; having the books distributed
responsible for the books’ custody, use and return; and appropriating funds
directly to the department of libraries rather than using the common school
fund. Id. at 482. As we stated then: “The statute in question seeks to evade
constitutional problems than to avoid them.” Id. The Court succinctly and
colorfully concluded:
Id. at 484 (citation omitted). The Fannin Court did note that under Section 184
a majority of legal voters can approve the expenditure of public funds “other
than in common schools.” Id. “If the legislature thinks the people of Kentucky
want this change, [it] should place the matter on the ballot.” Id.11
11 The Attorney General criticizes Fannin and urges us to overrule it, leaning
heavily on two cases as indicative of the proper application of Section 184 and as
illustrative of the constitutionality of the EOA Act. In Hodgkin v. Board for Louisville &
Jefferson County Children’s Home, 242 S.W.2d 1008 (Ky. 1951), the Court upheld an
appropriation to a public institution, essentially what was then known as a reform
school, operated by Louisville and Jefferson County. In that Court’s words, “the Act
squarely presents the question as to whether a school operated by any public
authority other than a regular school district may constitutionally receive a portion of
the Common School Fund.” Id. at 1009. Unsurprisingly, the Court found no bar to
appropriating state funds to an institution operated by local government units for the
public purpose of education, benefitting the state. In Butler v. United Cerebral Palsy of
Northern Ky., Inc., 352 S.W.2d 203 (Ky. 1961), then-Judge Palmore, writing for the
Court, noted that the legislation at issue pertained to funding schools for “exceptional
children,” an undefined term. From the text and record, he found the law “covers
18
The EOA Act goes to great lengths, well beyond those in Fannin, to avoid
the form of the statute to the substance of what it does.” O’Harrah, 262
liability to the state (or the federal government as the case may be). BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) defines “tax credit” as “[a]n amount subtracted
directly from one’s tax liability, dollar for dollar, as opposed to a deduction from
get essentially dollar-for-dollar credit (generally 95%) against the income taxes
they would otherwise owe the Commonwealth because they have contributed to
an AGO.
those children within this state who would be entitled to attend its common schools,
but for whom the school board, in its reasonable discretion, concedes that the
program and facilities of a particular school district are thus far inadequate.” Id.
at 205 (emphasis added). After referencing the Kentucky Industries for the Blind,
Mayo State Vocational School and Northern Kentucky State Vocational School as
institutions outside the common school system that could be supported or operated by
the state, the Court concluded: “We do not believe it was the intention of the delegates
in adopting Const. §§ 184 and 186 to deny forever the possibility of special
educational assistance to those who by no choice of their own are unsuited to the
standard program and facilities of the common school system.” Id. at 207. So
Hodgkin actually involved funding a public institution and Butler addressed
exceptional children, the most obvious examples being the “physically or mentally
handicapped,” id. at 205, who the local school board conceded were unsuited to the
regular public school. Neither provides precedent for concluding HB 563 complies
with Section 184.
12 By contrast, a tax deduction is “[a]n amount subtracted from gross income
when calculating adjusted gross income, or from adjusted gross income when
calculating taxable income.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 519.
19
allowed personal educational expenditures. The EOAs must be established by
whose annual income does not exceed 175% of household income necessary to
establish eligibility for reduced meals; who has previously received an EOA; or
KRS 141.502(6). Notably, an “eligible taxpayer” who can qualify for an EOA tax
this tax credit to a wide array of Kentucky taxpayers, with taxpayers of means,
million per year to an AGO, KRS 141.522(3), in “the form of cash or marketable
whom an EOA has been created may contribute their hard-earned dollars,13
20
the statute creates a system whereby any Kentucky taxpayers who want to
fund EOAs can send their money to an AGO for use at nonpublic schools
estimated state income tax liability withheld (as Kentucky employers are
required to do by KRS 141.310), then realization of the benefit derived from the
EOA credit will be in the form of a tax refund check sent to the taxpayer after
they file the return on which they claim the EOA tax credit. Similarly, if other
refunded to the extent their payments exceed their liability after claiming the
and auditing AGOs, as well as preapproving individual EOA credit requests and
monitoring the Commonwealth’s fiscal exposure so that the total EOA credits
annually do not exceed $25 million. The substance of this bill is obvious. The
school tuition (or other nonpublic school costs) but it most assuredly is
a taxpayer’s tax liability to the Commonwealth to the extent the taxpayer has
21
contributed a preapproved amount to an AGO to fund an EOA account. In
otherwise owe state income tax can instead send that money to nonpublic
schools via an AGO, reducing their tax liability and the state coffers by a
“allows this favored group of taxpayers to re-direct the income taxes they owe
the state to private AGOs, and thereby eliminate their income tax liability.”
This diversion of owed tax liability monies is made possible by the significant
amount of state resources employed to create and operate the EOA program.15
The Attorney General insists that Section 184 only prohibits (1) using tax
money allocated to the Common School Fund for other purposes and (2)
without a majority vote.” Reading the section in that narrow fashion, he urges
that it does not otherwise prohibit the Legislature from aiding non-common
schools and asks us to hold “that Section 184 does not prohibit the General
Constitution in a way that would avoid its plain meaning. Taxpayers who owe
Kentucky income tax owe real dollars to the state and when they are not
22
required to pay those real dollars in the first instance or have them refunded
because an EOA tax credit reduces or eliminates their tax bill, the public
subsidize that taxpayer’s personal choice to send money to an AGO for use at
nonpublic schools. In the language of Section 184, the EOA program causes
To conclude the EOA Act does not violate Section 184 would require us to
ignore “the substance of what [the statute] does.” O’Harrah, 262 S.W.2d at
389.
language in Section 184 must be read with the remainder of that sentence, i.e.,
“until the question of taxation is submitted to the legal voters, and the majority
of the votes cast at said election shall be in favor of such taxation.” We agree,
“question of taxation.” As the Fannin Court stated, “if the legislature thinks the
people of Kentucky want this change, [it] should place the matter on the
Equally unavailing is the Attorney General’s argument that “HB 563 only
affects private funds that never make it to the State Treasury.” We disagree.
23
The money at issue cannot be characterized as simply private funds, rather it
represents the tax liability that the taxpayer would otherwise owe but will have
liability those funds likely do make it to the State Treasury and are then
refunded. Regardless, the funds at issue are sums legally owed to the
but for the unconstitutional EOA Act which reallocates them to fund nonpublic
school tuition.
In an effort to convince this Court to hold the EOA Act passes muster
under the Kentucky Constitution, Intervening Defendants also suggest that any
holding to the contrary would imperil the charitable donations that Kentucky
education. Two facts cause this argument to fail: charitable deductions have a
relatively de minimis effect on state income tax collections vis-à-vis an EOA tax
credit and, more importantly, the Commonwealth is not involved in any way in
As to the first point, we noted above that a tax credit results in a virtually
24
Given the 95% EOA tax credit allowed under KRS 141.522(3),16 a taxpayer who
directs $1,000 to an AGO saves $950 in income tax and reduces the
beginning on or after January 1, 2018, but before January 1, 2023, the tax
rate shall be five percent (5%) of net income.” Consequently, the $1,000
But more importantly, the features that cause the EOA Act and
are not present in a charitable tax deduction. In the latter, the taxpayer
acknowledges the gift and the taxpayer takes a charitable deduction on their
16 As previously noted, the tax credit increases to 97% in the case of a multi-
year pledge in accordance with KRS 141.522(4)(b).
17 The portion of a taxpayer’s contribution to an AGO that is not offset by the
EOA tax credit, i.e., 5%, can be claimed as a deduction for both federal and state tax
purposes. For example, if a taxpayer contributes $500,000 to an AGO, they are
entitled to a $475,000 tax credit. The remaining $25,000 is subject to the allowable
deduction for charitable contributions.
25
dedicates state employees to constructing and overseeing a program whereby
private AGOs are created, accredited and audited; taxpayers apply to the
Department in advance for preapproved credit; parents apply for EOAs at the
AGOs which would not exist but for the state accreditation system; and the
regarding the overall program. The EOA program would not exist but for this
approaches the elaborately crafted EOA program and corresponding tax credit.
S.W.2d at 696, this Court is responsible for assessing statutes based on the
conclusion that the EOA Act violates the plain language of Section 184.
for their view that the EOA Act is constitutional. In fact, the programs in those
states are substantially different from the EOA program. More to the point,
by the Department of Education. Ala. Code § 16-6D-4(5). The AAA grants two
types of income tax credits: (1) a tax credit to the parent of a student enrolled
lesser of 80 percent of the average state cost of attendance for public K-12
Code § 16-6D-8(a)); and (2) a tax credit to individual taxpayers equal to the
the taxable year up to 50% of the taxpayer’s tax liability (not to exceed $7,500
per taxpayer), and a tax credit to corporate taxpayers of 50% of their total
Laws Act 2013-64 (H.B. 84).18 The AAA of 2013 imposes an aggregate tax
credit cap of $25 million annually. Thus, while Alabama offers a unique
18 The AAA, as enacted when Magee v. Boyd, 175 So. 3d 79 (Ala. 2015),
discussed below, was rendered, included the $7,500 limit for individual taxpayers and
restriction regarding 50% of the individual or corporate tax liability. The AAA, as
currently enacted, allows an individual tax credit of 100% of the contributions to
SGOs, up to 100% of the tax liability of the taxpayer (not to exceed $100,000), and a
corporate tax credit equal to 100% of the total contributions to SGOs, up to 100% of
the tax liability of the taxpayer. See Ala. Code § 16-6D-9.
27
taxpayers that make contributions to SGOs can avoid only 50% of their tax
liability.
Plaintiffs in Magee v. Boyd, 175 So. 3d 79, 91 (Ala. 2015), challenged the
legality of the legislation, arguing, in part, that the AAA appropriated funds
from the Educational Trust Fund (created by tax revenues and used to support
any charitable or educational institution not under the absolute control of the
The plaintiffs contended the credits have the practical effect of being an
prevented Alabama from collecting tax revenues that it would have otherwise
appropriations and reasoned that the tax credits available to parents are paid
the individual and corporate taxpayer credits for contributions to SGOs “no
19 Plaintiffs also argued unsuccessfully that the AAA provides a tax credit in
violation of Alabama Constitution Article XI, Section 211.02, which provides that
income taxes shall be earmarked for placement in the ETF and are “to be used for the
payment of public school teachers salaries only.” Id. at 91.
28
Constitution does not contain a provision comparable to Kentucky Constitution
Section 184 prohibiting raising or collecting funds for nonpublic schools. The
Magee court’s focus on the distinction between a tax credit and appropriation,
even if persuasive,20 is irrelevant to our task of assessing the EOA Act in light
of Section 184.
In Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 610 (Ariz. 1999), the Arizona
educational tax credit program that allowed up to $500 in tax credits21 for
prohibits the appropriation of public money or property for private schools and
29
Article II, Section 12 provides that no public money or property shall be
appropriated to any religious instruction. Much like the Magee court, the
Kotterman court reasoned that tax credits were not appropriations and rejected
the argument that the tax credits are public funds, emphasizing that the
The tax credits offered under the Alabama and Arizona programs are de
purpose. Section 184 of the Kentucky Constitution pertains not just to “public
funds” or “appropriations” but any “sums” that are “raised or collected for
education other than in common schools.” This simple but expansive language
22 See also Gaddy v. Georgia Dep’t of Revenue, 802 S.E.2d 225, 227-28 (Ga.
2017) (the Georgia Supreme Court discussed the distinction between credits and
appropriations after taxpayers challenged the constitutionality of a tax credit program
allowing individuals and businesses to donate to non-profit scholarship organizations,
that in turn distribute the funds as scholarships or tuition grants for private schools.
The Georgia Constitution only prohibits taking money “from the public treasury” to
fund certain private schools. Art. I, §2, Par. VII. The court ultimately dismissed the
constitutional challenge because the Plaintiffs lacked standing. Id. at 232); Toney v.
Bower, 744 N.E.2d 351 (Ill. App. 2001) (an Illinois intermediary court held that tax
credits awarded as part of an educational program were not appropriations. The
Illinois Constitution prohibits appropriating or paying from public funds to support
schools controlled by churches or sectarian denominations. Article 10, § 3.); McCall v.
Scott, 199 So. 3d 359, 370-71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (Florida appellate court
reasoned that “the authorization of tax credits . . . involve[s] no appropriation from the
public treasury.” The court ultimately held that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the
constitutional challenges.).
30
determine what exactly is a “public fund” or “appropriation” and instead
are they raising or collecting sums for nonpublic schools. Under the EOA Act
they most definitely are and, consequently, the Act violates Section 184.
CONCLUSION
Matthew F. Kuhn
Alexander Y. Magera
Office of the Solicitor General
Brian C. Thomas
William Robert Long, Jr.
Finance & Administration Cabinet
31
COUNSEL FOR COUNCIL FOR
BETTER EDUCATION, INC.; FRANKFORT
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL BOARD; AND
WARREN COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD:
Byron E. Leet
Virginia Hamilton Snell
Sean Gregory Williamson
Mitzi D. Wyrick
Wyatt Tarrant & Combs, LLP
Joshua A. House
Benjamin A. Field
Michael Bindas
Institute for Justice
Jeffrey S. Walther
John K. Wood
Walther, Gay & Mack, PLC
Kristen Hollar
Alice O’Brien
National Education Association
32
COUNSEL FOR THE BOARD OF
EDUCATION OF THE AUGUSTA
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT;
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
THE BOWLING GREEN INDEPENDENT
SCHOOL DISTRICT; THE BOARD
OF EDUCATION OF THE CORBIN
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT;
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
PAINTSVILLE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
DISTRICT; THE BOARD OF EDUCATION
OF THE PINEVILLE INDEPENDENT
SCHOOL DISTRICT; AND THE BOARD OF
EDUCATION OF THE RACELAND
WORTHINGTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
DISTRICT:
Timothy Crawford
Regina A. Jackson
Michael A. Owsley
Lindsay Tate Ratliff Porter
English, Lucas, Priest & Owsley
Bethany A. Breetz
Stites & Harbison, PLLC
Wendy Lecker
Jessica Levin
Education Law Center
33
COUNSEL FOR AMICI CURIAE,
JENNIFER BIRD-POLLAN;
PETER ENRICH; KENTUCKY CENTER
FOR ECONOMIC POLICY; AND
DARIEN SHANSKE:
Peter Enrich
Northeastern University School of Law
Pamela Thomas
Kentucky Center for Economic Policy
Joshua M. Salsburey
Donald C. Morgan
Sturgill, Turner, Barker & Moloney, PLLC
Philip D. Williamson
Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP
John A. Meiser
Notre Dame Law School Religious Liberty Clinic
34